Palma, Esperanza_Political Parties and Democratization in Mexico

8/3/2019 Palma, Esperanza_Political Parties and Democratization in Mexico

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11,670 words

Political Parties and Democratization in Mexico:

The Endless Chain of Electoral Reforms

By Esperanza Palma

How do parties facilitate or impede the work of democratic politics?

Today, it is widely accepted within democratic theory that contemporary

democracies are the result of parties and are unthinkable without them. For

third wave democracies, in particular, building, or re-building, strong party

organizations has been a key issue on the democratizing agenda since they are

the ones that organize the new systems of representation, including mobilizing

voters and structuring political power. Nevertheless, analyses of political

parties in recently democratized countries show the difficulty of strengthening

and making them more functional to democratic politics1 (Stokes, 1998). In

some Latin American countries parties have to face authoritarian legacies, such

as populism and the weakness of the state, and they have to act in contexts

where democratization has been uneven along the national territory. They also

have to deal with authoritarian legacies and an agenda inherited from various

types of transition to democracy.

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The main argument of this chapter is that the recent development of the

party system in Mexico is related to the process of transition to democracy and

problems of democratic consolidation.

After about fifty years of a hegemonic party system, the regime was

gradually democratized by parties through electoral and political reforms that

culminated with the 1996 reform which closed a process of the

institutionalization of electoral and political pluralism and, finally, allowed for

alternation in power in the 2000 presidential election. Since this crucial stage

ofdemocratization ended, we have witnessed positive and also negative signs

in the actions of parties in democratic politics. On the one hand, they have

become the channels of interests and discontent for a relevant part of the

citizenry; they have placed substantive issues on the public agenda and they

have been the main institutions forming political professionals and candidates

that run for office. The party system in Mexico has undergone a process of

institutionalization that now guarantees more political stability than some of its

counterparts in Latin America.

On the other hand, afterthe 2000 election there was a new period of

conflicts and tensions among the main parties that guided the transition to

democracy, regarding the rules of electoral competition and campaigns as well

as the relation between Congress and the Presidency. Moreover, the 2006

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presidential election brought up an old problem of electoral politics in Mexico:

the absence of a consensus on the electoral results whose consequence was a

post-electoral conflict that, at some point, brought the political system to the

brink of a major crisis.

Two problems must be considered when analyzing the role played by

parties in democratic politics in contemporary Mexico. First, Mexican

democracy is not consolidated, understanding by consolidated democracy a

political regime in which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules,

and patterned incentives and disincentives has become, in a phrase, the only

game in town2 (Linz and Stephan, 1997, p. 15). This thesis is relevant to our

analysis given that consolidation presupposes that actors accept that conflicts

will be resolved according to established norms and that violation of these

norms is costly and ineffective. Some leftist party leaders and their social bases

believe that disputes can be solved through non-institutional means,

undermining the work of democratic politics. Moreover, they show the legacy

of a relatively recent authoritarian past and a process of democratization where

the main cleavage was authoritarianism/democracy. For instance, civil

disobedience, or openly confrontational strategies like occupying the tribune of

Congress, as happened in November of 2006 and March of 2008 erode the

fragile democratic institutions and the legitimacy they have accrued. The leftist

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PRD, Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolucin

Democrtica) is a case in point. It can be defined as a semi-loyalparty semi-

loyal to democratic institutions since some of its leaders promote, tolerate or

excuse actions of their own or of other actors that go beyond the legitimate and

peaceful patterns of the political processes3 (Linz, 1978). Nevertheless, the role

played by the PRD must be analyzed carefully since some of its actions have

paradoxical consequences: they have eroded legitimacy, up to a point, and

impeded agreements with other parties but they have also had thepositive

effect of raising some issues for public debate and to push for further political

reforms.

Second, since Mexican democracy is not consolidated, there is still an

ongoing debate about electoral rules and the most appropriate institutional

design for processing pluralism, a debate in which the parties calculations

about possible gains and losses are always at stake. This is mixed with

dilemmas such as the means and strategies which are valid in order to pursue

some political goals, and whether democracy is about outcomes or about

procedures,4 as well as substantive issues on economic and social policy.

Thus, one of the distinctive features of the Mexican case is that its long process

of democratization has moved through cycles of electoral reforms since 1977.

Alternation in power in the 2000 presidential election represented a crucial

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stage of Mexican democratization since it symbolized the end of the hegemony

of the PRI. Nevertheless, it did notput an end to the disputes over electoral

results as the 2006 presidential election showed. Debate among the party elites

has led to the approval of a new electoral law in 2007.

The ongoing debate on rules and institutional design has revealed the

contradictions gapbetween institutional structures (the electoral rules inherited

from theperiod ofthe first stages transition to ofdemocratizationcy, and a

governmental system inherited from the authoritarian period) and

contemporary political dynamics (increasing party pluralism and electoral

competition).

In order to illustrate these tensions in party politics, this chapter will focus

on the following problems: the process of democratization from 1977 to 2000,

including a brief overview of the party system; the main lines of conflict

among parties afteralternation in power in 2000 the transition to democracy,

the role played by the electoral system and some party strategies in the present

process of political polarization, and finally some perceptions of public opinion

about parties.

The Hegemonic Party System and the Process of Democratization

The current Mexican party system is an institutionalized5 party system,

with three main parties and fourotherminor parties6. The three main parties

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cover the ideological spectrum from rRight to lLeft: the PAN, National Action

Party (Partido Accin Nacional) at the right, the PRI, Revolutionary

Institutional Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) at the center, and the

PRD at the left. These are the parties , and they are the ones that dispute the

presidency and aggregate about 90% of the national vote. These parties also

control Congress.

One distinctive element about the Mexican case, as compared to other

party systems in Latin America7, is that the current three main parties were

created under authoritarian rule. The hegemonic party system, based on a

presidential system, was established after the 1910 Revolution with the

creation of the PNR National Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacional

Revolucionario) in 1929 (some years later it became the PRI). The system

included citizens within the political body through universal suffrage.8 This

party was created by the revolutionary elite in order tobringcongregate

revolutionary leaders and their followers togetherand to organize access to

power by institutional means. It monopolized power for about seven decades

and claimed to be the inheritor of the revolutionary- nationalist ideology. More

than being a state party, like communist parties were, it was an authoritarian

party dependent on the ruling elite, with no ideological tasks. It had, and still

has nowadays, a corporatist structure based on three sectors: a workers,

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peasants, ing class trade union, a peasant trade union and a third sector

combining third one ofartisans, teachers and civil servants. Before

industrialization and modernization took place, these sectors represented

almost the whole of society. The PRI also implemented clientelistic practices

using social programs as means to in order to mobilize voters. The PRI

founded a state committed to the promotion of the welfare of popular classes

under a nationalistic project that its origins included an agrarian reform, a

progressive labor law and state intervention in key sectors of the economy such

as oil and electricity.

A hegemonic party system, following Giovanni Sartoris definition9

(1976), does not allow for alternation ance in power, although regular elections

are were held to elect the President, Congressmen, Governors and local

authorities with an electoral schedule that is well was always observed. In

Mexico Ssecond class parties were allowed to participate in unfair and non-

competitive elections. The hegemonic party controlled electoral processes and,

later in the 1980s, when opposition parties grew stronger, manipulated

electoral results to stop them from winning elections.

The rightist PAN (the ruling party since 2000) was created in 1939 in the

context of Lzaro Crdenas leftist policies of the expropriation of the foreign-

owned oil companies and the electricity company. Founded by some former

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collaborators of revolutionary governments, the PAN vindicated a liberal state,

political pluralism and some Christian Democratic values regarding human

dignity10 (Loaeza, 1999). For several decades, this party participated in

elections with no expectations of winning any governmental post, because its .

Its leaders recognized viewed the importance of developing a long-term

strategy that contributed to the creation of a culture of opposition politics and,

d gradually, to the democratization of e the regime. The PAN was

unambiguously without any ambiguities, a loyal opposition11 (Loaeza, 1977)

given that it always stood for institutional means to change the hegemonic

party system. It was not until the 1980s, after amendments to the electoral

reform of 1977 that introduced proportional representation for electing the

lLegislature, that this partybegan started to win some seats in Congress. It also

won some positions in the local government in the North of Mexico, the more

modern and industrialized part of the country, and drew support from

entrepreneurs, the middle class, and some traditional catholic popular sectors.

The PAN is linked to some catholic organizations such as the Opus Dei, and

organizations of entrepreneurs. Today, some of its most important leaders are

businessmen who have run for elections and won important positions, such as

former president Vicente Fox. During democratization, the PANs strategy

consisted of building an electoral base first, at the local level.

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The leftist PRD was born in 1989 as the result of an electoral coalition

formed in 1988 for participating in the presidential election of that year. The

electoral front the FDN, National Democratic Front, (Frente Democrtico

Nacional) resulted from an alliance between the CD, Democratic Current

(Corriente Democrtica), a split from the PRI, the PMS, Mexican Socialist

Party (Partido Mexicano Socialista), the former Mexican Communist Party,

and several social organizations of the urban lower middle class that had been

acting in the political scenario with a leftist program. The main goal of this

Front was to support the presidential candidacy of a former member of the PRI,

Cuahutmoc Crdenas, the son ofa past president one of the most respected

Presidents of Mexico greatly respected for his social and economic policies.

The CD criticized the neoliberal economic policy of the PRIs governments

and the authoritarian internal rules of this party, i.e., the dependence of the

party on the President to define the partys political orientation and its

presidential candidate. In the early eighties PRIs governments shifted to

neoliberal policies that emphasized the reduction of state investment in social

programs and the withdrawal of the state from the economy. As a result of this

internal conflict, the PRI expelled the members of the CD, which o then made

an alliance with other some Leftist parties.

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parties to access poweron the public agenda. For the first time in a presidential

election, the PRI was contested. The 1988 election It was a critical one

election14 (Key, 1955) that produced a dealignment from the PRI. As a result,

an important sector offormer PRI voters turned to the FDN. For the first time

in contemporary electoral history in Mexico, an opposition presidential

candidate won an important percentage of the national vote, 32%, against the

PRIs 51%. In the past the PRI had averaged The average percentage received

by the PRI in former elections wasof70% of the national vote, campaigning

on programs that emphasized welfare policies and the defense of a nationalistic

project. As the PRI governments actually abandoned this project, its public

support eroded.

Before the foundation of the PRD, the Leftist parties were marginal in

electoral politics and had little support among the middle-class. As a

consequence of this election, two cleavages emerged: the

authoritarian/democracy cleavage and the income distribution/neoliberalism

cleavage. These cleavages among parties had a social-electoral basis.

From then on the PRIs base shrank, and its support concentrated

gradually in rural areas and the lower income classes15 as the result of

clientelistic practices targeting the population most likely to benefit from

social programs. The FDN drew support from states with a diversity of levels

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of industrialization and modernization; from the Federal District16 to states like

Oaxaca which shows one of the lowest levels of economic and social

development. The Federal District became one of the main bastions of the PRD

PRD and in 1997 the party where in 1997 it won the won its first election for

city mayor. The analyses of Butler et.al. 17 and Bruhn18 show that there was no

statistical correlation between the vote for the FDN and some socioeconomic

variables such as education level, income, religion and urban population. In

other words, the FDN drew its support from almost all social sectors. On the

other hand, the PAN, running on a platform that defended state efficiency and

stood against corruption and populism obtained 16.82% of the national vote

and drew support mainly from highly educated and high income sectors.

The authoritarianism/democracy cleavage emerged as a powerful line of

division between the PRI on one side and PAN and the PRD on the other, a

cleavage among citizens as well as between the parties. PAN and PRD

demanded clean and fair elections and the creation of an autonomous electoral

college. From then on, they pushed constantly for electoral reforms that

allowed for the construction of electoral institutions independent from the PRI

and that guaranteed free elections.

Since there was considerable evidence of a rigged election, and both the

PAN and the FDN contested the electoral results, the demand for clean and fair

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elections became one of the most important issues for public opinion and

pushed the PRI towards further democratization19 (Domnguez and McCann,

1996).

During the nineties,both the PAN and the PRD became stronger and

they opened new channels of representation to a democratic citizenship20

(Palma 2004). Their strategies, for the most part, pursued democratization by

gradual reforms. The period that runs from the 1988 election to 1994 (when an

important electoral reform was approved), witnessed contradictory processes:

the opposition won several positions at the local level despite the fact that the

Electoral College was still controlled by the PRI and the President. At the same

time, several post-electoral conflicts developed mainly when the dispute took

place between the PRI and the PRD. Relations between these parties were very

tense and the Left did not consider validate the results of the 1994 presidential

election to be valid.

During this period, opposition parties engaged with the PRI in several

processes of negotiation in the pursuit of one main demand: to change the

electoral system and the rules of access to political power under democratic

conditions. In Mexico, democratization consisted of electoral reforms that

gradually built an electoral system that guaranteed free and fair elections based

on an independent Electoral College (IFE, Instituto Federal Electoral)

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formerly controlled by the President and the PRI-and the recognition and

promotion of pluralism through the design of a mixed system of majority and

proportional representation for Congress, maintaining a simple majority for

electing the President. The 1994 and 1996 electoral reforms incorporated new

principles for integrating the IFE, establishing that the General Council, the

most powerful maximum organ of the Institute, would will be formed by

citizens elected by a majority in Congress. Parties have representation in the

sessions of the Council and have the right to speak, but not the right to vote.

Thus today, as the result of several electoral reforms today Mexico has a

system that organizes representation as follows: the legislature is composed of

500 seats: 300 elected in majority districts and 200 elected by the proportional

representation principle. It is renewed every three years. The Senate is renewed

every six years and holds 128 seats; 64 seats elected by majority (that is, 2 for

each of the 32 states), 32 by the first minority principle in each state (the

party that came second in the state election), and a pure proportional

representation list of 32 seats. The president is elected in a first round election

for 6 years, as are the governors. It is worth mentioning that as a result of the

1996 electoral reform, the mayor of the Federal District and deputies of its

constituencies were opened to electoral contestation. Before this reform, the

Federal District did not hold local elections; the mayor of the city being

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appointed by the President of the country. The founding election in the capital

of the country was held in 1997 and it was won, from then on, by the PRD. It

must be added that the electoral system establishes since 1996 that for a party

to obtain legal registration and therefore receive public funding it must obtain,

at least, 2% of the national vote in any of the national elections (COFIPE,

1996).

There is no reelection for any political post. This is the legacy of a

principle established in the 1917 Constitution after the Revolution in order to

prevent a dictatorship. This principle, which was one of the main demands of

the Mexican Revolution, effective suffrage, no reelection, acts against

accountability and makes politicians more dependent on their own parties than

on the electorate. This issue will be brought up later in the chapter.

Summing up, parties played a crucial role during the first years of

democratization by 1) (i) conducting a peaceful transition to democracy,

privileging, for the most part, negotiation over confrontation; ;2)(ii)

channeling the political diversity of Mexican society; and (iii3) structuring a

new system of representation.

Lines of Conflict among Political Parties during the 2000 Presidential Election:

the Democracy/Authoritarianism Cleavage

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The mid-term elections of 1997, held under the last PRI government, and

some local elections, like the foundational one in the capital of the country,

showed clear signs of the end of the hegemony of the PRI21 (Becerra, 1998).

In In that year the PRI obtained 39% of the national vote for Congress and 239

seats, whereas the PAN got 37% and 122 seats and the PRD, 25% and 125

seats22 (Palma, 2004). The PRI thus lost control of Congress and no longer had

the power to change the constitution: any constitutional amendment given that

it won only 239 seats out of 500; the PRD won 125, the PAN won 122 and

minor parties 14. The Mexican Constitution establishes that any Constitutional

amendmentd needs two thirds of the votes in Congress. D Divided government

appeared for the first time in Mexico with the samesome consequence as

elsewhere: difficulties in cooperation between the President and the

Congress23. Furthermore, tThe electoral law of 1996 establishes that a party

cannot hold more than 300 seats, a; it is cap designed to promote pluralism and

inter-party cooperation, but it tooalso poses new issues for governance.

During the 1990s, the most important dimension of conflict and division

between the opposition parties and the PRI, and within the electorate, was

authoritarianism/ democracy or opposition/government. The centrality of the

democratic issue subordinated ideological dimensions; however, after

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alternation in power took place in 2000, it became irrelevant, as will be shown.

The 2000 presidential election clearly expressed this cleavage. The PAN, in

alliance with the minor party PVEM formed the Alianza por el Cambio (The

Alliance for Change), and won the presidency. The crucial issue of this

election was the possibility of alternation in power versus the political

continuity of the PRI. The Alianza candidate, Vicente Fox, was able to

organize a campaign that projected him as the choice of change in contrast to

the PRD, whose candidate was, for the third time, Crdenas24 (Beltrn, 2003).

CrdenasCrdenas The PRDs candidate organized his campaign on the

income distribution/neoliberalism cleavagebut focusing on this issue was

ineffective given which proved to be anti-mobilizing in a context where that

the real possibility of defeating the PRI was at stake. Crdenas presented a

scenario with two poles: on the one hand, the PRD, and on the other, the PAN

and the PRI as agents of a neoliberal economic and social model25 (Palma,

2001). InBy contrast, the PAN and its presidential candidate were able to build

a broad electoral coalition along the axis of democracy that incorporated voters

who that were not ideological sympathizers with the of this party but that saw

in it the possibility of political change. The presidential candidate appealed

explicitly to lLeftist voters in this election eager in orderto defeat the PRI.

Some scholars have shown, using public opinion polls26 , (Moreno, 2003) that

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part of the electorate voted along the axis PRI/anti-PRI (authoritarianism/

democracy) and not on ideological grounds and PANs candidate waged the

strongest anti-PRI campaign. Both the PRI and the PRD lost voters in this

election who turned to the PANs candidate. In 2000, around 8% of the

national electorate held a farlLeftist position and in former elections they

voted for the PRD. In 2000 Fox gained 50% of the vote from this group of the

electorate and 50% of the vote of Centrist voters27 (Moreno, 2003, pp.183-

184). The strategic vote came mainly from leftist voters. Strategic voting is

also corroborated by split voting: whereas Fox obtained 42.52% of the national

vote, the PANs candidates for Congress gained only 38.32%28 (Palma, 2004).

In this election the PANs candidate won 42.52% of the vote, the PRI

38.32% and the PRD 16.64% Map 1 shows that the coalition PAN-PVEM won

[Map 1 About Here]

in 20 states, the PRI in 11 states and the PRD candidatejust injust one29

(Palma, 2004). It must be highlighted that the PAN won in the northern states,

where it had been creating an electoral base over various decades. The PRD

only won in in only one state, Michoacn, in the south, the birthplace of its

presidential candidate. According to some studies, older voters were more

likely to vote for the PRI and younger voters for the opposition. Education also

had a negative relation with the PRI vote and higher income sectors were more

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likely to vote for the PAN and less likely to vote for the Left. The PAN grew in

rural districts and increased its vote considerably in the marginal areas of urban

districts30 (Tuirn, 2000).

Some scholars agree on the fact that the 2000 election symbolizes the end

of the transition to democracy31 (Salazar, et.al., 2001). Even though, in 1997

there were relevant achievements in democratic electoral politics, alternation in

power at the presidential level was crucial for political actors and for public

opinion. As it was grasped by some public opinion polls,T the perception that

Mexico was a democracy grew among citizens: from 37% who thought so in

May 1999, to 59% who thought that Mexico was a democracy by May 200232

(Moreno, 2003, p.225).

This was the first time in a long political period that the electoral results

were not contested. Nevertheless, the PRDs position and evaluation of the

2000 election left open the possibility of future conflicts. The PRD recognized

the importance of the PANs victory since it represented the end of what they

called the party-state regime. Yet, this party emphasized that substantial

regime change implied a shift to a new economic and social model, different

from the neoliberal one33 (Palma, 2001).

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The Cleavage between Left and Right: the 2006 Presidential Election and its

Aftermath

After the 2000 presidential election a new line of conflict among parties

emerged: the cleavage between Left and Right, which displaced the axis

democracy/authoritarianism that no longer was politically relevant after

alternation in power had taken place.

In the 2006 presidential election the PRD, in alliance with the Labor Party

(PT) and Convergencia, formed the electoral coalition Alianza por el bien de

todos (Alliance for the good of all) ) and nominated Andrs Manuel Lpez

Obrador, that ran with a popular candidate who had been the mayor of Mexico

City from during 2000 to -22006., Andrs Manuel Lpez Obrador. Lopez

Obrador had He was an important leader who emerged during the transition,

was a former member of the PRI, and who had led local social movements in

the state of Tabasco. He also held the position of president of the PRD in 1996-

1999. Although Lpez Obrador has held important political positions within

the party and as the mayor of the capital city, his trajectory is clearly marked

by his close relation to social movements and social organizations. As the

Mayor of the city, his main political platform, which became his campaign

program, targeted the most vulnerable sectors of society: the poor, the elderly,

single mothers, and the disabled, among others34 (Palma and Balderas, 2007).

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Some ofhis proposals, such as a them, like the monthly pension for the elderly,

became compulsory under local law. These measures were combined with

investment in infrastructure in Mexico City. By 2003, some public opinion

polls conducted in Mexico City showed a citizen approval of 81% for ofLpez

Obrador (Grupo Reforma, 2004) and he. He became one of the favorites for

the presidency and the measures he favored . The measures, briefly described,

were became the main guidelines for the PRDs presidential campaign

manifesto. The campaign slogan The poor first, for the good of all was very

appealing in a country where 30 million people out of 103 million live under

poverty conditions of poverty35 (CEPAL, 2007).

In 2004, a relevant event took place that set the conditions for an extremely

polarized election: the Attorney General, with the clear intervention of the

President, demanded solicited that the Senate deprive Lpez Obrador of his

legal immunity (privilege of elected politicians), in order to try him for legal

action brought by the citizens of a neighborhood for the supposedly illegal

measure of building a public street on private property. He was accused of

having abused ofhis authority. Respected lawyers claimed that the action had

no legal grounds. It was clear that the political goal was to exclude Lpez

Obrador from the possibility of becoming a presidential candidate. In the end,

President Fox himself had to stop the judicial process. However, the event

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created the scenario of two sworn enemies and was the starting point of the

thesis of a conspiracy against Lpez Obrador.

The PAN candidate, Felipe Caldern, presented an electoral platform

explicitly meant to continuing Foxs policies and aimed at the promotion of

private investment, the control of inflation, and increase in tax revenue by

eliminating evasion. Caldern emphasized the importance of the rule of law for

political stability and the proper functioning of the market. According to his

platform, the main responsibility of the state is to provide equal opportunities

to individuals who have to work for their own welfare36 (Reveles, 2007).

Public investment will be mixed with private investment in the areas of

education, health, public security and infrastructure. As part of its campaign,

the PAN put out television commercials that presented Lpez Obrador as a

danger to Mexico given that his populist program would bankrupt the state.

Some entrepreneurs paid for commercials that promoted the idea that the PRD

would expropriate private investors and would provoke political chaos in a

similarway similarto what Hugo Chvez had done in Venezuela. While at the

beginning of the campaign Lpez Obrador was ahead among electoral

preferences, some weeks before the election Caldern caught up with him and

most polls showed a dead heat between the two candidates.

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The PRI was marginalized in the 2006from the contest; its candidate,

Roberto Madrazo, could never position himselfsuccessfully within the Left-

Right dispute.37

The results for the presidential election reflected the political polarization of

the campaigns: Caldern obtained 35.89% of the vote whereas Lpez

Obrador AMLO[WHAT DOES THE ACRONYM STAND FOR HAVE

WE SEEN THIS BEFORE?] seized 35.31%; less than 1 % of difference.

The PRI, allied with PVEM, took sized 22.26%38 The IFEproved unable to

could not announce the results the same day, leaving of the election who

the winner was and it left a political vacuum that allowed the PRD to

contest the electoral results (arguing that there was something suspicious

about the delay in announcing official results).

Before analyzing the post-electoral conflict, which is relevant to the

analysis developed here, it is important to point out that the polarization of

the vote was territorialized; i.e., the polarization between Left and Right has

a territorial basis. Map 2 shows how the country was split between a North

[Map 2 About Here]

that voted for the PAN and a the South for Lpez Obrador, with some

exceptions, like Baja California Sur where the PRD is the ruling party, and

Yucatn in the Southeast of the country, where the PAN candidate won the

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election. In general terms, the northern states are more modernized and

urbanized, whereas the south has the most marginalized and poorest areas

of the country, with a strong presence of indigenous communities39 (Reyes

del Campillo, 2007). The PRI disappeared from the map; its presidential

candidate did not win in any state. Nevertheless, a closer look at voting

statistics reveals that tby looking at the stat results the polarization is not so

extreme, given that in most casesof them the difference between first and

second place is around 10% (Table 1). It is also interesting that in 14 states

[Table 1 About Here]

the PRI came second in the presidential contest. The concurrent elections

for Congress also showed a different panorama: the PAN obtained 33.39%

of the vote, the PRD 28.99% and the PRI 28.21% (Figure 1).

[Figure 1 About Here]

The pre-campaign environment, the conspiracy theory held by the PRD and

the polarized electoral results led to a post-electoral conflict with contradictory

effects on democratic politics.

The electoral results were contested by the PRD, arguing that the

election was plagued by many irregularities. The same day of the election,

before any official announcement had been made, Lpez Obrador called on his

followers to gather in the main square of Mexico City, declaring he had won

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the election. The PRD implemented a strategy of confrontation which is

explained by the characteristics of its leadership and its social base both of

which had become accustomed to using use extra-institutional means to pursue

their goals. The post-electoral strategy had different moments. It included a

legal petition to the Electoral Tribunal (TRIFE) fora vote by vote recount

arguing problems regarding electoral scrutiny as well as some acts of civil

disobedience nd some extra-institutional measures. For instance, Lpez

Obrador and his followers took over one of the main avenues of Mexico City,

installing a huge camp site there which completely blocked the traffic during

several weeks. Paradoxically, the PRD mayor of the city had to deal with the

public discontent generated by this measure. When the TRIFE announced that

the election had been legitimate, the PRD announced new measures of civil

disobedience40 (Palma and Balderas, 2007). Lpez Obrador summoned his

followers to a National Democratic Convention where he was proclaimed the

legitimate president against the usurper Felipe Caldern. In that

Convention he announced the creation of a legitimate cabinet,, and yet other

new measures of civil disobedience such as impeding Caldern from being

sworn as President. This meant that the parties that supported AMLO took over

the Congressional tribune in order to impede the elected President from

formally taking office at a Congressional session as the Constitution demands.

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After Caldern took office, in the middle of this crisis, Lpez Obrador

announced that his party and followers would only recognize himself as the

legitimate president and that they would not have any political relations with

his government.

Polarization translated into public opinion. Moreno (2008, p.41)

Moreno41 shows in his study of public opinion of the 2006 post-electoral

conflict that some weeks after the election was held, 38% of the population

believed that electoral fraud took place whereas 51% did not. Moreno argues

that the more politically informed citizens are and the more exposed they are to

party elites debates, the more they reflect the positions of these elites. Parties

shape the perceptions of citizens. More recent studies show42 (Campos, 2008)

that by 2008, the percentage of citizens that believed that Caldern won the

election rose to 57%.

The post-electoral strategy implemented by the PRD has had negative

effects on democratic politics. It responds both to Lpez Obradors leadership

and to the social movements and organizations that support him which

envisage his leadership as the main possibility for change. Although Lpez

Obrador has placed relevant and substantive issues on the public agenda, which

express cleavages in the Mexican society, his strategy seeks the de-legitimation

of institutions by using means that are not the normal procedures to process

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conflict. Is the loser of an election going to contest electoral results every time

that the outcome is a very close result? This view of politics acts against the

normalization of democratic life and expresses a personalization of politics43

(Bovero, 2007).As was mentioned in the first section of this chapter, the

origins of this political conception of party activity relates to the origins of the

PRD which was born under a strong leadership44 and in the context of a

presidential election that certainly was fraudulent in 1988 when the PRI and its

government controlled the whole electoral process.

The measures implemented by the PRD after the election have set the

moldbeen the platform for what seems to be a long-term strategy. Some

evidence of this is shown inby the way that the PRD has responded to a

Presidential initiative sent to Congress at the beginning of 2008 for reforming

the state-owned oil company, PEMEX (Mexican Petroleum). The Presidential

and PAN initiative brings up one of the main conflicting lines between the two

leadingparties given that it seeks to allow private investment in some areas of

oil production. Days before the parliamentary groups of the PAN and the PRI

were going to vote to approve this initiative the PRD took overthe tribune of

Congress [HOW?] demanding that there be apublic debate before making any

decision was taken on this crucial matter. Theis party thushas managed to

delay the approval of the reform and to open some public spaces for the public

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debate. It can be argued that it is the responsibility of Congress to inform and

involve citizens in such a sensitive issue aslike the reform of PEMEX45.

Nevertheless, the methods used by the PRD show the weak attachment of this

party to republican and institutional forms.

The role played by Lpez Obrador and his political base has had not

only some negative effects on democratic politics; it has also had an impact

within the PRD itself. Months after the election took place, the PRD group

called New Left, formed by some members of parliamentary groups as well

as some PRD governors, declared that they would analyze initiatives from the

Executive and would engage with the PAN in negotiations in Congress if

necessary46 (Palma and Balderas, 2007, p.119). They also criticized Lpez

Obrador for using the party as his personal instrument and for debilitating the

party by implementing a strategy that would leave it out of the process of

negotiation with other parties. In 2008 the division within the party between

two groups, New Left and the group supportive of Lpez Obrador, translated

into a struggle for electing the president of the party. Ironically, after their

internal election took place, both groups claimed they had won the election.

The directorate of the party has not been able to resolve who the winner was

and will have to hold another election in 2010.

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Summing up, the 2006 electoral process has had contradictory effects on

Mexican democracy: on the one hand, it reinforced the dividing line between

Left and Right by putting the issue of income distribution on the public agenda

in a context where the neoliberal model seemed to be unquestionable. Political

division among parties and public opinion is compatible with democratic

politics. As Chantal Mouffe has argued, agonism plays an important role in

democracies since ideological divisions between Left and Right can promote

further equality and popular participation47 (Mouffe, 2003). The hegemony of

neoliberalism and the center oriented consensus that has been reached in many

societies have de-mobilized the working class and have blurred Left-wing

proposals. Following In this line of argument, the current cleavage in Mexico

is welcome. On the other hand, some of the actions of the PRD, embedded in a

particular view of politics, have delayed democratic consolidation and might

open scenarios of serious confrontation and institutional breakdown.

The Electoral System and the 2007 Electoral Reform

The 2006 election showed the limitations and problems of the electoral

system. The main objective of the electoral reforms during democratization

was the recognition of pluralism and an autonomous electoral college. The

parties did not foresee that the rule for presidential election would lead to be

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potentially conflict in the context of a polarized contest, especially if one of the

parties is prepared to start a conflict around the electoral results. Some scholars

have pointed out that this rule was the main issue resulting from that the 2006

election was the viability of this rule48 brought up (Crespo, 2008; Shugart,

2007; Negretto, 2007).

Crespo49 (2008) argues that when there is little electoral distance

between the first and the second place in a presidential election the possible

human errors whenat counting the votes leave room for mistrust. In the 2000

presidential election the distance between the winning PAN candidate and the

second-place PRI candidate was 6% and nobody doubted that the election had

been clean. In 2006, under the same rules, when the winner only had 0.5%

more of the vote than the second place, mistrust emerged, exacerbated by the

context of a non-consolidated democracy. However, the same can happen in

consolidated democracies as it has in the United States in 2000, in Germany in

2005, and in Italy in 2006.

Proposals such as a second round were placed in the public and

academic debate. Nevertheless, the new electoral reform the party elites

introduced in 2007 did not introduce measures that could prevent a tight

electoral result from happening again. when they approved a new electoral

reform in 2007. It is worth noting that they did not even address seriously the

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possibility ofpermitting officeholders to seek reelection.reelection. Clearly

concerned about the impact of the 2006 election on governance, the PAN and

the PRI agreed with many of the proposals that the PRD placed on the

negotiating table. They focused on the following topics: public funding for

parties, the timing of campaigns, the role of the mass media in the campaigns,

and the smaller parties. The most relevant reforms in these areas were a drastic

reduction ofthe public funding for ordinary party activities and for campaigns.

Public finance for ordinary party activities will be distributed according to the

number of citizens registered on the electoral roll. Thirty percent of the money

will be distributed among all the parties and 70% according to the vote they

receive in a national election. Public finance for campaigns will be reduced

byin 50% (COFIPE, 2007). The length of the campaigns was also modified by

this reform. Before, presidential campaigns lasted about one hundred and sixty

days and now they will last ninety days.

The most relevant amendment was the one regarding the regulation of

party propaganda during the campaigns. Before the 2007 reform, the parties

and any particular organization, could directly pay for commercial

advertisements on television and radio. The new law prohibits the direct

buying of political advertising time in the mass media. Now, the IFE will pay

for the commercials during the campaigns and will distribute advertising time

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among the parties50 (Lorenzo Crdova, 2008). The reform went further:

attending to the PRDs complaint about a dirty war during campaigns, the new

rules state that any governmental propaganda during the campaigns regarding

public programs is forbidden, since such propagand it can be usedby for

electoral goals.

The reform also includes a very controversial measure: the prohibition

againston using denigrating expressions regarding institutions and parties or

libeling politicians. This measure has raised concerns among some intellectuals

and public opinion leaders who have argued that it will be extremely difficult

to trace the dividing line between a well-grounded criticism and libel; this

measure is not only inun-applicable but also represents an attack against

freedom of speech51 (Aguilar-Camn, 2008).

Finally, the new approved reform includes new restrictions on for

smaller parties and new parties. The most relevant amendment is the new

regulation for forming electoral coalitions. Before the 2007 electoral reform,

any party could be part of a coalition and the total vote obtained by the

coalition counted towards maintaining registration. This allowed small and

new parties, such as the PVEM, the PT and Convergencia, to maintain their

registration during their first electoral years. Today, each one of these parties is

able to win around 3% of the national vote, i.e., 10% of the national vote

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altogether. The new law establishes that parties can form coalitions but the

logo of the coalition will no longer appear on the ballot; each party of the

coalition will present its own logo and voters will have to choose among one of

them. Thus, the total vote for the coalition will no longer count for small

parties. While established small parties might have no problem at obtaining the

minimum of 2% of the national vote more recently founded parties will have to

participate in a very disputed market toand obtain this percentage of the vote.

The new electoral law also prohibits parties that lose their registration

from to contending again in an electoral process; thet se parties must return the

public funding they obtained. Whereas the former can be controversial the

latter is a positive measure given that in the past many small parties that lost

their registration kept the resources obtained from the state and there. There

were no accountability mechanisms.

The 2007 reform strengthens bigger parties. An important issue on a

democratic agenda should be the design of an electoral system that allows

citizens to create new parties for organizing their political preferences which

might not be included into the existing party system. Nevertheless, a very

permissive law might allow small parties to appear and disappear easily from

one election to another, creating confusion among the electorate and the

impossibility ofassigningpolitical blameing.52

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It is important to mention some of the absent issues absent of from this

reform. First, it did not include a second round for presidential election, or

any some other proevisions to ensure plurality, as has been the case in many

countries in Latin America53 (Shugart, 2007, p.180). None of the three main

parties put forward this proposal at the various to round tables on forpolitical

reform54 (Senado de la Repblica, 2007). Second, allowing reelection was

only proposed by the PAN and only for members of Congress and municipal

authorities. In Mexico, only legislators can run for a second time for a seat in

Congress after one term of office. period of legislature.

The PRI and the PRD stood against this initiative. Whereas the PAN

intends to change party links with society by reelection, the PRI and the PRD

(especially the latter), intend to strengthen their social links by incorporating

leaders of civil society and organizations as candidates. The PRD includes in

its internal rules a special quota for outsiders. The PRI is more concerned with

its internal elites rotation. As PRI Senator of the 2006-2012 legislature, Jess

Murillo Karam, posed it: if we approve reelection we will have a problem

within the party because we will create a monopoly of leaders who can obtain

public positions, excluding an important part of the members of the party. It

impedes the political circulation of elites and the incorporation of younger

politicians55.

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The constitutional clause mandating no reelection is, however, a major

problem in ofMexicos system of representation. because iI It makes

representatives more dependent on their parties for their political careers than

on the citizens. The absence of a debate on reelection reveals the little concern

that Mexican parties have, with the exception of the PAN, about introducing

accountability mechanisms. It remains and it is one of the pending themes on

a democratic agenda.

Parties and Ssociety

How do citizens view the role played by parties in democratic politics?

Thisese is a critical question for understanding the democratic ties parties have

with society.

Contradictory trends can be found in the relation between public opinion

and parties in Mexico. Even though, they are important actors in structuring

electoral preferences and political perceptions, partisan attachments have

declined, citizens have low levels of trust in these organizations and a

considerable part of the population sees them as irrelevant for democracy.

The segment of party sympathizers has declined after the transition

ended. According to Moreno and Mndez56 (2007) the proportion of

independents augmented from 2000 to 2006: in 2000 they counted for 31% of

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the electorate whereas in 2006 the proportion increased to 37%. The group of

partisans has, therefore, declined: in 2000, 64% of citizens had a partisan

attachment whereas in 2006 it declined to 59%57 (Moreno and Mndez, 2007,

p.52). This phenomenon is due to the decline of PRIs sympathizers during this

period. This party lost around 10% of its followers as part of the continuing

electoral dealignment:. Thus, from 2000 to 2006 the between 2000 and 2006

PRI sympathizers went from 34% to 23% of the electorate. By contrast, the

PAN maintained 21% of sympathizers while the PRDs sympathizers increased

from 9% to 15%. Data suggest that there is transference of loyalties from the

PRI to the PRD. It is worth noting that the PRI counts on the biggest pool of

party sympathizers, although it no longer obtains the majority of votes. This

means that independent voters represent a disputed market for the PAN and the

PRD.

The level of trust in parties is also a relevant indicator of their

performance. Public trust in parties is very low, as it is in most democracies58

(Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam, 2000) and has fluctuated considerably it

shows important changes in during the post-democratization period: in 2000

(when a presidential election was held) 34% of Mexicans showed much trust

in parties; this percentage dropped after the mid-term election of 2003 to 17%,

and rose again to 33% in the electoral context of the 2006 presidential

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election59 (Palma, 2008, p.77). Trust improves in the context of presidential

elections given that they draw more attention and interest from citizens.

There is a vast literature within comparative politics on the causes and

consequences of low levels of trust in parties and politicians and the profile of

citizens who show lower levels of political trust. Russell Dalton60 (1996),

Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam61 (2000) argue that one of the main causes of

low trust in parties is the emergence of a sophisticated, more informed and

demanding citizenship withwho has high expectations about the performance

of democratic institutions that are hardly met.

However, Mariano Torcal62 (2002), Gabriela Catterberg and Alejandro

Moreno63 (2003) have analyzed this phenomenon in most recently

democratized countries and their . Theirfindings are different from the

scholars above quoted. Torcal shows that low trust is linked to low levels of

information, cynicism and disaffection, whereas Catterberg and Moreno argue

that in some Latin American countries that have recently undergone

democratization processes, erosion of trust is related to a post-honeymoon

effect: the low performance of new democracies and their inability to

solvempossibility for solving acute social problems generate frustration and

alienation from politics. Some studies on Mexico have shown64 (Palma (2008)

that citizens who have higher levels of trust in parties are more politically

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informed and more likely to prefer democracy over any other form of political

regime. These studies suggest that the causes of low trust in parties in younger

democracies are to be found in the poor performance of regimes and lower

levels of political information and disaffection.

The problems of democratic consolidation in Mexico are also reflected

on in social perceptions of the democratic status of this country and the role

played by parties and Congress. According to Latinobarmetro65 (2006), 52%

of Mexicans thought that without parties there can be no democracy whereas

54% thought that without Congress, there can be no democracy. Mexico is

slightlybelow the average for the region: in 2006, 55 % of Latin Americans

thought that without parties there can be no democracy, and 58% that without

Congress there can be no democracy. In the same this year only 17% of

Mexicans thought that Mexico was very democratic and 17% believed that it

was not democratic at all. About 50% thought that there is and intermediate

democracy. Again, this perception is below public perceptions of consolidated

democracies in Latin America such as Uruguay, Costa Rica, Chile, and

Argentina.

Voter turnout has declined since the end of the first stage of Mexican

after the process ofdemocratization. In the 1994 presidential election (see

Figure 2), turnout was 77%, still under the process of regime change. From

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then on, electoral participation has declined both in mid-term elections and

presidential elections. In the 1997 mid-term election the turnout was 58%, and

in the 2003 mid-term election it dropped to 40%. In the 2000 presidential

election voter turnout was 64% and it went down to 59% in the 2006

presidential election.

Democratic theory emphasizes that participation is crucial for citizens to

be involved in the system of representation, to influence political decisions and

demand accountability66 (Lijphart, 1997). Yet, cases like the Mexican one,

where participation has dropped after the transition to democracy, could be

interpreted as part of the process of democratization given that this

phenomenon responds to the debilitation of clientelistic and corporativist

mechanismsbefore used earlierby the PRI for mobilizing voters, particularly,

lower income voters. Some research on electoral participation support this

hypothesis. For instance, some studies have shown67 (Buenda and Somuano,

2003) that in the 2000 presidential election the most politically sophisticated,

with higher levels of education and political information, were the citizens who

ones thatproportionally voted the most.

The data for levels of party attachments and social perceptions of parties

and democracy illustrate the contradictory processes that Mexican political

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culture is going through afterthe period of PRI hegemonythe transition to

democracy ended.

Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the role played by parties during the process

ofthe first stage ofdemocratization. and in the post transitional period.

Parties guided a gradual transition to democracy via electoral and

political reforms that institutionalized pluralism and opened new channels for

citizen representation.

The post-transitional period brought up new issues for democratic

consolidation that partly derive from the presidential electoral law and the PRD

strategy and view of politics.Alternation in power in 2000 was crucial for the

process of democratization. Nevertheless, it did not finish the disputes over

electoral results. The 2006 post-electoral conflict is a sign of the weakness of

the recently democratized electoral institutions. Moreover, problems of

democratic consolidation affecthave an expression onpublic opinion. Less than

half of Mexicans believe that there can be democracy without parties and

without Congress. Trust in parties is very low and since this phenomenon is

likely to be linked to political disaffection, it has an impact on citizen control

on political leaders.

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The introduction of accountability mechanisms is one of the pending

issues on the democratic agenda in Mexico. Prohibiting the No reelection of

representatives allows politicians to be more independent from the electorate

since they have less incentive to be accountable. Thisproblem is clearly not on

the agenda of party leaders both from the PRI and the PRD. The 2007 electoral

reform includes some self-protective measures for well established parties such

as the new regulations for coalitions and the prohibition for publicly using any

expression that denigrates institutions and politicians. Libeling politicians

should not be accepted under democratic rules; nevertheless, the ambiguity of

what denigration means seems to leave little room forhonest criticism.

This chapter has focused to a great extent on the PRDs strategy given

that this party played a major part in relevant conflicts during the last years

post-transitional period. As compared to the PAN and the PRI,parties thatwho

seek political stability, the PRD is an ambivalent actorin underdemocratic

politics. On the one hand, it has made an important contribution to public

debate by posing an alternative to neoliberalism. On the other, it acts against

democratic consolidation by using political means that undermine the fragile

institutions and democratic legitimacy. This party could change in the near

future its role in democratic politics if provided that the current party

leadership isbeing replaced by the more moderate wing of the party.group

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within the PRD. Thisprecisely is one of the main lines of conflicts that this

party faces internally.

In short, the relationship between parties and democracy today in

Mexico is to be understood by contradictory processes that parties have

undergone and pending issues of democratization and consolidation. One of

the most relevant features of this relationship is that parties have not been able

to hold a long-term commitment to electoral rules. This translates into an

endless chain of electoral reforms that always seem to be provisional and

permanent debates on institutional design. The ongoing debate on these matters

and the permanent electoral reformism gives the impression that

democratization never ends.

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NOTES

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1 Susan Stokes, Son los partidos pol ticos el problema de la democracia en Amrica Latina?,Poltica y gobierno 1

(1998): 13-46.2 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan , Toward Consolidated Democracies in Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies.Themes and Perspectives, eds. Larry Diamond y Marc Plattner (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997): 14-33.3 Juan Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Requilibration (London: John Hopkins

University Press, 1978)4 These dilemmas have to be addressed in any process of democratic design. See Richard Katz and William Crotty,

Handbook of Party Politics (London: Sage, 2006).5 Institutionalization is a matter of degrees. Following Mainwaring and Scully the institutionalization of party systems hasfour dimensions: patterns of party competition, roots in society, legitimacy, and the control on party leaders. See Scott

Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, Introduction: Party Systems in Latin America, inBuilding Democratic Institutions:

Party Systems in Latin America, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). In

Mexico, the system has a medium level of institutionalization, although, each party within the system has internally

different levels of institutionalization.6 Three of these minor parties, PVEM (Mexican Green, Ecologist Party), PT (Labor Party) and Convergencia Democrtica

(Democratic Convergence), always support one of the major candidate parties for the presidency. The other minor party,

Alternativa Socialdemcrata y Campesina (Social Democratic and Peasant Alternative) was created before the 2006 election

and run with its own candidates for the presidency.7 In countries like Uruguay and Chile the current parties were created under democracy and suspended after the militarycoups. After the transitions to democracy, the same old parties reemerged. See Manuel Antonio Garretn,Hacia una nueva

era poltica.Estudio sobre las democratizaciones,(Mxico: Fondo de Cultura Econmica, 1998).

8 The Mexican case showed similarities with the process the Communist party-systems where inclusion precededcontestation. For post-communist cases, see Zsolt Enyedi, Party Politics in Post-Communist Transition, inHandbook of

Party Politics ed. Richard Katz and William Crotty, (London: Sage, 2006).9 Giovanni Sartori,Parties and Party Systems: A framework for Analysis ( Cambridge, Cambridge: University Press, 1976) .10 Soledad Loaeza,El Partido Accin Nacional: la larga marcha, 1939-1994. Oposicin leal y partido de protesta

(Mxico: Fondo de Cultura Econmica, 1999).11 Soledad Loaeza,El partido Accin Nacional: la oposicin leal en MxicoLecturas de poltica mexicana (1977): 161 .12 The social Left includes an important number of social organizations some of them with revolutionary origins, whileothers are formed by students and neighbor based organizations.13 Vctor H . Martnez ,Fisiones y Fusiones, divorcios y reconciliaciones: la dirigencia del Partido de la Revolucin

Democrtica (PRD) 1989-2004, (Mxico: Plaza y Valds/Centro de Estudios Polticos y Sociales de Monterrey/Facultad de

Ciencias Polticas y Sociales/Facultad de Contadura y Administracin (UNAM)/FLACSO, 1999).14 Valdimer O. Key Jr., A Theory of Critical Elections,Journal of Politics 17 (1955): 3-18.15

Guadalupe Pacheco, Caleidoscopio electoral. Elecciones en Mxico, 1979-199 ( Mxico: IFE/UAM-X/Fondo de CulturaEconmica, 2000).16 The Federal District is the capital of Mexico where the federal government quarters are situated.17 Edgar Butler et.al., An examination of the Official R esults of the 1988 Mexican Presidential Election , in Sucesin

presidencial: The 1988 Mexican Presidential Election, ed. Victoria E. Rodrguez and Peter M.Ward (Alburqueque:

University of New Mexico Press, 1995.18 Kathleen Bruhn, Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico

(Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).19 Jorge Domnguez and James McCann,Democratizing Mexico: Public Opinion and Electoral Choice ( London: Johns

Hopkins University Press, 1996).20 Esperanza Palma,Las bases polticas de la alternancia en Mxico: Un estudio del PAN y el PRD durante lademocratizacin (Mxico: UAM-A, 2004).21 Pablo Javier Becerra, Las elecciones de 1997: La nueva lgica de la competencia enDespus del PRI. Las eleccionesde 1997 y los escenarios de la transicin en Mxico, coord. Csar Cancino (Mxico: Centro de Estudios de Poltica

Comparada, 1998), 75-96.22 Esperanza Palma,Las bases polticas de la alternancia en Mxico: Un estudio del PAN y el PRD durante la

democratizacin (Mxico: UAM-A, 2004).23 The analysis of the conflicts between the President and Congress that have taken place since 1997 exceeds the limits of

this chapter. Some scholars show that the rate of approval of Presidential initiatives by Congress has decreased importantly:

from 99% in 1994-1997 to 70% in 2003-2006. See Laura Valencia Escamilla, Puntos de veto en la relacin Ejecutivo-

Legislativo, Sociolgica 62 (2006): 56.24 Ulises Beltrn, Venciendo la incertidumbre: el voto retrospectivo en la eleccin presidencial de 2000 en Mxico,

Poltica y Gobierno 2 (2005):325-358.25 Esperanza Palma, El PRD y las elecciones del 2000,El Cotidiano 106 (2001): 15-23.


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26 Alejandro Moreno,El votante mexicano: democracia, actitudes polticas y conducta electoral( Mxico: Fondo de Cultura

Econmica, 2003).27 Alejandro Moreno,El votante mexicano: democracia, actitudes polticas y conducta electoral(Mxico: Fondo de CulturaEconmica, 2003), 183-184.28 Esperanza Palma,Las bases polticas de la alternancia en Mxico: Un estudio del PAN y el PRD durante lademocratizacin (Mxico: UAM-A, 2004).29 Esperanza Palma,Las bases polticas de la alternancia en Mxico: Un estudio del PAN y el PRD durante la

democratizacin (Mxico: UAM-A, 2004).30 Alejandro Tuirn, La marginacin que opt por el cambio,Reforma,August 6, 2000,Enfoque supplement .31 Luis Salazar, coord., Mxico 2000. Alternancia y transicin a la democracia ( Mxico: Cal y Arena, 2001 ).32 Alejandro Moreno,El votante mexicano: democracia, actitudes polticas y conducta electoral(Mxico: Fondo de CulturaEconmica, 2003), 225.33 Esperanza Palma, El PRD y las elecciones del 2000,El Cotidiano 106 (2001).34 Esperanza Palma and Rita Balderas , Una evaluacin del PRD despus de la alternancia de 2000 , in Mxico 2006:

Implicaciones y efectos de la disputa por el poder poltico, coord. Roberto Gutirrez, Alberto Escamilla and Luis Reyes

(Mxico: UAM, 2007), 85-123.35 CEPAL, Segundo Informe regional: Mxico, capital humano e ingresos, Serie de Estudios y Perspectivas 90 (2007).36 Francisco Reveles, El PAN en la eleccin presidencial de 2006: candidato, propuestas y resultados , in Mxico 2006:

Implicaciones y efectos de la disputa por el poder poltico, coord. Roberto Gutirrez, Alberto Escamilla and Luis Reyes(Mxico: UAM, 2007), 21-54.37 Since 2000 this party has undergone an identity crisis. Its main political internal discussions revolve around the new

ideology that should be adopted. In its national convention held in August 2008, the party decided to adopt a socialdemocratic identity.38 There were two other candidates from minor parties: Roberto Campa, of the newly created Nueva Alianza, a split from

the PRI, who gained .96% of the vote and lost registration, and Patricia Mercado who ran for Alternativa Socialdemcrata y

Campesina.39 Juan Reyes del Campillo, 2006: el nuevo mapa electoral , in Mxico 2006: Implicaciones y efectos de la disputa por el

poder poltico, coord. Roberto Gutirrez, Alberto Escamilla and Luis Reyes (Mxico: UAM, 2007), 153-177.40 Esperanza Palma and Rita Balderas, Una evaluacin del PRD despus de la alternancia de 2000, in Mxico 2006:


(Mxico: UAM, 2007).41 Alejandro Moreno, La opinin pblica mexicana en el contexto postelectoral de 2006 ,Perfiles Latinoamericanos 31

(2008): 41.42 Roy Campos, Las limpieza percibida en las elecciones , Consulta Mitofsky, December 12, 2008.43

Michelangelo Bovero, Elecciones controvertidas, signo de los tiempos ,Foreing Affairs en espaol7, no. 1 (2007) ,(http://www.foreignaffairs-esp.org/20070101faenespessay070116/michelangelo-bovero/elecciones-controvertidas-signo-de-

los-tiempos.html).44 The PAN and the PRI, on the other hand, are more institutionalized parties that have greater control over their leaders.45 Most public opinion polls have shown that the majority of citizens are against the privatization of the state-owned oil

company. A poll conducted by Grupo Reforma in July of 2008 showed that 64% of citizens are against privatization; see

Grupo Reforma, "Encuesta: segn la pregunta es la respuesta,"Reforma, July 20, 2008,Enfoque supplement.46 Esperanza Palma and Rita Balderas, Una evaluacin del PRD despus de la alternancia de 2000, in Mxico 2006:


(Mxico: UAM, 2007), 119.47 Chantal Mouffe, La paradoja democrtica. (Barcelona: Gedisa, 2003 ) .48 Jos A. Crespo, 2006: hablan las actas. Las debilidades de la autoridad electoral mexicana, (Mxico: Debate, 2008) ;

Matthew Sober Shugart, Mayora relativa vs. segunda vuelta,Poltica y Gobierno 1 (2007) ; and Gabriel Negretto,Propuesta para una reforma electoral en Mxico,Poltica y Gobierno 1 (2007).49 Jos A. Crespo, 2006: hablan las actas. Las debilidades de la autoridad electoral mexicana, (Mxico: Debate, 2008).50 Lorenzo Crdova, La nueva reforma electoral, Nexos 367 (2007).51 Hctor Aguilar Camn, La suprema corte y la libertad de expresin , Milenio, July 10, 2008, Opinion section, National

edition.52 A very important analysis of negative consequences of a fragmented party system is the one developed by Scott

Mainwaring on the Brazilian case; see Scott Mainwaring,Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization,

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).53 Matthew Sober Shugart, Mayora relativa vs. segunda vuelta,Poltica y Gobierno 1 (2007) : 180.54 Senado de la Repblica, Iniciativas de Ley sobre la Reforma del Estado, Senado de la Repblica,

www.senado.gob.mx/comisiones/LX/cenca.
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55 Interview conducted by the authorWITHto PRI Senador Jess Murillo Karam. March 2nd, 2008. Mexico City.56 Alejandro Moreno y Patricia Mndez, Identificacin partidista en las elecciones presidenciales en Mxico: 2000 y 2006,

Poltica y Gobierno 1 (2007).57Alejandro Moreno y Patricia Mndez, Identificacin partidista en las elecciones presidenciales en Mxico: 2000 y 2006,

Poltica y Gobierno 1 (2007): 52.58 Susan Phar and Robert Putnam,Dissaffected Democracies. Whats Troubling the Trilateral Countries? ( Princeton, New

Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000).59 Esperanza Palma, El problema de la confianza en los partido en las democracias latinoamericanas, reflexiones desde el

caso mexicano, Seminario Partidos polticos y Sistemas Electorales (2008): 77.60 Russell Dalton, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Western Democracies (Chatman, New

Jersey: Chatman House, 1996).61 Susan Phar and Robert Putnam,Dissaffected Democracies. Whats Troubling the Trilateral Countries? ( Princeton, New

Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000).62 Mariano Torcal, Richard Gunther and Jos Ramn Montero. Anti-party Sentiments in Southern Europe , inPolitical

Parties: Old Concepts and new Challenges, ed. Richard Gunther, Jos Ramn Montero and Juan Linz (Great Britain:

Oxford University Press, 2002) 257-290.63 Gabriela Catterberg and Alejandro Moreno , The Individual Bases of Political Trust: Trends in New Established

Democracies, (paper prepared for delivery at the 58yh Annual Conference of the American Association for Public Opinion

Research (AAPOR),Nashville, Tennessee, 2003).64 Esperanza Palma, El problema de la confianza en los partido en las democracias latinoamericanas, reflexiones desde el

caso mexicano, Seminario Partidos polticos y Sistemas Electorales (2008).

65 Latinobarmetro, Informe Latinobarmetro 2006, Latinobarmetro, www.latinobarometro.org .66 Arendt Lijphart, Unequal Participation: Democracys Unresolved Dilemma ,American Political Science Review Vol.

19, 1 (1997).67 Jorge Buenda and Fernanda Somuano, La participacin electoral en la eleccin presidencial de 2000 en Mxico,

Poltica y Gobierno 2 (2003).

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