Philosophy of Science and Social Science (106) { Comprehensive Reading List · ·...

Philosophy of Science and Social Science (106) – Comprehensive

Reading List

Robert L. Frazier

25 November 2017

1

General Philosophy of Science

Scientific Explanation

Reading

• Carl Hempel. Philosophy of Natural Science. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1966,chapters 5 & 6.

• Jim Woodward. Explanation. In Peter Machamer and Michael Silberstein, editors. TheBlackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Blackwell, Oxford, 2002, pages 37–54

• P. Achinstein. The Nature of Explanation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983, chapters1-5.

• Bas C. van Fraassen. The Scientific Image. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, chapter 5.

• Nancy Cartwright. How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983,essay 8.

• David Lewis. Causal explanation. In Philosophical Papers, volume ii, pages 214–240.Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986.

• Peter Lipton. Inference to the Best Explanation. Routledge, London, 1991, chs 2 & 3.

• David-Hillel Ruben, editor. Explanation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, Intro-duction.

• Alexander Bird. Philosophy of Science. Routledge, London, 1998.

Essay

Is there more than one kind of explanation? If so, which kinds are relevant to scientificexplanations? What are the aims of scientific explanations? What is the proper notion ofevaluation for scientific explanations (e.g., truth or usefulness)?

2

Laws of Nature

Reading

• Ernest Nagel. The Structure of Science. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961, chapter4.

• Fred I. Dretske. Laws of nature. Philosophy of Science, 44:248–68, 1977.

• David Lewis. New work for a theory of universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61(4):343–377, 1983.

• Bas C. van Fraassen. Laws and Symmetry. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, chapters 2–5.

• David Armstrong. What is a Law of Nature. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1989, various.

• Stephen Schiffer. Ceteris paribus laws. Mind, 100:1–17, 1991.

• Nancy Cartwright. Fundamentalism vs the patchwork of laws. Proceedings of the Aris-totelian Society, 93:279–292, 1994.

Essay

What are laws of nature? Are there different kinds of laws of nature? What purpose(s) do lawsof nature have in theorising?

3

Theory and Observation

Reading

• James Bogen. Theory and observation in science. In Edward N. Zalta, editor, The StanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, summer 2017edition, 2017

• Peter Achinstein. Concepts of Science: A Philosophical Analysis. The Johns HopkinsPress, Baltimore, 1968, chapters 5 and 6.


• Dudley Shapere. The concept of observation in science and philosophy. Philosophy ofScience, 49:485–525, 1982.

• Ian Hacking. Representing and Intervening. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983,chapter 10.

• W. H. Newton-Smith. The Rationality of Science. Routledge, London, 1981, chapter II.

• Harold I Brown. A theory-laden observation can test the theory. The British Journal forthe Philosophy of Science, 44(3):555–559, 9 1993.

• James Bogen. Experiment and observation. In Peter Machamer and Michael Silberstein,editors. The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Blackwell, Oxford, 2002, pages128–148.

Essay

Are observations of the sort used in evaluating theories theory-laden? Why is it supposed tomatter? Does it?

4

Falsification

Reading

• Karl Popper. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Hutchinson, London, 1959, chs 1–6*.

• Karl Popper. Science: Conjectures and refutations. pages 33–58. Routledge, London,1963**.

• A. F. Chalmers. What Is This Thing Called Science? Open Univeristy Press, MiltonKeynes, second edition, 1982, chs 4–5.

• James Ladyman. Understanding Philosophy of Science. Routledge, London, 2002, ch. 3.

• Donald Gilles. Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century. Blackwell, Oxford, 1993ch 2.

• W. H. Newton-Smith. The Rationality of Science. Routledge, London, 1981, ch. 3.

• I Lakatos. Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In Criticismand the Growth of Knowledge, pages 91–196. CUP, Cambridge, 1970.

*Long, but give it a go.*A shorter, more accessible version of the previous work.

Essay

What is Popper’s account of theory change and scientific progress? What objections to it, ifany, do you find most compelling?

5

Scientific Revolution

Reading

• Ian Hacking. Representing and Intervening. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983,Introduction: Rationality.

• Karl Popper. The rationality of scientific revolutions. In Ian Hacking, editor. ScientificRevolutions. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981, chapter IV.

• T. S. Kuhn. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago University Press, Chicago,second edition, 1970.

• Imre Lakatos. History of science and its rational reconstructions. In Ian Hacking, editor.Scientific Revolutions. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981, chapter V.

• Ian Hacking. Lakatos’s philosophy of science. In Scientific Revolutions Ian Hacking, editor.Scientific Revolutions. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981, pages 128–143.

• Paul Feyerabend. How to defend society against science. In Ian Hacking, editor. ScientificRevolutions. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981, chapter VIII

Essay

Does the history of scientific revolution undermine the claim that science is a rational activity?

6

Realism, Anti-realism, and Internal Realism

Reading


• Nancy Cartwright. How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983,chapter 5.

• Ian Hacking. Representing and Intervening. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983,Chapters 5–7.

• Hilary Putnam. Reason Truth and History. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982.

• Larry Laudan. A confutation of convergent realism. Philosophy of Science, 48:19–48, 1981.

• John Worrall. Structural realism: the best of both worlds? Dialectia, 43:99–124, 1989.

• Anjan Chakravartty. Scientific realism. In Edward N. Zalta, editor, The Stanford Ency-clopedia of Philosophy. Summer 2011 edition, 2011.

Essay

What is scientific realism? What are the alternatives to realism? How is the inference to thebest explanation supposed to establish scientific realism? Does it?

7

Models

Reading

• Pierre Duhem. The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Princeton University Press,Princeton, 1954, chapter 4.

• Peter Achinstein. Concepts of Science: A Philosophical Analysis. The Johns HopkinsPress, Baltimore, 1968, chapters 7 & 8.


• Rom Harre and Peter Achinstein. The constructive role of models. In L. Collins, editor,The Use of Models in the Social Sciences. Tavistock, London, 1976, if possible.

Essay

What are models? What role do they play in scientific theorizing? How do we evaluativemodels? Do different views about their role in scientific theorizing require different views abouttheir evaluation?

8

Causation

Reading

• Ernest Sosa and Michael Tooley, editors. Causation. Oxford Readings in Philosophy.Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, Introduction.

• David Hume. Enquires Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Prin-ciples of Morals. Clarendon Press, Oxford, second edition, 1748/1966, sec. VII.

• David K. Lewis. Causation. In Ernest Sosa, editor. Causation and Conditionals. OxfordReadings in Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1975, pages 180–191.

• Jaegwon Kim. Causes and counterfactuals. In Ernest Sosa, editor. Causation andConditionals. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1975,pages 192–194.

• Brian Skyrms. Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic. WadsworthPublishing Company, Belmont, second edition, 1975, pp. 85–89, 121-129.

• John L. Mackie. The Cement of the Universe. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1974, ch. 2.

• Nancy Cartwright. How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983,Essay 1.

• Donald Davidson. Causal relations. The Journal of Philosophy, 64:691–703, 1967.

• Simon Blackburn. Spreading the Word. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, ch. 5, § 1,6; ch.6, § 5,6.

• Paul Horwich. Asymmetries in Time: Problems in the Philosophy of Science. MIT Press,Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1987, pp. 167–76.

Essay

What is the counterfactual conditional analysis of causal statements? Is such an analysisnecessary for science or is a regularity or constant conjunction view adequate?

9

Probability

Reading

• Brian Skyrms. Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic. WadsworthPublishing Company, Belmont, second edition, 1975, chapters 1-3 and 7.

• John L. Mackie. Truth, Probability and Paradox. Clarendon, Oxford, 1973, chapter 5.


• R. G. Swinburne. The probability of particular events. Philosophy of Science, 38:327–343,1971.

Essay

What is the correct interpretation of probabilistic statements in the natural sciences?

10

Induction

Reading

• David Hume. Enquires Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Prin-ciples of Morals. Clarendon Press, Oxford, second edition, 1748/1966, IV part (ii), V part(i).

• Nelson Goodman. Fact, Fiction and Forecast. Harvard University Press, Cambridge,Massachusetts, 1955, ch. III.

• Brian Skyrms. Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic. WadsworthPublishing Company, Belmont, second edition, 1975, chs 2 & 3.

• Gilbert Harman. Induction. In Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, editors, A Companionto Epistemology, pages 200–206. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1992.

• A. F. Chalmers. What Is This Thing Called Science? Open Univeristy Press, MiltonKeynes, second edition, 1982, chs 1 & 2.

• Bertrand Russell. The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1959, ch.6.

• P. F. Stawson. Introduction to Logical Theory. Methuen, London, 1952, pp. 248–263.

• Barry Stroud. Hume. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1977, pp. 50-67.

• J. L. Mackie. A defence of induction. In G. F. MacDonald, editor, Perception and identity,page ?? Macmillian, London, 1979.

Essay

What is the problem of induction? What is the most promising strategy for solving it?

11

Emergence

Reading

• Brian P. McLaughlin. The rise and fall of british emergentism. In A Batterman, H. Flohr,and J Kim, editors, Emergence or Reduction?: Essays on the Prospects of NonreductivePhysicalism, pages 49–93. Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co., Belin, 1992.

• Timothy O’Connor and Hong Yu Wong. Emergent properties. In Edward N. Zalta, editor,The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2009 edition, 2009.

• Mark A. Bedau and Paul Humphreys. Emergence: Contemporary Readings in Philosophyand Science. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2008, Introduction.

• David Chalmers. Strong and weak emergence. In Philip Clayton and Paul Davies, editors,The Re-Emergence of Emergence, pages 244–258. OUP, Oxford, 2006.

• Jaegwon Kim. Making sense of emergence. Philosophical studies, 95:3–36, 1999.

• Jerry Fodor. Special sciences, or the disunity of science as a working hypothesis. Synthese,28:97–115, 1974.

• P. W. Anderson. More is different: broken symmetry and the nature of the hierarchicalstructure of science. Science, 177:393–396, 1972.

Essay

Can novel properties emerge from more fundamental properties or entities? If so, are theresulting properties metaphysically novel, or are they epistemological novel? If not, can specialsciences, such as biology, be reduced to physics?

12

Topics Specific to Social Science

Interpretation

Reading

• Wilhelm Dilthey. Wilhelm Dilthey: Selected Writings. Cambridge University Press, Cam-bridge, 1976*, pp 247-249.

• Max Weber. The Methodology of the Social Sciences. The Free Press, New York, 1949*,pp 51–58.

• Alfred Schutz. Concept and theory formation in the social sciences. The Journal ofPhilosophy, LI(9):257–272, 1954*

• Peter Winch. The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy. Routledge &Kegan Paul, London, 1958*, pp 7–18.

• Charles Taylor. Interpretation and the sciences of man. Review of Metaphysics, 25(1):3–51, 1971*, pp 3-10.

• Harold Garfinkel. Rational properties of scientific and common-sense activities. Be-havioural Science, 5:72–83, 1960*, pp 72–76, 79 and 82.

• Jane Roland Martin. Another look at the doctrine of Verstehen. British Journal for thePhilosophy of Science, 20:53–67, 1969**

• Michael Martin. Taylor on interpretation and the sciences of man. In Michael Martin andLee C. McIntyre, editors. Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science. The MIT Press,Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1994, pages 259–279.

• Hollis. The Philosophy of Social Science. Cambridge University Press, Cambride, 1994***,chs 7 & 8.

* Also in Gerard Delanty and Piet Strydom, editors. Philosophies of Social Science: The Classicand Contemporary Readings. Open University Press, Maidenhead, UK, and Philadelphia, USA,2003.** Also in Michael Martin and Lee C. McIntyre, editors. Readings in the Philosophy of SocialScience. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1994.*** Introductory textbook.

Essay

Should the social sciences concentrate on understanding rather than explanation?

13

Facts and Values

Reading

• Roger Trigg. Understanding Social Science. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985, ch. 6.

• Charles Taylor. Neutrality in political science. In P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman, editors,Philosophy, Politics and Society, third series, pages 25—57. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1967.

• Max Weber. The Methodology of the Social Sciences. The Free Press, New York, 1949,part II.

• James Bohman. New Philosophy of Social Science. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp186–191.

• Mary Hesse. Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science. Harvester,Brighton, 1980, ‘Theory and Values in the Social Sciences’.

• Ernest Nagel. The Structure of Science. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961, ‘TheValue-Oriented Bias of Social Inquiry’.

• David Papineau. For Science in the Social Sciences. Macmillan, London, 1978, ‘Facts,Values and Ideologies’.

• Michael Martin. The philosophical importance of the rosenthal effect. Journal of theTheory of Social Behavior, 7:81—96, 1977.

(Note: the selections from Weber, Taylor and Nagel can also be found in Michael Martinand Lee C. McIntyre, editors. Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science. The MIT Press,Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1994.)

Essay

Can we separate facts from evaluations? How would the answer to the above question affect aquest for ‘objectivity’ in the social sciences?

Does the relation between theory and observation provide a useful model for assessing therelation between facts and values?

14

Methodological Individuals

Reading

• Karl Popper. The Poverty of Historicism. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1957, Sec23, 28–29.

• J. W. N. Watkins. Historical explanations in the social sciences. British Journal ofPhilosophy of Science, 8:104–117, 1957.

• Steven Lukes. Methodological individualism reconsidered. British Journal of Sociology,19:119–129, 1994.

• Richard Miller. Methodological individuals and social explanation. Philosophy of Science,45:387–414, 1978.

• Geoffrey M. Hodgson. Meanings of methodological individuals. Journal of EconomicMethodology, 14:2:211–2265, 2007.

• David Papineau. For Science in the Social Sciences. Macmillan, London, 1978, Ch. 1.

• Harold Kincaid. Reduction, explanation and individualism. Philosophy of Science, 53:492–513, 1986.

• Charles Taylor. Atomism. In Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers,volume ii, pages 187–210. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985.

• Joseph Heath. Methodological individualism. In Edward N. Zalta, editor, The StanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy. Summer 2009 edition, 2009.

Essay

What is methodological individualism? Is it a good strategy for understanding social, collective,phenomena?

15

Rationality

Reading

• Donald Davidson. Actions, reasons, and causes. In Essays on Actions and Events, pages3–19. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980.

• Jon Elster. The nature and scope of rational-choice explanation. In E. LePore andB. McLaughlin, editors, Actions and Events: Perspectives on Donald Davidson, pages 60–72. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985.

• Dagfinn Follesdal. The status of rationality assumptions in interpretation and the expla-nation of action. Dialectica, 36:301–316, 1982.

• Debra Satz and John Ferejohn. Rational choice and social theory. Journal of PHilosophy,92(2):71–87, 1994. doi: 10.2307/2940928.

• Jody S. Kraus and Jules L. Coleman. Morality and the theory of rational choice. Ethics,97:715–749, 1987.

• John Broome. Weighing Goods. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, ch. 5.

• Amartya K. Sen. Rational fools: a critique of the behavioural foundations of economictheory. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6:317–344, 1977.

• S. I. Benn and G. W. Mortimore. Technical models of rational choice. In S. I. Benn andG. W. Mortimore, editors, Rationality and The Social Sciences, pages 157–195. Routledgeand Kegan Paul, London, 1976.

• Steven Lukes. Some problems about rationality. Archives Europeennes de Sociologie, 8:247–264, 1967.

• James Bohman. New Philosophy of Social Science. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp67–76.

• Daniel M. Hausman. Philosophy of economics. In Edward N. Zalta, editor, The StanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, winter 2013edition, 2013, section 5.

Essay

Does the ‘rational choice theory’ develop and improve the explanatory perspective of method-ological individualism?

16

Functional Explanation

Reading

• R. P. Dore. Function and cause. American Sociological Review, 16:843–853, 1961.

• G. A. Cohen. Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defense. Princeton University Press,Princeton, 1978, pp 278–296.

• Jon Elster. Explaining Technical Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983,pp 55-68, 241–243.

• G. A. Cohen. Reply to elster on ”marxism, functionalism, and game theory”. Theory andSociety, 11(4):483–495, 1982.

• Philip Pettit. Functional explanation and virtual selection. British Journal for the Philos-ophy of Science, 47(2):291–302, 1996.

• Harold Kincaid. Assessing functional explanation in the social sciences. Philosophy ofScience Association, 1:341–354, 1990.

• K Neander. The teleological notion of “function”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 69:454–468, 1991.

• Ruth Garrett Millikan. Explanation in biopsychology. In John Heil and Alfred Mele,editors, Mental Causation, pages 211–232. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993.

• L. Wright. Functions. Philosophical Review, 82:139–168, 1973.

• C. Boorse. Wright on functions. Philosophical Review, 85:70–86, 1976.

• Carl G. Hempel. The logic of functional analysis. In Llewellyn Gross, editor, Symposiumon Sociological Theory. Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1959.

• P. Achinstein. The Nature of Explanation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983, ch. 8.

Essay

Can functional explanations be reduced to causal explanations? If not, is that sufficient reasonto reject functional explanations in the social sciences?

17

Evolutionary Arguments

Reading

• Ian Gourch, Garry Runciman, Ruth Mace, Geoffrey Hodgson, and Michael Rustin. Dar-winian evolutionary theory and the social science. Twenty-first century society, 3:65–86,2008. doi: 10.1080/17450140701780218.

• Tim Lewens. Cultural evolution. In Edward N. Zalta, editor, The Stanford Encyclopediaof Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, spring 2013 edition, 2013.

• Richard Dawkins. The selfish Gene. OUP, Oxford, 1976, ch. 11.

• Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson. Summary of: ‘unto others: The evolution andpsychology of unselfish behaviour’. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7(1–2):185–206,2000. doi: 10.1.1.207.3447.

• Dan Sperber. An objection to the memetic approach to culture. pages 163–173. 2000.

• Philip Kitcher. The Ethical Project. Harvard, Cambridge, 2011, chs 1–2, or

• Philip Kitcher. Precis of The Ethical Project, 2011. URL http://www.nordprag.org/

papers/Kitcher3.pdf.

• Russ Shafer-Landau. Evolutionary debunking, moral realism and moral knowledge. Journalof Ethics & Social Philosophy, 7(1):1–37, 2012.

• William J. FitzPatrick. Human altruism, evolution and moral philosophy. Royal SocietyOpen Science, 4(8), 2017. doi: 10.1098/rsos.170441. URL http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.

org/content/4/8/170441.

Essay

What role should evolutionary arguments have in the social sciences?

18

Social Construction

Reading

• Karin Knorr-Centina. Strong constructivism - from a sociologists point of view: A personaladdendum to Sismondo’s paper. Social Studies of Science, 23:555–563, 1993.

• Jennifer Church. Making order out of disorder: on the social construction of madness.In Jennifer Radden, editor, The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion, pages 393–407.Oxford University press, Oxford, 2004.

• Ian Hacking. The Social Construction of What? Harvard University Press, Cambridge,Massachusetts, 1999, chs 1, 3 and 4.

• Paul Boghossian. What is social construction.

• Ron Mallon. Naturalistic approaches to social construction. In Edward N. Zalta, editor,The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2013 edition, 2013.

• Ted Benton and Ian Craib. Philosophy of Social Science. Palgrave, Houndsmill, 2001, pp67–73. and 9.

Essay

To what extent is the social world a construction?

19

MacIntyre on Tradition

Reading

• Alisdair MacIntyre. Epistemological crises, dramatic narrative and the philosophy ofscience. The Monist, 60:453–472, 1977.

• Alasdair MacIntyre. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? University of Notre Dame Press,Notre Dame, Indiana, 1988, Chs I, XVIII and XIX.

• Stephen P. Turner. Macintyre in the province of the philosophy of social science. InMark C. Murphy, editor, Alasdair MacIntrye, pages 70–93. Cambridge Philosophy in Focus,Cambridge, 2003.

• Robert Miner. Lakatos and MacIntrye on incommensurability and the rationality of theory-change. Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy, August 1998.

• Tom Angier. Alasdair macintyre’s analysis of tradition. European Journal of Philosophy,21:N/A, 2011.

• Alasdair MacIntyre. After Virtue. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana,second edition, 1984. If there is time, you might have a look at chs 1, 8 and 9.

Essay

Is MacIntrye’s appeal to tradition in explaining the rationality of theory choice in sciencecompelling?

20

References

P. Achinstein. The Nature of Explanation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983.

Peter Achinstein. Concepts of Science: A Philosophical Analysis. The Johns Hopkins Press,Baltimore, 1968.

P. W. Anderson. More is different: broken symmetry and the nature of the hierarchical structureof science. Science, 177:393–396, 1972.

Tom Angier. Alasdair macintyre’s analysis of tradition. European Journal of Philosophy, 21:N/A, 2011.

David Armstrong. What is a Law of Nature. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989.

Mark A. Bedau and Paul Humphreys. Emergence: Contemporary Readings in Philosophy andScience. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2008.

S. I. Benn and G. W. Mortimore. Technical models of rational choice. In S. I. Benn and G. W.Mortimore, editors, Rationality and The Social Sciences, pages 157–195. Routledge and KeganPaul, London, 1976.

Ted Benton and Ian Craib. Philosophy of Social Science. Palgrave, Houndsmill, 2001.

Alexander Bird. Philosophy of Science. Routledge, London, 1998.

Simon Blackburn. Spreading the Word. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984.

James Bogen. Experiment and observation. In Peter Machamer and Michael Silberstein, editors.The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Blackwell, Oxford, 2002, pages 128–148.

James Bogen. Theory and observation in science. In Edward N. Zalta, editor, The StanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, summer 2017edition, 2017.

Paul Boghossian. What is social construction.

James Bohman. New Philosophy of Social Science. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991.

C. Boorse. Wright on functions. Philosophical Review, 85:70–86, 1976.

John Broome. Weighing Goods. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991.

Harold I Brown. A theory-laden observation can test the theory. The British Journal for thePhilosophy of Science, 44(3):555–559, 9 1993.

Nancy Cartwright. How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983.

Nancy Cartwright. Fundamentalism vs the patchwork of laws. Proceedings of the AristotelianSociety, 93:279–292, 1994.

Anjan Chakravartty. Scientific realism. In Edward N. Zalta, editor, The Stanford Encyclopediaof Philosophy. Summer 2011 edition, 2011.

21

A. F. Chalmers. What Is This Thing Called Science? Open Univeristy Press, Milton Keynes,second edition, 1982.

David Chalmers. Strong and weak emergence. In Philip Clayton and Paul Davies, editors, TheRe-Emergence of Emergence, pages 244–258. OUP, Oxford, 2006.

Jennifer Church. Making order out of disorder: on the social construction of madness. InJennifer Radden, editor, The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion, pages 393–407. OxfordUniversity press, Oxford, 2004.

G. A. Cohen. Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defense. Princeton University Press, Princeton,1978.

G. A. Cohen. Reply to elster on ”marxism, functionalism, and game theory”. Theory andSociety, 11(4):483–495, 1982.

Donald Davidson. Causal relations. The Journal of Philosophy, 64:691–703, 1967.

Donald Davidson. Actions, reasons, and causes. In Essays on Actions and Events, pages 3–19.Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980.

Richard Dawkins. The selfish Gene. OUP, Oxford, 1976.

Gerard Delanty and Piet Strydom, editors. Philosophies of Social Science: The Classic andContemporary Readings. Open University Press, Maidenhead, UK, and Philadelphia, USA,2003.

Wilhelm Dilthey. Wilhelm Dilthey: Selected Writings. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1976.

R. P. Dore. Function and cause. American Sociological Review, 16:843–853, 1961.

Fred I. Dretske. Laws of nature. Philosophy of Science, 44:248–68, 1977.

Pierre Duhem. The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Princeton University Press,Princeton, 1954.

Jon Elster. Explaining Technical Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983.

Jon Elster. The nature and scope of rational-choice explanation. In E. LePore andB. McLaughlin, editors, Actions and Events: Perspectives on Donald Davidson, pages 60–72. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985.

Paul Feyerabend. How to defend society against science. In Ian Hacking, editor. ScientificRevolutions. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981, chapter VIII.

William J. FitzPatrick. Human altruism, evolution and moral philosophy. Royal Society OpenScience, 4(8), 2017. doi: 10.1098/rsos.170441. URL http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.

org/content/4/8/170441.

Jerry Fodor. Special sciences, or the disunity of science as a working hypothesis. Synthese, 28:97–115, 1974.

Dagfinn Follesdal. The status of rationality assumptions in interpretation and the explanationof action. Dialectica, 36:301–316, 1982.

22

Harold Garfinkel. Rational properties of scientific and common-sense activities. BehaviouralScience, 5:72–83, 1960.

Donald Gilles. Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century. Blackwell, Oxford, 1993.

Nelson Goodman. Fact, Fiction and Forecast. Harvard University Press, Cambridge,Massachusetts, 1955.

Ian Gourch, Garry Runciman, Ruth Mace, Geoffrey Hodgson, and Michael Rustin. Darwinianevolutionary theory and the social science. Twenty-first century society, 3:65–86, 2008. doi:10.1080/17450140701780218.

Ian Hacking. Lakatos’s philosophy of science. In Scientific Revolutions Ian Hacking, editor.Scientific Revolutions. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981, pages 128–143.

Ian Hacking, editor. Scientific Revolutions. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981.

Ian Hacking. Representing and Intervening. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983.

Ian Hacking. The Social Construction of What? Harvard University Press, Cambridge,Massachusetts, 1999.

Gilbert Harman. Induction. In Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, editors, A Companion toEpistemology, pages 200–206. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1992.

Rom Harre and Peter Achinstein. The constructive role of models. In L. Collins, editor, TheUse of Models in the Social Sciences. Tavistock, London, 1976.

Daniel M. Hausman. Philosophy of economics. In Edward N. Zalta, editor, The StanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, winter 2013edition, 2013.

Joseph Heath. Methodological individualism. In Edward N. Zalta, editor, The StanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy. Summer 2009 edition, 2009.

Carl Hempel. Philosophy of Natural Science. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1966.

Carl G. Hempel. The logic of functional analysis. In Llewellyn Gross, editor, Symposium onSociological Theory. Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1959.

Mary Hesse. Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science. Harvester, Brighton,1980.

Geoffrey M. Hodgson. Meanings of methodological individuals. Journal of EconomicMethodology, 14:2:211–2265, 2007.

Hollis. The Philosophy of Social Science. Cambridge University Press, Cambride, 1994.

Paul Horwich. Asymmetries in Time: Problems in the Philosophy of Science. MIT Press,Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1987.

David Hume. Enquires Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles ofMorals. Clarendon Press, Oxford, second edition, 1748/1966.

23

Jaegwon Kim. Causes and counterfactuals. In Ernest Sosa, editor. Causation and Conditionals.Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1975, pages 192–194.

Jaegwon Kim. Making sense of emergence. Philosophical studies, 95:3–36, 1999.

Harold Kincaid. Reduction, explanation and individualism. Philosophy of Science, 53:492–513,1986.

Harold Kincaid. Assessing functional explanation in the social sciences. Philosophy of ScienceAssociation, 1:341–354, 1990.

Philip Kitcher. The Ethical Project. Harvard, Cambridge, 2011.

Philip Kitcher. Precis of The Ethical Project, 2011. URL http://www.nordprag.org/papers/

Kitcher3.pdf.

Karin Knorr-Centina. Strong constructivism - from a sociologists point of view: A personaladdendum to Sismondo’s paper. Social Studies of Science, 23:555–563, 1993.

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