Petitioner Respondent Curiae Briefs... · Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(1). 2. Real Party in Interest. Fed....

NO. 20-1834

__________________________________________________________________

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT __________________________________________________________________

DEBRA TAO,

Petitioner,

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent. __________________________________________________________________

Petition for Review of the Merit Systems Protection Board

in Case No. SF-1221-19-0147-W-1 __________________________________________________________________

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER AND IN FAVOR OF REVERSING THE MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD’S DECISION

__________________________________________________________________ Respectfully submitted,

HENRY J. KERNER SOPHIA WOLMAN Special Counsel Attorney LOUIS LOPEZ SHERYL GOLKOW Associate Special Counsel Attorney

U.S. Office of Special Counsel EMILEE COLLIER 1730 M Street, NW, Suite 300 Attorney Washington, DC 20036-450 (202) 804-7000 LIZ BROWN Attorney

Case: 20-1834 Document: 16 Page: 1 Filed: 08/11/2020

FORM 9. Certificate of Interest Form 9 (p. 1) July 2020

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST

Case Number

Short Case Caption

Filing Party/Entity

Instructions: Complete each section of the form. In answering items 2 and 3, be specific as to which represented entities the answers apply; lack of specificity may result in non-compliance. Please enter only one item per box; attach additional pages as needed and check the relevant box. Counsel must immediately file an amended Certificate of Interest if information changes. Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(b).

I certify the following information and any attached sheets are accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge. Date: _________________ Signature: Name:

20-1834

Debra Tao v. Merit Systems Protection Board

United States Office of Special Counsel

Sheryl Golkow

/s/Sheryl Golkow08/11/2020



1. RepresentedEntities.

Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(1).

2. Real Party inInterest.

Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(2).

3. Parent Corporationsand Stockholders.

Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(3).Provide the full names of all entities represented by undersigned counsel in this case.

Provide the full names of all real parties in interest for the entities. Do not list the real parties if they are the same as the entities.

Provide the full names of all parent corporations for the entities and all publicly held companies that own 10% or more stock in the entities.

None/Not Applicable None/Not Applicable

Additional pages attached

✔ ✔




4. Legal Representatives. List all law firms, partners, and associates that (a)appeared for the entities in the originating court or agency or (b) are expected toappear in this court for the entities. Do not include those who have alreadyentered an appearance in this court. Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(4).

None/Not Applicable Additional pages attached

5. Related Cases. Provide the case titles and numbers of any case known to bepending in this court or any other court or agency that will directly affect or bedirectly affected by this court’s decision in the pending appeal. Do not include theoriginating case number(s) for this case. Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(5). See also Fed. Cir.R. 47.5(b).


6. Organizational Victims and Bankruptcy Cases. Provide any informationrequired under Fed. R. App. P. 26.1(b) (organizational victims in criminal cases)and 26.1(c) (bankruptcy case debtors and trustees). Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(6).


Sheryl Golkow Sophia Wolman Emilee Collier

Liz Brown Louis Lopez

✔

✔


i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITES ..................................................................................... ii IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE ..................................... 1 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ................................................................................. 2 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................................ 2 RELEVANT BACKGROUND ................................................................................. 4 STANDARD OF REVIEW ....................................................................................... 5 ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 5

MSPB COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO ANALYZE TAO’S RETALIATION CLAIM UNDER SECTION 2302(b)(9) ........................ 5

A. MSPB’s Analysis Disregards the Plain Language of the Statute.................. 5 B. MSPB’s Approach Here Contravenes Congressional Purpose and Intent .... 8 C. Tao Clearly Engaged in Protected Activities under Section 2302(b)(9) .... 11

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 12 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMITATION, TYPEFACE REQUIREMENTS, AND TYPE STYLE REQUIREMENT ............ 14


ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITES

Cases

Graves v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 434 (2016) .............................. 10 Herman v. Dep’t of Justice, 193 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .................................... 5 Horner v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 815 F.2d 668 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ................................. 7 In Re Frazier, 1 M.S.P.R. 163 (1979) ...................................................................... 11 Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .................................................. 6 Luecht v. Dep’t of the Navy, 87 M.S.P.R. 297 (2000) ............................................... 8 Miller v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 626 F. App’x 261 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ........................... 8 Ruffin v. Dep’t of the Army, 48 M.S.P.R. 74 (1991) .................................................. 8 Serrao v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 95 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir.1996) ................................... 6 Special Counsel v. Brown, 28 M.S.P.R. 133 (1985) ................................................ 11 Special Counsel v. Hathaway, 49 M.S.P.R. 595 (1991), recons. denied, 52

M.S.P.R. 375 and aff’d, 981 F.2d 1237 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ................................ 7, 12 Spruill v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 978 F.2d 679 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). ............................... 6 Tao v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, SF-1221-19-0147-W-1 (February 11, 2020) ........ 4 Viens-Koretko v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 53 M.S.P.R. 160 (1992) ..................... 11 Williams v. Dep’t of Defense, 46 M.S.P.R. 549 (1991) ............................................. 5

Statutes

5 U.S.C. § 1212(h) .................................................................................................1, 2 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3) ................................................................................................. 7 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a) ..................................................................................................... 7 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) ..................................................................................................... 1 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)....................................................................................... passim 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)....................................................................................... passim 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) ...................................................................................2, 7 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(B) .......................................................................................2, 7 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C) .......................................................................................2, 7 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(D) .......................................................................................2, 7 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B) ........................................................................................... 5 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) ..................................................................................................... 5


iii

Other Authorities

Fed. R. App. P. 29(a) ................................................................................................. 2 Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(2) ............................................................................................. 2 Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) .................................................................... 9 Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1475 (2012) .............................................................. 9 Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1615 (2017) .............................................................. 10 Pub. L. No. 95-454 (1978) ......................................................................................... 9 S. Rep. No. 112-155 (2012) ....................................................................................... 6


1

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE

The U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) is an independent federal agency

charged with safeguarding the merit system by protecting federal employees,

former federal employees, and applicants for federal employment from “prohibited

personnel practices,” as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) of the Civil Service Reform

Act of 1978 (CSRA), as amended by both the Whistleblower Protection Act of

1989 (WPA) and the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012

(WPEA). In particular, OSC is responsible for investigating and seeking corrective

action for federal employee whistleblowers and for those who experience

retaliation for engaging in protected activities. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)-(9).

OSC has a substantial interest in a legal issue presented in this case—the

protection of disclosures to OSC and other activities under section 2302(b)(9).

Moreover, as the agency responsible for enforcing these federal laws, OSC has

particular expertise interpreting, investigating, and evaluating claims brought

pursuant to these statutory provisions.

By statute, OSC is “authorized to appear as amicus curiae in any action

brought in a court of the United States related to section 2302(b)(8) or (9) … [and

is] authorized to present the views of the Special Counsel with respect to

compliance with section 2302(b)(8) or (9) … and the impact court decisions would

have on the enforcement of such provisions of law.” 5 U.S.C. § 1212(h); Fed. R.


2

App. P. 29(a). Therefore, OSC respectfully submits this amicus curiae brief to

address the protection against retaliation for disclosing information to OSC and

engaging in other activities under section 2302(b)(9), pursuant to its statutory

authority under section 1212(h) and as a government entity under Fed. R. App. P.

29(a)(2).1 OSC takes no stance on any other issues in this case.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Did the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB or Board) err by failing to

analyze petitioner’s allegation of retaliation for disclosing information to OSC and

engaging in other protected activities under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)?

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Federal employees, who first administratively exhaust certain complaints of

a prohibited personnel practice with OSC, may seek corrective action in de novo

proceedings before MSPB through an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal.

Notably, the Board’s IRA appeal jurisdiction is limited to non-frivolous allegations

of retaliation for making protected disclosures under section 2302(b)(8) or

engaging in protected activities under section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), and (D).

In this matter, Debra Tao, a pharmacist at the U.S. Department of Veterans

Affairs (VA), filed a complaint with OSC alleging that VA took personnel actions

against her in retaliation for making various protected disclosures, as well as in

1 OSC informed the parties of its intention to file this brief and no party objected.


3

retaliation for disclosing information to OSC, filing a complaint with VA’s Office

of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection (OAWP), filing a claim of an

unfair labor practice with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), and

testifying in coworkers’ MSPB and Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO)

proceedings. All of these activities are protected under section 2302(b)(9).

Nevertheless, the Board failed to address Tao’s protected activities under section

2302(b)(9) and instead only analyzed her activities as disclosures under section

2302(b)(8). The Board then dismissed her IRA appeal for lack of jurisdiction

because she ostensibly failed to non-frivolously allege that she made any protected

disclosures under section 2302(b)(8).

MSPB committed reversible error in this case. The Board’s legal analysis

contradicts the plain text of federal whistleblower statutes and neglects Congress’s

purpose and intent to provide broad IRA appeal rights against retaliation both for

making whistleblower disclosures as well as for engaging in activities related to

whistleblowing. MSPB’s analysis also departs from well-established precedent

that allegations of retaliation for engaging in protected activities are correctly

analyzed under section 2302(b)(9). The Board’s improper approach here is not in

accordance with law and leaves federal employees uncertain about their IRA

appeal rights under civil service laws and vulnerable to retaliation explicitly

prohibited by the statute.


4

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

Tao filed a complaint with OSC alleging that VA subjected her to a

proposed adverse action, a lowered performance appraisal, and a significant

change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions in retaliation for both

making protected disclosures and engaging in protected activities, including

disclosing information to OSC, filing with VA’s OAWP, filing with FLRA, and

testifying in two coworkers’ administrative law proceedings. See Tao v. Dep’t of

Veterans Affairs, SF-1221-19-0147-W-1 (February 11, 2020), Appx2-3. While

many of her disclosures were made in the context of her protected activities, Tao

separately alleged retaliation both for making protected disclosures under section

2302(b)(8) and for engaging in protected activities under section 2302(b)(9). After

OSC closed the complaint, Tao filed a timely IRA appeal with the Board alleging

the same theories of retaliation that she raised in her complaint to OSC. Appx2.

On February 11, 2020, an MSPB Administrative Judge (AJ) issued an initial

decision, which became the final decision of the Board on March 17, 2020.

Appx9. The AJ analyzed Tao’s claim under section 2302(b)(8) and found that Tao

did not have a reasonable belief that the wrongdoing she disclosed evidenced a

violation of law, rule, or regulation. Appx8. The AJ then concluded that the Board

did not have IRA appeal jurisdiction because any allegations that Tao made

protected disclosures had been found frivolous. Id. The AJ, however, failed to


5

analyze separately whether IRA appeal jurisdiction was appropriate based on Tao’s

allegations that she engaged in protected activities under section 2302(b)(9). On

May 14, 2020, Tao timely filed an appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because this appeal turns on questions of law—i.e., the application of

section 2302(b)(9) to the facts of this case—this court conducts a de novo review.

See Herman v. Dep’t of Justice, 193 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1999). This court

may reverse MSPB’s decision if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,

or otherwise not in accordance with law ….” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c).

ARGUMENT

MSPB COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO ANALYZE TAO’S RETALIATION CLAIM UNDER SECTION 2302(b)(9)

A. MSPB’s Analysis Disregards the Plain Language of the Statute

The Board’s legal analysis contravenes the statute, which explicitly creates

14 distinct prohibited personnel practices, including two separately-defined

provisions prohibiting retaliation for making a protected disclosure or engaging in

a protected activity. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) and (9). These statutory provisions

offer protection for “distinctly different” actions. Williams v. Dep’t of Defense, 46

M.S.P.R. 549, 553 (1991). The essential difference between the protections of

sections 2302(b)(8) and (9) is between “reprisal based on disclosure of information


6

and reprisal based upon exercising a right to complain.” Serrao v. Merit Sys. Prot.

Bd., 95 F.3d 1569, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Spruill v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 978

F.2d 679, 690 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Notably, while section 2302(b)(8) prohibits

retaliation for making protected disclosures, section 2302(b)(9) prohibits retaliation

for, among other things, disclosing information to OSC, exercising certain appeal,

complaint, or grievance rights, and testifying or assisting in the exercise of certain

appeal, complaint, or grievance rights.

In addition to offering statutory protection against retaliation for distinctly

different actions, sections 2302(b)(8) and (9) have different legal standards.

Claims under section 2302(b)(8) require complainants to have a reasonable belief

that their disclosures evidence a violation of law, rule, or regulation, or gross

mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and

specific danger to public health or safety. See S. Rep. No. 112-155 (2012

U.S.C.C.A.N. 589, 598-99; Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir.

1999). However, the statute imposes no such requirement for claims under section

2302(b)(9). Thus, even when a complainant alleges retaliation for actions that

could be protected under both sections 2302(b)(8) and (9), the analysis for a claim

under each provision would necessarily be different. Here, given these

distinctions, the Board should have separately analyzed whether Tao was retaliated

against based on her alleged activities under section 2302(b)(9). Critically, such an


7

analysis would not have required any “reasonable belief” determination or other

substantive review of Tao’s disclosures.

In this case, MSPB’s approach erroneously blurs the line that Congress

purposefully drew between retaliation based on a disclosure of information under

section 2302(b)(8) and retaliation based on engaging in a protective activity under

section 2302(b)(9). The statute contemplates that individuals may file IRA appeals

under either statutory provision or both. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3), 1221(a)

(individuals alleging retaliation for making protected disclosures or engaging in

certain protected activities have IRA appeal rights and “may seek corrective action

from the Board … for a prohibited personnel practice described in section

2302(b)(8) or section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) ….”) (emphases added).

By ignoring Tao’s section 2302(b)(9) claim after disposing of her section

2302(b)(8) claim, the Board improperly made her section 2302(b)(9) claim

redundant. It is axiomatic that a statute should not be interpreted to render one part

superfluous. See Special Counsel v. Hathaway, 49 M.S.P.R. 595, 612 (1991),

recons. denied, 52 M.S.P.R. 375 and aff’d, 981 F.2d 1237 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see,

e.g., Horner v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 815 F.2d 668, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Rather,

the Board should have separately analyzed Tao’s allegations of retaliation in her

IRA appeal under each statutory provision.


8

In cases similar to the instant matter—where a complainant makes

disclosures while engaging in certain protected activities—MSPB has consistently

recognized these statutory distinctions and held that such activities are protected

under section 2302(b)(9), not section 2302(b)(8). See, e.g., Miller v. Merit Sys.

Prot. Bd., 626 F. App’x 261, 265 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (disclosures made during

grievance process are allegations of prohibited personnel practices under section

2302(b)(9), not section 2302(b)(8)); Ruffin v. Dep’t of the Army, 48 M.S.P.R. 74,

78 (1991) (agency is prohibited from retaliating against employee for filing IRA

appeal under section 2302(b)(9), not section 2302(b)(8)); Luecht v. Dep’t of the

Navy, 87 M.S.P.R. 297, 302 (2000) (finding EEO complaints, IRA appeals, and

union grievances are section 2302(b)(9) activities, not section 2302(b)(8)

disclosures). Here, in dismissing Tao’s IRA appeal after considering only her

section 2302(b)(8) claim, the Board deprived Tao of a hearing on alleged

retaliation for her protected activities.

B. MSPB’s Approach Here Contravenes Congressional Purpose and Intent

The Board’s failure to separately analyze Tao’s allegations of retaliation

under section 2302(b)(9), after it determined that her section 2302(b)(8) claim

failed, directly contravenes clear legislative purpose and intent. Throughout the

past 40 years, Congress has made clear that section 2302(b)(9) protects certain


9

activities separate and apart from the protection for disclosures under section

2302(b)(8). To the extent that the scope of these protections against retaliation

may overlap, section 2302(b)(9)’s protection is aimed at the complainant’s

activities, not at the underlying disclosures or their reasonableness.

Since passing the CSRA in the late 1970s, Congress has protected federal

employees from retaliation for engaging in a particular activity—exercising appeal

rights. See Pub. L. No. 95-454 (1978) § 101(a). In 1989, with the passage of the

WPA, Congress added statutory protections to section 2302(b)(9) for other

activities, namely disclosing information to or cooperating with OSC or an Office

of Inspector General, exercising complaint and grievance rights, testifying for or

assisting an individual in the exercise of appeal, complaint, or grievance rights, and

refusing to obey an order that violates a law.2 See Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16

(1989) § 4(b).

When Congress passed the WPEA in 2012, it further strengthened the

protections against retaliation in section 2302(b)(9). Significantly, the WPEA

provided complainants with IRA appeal rights to the Board for many section

2302(b)(9) claims. See Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1475 (2012) § 101(b). The

expansion of these protections and the introduction of IRA appeal rights for certain

2 In 2017, Congress amended section 2302(b)(9) to include protections for employees who refuse to obey an order that would require that employee to violate a “rule, or regulation” in addition to a law.


10

section 2302(b)(9) claims, such as those at issue in this case, indicate that Congress

intended for complainants, like Tao, to be able to bring IRA appeals for section

2302(b)(9) claims along with and independent from any related section 2302(b)(8)

claims.

In more recent years, Congress has continued to expand on the important

protections against retaliation in section 2302(b)(9), even in the face of more

restrictive decisions by MSPB. For example, in OSC’s 2018 Reauthorization Act

(enacted as section 1097 of the FY 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, Pub.

L. No. 115-91, on December 12, 2017), Congress amended section 2302(b)(9) to

cover participation in agency fact-finding investigations, with attendant IRA

appeal rights, after the Board concluded that participation in an administrative

investigation board (AIB) is not a protected activity under section 2302(b)(9). See

Graves v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 434 (2016) (finding that

participation in AIB is not protected activity because it does not “constitute an

initial step toward taking legal action against the agency for a perceived violation

of employment rights”).

Through its multiple amendments over the last 40 years, Congress has

reaffirmed time and time again that section 2302(b)(9) is intended to provide

robust protection against retaliation for federal employees who engage in certain

activities. While related to section 2302(b)(8), this protection is separate and


11

distinct from the protections for employees who make whistleblower disclosures.

Congress strengthened the statutory protections by extending to federal employees

the same IRA appeal rights for certain 2302(b)(9) claims that are afforded to

whistleblowers under section 2302(b)(8). Here, the Board’s failure to separately

address Tao’s allegations of retaliation for engaging in protected activities under

section 2302(b)(9) seriously undermines that intention, grievously deprives Tao of

her statutory rights, and is not in accordance with law.

C. Tao Clearly Engaged in Protected Activities under Section 2302(b)(9)

It is undisputed that Tao made disclosures to OSC, filed with VA’s OAWP,

filed with FLRA, and testified in support of two coworkers in EEO and MSPB

proceedings. All of these activities have long been held to be protected under

section 2302(b)(9). See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9); see also Viens-Koretko v. Dep’t of

Veterans Affairs, 53 M.S.P.R. 160, 163 (1992) (“appellant’s act of testifying for

another employee at an EEO hearing constitutes an activity that is specifically

protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(B)”); Special Counsel v. Brown, 28

M.S.P.R. 133, 139 (1985) (testimony at MSPB hearing constitutes protected

activity under section 2302(b)(9)); see In Re Frazier, 1 MSPB 159, 1 M.S.P.R.

163, 192 (1979) (retaliation for participating in EEO proceeding is covered under

section 2302(b)(9)).


12

In analyzing Tao’s retaliation allegations, MSPB stated that Tao failed to

allege facts to show that her disclosures to OSC, VA’s OAWP, FLRA, and in two

administrative law proceedings were ones that a person would reasonably believe

evidenced a violation of law, rule, or regulation under section 2302(b)(8).

However, as explained above, the underlying substance of Tao’s disclosures—

including whether she had a reasonable belief in the alleged wrongdoing—is

immaterial to whether she engaged in protected activities under section 2302(b)(9).

See, e.g., Special Counsel v. Hathaway, 49 M.S.P.R. 595, 612 (1991) (section

2302(b)(9) covers disclosures to OSC that do not meet the terms of section

2302(b)(8)), recons. denied, 52 M.S.P.R. 375, aff’d, 981 F.2d 1237 (Fed. Cir.

1992). By failing or refusing to analyze Tao’s allegations of retaliation for

engaging in protected activities under section 2302(b)(9), the Board committed

reversible error.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, MSPB’s holding that it lacked IRA appeal

jurisdiction over Tao’s case—without specifically analyzing her allegations of

retaliation for engaging in protected activities under section 2302(b)(9)—is not in

accordance with law. Therefore, OSC respectfully requests that the court reverse

the Board’s decision and remand the case for consideration on the merits.


13

Respectfully submitted,

Henry J. Kerner Special Counsel

Louis Lopez Associate Special Counsel

Emilee Collier Attorney

Liz Brown Attorney

Sophia Wolman Attorney

/s/Sheryl Golkow Sheryl Golkow Attorney U.S. Office of Special Counsel

1730 M Street, NW, Suite 300 Washington, DC 20036-4505

(202) 254-3600


14

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMITATION, TYPEFACE REQUIREMENTS,

AND TYPE STYLE REQUIREMENT

1. This brief complies with the type volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.

32(a)(7)(B). The brief contains 2,659 words, excluding parts of the brief

exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f) and Fed. Cir. R. 32(b).

2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P.

32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6). The

brief has been prepared in a proportionally-spaced typeface using Microsoft

Word 2016 in a 14 point Times New Roman font.

/s/Sheryl Golkow Sheryl Golkow Attorney


FORM 8A. Entry of Appearance Form 8A (p.1) July 2020

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

ENTRY OF APPEARANCE

Case Number:

Short Case Caption:

Instructions: Refer to Fed. Cir. R. 47.3 for requirements governing representation and appearance in this court. Counsel must immediately file an amended Entry of Appearance if contact information changes and update information through PACER’s Manage My Account. Non-admitted government counsel should enter N/A in lieu of an admission date. Use the second page to add additional counsel.

Party Information. List all parties, intervenors, amicus curiae, or movants represented by below counsel; “et al.” is not permitted.

Principal Counsel: Admission Date: Firm/Agency/Org.: Address:

Phone: Email: Other Counsel: Admission Date: Firm/Agency/Org.: Address:

Phone: Email:

I certify under penalty of perjury that (1) the submitted information is true and accurate and (2) I am authorized to enter an appearance by all other listed counsel.

Date: _________________ Signature:

Name:

20-1834Debra Tao v. Merit Systems Protection Board


Sheryl GolkowUnited States Office of Special Counsel

1730 M Street, N.W., Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20036-4504

(202) 804-7000 [email protected] Wolman



(202) 804-7000 [email protected]

Sheryl Golkow

/s/Sheryl Golkow8/11/20

N/A

N/A


FORM 8A. Entry of Appearance Form 8A (p.2) July 2020

[DO NOT SUBMIT THIS PAGE IF IT IS BLANK.]

Other Counsel: Admission Date: Firm/Agency/Org.: Address:





Phone: Email:

Liz BrownUnited States Office of Special Counsel


(202) 804-7000 [email protected] Collier



(202) 804-7000 [email protected] Lopez



(202) 804-7000 [email protected]

N/A

N/A

N/A


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