WILL REDD+ « ONLY SUCCEED IF IT RESPECTS INDIGENOUS RIGHTS »?

rights-based and performance-based approaches for Bolivia and Peru

Deborah Delgado-Pugley UCL Louvain – EHESS Paris

Introduction

• Indigenous peoples have struggled hard to achieve recognition for community-based management of forests.

• We will focus on the political obstacles they find, arising from competition over rights & access to resources, and over the benefits from forests, (including REDD incentives).

• Claims for forests and forestlands may involve: Wealthy farmers & agribusiness agents b. Displaced peasants c. Business

consortia (logging, mining) d. The expansion of protected areas.

On the top of these competing actors and claims, both countries have large, state-supported infrastructure projects.

Analysing strategies of competing actors on the ground Ambitious reforms on governance for the Amazon Basin are still insecure.

Useful to analyse strategies displayed by actors on the ground related to IPs or community rights :

1. What are the strategies of competing interest groups to undermine existing indigenous rights?

2. How will third parties try to take advantage of communities who have gained rights?

3. What are the most effective available strategies for indigenous peoples to defend and continue to deepen rights granted to them by national regimes? (including the right to participate in opportunities such as REDD+)

(adapted from Larson, 2011)

Structure of the presentation

• Brief overview of the legal framework on Indigenous Peoples rights in Peru and Bolivia (Rights to land and FPIC).

• Analysis of the current political processes that engages Indigenous Peoples rights and REDD, (employing questions identified by Larson et al 2011) for Bolivian and Peruvian cases.

• Draw out some practical lessons, for both a rights-based and performance-based approach to REDD in national contexts.

Indigenous peoples rights to land

Bolivia Peru

1990s: Series of executive decrees recognizing areas as under indigenous control and possession. 1996: National Agrarian Reform Service Law. Serious obstacles. 5.4 million hectares of indigenous land entitled. 2009: AIOC (Autonomias indigenas originario campesinas [Indigenous originary peasant autonomies]) is recognized in the Constitution.

1979: The Constitution recognized indigenous land rights as inalienable, unmortgageable, and imprescriptible. 1993: Current Constitution represents a step backward on this issue making them subject to being bought and sold. 2009: Intention to weaken the legal framwork lead to IPs mobilization (Bagua)

Free Prior Informed Consent

Bolivia Peru

• Ratified ILO (1992) • Evo Morales administration (MAS)

actively promoted the approval of UNDRIP at the UN General Assembly.

• Bolivia is the first country to incorporate this UNDRIP in its Constitution.

FPIC is now a constitutional right, but indigenous peoples are still waiting for specific regulations to enforce it.

• Ratified ILO 107 and, ILO 169 (1994) • Peruvian law on FPIC was one of the

first strong measures adopted by the new government (in power since August 2011).

Law on Consultation and its reglament are designed (August 2011-March 2012). The Congress has to vote them. All peasant and indigenous national organizations (6) have presented their objections and reserves on both texts.

Bolivia in REDD at a glance

• First country to host a large forest carbon project for voluntary markets: the Noel Kempf Mercado in Santa Cruz.

• Receives direct support from the UN-REDD Programme. The 4th policy board (Nairobi, March 2010) approved $4.7M for Bolivia.

• First working plan (2010 – 2013). Bolivia’s international position on REDD (against market schemes) and the TIPNIS conflict caused significant delay in the project start up.

• Bolivia is not part of the FCPF or FIP.

• COP17 Bolivia presented its approach regarding integral and sustainable management of forests as a non-market alternative.

Bolivia’s position on UNFCCC COP16 in Cancun

“The text replaces binding mechanisms for reducing greenhouse gas emissions with voluntary pledges that are

wholly insufficient. These pledges contradict the stated goal of capping the rise in temperature at 2C, guiding us instead to a

rise of over 4C or more. ”

Pablo Solon – Bolivian Ambassador to the UN

• Bolivia organized critical social gatherings as the First ‘Peoples' World Conference on Climate and the Rights of Mother Earth’ after Copenhagen talks (April 2010).

Peru in REDD at a glance

• Part of FIP and receives indirect support from the UN-REDD.

• Part of the FCPF since 2008. FCPF Policy Committee positively assessed Peruvian R-PP during its 8th PC (March, 2011). IDB will probably accompany Peru as a Delivery Partner as soon as the PC adopts the Common Approach to environmental and social safeguards for multiple delivery partners (Oslo, June 2011) and once a Transfer Agreement between World Bank & the Delivery Partner is signed.

• Peru has ‘pilot projects’ ongoing on indigenous peoples’ land: Community attitudes to REDD+ range from expectation to suspicion.

Bolivian contradictions: The TIPNIS Case

• Both a protected area and an indigenous territory

• Entitled to three indigenous peoples: moxeños, yuracarés and tsimanes D.S. Nº 22610, 1990; ‘Titulo Ejecutorial’ TCO-1997 for 1.236296,3317 Has.

• Identified as one pilot project for Bolivian UN-REDD GIZ (Germany).

2 main drivers of deforestation: 1. Growing deforestation in the

south of the protected area because of agriculture (coca leaf production). Increasing pressure on land from new settlers.

1. Projected road by the core zone of the protected area. Bank loan approved in 2010 by the BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank).

3 años después

de la construcción195.792 haDeforestadas

[The road project] • Very high probability of important impacts in the environment

and livelihoods for the population (core zone of the park directly affected).

• No public information on the project (key-in-hand).

• A way open for new coca leaf production settlements (rumours of land allocations ‘lotizacion’ as already underway).

• No FPIC and…

Evo Morales declarations (June 2011)

15 August 2011 8th Indigenous March for the life, indigenous rights and the environment follows the same path.

June 1990 1st Indigenous March for the Territory and Dignity

What are the strategies of competing interest groups to undermine existing indigenous rights?

From competing social actors in the TIPNIS case:

• Strengthen of a peasant-indigenous ‘syndicate’ inside the TIPNIS territory (Conisur- Indigenous Council of the South, a group representing 12 of the 69 indigenous communities from the TIPNIS).

• Organization of a contested ‘Counter-marche’ with support of the State: Pro-road march is led by Conisur.

Strategies of competing interest groups to undermine existing indigenous rights

From the State in the TIPNIS case:

1. Attempts at ex post and biased consultation processes to Indigenous Peoples (Law Nº 222)

- without a national regulation on FPIC.

- Intending to include in the consultation populations who are not part of the IPs entitled to the territory (cf. Conisur).

- On a context of direct intervention in the territories by Ministers and the President himself in exchange for consent for the road development, widely documented by national media.

« El presidente Evo Morales empezó ayer a honrar sus

compromisos con el Consejo Indígena del Sur (Conisur). »

LA RAZON (Oromomo – March 2012)

From the State:

2. Interfering in co-administration of the protected area and the right of gathering in the territory:

A: Regional and national authorities of SERNAP were changed arbitrarily. Productive projects have been blocked (wood and tourism concessions as well as community management of fauna).

B: Militarization of the territory:

“The army is setting up camps within communities”

C: Limited access to transport inside the territory

(Commercialization of petroleum derivate is controlled; IP organization is not allowed to buy fuel, because of anti-drug trafficking policies).

3. Excluding progressively lowland IP (CIDOB members) from decision-making on the allocation of resources from the ‘Indigenous Fund’ (for indigenous and peasant communities).

4. Undermining the CIDOB alliance by negotiating other regional vindications case-by-case.

‘Climate change, the Green Fund and REDD’ (Act of negotiations 23th October 2011)

The government says no to REDD, but it has received money for REDD programs. What is demanded

by CIDOB is to know to which activities this funding will be allocated for. We, Indigenous peoples, as

owners of most of the forests of the country, have claimed to know on what we will work. “

Dilfredo Moreno, enlace técnico de la CIDOB-REDD

• )

Demand:

"We demand that the government recognizes our right to receive direct

retributions (payments) in compensation for the mitigation of greenhouse gases

emission that our territories ensure (environmental services)."

Agreement:

1. The Government and the IP agree to enforce the agreements of the World Conference

of Peoples held in Tiquipaya in April 2010 through a common agreement.

2. Based on the agreed Plan, build programs and concrete projects that strengthen the

capacity of the indigenous communities for the management of their forests and to

ensure that the benefits meet the social needs of communities in indigenous territories.

3. Socialize existing documents of the National Strategy for Forest and Climate Change,

CIDOB proposals and other existing initiatives.”

Effective strategies for Indigenous peoples to defend and deepen rights

1. Building on ILO 169 and UNDRIP. Assembly (February 13th -15th) to

evaluate the regulation of the Peruvian law on Consultation (N°29785). 4 of 6

finally asked for ‘amendements’ of the law arguing that it had articles that were against ILO 169.

2. Strengthening supra communal - regional organisations and building autonomous indigenous REDD committees. Regional organizations in Peru have agreed not to sign REDD+ contracts until IP’ and local communities’ rights are guaranteed, due processes for FPIC are agreed and the nature of REDD+ projects and programmes have been clearly defined.

Effective strategies for Indigenous peoples to defend and deepen rights 3. Mobilisation seeking for solidarity among the national society: The impact on public opinion proves to be crucial.

A new mobilization is programed for the 22th April, although in harder conditions, as the government starts breaking alliances among indigenous organizations.

4. Acting in different political arenas

UNFCCC COP 17 (Durban) Press Conference CONAMAQ, CIDOB, COICA

VIII March. Negotiation with State representatives (Puerto San Borja – Bolivia)

Reinforcing rights through performance?

• Opportunity-cost calculations and result-based approach defined as emission reductions is dominant on REDD proposals.

• In order to to address drivers of deforestation and degradation finance would need to catalyse the structural change in forest governance: policy and legal reform and long-term strategic planning.

• Performance-based: measure and directly pay for ‘co-benefinits’ as core-benefits that result in reversing forest cover & carbon loss.

Phase 1 The development of strategies or action plans, policies and measures and capacity building (the readiness phase)

Phase 2 The implementation of these strategies or plans, policies and measures that could involve further capacity building and technology transfer;

Phase 3 Results-based actions that are measured reported and verified.

Some lessons

• As the Bolivian case shows, governments can act against Constitutions that recently represented their biggest political achievement; confronting them to important segments of society that brought them to power.

• As Governments don’t put in practice legal principles, this contentious space continues to be insufficient: confrontations, which aren’t free of violence, still the way to get claims heard.

• Development imperatives undermines IP rights: Constitutions specifically let the central governments override indigenous and tribal land titles (Roldan Ortiga, 2004); as well as co-management of protected (TIPNIS co management contract 1.8).

Some lessons

How does REDD places itself in this context?

• In both cases there is a lack of national debate / public information on REDD.

• REDD is setting up incentives that increase the value of a contested asset leading to conflict.

• Procedural issues and expectations with no contract: Opening of misunderstandings and competition.

• Pushing for improvements in governance?

Thanks!

deborah.delgado@uclouvain.be