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Issue 1 August-September 2015

A r t h n i t i p u b l i c a t i o n

Artha , Niti and Shasthra :Economics and Rationality

by Akshath Ji tendranath

When I was first asked by the members of the

Arthniti club to write this present essay, I accepted

immediately. There were three reasons for my ac-

cepting this invitation: first, the name of the club

resonates with how I view the discipline of Eco-

nomics. Second, I think the way I look at Econom-

ics might be a useful insight to share with the stu-

dents of my alma mater, who I’m sure are still

grappling with the question “What is Econom-

ics?”. Third, through this essay I hope to introduce

myself to my juniors and update my old professors

by discussing, at a very elementary level, the work

I am currently engaged in.

The Sanskrit word ‘artha’ translates to ‘the means

of living’. In some other contexts, the word can

translate to meaning itself. However, in all con-

texts, artha is understood as an instrument that

provides for living. It is a means through which

life is lived. Paradoxically, in a dominant Indian

intellectual tradition, artha is also a part of the ends

of a good life, the other three parts being kama,

dharma, and moksha. Indeed, it is this duality of

the word ‘artha’ - simultaneously a means of liv-

ing and an end of a good life - that makes it antici-

pate the discipline of Economics.

But what is this discipline? And how does the

word ‘artha’ anticipate it?

The most famous use of the word is made in the

great text, Arthashastra. The Arthashastra, as every

Indian has been told, is a treatise on the means of

consolidating and extending the authority of the

State. It is the first text of its kind to be generated

by human civilisation. Indeed, the question must

then be asked, why the name Arthniti for an Eco-

nomics club? Surely, if we want to invoke an Indi-

an approach to Economics, we ought to use the

word Arthshastra for a journal or club concerning

this discipline?

Here, I shall pursue this matter a little further, jus-

tifying the use of the word ‘arthniti’. A shastra is

different from a niti. A shastra is associated with

divine or political authority. It is by invoking the

authority of divinity or the State that the means of

living get justified in an arthashastra. A niti, on the

other hand, is a just principle. The authority of a

niti isn’t derived from divinity, but relies on the

reasoning involved in justifying the principle. It is

true, of course, that words such

as niti and shastra have been used in many differ-

ent senses in different philosophical discussions in

ancient India, but there is still a basic distinction

between the respective concentrations

of niti and shastra.

Continued on Page 3

Akshath Jitendranath is studying Economics and

Philosophy at the Erasmus University, Rotterdam.

More importantly, he's the coolest, smartest, and

awesomest senior ever

M o v i e S c r e e n i n g

S c h e d u l e

Week Screenings

1st– 14th Modern Times —

Directed by and starring Charlie Chaplin, this 1936 silent classic chronicles “The Tramp” as he struggles to live in

modern industrial society with a help of a young homeless woman.

15th-27th Nero’s Guest —

Directed by Deepak Bhatia, Nero’s Guests documents the sad story of farmer suicides and the role of the government

and the public as passive onlookers while the fires of poverty and drought rage in the country side.

ABOUT US

As a collaborative initiative by some of our clubs (Arthniti, DebSoc, and Street Lights ), we want to screen a docu-

mentary or a film regularly in college. The exact date and venue of each screening shall be communicated via e-mail.

If you have any suggestions, do send them in at editorialboard@sse.ac.in

2

Going Under: The Taliban ’s Secret Dug Out The news of Mullah Omar ’s death throws a spanner into peace - talk proceedings

For as long as most readers will remember, we have

been hearing of the Taliban-Al Qaeda nexus next

door in Pakistan and its ties with the ISI. In the past

few years, ever since the death of Osama Bin Laden

in 2011, Al Qaeda has been seen to be weakening

both in Afghanistan and beyond, in its traditional

stronghold of the Middle East. The Taliban, on the

other hand, has been acting in an increasingly frac-

tured and uncoordinated manner. One faction, that

Taliban’s political head office in Doha disowns, is

engaged in talks with the new Afghan government,

while its militant wing has escalated the frequency

and scope of its attacks against said government. And

then came the news that Mullah Omar, the supreme

head of the Taliban since 1996, a man revered by his

followers, whose influence managed to keep the com-

peting factions together, has been dead for the past

two years. At first sight, this is a cause to rejoice,

since this is the man that housed the Al Qaeda and

caused Afghanistan’s descent into a civil war that still

doesn’t have a concrete resolution. But (the news of)

his death, ironically, has the ability to further compli-

cate the current chaotic state of affairs.

There is intense internal struggle regarding who the

new leader shall be. Mullah Akhtar Mansour, who

had been close to Mullah Omar, has been elected as

the new head by the Quetta Shura, the high council of

the Taliban leadership. Mullah Mansour is seen to be

a ‘moderate’ in support of the peace talks. But the

situation is far from stable. The decision has already

been challenged by Mullah Yakub, the son of late

Mullah Omar. Yakub, along with certain leaders who

have a stronghold in Peshawar and ties with Iran,

opposes the peace process which focuses on power

sharing rather than principles (establishing a ‘more

Islamic’ system of governance). To establish his

stronghold, Mansour has been seeking alliances with

fellow leaders while securing the support of interna-

tional donors. However, it will be hard for him to

engage in a reconciliation process that fulfils the de-

mand of both allies and donors, and he has already

been seen to be distancing himself from the peace

talks in an attempt to appease some of the factions.

Thus, the reason that the news of Omar’s death was

kept secret is quite evident. In his absence, there is

further fragmentation and confusion among the ranks

of the organisation and that does not bode well for

peace talks. Different leaders have different agendas.

This makes coherent decision-making that envelopes

the entire organisation practically impossible. The

Taliban today consists of increasingly radicalised and

ideologically motivated members, as opposed to the

nationalistic agenda that the organisation pursued a

decade ago. That makes rational reasoning and coop-

eration increasingly difficult.

A further cause for concern is that Mansour is a par-

ticular favourite of the ISI and that his chosen second

-in-command is Sirajuddin Haqqani. Both of them

have strong anti-India credentials. Mansour was Min-

ister of Aviation at the time of the 1999 Kandahar

hijacking and the Haqqani network was responsible

for the 2008 bombing of the Indian embassy in Ka-

bul. Whatever direction these developments take will

be a matter of significance for Indian national securi-

ty and international diplomacy.

Furthermore, the entry of the IS (Islamic State) in the

international terrorism network has made matters

even more complex. Though there are significant

barriers to the establishment and thriving of an IS

branch in the Indian subcontinent, the power struggle

between Al Qaeda and the IS is likely to further com-

plicate things. The Al Qaeda’s credibility is being

questioned, with them being seen either as deceptive

for being party to keeping the truth of Omar’s death a

secret, or incompetent for being out of the loop. The

IS will now be looking for recruits among those of

the Taliban who, disillusioned with the current direc-

tion the organization is taking, wish to defect.

At present, not much can be said of how exactly the

direction of these developments will be taken, given

the multitude of competing players and conflicting

interests involved. One thing that can be agreed upon

is that the situation is precarious and needs to be fol-

lowed closely so that the international community can

keep in stride with the volatile geopolitical dynamics.

Tania Sharma

Continued .from page 1

Now, Economics is a set of principles that outlines

the means of living – for an individual, a firm, or a

state – and thus, is also one constituent of the good

life for an individual, firm, or society. These princi-

ples, then, have to be justified by reasoning, not by

invoking any spiritual or political authority. Artha

must be based on niti, not shastra. Thus, arthniti, ra-

ther than arthshastra, is rightly the appropriate word

for an economic journal. It is the reasoning involved

in an argument, and not its appeals to divine or politi-

cal authority, which must justify the means we use to

live our life, which in the end are also a constituent of

the good life.

It is for this reason that I feel honoured to have the

opportunity to write to my juniors through the chan-

nel of a students’ club named Arthniti. By invoking

the word niti, the club is dedicating itself to the use of

reason and not divine or political authority, to justify

an economic principle. Indeed, this is how I view

Economics. It is this lesson that I hope you will learn

from Economics as well.

In what follows, I shall make a comment on econom-

ic theory, through which I will introduce to you the

work I do. It is important to pay special attention to

this for two reasons: first, all this might seem a little

abstract in the beginning, but I assure you, pay close

attention and you will understand what I’m saying.

Second, I am commenting on the use of reason – or

more specifically, rationality – in Economics. While

we have seen rational argument to be central to Eco-

nomics, I am afraid that I am reporting on the disci-

pline short-changing the idea of rationality itself.

Reason, as we have already seen, is central to justify-

ing economic principles. Further, a central axiom

from which most of economic theory has been con-

structed is the axiom of the rational agent. This axiom

states the following: rationality entails a decision

maker having a complete and transitive ordering over

a set of alternatives. I understand that for some of

you, the Sanskrit might have been easier to translate

than these abstract words. ‘What is a complete and

transitive ordering?’ I can hear some of you say. Fret

not. Let me illustrate what I mean.

Let A be a set of three alternatives x, y, z. Thus, A=

{x, y, z}

Let i be an individual or institutional agent deliberat-

ing over the alternatives in A.

Let R be the relation of i over A.

R is complete if every alternative in the set A is com-

parable to each other. That is to say, if xRy, xRz and

yRz, then R is said to be complete.

R is said to be a transitive relation if xRy and yRz

implies that xRz.

Perhaps my meaning will be better illustrated with an

example. Let us call the individual i by the name of

Mohammed, and let R be the preference relation. Let

Mohammed be an anti-terrorist specialist combatant.

Let A be the set of alternatives a terrorist organisation

is said to be targeting. Now, let us specify the alterna-

tives in A. Let x be the ancient city of Palmyra. The

city isn’t populated densely, but is rich with the herit-

age of the human civilisation. Let y be a central dis-

trict in the city of Baghdad, much more densely pop-

ulated than Palmyra. Let z be the embassy of the Mo-

hammed’s country in Kabul. The alternative z isn’t

densely populated, but is populated by individuals

Mohammed shares an identity with, namely his na-

tionality.

Given the three alternatives in the set A, and given

that Mohammed and his team of commandoes can

save only one alternative, then which alternative

should Mohammed save? Should Mohammed save

Palmyra? Should he save the embassy populated with

people of his nationality? Or should he save the

densely populated district of Baghdad? Now, eco-

nomic theorists assume Mohammed should order his

alternatives in a complete and transitive fashion. This

ordering will be based on some real valued utility

function each alternative is said to represent. But it is

impossible for Mohammed to compare each alterna-

tive to the other. Further, he cannot conclusively say

that one alternative is better than the other. This situa-

tion of logical incompleteness is one we encounter

very often in our daily lives, because we cannot com-

pare one alternative with respect to another alterna-

tive in the same units of accounting – a real valued

utility function.

However, economists have been blind to such prob-

lems of incomplete logical relations between alterna-

tives. In their opinion, every alternative will have a

real valued utility function, which gives us a number,

and the highest number must rank first, the second

highest number second, and so on. Such reasoning,

which is very common among economists, has two

problems. First, not every alternative is comparable in

the same units of accounting. Second, a decision

maker confronted with such logical incompleteness is

branded by the economist to be an irrational agent.

The point of this discussion is the following: rational

decision making is important. Misunderstanding this,

as economists often do, has enormous consequences

for the content of economic principles. Indeed, econ-

omists who posit this model of the rational agent in-

creasingly look like they derive their authority from

divinity rather than reason – shastra more than niti.

The rational agent of economics, like divinity, is

found only in texts, seldom in real life. However, if

there is anything I can tell you by way of advice, it is

the following: like with divinity, in Economics spe-

cifically and science more generally, we must not

succumb to the temptation of mistaking the text to be

the final word.

3

WHAT THE

‘F’ILOSOPHY!

T he past year has seen a series of bans across the country, some major, such as the ban on

the slaughter of cows and bullocks in Maharashtra, and some minor, such as the ban on American Indolo-gist, Wendy Doniger’s book The Hindus: An Alterna-tive History. In the month of August itself, the Mum-bai police were involved in a shocking incident in which several adult couples who had booked hotel rooms were rounded up, humiliated and fined, on the grounds of ‘public indecency’. Looking past the intui-tive outrage at these limitations on our freedoms, we see the even murkier reasoning behind such deci-sions: that they are taken for the people’s own good. This wave of patronising ‘reform’ warrants a closer look at the political philosophy of paternalism and an analysis of its justifications and flaws.

Paternalism can be loosely defined as interfering with a person's freedom without her consent, for her own good. It comes from the idea of a father (‘pater’ in Latin) making decisions for his children on the grounds that he knows what is best for them. There-fore, laws ranging from the compulsory wearing of a seatbelt or helmet to the banning of alcohol or por-nography fall under the banner of paternalism.

According to the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philoso-phy, an action can be defined as paternalistic if it ful-fils the following conditions: the action interferes with the autonomy of a person(s), the action is im-posed without the consent of the person(s), and the action is taken only because it is thought that it will in

some way promote the interests, well-being or values of the person(s). Now, given this definition, what are the limits, if any, within which paternalistic action is permissible?

We would all agree that paternalism is justified in cases where a person’s capacity for rational thinking is seriously impaired, such as with a minor, who is thought to lack the cognitive and emotional capacity to make the right decisions for herself, or with a per-son who is under the influence of alcohol or drugs, which impair one’s ability to think of long term con-sequences. It could also be said that a person does not see the importance of wearing a seatbelt or helmet only because one has not yet been in an accident, but once they are involved in one, they would prefer to wear a seatbelt or helmet henceforth. Thus, it be-comes acceptable to make these actions compulsory.

Now we look at cases where the person is capable of making choices for herself, and ask whether or not the state is permitted to aim at doing (what it considers) good for its citizens against their wishes. To evaluate this question, we could simply ask whether the state does more harm or good when it behaves paternalisti-cally, but is this comparison a normative or empirical one? If we define good as simply better health, lon-gevity or more income, the evaluation would be em-pirical. However, if we, like John Stuart Mill or Em-manuel Kant, believe that the good of a person in-volves her being respected as an individual or her having the right to make her own decisions, then the evaluation of whether she can be made better off

through paternalistic interventions becomes norma-tive. As Mill says in On Liberty, “…a man's mode of laying out his own existence is best not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode…”.

Another aspect to scrutinise when thinking of the State’s authority to interfere paternalistically with individuals’ autonomy is that the state is doing what it believes to be good. This brings us back to the series of bans in the country and the distinction between moral and welfare paternalism. The latter refers to actions taken to promote the welfare of the people, and prevent such ‘bads’ as disease, poverty and death. The former, moral paternalism, seeks to protect the moral welfare of the individual. For example, a mor-ally paternalist State would ban prostitution even if the profession took care of the income and health of prostitutes, because provision of sexual services for money is thought to be morally corrupt.

Morality however, is a deeply personal issue. In a country like India, which has a plurality of moral opinions, the government is playing a dangerous game by imposing its narrow sense of right and wrong on a billion citizens. The subjectivity and nu-ances of morality, especially for such a multitude of people, means that the law should best avoid the use of morality as a basis for infringing on the autonomy and dignity of the citizens it serves. Happiness, unlike responsibility, cannot be thrust upon people.

Malavika Gode

"Men, it has been well said, think in

herds; it will be seen that they go mad in herds, while they only recover their

senses slowly, and one by one."

With the Chinese currency devaluated and stock markets crashing, as events unfold it is likely that many of us will stumble upon news of the highly con-tentious and exceedingly complicated debates over the government’s role in regulating financial markets. Almost all of us would agree that bad things happen when one leaves specula-tors alone with commodities, and we find it easy to recall recent examples of economic booms and bubbles, be it the recession of 2008 or the more current fluctuations in the Shanghai Stock Ex-change. On the other hand, it is possible that this effect, the “madness of crowds”,

has on overvaluing goods is more in-nate and natural to traditional markets than someone in the modern age might believe, as is illustrated by the case of what economists like to call “tulip ma-nia”. Jumping back to the mid seventeenth century, it was during the Dutch golden age that the tulip was introduced to Europe from Turkey. Amsterdam, at the time, was brimming with wealthy traders and merchants, to whom the tulip became a novelty used to fill up their orchards as a sign of prosperity. The hype for the flower slowly escalat-ed. Even though its trade was limited to small circles of gentry at first, gossip soon diffused throughout the nation; as opposed to the flower’s exotic design or appearance, many began to be more mesmerised by its exceptional return on investment. Tulip prices, already at a premium, skyrocketed as speculators

and investors became involved in the craze, both from within the Netherlands and overseas. As is usually the case, things got better before they got worse. Individuals were known to sell off their savings, houses and every other liquefiable asset for a chance to ride the tulip’s success. Many made their fortunes overnight. A system highly reminiscent of the mod-ern day futures market was created; farmers would sell contracts to pur-chase their tulips at the end of the year; bearers of said contracts would meet in taverns and, paying a small fee to the host, would trade their deeds with other investors. Although investments in the absence of physical goods are a common occur-rence now, the same was a peculiar sight four centuries ago; the Dutch took to calling the practice “Windhandel” or “The Wind Trade”, alluding to how no tulips actually exchanged hands alt-hough payments were made, and how many of the persons who held contracts for tulip bulbs had never actually seen them. Quoting a contemporary poet, “he who considers profits that some make every year from their tulips will believe that there is no better Alchemy than this agriculture.” As was an inevitable result of this hype, the value of many tulips increased twentyfold over a period of three months and, at a point, the value of a single bulb was ten times the annual wage of a skilled labourer. As was even more inevitable, buyers soon realised the offensively high prices they were being asked to pay for what was essen-tially a stem and petals, and the bubble soon popped. Some tulip bulbs were worth a small mansion one day, an onion the next; prices came crashing down, taking the

brokerage, trading and insurance insti-tutions built around them with it. The economy was hit with a significant shock and the government intervened,

In this satire on “Tulip Mania,” painted in 1640 by Dutch artist Jan Brueghel the Young-er, the upper class are portrayed as monkeys, buying tulips at ludicrous prices. setting up the Commission for Flower Affairs to ease the situation. In a move that would be outrageously inequitable today, all contracts were voided, with a minimal fee paid to the farmers whose livelihood was the most affected. De-spite this, the crash retained its far-reaching effects, inflicting the entire nation with a recession and leaving the Dutch cautious of speculative invest-ments for years to come. Even though the specific details of the “tulip mania” story are still highly de-bated, it remains a useful example to highlight the underlying principles at work in an economic bubble, many of them still applicable today. Of course, we would like to think that we have come a long way since then; perhaps our investment bankers today know it’s better to stop and smell the flowers as opposed to betting a fortune on one. Arshaan Furniturewalla

Daddy Issues A look at how governments sometimes take i t upon

themselves to decide what ’s best for you

Tulips and Bubbles

While housing bubbles and financial crises may seem to be recent phenomena, we take a look at how seventeenth century

finance can get risky

4

SPORTS

The summer of 2015 wasn’t a very radiant one for Kev-in Pietersen and his fans. One of the most reputed play-ers of the England Cricket Team and its highest run scorer, Kevin Pietersen, was informed that there was an issue of trust and he would not be part of England’s plans for the summer.

The record-breaking batsman, who was sacked by the England and Wales Cricket Board after England’s 5-0 defeat against Australia in the 2014 Ashes, had hoped

for a recall after apparent pre-season encouragement from new ECB chairman, Colin Graves. But even after his maiden triple-century for Surrey, he was informed within hours by Andrew Strauss, former England cap-tain English cricket’s new director, that there was no imminent prospect of him playing for England again.

Kevin Pietersen put his Indian Premier League (IPL) commitments at stake and chose to play for his country first. His outrage at the Board was clearly visible in his open letter; ‘My Fury at England Deceit’ which was published in the Telegraph, UK. He plays for SunRisers Hyderabad in the IPL, where he believes he is much more respected than he was in the England team.

Hours after he scored 326-not out, his highest first-class score, Pieterson, who had high hopes and a “burning desire” to play for the team, was told that there was no place for him in the England team this summer. He was offered a job as an advisor on the one-day side, but he turned it down. How can Strauss, on one hand, say that he cannot trust Pieterson, and then want him on board because he has a wonderful cricket brain, on the other?

The England Cricket Board has faced a lot of criticism due to this issue. The fans are truly dismayed by these contradictions and the events that have transpired. It was a sorry sight to not be able to see Kevin Pietersen sport an England shirt this summer.

Saakshi Puri

Kevin Pietersen Sacked

The former England batsman seems to have seen his last playing days for English cricket

The Zimbabwean dollar is expected to be demone-tised, that is, the currency will hold no value and won’t be a recognised medium for transactions, by the end of September 2015. Zimbabwe suffered a huge bout of inflation in mid 2008 with inflation averaging at 98% daily and nearly 1023 % annually. The central bank of Zimbabwe was forced to introduce a bank note valued at 100 trillion Zimbabwean dollars with its nominal value compared to the US dollar being just 40 cents. In 2009, the government stopped the printing of the Zimbabwean dollar and discontinued it as the coun-try’s official currency. Currently multiple currencies are used in Zimbabwe with the US dollar being the most common. Apart from the fact that the government indiscrimi-nately printed money to support its spending, there are multiple underlying factors that led to Zimbabwe be-ing branded as the Weimar Republic of the 21st centu-ry. These are mostly centered on the country’s bad governance, led by President Robert Mugabe’s pseudo dictatorial regime. The origins of the cause that led to the largest banknote to be witnessed by the world can be traced back to early 1980s when Zimbabwe attained independence from British rule and President Mugabe began his land reform policy. Throughout the colonial history of Zimbabwe, and through the 80's and 90's, Zimbabwe had experienced large-scale agricultural exports and relative economic success, once second only to South Africa in agricultural production. During this period, most of the country's most productive farmland remained in the hands of white colonists, but after independence, and throughout the 1990s, Presi-dent Mugabe’s government worked to shift ownership. During the reform program most of the farmlands were taken over by local people and other government officials who had only little knowledge about agricul-ture related activities. As a result the production de-clined to drastically low levels. The annual wheat production, which once stood at 300,000 tones in 1990, plummeted to 50,000 in 2007.The tobacco in-dustry, which was Zimbabwe’s largest generator of foreign exchange and accounted for almost a third of Zimbabwe’s foreign exchange earnings in 2000, al-most completely collapsed. The crop that earned near-ly US$600 million in 2000 generated less than

US$125 million in 2007. The banking sector also col-lapsed, with farmers unable to obtain loans for capital development. The country was not able to repay a big chunk of its loans and its debt accumulated day by day. Most of the external and internal borrowing came to a halt, as no one was ready to lend any more money. At the peak of the crisis the government was mostly dependent on the aid from other nations and interna-tional agencies. Zimbabwe’s participation in the second Congo war also played a major role in the rise of inflation in the country. In late 1990s Mugabe authorised Zimbabwe-an troops to fight in the Second Congo War. In Sep-tember 1998, even as economic conditions continued to worsen, the President sent 11,000 troops to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to back the discredited leader, Laurent Kabila. Its involvement in the war drained much of the country’s monetary re-serves in the wake of the21st century. In fact the Mu-gabe government was printing more money to help finance the war. Zimbabwe was under-reporting its war spending to the International Monetary Fund by nearly $22 million a month. Another one of the major drivers of inflation has been fiscal mismanagement over the past 10 years. Accord-ing to IMF reports, the budget deficit, including grants, stood at 10% of the estimated GDP in 2006. This figure is over triple the figure of 3% of the GDP achieved in 1998. In the 2008 budget, announced on November 29, 2007, the forecast budget deficit was approximately 11% of expected GDP of Z$16 quadril-lion. According to IMF estimates, government ex-penditure had reached 53.5% of GDP in 2006 – more than double the expected value of 24.7%. Moreover Zimbabwe’s Reserve Bank is state owned and the gov-ernor had been ordered by Mugabe (on an ongoing basis over the years since 2000) to print amounts of currency that grow the money supply at a rate well over Zimbabwe’s inflation rate. It should be noted that a government could finance a large fiscal deficit, possibly indefinitely, by issuing debt obligations. These debt obligations (bonds or treasury notes) are sold on the open market, and inves-tors choose to purchase them at a price influenced, to a large degree, by the confidence buyers place in the

capacity of the issuing agency to repay them - either through taxes, or through the issuance of further debt. Due to widespread belief in the essential criminality of the Mugabe regime, this was simply not a viable op-tion. Since a large proportion of government payments in Zimbabwe were made in the form of cash, it was pos-sible for the Mugabe government to meet its obliga-tions by the simple expedient of printing Zimbabwean Dollars. But since these Zimbabwean Dollars had no credible backing (i.e. people did not believe they were backed by either assets or potential tax revenues) both consumers and businesses rapidly lost confidence in the currency. This loss of confidence led to an infla-tionary spiral that lost all control, reaching a peak esti-mated at 1023 % in 2008.

The Zimbabwean government tried numerous measures to address inflation, including revaluing the currency, or simply "redenominating" existing notes. However, since these policies did nothing to address the underlying lack of faith in the government's means or willingness to honor its obligations, they met with little success. In the end the government was forced to stop printing the Zimbabwean Dollar and replace it with a currency that was more popular among the general populous - the US Dollar. Shashank Pareek

The hyper-inflated Death of the Zimbabwean Dollar

Although the first edition (!) of our

newsletter is quite spectacular, we are

always open to your suggestions.

Do send them at editoralboard@sse.ac.in

Aapka,

SanSar