OPERATIONS SERIES ADFP 3.8.1 PEACE OPERATIONS … · 2017. 11. 23. · 2D–1 Water requirements in...

ADFP 3.8.1

OPERATIONS SERIES

ADFP 3.8.1

PEACE OPERATIONS PLANNING AND PROCEDURES

Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) 3.8.1 is issued for use b y the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and is effective forthwith. This publ ication supersedes ADFP 3.8.1 edition 1, dated July 2004.

A.G. HOUSTON, AO, AFCAir Chief MarshalChief of the Defence Force

Department of DefenceCanberra ACT 2600

14 December 2009

Edition 2

© Commonwealth of Australia 2009

This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part may be rep roduced by any process withou t prior written permission from the Australian Government Department of Defence.

Announcement statement—may be announced to the public.

Secondary release—may be released to the public.

All De fence i nformation, wh ether cl assified or n ot, is pro tected from unauthorised d isclosure u nder the Crimes Act 1914. Defenc e information may only be released in accordance with the Defence Security Manual and/or Defence Instruction (General) OPS 13–4—Release of Classified Defence Information to Other Countries, as appropriate.

ADFPFirst edition 2004Second edition 2009

Sponsor Chief of Joint OperationsHeadquarters Joint Operations Command

Developer CommandantJoint Warfare Doctrine and Training CentreRoyal Australian Air Force BaseWILLIAMTOWN NSW 2314

Publisher Defence Publishing ServiceDepartment of DefenceCANBERRA ACT 2600

Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1

FOREWORD1. Australian De fence D octrine Publications (ADDP) and ADF P are authorised join t d octrine for th e gu idance of ADF op erations. ADDP are pitched a t the ph ilosophical an d h igh-application level, a nd AD FP a t the application and pro cedural le vel. Pol icy is prescriptive as represented b y Defence Instructions, and has legal standing. Doctrine is not policy and does not have l egal st anding, however, i t provide s authoritative an d proven guidance, which can be adapted to suit each unique situation.

2. ADDP 3.8—Peace Operations is the parent publication to this ADFP. It i s d irected at th e st rategic a nd o perational level s of conflict, with the intention of provid ing information to assist commanders a nd the ir sta ff in understanding the nuances of peace operations (PO) an d in planning ADF participation in such operations.

3. ADFP 3.8.1 is directed at the operational and tactical levels. It provides more detailed information on PO to assist commanders and staff at all levels in understanding the nuances and planning and conduct ADF participation in PO. The structure of this publication is as follows:

• Chapter 1 p rovides information on PO terminology an d p rinciples, describes the nature and type of PO that the ADF may be involved in, and identifies the various organisations that are part of contemporary PO.

• Chapter 2 o utlines the ap proach of human itarian orga nisations towards PO, i dentifying thei r em ergency, de velopment a nd human rights focus and the roles and relationships they expect of a military force.

• Chapter 3 discusses those a spects of comman d, co ntrol and coordination which are applicable to ADF participation in PO.

• Chapter 4 identifies the main types of tasks that may be performed by a military force during PO.

• Chapter 5 provides in formation on th e pla nning aspects of PO including in telligence, in formation op erations and gen eral p lanning considerations.

• Chapter 6 outlines legal issues such as mandates, rules of engagement and other operations law considerations.

• Chapter 7 reviews the training and force preparation requirements for military forces deploying on a PO.

• Chapter 8 provides an overview of logistic support to PO.

Edition 2 iii

ADFP 3.8.1

4. The material in this ADFP has bee n sourced from opera tional experience, oth er natio ns’ do ctrine, a nd a w ide ran ge o f un classified publications and websites.

iv Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1

AMENDMENT CERTIFICATEProposals for amendment of ADFP 3.8.1 may be i nitiated i n either of the following ways:

• By Minute to:

SO1 DoctrineJoint Warfare Doctrine and Training CentreRAAF BaseWILLIAMTOWN NSW 2314

• By directly enterin g comment into the Join t Do ctrine Lib rary (JDL ) found on the Joint Wa rfare Doctrine a nd T raining Centre (JWDTC) Defence Restricted N etwork (DRN) website (see http://intranet.defence.gov.au/vcdf/sites/JWDTC/). Select JDL on the JWDTC ho me pa ge a nd o pen eithe r the ADDP o r ADFP block a s required. Open the relevant publication and utilise the ‘Add Comment’ function button of the summary page for each publication.

Note

The second op tion is an addi tion to encourage fe edback from the wider ADF, as well as encouraging use of the JDL in general.

Amendment Effected

Number Date Signature Date

This publication is current as at December 2009.

This pu blication wi ll be periodically reviewed and amended. The latest version of this publication is available on the JWDTC DRN website http://intranet.defence.gov.au/vcdf/sites/JWDTC/.

Edition 2 v

http://intranet.defence.gov.au/vcdf/sites/JWDTC/



ADFP 3.8.1

DOCTRINE PUBLICATION HIERARCHYThe hi erarchy of ADDP an d ADFP and the latest el ectronic version of all ADDP and ADFP are available on the JDL found on the JWDTC DRN website located at http://intranet.defence.gov.au/vcdf/sites/JWDTC/.

vi Edition 2


ADFP 3.8.1

CONTENTSPage

Authorisation iForeword iiiAmendment Certificate vContents vii

Paragraph

CHAPTER 1 THE NATURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Introduction 1.1Organisations 1.3Terminology 1.8Principles 1.10Primary stakeholders 1.11Other stakeholders 1.13

CHAPTER 2 HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

Introduction 2.1HUMANITARIAN STAKEHOLDERSNon-government organisations 2.5United Nations agencies 2.14International organisations 2.16Australian Government aid 2.21HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLESCOORDINATION MECHANISMS

Annexes:A. Humanitarian relief, aid and development

organisations/agenciesB. The humanitarian charterC. The humanitarian Code of ConductD. Minimum standards in disaster relief

CHAPTER 3 COMMAND, CONTROL AND COORDINATION

Introduction 3.1COMMAND AND CONTROLDefinitions 3.7Exercise of command 3.8Command and control in United Nations peace

operations 3.12COORDINATIONCivil-military operations 3.24

Edition 2 vii

ADFP 3.8.1

CHAPTER 4 PEACE OPERATIONS TASKS

Introduction 4.1MILITARY OPERATIONSFact-finding missions 4.2Liaison and negotiation 4.3Inspection, investigation, verification and

monitoring missions 4.4Sanction operations 4.5Observer missions 4.6Interpositional missions 4.7Preventive deployments 4.8Defence of protected zones 4.9Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of

belligerent/opposing forces 4.10HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONSRESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDERMilitary involvement 4.18Tasking considerations 4.20Liaison 4.31Summary 4.33SUPPORT TO ELECTORAL OPERATIONSIntroduction 4.34Security 4.35Logistics 4.38Coordination and integration 4.39

Annex:A. Differences between civilian police and the

military

CHAPTER 5 PLANNING ASPECTS

Introduction 5.1INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION

OPERATIONSIntelligence 5.4Information operations 5.10PLANNINGPlanning environment 5.13Characteristics and constraints 5.17Planning considerations 5.29MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

Annex:A. United Nations Integrated Mission Planning

Process

viii Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1

CHAPTER 6 LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

Introduction 6.1LEGAL BASIS FOR PEACE OPERATIONSLEGAL REGIME APPLICABLE DURING A

PEACE OPERATIONMission accomplishment and the use of force 6.7Rules of engagement 6.11Status of deployed forces 6.15Rights, privileges and immunities 6.19Command and discipline 6.24Law of armed conflict in peace operations 6.29Human rights in peace operations 6.34OTHER OPERATIONS LAW

CONSIDERATIONS

Annex:A. Summary of Guidelines for the Development

of Rules of Engagement for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

CHAPTER 7 TRAINING AND FORCE PREPARATION

Introduction 7.1Training 7.3Auditing 7.4United Nations training and force preparation 7.5United Nations standardised guidelines 7.10Multinational force training guidelines 7.15Australian Defence Force training support 7.16

Annexes:A. United Nations Peacekeeping Training

Standards and GuidelinesB. Multinational Force Training Guidance

CHAPTER 8 LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Introduction 8.1UNITED NATIONS LOGISTICSDefinition 8.6Structure 8.7Concepts 8.9Logistic support 8.13Equipment 8.16Contingent owned equipment 8.17

Edition 2 ix

ADFP 3.8.1

Verification and control for contingent owned equipment 8.25

MULTINATIONAL FORCE LOGISTICSAUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE LOGISTICS

DOCTRINE

Glossary

Acronyms and Abbreviations

x Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1

LIST OF FIGURESFigure Title Page

3–1 Civil-military liaison elements will facilitate the cooperation required to ensure achievement of mission objectives 3–9

4–1 Australia’s contribution to enforcement of United Nations sanctions in the Persian Gulf 4–3

4–2 Military coordination with local police during United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor in Timor Leste 4–8

4–3 Australia’s commitment to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 4–12

5–1 Example of information operations material produced during Operation STABILISE INTERFET 5–5

Edition 2 xi

ADFP 3.8.1

LIST OF TABLESTable Title Page

2–1 Gap identification chart—matrix showing emergency sector providers within each region in an area of operations 2–13

2–2 United Nations High Commission for Refugees view on the role of military force 2–16

2D–1 Water requirements in relief operations 2D–22D–2 Food and nutrition in relief operations 2D–3

4A–1 Differences between civilian police and the military 4A–1

7–1 United Nations standardised generic training modules 7–8

7A1–1 United Nations Military Observer Pre-deployment Training Core Curriculum Checklist 7A–4

7A1–2 United Nations Staff Officer Pre-deployment Training Core Curriculum Checklist 7A–8

7A1–3 United Nations Peacekeeping Contingent Pre-deployment Training Core Curriculum Checklist 7A–14

Edition 2 xiii

ADFP 3.8.1 Chapter 1

CHAPTER 1

THE NATURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS 1

Introduction 1.1

1.1 PO are und ertaken by the in ternational community as part o f wider diplomatic efforts to assist in the prevention, resolution or con tainment of a conflict. The first PO i nvolved un armed United Natio ns (UN) o bservers o r lightly armed military peacekeeping (PK) forces, deployed after the cessation of hostilities between two or more States and with the consent of the parties involved. In the modern, post Cold War world such ope rations can be more complex and multi-dimensional, ranging from pure PK to peacebuilding (PB) operations incorporating preventive diplomacy, peace enforcement (PE) and peacemaking activities.

Executive summary

• A peace o peration (PO) is o ne response o ption available to the international community to assist in the preve ntion, reso lution or containment of a conflict.

• PO are con ducted i n supp ort o f p olitical and dipl omatic effo rts to establish and maintain peace.

• The fu ndamental pri nciples gu iding a military force in PO a re consent, impartiality, the use of force and legitimacy.

• In modern PO, a military force will often be required to create and maintain a secure environment to permit the conduct of political and diplomatic negotiations and th e del ivery of hu manitarian assistance (HA).

• A PO may include diplomatic, political, civil administration, military, HA, civilian police (CIVPOL) and electoral organisations.

• Multi-agency missions create an environment where cooperation is critical to developing the coordination necessary for agencies to fulfil their respective mandates.

‘Peacekeeping is not a soldier’s job, but only a soldier can do it’.

Dag Hammarskjold Secretary-General United Nations 1953–1961

Edition 2 1–1


1.2 This Austra lian Defen ce Fo rce Publi cation (ADF P) bui lds up on the philosophical b asis for PO ou tlined in Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.8—Peace Operations. It provides practical information to assist commanders and staff at all levels to understand PO and to assist in planning Australian Defence Force (ADF) participation in such operations.

Organisations 1.3

1.3 United Nations. The UN concept was developed during World War Two, building on the strengths of its predecessor, the League of Nations. The UN has played a pivotal role in PO since its inception in 1945, although in the post-Cold War environment PO have become more complex in response to changing world political conditions.

1.4 The UN Charter provides the authority for establishing UN PO. Detail on th e UN and its Cha rter i s con tained in chap ter two of ADDP 3.8 . Traditionally, PO fel l in to one of tw o categories, ‘ peacekeeping’ or ‘ peace enforcement’, based on Chapters VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggre ssion) respectivel y of th e UN Charter. More rece ntly the characteristics and requirements of some missions have required responses that overlap both Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter.

1.5 Regional and multinational operations. In the post Col d Wa r environment it has become apparent that the UN may not be the most suitable or w illing o rganisation to un dertake ce rtain military op erations. In such circumstances there are exampl es where regio nal or mu ltinational (MN) coalitions have e ffectively instigated PO in resp onse to reg ional conflict. In these instances the UN is relieved of the significant burden imposed by PO but international legitimacy should still be provided by UN sanction. Examples of e ffective PO co nducted by regi onal, co alition or MN forces incl ude the South Pacific Peace keeping Force (SPPKF), Boug ainville; the Regional Assistance Mission to th e Solo mon Isl ands (RAMSI) a nd Econo mic Community of Western Africa’s operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Each of these operations was supported by UN sanctions.

1.6 Regional or alliance operations are specifically provided for in Chapter VIII (Regional Arrangements) of the UN Charter. PO under this chapter can be PK or PE, however the use of force does require the authorisation of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Such PO will be governed by the terms of an agreement between pa rties to a d ispute, an d must be condu cted in accordance with the di ctates of in ternational l aw. Example s of such operations include the SPPKF operation on Bougainville1 and the MN Force

1 Australia was lead-nation for the SPPKF, and Brigadier Peter Abigail was the SPPKF Force Commander. Operation LAGOON was t he f irst Au stralian-led j oint an d combi ned peace operation.

1–2 Edition 2

http://intranet.defence.gov.au/jdde/twautologin?KD=kd1&username=GuestUser&L=1


http://intranet.defence.gov.au/VCDF/sites/JWDTC/comweb.asp?page=46298&Title=Joint%20Doctrine%20Library





and Observers in the Sinai. The latter was established under sponsorship of the United States of America to supervise the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt. Creating a regional alliance for the operation circumvented opposition to UN involvement from the then Soviet Union.2

1.7 Asia-Pacific arrangements. Within the Asia-Pacific region there are several alliances, treaties and arrangements to which Australia is a signatory. Australia cond ucts b ilateral regio nal se curity dial ogue with most of the countries in the East Asia/Pacific reg ion. It sho uld be noted, however, that nations choose to be involved in PO for many reasons and membership of an alliance or orga nisation doe s not automatically g uarantee th at nation’s participation.

Terminology 1.8

1.8 PO make use of di plomatic, civil and military means, no rmally in pursuit of UN Charter purposes and principles, to prevent conflict or to restore or maintain peace. Today, PO may include the following activities:3

a. Conflict prevention. A pea ce supp ort ope ration (PSO) employing complemen tary d iplomatic, civil , an d when necessary military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, an d ta ke ti mely action to p revent the occurren ce, escalation, or resumption of hostilities.

b. Peacebuilding. A PSO employing complementary diplomatic, civil an d w hen necessary military mea ns, to ad dress the underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. It requires a commitment to a long-term process and may run concurrently with other types of PSO.

c. Peace enforcement. A PSO condu cted to main tain a ceasefire or peace agreement where the level of consent and compliance is uncertain and the threat of disruption is high. The peace sup port force must be cap able of applying cred ible coercive force and must apply the provisions of the ceasefire or peace agreement impartially.

d. Peacekeeping. A PSO follo wing an ag reement or cease fire that has established a permissive environment where the level of consent and compliance is high, and the threat of disruption is low. The use of force by a peace support force is normally limited to self-defence.

2 Major G eneral David Fergu son, AM f rom Australia was mult inational f orce and observers Force Commander (21 April 1994 to 10 April 1997).

3 Refer ADDP 3.8 and for further details.

Edition 2 1–3




e. Peacemaking. A PSO, co nducted afte r the ini tiation o f a conflict to secure a ceasefire o r pea ceful settl ement, th at involves prima rily dipl omatic acti on sup ported, when necessary, by direct or indirect use of military assets.

f. Preventive diplomacy. Action to preven t di sputes from developing betwee n p arties, or to preve nt existing dispu tes from escalating into conflic t and to li mit the exp ansion of conflicts when they occur.

1.9 Traditional PK operations can be divided into four b road, sometimes overlapping, categories as outlined below:

a. Military observer/liaison mission. A military obse rver (MILOB)/liaison mission is a traditional observer mission relying on unarm ed MN UN mili tary observers (UNMO) or military liaison of ficers (MLO). Th e U N can es tablish an UNMO-only mission or it may deploy UNMO within the same area of operations (AO) as a UN PK force.

b. Comprehensive settlement mission. A compreh ensive settlement mi ssion uti lises PK forces to pro vide the stabi lity necessary to conduct free and fair el ections and establish a new government.

c. Humanitarian assistance mission. A HA mission involv es the deployment of a PK force to protect the distribution of aid and the distribution agency involved.

d. Interpositional forces. Interpositional forces are lightly armed PK forces deployed into a d isputed area following the signing of a cea sefire agreement or tru ce. Interpositional forces may also monitor the wi thdrawal of o pposing an d interna tional forces that are, or are b elieved to be, sympathetic to one side or have been used in a support role during a conflict. The use of an in terpositional force dur ing th e preven tive diplomacy process can al so b e a u seful de-escalation tool. The sequencing and military occupation of the ceasefire line by an interpositional force sho uld take i nto con sideration the following:

(1) acceptance by a ll p arties of the presen ce of the PK force;

(2) deployment along agreed lines of demarcation;

1–4 Edition 2


(3) withdrawal of op posing fo rces (i f n ot already undertaken);

(4) expansion of the PK force into a buffer zone or area of separation; and

(5) potential areas of limitation designed to prevent major weapon systems or troop conc entrations adjacent to a buffer zone.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—THE NATURE OF A TRADITIONAL UNITED NATIONS MISSION

The deployment of an Australian Army Officer, Major George Mayes, to the Middle East typifies the nature of a ‘traditional’ UN mission, the importance of having observers ‘on the spot’, and the importance of maintaining an inherent ability to respond.

Born in Maryborough, Quee nsland, Ge orge Mayes un derwent National Service tra ining in 1956 and subseq uently served in the Citizens’ Mili tary Forces (CMF) , later Army Reserve ( ARES), until 1983. At th e he ight o f the Vietnam W ar ARES officers were employed on ful l-time service to fill many of Austra lia’s UN commitments. Mayes was Office r Commanding B Company, 42nd Battalion, The Royal Queensland Regiment, in 1972 when he was selected fo r du ty as a UNMO) with the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) from September 1972.

He served a s D uty Office r in Da mascus and Amman , an d in observation posts (OP) alon g the Demarcation Line on the Go lan Heights between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. In October 1973 he sha red du ty i n OP X-R ay on the Syrian si de o f the Demarcation Line with fellow UNMO Captain Chris Linde (Swedish Army) and Lie utenant Mu stapha Ra madan (Syri an Army Li aison Officer). L ife in an OP fol lowed the pattern o f a ‘tradi tional’ UN mission, maintaining a presence in a self-sufficient, isolated outpost between former be lligerents. UNMO attend to the ir own d omestic chores whil st obse rving the ma intenance of the cease -fire agreement and reporting violations—a r elentless cycle of ‘cooking and looking’.

Edition 2 1–5


Principles 1.10

1.10 The principles that guide a military force in PO are:

a. Consent. PK requires the con sent and coo peration of the parties to the conflict to allow a PK force to deploy and carry out its tasks. PE operations may be undertaken where consent is not guaranteed or universally acknowledged by all parties.

b. Impartiality. T he impa rtial a nd objective pu rsuit of the mandate, regardless of provocation and challenge, is essential to preserving the legitimacy of the operation and the consent and cooperation of the conflicting parties.

c. Use of force. PK is a non -coercive instrument and, as a general rule, force is use d as a l ast re sort to a chieve the mandate. Th e righ t of self-defence alwa ys remains. Since 1973, the UNSC has stipulated that self-defence includes the resistance to at tempts by forceful me ans to pre vent th e PK force from discharging its duties as mandated.4 PE operations are coercive in nature, and will inevitably involve some use of force.

4 Department of Peacekeeping Operations General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations, page 20.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—(cont)Mayes and Linde were on duty at OP X-Ray on 06 October when a Syrian armoured division crossed the Demarcation Line at that very location to invad e Israe l, commencing the ‘Yom Kippu r’ War. The fortuitous presen ce of th e UNMO ga ve th e U NTSO Force Commander an une quivocal and quan titative assessment of this breach of th e Go lan He ights cease-fire, whi ch had b een in place since the conclusion of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.After a cease-fire was established between Israeli and Syrian forces on th e Gol an Hei ghts, the UN Disengagement Observer Fo rce (UNDOF) was created on 6 June 1974 as an inter-positional force to supervise the terms of the cease-fire. Maj or Maye s was o ne of several UN MO de tached from UN TSO to create thi s new force immediately upon the cease-fire coming into effect. The ability to respond in such a way is an inherent capability of missions such as UNTSO.

1–6 Edition 2


d. Legitimacy. The UN or o ther reg ional o rganisation provides legitimacy through the mandating of a mi ssion. For Australia, legitimacy is an important asset for an y operation, demonstrating that the operation is representative of the will of the international community as a whole.

Primary stakeholders 1.11

1.11 There will be a number of primary stakeholders wi thin an AO, each operating within its own sp here of co mpetence an d influence. T he goals, however, should be intertwined and the efforts coordinated. Because of the limited opp ortunities fo r these primary stakeho lders to o perate together outside of a PO, the relationship between them may a t times be strained. A clear u nderstanding of the role of each primary stake holder wi ll better facilitate the attainment of the end state of the PO.

1.12 The various primary stakeholders and the structure of contemporary PO are di scussed in chapter o ne of ADDP 3.8 . T he pri mary stakeh olders typically involved in PO include:

a. Diplomatic and political. Diplomatic efforts will initially seek to broker an agre ement be tween conflicting pa rties to cease armed agg ression, an d a PO may be initiated to aid implementing an agre ement or to buil d confidence in the diplomatic process. Th e po litical represen tative providing leadership in most UN missions is the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) or Head of Mission (HOM).

b. Civil administration. The civil administration (CA), led by the Director of Ad ministration o r Chief Administr ative Officer, supports th e SRSG o r H OM in the fields of log istics procurement, sustainment, movement and communica tions. Detailed information concern ing lo gistics can be fo und in chapter eight.

c. Military. The military force is provide d by several troop contributing nations. The military force and ADF conduct of a PO is discussed in chapter 6—‘Legal considerations’. Detailed information co ncerning legal con siderations a nd force preparation guidance is provide d in chapter 6 and chapter 8—‘Logistic support’ respectively.

d. Humanitarian assistance. In almost every crisis there will be an interde pendence between th e role s of the mi litary and humanitarian g roups. D etailed i nformation on the varie ty of humanitarian an d human rights age ncies ca n be fou nd in chapter 1—‘The nature of peace operations’.

Edition 2 1–7




e. Civilian Police. The need to restore and uphold law and order is a growing trademark of contemporary PO that demands the expertise of i nternational CIVPOL. In formation o n CIVPOL operations is at chapter four.

f. Electoral. Op erations that are fo cused on nation or PB will often require a p lebiscite as part o f the p eace agreement. Information on mili tary support to electoral processes during operations can b e found in chapter 4—‘Peace op erations tasks’.

Other stakeholders 1.13

1.13 In addition to the primary stakeholders referred to above, there may be a range of other civil actors op erating within an AO or providing external influence on the conduct of operations.

a. Other government departments. Mi litary force represents only one instrument of national power. National military forces will work with other national authorities in order to achieve unity of ef fort a nd th e d esired ou tcomes o f th eir re spective governments. Ag encies from other government departments (OGD) have roles in foreign operations including responsibility for the fun ding, mo nitoring and eval uating development progra ms. Aust ralian OGD may incl ude the Department of Fore ign Affairs and Trad e, the Austra lian Agency for International Development, the Australian Federal Police, and the Department of Immigration and Citizenship. In humanitarian emergen cies th ese OGD ma y be present and working with the lead agency or CA.

b. Civilian community leaders. Community leaders will be those people in n on-government po sitions wh o control co mmunity decisions, resources, and guide the opinions and actions of the civilian community.

c. The general population. T he gen eral population in cludes inhabitants within the AO who hold no formal office, posting or position that identifies them as a representative of a recognised CA or mandated organisation. In situations that require military engagement it is probable that the general population has been involved in a crisis, such as conflict or natural disaster, that has influenced their e xisting situa tion. The crisis may result in civilians leaving thei r p lace of residence, either voluntarily or involuntarily. Su ch p eople ar e re ferred to collectively as dislocated civil ians, w hich could in clude in ternally displaced persons and refugees.

1–8 Edition 2


d. The corporate sector. T he co rporate se ctor i nvolves MN business, civilian companies and financial institutions that may already be established in the crisis region or become engaged early on in the process of reconstruction. Companies deployed in response to th e crisis may contribute to emergen cy reli ef initiatives as well as to longer-term development.

e. Private military corporations. Pri vate mi litary corpora tions, or private security companies, provide a range of advisory, training, defensive and offensive services normally considered within the responsibilities of regular military and police forces. Such org anisations a re u sed in an AO b y go vernments, corporations, humanitarian groups, the media, and the UN.

f. Media. The media is a pervasive force during war and peace. Its importance in modern conflicts is well understood by most parties due to its ability to disseminate information rapidly and widely. F urther de tail on th e impo rtance of the me dia i s contained in ADDP 3.8, chapter one.

1.14 Further detail on t hese stake holders is avai lable in ADDP 3.11—Civil-Military Operations, chapter three.

Edition 2 1–9


http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/home/documents/data/ADFPUBS/ADDP/3.11/03.pdf

http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/home/documents/data/ADFPUBS/ADDP/3.11/03.pdf


CHAPTER 2

HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS 2

Introduction 2.1

2.1 As peacekeeping (PK) missions have evolved, the need for concurrent HA activities has become increasingly apparent. During the UN Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) in 1992–94, a HA program was launched to help the 3.7 million people displaced by the war. In the two-year operation, the biggest ever undertaken in Africa by the UN High Commission fo r Refugees (UNHCR), 1.3 million refugees were repatriated. At the same time UNOMOZ demobilised more than 76 000 soldiers from both sides (10 000 of whom were rei ntegrated into the ne w national a rmy) and recovered about 155 000 weapons.

2.2 HA activity is most likely to be a permanent military line of operation in future p eace o perations (PO). T his is cer tainly the case in complex environments where conflict is on going. The most suitable organisations to undertake HA are UN a gencies, NGO a nd private vo lunteer organisations (PVO). The mi litary fo rce shoul d fo cus on the p rovision of security in order to permit freedom of movement and access to the affected local population by HA a gencies. There may be times when the mil itary will be intimately involved in the provision of HA.

2.3 Although UN agencies, NGO a nd PVO share simila r goals, the self-motivation of such groups can lead to confli cts in prio rities and inefficiencies in the delivery of aid. Regardless, their organisation, experience and access to resources make these groups highly effective in identifying and addressing HA needs.

Executive summary

• The most suitabl e orga nisations to un dertake hu manitarian assistance (HA) are United Nations (UN) age ncies an d non-government organisations (NGO).

• The focus of a military force in HA ope rations is the provi sion of security in order to permit freedom of movement and access to the affected local population by the HA organisations.

• The involvement of NGO in conflict zones is focused on three main areas of activity: humanitarian, human rights and conflict resolution.

• The three internationally accepted principles of HA a re human ity, impartiality and neutrality.

Edition 2 2–1


2.4 This chapter details the humanitarian principles and code of conduct followed b y hu manitarian agencies; i t also id entifies the support they ma y request from the mili tary. The provision of life savin g support i s sub ject to minimum standards which are also identified to assist in the planning of any military supp ort. T he intent is to convey the human itarian age ncies’ perspective. A list of H A, aid and development operations and agencies is provided in annex A.

HUMANITARIAN STAKEHOLDERS 2.5

Non-government organisations 2.5

2.5 NGO may also be known as PVO or voluntary agencies. NGO may be formed b y gene ral cha rity g roups; church o r re ligious affilia ted grou ps; o r trade, business or u nion affilia ted groups. They a re, in e ffect, not-for-profit organisations focused on p reventing and alle viating human su ffering, protecting l ife, improving h ealth, p rotecting the human be ing, promoting education and economic development and encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.1

2.6 The structure an d capaci ty of NGO to respond to lo cal and international emerge ncies is as diverse as th e fields of interest an d the budgets they operate within. Funding for NGO activity can be provided from both pub lic2 and private sou rces, wi th many relying purel y on priva te donations. The work of NGO can be broadly grouped into three categories: humanitarian, human rights and conflict resolution.

2.7 The prepo nderance of NGO effort in conflict resolu tion is directed towards stop ping conflicts from arising, acti ng as ad vocates and negotiating/mediating with th e parties to the conflict. The presence of NGO cannot be discounted in the area of operations (AO), ho wever, it is unlikely that Au stralian Defence Fo rce (ADF ) ele ments wou ld b e re quired to w ork closely with them. On the other ha nd, th e presen ce of hu manitarian and human righ ts grou ps sh ould be expe cted at the op erational and tactical levels, and they should be expected to wield individual or collective authority and influence.

2.8 Humanitarian non-government organisations. Humanitarian NGO are th e most n umerous a nd in clude such wel l known organ isations a s Cooperative for Assistance and Re lief Ever ywhere (CARE), Oxford Committee for Famine Reli ef (OXF AM) an d Wo rld Visio n. Th e activity of

1 Aall, P (2000) International Peacekeeping. Volume 7(1).

2 The 2008–2009 Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) budget earmarks $AUD 95 millio n f or contribution t o NGO. ( AusAID Bu dget S ummary, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/budget/budget08/summary08.cfm.)

2–2 Edition 2

http://www.ausaid.gov.au/budget/budget08/summary08.cfm


humanitarian organ isations is usua lly divided between two phases; a relief phase (emergency response), where priority is to the immediate humanitarian needs of the population, and a development phase, where projects aimed at long-term sustainability of the community are implemented.

2.9 International agencies su ch tho se na med above may possibly be present in the AO undertaking development projects prior to the demand for a military commitment. T hey are li kely to be present th roughout a PO, engaged in either relief or development work or both. During the relief phase emergency management experts will replace or supplement the development staff. The focus during emergency operations is to relieve suffering and save lives and may include provision of f ood, clean water, san itation equipment, shelter, me dical aid i ncluding disease control and the repa ir of essential infrastructure. This group of NGO will be the most prevalent and will have the most in teraction with the military force d uring the early stages of a mil itary deployment.

2.10 Refugee3 a ssistance ran ges from su pplying b asic h uman needs during mass movement of people to protecting asylum seekers. Refugees are usually co ntained in ma keshift ca mps admini stered by the U NHCR or a refugee NGO. Because of the mass of people accommodated, it is probable that these camps will be a haven for elements or groups responsible for the conflict or forced displacement. This poses a security threat to the people, the administrating authority and the military force. Security screening of refugees is a UNHCR responsibility, ai ded by th e UN civilian police (CIVPOL). The military force may have an interest in the security and screening processes in order to gain pertinent tactical information. The security responsibility within a refugee camp rests with national police authorities however in their absence the military force and CIVPOL may be requested to assist.

2.11 Human rights non-government organisations. Human rig hts violations are commo n durin g intra-st ate a nd inter-state conflict. This has resulted in an increase in the number of human rights specialists present in an AO during a PO. Human rights NGO focus on promoting the basic rights of all people regardless of their background. The protection of these rights is often a contentious issue, not only in States with repressive regimes but also with governments whose reli gious or cu ltural val ues are at od ds with the principles of individual rights.4

3 Within th is publ ication, the te rm ‘re fugee’ col lectively refers to those people who cross an international border i n order t o seek protection, and also t hose people who are d isplaced within t heir national b orders ha ving f led conf lict or be en f orcibly moved but are unable to sustain themselves (often termed ‘internally displaced persons’).

4 Aall, P (2000) International Peacekeeping. Volume 7(1):128.

Edition 2 2–3


2.12 Human rights NGO do not have the same focus as relief organisations, in that they see k out, rese arch a nd addre ss situation s where repression occurs. T he re lationship re quirements between these sp ecialists a nd the military will vary from the p rovision of case evidence or information gained during operations to the protection of their representatives in the conduct of their duty.

2.13 There are over 2100 NGO with consultative status to the UN ranging in size from small voluntary organisations to large, well known, professional organisations. While not all of these will be represented in an emergency, it is likely that NGO working in the same conflict zone will operate in partnership with the UN and in some cases may be viewed as sub-con tractors for the delivery of support. It wil l be important that the military force is aware of the standing of each agency, as those with UN endorsement will be afforded the same protection as UN representatives.

United Nations agencies 2.14

2.14 There are many UN agencies and organisations directly involved with humanitarian o perations. The manda tes of th e vari ous org anisations are specific to a particular be neficiary po pulation or sectoral interest, of which there may be some overlap. Regardless of the organisation, UN assistance in emergencies is usually at the request of a national government.

2.15 The more common organisations that may be encountered include the following:

a. United Nations High Commission for Refugees. In operations involving refugees, UNHCR will be responsible for protection and assistance a ctivities on b ehalf o f refugees. In some circumstances UNHCR may be appointed as th e UN lead a gency and the refore assume respon sibility for the coordination of the entire UN response.

b. United Nations Development Program. The focus of the United N ations Development Prog ram (UNDP) is on development of local capacities including governance, poverty reduction, recovery and the environment.

c. United Nations Children’s Fund. Uni ted Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) holds a mandate for chil d p rotection, education/development and poverty reduction.

d. World Food Program. T he World F ood Program i s responsible for the alleviation of hunger, and has vast capacity to deliver food for distribution. It is likely that a military force will operate closely with this organisation.

2–4 Edition 2


e. World Health Organisation. With a respo nsibility for heal th and disea se control of a glo bal nature, Wo rld Heal th Organisation e lements are likely to be in an AO, b ut contact with the military force may be limited to medical staff.

f. United Nations Commission for Human Rights. Thi s commission is responsible for the supervision of the universal principles of human rights, monitoring human rights within the AO and in vestigating human righ ts a buses including allegations ag ainst the mul tinational (MN) force or UN PK force. United Nations Commission for Human Rights (UNCHR) may be supported by NGO specialists.

g. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.The Office for the C oordination of Human itarian Affairs (OCHA) is not an ope rational age ncy (for exampl e, sector delivery agency), but is part of the UN secretariat tasked with the coordination of UN assistance in humanitarian crises where more th an o ne a gency is de ployed. This is the focus organisation for the coordination of military support to HA.

5

International organisations 2.16

2.16 The major international organisations with a hu manitarian focus are the International Committee of the Red Cross (IC RC) and the Interna tional Federation o f R ed Cro ss a nd Re d Cresce nt Societies (IFR C). T hese organisations combine to form the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ofte n re ferred to as ‘ the Move ment’). They h ave sp ecial international status deri ved fro m th e Ge neva Co nventions and Pro tocols. They are the on ly aid agencies with an offi cial resp onsibility unde r international humanitarian law (IHL) for reducing human suffering in times of conflict.

2.17 International Committee of the Red Cross. The ICRC undertakes protection an d assistance activities for the b enefit of prisoners-of-war, supervises prison er releases an d exchanges, provi des emergen cy reli ef

The aim of humanitarian assistance is to sustain dignified life, to strengthen local institutions’ efforts to relieve suffering and build self-reliance, and to assure that the first step is taken towards reconstruction, rehabilitation and development.

United Nations Commission for Human Rights5

5 Handbook for UNHCR Field Officers on working with the military (2002).

Edition 2 2–5


services to war-affected populations, traces displaced individuals, organises family contacts and reunions, and develops, disseminates and interprets IHL. In times o f con flict, the ICRC directs an d coord inates the re lief a ctivities conducted by the Movement.

2.18 International Federation of Red Cross. The IFRC is an ‘umbrella’ organisation for th e many national R ed Cross soci eties, in cluding the Australian Red Cross. The functions described below are actually carried out by the n ational socie ties wh ile the IFRC coordi nates p olicy and contact between the societies.

2.19 The functions undertaken by the Red Cross and Red Crescent include some operational tasks of the ICRC such as tracing and national c ustodial responsibility for IHL, however, its humanitarian activities include response to domestic disasters and activities such as first aid and blood bank services.

2.20 There is a cl ose affiliation between the ADF and the Australian Red Cross a s members of bo th organ isations have d eployed o n the sa me operations many times. The Red Cross in all its forms is fiercely independent and impartial, and will not deploy on operations with a military force. Rather, they wil l deploy independently into a humani tarian operation AO, and then liaise with the ADF elements in place.

Australian Government aid 2.21

2.21 The Austra lian Government aid ag ency (AusAID ), admin isters Australia’s overseas aid program. AusAID is an autonomous body within the Department o f Foreign Affairs and T rade. Its ob jective i s to a dvance Australia’s natio nal intere st by a ssisting deve loping coun tries to reduce poverty an d achie ve susta inable de velopment.6 Th e primary geog raphic focus of AusAID is the Asia-Pacific region; however, it also assists in wider global problems providing development and emergency relief where required. The sectors th at AusAID focuses on are heal th, ed ucation, infrastructure, rural development and governance.7

2.22 AusAID maintai ns close and effe ctive partnersh ips wi th MN organisations and NGO. By working with the UN, AusAID is able to address global h umanitarian a nd d evelopment i ssues throug h a wid er ne twork of organisations. It also provides dire ct a ssistance to o ther Co mmonwealth countries in development, advocacy and conflict management strategies.

6 Australia’s Overseas Aid Program (see http://www.ausaid.gov.au/makediff/default.cfm).

7 As an example, through the governance program, AusAID has been involved in East Timor since the UNAMET p opular con sultation in 19 99, imp roving the East T imor g overnment’s capacity in public administration and supporting rural development, water supply and water sanitation.

2–6 Edition 2

http://www.ausaid.gov.au/makediff/default.cfm


2.23 Due to the links NGO have with communities in nee d, AusAID continues to develop strong strategic links with these organisations including the integration of NGO and volu nteers into its coun try progra ms. The Australian NGO umbrella organisation, the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, works closely with AusAID in information dissemination and coordinating responses for aid donations.

2.24 The ADF, at the stra tegic and op erational level s of conflict, should establish information sharing and planning relationships with AusAID in order to become familiar with the aid aspect of the whole of government response to crises.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE EAST TIMOR IN FACILITATING HUMANITARIAN

ASSISTANCEThe operation of the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) clearly de monstrates th e he althy a nd co -operative relatio nship which mu st n ecessarily be eng endered between a mili tary force conducting pea ce op erations and UN o rganisations a nd NGO in order to further the interests of all parties.

Following the rejection of a special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia by a majority of voters in a popular consultation hel d in 199 9, pro-integration mi litias l aunched a campaign of violence throughout the territory. As a result of the visit to Jakarta and Dili by a UN Security Council (UNSC) mission, on 12 September 1999 the Government of Indonesia agreed to accept an offer of assistance from the international community. Through UNSC Resolution 12 64, the U NSC then autho rised INT ERFET, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to restore peace and security in East Timor and, within force capabilities, to facilitate HA operations.

Organisations within the UN system began a large-scale emergency relief effort, including aid convoys and the provi sion of sh elter and basic services. INTERFET elements initially airdropped supplies of food an d medi cine, a nd p rotected convoys carrying aid workers, making sure supp lies got to the East Timorese pe ople. Relief workers and supplies were deployed incrementally as th e security situation i mproved, a nd co nsideration was g iven to the man y thousands of displaced Ea st Ti morese peop le in West Timor and other areas in Indonesia and the region.

Edition 2 2–7


HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES 2.25

2.25 Humanitarian relief and aid agencies are bound by the Humanitarian Charter an d Co de o f Conduct (see annexes A a nd B), an d h ave a greed standards for the provision of emergency relief (see annex C).

2.26 UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 46/182 states that HA must be provided in accordance with the core humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality:8 these principles are well accepted by aid agencies and organisations.

a. Humanity. Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, wi th pa rticular attention to the most vulne rable in the population, such as chi ldren, wo men an d th e eld erly. The dignity an d ri ghts9 of all victims must be resp ected and protected.

b. Neutrality. HA must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in con troversies of a p olitical, reli gious or ideological nature.

c. Impartiality. HA must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic o rigin, g ender, nationality, po litical opi nions, race o r religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.

8 Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies—An IASC Reference Paper (2004).

9 See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—(cont)Much of the success of INTERFET can be attributed to the security and sup port it con tributed to the stabilisation process, permitting freedom of movement and access to the affected local population by humanitarian elements which carry the central responsibility for relief and deve lopment. IN TERFET achi eved this success th rough the effective acti ons of a civil -military op erations cel l wh ich directed activities in support of NGO and the UN agencies.

2–8 Edition 2


2.27 UN age ncies and NGO will no rmally be prese nt in an AO th at demands a mi litary pre sence be cause of conditions wh ich these organisations co nsider as an emerg ency. Human itarian orga nisations describe a complex emergency as:

‘A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown in authority resulting from internal or external co nflict, a nd wh ich req uires an interna tional respon se th at goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country program’.10

2.28 Characteristics that are l ikely to pre vail i n a compl ex emerge ncy include the following:

a. large numb ers of civili an victims in cluding besi eged or displaced populations and human suffering on a major scale;

b. substantial i nternational a ssistance is needed a nd the response goes beyond the cap acity of a single humanitarian relief organisation;

c. delivery of HA11 is impeded or prevented by parties to a conflict;

d. the security risk for relief workers providing HA is high; and

e. relief workers are targeted by parties to the conflict.

2.29 Humanitarian relief operations will require the commitment of national and international agencies to reduce the impact of these conditions, as well as diplomatic and political initiatives, which may include the deployment of a military force.

2.30 The principles of response12 for a humanitarian relief emergency are in most instances common regardless of the main demand of the operation.

10 UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies, 2nd edition, page 4.

11 HA here is consid ered to i nclude food, water, sanitation, shelter, logistics and med ical care required to sustain the population that would not normally be required.

12 UNHCR Hand book f or E mergencies, 2 nd ed ition, p ages 5– 8, but ada pted t o re flect a generalised response to humanitarian emergencies.

Edition 2 2–9


2.31 The following guidance is provided to identify some of the difficulties confronted by huma nitarian agen cies so th at military plan ners may bette r understand HA sector respo nses. Th is ma y assist in a ssessing the coordination effort required to produce an effective response.

a. Get the right people to the right place at the right time. The single most important fa ctor in determinin g whe ther or not sufficient emergency assistance reaches those in need will be the quality of people involved in planning and implementing the response. This includes the read iness to fund activities, and provide sufficient materiel.

b. Ensure measures are appropriate.

(1) Identify the need. An app ropriate resp onse in the provision of protection and material assistance requires an assessment of the needs of the affected population that considers material state, culture, age and gender.

(2) Flexibility. Pl anning and re sponse must be flexible enough to surge and meet new challenges early in an operation. It sh ould as far as p ossible use local resources (personnel and material).

(3) Identify the standards. UN a nd NGO re sponse agencies ne ed to de termine, in consu ltation wi th the government and sta keholders, th e ap propriate standards of relief to be app lied. In gen eral, these standards must reflect the special needs of the affected population based on their condition, physical situation and experiences.

(4) Remember long term objectives. From the outset of the response, the resources must b e divided between immediate ne eds and action a imed at lo nger term capacity building an d d evelopment. Emerge ncy assistance should be allocated, to the maximum extent possible, to a ctivities th at wil l be of la sting b enefit. Transition planning to the l ong term situation needs to be undertaken early in the response.

c. Involve the population and promote self-reliance. T hose affected by the e mergency can inadvertently be rega rded as passive recipients of aid. This can have detrimental outcomes and b reed unnecessary d ependency. T he population sho uld be i nvolved from the o utset in o rder for the response to be effective and promote self-re liance. T here is a ne ed to be

2–10 Edition 2


aware of varying social and economic roles: understanding the roles of men, women and children in the affected society will be necessary to ens ure response s do not cross social lines. Community lea ders sho uld be involved i n p lanning and decision making processes.

d. Do not treat issues in isolation. The most effective response is to h ave a mul ti-sector framewo rk a nd b e mindful of environmental degradation.

e. Work for durable solutions. Encourage self-reliance in order to reduce dependency, and be mindful of early actions having long term consequences.

f. Monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the response.Implement monitoring, reporting and evaluation systems th at detect chan ge or success (develop measures of effectiveness).

COORDINATION MECHANISMS 2.32

2.32 OCHA has the resp onsibility fo r coord inating the UN a nd N GO response to complex emerg encies. It doe s so throug h the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) establi shed in the mission , a commi ttee convened b y OCHA with p artners that may inclu de any or all of the UN agencies and NGO involved.

2.33 One of these agencies will be appointed the humanitarian coordinator, and coo rdination o f U N assistance will be throu gh o ne o f the follo wing options:13

a. Resident coordinator. Th e reside nt coo rdinator (RC) is the leader of the UN country team and is normally the head of the UN Development Program (UNDP). In a complex emergency, the RC may also be desi gnated as the human itarian coordinator (HC).

b. Lead agency. One of the UN agencies may be selected to lead the coordination, and this is often the agency that provides the majority of the assistance.

13 UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies, 2nd edition, pages 59–60.

Edition 2 2–11


c. Humanitarian coordinator. A HC ma y be appointed in large scale eme rgencies. This role no rmally p hases out o nce the emergency re aches the recovery p hase with resi dual tasks then passed to the RC.

d. Regional humanitarian coordinator. If the emergency affects more than one country, a HC having regional responsibilities may be appointed.

2.34 United Nations Civil Military Coordination. The primary UN process for enabling coordination between civil agencies and the military force is UN Civil Military Coordination (CMCoord).

a. UN CMCoord is the essential dialogue and interaction between civil actors and the military force in humanitarian emergencies that i s ne cessary to p rotect and promote human itarian principles, a void compe tition, mi nimise in consistency, and when a ppropriate p ursue co mmon go als. Basic strategie s range from coexistence to cooperation. Co ordination is a shared respon sibility facilit ated by lia ison and common training.14

b. UN CMC oord i s u ndertaken on b ehalf of the interna tional humanitarian community under the direction of the HC or RC for humanitarian action by UN officers trained in CMCoord. UN CMCoord officers are advisors and facilitators. They advise the leadership of the humanitarian community on civil-mil itary issues and facil itate th e establi shment, mai ntenance and review of ap propriate rela tions be tween the human itarian organisations a nd the military force. Dep ending on the situation, they may also serve as liaison from the humanitarian community to the military force.

2.35 In determining whether and to what extent they should coordinate with a military fo rce, human itarian agencies must be mind ful o f the p otential consequences of too clo se an affil iation with the mili tary o r even the perception of su ch a ffiliation. An y su ch rela tionship or percep tion co uld jeopardise th e humanitarian princi ples of ne utrality a nd impartiality. The concept o f non-allegiance is central to the principle of ne utrality in humanitarian action; likewise, the idea of non-discrimination is crucial to the principle of impartiality. However, the key humanitarian objective of providing protection and assistance to populations in need may at times necessitate a pragmatic approach. Even so, ample consideration should be given to finding

14 United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook.

2–12 Edition 2


the right b alance be tween a prag matic and a p rincipled re sponse, so th at coordination wi th the military fo rce does no t comp romise human itarian imperatives.

2.36 Depending on the scope of th e emer gency it m ay be necessary to establish implementing agreements with partner organisations within the UN system or between UN agencies and NGO. From the military perspective this may seem to confuse operational responsibilities on the ground. For instance, the provision of health care may be the responsibility of one organisation, and water, sanitation and hygiene the responsibility of another.

2.37 Operational responsibilities may be fu rther complicated by a division of re sponsibility i nto ge ographic re gions within the AO. It wi ll the refore be necessary for the military force to de velop a ma trix o f emerg ency secto r providers within each sector or region in an AO, as shown in the example in table 2–1.

Table 2–1: Gap identification chart—matrix showing emergency sector providers within each region in an area of operations15

Region 1 Region 2 Region 3Refugee Protection

UNHCR UNHCR UNHCR

Food Distribution Agency M Agency M Agency RShelter Agency B Agency KWater Agency B Agency YHealth Agency J UNHCRLogistics Agency H Agency K

15 UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies, 2nd edition, modified from page 52.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN EAST TIMOR IN FACILITATING

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONSThe su ccess o f the U nited Na tions T ransitional Autho rity i n East Timor (UNTAET) in facil itating HA o perations i n Ea st Timor in 2000–01 larg ely resulted from an ef fective force structure. Thi s combined with a strong cooperative relationship through which the efforts of the military force permitted humanitarian elements to carry out their central role.

Edition 2 2–13


2.38 Coordinating th e effo rt of civil -military reso urces is outlin ed in chapter 4 of Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.8—Peace Operations. The fo llowing paragraphs outline the perspective of humanitarian agencies (including the UN) regarding how the military could support the humanitarian relief effort.

2.39 Humanitarian assistance principles of engagement. Th rough experience in humanitarian relief operations, HA agencies have developed a number of prin ciples relatin g to their en gagement with the mi litary on the

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—(cont)On 25 Octobe r 1 999, the U NSC establi shed the UNTAET as an integrated, multidimensional PK operation ful ly responsible for the administration of East Timor during its tra nsition to independence. UNSC Resolution 1272 mandated UNTAET under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to ensure the coordination and de livery of HA and to assist in th e esta blishment of condi tions for sustaina ble development. T o maintai n a secure en vironment in o rder to accomplish thi s, UNTAET i ncluded a ci vilian pol ice force an d an armed military PK force. Responsibility for mili tary operations was transferred from International Force East Timor to the UNTAET on 24 February 2000.

With the secure e nvironment provi ded by UNTAET, the UNHCR implemented a shelter rehabilitation program and the distribution of shelter kits, wh ile the UN C hildren’s Fund became in volved in rebuilding schools.

It is interesting to note that the ADF efforts in school, community and other infrastructure reco nstruction are generally not considered as ‘humanitarian projects’ by humanitarian agencies. Rather, they are construed as ADF elements deployed with a PK force expressing a sentiment of wanting to help the community within that unit’s area of operational responsibility, o r as a mea ns o f establishing rapp ort between the ADF and the local community.

UNHCR also looked towards facilitating the voluntary repatriation of some 250,000 East T imorese from West Ti mor and o ther areas in Indonesia and the region. With this aim, it pursued an effective mass information p rogram ab out con ditions of return to East Timor. Convinced that stabilisation had occurred and trusting in the security provided by the UNTAET, by April 2000 over 200 000 refugees had returned from Indonesia.

2–14 Edition 2



conduct and delivery of humanitarian relief. The following principles represent the coll ective sen timent of the hu manitarian co mmunity, a nd indicate the environment in which the ADF could operate:

a. HA work should be performed by humanitarian organisations (an agreed OCHA principle) and military force elements should only be empl oyed as a last re sort. When there are ad equate humanitarian agencies within an AO, they should conduct all humanitarian relief operations. The conduct of special projects is not ne cessarily co nsidered a s ‘hu manitarian’ b y humanitarian agencies.

b. HA agencies provide assistance according to the principles of humanity (addressing suffering wherever it is found), neutrality (providing assistance without engaging in hostili ties or taking sides in poli tical, religious, or ide ological controversie s), and impartiality (providing assistance wi thout discriminating as to ethnic o rigin, g ender, nationality, po litical opi nions, race o r religion). As a conseq uence of these principles, HA agencies can never operate under military control.

c. From the perspective o f the h umanitarian agencies, the primary aims of international military peace force should be to:

(1) establish and maintain order and security;

(2) protect civilians; and

(3) facilitate a comprehensive settlement of the conflict.

2.40 The type of support the military is considered likely to p rovide to the population is reflected in table 2–2. In a ddition, humanitarian agencies may expect supp ort to their organisations within th e categories of information support, security for the conduct of operations (convoy escorts and security of personnel), asset protection and evacuation operations.

Edition 2 2–15


Notes

(a) Direct Assistance: th is invol ves direct interface wi th beneficiaries in delivering humanitarian assistance.

(b) Indirect Assistance: the humanitarian deliverable is at least one step separated from th e bene ficiary. F or example, provisio n of interim transport and handling of relief goods.

(c) Infrastructure Support: this w ould in clude repa iring road s, b uilding bridges and restoring electricity.

Table 2–2: United Nations High Commission for Refugees view on the role of military force16

Annexes:A. Humanitarian relief, aid and development organisations/agenciesB. The humanitarian charterC. The humanitarian Code of ConductD. Minimum standards in disaster relief

Type of Support

Peacetime (for example,

natural disasters)

Peacekeeping

UN Charter Chapter VI

Peace Enforcement

UN Charter Chapter VII

Combat

Direct Assistance (Note a)

Yes Maybe No No

Indirect Assistance (Note b)

Yes Yes Maybe No

Infrastructure Support (Note c)

Yes Yes Yes Maybe

16 Handbook for UNHCR Field Officers on working with the military (2002), page 22.

2–16 Edition 2

Annex A to ADFP 3.8.1 Chapter 2

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF, AID AND DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATIONS/AGENCIES A

* French/German abbreviations and terms in italics where applicable

* French abbreviations in brackets where applicable

ACFOA Australian Council For Overseas AidACVA American Council of Voluntary Agencies (New York)ADB (BAFD*) African Development Bank (Adidjan)AFP Agence France PresseAFSC American Friends Service Committee Inc (Philadelphia)AICF Action Internationale Contre la FaimAID Agency for International Development (Washington)AID Action In Distress (London)AJDC American Joint Distribution CentreAP (BAD*) Asian Development Bank

BBF Brother’s Brother Foundation (Pittsburgh)

CAFOD Catholic Fund for Overseas Development (London)CARE Cooperative for American Relief EverywhereCARICOM Caribbean Community (Georgetown)CARITAS Caritas Internationalis (Rome)CASA Christian Agency for Social Action (India)CCC (CCD*) Customs Cooperation Council (Brussels)CCIA Commission of the Churches on International

Affairs (WCC)CCPD Commission on the Participation of the Churches in

DevelopmentCE Council of Europe (Strasbourg)CENTO Central Treaty Organisation (Ankara)CICARWS Commission on Inter-Church Aid, Refugee and World

Service (WCC)CIDA (ACDI*) Canadian International Development Agency (Ottawa)CMC Christian Medical CommissionCMEA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Moscow)COR UNUM Coordination of Roman Catholic Relief Agencies (Vatican)CORR Christian Organisation for Relief and

Rehabilitation (Dacca)CORSO Council of Organisations for Relief Service Overseas

Inc (NZ)CRS Catholic Relief Service (New York and Geneva)CWS Church World Service (USA)

Edition 2 2A–1

ADFP 3.8.1

DAC (CAD*) Development Assistance Committee (OECD, Paris)DANIDA Danish International Development Agency (Copenhagen)DART Disaster Assistance Relief Team (USA)DD–II Second Development Decade (UN)DDW Das Diakonische Wark-German Churches Service

Agency (Stuttgart)DEC Disaster Emergency Committee (UK)

ERO Emergency Relief Operations of WHO (Geneva)

FDRC Foreign Disaster Relief Coordinator (USAID, Washington)

GIEWS Global Info rmation a nd Early Wa rning Syste m (FAO, Rome)

ICCB International Catholic Child Bureau (Geneva)ICEM (CIME*) Intergovernmental Committee for European

Migration (Geneva)ICRC (CICR*) International Committee of the Red Cross (Geneva)ICVA (CIAB*) International Council of Voluntary Agencies (Geneva)IDA (AID*) International Development Association (Washington)IIPE International Institute for Education Planning (UNESCO,

Paris)INCSEC Indo-China Secretariat (ICRC/LORCS, Geneva)IRC International Rescue Committee (New York)IUCW International Union for Child Welfare

LWF Lutheran World Federation (Geneva)LWS Lutheran World Service (Geneva)

MSF Medecins Sans Frontiers

NCR Norwegian Church Relief (Oslo)NORAD Norwegian Agency for Development (Oslo)NOVIB Netherlands Org anisation for In ternational Devel opment

Cooperation

OAS Organisation of American States (Washington)OAU Organisation for African UnityOECD Organisation for Economic Coo peration and

Development (Paris)OFDA Office of Fo reign Disaster Assistance (USAID,

Washington)OSRO Office of Special Relief Organisation (FAO, Rome)

PAHO Pan American Health Organisation (Washington)

2A–2 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1

SCF Save the Children FundSPEC South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (Suva)SWISSAID Swiss Association for Aid to Developing Countries (Bern)

UNO (ONU*) United Nations OrganisationUNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and

Development (Geneva)UNDP United Nations Development ProgramUNDRO Office of the United Nations Disaster

Coordinator (Geneva)UNEP United Nations Environment Program (Nairobi)UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organisation (Paris)UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

(Geneva)UNIC United Nations Information CentreUNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund (New York)UNRISD United Nations Research Institute for Social Development

WCC World Council of Churches (Geneva)WEP World Employment Program (Geneva)WFC World Food Council (UN FAO, Rome)WOW War on Want (London)

Edition 2 2A–3

Annex B to ADFP 3.8.1 Chapter 2

THE HUMANITARIAN CHARTER B

Humanitarian age ncies committe d to thi s Charter and to the Min imum Standards will aim to achieve defined levels of service for people affected by calamity or armed conflict, and to promote the observance of fundamental humanitarian principles.

The Humanitarian Ch arter expresse s agencies’ co mmitment to these principles an d to a chieving the Mini mum Standards. T his commitment i s based on agencies’ appreciation of their own ethical obligations, and reflects the rights and duties enshrined in international law in respect of which states and other parties have established obligations.

The Charter is concerned with the most basic requirements for sustaining the lives and dign ity o f those a ffected b y calamity or c onflict. The Minimum Standards wh ich foll ow a im to qua ntify the se requ irements wi th regard to people’s needs for water, sanitation, nutrition, food, shelter and health care. Taken together, the Human itarian Charter and the Minimum Sta ndards contribute to a n op erational framew ork for a ccountability in human itarian assistance efforts.

1. Principles 1

We reaffirm our belief in the humanitarian imperative and its primacy. By this we mean the beli ef th at a ll p ossible ste ps shoul d be take n to preve nt o r alleviate human suffering arising out of conflict or calamity, and that civilians so affected have a right to protection and assistance.

It is on the basis of this belief, reflected in international humanitarian law and based on the principle of humanity, that we offer our services as humanitarian agencies. W e will act in accordan ce with the prin ciples of hu manity and impartiality, and with the o ther principles set out in the Code of Conduct for the Internation al Red Cross and Red Cre scent Movemen t and Non-Governmental Organisations in Disaster Relief (1994).

The Humanitarian Charter affirms the fundamental importance of the following principles:

1.1 The right to life with dignity 2.2

This right is reflected in the legal measures concerning the right to life, to an adequate standard of living and to freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. We understand an individual’s right to life to entail the right to h ave steps taken to p reserve li fe where it is threa tened, and a corresponding duty on others to take such steps. Implicit in this is the duty not to wi thhold or frustra te th e pro vision of life-saving assistance . In a ddition, international h umanitarian l aw make s specific p rovision fo r assistance to

Edition 2 2B–1

ADFP 3.8.1

civilian populations during conflict, obliging states and other parties to agree to the provision of humanitarian and impartial assistance when the civi lian population lacks essential supplies.1

1.2 The distinction between combatants and non-combatants 2.3

This i s the distinction which underpins the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Add itional Protoco ls o f 1977. This fun damental p rinciple h as b een increasingly eroded, as reflected i n the enormously increased proportion of civilian casualties duri ng th e se cond ha lf of the twen tieth ce ntury. That internal conflict is often referred to as ‘civil war’ must not blind us to the need to distinguish between those actively engaged in hostilities, and civilians and others (including the sick, wou nded and prisoners) who play no d irect part. Non-combatants are protected under international humanitarian law and are entitled to immunity from attack.2

1.3 The principle of non-refoulement 2.4

This is the principle that no refugee shall be sent (back) to a country in which his or h er li fe or freed om would be threatened on account of race, rel igion, nationality, membership of a pa rticular social group or po litical op inion; or where there are substantial grounds for believing that s/he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.3

2. Roles and responsibilities 2.5

We recognise that it is firstly through their own efforts that the basic needs of people affected by calamity or armed conflict are met, and we acknowledge the primary role and responsibility o f the state to provid e assistance when people’s capacity to cope has been exceeded.

International law recognises that those affected are entitled to protection and assistance. It defines legal obligations on states or warring parties to provide such assistance or to allow it to be provided, as well as to prevent and refrain

1 Articles 3 and 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948; Articles 6 and 7 of the International Covenan t on Civil and Poli tical Righ ts 1966; common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conven tions of 194 9; Ar ticles 23 , 55 and 59 of the Four th G eneva Conven tion; Articles 69 to 71 of Additional Protocol I of 1977; Article 18 of Additional Protocol II of 1977 as well as other relevant rules of IHL; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading T reatment o r P unishment 1984; Ar ticles 10, 1 1 an d 1 2 o f the I nternational Covenant on Economi c, Social, and Cultural Right s 196 6; Articles 6, 37 an d 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989; and elsewhere in international law.

2 The disti nction bet ween co mbatants and non- combatants is th e ba sic p rinciple unde rlying IHL. See in particular common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Article 48 of Additional Protocol I of 1977. See also Article 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

3 Article 33 o f t he Convent ion on t he Status of Refugees 1951; A rticle 3 of t he Convention against Torture and Other Cruel , I nhuman or Degr ading Treatment or Pu nishment 198 4; Article 22 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989.

2B–2 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1

from beha viour that violates funda mental human rights. Th ese righ ts and obligations are con tained in th e b ody o f i nternational human rights l aw, international humanitarian law and refugee law (note sources given below).

As humanitarian agencies, we define our role in relation to these primary roles and responsibilities. Our role in providing humanitarian assistance reflects the reality that those with primary responsibility are not always able or wil ling to perform this role th emselves. Thi s is sometimes a matter of ca pacity. Sometimes it co nstitutes a wilful disregard of fundamental legal and ethical obligations, the result of which is much avoidable human suffering.

The frequent failure of warring parties to respect the humanitarian purpose of interventions has shown that the attempt to provide assistance in situations of conflict may potentially render civilians more vulnerable to attack, or may on occasion bring unintended advantage to one or more of the warring parties. We are committed to minimising any such adverse effects of our interventions in so far as this is consi stent w ith the obl igations outli ned a bove. It i s the obligation of warrin g pa rties to respe ct the hu manitarian na ture of such interventions.

In relation to the principles set out above and more generally, we recognise and sup port the p rotection a nd a ssistance mand ates of the Interna tional Committee of the Red Cross and of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees under international law.

3. Minimum standards 2.6

The Mini mum Stand ards are based on agen cies’ expe rience of provid ing humanitarian assistance. Though the achievement of the standards depends on a range of factors, many of which may be beyond our control, we commit ourselves to attempt consisten tly to achieve them and we expect to be h eld to account accordingly. We invite other humanitarian actors, including states themselves, to adopt these standards as accepted norms.

By adhering to the sta ndards we commit ourselves to make every effort to ensure that people affected by disasters have access to at least the minimum requirements (water, sa nitation, foo d, nutrition , sh elter an d he alth care ) to satisfy th eir basic rig ht to life wi th dignity. To this en d we wil l continu e to advocate that go vernments an d other parties meet thei r o bligations unde r international human rights law, international humani tarian law and refugee law.

We expe ct to b e he ld accou ntable to th is commitme nt and u ndertake to develop systems for accountability within our respective agencies, consortia and federations. We acknowledge that our fundamental accountability must be to those we seek to assist.

Edition 2 2B–3

ADFP 3.8.1

Sources: 2.7

The following instruments inform this Charter:

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.International C ovenant on Econo mic, So cial and Cultural Rights, 1966.The four Ge neva Con ventions of 1949, a nd their two Additional Protocols of 1977.Convention on the Status of Refugees, 1951 and the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967.Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984.Convention o n th e Preventio n and Punish ment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948.Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989.Convention on the Elimination of Al l Forms of Discrimin ation Against Women, 1979.Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998.

2B–4 Edition 2

Annex C to ADFP 3.8.1 Chapter 2

THE HUMANITARIAN CODE OF CONDUCT C

These Princip les o f Conduct for the Interna tional Federation o f Red Cross and Red Crescent (IF RC) an d N on Government Organi sations (NGO) in disaster response programs have been prepared jointly by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and IFRC.

Purpose 1

This Code of Conduct seeks to guard our standards of behaviour. It is not about operational details, such as how one should calculate food rations or set up a refuge e camp. Rathe r, it see ks to mai ntain the high standards of independence, effe ctiveness and imp act to which disaster re sponse NGO and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement aspires. It is a voluntary code, enforced by the will of an organisation accepting it to maintain the standards laid down in the Code.

In the event of armed conflict, the present Code of Conduct will be interpreted and applied in conformity with international humanitarian law.

The Co de of Con duct is presen ted fi rst. Attached to i t are three annexes, describing the working environment that we would like to see created by Host Governments, Donor Governments and Intergovernmental Organisations in order to facilitate the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Definitions 2.2

NGO: NGO refers h ere to organisations, b oth na tional and in ternational, which are constituted separate from the government of the country in which they are founded.

NGHA: for th e purp oses of th is te xt, th e te rm No n-Governmental Humanitarian Agen cy (NGHA) has bee n coine d to encompass bo th international organisations and NGO. This code refers speci fically to those NGHA who are involved in disaster response.

IGO: IGO (Inter-Go vernmental Org anisation) refers to organisations constituted by two o r more governments. It thus includes all United Nations Agencies and regional organisations.

Disaster: a disaster is a calamitous event resulting in loss of life, great human suffering and distress, and large scale material damage.

Edition 2 2C–1

ADFP 3.8.1

The Code of Conduct 2.3

1. The Humani tarian impe rative comes first. T he righ t to receive humanitarian a ssistance, an d to o ffer i t, is a fund amental human itarian principle which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries. As members of the in ternational commu nity, we recognise our obl igation to provide humanitarian a ssistance wh erever it is ne eded. Hence the n eed fo r unimpeded access to affected populations is of fundamental importance in exercising that respo nsibility. T he prime motivation of our respon se to disaster is to alleviate human suffering amongst those least able to withstand the stress caused by disaster. When we give h umanitarian aid it i s n ot a partisan or political act and should not be viewed as such.

2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone. Wherever possible, we will base the provision of reli ef aid upon a thorough assessment of the needs of the disaster victims and the local capacities already in p lace to meet those needs. Within the entirety of our prog rams, w e wil l reflect con siderations of p roportionality. Human suffering must be alleviated whenever it is found; life is as precious in one part of a country as another. Thus, our provision of ai d will reflect the degree of suffering it see ks to al leviate. In implementing this approach, we recognise the cru cial rol e pl ayed b y w omen i n disa ster-prone communi ties and will ensure that this rol e is supported, not diminished, by our aid programs. The implementation of such a universal, impartial and independent policy can only be effective if we and our partners have access to the necessary resources to provide for such equitable relief, and have equal access to all disaster victims.

3. Aid wi ll no t b e used to further a particular p olitical or reli gious standpoint. Human itarian aid wi ll be given according to the nee d of individuals, families and communities. Not withstanding the right of NGHA to espouse particular political or religious opinions, we affirm that assistance will not be dependent on the adherence of the recipients to those o pinions. We will not tie the promise, delivery or distribution of assistance to the embracing or acceptance of a particular political or religious creed.

4. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy. NGHA are agencies, which act independently from governments. We therefore formulate our own pol icies and implementation strategies and do not seek to i mplement the policy of an y government, except in so far a s it coincides with o ur own ind ependent policy. W e wi ll n ever kno wingly—or through negligence—allow ourselves, or our employees, to be used to gather information o f a pol itical, military or e conomically sen sitive na ture fo r governments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those which are strictly humanitarian, nor will we act as in struments of foreign policy of donor gove rnments. We wil l use the assistance we receive to respo nd to needs and this a ssistance shou ld not be driven by the n eed to d ispose of

2C–2 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1

donor commod ity su rpluses, no r b y the pol itical in terest o f an y particula r donor. We value and promote the voluntary giving of labour and finances by concerned individuals to support our work and recognise the independence of acti on promoted by such volu ntary motivation. In order to protect ou r independence we wi ll see k to avo id d ependence up on a sing le fund ing source.

5. We shall respect culture and custom. We will endeavour to respect the culture, structures an d customs of the c ommunities an d co untries w e a re working in.

6. We sh all a ttempt to bu ild d isaster respon se on local ca pacities. All people and communities—even in disaster—possess capa cities as wel l as vulnerabilities. W here possible, we will strengthe n these ca pacities b y employing loca l sta ff, purchasi ng lo cal materia ls and trad ing wi th local companies. Where possible, we will work through local NGHA as partners in planning and imple mentation, and cooperate with lo cal govern ment structures where ap propriate. We will place a high priori ty on the prope r coordination of o ur e mergency responses. T his is b est do ne within the countries concerned by those most directly involved in the relief operations, and should include representatives of the relevant UN bodies.

7. Ways sh all b e foun d to invo lve pro gram ben eficiaries in the management of relie f a id D isaster re sponse assistan ce shou ld n ever be imposed upon the beneficiaries. Effective relief and lasting rehabilitation can best be achieved where the intended beneficiaries are involved in the design, management and implementation of the assistance program. We will strive to achieve full community participation in our relief and rehabilitation programs.

8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs. All relief actions affect the prospects for l ong term development, either in a positive or a negative fashion. Recognising this, we will stri ve to implement reli ef programs which actively reduce the beneficiaries’ vu lnerability to future d isasters and h elp cre ate sustaina ble lifestyles. We will pay pa rticular attention to environmental concerns in the design and ma nagement of reli ef programs. W e will also endeavour to minimise the negative impact of humanitarian assistance, seeking to avoid long-term beneficiary dependence upon external aid.

9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources. We often act as an institutional link in the partnershi p be tween those who wish to a ssist a nd those who n eed assistance during disasters. We therefore hold ourselves accountable to both constituencies. All our dealings with donors and beneficiaries shall reflect an attitude of openness and transparency. We recognise the need to report on our activitie s, both from a fina ncial pe rspective a nd the p erspective of effectiveness. We recognise the obligation to ensure appropriate monitoring

Edition 2 2C–3

ADFP 3.8.1

of aid d istributions a nd to ca rry out regu lar assessments of the impact of disaster assistance. We will also seek to report, in an open fashion, upon the impact of our w ork, and the factors lim iting or e nhancing that impact. Ou r programs will be based upon high standards of professionalism and expertise in order to minimise the wasting of valuable resources.

10. In o ur in formation, p ublicity and a dvertising activitie s, we shall recognise disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects.

2C–4 Edition 2

Annex D to ADFP 3.8.1 Chapter 2

MINIMUM STANDARDS IN DISASTER RELIEF D

Introduction 1

1. The purpo se of this annex is to provi de Australia n Defence Force (ADF) planners with detai ls of wha t humanitarian agencies consider the minimum standards for the provision of water, sanitation, food, nutrition, shelter a nd health ca re i n re lief operations. Sho uld the provision of humanitarian aid be a specified or implied task early in a deployment, it may serve to assist in planning the logistic requirements for such tasks.

2. The information provided below is purely for an understanding of the lengths necessary for response organisations to provide essential care. The circumstances and figures outlined are not limited to conflict zones but may also apply in generic disasters, such as the ADF response to the Papua New Guinea tsunami in 1998. Clearly the ADF and other mi litary contingents are not scaled to undertake many of the relief activities that this annex demands, however, it does describe the types of support needed and how inappropriate the provision of combat rations and other foods may be. The ADF may have the capacity to move stores, provide or support th e water and sanitation requirements, and coul d assist—wi thin capaci ty, and shoul d it be needed—with supporting shelter and camp construction.

3. The refere nce for this da ta in cludes the ‘Humanitarian Cha rter and Minimum Standards in Disa ster Resp onse’ handbook, and the UNHCR ‘Handbook for Emergencies’ 2nd edition.

4. Water. Water requirements in relief opera tions are detai led in table 2D–1.

5. Food and nutrition. Foo d and nutrition requ irements in reli ef operations are detailed in table 2D–2. Every effort should be made to provide familiar foodstuffs and maintain traditional food habits. Staples should not be changed just because there are a lternatives readily ava ilable. The need is nutrition versus volume.

Edition 2 2D–1

ADFP 3.8.1

Table 2D–1: Water requirements in relief operations

Water usage QuantityIndividual need Minimum survival requ irement is 7 litres per

person/day, in creased to 15 litres per person/day as soon as possible

Public toilets 1–2 litres/user/day for hand washing2–8 litres/cubicle/day for cleaning toilets

All flushing toilets 20–40 litres/u ser/day fo r conventional flushing toilets3–5 litres/user/day for pour-flush toilets

Anal washing 1–2 litres/person/dayHealth centre and hospitals 5 litres/outpatients

40–60 litres/inpatient/dayAdditional quantities may be needed for some laundry equipment, flushing toilets, and so on

Feeding centres 40–60 litres/patient/day

Commodity Energy (kcal)Cereals—Wheat, rice, sorghum/millet, maize

330, 360, 335, 350

Processed cereals—maize meal, wheat flour, bulgur wheat

360, 350, 350

Blended food—corn soya blend, wheat soya blend, soya-fortified bulgur wheat, soya-fortified wheat flour, soya-fortified sorghum grits

380, 370, 350, 390, 360, 360

Dairy products—dried skim milk (enriched/plain) dried whole milk, canned cheese, therapeutic milk

Both skim milks 360, 500, 355, 540

Meat and fish—canned meat, dried salted fish, canned fish

220, 270, 305

Oils and fats—vegetable oil, butter oil, edible fat

885, 860, 900

Pulses—beans, peas, lentils 335, 335, 340Miscellaneous—sugar, high energy biscuits, dates, dried fruit

400, 450, 245, 270

Nutrient Mean population requirementsEnergy 2100 kcalProtein 10–12% total energy (52-63g)

but<15%Fat 17% of total energy (40g)

2D–2 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1

Table 2D–2: Food and nutrition in relief operations

6. Shelter. Shelter requirements, clothing and household items required in relief operations are as follows:

a. the covered area per person averages at 3.5–4.5 m2;

b. in warm, hu mid cli mates, sh elter sho uld allow for ven tilation and protection from the sun;

c. in col d cl imates, shelter material an d con struction sho uld ensure optimal insulation;

d. clothing should be appropriate for the weather; children should have two sets and all should have access to blankets; and

e. basic household items—cooking pot, basin, knife, spoons and two water collection containers (~ 20 litres) plus 20 litres water storage; soap; individual eating utensils—plate, spoon, mug.

7. Health care. The main cause s of death and disease in emerge ncy situations are mea sles, diarrh oeas (i ncluding cho lera), acute respi ratory infections, malnutrition and malaria (where prevalent). Effort should be placed on means of averting instances of these breaking out.

Vitamin A 1666 IU (or 0.5mg Retinal Equivalents)Thiamine (B1) 0.9mg (or 0.4mg per 1000 kcal intake)Riboflavin (B2) 1.4mg (or 0.6mg per 1000 kcal intake)Niacin (B3) 12.0mg (or 6.6mg per 1000 kcal

intake)Vitamin C 28.0mgVitamin D 3.2–3.8µgIron 22mg (low bioavailability (5–9%))Iodine 150µg

Edition 2 2D–3


CHAPTER 3

COMMAND, CONTROL AND COORDINATION 3

Introduction 3.1

3.1 The key to successful PO is achieving not only efficient command and control (C2) wi thin the mi litary forc e, but al so effecti ve coop eration and coordination between the military and all the civilian agencies involved.

3.2 C2 has long been an issue for United Nations (UN) and multinational force (MNF) ope rations. Exp erience has clearly de monstrated tha t di vided command i n th e fi eld i ncreases risk, i ncluding t he r isk of ca sualties. Command, by d efinition, is a mil itary te rm but ideally all agencies wi thin a mission, not just the military, should function in a coordinated and integrated manner that reflects the will and solidarity of the international community. The military commander of a PO should make every effort to contribute to effective cooperation and coordination between all agencies of a peace mission so that each agency can efficiently achieve its mandated outcome.

Executive summary

• Command, control and coordination arrangements will be influenced by differences in pol itics, stra tegic outloo k, lan guage, re ligion, national customs, e quipment a nd systems, a nd doctrine an d practices.

• Peace operations (PO) require the same unity of command as any other military operation in order to achieve success.

• Effective proced ures shoul d be established to coo perate an d coordinate with the ran ge of no n-military ag encies, org anisations and groups within the area of operations (AO).

• Civil-military op erations (CMO) pr omotes uni ty of effort within a complex AO; developing e ffective inter-agency coo peration to facilitate the coo rdination of mili tary a nd civi lian age ncy acti vities and objectives.

UN military operations need to be commanded effectively by trained professionals, conscious of the strategic context of their operations, their integrated civil-military nature and the implications of their directions on broader international goals.

Lieutenant General J.M. Sanderson

Edition 2 3–1


3.3 Operational command , con trol and coordi nation arrang ements will vary according to the type of PO, the level of Australian involvement and the agency spo nsoring th e ope ration. Gi ven thei r u sual mul tinational (MN) makeup, UN PO wil l also be influe nced by differences in politics, s trategic outlook, language, religion, national customs, equipment and systems, and doctrine and practices.

3.4 The purpose of this chapter is to discuss those aspects of command, control an d co ordination that are applicable to Au stralian Defence Force (ADF) participation in PO.

COMMAND AND CONTROL 3.5

3.5 Australian Defen ce Doctrine Publi cation (ADD P) 0 0.1—Command and Control is the authoritative sou rce for C2 doctrine in the ADF providing guidance on C2 for joint, coalition and combined operations.

3.6 Command is a purely military concept which lies at the very heart of the military profession and is central to success in battle. C2 is the system empowering desi gnated persons to exer cise la wful authori ty and direction over assigned forces for the accomplishment of missions and tasks. Military commanders ha ve the a uthority to commit sail ors, soldiers and airmen to battle in po tentially life threatening circumstances. They therefore have an onerous re sponsibility a nd w ill b e he ld a ccountable for their a ctions, and inaction.

Definitions 3.7

3.7 The fol lowing defin itions fro m ADDP 00 .1 have some agree ment internationally, although not every ally or coalition partner will necessarily use the terms with exactly the same meaning.

a. Command. Command is:

‘The autho rity wh ich a comm ander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subord inates by vi rtue of rank o r assignment. Command inclu des the a uthority and responsibility for effectively u sing available resources and for planning the employment of, organising, directing, coordinating and controll ing military forces for th e accompli shment of assigned mi ssions. It also includes respon sibility for hea lth, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel’.

3–2 Edition 2

http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/home/documents/data/ADFPUBS/ADDP/00.1/00_1.pdf



b. Control. Control is:

‘The au thority exe rcised by a commander o ver p art of the activities of subord inate organisations, or o ther organisations not n ormally un der thei r co mmand, which e ncompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. Al l or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated’.

Exercise of command 3.8

3.8 Unity of command. PO require the same unity of command as any other mi litary op eration in ord er to achieve success. Unity of command i s central to unity of effort, which can only be achieved through the coordination of military and dip lomatic initiatives with the efforts of non-military agencies. Note that the authority of mil itary command does not extend to UN and/or other civilian agencies.

3.9 Status of command. The status of comma nd for each con tributing country wi ll be de termined by ne gotiations between national gove rnments and the agency sponsoring the operation. The UN prefers military contingents to be p laced u nder operational command (OPCOM) of th e UN app ointed force commander (FC).

3.10 In mo st ci rcumstances, Australi an forces in volved in a PO wil l be placed under o perational con trol (OPCON) of the spo nsoring age ncy or commander. This command status restricts the employment of an Australian contingent (ASC) to missions and tasks limited in function, time or location. It also prevents the entire contingent, or force elements (FE) of it, from being reassigned to other agencies, commands or headquarters (HQ).

3.11 Command of an ASC is retai ned by the C hief o f the Defence Force (CDF). Command of an ASC is normally exercised, at the operational level, through the Ch ief of Jo int Operations (CJOPS). CJOPS may in turn appoint the commander ASC as the national commander, who is the senior Australian operational comman der i n the AO. The ASC ma y also be established as a joint task force.

Command and control in United Nations peace operations13.12

3.12 Chapter six of ADDP 0 0.1 pro vides g uidance on comman d in combined and coalition operations, including PO.

1 Derived from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Command and Control of Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (17 October 2001).

Edition 2 3–3



3.13 The guiding authority of a PO d epends on whether the operation is sponsored or me rely sanctio ned b y the UN. If sponso red, it i s guided in theatre by a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG). If sanctioned, the mission w ill operate under the gu idance of the san ctioned body, for example a lead nation. Unity of command should be sought using recognised states of command.2 While it is possible that national FE may be assigned under OPCOM, assignment under OPCON is more likely. This has important p lanning a nd tasking implications for the F C who sh ould cl arify those activities i n whi ch pa rticular national conting ents may or may n ot operate. This should be divulged at the commencement of detailed planning.3Once deployed, it is common practice that any planning having an impact on a national contingent will ini tiate consultation betwe en the head of mission (HOM) or FC and the commander of that national contingent.

3.14 Instructions by national authorities. The UN Depa rtment of Peacekeeping Ope rations requires that whil e govern ments of troop contributing nations (TCN) will maintain an ad ministrative ch annel of communications with their contingents they must not issue any instructions to their military p ersonnel contrary to UN policies or the implementation of its mandated tasks.4

3.15 United Nations chain of command. The UN chain of command in peacekeeping (PK) operations is as follows:

a. Security Council. Authorit y for PO f lows fr om the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which is responsible for the overall direction of the PK operation. It authorises the mandate of the mission through a UNSC resolution.

b. Secretary-General. T he Un ited Na tions Secretary-Ge neral (UNSG) is responsible for the executive direction and control of the mi ssion. Member States tran sfer ‘Op erational Authority’ over the ir military forces an d person nel to the UN. Thi s authority is vested in the UNSG, who exercises it on behalf of the UNSC.

c. Under-Secretary-General. T he Un der-Secretary-General (USG) for Pea cekeeping Opera tions is accou ntable to the UNSG. On behalf of the UNSG, the USG:

(1) directs and controls UN PO;

2 Refer ADDP 00.1.

3 UNITAR, Principles for the Conduct of Peace Support Operations, page 149.

4 DPKO Comman d and Con trol of Mil itary Compo nents in Uni ted N ations Peacekee ping Operations (17 October 2001).

3–4 Edition 2



(2) formulates pol icies for PO and operational g uidelines based on UNSC mandates;

(3) prepares reports for the UNSG to the UNSC on each PO, with observations and recommendations; and

(4) advises the UN SG o n al l matters rela ted to the planning, establishment an d condu ct of UN PK missions.

d. Military adviser. The military advisor (MILAD) is the senior UN uniformed person in UN HQ, New York (UNNY). The MILAD is accountable to the USG and ad vises the USG o n mil itary matters, rep orting throug h th e Assista nt Secretaries-General for the Office of Operations and the Office of Mission Support.

e. Head of Mission. The HOM is respon sible, through the USG for Peacekee ping Operations, for th e imple mentation of the mission mandate. The HOM exercises ‘operational authority’ in the field on behalf of the UNSG and may be appointed as the SRSG.

f. Force Commander. The FC , when not also fu lfilling the responsibilities of HOM, reports to the HOM. The FC exercises OPCON over all mi litary person nel, in cluding UN mil itary observers (UNMO), in the mission area. The FC may delegate OPCON of UNMO to the chief military observer (CMO). The FC establishes an operational chain of command in the field , as follows:

(1) For military units/contingents. Deputy FC; sector commander(s); n ational contingent comman ders; un it commanders; sub-unit commanders.

(2) For United Nations military observers. CMO; sector commanders/senior MILOB; MILOB team lea ders; MILOB.

g. Chief military observer. If the CMO is also the head of the military component, they report directly to the HOM. The CMO exercises OPCON over al l UNMO. The CMO e stablishes the operational chain of command in the field, to include the deputy CMO, sector commanders/senior MILOB, MILOB team leaders and MILOB.

Edition 2 3–5


3.16 United Nations command and control terminology. UN command authorities are defined below.

a. United Nations operational authority. Operational authority over forces and personnel assigned to the UN involves the full authority to issue operational directives within the limits of:

(1) a specific mandate of the UNSC;

(2) an ag reed p eriod of time (with the stipul ation tha t an earlier withdrawal of a national contingent would require the TCN to provide adequate prior notification); and

(3) a specific geographic are a (the missio n a rea). UN operational au thority do es n ot include personnel matters (such as pay and allo wances). Whilst national contingents a re responsible for the discip line of their force, the UN is responsible for the good conduct of all military personnel.

b. United Nations operational control. OPCON is the authority granted to a UN military commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may a ccomplish specific missions or assigned tasks. The tasks are usually limited by function, time, or lo cation (or combina tion), to de ploy un its an d/or military personnel, and to retain or assign tactical co ntrol (TACON) of those uni ts/personnel. UN OPCON includes the au thority to assign separate tasks to sub-units of a contingent as required by ope rational necessities, within the mi ssion area of responsibility, in co nsultation with the contingent commander and as app roved by UN HQ. It does no t in clude the responsibility for personnel administration.

c. United Nations tactical control. TACON is the detailed and local dire ction and control of mo vement or manoeuvre necessary to accomplish a mi ssion or assigned tasks. As required by operational nece ssities, the F C may de legate TACON of th e fo rces assigned to the UN PK operation to subordinate sector and/or unit commanders.

d. United Nations logistics support. The logistics su pport of units and personnel placed under the ope rational authority of the UN and OPCON of the FC or CMO is a joint responsibility of the TCN government and the UN. Logistic support includes supply, main tenance, transportation, and health and medical support. Th ese fu nctions are mutually coordi nated and

3–6 Edition 2


performed by the UN and the TCN government, and are included i n the mission -specific memora ndum of understanding.

e. Administrative control. Administrative c ontrol (ADCON) is the authority o ver subo rdinate or o ther orga nisations, within national contingents, in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply services and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations. ADCON is a nation al responsibility given to national contingent commanders in PO.

3.17 Transfer of authority. T he transfer of a uthority b etween na tional contingents and military personnel to the UN-designated commander must be completed before these forces come und er control of the UN. Thi s process may take pla ce when personnel arrive in the AO, or it may be transferred immediately prior to dep loyment from home l ocations. The exact timing for this tra nsfer will be decid ed durin g the n egotiations b etween the UN and national authorities.

COORDINATION 3.18

3.18 Complex, MN, multicultu ral and multi-dimensional PO no rmally take place in difficult political, security, economic and humanitarian environments. They therefore require effective cooperation and coordination. Cooperation is as much an attitude as a physical act. It is a willingness to explore possibilities to partner with oth er organisations to pursue mutually beneficial courses of action.

3.19 In seeking to achieve sustainable peace, peacebuilding (PB) activities have increasingly been recognised as being just as import ant as provid ing physical security. The question of wh o should carry out such activities has resulted i n a n o verlap of in terests and responsibilities tha t at times ha s caused clashe s between different stakeholders. Coord ination between security, huma nitarian and development orga nisations within an AO is required to address these issues and make best use of available resources.

3.20 The efforts of externa l org anisations wi ll b e o f little be nefit if the beneficiaries of th e assistance are not fully en gaged and committed to the process. Effort sh ould not on ly be sp ent on co ordinating b etween international organisations, but also in improving the partnership with the civil society and its national institutions.

3.21 Coordination is multi-faceted and mu lti-layered, between internal UN departments, between th e UN a nd T CN, and between th e UN a nd o ther organisations. The UNSC recognises the importance of coordination amongst

Edition 2 3–7


regional o rganisations. Durin g de liberations o ver the req uirement for exit strategies for all UN PO, the UNSC noted the need to cooperate with regional organisations. Specific note was made that:

a. the view s of th ose who wil l be re sponsible for the implementation of a peace agreement should be considered during the negotiation phase;

b. the main actors in negotiations should assess realistically the capacity and comparative advantage of different implementing bodies; and

c. the l ines of repo rting and the division of labour mu st be unambiguous.

3.22 These p oints re late d irectly wi th relationships be tween the UN and regional orga nisations unde r chapter VIII of the UN Ch arter. It is eq ually important that coordination and cooperation between key stakeholders on a mission is undertaken. Many of these stakeholders operate within their own authority as humanitarian assistance or disaster relief experts of international standing, abiding by agre ed standards and with the agreement of the host nation (HN) or belligerents. Ignoring their presence can jeopardise success.

3.23 An effective method for developing cooperation and coordination of effort between the military and other agencies and the local communities is CMO supported by civi -military cooperation (CIMIC). CMO an d C IMIC are military ter ms for which the UN has a sim ile, civil-military coordination (CMCoord), which takes the priority from the military mission to the overall mission.

Civil-military operations53.24

3.24 CMO and CIMIC refer to actions and measures undertaken between commanders and national authorities, military or civil, in peace or war, which concern the re lationship between mi litary forces and the government, ci vil population or a gencies i n the areas where such forces a re statione d, supported or deployed. Military force s fre quently und ertake complex PO alongside international and non-government organisations (NGO), at times actually a ssisting the ir wo rk. Some of these ‘partners’ are unw illing o r vehemently opposed to cooperating with the military because of their charter and mandate. In general, humanitarian NGO and international agencies are guided by three prin ciples whe n they respo nd to a human itarian crisis: humanity, impartiality and neutrality. Any conflict of in terest associated with operating coop eratively w ith th e mili tary l ies wi th agencies’ p erceptions of impartiality and neutrality.

5 See ADDP 3.11—Civil-Military Operations.

3–8 Edition 2

http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/home/documents/adfdocs/ADDP/3.11.htm


Figure 3–1: Civil-military liaison elements will facilitate the cooperation required to ensure achievement of mission objectives

3.25 Although the mil itary and interna tional human itarian orga nisations may find th emselves wo rking sid e-by-side in compl ex emerge ncies, each operates differently. As a consequence, they e ach tend to reg ard thei r activities and information as p roprietary, be lieving the ir respe ctive organisational in tegrity and th erefore mission, are at sta ke shou ld the y appear to be ‘ co-opted’ by the mi litary on one hand, or subj ect to ‘mission creep’ (the military) on th e other. Collaboration, even if only perceived, can spell danger for NGO bound by a mandate based on the principle of neutrality. Military participants on the other han d, are con cerned wi th op erations security.6

3.26 From a commander’s perspective, coordination and cooperation with HN and human itarian agen cies is a imed at developing an enviro nment in which achieving the military end state minimises any adverse effects on the civil p opulation an d the co nduct of hu manitarian relief and PB operations. This effort is particularly necessary at the operational an d tactical levels where e arly en gagement with agencies d uring edu cation a nd train ing opportunities will assist in deve loping trust and a n und erstanding of each other, and in the development of supportive information sharing and planning

6 US Institute of Peace, Virtual Diplomacy number 10 August 2000, page 7.

Edition 2 3–9


processes. The conduct of collaborative planning and sharing of information at the strategic level will assist in developing a whole of government response and operation plan.

3.27 The key task of the mil itary contribution to a PO wi ll normally be the establishment a nd mai ntenance of a secure enviro nment within which humanitarian a nd g overnance functio ns can be u ndertaken witho ut intervention by th ird pa rties. This is not to sa y th at the mi litary wil l not be intimately involved in the provision of humanitarian and other assistance, but rather that when such instances arise, effort sh ould be made to hand over responsibility of these assum ed tasks to the appropriate civil agencies as soon as possible.

3.28 Cooperation mechanisms. Personnel appointed as CIMIC HQ staff will be crucial in developing and maintaining cooperation with civil authorities and humanitarian agencies. This may be achieved through the following:

a. detailed C IMIC o peration order/operation in struction supporting plans;

b. clear ope rational gui dance and coordination w ith th e HQ operations branch staff concerning support limitations and task allocation;

c. liaison with o rganisations i n orde r to coord inate p lanning fo r support tasks, as well as representing the commander’s intent;

d. identification o f opportunities for the military to supp ort civil agencies and for the civil agencies to support the military; and

e. establishment of a civi l-military operations centre as a venue where information and op erational upd ates may be exchanged, briefings provid ed to all interested parties and coordinated planning may be conducted.

3.29 The military is one stakeholder in resolving complex emergencies. The basic principle to be applied is that military support to civil organisations (HN and hu manitarian orga nisations) should be ne eds dri ven, re sponding to a ‘demand pull’ rather than a ‘supply push’. CIMIC should enhance the ability of both mi litary and civilian lead ers to prioritise, all ocate and undertake appropriate activities, with a vi ew to withdrawing military forces as soon a s possible to allow a return to normality.7 For additional information on CIMIC refer to ADDP 3.11.

7 Spence, N (2002) International Peacekeeping. Volume 9 (1): pages 165–171.

3–10 Edition 2

http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/home/documents/adfdocs/ADDP/3.11.htm


CHAPTER 4

PEACE OPERATIONS TASKS 4

Introduction 4.1

4.1 Within th e gene ric framework of PO, there is a myria d of potential tasks for the Australi an D efence Force (ADF) that will be specified in a mandate, along with specified and implied tasks identified during the mission analysis step of the joint military appreciation process. PO tasks may span the full range of operations1 and include all those tasks that could be undertaken on a warfighting operation. Daily tasking may include the full range of skills and capabilities within a force, however, planning and performance in support of activities will be within the context of the mandate and in accordance with the fundamental principles of PO. This chapter identifies some potential PO tasking but these are neither proscriptive nor exclusive.

MILITARY OPERATIONS 4.2

Fact-finding missions 4.2

4.2 The AD F coul d be requ ested to form part of an inspection or reconnaissance team tasked with e stablishing or confirming the need for a United Nations (UN) or multinational fo rce (MNF) opera tion. Fact-finding missions wi ll i nclude personnel from the UN Department of Pe acekeeping Operations, Department of Political Affairs and, dependent on the crisis, the United Na tions Secu rity C ouncil (UNSC) . Th e mili tary re presentative on a fact-finding mission would be required to meet with appropriate stakeholders and make preliminary assessments concerning the shape of any force.

Executive summary

• The range of tasks in peace operations (PO) may include all those that could be undertaken in warfighting operations.

• A mili tary force may be req uired to un dertake la w and order responsibilities in the absence of civilian police (CIVPOL).

• Support by a military force for the electoral process usually involves security and logistics assistance.

1 Refer to Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.0—Operations.

Edition 2 4–1



Liaison and negotiation 4.3

4.3 The UN undertakes liaison and negotiation operations at the request of the UNSC in order to provide a political presence in regions where there is a fra gile pe ace, ei ther be fore or fo llowing co nflict. Military rep resentation would be small and based on the need to maintain contact with military forces of th e conflicting parties and provid e military advice to th e Special Representative of the Se cretary-General (SRSG), Hea d of Mission o r the personal representative or envoy of the Secretary-General.

Inspection, investigation, verification and monitoring missions 4.4

4.4 Military operations can combin e poli tical, military and specialist staff who may be tasked with ensuring that the destruction or disposal of weapons (small arms a nd w eapons of mass destructi on) or red uction o f mil itary capability is in accord ance wi th p eace a greements. Th e presen ce of personnel may also be a me ans of provid ing stab ility to a reg ion tha t has experienced conflict. Monitoring requires close coordination and cooperation with the host nation (HN) and belligerent parties as, in order to be effective, inspectors and monitors requi re fr eedom of movement and ma y require access to industrial facilities and military establishments.

Sanction operations 4.5

4.5 Graduated response options, short of direct military action, include the imposition of sa nctions o n natio ns where econo mic, p ostal, telecommunications and travel limits are applied. These sanctions require UN member states to avoid or limit relationships with the state under sanction and military measures may be used in control and denial ope rations. These operations may involve naval control of shipping to verify cargo manifests and deny the shipment of arms (including the conduct of interception and boarding operations), patrolling o f land borders and coo rdination o f crossing points, and combat air patrol and interception.

4–2 Edition 2


Figure 4–1: Australia’s contribution to enforcement of United Nations sanctions in the Persian Gulf

Observer missions 4.6

4.6 Military observer (MILOB) operations can be stand-alone missions or conducted i n supp ort o f o ther mi ssions (for example , the UN Truce Supervision Organisation supports the UN Interim Force in Lebanon and UN Disengagement Observer F orce whi lst mai ntaining its own comman d and control (C2)). Equa lly MILOB co uld form p art of th e mili tary force under operational control of a force commander (FC). Tasks for observer missions will vary and may include monitoring a ceasefire, conducting inspections and investigating bre aches o f ce asefire o r pea ce ag reements. MIL OB are unarmed and gen erally live amon g t he local po pulation. UN obse rver missions can also be deployed to monitor, observe and report on the conduct of non-UN operations.

Interpositional missions 4.7

4.7 Traditional peacekeeping (PK) often calls for the positioning of a lightly armed force to provide a buffer zone between states post-conflict resolution and with the consent of the parties. Operations in this environment permit time for continued diplomacy and rapprochement. Complex operations, requiring the forceful separation o f belligerents or fo rces and the establishment of ceasefire lines, will dema nd a force st ructured and capable of und ertaking higher in tensity operations. In disrupted o r failed states, this may mean

Edition 2 4–3


overwhelming force. Peace e nforcement (PE) op erations will req uire a comprehensive mandate and robust rules of engagement (ROE) that permit the military force to gai n an d mai ntain the in itiative. The re quirements fo r zones of sep aration, ceasefire lin es, lines of demarcation an d areas of limitation will normally be required in both traditional and PE operations.

Preventive deployments 4.8

4.8 An o utcome o f preventive d iplomacy may b e the de ployment of a military force to protect a State or region from being embroiled in an ongoing conflict. This may occur in a traditional PK or complex environment that will have force structure impl ications. Dependent on the modus op erandi of the potential be lligerents, the mili tary force ma y be required to use force to prevent escalation of op erations and must therefore be capable of forcibl y separating bel ligerents. C ombat capa ble logi stics sh ould also be a consideration.

Defence of protected zones 4.9

4.9 In so me op erations it has been necessary to e stablish a protected zone for the defence and safety of at-risk communities. This is a difficult task and one that can be a source of protest by belligerents and other parties to the conflict a s b eing partial. Rega rdless, if tasked with opera tions of thi s nature, it will be necessary to d isarm and in effect demilitarise the zone in order to deny th e poten tial of it being u sed for o ffensive operations. Knowledge of th e threat wi ll assist in designing defensive measu res necessary to protect the inh abitants, as wel l as defin ing force cap ability requirements. Normal considerations for the conduct of defence will guide the FC. Additional factors in a PO may include the following:

a. establishing and then enforcing weapon exclusion zones; and

b. establishment a nd mai ntenance of can tonment area s and weapon holding sites.

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of belligerent/opposing forces 4.10

4.10 A cease fire agree ment in complex operations is l ikely to include a condition of di sarmament of bel ligerents an d pe rhaps n ational forces, cantonment and preparation for reintegration into civil society. Aspects of these tasks will be established by specialists, however setting the pre-conditions is a likely task for a mili tary force. These pre-conditions may include the establishment and administration of secure assembly areas o r cantonments, the coordination o f the disen gagement and withdraw al of belligerents/opposing forces, and the securing or destruction of weapons and weapon systems.

4–4 Edition 2


4.11 Effective di sarmament, in cluding the recovery and disposal of weapons caches, will rely on the perception of impartiality of the PO military force and can involve search and interdiction operations. Disarmament and reintegration op erations can re quire th e mili tary force to retrain and restructure a ny resid ual HN d efence force or re build a force from representatives of all factions as part of the peace agreement. Alternatively, the ADF could participate in parallel bilateral or multilateral operations for this task.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS 4.12

4.12 Introduction. Complex, multi-dimensional environments requiring the deployment of a military force will, i n most i nstances, incl ude seriou s humanitarian and human rights situatio ns. It is proba ble that UN agencies, non-government orga nisations (NGO) an d priva te vo lunteer orga nisations (PVO) specialising in the provision of food, shelter, water, sanitation, medical and logistics support will be present to deal with the emergency and recovery aspects. In some circumstances, where the threat levels are high, the military force wi ll be the only organisation capable of providi ng li fe saving support. This will be necessary but priority of effort should go to establishing conditions that allow the civil humanitarian organisations to perform their role as soon as possible. Specific aspects of military support to the humanitarian sector are discussed below.

4.13 Coordination. Coordination and control of routes and resources for humanitarian relief requirements and the prosecution of security op erations may be necessary. Coordination will need to be established at the operational and tactical levels with the sp onsoring hu manitarian ag ency (usu ally the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Office of the UN Hig h Co mmissioner for R efugees (UNHCR ) or the UN De velopment Program (UNDP)). In high threat situations, the conduct of convoy escorts and the protection of distribution points and humanitarian workers will usually be specified or implied tasks.

4.14 Military conduct of humanitarian assistance operations. There will be times whe n the mil itary will be required to conduct HA operations. This should be the exception to the rul e but circumstances may demand actions such as aerial dispatch of supplies or the establishment of distribution points for the immediate re lief of human suffering. In o ther circumstances, the military force may choose to contribute to the wellbeing of the society in which they are deployed. In doing so, commanders at all levels should be impartial, strive to make the sup ported population independent, and not duplicate the effort of humanitarian agencies operating in the same region.

Edition 2 4–5


4.15 Peace/nation building. T he military may ha ve the cap ability to conduct vertical an d ho rizontal con struction. T his ca pability is to aid the conduct of military operations and, by their very nature, will have an enduring quality as part of nation building. The opportunity for minor works that have an immediate impact and build community goodwill should be judged on a case-by-case basis using the criteria in the previous paragraph. Longer-term construction should be left to civil contractors. Clearance of minefields and explosive ordnance devices is the responsibility, in principle, of those that laid them.2 Ho wever, gi ven the likel ihood o f operating i n a n un conventional environment (disrupted or fa iled States) or when mi nes interfere with the conduct of military op erations, cle arance ma y be a key military task. The training of local civilians or national defence forces of the HN to re lieve the military force o f this resp onsibility w ill be part o f the l onger-term nation building strategies.

4.16 Human rights monitoring. The protection of human rights3 of people in conflict zones is the responsibility of all members of UN agencies, NGO and the military. ADF pe rsonnel a re no t expected to h ave a de tailed understanding of human rights issues to the level of advocates or appointed human rights monitors. They do, however, need to understand the principles and the authority (mandate and ROE) to act in the prevention of a violation. On o perations establi shed in resp onse to a huma nitarian crisis or g ross human rights violations, ADF personnel should anticipate being informed of accusations of human rights violations by members of the community. These should be accurately reported and any preliminary investigation recorded in case of subsequent criminal prosecution.

4.17 Refugees or internally displaced persons. On op erations where there i s si gnificant dislocation of the civilian co mmunity, there will be consequent support requirements for accommodating people and facilitating their repatriation. UN agencies, NGO and PVO are best su ited for this task, however, a rapid surge in nu mbers is likely to re quire military support; primarily engineers for construction tasks and logistics for food, water, transport and possibly shelter. When cross-border movement occurs, there will be a ne ed to con duct screening operations which is normal ly a task fo r UNHCR and/or CIVPOL. Screening by the military of refugees or internally displaced persons (IDP) that have asso ciation with combatan ts/belligerents

2 Conventional Weapons Convention (Protocol II) states the force/party that lays any mine is required to undertake to clear, remove or destroy or maintain the minefield unless it has been cleared or is no longer in the control or jurisdiction of the laying force.

3 The principle of human rights is embodied in the UN Charter Article 1 and contained in detail in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Human rights are not bestowed on individuals by g overnments, h owever, a t it s mo st ba sic, an abuse o f h uman r ights is an acti on by a government or repr esentative of government denying ‘fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion’.

4–6 Edition 2


will b e ne cessary to establi sh any cu rrent intell igence that may assist in operations. Cultural sensitivities, including those of the UN agencies, need to be appreciated.

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER 4.18

Military involvement 4.18

4.18 There have been operations where there is a law and order vacuum owing to either a compl ete collapse of the HN po lice or safety an d security implications requiring the evacuation of CIVPOL. In such circumstances, the responsibility for imposing internal law and order will be either a specified or implied task for a military force. Policing intervention would ideally follow when organised armed conflict has been contained and there is a need to harness community resou rces and protect it from disa ffected ele ments, whe ther criminal or otherwise. Ideally, the military and police can work together from the outset of an o peration to ensu re effective and susta inable p eace i s restored and maintained.

4.19 Law and order is not a task a military force is structured or trained for, however, it is possible that there will be no other alternative until HN capacity is rebuilt or sufficient international CIVPOL arrive i n-theatre. There can be considerable capability differences within military contingents to deal with this situation, but this mission-critical issue requires early planning consideration during the pre-deployment stage of an operation. It is important to state that the military should not be tasked with maintaining internal public security (as opposed to internal security) indefinitely.

Tasking considerations 4.20

4.20 In circumstances where a mil itary force a ssumes or supports the restoration and maintenance of law and order, the fol lowing considerations are critical to the intelligence p reparation, pl anning, force structure and allocation of force elements for each task.

4.21 The law to be applied. The most potentially significant legal factor is the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and related instruments. This body of law se ts out in detail the righ ts and ob ligations under Interna tional Humanitarian Law to ensure public order and safety as wel l as the just and effective administration of, and su pport to, a hostile or occupied territory. In some circumstances, International Human Rights law may be more relevant. Due con sideration must al so be gi ven to the dome stic l aw o f the State in which the operation is occurring.

Edition 2 4–7


4.22 Executive authority. Executive authority for law enforcement in UN missions resides with the SRSG based on the relevant UNSC Re solution. However, in instances where there is a collapse of national civil authority and no U N structu re, a MNF commander could be expected to act as the executive p olicing a uthority. A commander may, for e xample, u se an authorisation to ‘take all necessary measures’ to p romulgate mil itary government ordi nances or policy to esta blish an interim pu blic orde r framework.

Figure 4–2: Military coordination with local police during United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor in Timor Leste

4.23 Power of arrest. In ope rations where there is a spe cified or imp lied task for a mi litary force to provide interna l publ ic security, the FC should ensure that powers of arrest exist and give consideration to what levels those powers will be devo lved. On UN operations, it would be ex pected that the SRSG woul d devol ve th is authority to the p olice commissioner and, a s necessary, the FC.

4.24 Power of detention. T he F C sho uld und erstand the difference between detention of a person for a sh ort p eriod of time to al leviate the immediate threat of continu ation o f an offen ce and detention fo r l onger periods; remand. Remand is normally necessary to negate any flight risk, to remove the ri sk that the person wi ll fail to attend any j udicial procedure, to remove the po tential fo r repetition of the offence, a nd for a ny o ther considerations that suggest that remand be warranted.

4–8 Edition 2


4.25 The FC should ensure that there are clear policy guidelines laid down governing detention action. It is normal for the military force to have the power of de tention for se curity reasons. The military may al so detain persons in other circumstances where it does not have the power of arrest. The FC will need to ide ntify a suitable place for a deten tion facili ty and staff this wi th sufficient personnel to adequately protect detainees and cater to their needs during the period of detention, having due regard to reportin g requirements and internatio nal conven tions co ncerning h uman rights.4 Th e d etention arrangements must meet external scrutiny, as failure in this regard can have serious consequences fo r individual military personnel, FC and th e overall mission.

4.26 The ability to investigate offences. Wh ere no CIVPOL option is available consideration should be given to utilising resources available to the FC, such as military police units, to investigate and gather evidence in relation to offe nces. Investigation may include i nterviews of su spects, obtaining witness statements, obtaining documentary and photographic evidence and the seizure of exhibits that can be passed to CIVPOL or other authorities for presentation in judicial proceedings. The mi litary force may also be tasked with the provisi on of security for inve stigators, investig ation site s or to apprehend indictees.

4.27 Judicial capability. In the event that it is unlikely a judicial system will be re-established prior to the reintroduction of CIVPOL a uthority, there is a requirement for correct stora ge and continuity of evid ence if successful prosecutions are to follow. This is critical to the provision of due process to detained persons. The military force should make adequate provisions for the safe storage of evidence and have the ability to demonstrate con tinuity of possession of that evidence. It may also be necessary to establish a military judicial me chanism to conduct preli minary heari ngs to enable extended detention of individuals and even a trial capability if there is a lengthy delay in establishing civil cou rts. The jud icial processes of applying th e rules of evidence and the conduct of civil hearings are not normally in the realm of the military and consequently it is not desirable for the military to undertake such processes. Any decision to do so shou ld only be made as a last resort and then in consultation with the UN and legal advice.

4.28 Public support. It wil l be esse ntial to th e success of the mission to ensure pub lic orde r action s are well communi cated to the communi ty and done o n a basi s that wi ll not create un certainty or und ue cultura l offen ce. Consultation wi th the co mmunity and un derstanding of t he H N op erating environment will be critical.

4 These are ident ified in severa l publications, fo r example t he ‘Bod y of Prin ciples for the Protection of All Person s Under any f orm of Det ention or I mprisonment’ an d t he G eneva Conventions. A quick reference for these and other conventions concerning human rights in the administration of justice can be found on the UN web site, www.un.org.au.

Edition 2 4–9

www.un.org.au


4.29 Limitations. Limitations (if any) in the application of law should also be considered. Before implementing any limitations the FC should seek legal advice.

4.30 Civilian police/military distinction. Both CIVPOL and the military force on PO have specific and yet supporting tasks, so it is important to be aware o f the di fferences between each organ isation. Annex A, which compares ci vilian poli ce and mili tary activities, individual responsibility and organisational culture, may assist in this understanding.

Liaison 4.31

4.31 Given th e similari ty of some CIVPOL and mili tary force ta sks in complex mu lti-dimensional op erations, it is important to establ ish sound working re lationships at th e operational a nd tactical levels of conflict. Operational liai son is be st achi eved through the operations branch of the force headquarters (HQ) and operations section of CIVPOL HQ. This liaison is also useful in establishing and coordinating combined training objectives aimed at addressing emergency response capabilities within the UN or MNF mission area.

4.32 At th e tactical leve l, lia ison and coord ination is necessary at sector/region level and within unit areas of responsibility. Unfortunately, the success of the CIVPOL/military relationship is often an issue of personalities. This can be ove rcome to some deg ree throug h th e de velopment of a memorandum o f u nderstanding (MOU) be tween the FC a nd p olice commissioner identifying the areas where close cooperation, coordination of effort and su pport is to be a chieved. Such an MOU shoul d identify generic circumstances that would predicate the requirement for a lead agency.

Summary 4.33

4.33 While the law and order aspect of an operation will pose challenges for the military force, law and order activities may be unavoidable due to mandate and l egal requ irements. A FC co uld be e xposed, u nder the doctrine of command responsibility, to legal action if these issues are neglected. Handled with care and discipline, support and action at critical points of weakness in the pub lic order phase of op erations could enhance the opportunity for an early departure of the force.

4–10 Edition 2


SUPPORT TO ELECTORAL OPERATIONS 4.34

Introduction 4.34

4.34 The structure and tasks of a military force deployed as part of a comprehensive settlement or transitional mission will depend on the levels of consent and threat. Comprehensive settlement operations may focus on the conduct of an election as the critical milestone for the ‘whole of mission’, and for the mil itary th is could be a n en d state cr iterion. A p re-condition f or elections will be stable law and order and a secure environment. Support for the electoral process from the mil itary force tends to b e required in two key areas: security and logistics.

Security 4.35

4.35 The electoral organisation tends to look to th e mi litary not only fo r advice on security issues based on up-to-date information about the situation on the ground, but also for the provision of physical security. Physical security encompasses not only th e electoral process, but for th e wider process of political transition, of which the ballot may be only a part.

4.36 This conce pt of secu rity, ho wever, needs to be bala nced with the mandate of the CIVPOL and the military force, with the former often required to provi de in ternal security and the latter resp onsible fo r external threats. Again, close li aison with CIVPOL and the el ectoral orga nisation at the operational an d tactical levels wil l be importan t. It will be necessary to establish responsibilities for security and transportation of the ballot boxes and p apers, an d the security of po lling cen tres, in cluding the actual centre/booths and the approaches to the centres, and security of co unting sites.

4.37 The wishes and culture o f the pe ople should be recog nised as they may have particular concerns, based on previous events, on the impartiality of police and the military in such sensitive areas.

Logistics 4.38

4.38 Elections are e xtraordinarily de manding lo gistical activities, and sometimes it will only be the mili tary force on a missio n which will have the expertise a nd the reso urces req uired to bring them to a su ccessful conclusion. A j oint military and electoral working group may be established before th e electio n to pursue the nece ssary logistic pla nning and implementation requirements.

Edition 2 4–11


Figure 4–3: Australia’s commitment to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

Coordination and integration 4.39

4.39 The sca le of an election operation requires the full mob ilisation at election time of the resources of the mission. This requires a high degree of coordination and interaction between all organisations. Integration should be built into the structure of a mission at its inception. If integration has not been established prior to it should be pursued by the FC after deployment.

4.40 Integration between the military force and electoral organisation can often be facilitated by the fact that both are fundamentally outcome-oriented rather than process-oriented and mentally prepared to work towards defined deadlines.

4.41 C2 of the election phase can be prob lematic and will depend on the nature of the mission and the extent of integration. Co mmunications standards contin ue to improve a nd most organisations ha ve th eir own equipment and facilities, however, there needs to be a level of redu ndancy planned for the el ection. Given the d ispersion of the mili tary in the mission area it can be expected that it will provide the required redundancy. This has the poten tial to see ‘ command’ of the election movin g from the electoral

4–12 Edition 2


organisation to the mili tary force; a per ception that shou ld be avoided. The establishment of joint operations centres at sector/regional HQ may assist in overcoming any communications shortfall.

4.42 Coordination of the civil administrative and some other organisations at the operational level may be difficult to achieve on all occasions. To assist this process lia ison offi cers shou ld be establi shed within the key planning agencies responsible for the safe and effective conduct of the various phases of the election. Military, CIVPOL and electoral officers from the HQ operations and plans branches should focus on unity of effort and purpose in ord er to achieve this critical aspect of an election.

4.43 There ma y also be a requirement to cond uct tra ining of each organisation in the conduct of security operations and contingency plans. If the th reat en vironment i s ben ign, the logistic supp ort requ irement to the electoral organisation is likely to be the greatest task of the military.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—ELECTORAL SUCCESS IN CAMBODIA

The rule of Pol Pot’s brutal Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia was ended only by Vietnamese military intervention in late 1978. Three factions h owever, opp osed the n ewly in stalled g overnment in Phnom Penh, and a four-sided civil war ensued.

After more than a decade of conflict, producing a massive refugee crisis in n eighbouring Thailand, the Agreements o n the Comprehensive Poli tical Settlement of th e Cambod ia Conflict (the ‘Paris Ag reements’) were signed in Pari s on 2 3 October 19 91. A cease-fire was maintained by the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambod ia (UNAMIC ), all owing th e depl oyment of the UN Transitional Au thority i n Cambo dia (UNTAC). During its b rief existence, from March 1992 to September 1993, UNTAC ensured the i mplementation of th e Paris Agree ments a nd sup ervised a general election in Cambodia.

Edition 2 4–13


Annex:A. Differences between civilian police and the military

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—(cont)The Australian Defen ce F orce mad e a significant con tribution to UNTAC under Operation BANNER, and the Force Commander was Australia’s Lieutenant-General John Sanderson AO. Australia also contributed a small Federal Police detachment along with Electoral Commission person nel to assist with voter registration, electoral education and the conduct of the federal election during the period 23–28 May 1993.

The UNTAC mand ate e nded wi th the promulgation of the Constitution for the Kingdom of Cambodia and the formation of the new Go vernment. Th e goa l of th e Paris Agree ments had b een achieved, UNTAC had ensured the conduct of a free and fair election in Cambodia, laying a so und foundation for a sta ble and p eaceful future for the pe ople of Cambodia. Its success lay in a bal anced force structu re: a stro ng mili tary co mponent (in cluding mil itary observers) pr oviding security and logistics assistan ce, a civilian police component and an effective civil administration component, working in co ncert with th e ele ctoral and other compone nts (repatriation, rehabilitation and human rights).

4–14 Edition 2


DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CIVILIAN POLICE AND THE MILITARY1

A

Table 4A–1: Differences between civilian police and the military

Activities Police MilitaryPrincipal purpose Law enforcement

Crime preventionCombat deterrence

Objective Justice Victory/political aimFocus Law and order; internal Security; externalActivity Constant Preparatory; periodicRelevant law Domestic law Law of armed conflictConstitution Instrument of law

No political interferenceInstrument of policyPolitical control

Accountability Domestic courtsRule of law

Chain of commandExecutive government

Procedures Gather evidenceNeed of proof

Limited informationUncertainty

Use of force Minimum Graduated Individual responsibilityResponsibility Individual

‘Office of Constable’Primarily a member of a unit

Duty To the law/judiciary To the state/monarchKnowledge Law Lethal forceUnlawful orders Uphold the law Refuse unlawful orderStatus Citizen with special powers Citizen with no special

powersService Voluntary Voluntary or conscriptedCareer Starts ‘on the beat’ Soldier or officer entry at the

tactical levelOrganisational cultureControl Local/central CentralStructure Hierarchical Strongly hierarchicalPersonnel Uniformed/ non-uniformed UniformedOrigins Emerged in 19th century 17th century and earlierPublic Direct relationship

Practical cooperationDesire for general supportPublic esteem

Mobility Limited Part of core capability

1 Drawn fr om MacFarla ne, J and W Maley (2 001) Civilian Police in United Nations Peace Operations. Aust ralian D efence Studies Centre Working Pap er numbe r 64 (Apr il 2001 ), pages 7–8.

Edition 2 4A–1


CHAPTER 5

PLANNING ASPECTS 5

Introduction 5.1

5.1 The guiding principles for the conduct of PO are the principles of war.1The emphasis pla ced o n an y principle of war for a given ope ration i s determined by the commander and will vary from one operation to the next. PO can be highly complex due to the variety of military and civil participants working coop eratively in an often complicated host nation envi ronment. Irrespective, planning should reflect the joint nature of ADF operations and the need for an integrated and dynamic team approach for success.

5.2 The purpose of this chapter is to highlight planning considerations that may be of particular significance on PO.

INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS 5.3

5.3 The importance to PO of intelligence and IO is identified in Australian Defence D octrine Pu blication (ADDP) 3 .8—Peace Operations. Th ese two functions, pl anned wel l, can greatly enh ance mission success and F P by limiting adversary freedom of action while expanding the opportunities open to friendly elements.

Executive summary

• The princip les o f w ar are a pplicable to th e con duct of pea ce operation (PO).

• Intelligence and information operations (IO) are complimentary force multipliers, providing information for situational awareness and force protection (FP) and shaping stakeholders’ perceptions.

• PO are characterised by a range of belligerents and stakeholders, deep-rooted sources of the cris is/conflict, a strong political dimension, the impact of varyin g nation al in terests an d a stron g media presence.

• Constraints expe rienced by the Australian Def ence Fo rce (A DF) during PO may i nclude sho rt p lanning time frame s, li mited intelligence, logistic burden an d the reduced ab ility to u se manoeuvre at the operational level.

1 See ADDP–D—Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, chapter 4.

Edition 2 5–1

http://intranet.defence.gov.au/home/documents/data/ADFPUBS/ADDP/doctrine/04.pdf




Intelligence 5.4

5.4 Due to the nature of United Nations (UN) operations and experiences, member States and the Uni ted Nations Security Council for many years did not endorse the need for ‘ intelligence operations’ as an integral role of the military force. T his was due to a combi nation o f factors including the sensitivity of the information colle cted, the UN pe rception tha t i ntelligence collection may result in the military force not being considered impartial, and a desire to avoid competing stakeholder interests.

5.5 Recent developments in PO have had significant ramifications for the safety of personnel2 and the conduct of operations.3 Such developments add a new dimension to the civilian protection challenge that often cannot be met without adequate intelligence assets and appropriate force capabilities.

5.6 UN member States now recognise that, at the operational and tactical levels, a force command er (F C) nee ds a ccurate, relevant information on armed gro ups a nd former w arring factions in orde r to be pre-emptive and neutralise d estabilising influences an d ‘spoi lers’. At mi ssion he adquarters (HQ) level, coordi nating and ana lysing available in formation from all stakeholders ha s long be en a chall enge. UN mission s direct a comple x mixture of political, military and humanitarian elements, each with the ir own sources of information, analytical process and operational objectives. Failure to establish an integrated mechanism to manage this information has resulted in different organ isations each havin g their own view of a g iven situation which may result in the provision of contradictory or confused information to a FC.

5.7 To counter th is, join t mi ssion anal ysis cells (JMAC) are being established in UN mission s. JMAC are staffed with civili an and military analysts pro viding cen tralised direction, collection, pro cessing and dissemination of information fo r the mi ssion.4 Th e ro le of the JMAC is to provide the expertise to han dle information, conduct and present analysis, build databases, and provide advice at a level that will ensure that decisions are made with awareness of all available and relevant factors. The JMAC is the focal point for th e fusion of information from al l sources. It undertakes in-depth current and longer term analysis of issues affecting the mission and draws on information which is available from open sources a s well as that gathered by all elements of the mission.

2 2003 killing of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and other UN personnel in a bomb attack on the UN mission headquarters in Baghdad.

3 Joint UN-Congolese a rmy op erations, l aunched t o drive Rwandan re bels b ack across t he border, for examp le, are more akin to rur al count er-insurgency op erations t han peacekeeping.

4 For more information refer to ADDP 2.0—Intelligence.

5–2 Edition 2

http://intranet.defence.gov.au/home/documents/adfdocs/ADDP/2.0.htm


5.8 The strategic inten t of the JMAC is to harness information from multiple sources and services in order to provide the mission decision makers with the ability to deter and defeat threats posed by armed groups and other spoilers within the area of ope rations. Ho wever, for the JMAC to function appropriately, it is essential that all stakeholders within the mission are willing to cooperate and share information for the common good of the mission. It is important therefore that communication and liaison are established from the beginning to engender good working relations between all the organisations involved in a PO. T he same p rinciple a pplies for the li aison with external agencies such as non-government organisations (NGO) and with other JMAC in the region.

5.9 When the ADF is considering involvement in a PO, there are several areas that it may want to influence. These may include the following:

• Regardless of the size of the ADF contribution, it will be necessary to establish the p arameters for the exchange of i nformation b etween troop contrib uting na tions (TC N) and the Au stralian con tingent HQ. Therefore, the development of the intelligence and IO plans will need to comply with the Exchange of Mil itary Informa tion C ommittee (Australia) requirements.

• The ADF con tribution will ne ed a n i ntegral capa city to coll ect and collate information for FP purposes.

• When the ADF is a major contributor to a UN or mul tinational force (MNF) o peration, it sho uld seek to gain commen surate staff officer appointments within the intelligence element of the MNF force HQ.

• Regardless of whi ch nation ta kes the lead in a PO, there wi ll be parallel intelligence processes in the area of ope rations (AO). A ke y responsibility of the FC will be appreciating the existence of this and maximising the output of these processes in a supporting way.

• Management of national information and in telligence is a command responsibility.

Information operations55.10

5.10 IO is an emergi ng facet within UN PO, how ever, it shou ld be considered as an enabling capability of an ADF contribution, focusing on the following areas:

5 For more information refer to ADDP 3.13––Information Operations.

Edition 2 5–3



a. advising local p opulation gro ups of why th e PO force (and ADF) is present, its ro le a nd ways that the lo cal p opulation might be able to assist;

b. achieving natio nal a nd mili tary e nd state s, in cluding po litical and military outcomes;

c. emphasising the po sitive aspects of th e operation to cou nter negative action b y be lligerents or tho se oppo sed to the UN/MNF deployment; and

d. ensuring that be haviour b y individuals o r one na tional contingent does not h ave a de trimental i mpact upo n the mission as a whole.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE––AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE INFORMATION OPERATIONS DURING OPERATION STABILISE

‘When this is over, it will be asked what was different about this operation from others. One of those things will be that we conducted

information operations’.

COMINTERFET, Major General P J Cosgrove, AM, MCThe deployment of IO force elements with the International Force in East T imor (INTERFET) p rovided the first opportunity for the Australian Defence Force to conduct IO as the lead nation of a large multinational force committed to a peace operation.

After the majori ty of voters rejected the concept of a special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia in 1999, p ro-integration mili tias be gan a con certed campa ign of violence. On 15 Septembe r 199 9 INTERFET was authori sed by United Na tions Secu rity Council Re solution (UNSCR) 1 264 to restore peace and security in East Timor, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Th e UN T ransitional Administration i n East Ti mor (UNTAET) was th en esta blished und er UNSCR 1272 (25 October 1999) to be fully respo nsible fo r the administration of East Timor. As one of the operational enablers of INTERFET, an IO campaign was conducted to ensure that all available assets were used to achieve information dominance in the area of interest and to shape the information environment in such a way that it contributed to the success of the operation.

5–4 Edition 2


Figure 5–1: Example of information operations material produced during Operation STABILISE INTERFET

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE––(cont)INTERFET person nel a nd ag encies were di rected to utili se all available means to conduct IO through a coordinated and synergistic effort. IO p rograms, th emes and me ssages we re deve loped, prioritised and distribu ted to selected target aud iences throughout East T imor, at a ll times mai ntaining cog nisance of na tional command obj ectives. T he end state wa s g iven a s: ‘ For the IO campaign to have significantly contrib uted to the success of the INTERFET mission and supported an enduring peace and security in East T imor’. Th e exampl e lea flet in figure 5–1 reassured East Timorese that, whi lst UNTAET assisted with th e transition to independence, INTERFET would continue to provide security.

The key progra ms a pproved in itially by Comman der INT ERFET (COMINTERFET) w ere force protection , humanitarian a ssistance, peace promo tion and law and order. Additional progra ms were subsequently a pproved by COMINTERFET as the op eration developed, inclu ding: return of interna lly displ aced pe rsons, anti-militia/anti-vigilantism and transition to the UNTAET.

Edition 2 5–5


PLANNING 5.11

5.11 Many of the considerations app licable to coalition and combined warfighting planning are also relevant for PO. ADF PO are un dertaken with the phi losophy of jo int op erations as de scribed in ADDP 00.3 —Coalition Operations a nd ADDP 3. 0—Operations. Whilst in m ost PO the preponderance of effort will be by land force elements (FE), effective and safe operations rely on the critical enabling support of both maritime and air FE.

5.12 ADFP 5.0.1—Joint Military Appreciation Process p rovides guidance on the process for ADF joint planning. UN plan ning staff use the integrated mission planning process (IMPP) which is described in annex A. PO planning staff should make themselves aware of the IMPP. In p articular, they should identify those p oints wh ere the joint mil itary app reciation proce ss a nd the IMPP relate and where information may be fed between the processes. Staff should also recognise that a si gnificant d ifference b etween ADF a nd UN planning is time. This is fu rther discussed in characteristics and constraints later in this section. This section will also discuss the factors that should be considered in conducting planning for PO.

Planning environment 5.13

5.13 Planning for ADF participation in PO is complex and requires specific actions at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, including the timely passage and synchron isation of information , i n o rder to facil itate para llel planning processes. Successfu l planning should recognise from the outset that achieving the military e nd state may only be part of ‘whole of mi ssion’ success and therefore it must co mplement di plomatic, e conomic and humanitarian endeavours.

5.14 In ach ieving thi s complementation it is impo rtant th at planners consider the people for whom the operation is being conducted. It is likely that the social, cultural, political, racial and ethnic environment of the operation will differ co nsiderably from that o f Au stralia. Wh erever p ossible, force composition sho uld con sider gen der, ethnicity, race an d re ligion to bette r support the local population. In particular the inclusion of women in the force, including at the planning and decision making levels, may aid the involvement of local women in the d evelopment o f a resol ution to the conflict. This inclusive app roach may a lso a ssist in ensu ring tha t co nsideration o f the special needs of women and children are part of support plans for the local population.

5.15 During the planning process it is important to conceptualise the overall mission objectives and consider the other agencies likely to be involved when developing military l ines of ope ration. W hen cond ucting strategi c and operational planning, contact and liaison with key external agencies involved in crisis response (su ch as the Au stralian Agency for Interna tional

5–6 Edition 2



http://intranet.defence.gov.au/home/documents/adfdocs/ADFP/adfp5_0_1.htm


Development (AusAID), the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and peak NGO) may assi st in b etter a ppreciating no n-military con siderations and requirements.

5.16 In the eyes of the international community, the success of a PO is not measured b y how su ccessful mi litary operations a re in achie ving the cessation of banditry and open hostilities or d isarmament and containment. Achievement of the se a spects wi ll be important, b ut reso lving i mages of tormented fl eeing civil ians, da mage to i nfrastructure a nd i nstitutions, and economic instability will be the determinant of success.

Characteristics and constraints 5.17

5.17 Belligerents. In direct contrast to warfare, PO are not undertaken with a clear aim of defeating an adversary or opposing force. In most environments to which the ADF will deploy there will be political and military (including militia and para-military) elements within the mission area that oppose the presence of a multinational ( MN) or UN fo rce. This may b e because thei r aims and objectives have not been addressed in any peace agreement or ceasefire or, because of their lack of influence, they have not been involved in the peace process. In some o perations, it wil l no t be unusual for there to b e man y disaffected groups who see their authority being questioned or eroded simply by the presence of a MNF. These groups normally do not have sophisticated command and con trol structures and t herefore the lea dership ca pacity to control dispersed elements is often minimal.6 Regardless, it will be necessary for any PO force to treat all belligerent organisations in the same impartial manner. This will require discipline and a willingness to engage the belligerent leadership in order to display the force’s resolve.

5.18 Deep roots to the conflict. The circumstances that give rise to the deployment of a UN or MNF on PO are likely to be the result of ethnic tensions or dra wn out conflict between go vernment and freedo m fighters/liberators. These traits may have been present for a long time, with generations knowing nothing else. This places a burden on the UN, the military force in particular, because the vast majority of locals may see the peacekeeping (PK) force as just another o ppressive o rganisation they must endure. Sup port from the Special Representative of the Se cretary-General an d staff, IO a nd o ther sources will be necessary to minimise these perceptions.

5.19 Political dimension. Political scrutiny of UN or MNF op erations will not only be in the interest of the Australian Government but a lso the other members of the UN or coalition. Interest from other UN member States may

6 An example of this occurred in August 2002 shortly after the well-reported signing of a peace agreement bet ween th e Democratic Republic of C ongo and Rw anda, when a U N reconnaissance mission was ‘repelled’ by rocket propelled grenade and machinegun wielding fighters because factions had not passed details to outlying regions.

Edition 2 5–7


vary from the cost of the operation to allegations of human rights abuses by a member of the PK force in order to achieve political advantage. In coalition operations the stakes may be higher a nd mo re focused , h owever, friction cannot be di scounted. Deployment timelines, AO and other con straints are agreed at the political leve l; the se ma y impose restrictions o n how the operational commander builds the force and the flexibility to command it.

5.20 National interest. In situations where contribution to a UN or MNF mission is of questionable national interest in the eyes of the public, casualties may be u nacceptable. An impression that the casualty ra te is b ecoming 'excessive' may lead to lobbying for withdrawal from th e mission. Similarly, public perception of what is in the national interest can quickly change. Such influences can result in the withdrawal of a nation’s troops, which may leave the balance of the force at increased risk.

5.21 Multinational. Operations will always be MN. They may be UN-led or UN-sanctioned b ut wi ll deploy u nder lead nation (LN) arrangements. Regardless of the l eadership a rrangements, i t i s likel y th at interop erability between dep loyed force el ements of T CN wi ll be a key issue . PO mil itary forces are ad hoc in nature. The military force may include disparate training standards, equipment capabilities and language and cultural barriers that will need to be addressed prior to and d uring the deployment (refer cha pter seven). From a commanders’ perspective, this may require a pool of linguists (if L N), liaison officer teams and con firmatory b ack bri efs of subo rdinate commanders’ concept of operations to ensure that the commander’s intent is understood and implemented.

7

5.22 Media. In a simila r way to government scrutiny and interest, but for different reasons, PO will have the eyes of the world opened and focused by the media. Crises are media targets. There is normally a proliferation of media agencies present in the early stages of a deployment and, dependent on the speed of response and effectiveness of the operation, they may remain. Used wisely, the media can support the FC through the delivery of key messages to th e local population and wider viewi ng aud ience. Bein g proactive and engaging the media can be a force multiplier. Given the ease with which the

... our military operations to provide a peaceful and secure environment in which the UN could conduct humanitarian assistance and nation building activity [in East Timor] were to be seen in two dimensions: what we were actually doing and achieving on the ground; and what we were perceived as doing, its relevance, proficiency and legitimacy.

General P.J. Cosgrove, AM, MC7

7 ANZAC lecture, Georgetown University, 04 April 2000.

5–8 Edition 2


media can quickly disseminate images and news, and their capability to find stories beyond th e HQ , media aw areness in cluding th e rol es, fu nctions, purpose of the mission and ADF should be widely understood throughout the force.

5.23 Intelligence. The ke y eleme nts co ncerning intel ligence an d IO are noted in the preceding paragraphs. Linked to this is the reliance, with UN-led operations, on the wil lingness o f member States’ to provide accura te and comprehensive intel ligence from natio nal sources that will assist in the UN planning and de cision-making process. F rom an ADF prep aration perspective, and wi th the exce ption of some recent PO, ma ny of ou r commitments are beyond our immediate neighbourhood and area of direct military interest. This can therefore limit the amount and quality of intelligence the ADF has readily available to prepare for operations and place additional constraints th rough th e req uirement to rely on allies or othe r nation s to provide timely and accurate data.

5.24 Logistics. PO are generally far from the Australian support area and this will pose limitations on the force structure and logistics build up to sustain operations. When Australia is the LN, additional logistic demands will require attention. In coalition operations, the ADF must be aware of cross-servicing agreements with coal ition pa rtners that can supp ort its dep loyment. UN operations impose additional constraints on participating nations: the demand on op erating stock, th e op tions ava ilable throu gh UN logi stics su pport, requirements for conting ent own ed equ ipment, ta bles o f orga nisation and equipment and the UN log istics staff structures. Th ese sho uld b e clea rly understood and applied by ADF planners. The reliance on local purchase of items will depend on the status of HN infrastructure. These and other factors (such as poin ts o f en try, sto rage and materia l handling equ ipment) wi ll be critical in formation requirements during any reconnaissance. More detailed information con cerning UN log istics i s contained in chapter 8—‘Logistic support’.

5.25 Time. Due to pol itical imp eratives at the in ternational an d na tional strategic level to respond to emerging crises, the foresight and warning by the UN Dep artment of Peace keeping Ope rations may be sh ort. T he time compression versus th e rati o of planning and incompl ete information can therefore impose serious constraints on the respon siveness of TCN. Short notice may also result in deployment planning not being properly sequenced, potentially resulting in an unbalanced force in the early stage of the operation. From a UN commander’s perspective, the political process of appointing the FC (at least for the initial deployment) may mean that there is no opportunity to influence the operational plan until UN mandate review or the operational focus changes. For coa lition operations, the time imperative may still be a

Edition 2 5–9


factor but LN planning at the strategic level should provide early warning to coalition partners in orde r to facil itate pla nning an d force prep aration (FORCEPREP).

5.26 Warning time. T he ADF Defen ce Atta ché to the Australian Permanent Mission to the UN in New York (DA UNNY) plays an instrumental role in warn ing the ADF and coord inating responses for force elements o r specialists to and requests for in formation on UN operations. T his also applies (dependent on the level of ADF contribution) with coalition operations that are sa nctioned by the UN and ope rate in parallel with a UN mission administration.

5.27 United Nations staff procedures. UN staff procedures are not well known by ADF personnel deploying as part of a MNF HQ or at unit level. This can have implications for the force HQ maintenance of productive work effort and continu ity of operations. TCN staff rotations are no t necessarily of the same duration, a fact that can be disruptive especially when involving key HQ appointments. T his mean s th at AD F st affs de ploying as p art o f a UN HQ should be b riefed on the staff proce dures and the operational leve l issues affecting the force as part of the ir FORCEPREP. Th e equa l geog raphic representation req uirements established by UNN Y for TC N on a HQ may result in unequal distribution of work effort to the staff officers from countries such as Australia.

5.28 Manoeuvre. At the ope rational level , PO are ge nerally not manoeuvre-based becau se of the in ternational restrictions p laced on the force by the mandating authority, the belligerents and the TCN. Regardless of this, commanders must still establish and maintain the initiative and flexibility to respond to new challenges. At the tactical level manoeuvre is implicit and freedom of move ment essential de spite b elligerents’ at tempts to impose restrictions. Su ch restrictions should be deal t with quickly th rough negotiations and, if necessary, a demonstration of resolve or use of force.

Planning considerations 5.29

5.29 When pla nning, subject to the UN mandate, the fol lowing po ints should be considered:

a. Law and order operations. Con sider rule s of eng agement (ROE) suitability; arrest and detention p olicy; confine ment facilities a nd administrative sup port to them; ordinance requirements; relationships and operations with civilian police (CIVPOL) and HN police; non-lethal weapons; civil disturbance responses; and knowl edge of th e app licable na tional and international laws.

5–10 Edition 2


b. Humanitarian operations. Wha t hu manitarian age ncies are in-theatre; what is the log istics capaci ty of human itarian agencies; en gineer capa city (local, co ntractor, military); warehousing (securi ty an d sharin g me chanisms); refu gee movement a nd a ccommodation; co ordination mech anisms; escorting a id convoys a nd food d istribution (de aling wi th ‘rogue’ agencies8); force structure considerations.

c. Electoral operations. Consi der the co mmunications requirements to support security and administration to achieve stated o utcomes; HN or other agency logistics c apacity; potential military force implied tasks; security relationships with CIVPOL and HN.

d. Monitoring/observation operations. Armed or unarmed; the number and offensive capacity of belligerent groups; language needs; existence of a pea ce agreement or role of mili tary in agreement evol ution; rela tionship (including command ) between observers and formed bodies.

e. Separation of forces and cantonment operations. The number an d offensive capacity of be lligerent grou ps; disarmament processes and containment/security of weapons; weapon de struction capa bility and plan; lines of control and weapon exclusion zones; marking of zones; patrolling; use of force; ROE; l iaison; l anguage nee ds; mi litary obse rver requirements; existence of a pe ace agreement or ro le of the military in agre ement evolution; force structure and response requirements; logistic requirements to support cantonment.

f. Operations with other organisations. Relationships with UN leadership if a coalition/MNF operation; civil authority and HN coordination mecha nisms; l iaison requ irements; coordi nation with humanitarian agencies and CIVPOL.

5.30 A Peace Ope rations W orking Group (POW G) wi ll be cri tical as the consideration for a commi tment ad vances. At the strate gic le vel, representatives from the fol lowing agencies sho uld form th e co re of the POWG: Dep artment of Foreign Affai rs an d Trade, AFP, ADF/Australian Defence Organisation, AusAID, the Australian Electoral Commission and the

8 The suggestion here is that among the myriad of NGO that will be supporting an operation, there is the possibility of some ignoring or modi fying the security advice of the military. This may result in such g roups being ambushed, looted or h ijacked, which in t urn may require military action to recover them.

Edition 2 5–11


Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. The POWG can be supplemented by other interested parties, such as the Australian Council for Interna tional Development, Australian Council for Overseas Aid representing NGO.

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 5.31

5.31 In the lo ng term, PO will require re solution b y con ciliation and consensus rather than termination by force. As such, military action cannot be viewed a s a n end in itself but inst ead n eeds to complement diplomatic, humanitarian and economic action to achieve political objectives. Ultimately, success of a PO will be measured by the rate at which activities progress toward achievement of the mission mandate.

5.32 Measures of effectiveness (MOE) are primarily tools for commanders to evalu ate whether or not the mission is on the path to success. Having developed criteria for success, it is po ssible to measure th e cond uct of operations at any g iven p oint. MOE fo cus on whethe r military effo rts are having the d esired resul t i n a chieving the mand ate or mission sp ecifically assigned to the force.

5.33 Secondary uses of MOE include the following:

a. establishing parameters for operational planning partnerships;

b. assisting in bu ilding co nfidence be tween each of the PO components th rough openness and wil lingness fo r collaboration; and

c. minimising in stances o f confusion a nd risk in a complex environment b ecause compon ent ap proaches will be more easily understood (noting that all agencies wil l have different MOE and mission end states).

5.34 MOE will vary between operations and are dependent upon the level of complexity and the number of organisations involved in resol ving conflict and providing the conditions for sustainable peace and security. Achievement of MOE will be a trigger for transition operations and an indicator that e ffort can be redi rected, the force do wnsized or the need for bran ches an d/or sequels.

5.35 The list of MOE wi ll be limited o nly by the imagin ation o f the commander and staff. However, there is a ne ed to exercise cautio n when applying statistical data, as this data needs continuous staff analysis in order to limit influences of time, place and groups of people that may provide false perceptions in, for example, security. Some MOE that may be applicable during PO include the following:

5–12 Edition 2


a. reduction in the level of violence or threats of violence;

b. reduction i n th e nu mber of sightings and contacts wi th belligerents still intent on being spoilers;

c. reductions of arms and ammunition entering the country and cross regional/sector boundaries (for example, effectiveness of sanctions, embargoes and border control);

d. disarmament and weapon containment, noting the difference between tra ditional/home-made we apons an d hi gh-powered small arms and crew-served wea pons that may reflect tokenism;

e. reduction i n th e nu mber of ceasefire o r peace agree ment violations;

f. increased repo rting of security i ncidents by the civi lian population;

g. improvements in eco nomic activity (fo r exampl e, re-establishment of markets, farm produ ctivity, industry and infrastructure development);

h. reduced restrictions o n fo rce, po pulation an d human itarian agency fre edom of mo vement and reduced in stances of restrictions i mposed by be lligerents (for examp le, snap roadblocks);

i. reduction in raids/interdiction on humanitarian operations;

j. improved security resulting in the reduction of escort and other support to humanitarian agencies (for example, resettlement of refugees/internally di splaced person , e ngineer e ffort and military conducted humanitarian operations);

k. reduction in th e level of co mbined opera tions in sup port of public security and law order with CIVPOL; and

l. transition pre-conditions to another PK force (MNF or UN) o r other alternative met.

Annex:A. United Nations Integrated Mission Planning Process

Edition 2 5–13


UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED MISSION PLANNING PROCESS A

Introduction 1

The Integrated Mission Planning Process1 (IMPP) is the authoritative basis for the planning of integ rated peace supp ort ope rations by all United Nation s (UN) d epartments, o ffices, age ncies, fu nds an d progra mmes (he reafter collectively referred to as ‘agencies’). Prior to a decisio n by the Secretary-General to in itiate detail ed pla nning the Peace Build ing Sup port Office (PBSO) wil l help ensure longer term strategies to he lp countries fully recover from conflict, help bring the UN system together, and also help draw together non-UN actors, including international financial institutions (IFI) and regional organisations in support of a common strategy. Once the decision has been taken to begin more detailed planning for a potential peace support operation the process will follow three stages, each requiring specific inputs, outputs and decision points:2

• Stage 1: Advance Planning, comprising two ‘levels’—Level 1.1 being the Advance Planning to develop strategic options for expanded UN engagement, and Level 1.2, which provides the Foundation Planning as the basis for development for a concept of operations.

• Stage 2: Operational Plan ning, ag ain comprising two levels—Level 2.1 takes the draft mission plan to a n operational plan and Level 2.2 covers transition of responsibility to the field.

• Stage 3: Review an d Tran sition Plan ning, the fina l two levels—Level 3.1 focuses on contin uous review and updating of the mission plan where necessary and Level 3.2 deals with draw-down of peacekeeping and transition.

The IMPP is designed to facilitate achievement of common understanding by establishing a planning process that engages the capacities of all parts of the UN System relevant to achieving impact in a given country setting. The IMPP does not aim to take over all other planning processes. It aims to ensure that the right people are at the table, that the right issues are being considered, and that th e app ropriate authorities a nd accou ntabilities are i n pla ce to motivate flexible, creative, and integrated strategic and operational thinking and planning.

1 A copy of t he parent d ocument f rom which t his An nex is sou rced i s available via http://action.web.ca/home/cpcc/attach/06_DPKO_IMPP_final_.pdf.

2 The description of the ‘Levels’ in the following dot points have been modified from the source document to make th em consistent with descriptions later in t he annex. The int ent has not been changed.

Edition 2 5A–1

http://action.web.ca/home/cpcc/attach/06_DPKO_IMPP_final_.pdf

ADFP 3.8.1

The Planning Process 5.2

Initiation. T he IMPP may be triggered b y a number of different factors, depending o n the international, regional an d na tional respo nse to a given crisis, including:

• a re commendation b y the Pe acebuilding Commission (PBC), or a request by a Member State o r regi onal orga nisation, to the United Nations Secretary-Ge neral (UNSG) to consi der p ossible op tions, including a peace support operation;

• deliberations in the UN Security Council on the possibility of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandated peace support operation;

• the development by the PBC or PBSO of an overarching strategy for UN peacebuilding support; and

• the negotiation or signing of a pea ce agreement with implications for the international community and the UN.

Decision point. If strategic analysis indicates the desirability of a peace support operation as part of the overall UN peacebuilding strategy for a given country, the UNSG will initiate the IMPP.

STAGE I: SETTING THE STAGE 5.3

Level 1.1: Advance Planning

Objective. To develop a strategi c assessment of UN peace support objectives and determine the appropriateness and viability of a UN peace support operation.

Responsibility. Mana ged primarily by the Integrated Mi ssion T ask Force (IMTF) (with designated focal point(s) from the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) as member(s) and close partnersh ip with the Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC).

Key Outputs. Strategic Assessment; an d UNSG Strategic Planning Directive.

Phase. Commences w ith th e deci sion b y the UNSG to i nitiate the IMPP and ends with the Planning Directive of the UNSG.

5A–2 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1

Time frame.3 The time frame may vary considerably due to the pace of political and other developments; the strategic assessment should be developed within a minimum period of four we eks, depending on the amount of work undertaken prior to the IMPP being triggered.

Steps

1.1.1 Establishment of an Integrated Mission Task Force. The IMTF comprises all relevant UN departments and agencies depending on the context, as well as member(s) of the UNCT/Mission at country level.

1.1.2 Strategic Assessment of UN Peace Support Objectives. The Strategic Assessment outlines possible strategic objectives for a UN peace support operation, a range of alternative strategies, options and scenarios fo r th e scope and role of UN efforts, key p lanning assumptions, and factors and risks that could condition or restrict UN involvement.

1.1.3 United Nations Secretary-General’s Strategic Planning Directive. After co nsidering the Stra tegic Assessment, UNSG will determine if a pea ce suppo rt o peration is an o ption that cou ld be considered by the UNSC. If so, the UNSG will issue a Strategi c Planning Directive, sta ting the b road strategic objectives, as well as the proposed form and scope of a peace support operation.

Decision Point. Based on the Strategic Assessment, the UNSG decides on the strategic objectives and form of UN involvement. If a peace support operation is deemed a suitable option for UN engagement, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) will be designated as the lead for operational planning.

Level 1.2: Foundation Planning

Objective. To develop a comprehensive concept of operations for an integrated mission for submissio n to the UNSC, and initiate detailed results and resource planning.

Responsibility. Managed primarily by the IMTF, in close consultation with the RC/HC.

Key Outputs. Under Secretary-General’s (USG) Plan ning Directive; Joint T ransition Pla n (if n eeded); Fi rst D raft Missio n Pla n; Draft Mission Budget; and Report of the UNSG.

3 The pr oposed min imum time f rames are t he minimu m necessary t o achieve each ste p; however, planning according to the minimum time frames involves tradeoffs. Maximum time frames are provided to reflect a more desirable duration for each stage to ensure quality.

Edition 2 5A–3

ADFP 3.8.1

Phase. Commences with the promu lgation of the USG Plann ing Directive an d ends with the submissi on of the UNSG repo rt to the UNSG.

Time frame. Minimum three weeks; desirable six weeks.

Steps

1.2.1 Under-Secretary-General’s Planning Directive. The IMTF will develop the USG DPKO Planning Directive, which provides the basis for detailed operational planning.

1.2.2 Joint Transition Plan (if needed). The Joint Transition Plan will only be relevant when the UN assu mes responsibility from ano ther organisation or coalition, or as part of rehatting.

1.2.3 Technical Survey and Development of Draft Mission Plan.The IMTF will develop a draft Mission Plan for an in tegrated mission which will act as the basis for the initial phase of detailed planning. The IMTF wi ll then lau nch a techn ical survey to und ertake a sho rt-term country-level assessment. The IM TF will u se th e results of the Technical Survey to produce a refined draft of the Mission Plan.

1.2.4 Preparation of Mission Budget. The IMTF wil l fo rm a sub-group to w ork with the DPKO will ensu re that the first mission budget report (covering the first yea r of peacekeeping operations) is aligned with the d raft Mission Plan. T he pre paration of th e mission budget will be finalised during Stage 2, Operational Planning.

1.2.5 United Nations Secretary-General’s Report on Proposed Concept for a Peace Support Operation. Con current with the development of the Mission Plan, the IMTF will draft the UNSG Report detailing the co ncept o f o perations for the proposed i ntegrated mission.

Decision Point. The UNSG submits his report containing the proposed mission concept of operations to the UNSC.

STAGE 2: OPERATIONAL PLANNING 5.4

Level 2.1: Operational Planning

Objective. To develop the first draft Mission Plan in to an integrated and fu lly-costed d raft Mission Plan , a nd p repare the tra nsfer of planning responsibilities to the Mission when deployment begins.

Responsibility. Man aged primaril y by th e IMT F, an d Mission planning teams/leadership (as they are deployed).

5A–4 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1

Key Outputs. Advanced Draft Mission Plan, Mission Budget Report, Directive to the Specia l Representative of the Secretary-Ge neral (SRSG).

Phase. Commences with UNSC au thorisation of the p eace support operation and ends with the Directive to the SRSG.

Time frame. Minimum three weeks; desirable six weeks (or until the SRSG is deployed).

Steps

2.1.1 Authorisation of the Peacekeeping Operation by the UNSC.Stage 2 co nverts prepa ratory work into o perational re ality as the peacekeeping operation begins deployment. The Mission Plan must be reviewed in light of the mandate provided by UNSC Resolution and discrepancies reconciled.

2.1.2 Refining of the draft Mission Plan. The SRSG should be invited to wo rk with the IMTF and pro vide appropriate direction in developing the Directive to the SRSG.

2.1.3 Preparation of Mission Budget. The IMTF budget sub-group will help DPKO in consultation with the UNCT finalise the first Mission Budget Report during this phase.

2.1.4 Directive to the SRSG. In prep aration for the pe acekeeping operation’s assumption of responsibility, the USG DPKO will issue a Directive to the SRSG, p repared by the IMTF, outlining his/her roles and responsibilities and conferring authority to guide the activities of the integrated mission in a coordinated and coherent approach.

Decision Point. USG DPKO issues the Directive to the SRSG, initiating the transfer of planning responsibility from the IMTF to the peacekeeping operation.

Level 2.2: Implementation Planning

Objective. T o en sure a smooth tran sfer of respon sibility for operational planning from the IMTF to the peacekeeping operation, to finalise th e Mission Pla n and provide the basis for re sults based budgeting (RBB).

Responsibility. Ma naged p rimarily b y the jo int (pe acekeeping operation an d UNCT) pla nning team, working in clo se coordi nation with the IMTF.

Edition 2 5A–5

ADFP 3.8.1

Key Outputs. Esta blishment of the Inte grated Mission Planning Team, Final Mission Plan.

Phase. Commences with an exe rcise at country level to review and validate the Draft Missio n Pla n, and end s with the adoption o f the finalized Missio n Pla n by the Mission and its endorsement by the UNCT.

Time frame. Minimum two weeks; desirable three weeks.

Steps

2.2.1 Transfer of Operational Planning Responsibility to the Integrated Mission Planning Team. (See appendix 1 o f the parent document).

2.2.2 Review and Validation of the Draft Mission Plan. The validation exercise sh ould take the form of a st ructured se ries o f discussions and map exercises to challenge plans and assumptions, examine k nown tasks in detail, si mulate potential scenarios , and practice th e mission’s decisi on-making and crisis management procedures.

2.2.3 Finalisation of the Mission Plan. T he I ntegrated Mi ssion Planning T eam (IMPT) sh ould en sure th at th e fi nal Mi ssion Pl an contains a detailed implementation schedule. As soon as possible, the final Mission Plan should be formall y adopted by th e SRSG a s the authoritative basis for sub sequent decision-making, thereby marking the transfer of planning responsibility.

Decision Point. The SRSG adopts the Mission Plan as the authoritative framework for achieving mission objectives.

STAGE 3: REVIEW AND TRANSITION PLANNING 5.5

Level 3.1: Continuation Planning

Objective. To ensure the Mission Plan remains flexible in the face of new demands and changing circumstances.

Responsibility. Ma naged primarily by the IMPT , working in close consultation with the IMTF, as appropriate.

Key Outputs. Periodic reviews, monitoring and updates.

5A–6 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1

Phase. Commences foll owing the adoption of the Mission Plan and lasts until a decision to reconfigure the mission or develop a mission exit strategy.

Timing. Length of the mission.

Steps

3.1.1 Periodic Reviews, Monitoring and Updates. Pr ocess of continuous review throughout the mission’s life.

3.1.2 Significant Revisions to the Mission Plan. Signi ficant changes at the coun try level may result in a change in the UN’s strategic objectives and the need to reconfigure the overall role of the UN or capability of the peacekeeping operation.

3.1.3 Initiating Transition and Exit Planning. Th e Mi ssion Plan should contai n tri ggers a nd be nchmarks for initia ting transitio n and exit planning.

Decision Points:

• Significant Revisions of the Mission Plan: In response to a UNSC request or dramatically changed situation on the ground, the UNSG decides to undertake a substantial revision of the Mission Plan.

• Transition and exit planning: Upon the request of the UNSC, the UNSG requests the SRSG in close cooperation with the UNCT to initiate the process of transition and exit planning.

Level 3.2: Transition and Exit Planning

Objective. To provide a framework for transition and exit planning.

Responsibility. Ma naged primarily by the IMPT , working in close consultation with the IMTF.

Key Outputs. Revised USG Planning Directive, Repo rt of the Secretary-General, Revised Mission Plan, Revised SRSG Directive.

Phase. Commences following the UNSG decision to initiate a process of transition and exit planning, and ends with a revised SRSG Directive and Mission Plan.

Steps

3.2.1 Revision of the USG Planning Directive. The USG Plann ing Directive is revise d to reflect the ne w opera tional planning requirements resulting from initiating transition and exit planning.

Edition 2 5A–7

ADFP 3.8.1

3.2.2 Revision of the Mission Plan and SG Report. The IMTF, in close co llaboration with the IMPT, will lau nch a techn ical survey to assess transition/exit requirements, plan disposition of peacekeeping operation assets, consid er the options, and de velop a mission transition an d exit strategy. The Mission Plan will be revised accordingly. At the same time, the IMTF, in close collaboration with the Integrated Mission Planning Team, will prepare the UNSG Report to the UNSC on the peace-keeping operation transition and draw-down.

5A–8 Edition 2


CHAPTER 6

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 6

Introduction 6.1

6.1 Australian participa tion in PO ra ises a ho st of ofte n comple x le gal considerations. Th ese ran ge from c ontractual suppo rt for the PO, th rough force status issues in the HN, to the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

6.2 These leg al consi derations will i mpact o n ma ny aspects of the planning and execution of (PO), and may be as extensive as those traditional considerations impacting on a rmed co nflict. Th e re levance of the variou s considerations will be determined by the nature of the pending PO, the extent of Australian and allied involvement, and the location of the operation. Such complexity necessitates the involvem ent of Defence Le gal, part of the Defence Support Group, at the earliest stages of planning for a PO.

6.3 This chapter outlines the more important legal considerations which may impact on the planning and execution of PO by the ADF.1

Executive summary

• A United Nations (UN) mandate will influence the nature of a peace operation (PO), and provide specified and implied tasks.

• Rules of engagement (ROE) result from the complex interaction of legal constraints, Australian government policy, UN and/or coalition policy and operational requirements.

• A UN mandate will contribute to determining the circumstances i n which force can be used, and to the development of mission-specific ROE.

• Use of force is commonly divided between that used for self-defence and that employed for mission accomplishment. Australian Defence Force (ADF) person nel will always have the rig ht of ind ividual and unit self-defence . Us e of fo rce for mission acco mplishment wil l depend on the nature of the PO.

• A st atus of f orces agreement (SO FA) applicable to AD F fo rce elements (FE) ma y be concluded betwee n th e UN and the host nation (HN) or, where circumstances allow, between the HN and the Australian government.

1 See Australian De fence Do ctrine P ublication ( ADDP) 3.8—Peace Operationschapter 3—‘The Authority to Act’.

Edition 2 6–1



LEGAL BASIS FOR PEACE OPERATIONS 6.4

6.4 The legal basis for a PO refers to an operation’s legal authority under either domestic or interna tional law. In the Australian domestic sense, the legal basis for any military operation will be found primarily in the executive’s prerogative po wer un der sections 2 an d 6 1 o f the Co mmonwealth Constitution. This chapter d eals predominantly w ith the l egal b asis under international law.

6.5 Establishing the correct legal basis in international law is fundamental to the planning and subsequent execution of all types of PO. The legal basis for the operation, often referred to as the ‘mandate’, will influence the nature of the PO a nd d etermine the scope of authori ty to a ct towa rds mission accomplishment.

6.6 Further, the legal basis for the operation will identify specified tasks and assist in determining implied tasks in the resolution of many legal issues that may ari se durin g the con duct of the ope ration su ch as th e status of participating mi litary forces and the mission ROE. Notwit hstanding that the legal basis will be determined and articulated at the strategic level of conflict, understanding the le gal basis fo r a PO is fund amental to pla nning at the operational and tactical levels of conflict.

LEGAL REGIME APPLICABLE DURING A PEACE OPERATION 6.7

Mission accomplishment and the use of force 6.7

6.7 As PO i nevitably re sult fr om actions o utside a n a cceptable l egal framework and are aimed at correcting t hat, ensuring that the military force does not excee d the limits of i ts mandate becomes an issue of enormou s importance, particularly in relation to the use of force. The use of unnecessary force is unlawful, and tends to undermine the moral authority of the operation, which would inevitably compromise the achievement of mission objectives. For co nvenience, the use of fo rce by armed force s is commonly divided between that use d in self-de fence and that empl oyed for mission accomplishment.

6.8 Self-defence. Notwithstanding the relatively benign environment that may characterise many PO, ADF pers onnel wi ll a lways ha ve the rig ht of individual and collective self-defence. The right is expressed as enabling ADF personnel to defend th emselves, ot her ADF o r coalition me mbers and protected persons from either actual attack or the threat of an attack. Actions taken i n se lf-defence mu st be ne cessary and propo rtionate to the th reat faced. More de tail on the right of se lf-defence is contai ned in ADDP 06.1—Rules of Engagement.

6–2 Edition 2



6.9 Force used in mission accomplishment. Whether the use of fo rce can be au thorised in ci rcumstances not justifying acts in self-defen ce will depend largely on the nature of the PO. As PO generally involve an attempt to reduce tensio n, use of le thal force will typical ly on ly b e a uthorised in self-defence. Thi s wi ll ordin arily be the case in a traditio nal pe acekeeping (PK) operation. There may, h owever, be circumstances, typi cally in peace enforcement o perations, wh ere lethal force is authorise d for mission accomplishment. Although uncommon, this may also be a ccompanied by a declaration of certain forces as ‘hostile’, thereby authorising engagement of these forces upon identification.

6.10 The use of non -lethal force, whi le an o stensibly le ss volatile issue, tends to be similarly complicated. No n-lethal force may be req uired, for example, to restore law and order, to protect certain classes of civilians or in the supervision of elections, and may include power to search and arrest, the restriction of mo vement or the pla cement of barrica des. Th e de cision to authorise the use of force will be affected by ma ny legal considerations, including HN laws and international human rights, and will be strictly defined in the issued ROE.

Rules of engagement 6.11

6.11 ROE are lawful military orders endorsed by Government and issued by co mmanders, which d elineate the ci rcumstances a nd li mitations within which armed force may be applied by the ADF to achieve military objectives in furtherance of Australian Government policy. ROE result from the complex interaction o f legal con straints, Australi an Govern ment pol icy, U N an d/or coalition pol icy and ope rational requ irements.2 The UN De partment of Peacekeeping Op erations has i ssued provisio nal gui delines for the development of ROE for UN PK operations. These guidelines contain basic UN doctrine on the dra fting and use of ROE by UN forces duri ng a PO. A summary of these guidelines is in annex A.

6.12 Influence of the mandate. Th e drafting of ROE fo r PO will be influenced by factors simila r to tho se th at sh ape ROE for more tradi tional military operations. In relation to PO, the mandate or United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Reso lution will be the mo st influential factor in determining the circumstances in which ADF personnel can use force and consequently, will contribute considerably to the development of mission-specific ROE. This is pa rticularly th e case where th e o peration i nvolves a humanitarian assistance (HA) element that has to be combined with more traditional military tasks.

2 ADF doct rine on ROE is cont ained in ADDP 06.1 a nd ADDP 06.2—Rules of Engagement—Operational Rules.

Edition 2 6–3




6.13 Coalition issues. As PO will generally involve two or more nations in coalition, the ROE autho rised will have to satisfy the po licy an d le gal requirements of all participants. Consideration must also be made of the need for each individual participating Sta te to app rove and issue ROE in accordance w ith the ir own domestic practice. T his nee d has created the tendency for each troop contributing nation to draft and implement either their own discrete national ROE or national ROE amplifications or caveats on force ROE. These amended ROE comply with the needs of the particular nation but can be no less restrictive than the ROE issued by the force commander (FC) for application by all national contingents.

6.14 Security issues. There is a need for operations security in order to protect ROE details be coming kno wn amongst be lligerent parties in the theatre of o perations. Such measures will avoid the practice of belligerents testing PO forces beyond the approved use of force levels.

Status of deployed forces 6.15

6.15 Generally, where a mi litary force enters the territory of an other State other than during an armed conflict, it will be subject to that State’s law and jurisdiction. Con sequently, ADF person nel pa rticipating in a PO could be brought before the co urts of another State in relation to civi l matters or for alleged criminal offences.

6.16 The ap plication of HN l aw, how ever, can be modifie d by wa y of agreement. Crimina l and civil matters, as well a s a vast array of o ther concerns including taxation and other duties, can be addressed in a variety of different types of bilateral or multilateral agreements and arrangements, such as SOFA, Military Technical Agreement (MTA), or Third Party Note (TPN).

6.17 A SOFA, MTA, or TPN applicable to ADF forces deploying on a PO may be concluded between the UN and the HN (and applicable to members of national contingents) or, where circumstances allow, between the HN and the Australian government. The SOFA, MTA, or TPN is a l egal agreement between governments and, as such, will take time and effort to be negotiated to a mutually acceptable state.

6.18 Among other matters, the SOFA, MTA, or TPN may also address the following:

a. rights of entry and exit;

b. freedom of movement in the HN;

c. the right to carry weapons on HN territory;

6–4 Edition 2


d. the right to admini ster the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982(DFDA) in relation to ADF personnel of the deployed force; and

e. the allocation of l iability for damag es caused by memb ers of the deployed force.

Rights, privileges and immunities 6.19

6.19 In th e a bsence of an a greement such as a SOF A, MT A, or T PN specifying the i mmunities of the de ployed force fro m HN law, certain rig hts and privileges may be invoked by international conventions. The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN 1946 and the Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel 1994 both provide varying levels of immunity to specific classes of pe rson, inclu ding UN civi lians a nd so me non-government organisation (NGO) personnel.

6.20 The privile ges an d immu nities ou tlined in th e Conve ntion on the Privileges a nd Immunities of the U nited Nations 1946 ma y be i nvoked b y agreement between Australi a an d the UN for operations o verseas. Fo r example, this was the case in relation to East Timor:

a. Firstly, the provisions of the Convention were invoked for the benefit of the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) through a n Exchan ge of No tes betwee n Australia and Indonesia (24 September 1999).

b. Secondly, the re wa s an Exchan ge of No tes constituting an Arrangement between the Government of Australia and United Nations T ransitional Authori ty in Ea st Timor applying to the activities of the mul tinational force op erating u nder u nified command structure in East Timor from 26 October 1999.

In the rare ca se where no SOFA, MTA, or T PN can be negotiated and the provisions of the co nventions mentioned above cannot be impo rted to the operation, members of a military force will be subject to HN laws.

6.21 Further, whil e the Australian contin gent (ASC) wil l be su bject to Australian l aws via th e extra-territorial ope ration o f the DFDA, the ASC commander will only be permitted to exercise primary ju risdiction over ADF personnel with th e consent of th e HN. Advice will be provided by Defence Legal to the Australian national contingent on the application of HN laws and the exercise of jurisdiction under the DFDA in that HN.

Edition 2 6–5

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/dfda1982188/




6.22 Conversely, a UN or coalition force may be dep loyed into a nation whose l egal system, beca use o f con flict or other e mergency, has b een degraded to the point that it is unable to function effectively. This was the case during the ADF deployment as part of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia and, to an extent, as part of United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia.

6.23 Whether the UN force is authorised to undertake the administration of justice in the HN, wil l de pend la rgely on th e extent of th e mandate or on whether the force could be regarded as an occupying force in accordance with the spirit and principles of international humanitarian law (IHL).3

3 During the INTERFET dep loyment, t he spi rit and p rinciples o f t he law of o ccupation were applied as a m atter of policy and, in conjunction wit h Un ited Nat ions S ecurity Council Resolution 1264, were relied on to establish an interim justice system.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—MANDATES, STATUS OF FORCE AGREEMENT AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Some UN operations in recen t times have demonstrated how the strength or we akness of a man date, SOFA a nd mission-specific ROE can influence the success or otherwise of a peace operation.

The UN Op eration in Somalia I (UNOSOM 1, 199 2–93) was established by the UN Secu rity Council to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu, provid e protection and security for UN pe rsonnel, equipment an d su pplies a t seaports and airports, a nd escort deliveries of HA supp lies to distributio n centres. The mission was unsuccessful because its ini tial mandate under Chapter VI was not robust enough, and did not allow the mission to p rovide adequate protection for the HA convoys. UNOSOM 1 had to be replaced by a United States-led coal ition (UNITAF) which ha d a robust ma ndate and adequate ROE. UN ITAF was then succeeded by UNOSOM 2 (1993–95), a Chapter VII UN mission authorised to use enforcement measures to establish a secure environment throughout Somalia for HA operations. This mission included civilian police personnel, and implemented judicial processes and a police force.

6–6 Edition 2


Command and discipline 6.24

6.24 As PO ca n in volve a variety of n ational mili tary co ntingents, UN civilians, NGO representatives and locally engaged personnel, the question of command will ofte n be conten tious. T he appropriate co mmand and control (C2) structu re wi ll depend largely o n the na ture of the op eration contemplated and the extent of the authority granted by the UNSC. The issue of C2 is discussed in chapter 3—‘Command, control and coordination’.

6.25 Notwithstanding the higher level command arrangements, members of the ASC will always be part of the ADF chain of command and will always be subject to the discipline arrangements established pursuant to the DFDA. Ordinarily, a senior Australian commander in the area of operations will be appointed to safeguard Australian national interests and will be given National Command (Co mmander Australian Con tingent (COMASC)) over the contingent.4

6.26 The ASC to a PO will ordin arily be a ssigned to the FC under operational con trol, a llowing for tasking by a foreig n command er fo r the accomplishment of specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location. Care should be taken by the COMASC to ensure that the foreign commander does not attempt to give deployed ADF elements missions which may exceed the limitations of the mission as approved by the Australian gove rnment. Rel ationships bet ween the forces of pa rticipating states can be regulated by way of an agreement.5

4 ‘National Command’ is defined as a command that is organised by, and functions under the authority of, a specific nation.

5 During t he I NTERFET dep loyment, co mmand re lationships wer e specif ically add ressed in the Agreement on Participation in the International Force East Timor.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—(cont)UN mandates gen erally do not prov ide for secur ity force activity outside th e boundaries of the HN, and th is provides a si gnificant planning consideration. In September 2000, a series of armed militia attacks aga inst East Timorese peop le i n refugee camps in West Timor cu lminated in the mu rder o f three UN staff me mbers in Atambua, and HA efforts in the region were suspended. Without the Government of Ind onesia taking immediate steps to ensure safety and security in the refugee camps and for humanitarian workers, the peacekeeping fo rce of the UN Transitional Authority East Timor—restricted to operations east of the borde r—was powerless to intervene.

Edition 2 6–7



6.27 Civilian contractors. Contractors providing goods and services to the UN mission or individual national contingents are not regarded as part of the mission unless they are fully integrated into the ASC and have accepted the status of ‘defence civilian’ in accordance with the DFDA.

6.28 International Committee of the Red Cross. N otwithstanding th e status of NG O, the International Co mmittee of the Red Cross an d Red Crescent (ICRC) has a unique mandate under international law. As outlined in th e Ge neva Co nventions, thi s ma ndate includes the p rovision of humanitarian relief during al l forms o f conflict or emergency as w ell as the authority to visit Prisoners of War and detained persons. The ICRC also has a general responsibility for the p romotion of IHL (refer ADDP 06.4—Law of Armed Conflict). The presence of the ICRC during a PO should be expected, and planning staff should p lan for a coordinated effort of cooperation wi th ICRC representatives. The role and responsibility of the ICRC is covered in more detail in chapter 2—‘Humanitarian aspects’.

Law of armed conflict in peace operations 6.29

6.29 The a pplication or o therwise of L OAC is an im portant pr eliminary question when planning a PO. LOAC is necessarily only applicable in strictly defined circumstances and accordingly its impact will depend on the nature of the operation contemplated.

6.30 Generally, LOAC applies only to the participants in an international or internal armed conflict, whether or not they recognise themselves as being in an armed conflict, and only to the extent that individual participating states are bound by LOAC. This is a question of fact, based upon the level of intensity of the conflict and not po litical assertion. Consequently, the authorisation of an operation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, although indicative, will not of itself determine whether LOAC applies to UN or multinational forces.

6.31 A prominent indicator of whe ther LOAC applies will be the extent to which the use of force is au thorised in accomplishment of th e mi ssion. A mandate a uthorising on ly limited pow ers may sign ify tha t L OAC does n ot apply to a UN or multinational force acting in accomplishment of its mission, notwithstanding tha t LOAC do es a pply between the partie s to the original conflict. This was the cas e when th e United Nation s Protectio n Fo rce deployed to Croatia pursuant to UNSC resolution 749.

6.32 However, in 1999, the UN Secretary-General issued a bulletin on the observance of LOAC by UN forces. This bulletin provides not only guidance on the application of the LOAC to forces conducting operations under direct UN control, but also extensive guidance on the interpretation of the principles of LOAC that may apply.6

6 Secretary-General of the United Nations Bulletin, dated 19 August 1999.

6–8 Edition 2




6.33 Further, in situations where LOAC may not technically apply to UN or coalition forces, the Australian Government (as a matter of policy) may direct the ASC to comply with th e principles and spiri t of LOAC (to th e exte nt relevant in the circumstances). F urther detail on the application of LOAC i s contained in ADDP 06.4.

Human rights in peace operations 6.34

6.34 Human rights law recogn ises and articulates th ose rights th at individuals possess, relative to those in authority. Some of those rights can only be derogated in well-defined circumstances. This will have a direct effect on how a UN or coalition force deployed on a PO relates to civilians, including refugees and internally displaced persons, present in the HN territory.

6.35 The impact o f human rights wil l be more kee nly fel t where b roader powers are autho rised u nder the manda te, p articularly where th e UN o r coalition force is autho rised to con duct law e nforcement operations. Advice on the extent of the application o f human righ ts law wil l b e p rovided b y Defence Legal.

6.36 Some human rights however are rega rded as fu ndamental and are required to be respected at all times, including the right to life, the prohibition on torture and slavery, and the right to ce rtain judicial guarantees. Many of these prin ciples had consid erable i nfluence on IN TERFET, in cluding the force’s arrest and detention policy.

OTHER OPERATIONS LAW CONSIDERATIONS 6.37

6.37 A nu mber o f other legal i ssues may arise during the pl anning and conduct of PO. These matters w ill not di ffer grea tly from those that would ordinarily impact on any other type of ADF operation and accordingly, will not be discussed in de tail in this pu blication. Such matte rs may in clude the following:

a. Navigational issues. Th is may incl ude passa ge th rough designated w aterways a nd overflight of na tional ai rspace. It may also include the assumption of control of airspace by the UN or coalition force, as was the case for UNITAF in Somalia and INTERFET.7

b. Environmental law. Th is may inclu de the i nterpretation of international treaties a s wel l a s the extra-te rritorial effe ct of Australian domestic legislation.

7 Navigational issues are discussed in detail in Australian Book of Reference 5179––Manual of International Law and in Australian Air Publication 10 03––Operations Law for RAAF Commanders.

Edition 2 6–9


http://intranet.defence.gov.au/home/documents/navy/abr5179.htm

http://intranet.dpo.mil.au/avpubs/aaplib/1003/prelim.pdf


c. Commercial law matters. This may typically include the management of commercial contracts for su pply of logistic support, the interpre tation of lo gistic supp ort arrangements with fri endly sta tes, the employment of loca l staff a nd the management of claims mad e ag ainst the fo rce by HN nationals.

d. Telecommunications law. The establishment and operation of many forms of communications networks are go verned by international trea ties, some of whi ch impose restrictions on their use by armed forces.8

e. The International Criminal Court. As Australia is a party to the Rome Statute o f th e In ternational Crimin al Court (ICC), Australian forces may also fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC for the commission of crimes against humanity or war cri mes where Australi a ha s not un dertaken investig ation o r prosecution for these offences. It is an offence under the Rome Statute to attack a UN peacekeeper, and it is al so an offence to misuse UN symbols.

Annex:A. Summary of Guidelines for the Development of Rules of Engagement

for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

8 For example, the International Maritime Satellite Organisation Convention states its purpose is t o p rovide mobile s atellite communi cations fo r ‘pe aceful pu rposes’. The I nternational Telecommunications Satellite (IN TELSAT) Organisation agreement provides fo r the use of INTELSAT satellites f or ‘specialised te lecommunications services’, but only f or ‘o ther t han military purposes’.

6–10 Edition 2


SUMMARY OF GUIDELINES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS1

A

Introduction 1

1. United Nation s (U N) ru les of en gagement (ROE) pro vide the parameters wi thin w hich armed mi litary pe rsonnel assi gned to UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) may use force. They ensure that the use of force by UN armed mili tary personnel is undertaken in accordance with the purposes of the UN Cha rter, the United Nation s Security Coun cil (UNSC) mandate and the relevant principles of International Law, including the Law of Armed Conflict. ROE al so assist the force commander in implementing the military objectives of the mandate of a PKO pursuant to the pertinent UNSC resolutions.

Context 6.2

2. These Guidelines are an essential element of the UN military planning process a nd operating procedures for PKO, there by assi sting the development of ROE for a new PKO. It is in tended that the document will provide simple and in formative dire ction, whi ch wil l n ot onl y expe dite the production of R OE for PKO b ut may a lso be u sed for generic train ing purposes.

Aim 6.3

3. The aim of these Guide lines is to ensure con sistency in the development and implementation of ROE for PKO.

Limitations 6.4

4. Any UN Guideline(s) or directive(s) in no way restricts an individual’s inherent right to act in self-defence.

ROE amendment or change 6.5

5. ROE can o nly b e a mended or ch anged wi th the a uthority of the Under-Secretary-General (USG) for De partment Peaceke eping Op erations (DPKO).

1 Abridged from UN Doc MD/FGS/0220.0001 (May 2002).

Edition 2 6A–1

ADFP 3.8.1

Review 6.6

6. This document and a ll its atta chments have been reviewed by bo th DPKO and the Office of Legal Affairs. Therefore, in preparing mission-specific ROE, if changes to the language of any part of the proposed text are deemed necessary, the proposed changes must b e sub ject to the same review procedures. As a routin e revie w/revision, the se Guide lines and attached Sample ROE will be revised and updated annually by the Mili tary Division, taking in to account al l comments and observations of the DPKO Office of Operations and the Office of Legal Affairs on mission-specific ROE during this period. Any sugg estions made by troo p contributing nations (TCN) wi ll also be taken into account during the revision. The Military Division will provide a copy of the revised Guidelines and Sample ROE, duly approved by the USG DPKO, to the Office of Operations and the Integrated Training Service (ITS) of DPKO, and the Office of Legal Affairs, after all periodic reviews/revisions. A copy of all approved mission-specific ROE must be provided to the Office of Legal Affairs.

Use of sample rules of engagement for training purposes 6.7

7. The ITS wi ll provide these Guidelines and Sample ROE to TCN for generic training of their troops for PK duties. It must be clearly mentioned that, whereas sample ROE may be used for generic training purposes they do not substitute the mission-sp ecific ROE. W henever a cou ntry decides to contribute armed tro ops to a PKO, th ese troo ps must re ceive ad equate information and training about the approved ROE for that particular mission.

Summary 6.8

8. ROE are one of the key documents in any peace operation. It is essential that th ey are unamb iguous and ea sy to use. Al though thi s instruction defines what should be included in future R OE for specific PKO, adjustments may have to be made if so required.

6A–2 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1

SUMMARY OF UNITED NATIONS MASTER LIST OF NUMBERED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 6.9

SAMPLE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FORMAT 6.10

Rule 1––Use of Force (Rules 1.1–1.10)

Rule 2––Use of Weapon Systems (Rules 2.1–2.6)

Rule 3––Authority to Carry Weapons (Rules 3.1–3.6)

Rule 4––Authority to Detain, Search and Disarm (Rules 4.1–4.5)

Rule 5––Reaction to Civil Action/Unrest (Rules 5.1–5.2)

Introduction

Authority

Mission

Execution of ROE

Principles

Applicability

Responsibility of the Fo rce Commande r and Subo rdinate Commanders

ROE Contravention

Security Classification

ROE Changes

Revocation

Annexes:

a. Authorised Numbered ROE for the Mission

Security Council Resolution

Specific ROE for Mission

b. UN Definitions (for use with UN ROE)

Civil Unrest

Collateral Damage

Cordon

Detainee

Edition 2 6A–3

ADFP 3.8.1

Force

Armed force

Deadly Force

Non-deadly Force

Minimum Force

Unarmed Force

Hostile Act

Hostile Intent

Loaded Weapon

Positive Identification

Proportionality

Reasonable belief

Self-Defence

Unloaded Weapon

UN Personnel

Other International Personnel

Warning Shots

c. Supporting Directions and Procedures

General

Identification

Prohibitions

Cordon Principles

Warning Procedures

Graduation

Verbal Negotiation and/or Visual Demonstration

Unarmed Force

Charge Weapons

Warning Shots

Armed Force

Opening Fire Without Warning

6A–4 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1

Firing Procedures

Procedures After Firing

Medical Assistance

Recording

Reporting

Search and Apprehension Procedures

Authority to Stop and Search

Search Procedure

Authority to Apprehend and Detain

Treatment of Detainees

d. UN Weapon States

General

Graduated Weapon States

State 1––Personal Weapons

State 2––Heavy Machine Guns

State 3––Mortars

State 4––Recoilless Rifles and Rocket Launchers

State 5––Vehicle Mounted Weapons

State 6––Aircraft/Helicopter-Mounted Weapons

State 7––Vessel-Mounted Weapons

State 8––Infra-Red and Laser Equipment

State 9––Riot Control Equipment and Weapons

Edition 2 6A–5


CHAPTER 7

TRAINING AND FORCE PREPARATION 7

Introduction 7.1

7.1 Training and FORCEPREP are necessary enab lers fo r mission success, particularly given the complex, multi-dimensional nature of modern PO. The responsibility for this trai ning rests w ith the commander, however, there are organisations within the ADF and other government departments (OGD) an d non -government org anisations (NGO ) tha t can assist. A Resolution passed by the UN Ge neral Assembly (UNGA) in 1989 1

encouraged Membe r States to establ ish natio nal train ing p rograms fo r military and civilian personnel assigned to PO.

7.2 The current ADF appro ach to PO F ORCEPREP is base d on the principle that being capable to undertake single-Service and joint warfighting roles will be the basis fo r the conduct of le ss intense ope rations. Thi s approach also acknowledges that there are additional constraints placed on the military during PO, and FORCEPREP must address these. This applies to UN an d multina tional force (MNF ) o perations. F ORCEPREP compri ses two elements: pre -deployment trai ning a nd auditing o f the mand atory pre-deployment criteria.

Executive summary

• The Australian Defence Force (ADF) approach to peace operations (PO) preparation is that the capacity to conduct PO has its basis in being able to undertake single-Service and joint warfighting roles.

• Specific educa tion, training and force prepa ration (FORCEPREP) programs will be derived from the joint military appreciation process (JMAP) mission analysis (MA) and commander’s guidance.

• Member States are responsible for PO training, however, the United Nations (UN) provides guidelines and performance standards.

• The ADF Pe acekeeping Centre is the ADF dedicated PO doctrine and train ing organ isation. So me prepa ration for d eployment is conducted by the 39th Personnel Support Battalion (PSB).

1 UNGA Resolution 44/49, of 08 December 1989.

Edition 2 7–1


Training 7.3

7.3 The structure of training and FORCEPREP programs will be derived from th e MA an d commande r’s guid ance d uring the JMAP. Some generic areas that may require addressing include al l or parts of the following list, which is not exhaustive:

a. The mission mandate, from wh ich may be derived specified, implied and essential tasks:

(1) What is the lead organisation: structure and leadership (function, unity of purpose/effort).

(2) National command rel ationships: force comman der, ADF contribu tion to mission success, powers of discipline, costs of a national command element.

(3) Peacekeeping (PK) or peace enforcemen t: strategi c implications of tactical outcomes.

(4) Adversary/belligerent capabilities and tactics.

(5) Use of non-lethal weapons.

(6) Public security operatio ns: law enforcement tasks, operations with U N civilia n po lice (CIVPOL ) or local police.

b. The capacity of troop contributing nations (TCN):

(1) Boundary operations.

(2) Cultural norms.

(3) Interoperability.

(4) Liaison officer requi rements: cul tural aware ness, linguistic skills, ability to temper ADF operational focus, express TCN approach to ADF commanders.

c. Working with humanitarian agencies (Civil-Military Operations (CMO)/Civil-military Cooperation (CIMIC), noting that this is not a Service-specific task) and CIVPOL.

d. Understanding of th e l ocal environment: country, history, culture, language, customs and local laws and societal norms. There is a speci fic need to develop an und erstanding of the

7–2 Edition 2


impact of conflict on th e population, which can then form the basis of actions directed towards winning the confidence of the local population.

e. Rights, p rivileges and immuni ties under Status of Fo rces (or Mission) Agreements (SOFA, SOMA) or other arrangements.

f. Liaison and negotiation: these are traits required in all PO, and are not re stricted to hea dquarters staffs and seni or officers. These skills at the tactical level can impact on operational and strategic outcomes, therefore role -playing as pa rt of scenario-based FORCEPREP may be necessary.

g. Combat functions:

(1) Maritime, land and air component FORCEPREP.

(2) Excellence in individual and collective skills.

(3) Legal provisio ns, incl uding rules of eng agement (ROE)/orders for opening fire.

(4) Human rights and humanitarian law issues appropriate to operations.

(5) Urban warfare requirements and limitations.

(6) Force protection.

h. Logistics and administration management tools:

(1) UN co ntingent owned equipment (COE) an d table of entitlement.

(2) Memorandum o f understanding, rei mbursement of national eq uipment b eyond COE, and sustain ment options.

(3) Coalition cross-servicing arrangements an d the coalition maintenance plan.

(4) Conditions of service: i ncluding p ay a nd allowances, dependant respon sibilities, pastoral care, rest and recuperation and rotation plans.

Edition 2 7–3


i. Environment:

(1) Health threats and precautions, and risk assessments.

(2) Characteristics and constraints of the area of operations.

j. Continuation training:

(1) Skill maintenance.

(2) Emerging tasks during operations.

(3) Mission updates.

(4) Other skill s or kno wledge whi ch, be cause of ti me or information constraints, were not ava ilable d uring pre-deployment training.

Auditing 7.4

7.4 Effective F ORCEPREP i ncludes a compreh ensive assessment of individuals’ compl iance with the mand atory crite ria for d eployment on overseas ope rations. So me gene ric areas th at may req uire ad dressing include all or parts of the following list, which is not exhaustive:

a. FORCEPREP au diting of ma ndatory admin istrative criteria including:

(1) Must be aged 18 years or older.

(2) Current individual readiness report.

(3) Physical fitness, in ac cordance wi th single-Service directives.

(4) Weapon qualification or competence.

(5) Current military identification card (with correct rank).

(6) Possession of identity discs.

(7) Possession of an up -to-date international certificate of vaccination.

(8) Medical p re-deployment checklist ce rtifying ‘ Fit to Deploy’.

7–4 Edition 2


(9) Dental pre-de ployment checklist certifying ‘F it to Deploy’ and stating clearly the dental classification and date of the last annual dental examination.

(10) Completion of th e rele vant heal th countermeasures program.

(11) Evidence of having a will lodged, or a signed declaration stating no wish to have a will.

(12) Police inve stigation status: membe rs involved i n an on-going civil or mil itary po lice investigation or o ther legal or court action may not be allowed to deploy.

(13) Financial arrangements and personal allotments.

b. Auditing of the member’s status:

(1) Force assignment and/or deployment order authority or visit approval. A p osting ord er does n ot p rovide the authority to deploy.

(2) Reserve force person nel may not depl oy unless on full-time service or a ‘4j(3)’ has been approved.

(3) Civilians may d eploy und er a pa rticular au thority to accompany the ADF on operations.

(4) Deployment of fore ign (n on-Australian) defen ce fo rce personnel may generally only occur if they are in receipt of a third country deployment authorisation.

(5) Personnel deploying into an operational area may do so under the auspices of other Australian military activities (such as a train ing su pport te am) or Defence cooperation program task.

United Nations training and force preparation 7.5

7.5 In 2000, th e UN Se cretary-General (UNSG) di rected a study be undertaken on the whole question of PK. This report (commonly referred to as the Brah imi Repo rt, after the project l eader) a nd UNSG re sponse recognise th at, while tra ining i s primarily the respo nsibility of the Membe r States, the UN sh ould assi st the m by esta blishing basi c guidelines and performance standards by providing UN PK training material.2

2 Panel on UN Pea ce Operations U N A/ 55/305–S/2000/809 dated 21 August 200 0; Secretary-General’s Report UN A/55/502 dated 20 October 2000.

Edition 2 7–5


7.6 The integrated training service of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is responsible for developing and providing standardised PK training guidance, and mission planning services are responsible for the development of gui delines to TC N,3 which in cludes some preparedness advice.

7.7 In August 2001 , the then Train ing and Evalu ation Servi ce (TES) provided Member States with in itial guidelines to sta ndardise th eir PK training. Since then, a system of Standardised Generic Training Modules has been de veloped to provide pre-deployment tra ining package s for all personnel d eploying to a UN or MNF mission . A series of Standa rdised Training Modules (STM) provide task-specific training packages, for example, the UN Military Obse rvers Course provided by the ADF Peace Op erations Training Centre (ADF POTC) is based on the UN STM 2– 3 for Mil itary Observers.

7.8 For UN PO, the UN ha s determined i ts responsibility to con firm the preparedness of each TCN before they deploy to the mission area as noted below:

4

7.9 To e nforce this, the U NSG has recommended5 that the UN sho uld send a team of expe rts to TCN to ascertain their pre paredness be fore deployment of personnel to mission areas. It was further p roposed that field missions be visited every six months ‘to ensure that (training) standards are continuing to be met’. Additionally, th e deve lopment o f compreh ensive lessons learned from operations is to be available to TCN.6

3 These guidelines are issued to each troop contributing nation when their offer of contribution is accepted.

The Secretariat should, as a standard practice, send a team to confirm the preparedness of each troop contributor to meet the provisions of the memoranda of understanding on the requisite training and equipment requirements, prior to deployment; those that do not meet the requirements must not deploy.4

4 UN A/55/305–S/2000/809, dated 21 August 2000 paragraph 117(c).

5 Secretary-General’s Report A/55/502 dated 20 October 2000, paragraphs 90–93.

6 The value of lessons learned (‘to be learned’) relies heavily on the availability of TCN lessons during their service on UN operations. Australian observations and post-operational reports, although having an ADF focus, are most likely also applicable to other TCN. As part of the ADF ro tation p lan an d t asks f or t he n ational comma nd ele ment, ADF lessons shou ld be passed to the Force Headquarters Training Cell, for inclusion in the Mission’s lessons to be passed to DPKO.

7–6 Edition 2


United Nations standardised guidelines 7.10

7.10 The process of standardisation of PK training is a necessity if TCN are to con firm the ir prep aredness to participa te in UN PK opera tions prio r to deployment, as recommended by the Brahimi Report.

7.11 The standardisation guidelines, or core training requirements, include specific curriculum requirements for the training of personnel to be deployed as UNMO, UN staff officers and UN CIVPOL. These training standards and guidelines (with the exception of UN CIVPOL) are detailed in annex A.

Module Subject Requirements

The UN The UN system; UN peacekeeping operations

Legal framework for UN peacekeeping operations

UN Security Council Resolutions; The UN Charter;SOFA/SOMA, Military Technical Agreement, Third Party Note, etc; Rights,Privileges and Immunities

The UN peacekeeper UN code of conduct (‘We are Peacekeepers’); Cultural awareness

Command and control UN command and control;ROE; Use of force; UN planning process

Tactics and techniques UN staff process;UNMO and Contingent operations

Safety and security awareness

UN security alert system;Peacekeeping Force coordination with UN Security Coordinator;Personal security awareness;Mine and booby trap awareness; Terrorism

Media relations Public information; the Media in UN peacekeeping operations; ‘Key mission messages’ (UN, force commander, ADF).

Negotiation and mediation

Negotiation and mediation techniques and needs

Edition 2 7–7


Table 7–1: United Nations standardised generic training modules

7.12 Training assistance. The UN has several options to assist TCN with FORCEPREP, including mobile UN training assistance teams for operational and logistics training assistance. As part of the U N stand-by arrangements system, the ADF supports this prog ram and makes available to the UN personnel to be part of a ‘fly-away’ training team to support TCN preparations. These personnel are also a vailable for ADF FORCEPREP. Th e ADFPOTC can provide details.

7.13 Standardised generic training modules. TES has developed training guidance at a generic level for UN PKO, which is outlined in table 7–1and in annex A. These are presented as standardised generic modules.

7.14 United Nations correspondence courses. The UN offers individual courses that may be of interest to ADF membe rs, coo rdinated b y the UN institute for training and research (UNITAR).7 Courses are offered as part of a web-based learning environment.

UN CIMIC/CMO UN humanitarian mission aims (refugee, internally displaced persons, emergency requirements and focus); UN and NGO agencies roles and tasks;humanitarian tasks and coordination

Gender and peacekeeping

Gender awareness (UN and NGO agencies, the people)

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

UN mission focus, as necessary

Human rights for peacekeeping

human rights awareness;Reporting and monitoring human rights

Force generation Selection and management of personnelUN stand-by arrangement system

Logistics UN logistics and support;Contingent owned equipment and table of equipment entitlements; Mission integrated logistics

Medical UN medical support;Diseases and stress management

Module Subject Requirements

7–8 Edition 2


Multinational force training guidelines 7.15

7.15 Training guidelines for multinational military operations are contained in annex B. For additional guidance, refer to the Multinational Interoperability Council Coalition Building Guide.

Australian Defence Force training support 7.16

7.16 In fulfilment of the UNGA Resolution encouraging Member States to establish national tra ining programs, the ADF has a dedi cated PO training organisation: the AD FPOTC b ased at Au stralian D efence F orce W arfare Centre, RAAF Base Wil liamtown. The 39th Personnel Supp ort Batta lion (39 PSB) conducts some FORCEPREP training.

7.17 ADFPOTC looks at op erational and strategic issues, and deals with international e ngagement. 39 PSB d eals wi th ta ctical an d practical FORCEPREP requirements for small con tingents and individuals, including civilians deploying with the ADF. The focus of 39 PSB is on minor overseas contingents (including administration of the elements whilst deployed).

7.18 These organisations have specific tasks concerning the FORCEPREP (training an d aud iting) of AD F forc e eleme nts an d suppo rting sta ff. Pre-deployment training can be conducted in a u nit’s home location (using ‘fly-away tra ining teams and local subject matter experts) or in a mounting area or fo rward moun ting ba se (F MB). T he Australia n conting ent fo r UNAMIR II (1994–95), for example , was trai ned in Townsville prior to deploying to Rwanda. Force Preparation Squadron—Darwin was specifically raised in Darwin in late 1999 as this was the FMB for operations in East Timor.

7.19 These o rganisations h ave d eveloped close working rela tions wi th organisations exte rnal to the ADF that pla y key ro les in th e co nduct of successful PO (UN or MNF), and can a ssist w ith edu cation a nd train ing requirements as well as liaison with NGO, Australian Agency for International Development and the Australian Federal Police.

Annexes:A. United Nations Peacekeeping Training Standards and GuidelinesB. Multinational Force Training Guidance

7 Refer to the UNITAR website: www.unitarpoci.org.

Edition 2 7–9

http://www.unitarpoci.org


UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING TRAINING STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES A

Introduction 1

1. This annex outlines the United Nations (UN) requirements for peace operations train ing a nd force preparation. The se stan dards are minimums which the UN exp ects a ll n ations to u ndertake prior to co mmitting force elements, regardless of size and service. Troop contributing nations (TCN) can and must provide additional training based on knowledge of the theatre of operations and from lessons learned from earlier national or other nation’s contributions to the same operation or theatre.

2. The UN has developed and continues to research appropriate training publications. T he list be low is the sou rce of i nformation for the train ing programs listed in appendix 1 to this annex:1

a. UN Military Observers Handbook.

b. General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations.

c. United Nations Peacekeeping Handbook for Junior Ranks.

d. United Nations Stress Management Booklet.

e. Ten Rules: ‘C ode of Persona l Co nduct for Blu e Hel mets’ (appendix 2).

f. ‘We Are United Nations Peacekeepers’ (appendix 3).

g. Selection Standards an d Training Guid elines for United Nations Military Observers.

h. United Nations Military Observer Course Curriculum.

i. United Nation s Tra ining Assistance Teams: Advisor ’s Guidebook.

j. A Peacekeeping Training Manual.

k. Disarmament, Demob ilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekee ping Enviro nment––Principles and Guidelines.

l. A Guide to Peace Support Operations.

1 Australian De fence F orce Pea cekeeping Cent re sho uld be co ntacted if copie s o f t hese publications are required.

Edition 2 7A–1

ADFP 3.8.1

m. Provisional Gu idelines for Pu blic Information Compo nents in United Nations Peacekeeping and Other Field Missions.

n. Standby Arra ngements in the Service of Pea ce: T ables of Organization and Equipment.

o. Security Awareness: An Aide-Memoire.

p. Medical Supp ort Manu al for United Natio ns Peacekeeping Operations.

q. ‘Hostage Incident’ Card.

r. Protect Yoursel f, an d T hose You Ca re Abou t, Aga inst HIV/AIDS.

s. HIV Prevention and Behaviour Change in International Military Populations.

t. Aide-Memoires: Pol icy Gu idelines on H IV/AIDS Prevention and Control for UN Military Planners and Commanders.

u. United Nations Civilian Police Handbook.

v. Selection Standards an d Training Guid elines for United Nations Civilian Police.

w. UN Military Symbols Handbook.

3. The following definitions are used by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Training Evaluation Services to identify UN peacekeeping training activities:

a. Classroom course. A series of lectures or lessons dedicated to a particular subject, usually aided by specialized books and teaching aids.

b. Distance training. Sta ndard trai ning provided directly to individual students world-wi de. May inclu de printed correspondence courses, web-based, computer based , and others.

c. Seminar. A short but intensive and research-based classroom course of study or discussion of experts on a particular subject or issue.

d. Workshop. A meeting for concerted discussions or acti vities, usually of ex perts and/or i nterested an d committed participants.

7A–2 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1

e. Generic training. Training con ducted in preparation of contributing officers and troops to any mission and before the mission is made known to the respective TCN.

f. Pre-deployment training. N ational traini ng o r distance training co nducted in p reparation for de ployment o f p olice and/or military officers and troops to a specific mission.

g. Exercise. A particular task or set of tasks des igned for the purpose o f pa rticipating or testing th e abi lity, techni que or quality of a person, thing or process.

h. In-mission briefings. Briefin gs conducted to po lice an d/or military officers and tro ops in prep aration for fu rther deployment into sectors in mission area and upon undertaking the designated task and responsibilities.

Appendixes: 1. United Nations Pre–deployment Training Core Curriculum Checklists2. Ten Rules—Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets3. We are United Nations Peacekeepers

Edition 2 7A–3

Appendix 1 to Annex A to


UNITED NATIONS PRE–DEPLOYMENT TRAINING CORE CURRICULUM CHECKLISTS1

1. This appendix contains the following tables:

a. Table 7A1–1: U nited Nations Military Observer (UNMO) Pre-deployment Training Core Curriculum Checklist.

b. Table 7A1–2: United Natio ns Staff Officer Pre-d eployment Training Core Curriculum Checklist.

c. Table 7A1–3: United Nation s Peaceke eping Contingent Pre-deployment Training Core Curriculum Checklist.

2. The United Nations (UN) Department of Pe acekeeping Operation s (DPKO) Training an d Eva luation Service has pro mulgated these su bjects, and they w ill form the b asis of any a ssessment or eval uation of Austra lian Defence Fo rce force e lements (and an y other troo p contributin g nation ) offered to participate in a UN pea ce operation. The source of information to develop th ese packag es is noted in annex A, an d from other na tional resources.

3. This guidance should also suit multinational force preparation, but will require supplementation by lead nation and/or organisation information.

UNMO Pre-deployment Training Core Curriculum Checklist

Subject Subject Matter Components Questions and Focal Areas

UN structure, functions and purpose

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5

UN charter and organisationUN PeacekeepingStructure of peacekeeping operationsUN Agencies and international organisationsLegal aspects

What is the UN.Charter Chapter VI/VII.What is peacekeeping and how was it developed.Who are the other players?What is the legal basis?

Edition 2 7A1–1

ADFP 3.8.1
Military observer duties and responsibilities

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7

ObservationReporting PatrollingVerification and monitoringInvestigation and inspectionLead an UNMO teamBriefing and staff skills

UNMO duties.What to report.How to read a map/GPS.What to look at/for.How to inspect.Leading a team with higher ranked officers.How to conduct a briefing.

Negotiation, mediation and liaison procedures

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8

Cultural factorsMedia relationsUse of interpretersCrisis managementNegotiation and mediation techniquesLiaison techniques and interpersonal skillsWorking with local authorities, international staff and organisationsSocial interaction with local population

How does culture and religion affect individuals.How the media behaves.Using an interpreter.How to handle difficult situation.How to build confidence in the local population.Restrictions to take into consideration while dealing with the local population.

Administration and pay

4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4

UN administrative arrangementsUN pay and allowancesUN leave/CTO policyUN, host and own country support

Familiarity with UN administration and support arrangements.

Basic driving, maintenance and vehicle recovery skills

5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5

UN RegulationsVehicle checks and maintenanceDriving techniquesRecoveryConvoy driving and mine awareness

UN standards for vehicle maintenance.Vehicle use (including off-duty).Understanding the driving conditions.Self and assisted recovery.


7A1–2 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1
Communications and RTP

6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4

Operating UN radiosUN proceduresMilitary termsUN standard reports and report writing

Types of UN equipment.Transmit and receive messages.Understand UN report and return requirements.

Mine awareness and explosive ordnance

7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4

Mine and mined areas in areas of operation (AO)Improvised explosive devices (IED)Casualty recoveryPrecautions in moving in mined or EO threat

How to judge if an area is mined or not.What are IED.Dealing with mine casualties.Preparations for working in mined areas.

Personal health, hygiene and fitness

8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4

Risks with HIV/AIDS and other STDWater and foodPersonal fitness and hygieneAlcohol and food

Staying fit and healthy in small team environment.

Personal survival skills

9.1 9.2 9.3

CBR protectionHostage and hijacksOthers

Personal protection requirement.Dos and don’ts.

Medical and evacuation

10.1 10.2 10.310.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9

Stress managementCasualty requirementsResuscitationWounds, fractures and burnsShockClimatic conditionsInsects and animalsEvacuation arrangementsReporting requirements

Recognition and management of stress.How to provide casualty support and priorities.Climatic survival requirements.Patient evacuation. Preparation and calling for Medevac.Report requirements.

Language 11.1 11.2 11.3

UN termsMission language testsLocal language

Understand basic phrases.Test requirements.


Edition 2 7A1–3

ADFP 3.8.1
Table 7A1–1: United Nations Military Observer Pre-deployment Training Core Curriculum Checklist

Human rights and humanitarian issues

12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.8

LOAC/IHLMonitoring human rightsGender issuesChild and women issuesICRCRefugee and IDPCIMIC/CMOElection monitoring

Familiar with LOAC/IHL/HR issues.What are gender and women/children issues in AO.What may be considered HR abuses/violations and how to report.Refugee issues.CIVPOL responsibilities.

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex combatants

13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4

Disarmament and weapon managementVerification needsDemobilisation and reintegration plansPost conflict peace building

What is DDR.What are UNMO responsibilities.

Mission information

14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4

History of the conflict, region and parties to the conflictMission mandate, agreements, SOP and ROEMission organisation, commanders and UNMO locationsDeployment and OPFOR recognition


7A1–4 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1
UN Staff Officer Pre-deployment Training Core Curriculum Checklist


Background of UN

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4

UN CharterUN OrganisationOther UN agenciesNational lessons learned

What is the UN.Charter Chapter VI/VII.Peacekeeping, and how it was developed.The other players.

UN peacekeeping operations

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4

Evolution of UN peacekeepingDefinitions—preventative deployment to peace enforcementUniversal principles and guidelinesOrganisation and composition of DPKO/UN mission

Development of UN peacekeeping.Legal framework for operations.What is DPKO and the UN mission structure.What is mission management.

Geopolitical information

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10

GeographyHistoryExternal influencesEconomyPolitical systemReligionsArmed forces/factionsDemographyCultural issuesThreats and hazards

What are the constraints of the mission area.What are the national cultural, religions issues.What is the origin of the conflict.What is the regional international intervention.What is the political situation.

Mission mandate

4.1 4.2

Mission historyAuthorities—SOFA/SOMA

UN action—SC/GA, mission organisation.CONOPS.

Edition 2 7A1–5

ADFP 3.8.1
General military staff officer skills

5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6

Organisation of an Operations Center:– SOPs– Orders and reports– Management ofinformation– Coordination ofoperationsObservation, recon and surveillance techniquesPatrollingDriving skillsMap reading and navigationRapid reaction force procedures

What does the UN expect us to do.Deployment.SOPs.Reporting.Riot and crowd control.Observation Post duty.Tracking and tailing.Patrol duty.Inter positioning.Check-point duty.Guard duty.Show of Force.Escort duty.Monitoring.Weapons Confiscation and Disarmament.Rapid Reaction reserve.

UN peacekeeping skills

6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7

Negotiation and mediationROE comprehensionUse of ForceUN Code of ConductComputer skillsPersonal communication skills:– Mission language– Local languageLiaison requirements– Within mission– Media– Other UN Agencies– Local Authorities– CIMIC

Main principles ofnegotiation/mediation.De-escalation techniques.Why ROE.Principles of Use of Force.Knowing COC.Oral and written test in Mission language.Why use liaison officers.Modus operandi for UN agencies.Principles of CIMIC.


7A1–6 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1
UN Staff Officer operational skills

7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8

Staff coordinationHQ Planning process:– Consultation anddecision– National consideration– Interoperability and multicultural awareness– Coordination NGOs/UN Agencies– Estimates– Plans and ordersOrders formatSOPSMinutes of meetings formatReports/returnsSymbols/map markingMessage handling:– Internal/external– Information security

Familiarity with HQ composition and staff cells.Understanding staff working procedures.Developing understanding of the civilian functions in HQ.Being familiar with formats used.Knowing symbols for map marking.Communicating using voice or messages.Conforming to information security systems.Being able to give briefings.Computer skills.

Protective and safety measures

8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9

Medical, first aid and preventive health measures:– Hygiene– Camp organisation– Food and water controlMedical evacuationSurvival skillsMine and EO awarenessFortification/sheltersFire safetyUN marking–visibilityCurfew and movement restrictions

Performing First Aid.Local diseases.Hygiene and food/water control.Knowledge of UN Medical system.Basic survival skills.Construction of fortifications and shelters.Knowing how to use UN markings and flags.


Edition 2 7A1–7

ADFP 3.8.1
Table 7A1–2: United Nations Staff Officer Pre-deployment Training Core Curriculum Checklist

Medical 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4

Stress managementBasic facts on HIV/AIDSPersonal risk assessment:– Prevention– Condom demonstrationMedical challenges

Understanding stress management.Transmission of STD—HIV–AIDS.Personal protection/ prevention.UN COC.

Administration and welfare

10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4

PayCTO/Home leaveMailWelfare

Managing personal economy for tour of duty. Retrieving cash in mission.Leave entitlements.Sending/receiving mail.UN welfare issues.Planned national welfare.

DDR 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4

DefinitionsAgreements and international standardsMain issues in DDRIntegrated planning

Why the need for DDR.Principles for DDR process.Actors and responsibilities.What is ‘Unity of Effort’ and ‘End State’.How to achieve these goals.


7A1–8 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1
UN Peacekeeping Contingent Pre-deployment TrainingCore Curriculum Checklist


Background of the UN

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4

UN CharterUN OrganisationOther UN agenciesNational lessons learned

What is the UN.Charter Chapter VI/VII.Peacekeeping and how it was developed.The other players.

UN Peacekeeping Operations

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4

Evolution of UN peacekeepingDefinitions––preventative deployment to peace enforcementUniversal principles and guidelinesOrganisation and composition of DPKO/UN mission

Development of UN peacekeeping.Legal framework for operations.What is DPKO and the UN mission structure.What is mission management.

Geopolitical Information

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10

GeographyHistoryExternal influencesEconomyPolitical systemReligionsArmed forces/factionsDemographyCultural issuesThreats and hazards

What are the constraints of the mission area.What are the national cultural, religions issues.What is the origin of the conflict.What is the regional international intervention.What is the political situation.

Mission mandate

4.1 4.2

Mission historyAuthorities—SOFA/SOMA

UN action—SC/GA, mission organisation.CONOPS.

Edition 2 7A1–9

ADFP 3.8.1
General military skills

5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6

Organisation requirements:– SOPs– Orders and reports– Management ofinformation– Coordination ofoperationsObservation, recon and surveillance techniquesPatrollingDriving skillsMap reading and navigationRapid reaction force procedures

What does the UN expect us to do.Deployment.SOPs.Reporting.Riot and crowd control.Observation Post duty.Tracking and tailing.Patrol duty.Inter positioning.Check-point duty.Guard duty.Show of Force.Escort duty.Monitoring.Weapons Confiscation and DisarmamentRapid Reaction reserve.

UN peacekeeping skills

6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7

Negotiation and mediationROE comprehensionUse of ForceUN Code of ConductComputer skillsPersonal communication skills:– Mission language– Local languageLiaison requirements:– Within mission– Media– Other UN Agencies– Local Authorities– CIMIC

Main principles ofnegotiation/mediation.De-escalation techniques.Why ROE.Use of Force.Knowing COC.Oral and written test in Mission language.Why use liaison officers.Modus operandi for UN agencies.Principles of CIMIC.


7A1–10 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1
UN peacekeeping operational skills

7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8

Use of ForceCheckpoint operationEscort dutiesGuarding key and vulnerable pointsCrowd and riot controlInspection and searchTracking and tailingSignal and communications

Practical ex in constructing/operating a CP/Mobile CP.Escorting through CP.Guarding.Observe ROE/Use of Force.Exercise patrolling.Practical Crowd/Riot control.Inspecting and searching vehicles.Live communications ex.

Protective and safety measures

8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8

Medical, first aid and preventive health measures:– Hygiene– Camp organization– Food and water controlMedical evacuationSurvival skillsMine and EO awarenessFortification/sheltersFire safetyUN marking-visibilityCurfew and movement restrictions

Performing First Aid.Local diseases.Hygiene and food/water control.Knowledge of UN Medical system.Basic survival skills.Construction of fortifications and shelters.Knowing how to use UN markings and flags.

Medical 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4

Stress managementBasic facts on HIV/AIDSPersonal risk assessment:– Prevention– Condom demonstrationMedical challenges

Understanding stress management.Transmission of STD—HIV–AIDS.Personal protection/prevention.UN COC.


Edition 2 7A1–11

ADFP 3.8.1
Administrative and welfare

10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4

PayCTO/Home leaveMailWelfare

Managing personal economy during the tour of duty.Retrieving cash in mission.Leave entitlements.Sending/receiving mail.UN welfare issues.Planned national welfare.

Logistics 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6 11.7

Personnel adminDeploymentCOEInspectionsPOLFoodSelf sustainment

What is national responsibility and what is UN responsibility.Understanding the differences between COE, UN-owned equipment and nationally owned equipment.UN Logistics versus National Support Element.


7A1–12 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1
Human rights and humanitarian issues

12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7

Law of war/IHLInternational HumanRightsGender issuesChildren and womenissuesMonitoring of HRICRCRefugees and IDP’s

Familiarity with international laws.Understanding of Human Rights in connection with UN Peacekeeping. Why the need for Gender awareness.Why special concern for women and children.What to look for from violations of HR.How to report violations.Concerns in connection with refugees/IDPs.

CMO/CIMIC 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6

UN Force civiliansNGO’sHost Nation civiliansCultural sensitivityLocal authoritiesMedia

What are the roles and functions of UN civilian staff.How to deal with civilians/NGOs.Sensitive issues.Authority of local Police.Dealing with media/ media awareness.Understanding principles of Civil-military Cooperation (CIMIC).


Edition 2 7A1–13

ADFP 3.8.1
Table 7A1–3: United Nations Peacekeeping Contingent Pre-deployment Training Core Curriculum Checklist

DDR 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4

DefinitionsAgreements andInternational standardsMain issues in DDRIntegrated planning

Why the need for DDR.Principles for DDR process.Actors and responsibilities.What is ‘Unity of Effort’ and ‘End State’.How to achieve these goals.


7A1–14 Edition 2



TEN RULES—CODE OF PERSONAL CONDUCT FOR BLUE HELMETS 2

1. Dress, think, talk, act and behave in a manner befitting the dignity of a disciplined, carin g, consid erate, ma ture, re spected an d tru sted sold ier, displaying the highest integrity and impartiality. Have pride in your position as a peacekeeper and do not abuse or misuse your authority.

2. Respect the law o f the land of th e host cou ntry, their l ocal cu lture, traditions, customs and practices.

3. Treat the in habitants of the ho st country with respect, courtesy and consideration. You are there as a guest to help them and in so doing will be welcomed with admi ration. Nei ther solic it no r accept an y ma terial rew ard, honor or gift.

4. Do not indulge in immoral acts o f sexual, physical or psychological abuse or exploitation of the local population or United Nations staff, especially women and children.

5. Respect and regard the human rights of all. Support and aid the infirm, sick and weak. Do not act in revenge or with malice, in particular when dealing with prisoners, detainees or people in your custody.

6. Properly care for and account for all United Nations money, vehicles, equipment and property assigned to you and do not trade or barter with them to seek personal benefits.

7. Show military co urtesy and pay appropriate co mpliments to all members of th e mi ssion, inclu ding o ther U nited Nations contingents regardless of their creed, gender, rank or origin.

8. Show respect for and promote the environment, including the flora and fauna, of the host country.

9. Do not engage in excessive consumption of alcohol or traffic in drugs.

10. Exercise the utmost discretion in handling confidential information and matters of official business which can put lives into danger or soil the image of the United Nations.

Edition 1 7A2–1



WE ARE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPERS 3

• The United Nations Organisation embodies the aspirations of a ll the people of the wo rld for peace. In this context the United Nation s Charter req uires that all personnel must ma intain the high est standards of integrity and conduct.

• We will comply with the Guidelines on International Humanitarian Law for Forces Undertaking United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and the applicable portions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the fundamental basis of our standards.

• We, as peacekeepers, represent the United Nations and are present in the coun try to help it recover from the trauma of a con flict. As a result, we must consciously be prepared to accept special constraints in our public and private lives in order to do the work and to pursue the ideals of the United Nations Organisation.

• We w ill b e accord ed certain privil eges a nd i mmunities arran ged through agreements negotiated between the United Nations and the host country solely for the purpose of di scharging our peacekeeping duties. Expectations of the world community and the local population will be high and our action s, beh aviour, and speech wil l be closel y monitored.

We will always:

• Conduct oursel ves in a profession al an d di sciplined man ner, at all times;

• Dedicate ourselves to achieving the goals of the United Nations;

• Understand the manda te and mission and compl y with thei r provisions;

• Respect the environment of the host country;

• Respect local customs and practices through awareness and respect for the culture, religion, traditions, and gender issues;

• Treat the inhabitants of the host country with respec t, courtesy, and consideration;

• Act with impartiality, integrity, and tact;

• Support and aid the infirm, sick, and weak;

Edition 1 7A3–1

ADFP 3.8.1
• Obey our United Nations superiors and respect the chain of command;

• Respect all other peacekeeping members of the mission regardless of status, rank, ethnic or national origin, race, gender, or creed;

• Support a nd e ncourage p roper co nduct amon g ou r fe llow peacekeepers;

• Maintain proper dress and personal deportment at all times;

• Properly accou nt for all money and prop erty assig ned to us as members of the mission; and

• Care for all United Nations equipment placed in our care.

We will never:

• Bring discredit u pon th e Uni ted Natio ns, or ou r nations th rough improper personal conduct, failure to perform our duties or abuse of our positions as peacekeepers;

• Take any action that might jeopardise the mission;

• Abuse alcohol, use drugs, or traffic in drugs;

• Make un authorised communi cations to e xternal a gencies, including unauthorised press statements;

• Improperly d isclose or use informatio n ga ined throug h ou r employment;

• Use unnecessary violence or threaten anyone in custody;

• Commit any act that could result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or su ffering to members of the loca l population, espe cially women and children;

• Become involved in sexual liaisons which could affect our impartiality, or the wellbeing of others;

• Be abusive or uncivil to any member of the public;

• Wilfully damage or misuse any United Nations property or equipment;

• Use a vehicle improperly or without authorisation;

7A3–2 Edition 1

ADFP 3.8.1
• Collect unauthorised souvenirs;

• Participate in any illegal activities, corrupt or improper practices; or

• Attempt to use our positio ns for personal advantage, to make false claims or accept benefits to which we are not entitled.

We realise that the consequences of failure to act within these guidelines may:

• Erode confidence and trust in the United Nations,

• Jeopardise the achievement of the mission, and

• Jeopardise our status and security as peacekeepers.

Edition 1 7A3–3

Annex B to ADFP 3.8.1 Chapter 7

MULTINATIONAL FORCE TRAINING GUIDANCE B

Introduction 1

1. The information contained in this annex is derived from the Australia, Britain, Can ada, and America (ABC A) Coalition Operatio ns Ha ndbook.1Whilst the handbook is oriented towards land operations, it is generic enough to be used as a guide for all co mponent pre parations. There a re man y similarities between information from the handbook and the Uni ted Nations training guidance, therefore publications may be considered interchangeable.

Conduct of training 7.2

2. Training and fo rce preparation teaches participants about strengths and weaknesses of multinational force partners, the area of operations (AO), tasks and the pe ople th e opera tion is to support. Traini ng shou ld be conducted at all le vels, and include the staff. Importantly, training does not cease once deployed into the AO; a training continuum must be established to de al with mission changes, rehe arsals for operations and con ducting combined ope rations. Activi ties of this nature ca n also broad cast the capabilities of the force and act as a deterrent to adversaries.

3. Pre-deployment focus. Pre-deployment training should focus on the following areas:

a. Individual military skills.

b. Individual and collective preventive medicine procedures and practice.

c. First aid—both individual and ‘buddy’.

d. Terrorism awareness and prevention.

e. Education lessons in the coalition structure, mandate, chain of command and divi sion of responsibilities (to inclu de non government org anisations and interna tional age ncy structures).

f. Unit training based on projected operations (rehearsals should be mandatory).

g. Team-building and sta ff training (to include tra ining with coalition forces and non-military organisations).

1 ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook.

Edition 2 7B–1

ADFP 3.8.1

h. Liaison offi cer (LO) train ing (to e nsure tha t p ersonnel are knowledgeable representatives).

i. Customs, culture, re ligious pr actices, pol itical situatio n, geography, econ omic, and hi storical ba ckground of the situation and population of the AO.

j. Adversary capabilities.

k. How to effectively communicate to the public through the news media.

l. Negotiation and mediation.

m. Language traini ng, e specially ke y ph rases. Although ABCA armies all sp eak Engl ish, not all operational terms ha ve the same meaning to each army.

n. Situational awareness (to in clude mi ne an d boo by trap awareness, and weapons recognition).

o. Rules of engagement.

p. Law of armed conflict.

q. Crowd control, and the use and employment of non-lethal riot control agents.

r. Employment and use of non-lethal weapons’ capabilities.

s. In-theatre driving conditions and skil ls for drivers and vehicle commanders.

4. In-country training. The coalition commander may need to evaluate the level of training of each troop contributing nation (TCN) to determine if it is ready to commit to the AO or if additional training may be necessary prior to commitment.

5. This training may be related to cultural or other issues related to the host nation. A checklist might include the following:

a. What pre-deployment training has been conducted by TCN?

b. Have de signated troop s fro m a T CN trai ned previously wi th troops from other TCN?

c. What pre-deployment or in-country training will be necessary before the commitment or deployment of troops into the AO?

7B–2 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1

d. What level of training is posed by each of the TCN?

e. Does each of the TCN have some form of train ing LO, or will the coalition headquarters need to establish a program?

Edition 2 7B–3


CHAPTER 8

LOGISTIC SUPPORT 8

Introduction 8.1

8.1 The deployment of military forces for operations requires the provision of considerable logistics support to sustain capability. The establishment and maintenance of a peace ope ration (PO) is no different. Log istics is an essential element of any PO deployment.

8.2 The UN has its own logistics infrastructure which plans new missions and coordinates support for existing and new missions from member nations. The UN relies on a combination of the inherent logistics support provided by of individual nations, and common support provided to TCN.

8.3 In complex operations sponsored by the UN much of the planning and organisation will be condu cted by th e UN al beit that most of the log istic capability will be provided by TCN. It is possible therefore that requests for an Australian De fence F orce (ADF ) co ntribution ma y be for on ly log istic elements, such as medical support, airlift, engineering or movement control. On the other hand, PO conducted by MNF generally rely on one of the TCN taking the lead on logistics support.

8.4 This chapter provides an overview of logistic support to PK missions. It will describ e the U N log istics organ isation, i ts structure, te rminology, concepts of log istics su pport an d respo nsibilities of the UN and T CN wi th respect to a PO d eployment. It also provide s a sho rt di scussion on MNF logistics.

Executive summary

• The United Nations (UN) logistics system relies on a combination of the inherent logistics support of troop contributing nations (TCN) and common support that is provided to all contributing nations.

• Multinational forces (MN F) gen erally rely on on e of the coalition forces taking the lead for logistics support.

• The UN missi on logistics support system supp orts all involved UN elements, not just the military or peacekeeping (PK) elements.

• A memora ndum of und erstanding (MOU) be tween n ations, or between a nation and the UN, will identify the equipment, personnel and self-sustainmen t req uirements, and detai l the maintenance support arrangements of that equipment and who is responsible for it.

Edition 2 8–1


8.5 Detailed guidance on ADF l ogistic planning a nd procedures i s contained in ADF doctrine identified later in this chapter.

UNITED NATIONS LOGISTICS 8.6

Definition 8.6

8.6 The UN d efines logistics a s coverin g al l aspe cts o f p lanning and carrying out the administration, movement and maintenance o f forces and materials needed on a UN mission, and includes activities related to communications, engineering and aviation services.1

Structure 8.7

8.7 UN logistics is structured on the Office of Mission Su pport (OMS) of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).2 The role of this office is the overall coordination of all administrative and logi stic support activities for field mi ssions, inclu ding sta ffing, fina nce, logi stics a nd procu rement. It comprises the Administration Division and the Logistics Support Division, and also operates the UN Logistics Base (UNLB) at Brindisi in southern Italy.

8.8 The Chief Administration Officer (CAO) is the head logistician on a UN mission. The CAO is appointed by and is responsible to DPKO for all mission logistics functions. The CAO is normally a civilian, permanent (professional) employee of the UN Secretariat rather than a military officer of any national contingent.

Concepts 8.9

8.9 UN logistics responsibilities in moun ting a PK mission are to ensure that:

a. the PK mission is provided with the appropriate personnel and equipment required to fulfil its mandate;

b. the T CN provid e person nel, equ ipment and services as detailed in the specific MOU between them and the UN; and

c. the con tingents perform according to the establ ished standards.

1 UN inst itute fo r t raining an d resea rch (UNI TAR), Logistical Support to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 2002.

2 OMS was previously th e Field Admin istration and Log istics Divi sion. DPKO’s stru cture is detailed in chapt er 2 o f Australian Defence Doctrine P ublication (ADDP ) 3.8 ––Peace Operations.

8–2 Edition 2



8.10 The UN logistics mandate is based on integration and coordination of the various types and sources of available logistics support. In addition, UN logistics sup port to missions i ncorporates th e comple x, mul ti-dimensional approach of the UN to the mission. This means the mission logistics support system supports all UN elements to var ying ex tents, not just the military/DPKO component.

8.11 The princip les for the UN provision of lo gistic suppo rt for TCN are simplicity, accoun tability and financial and management control. These principles are achieved through the following means:

a. reduction of the administrative burden on TCN, the Secretariat and PK missions;

b. standardisation of reimbursement rates on an equitable basis;

c. standardisation of equipment and services to be provided; and

d. establishment of prior agree ments betwee n the UN a nd the TCN for the leasing of ma jor equipment and the provision of service pe rsonnel an d se lf-sustainment. Any equipment, personnel and services above those will be considered the sole responsibility of the TCN and are not subject to reimbursement by the UN.

8.12 This system is focused on managem ent rather than accounting for contingent owned equipment (COE). It is pe rformance driven, and provides for transp arency o f d eployment as we ll a s accountability. Th is en ables Member States to a ppreciate th eir commitment to PK at the outset, thu s leading to si mplified budgeting and reimbursement. A further ke y benefit is that missions will be able to implement an integrated management structure in the field.

Logistic support 8.13

8.13 There are three basic concepts of UN logistics support to missions:

a. Self-reliance concept. The mission has reliance on the local economy (also kn own a s h ost n ation (HN ) su pport); this is particularly used for small missions (such as military observer missions).

b. Lead Member State concept:

(1) For smalle r mission s, th e lead member may assume responsibility for al l log istic suppo rt. Othe r n ations’ contingents would rely on the lead Member State fo r their logistic support needs.

Edition 2 8–3


(2) For la rger mi ssions, one Member Sta te assumes overall respon sibility for coordi nation of a ll log istics elements, grou ped under a Force L ogistic Sup port Group (F LSG). T he F LSG comprise s specialised support uni ts in areas such as signals, airli ft, engineering, sup ply, grou nd tran sport, move ment control, postal a nd medi cal. (Other aspects such as catering and fuel are arranged and provided centrally by the FLSG.)

c. Commercial sources. The overall aim for the logistics support of an y UN mi ssion is to prog ress to the mo st eco nomical means of suppo rt. Th is ge nerally me ans a re liance on commercial sources rather than any TCN logistics capability or the inherent UN system (such as support from UNLB Brindisi).

8.14 For major e quipment pro vided by a TC N (contin gent o wned equipment), the UN p rovides support to that equipment throu gh a combination of ‘wet’ and ‘dry’ lease arrangements, as follows:

a. Wet lease. The TCN itself provides the major equipment items and al l main tenance. Under a wet le ase, contin gents are responsible for:

(1) maintenance;

(2) warehousing;

(3) repairs;

(4) labour;

(5) resupply/shipment; and

(6) equipment replacement.

b. Dry lease. The TCN provides the major equipment only and is to deploy with serviceable equipment. The UN ma intains the equipment and provides maintenance by:

(1) commercial contract;

(2) UN employed personnel; or

(3) from another contingent’s capability.

8.15 Spare pa rts are provi ded ei ther from commercial sou rces or via a Letter of Assist (LOA see below).

8–4 Edition 2


Equipment 8.16

8.16 The equipment utilised on a UN missio n may come fro m a variety of sources. Of most direct relevance to a TCN is COE, but equipment may also be UN owned (for example: transferred from other UN missions), come from HN support (such a s buil dings or fi xed in frastructure/plant) o r be pro vided through commercial sources.

Contingent owned equipment 8.17

8.17 COE is that equipment required by a TCN to support its own or other agreed forces deployed on a PO. The range and quantity of equipment must be agree d to by the UN to ensu re reimbursement, and the sup ply of the agreed items into theatre is verified by UN inspection prior to reimbursement being authorised.

8.18 In 1 996 the C OE Manual3 was autho rised by the Un ited Nation s General Assembly (UNGA) to be a means for determining reimbursement to Member Sta tes fo r COE, rep lacing the previo us method ology TC N were reimbursed based on In and Out surveys and depreciation of equipment.

8.19 The scope of the COE Manu al p rimarily co vers the ad ministrative, logistics and fi nancial aspe cts rela ted to COE (majo r equipment and self-sustainment). It con tains th e poli cies, procedures and action s to be followed by the UN Head quarters (HQ) and Mi ssions, and is in tended to provide assistance to TCN to ensure that the intent of the UNGA is fully and consistently implemented.

8.20 One of the key aims of the COE manual is to facilitate the preparation of a MOU for the deployment of troops and equipment to a PK operation. The COE Manu al con tains in formation rela ting to d eployment/redeployment of personnel, p rocedures for d eath and di sability cla ims, painting/repainting claims, inland transportation claims, and provision of goods and services to contingents by the UN.

8.21 The COE manua l sho uld be rea d in conj unction with othe r related documents such as the UN Oper ation Su pport m anual, the Standby Arrangements in the Service of P eace, T able of Orga nizations and Equipment (1998) and mission-specific directives and guidelines produced by DPKO o r the UNGA or the UN Se curity Cou ncil. In the even t of any discrepancy between the COE manual and the documents of the UNGA, the resolution/reports approved by the UNGA shall prevail.

3 Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning Reimbursement and Control of Contingent Owned Equipment of Troop-contributors participating in Peacekeeping Missions (UN COE Manual), 25 A pril 20 01 (ap proved by UN Gen eral A ssembly Resol ution 50/ 222 of 11 April 1996).

Edition 2 8–5


8.22 Special case equipment. Special case equ ipment is eq uipment which, because of its nature or cost, is not identified in the UN COE Manual. In general, a ‘special case’ requirement exists for aircraft, medical and dental equipment, naval vessels and specia list communications equipment. Thi s equipment is provided under a LOA.

8.23 Self-sustainment. Minor e quipment an d con sumables not di rectly related to major equipment can be reimbursed as ‘self-sustainment’ services based on troo p stre ngth. Se lf-sustainment services a re de fined as those services that the UN requests a TCN to provide for its contingent deploying to the mission area . Se lf-sustainment categori es are no t sub ject to accountability upon entry into and departure from the mission area, but rather to verification and inspection to ensure that they meet the agreed standards and mandate of the contingent.

8.24 Only those services spe cifically re quested by the UN are reimbursable. Th ese se rvices are defin ed w ithin the MOU or L OA a s applicable. Wh en a con tingent pro vides less majo r equipment or self-sustainment than that stipulated in the MOU, the TCN will be reimbursed only for actual numbers.

Verification and control for contingent owned equipment 8.25

8.25 Arrival inspection. The UN Mission Inspection Tea m, und er the authority of th e CAO, in spects the TCN depl oyed e quipment within one-month of arrival into the area of operation. The inspection is designed to ensure the ca tegories, grou ps and numbe rs o f eq uipment delivered in to theatre correspond to the Contribution Agreement/MOU between the UN and TCN.

8.26 Readiness inspection. Operational Re adiness Inspe ctions are conducted by the Mission Inspection Team at least once during the mandate of the contingent in the mission area and at least once every six months. The inspection is intended to ensure the equipment is operational and being used in accordance with the Contribution Agreement. This inspection is used to validate the contingent’s capability in accordance with the MOU and is used to commence the monthly reimbursement process from UN HQ.

8.27 Repatriation inspection. This is conducted by the Mission Inspection Team at the time of the repatriation of the contingent or component thereof. The inspection sh all verify an d a ccount for a ll of the co ntingent’s majo r equipment and ensure UN equipment remains in the mission area.

8.28 Inspection reports. In each instance follo wing an inspection, an Inspection R eport i s fo rwarded t o DPKO/OMS t o progress re imbursement payments to the TCN.

8–6 Edition 2


8.29 Support documentation. Support documen tation is re quired to confirm the equipment and personnel to be deployed into a mission area. This documentation details which organisation is responsible for various support functions for the TCN contingent in the mission area. Further, it is required to ensure the reimbursement of the TCN by the UN via DPKO/OMS. Support documentation includes the following:

a. Status of Forces Agreement. A Status of Force Agreement is a leg al a greement b etween natio ns de fining th e rig hts of personnel and conditions of d eployment to that country. It includes, inter alia, powers of arrest and cha rging, freedom of movement conditions an d the requirement to pa y taxes and tariffs.

b. Memorandum of Understanding. A MOU is an eq uipment and support agreement between nations or a n ation and the UN. It i dentifies the COE, p ersonnel and sel f-sustainment requirements, a nd d etails the main tenance sup port arrangements of that equ ipment and who is responsible for it. A MOU eliminates the need for detailed surveys of equipment, spare parts and consumables, and puts the emphasis on the TCN fo r asset ma nagement. A model MOU is provid ed at chapter nine of the UN COE manual.

c. Letter of Assist. A LOA is an agreement between the TCN and UN for essential items or services n ot avai lable from normal sou rces of supp ly an d where a contingent’s na tional government is the only logical source of supply and the items or services are not covered by the contingent’s COE MOU.

8.30 Reimbursement. Reimbursement to TCN is made in accordance with chapter eight of the UN COE Manual.

Edition 2 8–7


HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—AUSTRALIAN LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS

The UN looks to countries with sophisticated armed forces to provide specialist support for its forces. Most countries can provide infantry, but logistics and communications elements are scarce commodities. This burden was long shouldered by Canada until the 1980s when it decided that the continuing disruption to its own force sup port had become una cceptable. Australia is wel l regard ed by the UN a s a competent all-rounder, and during the early discussions towards a resolution of th e con flict in Na mibia, a requ est w as made fo r Australia to provid e the logistics support for th e planned transition force. Whilst co mplimentary, this request was me t with so me reluctance by Army, both becau se of the prefere nce to deploy combat units (which had been homebound for ten years) and the neglected status of the log istic support uni ts which ma de such a commitment frau ght wi th risk. T he ideal compromise wa s an engineer construction squadron (1989–90), with a parallel engineer presence in th e mi ne cl earance training team i n Afgh anistan (1989–93).

A movement co ntrol unit w as p rovided b y Australia to Force headquarters for th e con trol of relie f o perations in Somalia (1992–93). From this point on, the demonstrated competence of the movement control e lements, and th e rela tive econ omy of such a national contribution, made this a regular component of subsequent UN force s. In add ition, the su ccessful deployments of me dical (Somalia, 19 92–95) a nd communications (We stern Saha ra, 1991–94 a nd Ca mbodia, 1 991–93) e lements ha ve provid ed a widening base for on going ADF contributions in those fie lds. Airlift support for UN missions was initiated with a flight of CC–08 Caribou aircraft on th e Pakistan -India b order (19 75–80). Since the n, elements of all three Services have made direct contributions to UN and multin ational fo rce pea ce ope rations, or have flown mission s supporting ADF elements.

Major peace making a ctions are few in comp arison to mission s facilitating settlemen ts an d protection of h umanitarian ai d. The INTERFET mission in East Timor (1999–2000), led by Australia both operationally a nd lo gistically, wa s a prime e xample o f such facilitation missions. How ever, fo r the maj ority of op erations, the ADF contribu tion wil l be small and spe cialised, drawin g on the expertise of the su pport and logistics resources o f the ADF in joint and single Service organisations.

8–8 Edition 2


MULTINATIONAL FORCE LOGISTICS 8.31

8.31 PO con ducted b y co alition MNF g enerally rely o n one of th e TCN taking the lead on logistics support. This lead would be structured similarly to the UN logistics lead Member State concept discussed in this chapter. Similar to the UN logistics sy stem, co alition force member nations rel y on a combination of thei r own l ogistics sup port syste m p lus the log istics l ead nation.

8.32 Detail on lo gistics an d admin istrative information requi rements and planning gui dance in multinational military op erations is contai ned in the Multinational Interop erability Coun cil’s Coalition Building Guide. For North Atlantic Trea ty Organisation (N ATO)-led operations, logistic p rinciples are detailed in the relevant Military Committee publications.4

8.33 In the case of an MNF (non-UN ) PO where the ADF is the logistics lead nation (LN), no rmal ADF ope rational lo gistics an d coa lition doctrine would be the basis of the logistics system. The relevant publications are listed later in this chapter. As the logistics concept to be employed under a non-UN MNF PO is particular to the systems and doctrine of the logistics LN, it will not be further considered in this publication.

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE LOGISTICS DOCTRINE 8.34

8.34 The primary ADF publications relating to the planning and provision of logistic support to operations are described in this section. The Joint Logistics Group sponsors these publications and the associated logistics processes and procedures.

8.35 ADDP 4.0—Defence Logistics. ADDP 4.0 is the keystone Defence logistics pub lication that describe s th e doctrine governi ng the p rovision of logistics support to Defence. In particular it:

a. provides a concep tual framework for the u nderstanding and conduct of effective logistics within Defence,

b. provides military guidance for the exercise of authority and the preparation of logistic plans,

c. prescribes logistics doctrine for joi nt ope rations and tra ining, and

4 NATO Military Committee publications MC319/1 and MC327/1.

Edition 2 8–9




d. provides a commo n po int of reference fro m w hich a ll o ther logistics doctrine a nd proce dural publications shou ld be derived.

8.36 ADDP 4.2—Support to Operations. This ADDP provides operational commanders and logistics practitioners with an understanding of the nature of joint and coalition logistics and guidance on how to plan and execute joint logistics support.

8.37 The Handbook of International Logistics. The Hand book is the principal reference o n interna tional logistics fo r use by opera tions and logistics planning staffs at the strategic and operational levels.

8.38 ADFP 4.2.2—Distribution Support to Operations. This ADFP sets forth doctrine to de scribe th e nature, pla nning and conduct of distribution support to operations.

8.39 ADDP 4.4—Movements and Transport. Th is ADDP sets forth doctrine to describe the nature, planning and cond uct of movements and transport support to operations.

8.40 ADFP 4.2.1—Civilians in Support of Australian Defence Force Operations. This ADFP provides doctrine for the provision of support drawn from external sources in the conduct of operations.

8–10 Edition 2





ADFP 3.8.1

GLOSSARYThe source for approved Australian Defence Force glossary (terms and definitions) and acronyms and abbreviations used in this publication is the Australian Defence Glossary, available on the Defence Restricted Network at http://adg.eas.defence.mil.au/adgms/.

administrationThe provi sion and implementation o f re gulations a nd p rocedures related to th e mana gement o f a n org anisation in suppo rt o f the accomplishment of its mission.

administrative control (ADCON)Direction o r exe rcise o f authority over subordinate o r o ther organisations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations.

area of limitation (AOL)A d efined a rea where spe cific l imitations apply to the strength and fortifications of disputing or bell igerent forces. Note: Normally, upper limits are establ ished for the nu mber and type of formations, tanks, anti-aircraft weapons, artillery, and other weapons systems in the area of limitation.

area of operations (AO)An operational area defined by a joint commander for land or maritime forces to co nduct military activities. Normal ly, an area o f operations does not encompa ss the entire jo int ope rations are a of th e joi nt commander, bu t is sufficient in size for the jo int fo rce co mponent commander to accomplish assigned missions and protect forces.

armed conflictConflict b etween Sta tes, or b etween a State an d o rganised, disciplined and uniformed groups within a State such as an organised resistance movement, in which at least one party has resorted to the use of armed force to achieve its aims.

asylum seekerA person who in vokes the pro tection of th e 195 1 Uni ted Nation s Convention relating to the Status of R efugees be fore the na tional authorities of a State and claims persecution to gain official refugee status in that country.

Edition 2 1

http://adg.eas.defence.mil.au/adgms/

ADFP 3.8.1

Australian support areaA part of the Australian continent which provides the manpower, civil and military resources and materials required to raise, train, mobilise, deploy and sustain forces.

belligerentIn time o f crisi s or wa r, an i ndividual, entity, military force o r sta te engaged in conflict.

buffer zone (BZ)A d efined area controlled b y a p eace operations force from which disputing or bel ligerent forces have been excluded. A buffer zone is formed to create an area of s eparation between d isputing o r belligerent forces and reduce the risk of renewed conflict. Also called ‘area of separation’ in some United Nations operations.

cargoCommodities and supplies in transit.

chain of commandThe succession of co mmanding of ficers from a sup erior to a subordinate through which command is exercised.

civil actorA non -military person , i ncluding tho se fro m the natio nal p opulation and local au thorities, as well as in ternational, national and non-government organisations and agencies.

civil administration (CA)An interim administration established by a foreign government, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, and which exercises executive, legislative and judicial authority which is normally the fun ction o f the l ocal government un til a n in digenous civil government can be established.

civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authori ties, as we ll as intern ational, n ational and non-governmental organisations and agencies.

civil-military operation (CMO)An operation conducted in support of military operations or in times of emergency aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of a military force or civil operation and reducing the negative aspects of military operations on civilians.

2 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1

combat air patrol (CAP)An aircraft patrol provided over an objective area, the force protected, the critical area of a comba t zone, or in an air defence area, for the purpose o f intercepting a nd destroying h ostile ai rcraft be fore th ey reach their targets.

combatantAn organised armed force, group or unit, except medical service and religious personnel, who is under the command of a party to a conflict and is subject to an internal disciplinary system.

commandThe au thority which a co mmander i n the mi litary Service lawfully exercises o ver subord inates b y vi rtue of ra nk or assig nment. Notes: 1. Command includes th e authori ty and responsibility fo r effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accompl ishment of assign ed missions. 2. It also includes responsibility for h ealth, wel fare, mo rale a nd di scipline of assig ned personnel.

command and control (C2)The process and means for the exercise of authority over, and lawful direction of, assigned forces.

conflictA politico-military situation between peace and war, distinguished from peace by the introduction of organised political violence and from war by its reliance on political methods. Note: It shares many of the goals and characteristics of war, including the destruction of governments and the control of territory.

conflict preventionA peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and—when necessary—military me ans, to moni tor and identify the causes of co nflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities.

contingency plan (CONPLAN)A plan for contingencies which can reasonably be anticipated in an area of responsibility.

Edition 2 3

ADFP 3.8.1

controlThe authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under their command, whi ch encompa sses the responsibility fo r implementing orders o r directives. No te: Al l or p art of th is au thority may be transferred or delegated.

convoy escortAn e scort to p rotect a co nvoy of veh icles from be ing sca ttered, destroyed or captured.

course of action (COA)A possible plan op en to an indi vidual or commander th at would accomplish, or is related to accomplishment of, the mission. Note: It is initially stated in broad terms with the details determined during staff wargaming.

cross-servicingThat servicing performed by one service or national element for other services or natio nal elements and for wh ich the othe r servi ces or national elements may be charged.

deploymentThe movement of forces within areas of operations.

detentionThe act of holding in custody for lawful purposes such as prosecution, maintenance of public safety, or pursuant to legal order.

doctrineFundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of o bjectives. It is authoritative but req uires judgement in application.

end state1. The military end state is the set of desired conditions beyond which the use of military force is no longer required to achieve national objectives.2. The natio nal en d state is the set of desi red co nditions, incorporating the elements of n ational powe r that will achie ve the national objectives.

establishmentAn installation, together with its personnel and equipment, organised as an operating entity.

4 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1

evacuationThe process o f moving any person who is wounded, injured, or ill to and/or between medical treatment facilities.

force element (FE)A compo nent o f a u nit, a unit, or an association o f units h aving common prime objectives and activities.

force multiplierA capability that, whe n added to and employed by a combat force, significantly i ncreases the combat po tential of tha t force an d thu s enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment.

force structureRelates to the type of force required including personnel, equipment, facilities and mil itary do ctrine to achieve the l evel of cap ability necessary to co nduct op erations effectively. N otes: 1. In the medium-term to th e lo ng-term, mil itary ca pability wil l vary due to changes in force generated by the capability development progress. 2. In the short-term, force structure is the more constant component of military capability and the level of capability available for operations is determined by the Defen ce’s m anagement prep aredness of the current force.

health and medical supportA set of actions which contribute to the preparation and preservation of the human potential by full and coherent care.

host nation (HN)A nation which, by agreement: a. receives forces and ma teriel of NAT O or o ther nation s

operating on/from or transiting through its territory;b. allows materiel and/or NATO organisations to be located on its

territory; and/orc. provides support for these purposes.

humanitarian assistance (HA)Support provided to human itarian and deve lopment agencies, in an insecure environment, by a deployed force whose primary mission is not the provision of humanitarian aid.

informationUnprocessed d ata of eve ry d escription whi ch may be used in the production of intelligence.

Edition 2 5

ADFP 3.8.1

information operations (IO)The coordi nation of information e ffects to influe nce the de cision making and actions of a target audience and to protect and enhance our own decision making and actions in support of National interests.

intelligenceThe product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nation s, h ostile o r potentially ho stile forces or el ements, o r areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organisations engaged in such activity.

intergovernmental organisation (IGO)An organisation created by a formal agreement (for example, a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or fu nctional basis for wide -ranging or narrowl y defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and the African Union.

internally displaced person (IDP)A person who, as part of a mass movement, has been forced to flee his or her home or pla ce of hab itual reside nce su ddenly or unexpectedly as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violation of human rights, fear of such viol ation, or natural or man-made di sasters, and wh o has not crosse d a n internationally recognised State border.

international organisation (IO)An orga nisation esta blished by intergovernmental agre ement and operating at the international level.

law of armed conflict (LOAC)The international law regulating the conduct of States and combatants engaged in armed hostilities.

lead agencyMay be designated to take the lead in pol icy making , p lanning and information sharing, and acting as the main point of contact for o ther UN agencies, the mil itary and political components, non-government organisations, an d for th e partie s to the co nflict. No te: it may also allocate tasks and coordinate activity, but it does no t have any command responsibility or overall authority.

6 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1

lead nation (LN)The nation with the will and capability, competence, and influence to provide the e ssential elements o f political consu ltation a nd mil itary leadership to coordinate the pl anning, mounting, and e xecution of a coalition military operation.

lethalThe method of attack which is intended to cause physical damage to personnel, material, or capabilities.

liaisonThat contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to en sure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action.

line of demarcationA line defining the boundary of a buffer zone or area of limitation. A line of demarcation ma y a lso be u sed to define the forwa rd limits of disputing or belligerent forces after each phase of disengagement or withdrawal has been completed.

line of operation (LOO)Describes how mi litary fo rce is applied in time and space th rough decisive points on the path to the enemy’s centre of gravity.

logisticsThe science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, the aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and deve lopment, acqu isition, sto rage, mo vement,

distribution, main tenance, e vacuation, a nd d isposal of materiel;

b. transport of personnel;c. acquisition or con struction, mai ntenance, opera tion, and

disposition of facilities;d. acquisition or furnishing of services; ande. medical and health service support.

maintenanceAll supply and repair action taken to keep a force in condition to carry out its mission.

manifestA document specifying in detail the passengers or items carried for a specific destination.

Edition 2 7

ADFP 3.8.1

material handling equipment (MHE)Mechanical d evices for h andling of supp lies with gre ater ease and economy.

measure of effectiveness (MOE)A criterion used to assess changes in system behaviour, capability or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective or creation of an effect.

military government ordinanceAn e nactment on t he a uthority of a mi litary govern or promul gating laws or rules regulating the occupied territory under such control.

military occupationA condition in which territory is under the effective control of a foreign armed force.

missionA cle ar, con cise statement of the task of the command a nd its purpose.

movementThe activity involved in the change in location of equipment, personnel or stocks as part of a military oper ation, and requires the supporting capabilities of mobility, transportation, infrastructure, and movement control and support functions.

multinational (MN)Between two or more fo rces or age ncies of two or more natio ns or coalition partners.

national contingentA national force of one or more Services including civilian personnel, under the command of a sin gle na tional command er, wh ich i s committed to UN or other internationally organised operation.

natural disasterAn emergency situation posing significant danger to life and property that results from a natural cause.

neutralIn identification, the designation given to a track, object or entity whose characteristics, behaviour, origin or nationality indicate that it is neither supporting nor opposing friendly forces.

8 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1

non-government organisation (NGO)A voluntary, non-p rofit makin g organisation that is gen erally independent of government, international organisations or commercial interests.

offensive operationA military operation conducted for the purpose of seizing or retaining the initiative.

operationA designated military activity usi ng lethal and/or nonlethal ways and means to achieve directed outcomes in accordance with national legal obligations and constraints.

operational command (OPCOMD)The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassig n forces and to retain or delegate opera tional and/or tactical control as may be deemed nece ssary, an d may also be used to deno te the fo rces assigned to a commander.

operational control (OPCON)The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually l imited by functio n, time, or location; to d eploy u nits concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of th ose uni ts. It does not inclu de au thority to a ssign sep arate empl oyment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, in clude administrative or logistic control.

operational level of conflictThe l evel of conflict co ncerned w ith the pl anning and co nduct of campaigns. Note: It is at this level that military strategy is implemented by assigning missions, tasks and resources to tactical operations.

operation order (OPORD)A dire ctive, u sually fo rmal, issued by a commande r to subo rdinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

Edition 2 9

ADFP 3.8.1

operation plan (OPLAN)A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in successio n. It is usu ally ba sed upo n stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. T he d esignation 'plan' is u sually used instead of ' order' in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order.

operations security (OPSEC)The process which gives a military operation or exercise ap propriate security, using passive or active means, to deny the enemy knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces.

peacebuilding (PB)A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil and—when nece ssary—military mean s, to add ress the unde rlying causes of conflict and the longer term needs of the people. It requires a commitment to a lon g-term process and may run concurrently with other types of peace support operations.

peace enforcement (PE)A peace support operation conducted to maintain a ceasefire or peace agreement wh ere the le vel o f consent and compl iance is uncertain and the threat of disruption is high. The peace support force must be capable o f a pplying cred ible coercive fo rce and mu st a pply the provisions of the ceasefire or peace agreement impartially.

peacekeeping (PK)A peace support operation following an agreement or cea sefire that has established a permissive environment where the level of consent and compliance is high, and the threat of disruption is low. The use of force by a peace support force is normally limited to self-defence.

peacemaking (PM)A peace support operation, conducted after the ini tiation of a conflict to secure a ceasefire or pe aceful settlement, that involves primaril y diplomatic action supported, when necessary, by direct or indirect use of military assets.

peace operation (PO)A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of d iplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

10 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1

peace support operation (PSO)An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursui t of United Na tions Charter purp oses and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peace building and/or humanitarian operations.

permissive environmentAn op erational en vironment in wh ich host country military an d law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.

preventive deploymentThe deployment of military forces to deter violence at the interface or zone of potential conflict where tension is rising among parties. Forces may be employed in such a way that they are indistinguishable from a peacekeeping force i n terms o f equipment, force po sture, and activities.

preventive diplomacy Action to p revent d isputes from developing be tween p arties o r to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the expansion of conflicts when they occur.

prisoner of war (POW)A detained person as defin ed in Articles 4 a nd 5 of the Geneva Convention Rel ative to the T reatment of Prisone rs of War of August 12, 194 9. In p articular, one who, whi le en gaged in combat under orders of his or her government, is captured by the armed forces of the enemy. As su ch, he or sh e i s entitled to the comba tant’s privilege of immunity from the municipal law of the capturing state for warlike acts wh ich do not amount to b reaches of the law of armed conflict. For example, a prisoner of war may be, but is no t limited to, any person belonging to one of the following categories who has fallen into the power of the enemy: a member of the armed forces, organised militia or volu nteer corps; a p erson w ho a ccompanies th e armed forces w ithout a ctually be ing a me mber thereof; a me mber of a merchant ma rine or civilian aircraft crew n ot qualifying for more favourable treatment; o r i ndividuals who, on the a pproach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces.

private volunteer organisation (PVO)An org anisation, other than a reco gnised no n-government organisation, that is involved in the delivery of humanitarian aid and services within the area of operations.

Edition 2 11

ADFP 3.8.1

refugeeAny person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to su ch fear, is un willing to avail himsel f o f the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

request for information (RFI)Any spe cific time-sensitive a d h oc requ irement for i ntelligence information or p roducts to support an ongoing crisis or operation not necessarily related to standing requirements or scheduled intelligence production. A requ est fo r information can b e ini tiated to re spond to operational requirements and will be validated in accordance with the theatre command’s procedures.

riskProbability and severity of loss linked to hazards.

rules of engagement (ROE)Directives that set out the circumstances and limitations within which commanders may apply military force to achieve military objectives in support of Government policy, and guide the application of force, but in doing so they neither inhibit nor replace the command function.

securityThe measu res necessa ry to achieve protection aga inst espi onage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism, as we ll as aga inst loss or unauthorised disclosure.

staffThe body of military professionals who support a commander in his or her estimation of a situa tion, an d in fo rmulating and executing subsequent plans, orders and activities.

standard operation procedure (SOP)Codified common pra ctice based on co llective e xperience which provides gu idance w ithout b eing pre scriptive. Note: In Australian usage standard operating procedures are used for guidance whereas NATO (and US Joint) use standing operating procedures which are prescriptive.

12 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1

sustainmentThe provisio n of personnel, logistic, and othe r sup port re quired to maintain a nd prolong operations or co mbat un til su ccessful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective.

tactical control (TACON)The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. tactical level of conflictThe pla nning an d condu ct o f ba ttle a nd is cha racterised b y the application of con centrated forc e and o ffensive action to gain objectives.

taskAn action or activity (d erived from a n ana lysis of th e mission and concept o f o perations) assign ed to an in dividual o r organ isation to provide a capability.

trainingA planned process to inculcate and modify attitude, knowledge or skill behaviour th rough a l earning e xperience to a chieve effe ctive performance in an activity or range of activities.

weapon systemA combination of one or more w eapons with all re lated equipment, materials, services, personnel and means of delivery and deployment (if applicable) required for self-sufficiency.

Edition 2 13

ADFP 3.8.1

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONSABCA Australia, Britain, Canada and AmericaACFID Australian Coun cil fo r International

DevelopmentACFOA Australian Council for Overseas AidADCON administrative controlADDP Australian Defence Doctrine PublicationADF Australian Defence ForceADFP Australian Defence Force PublicationADFPOTC Australian D efence Force Peace Operation s

Training CentreADO Australian Defence OrganisationAEC Australian Electoral CommissionAFP Australian Federal PoliceAO area of operationsASC Australian contingentAusAID Australian Agency for International

Development

BZ buffer zone

C2 command and controlCA civil administrationCAO chief administration officerCARE Cooperative for Assistance a nd Relief

EverywhereCDF Chief of the Defence ForceCIMIC civil-military cooperationCIVPOL civilian policeCJOPS Chief of Joint OperationsCMCoord civil-military coordinationCMO chief military observerCMO civil-military operationsCMOC civil-military operations cellCOMASC commander Australian contingentCJTF commander joint task forceCOMINTERFET Commander International Force East TimorCSS combat service support

DA UNNY Defence Attaché to th e Australian Permane nt Mission to the United Nations in New York

DDR disarmament, demobilisation and reintegrationDFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and TradeDFDA Defence Force Discipline Act 1982DI Defence Instruction

14 Edition 2


ADFP 3.8.1

DIAC Department of Immigration and Citizenship DPKO Department of Peacekeeping OperationsDR disaster reliefDRN Defence Restricted Network

FALD field administration and logistics divisionFC force commanderFE force elementFLSG force logistic support groupFMB forward mounting baseFORCEPREP force preparationFP force protection

HA humanitarian assistanceHC humanitarian coordinatorHN host nationHOM head of missionHQ headquarters

IASC Inter-Agency Standing CommitteeICC International Criminal CourtICRC International Committee of the Red CrossICV international certificate of vaccinationIDP internally displaced personIED improvised explosive deviceIFI international finance institutionsIFRC International F ederation of the Red Cross and

Red Crescent SocietiesIGO inter-governmental organisationIHL international humanitarian lawIMPP integrated mission planning processIMPT integrated mission planning teamIMTF integrated mission task forceINTEL intelligenceINTERFET International Force in East TimorIO information operationsIOITS international o rganisation integrated train ing

service

JMAC joint mission analysis cellJMAP joint military appreciation processJWDTC Joint Warfare Doctrine and Training Centre

LN lead nationLO liaison officerLOAC law of armed conflict

Edition 2 15

ADFP 3.8.1

MFO multinational force and observersMILAD military advisorMILOB military observerMLO military liaison officerMN multinationalMNF multinational forceMOE measure of effectivenessMOU memorandum of understandingMTA military technical agreement

NGHA non-government humanitarian agencyNGO non-government organisation

OCHA Office fo r th e Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OFOF orders for opening fireOGD other government departmentOP observation postOPCOMD operational commandOPCON operational controlOXFAM Oxford Committee for Famine Relief

PB peace buildingPBC peace building commissionPE peace enforcementPK peacekeepingPKO peacekeeping operationPM peacemakingPM&C Department of Prime Minister and CabinetPO peace operationPOW prisoner of warPOWG peace operations working groupPSO peace support operationPVO private volunteer organisation

RAMSI Regional Assista nce Mission to th e So lomon Islands

RC resident coordinatorRFI request for informationROE rules of engagement

SGTM standardised generic training moduleSOFA status of forces agreementSOMA status of mission agreementSPPKF South Pacific Peacekeeping ForceSRSG Special Rep resentative of the

Secretary-GeneralSTM standardised training module

16 Edition 2

ADFP 3.8.1

TACON tactical controlTCD third country deploymentTCN troop-contributing nationTES training and evaluation serviceTPN third party note

UN United NationsUNAMET United Nations Advance Mission East TimorUNAMIC United Nations Advance Mission in CambodiaUNCHR United Nations Commission for Human RightsUNDOF United Nations Disengagement Observer ForceUNDP United Nations Development ProgramUNGA United Nations General AssemblyUNHCR United Na tions H igh Commission(er) fo r

RefugeesUNICEF United Nations Children’s FundUNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in LebanonUNITAR United Nations Institute for Training & ResearchUNLB United Nations logistics baseUNMO United Nations military observerUNMOC United Nations military observer’s courseUNNY United Nations Headquarters New YorkUNOMOZ United Nations Operation in MozambiqueUNOSOM United Nations Operation in SomaliaUNSC United Nations Security CouncilUNTAC United Nation s Transitional Autho rity in

CambodiaUNTAET United Nation s Transitional Authority in East

TimorUNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision OrganisationUS United StatesUSA United States of AmericaUSG Under-Secretary-General

WFP World Food ProgramWHO World Health Organisation

Edition 2 17

OPERATIONS SERIES ADFP 3.8.1 PEACE OPERATIONS … · 2017. 11. 23. · 2D–1 Water requirements in...

Documents

Transcript of OPERATIONS SERIES ADFP 3.8.1 PEACE OPERATIONS … · 2017. 11. 23. · 2D–1 Water requirements in...