Mylrea - Interview with Itamar Rabinovich: Walking the Tightrope of Middle East Diplomacy

8/12/2019 Mylrea - Interview with Itamar Rabinovich: Walking the Tightrope of Middle East Diplomacy

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The Fletcher School Al Nakhlah Tufts University160 Packard Avenue Medford, MA 02155-7082 USA Tel: +1.617.627.3700

The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Fall 2007

InterviewwithItamarRabinovich:WalkingtheTightropeofMiddleEastDiplomacyMichaelMylreaIn an attempt to revive peace talks, Israeli PrimeMinisterEhudOlmert recentlymetwithPalestinianPrimeMinisterMahmoudAbbas at his residence inJerusalem.Onceagain,Palestinianand Israeli leadersappeartobeatanimportantcrossroads.Ispeaceonthehorizon?Orwillviolenceerupt?Toughquestionsloomominously. ThecomplexenvironmentofMiddleEastdiplomacy is like walking a tightrope, where eachnegotiation rests on a delicate balance betweenpeaceandwar.AsIsraelsformerAmbassadortotheUnitedStates and Chief Negotiator to Syria, ItamarRabinovich has walked this tightrope, negotiatingthrough some of Israels most challenging times.Former Ambassador Rabinovich sat down with alNakhlah to shed light on his diplomatic experience,offeringimportantlessonsfromthepastandhisuniqueperspectiveon thefuturechallengesandopportunitiesintheMiddleEast.October 31, 2007

What does Israel hope to accomplish atthe upcoming peace summit? And, howwill current events in the region affect its

ability to realize these goals?IthinkIsraeliexpectations,inanticipationof

the peace summit as it is referred to, are quite

modest.

Given the problems of the Bush administration

andthefactthat it isanadministrationthatison

itsway out andbogged down in Iraq, coupled

withtheweaknessofAbuMazenandthatHamas

is incontrolofGaza,and

the fact that the Syrians

canrocktheboatthrough

Lebanon and through

their influenceonHamas

and Islamic Jihad, the

sense is that it isnot the

right time to go for final

status negotiations.

Therefore, the Israeli

policywouldbe to try to

look forwhatwesometimescalladeclarationof

principles,whichwouldnotexact thathighofa

price from the Olmert government, and which

wouldbeaccompaniedbyIsraeligestureson the

ground such as release of prisoners, removal of

roadblocks, and maybe dismantling of illegal

settlements.ThisistheIsraeliexpectation,butnot

thePalestinian

expectation.

So,

the

Palestinians

have higher expectations and the sizable gap

between expectations has already led to a

postponement in the peace talks. I think the

postponement occurred because Secretary Rice

andherteamrealizedtherewouldnotbeenough

time for them to narrow the gap sufficiently for

The Palestin ians havehigher expectationsand the sizable gap

between expectationshas already led to a

postponement in thepeace talks.

MichaelMylrea isamanaging editorofAlNakhlahthe Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, andresearcheratHarvardLawSchoolsBerkmanCenteratMIT.


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some kind of success to emerge out of the

conference.

The violence that p receded the Oslo peacenegotiations and Israels withdrawal fromthe Gaza Strip appears to have made the

Israeli public pessimistic about theupcoming peace process. Furthermore,recent violence between Hamas and Fatahand continued Israeli settlementexpansion in the occupied territories, alsopaint a pessimistic picture of the latestpeace initiative from a Palestinianperspective. This has led a number ofscholars to warn that another round offailed peace negotiations could trigger athird intifada. Could you touch on theconsequences of raising high

expectations for the current peace talks?When there is failure, there is a sense of

despair and exasperation that could lead to

anotheroutburstofviolence.Itcouldplayintothe

handsofHamas,whowould then say, we told

you,thereisnohopeonthispathandyouhaveto

join our path, and the only way is violent

resistance. So the answer is yes. And then, of

course, there isadomesticpriceof failure forall

parties involved. I think one of the Bush

administrationspurposes is to tryandendeight

yearsin

office

with

something

positive

in

the

contextof theMiddleEastagainst thebackdrop

of Iraq, and a resonant failure is notwhat they

haveinmind.

Considering the severity of theconsequences of failed negotiations, howdo you know when it is the right time tonegotiate? What criteria need to be inplace in the context of Middle Eastdiplomacy?

In conflict resolution theory, there is an

importantconcept

of

ripeness.

You

need

to

identifywhenaconflict isripeoralmostripe for

resolution. There is positive and negative

ripeness. Positive ripeness is when parties can

expect benefits, and negative ripeness is when

they are under pressure and feel despair. The

prospect ofwhat a negotiation can produce for

youhas tobemore enticing than the statusquo

becauseinordertomakeadealyouhavetopaya

price and it is painful. The question is if the

alternative ismorepainfulor lesspainful and if

the rewards offeredby the alternative are large

enoughtomakeupforthepain.

Another importantvariable istheconceptof

time.Istimeworkingformeoragainstme?Ifits

working forme, letmewait. If timeseems tobe

working againstme, letme amake adealnow.

Andofcoursethedecisionmakersandmediators

needtobeabletoreadthesetrendscorrectlyand

makeagoodjudgmentcall.Youknow, itsnota

mechanicalprocesswhereyougoby the criteria

andmeasurethem.Itsoftenaquestionofinstinct

thatpoliticiansanddiplomatsneedtohave.

In your book, Waging Peace you

mention that the first step tounderstanding the complexity of the[Arab-Israeli] dispute is recognition thatthere is no single Arab-Israeli dispute buta cluster of distinct, interrelated

conflicts. i Could you give an example of

how the interplay of other regionalconflicts contributes to the complexity?

Indeed, it is complex. We have had the

conflictformorethan60yearsnow,andthepeace

processfor34yearsnowhasnotbeenconcluded

successfully. This bears testimony to the

complexity and difficulty of the conflict. For

example, consider how theGulfWarweakened

thePLOandenabledBakertoinviteaPalestinian

delegation toMadridwithout the PLO.There is

always interplay of regional politics. The art of

policymakingandplanning is theability toread

the trends correctlyevenwhen total information

isnotalwaysavailable.

What should be Israels role in finding asolution to the Fatah and Hamas split?

Actually,Ithink

its

not

the

right

thing

for

IsraeltotryandengineerPalestinianpolitics.The

product of Israeli engineering will always be

illegitimate.But Israelcanact indirectly. If Israel

thinks Fatah as a secular, nationalist, and

pragmaticgroup is theanswer toHamas, it can,

withoutbeingtootransparent,trytohelpFatah.


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Do you believe Fatah will be able to holdthe West Bank? What do Israel's act ions(or lack thereof) in this current cris is meanfor the future of the Palestinian territories,Israel and the region?

ii

I think Fatah can retain its control over the

WestBank.

Israel

can

be

helpful

and

is

helpful

in

that regardbecause Israelspresence in theWest

BankisveryconcreteunlikethatinGaza,whichis

cut off from Israel. And, therefore, I think that

Fatahsability to retain its controlover theWest

Bankisquitegood.ItsabilitytorecaptureGazais

questionableandofcoursetheenduringsituation

of a divided Palestine is not conducive to

peacemaking. Imafraid there isnotmuch Israel

candoaboutit,excepttolivewithit.

Could you imagine a viable vision of adivided Palestinian State?

Itisnotgoingtobeveryviable.Notastate,

butstateled.Thismeansthataslongasyouhave

divided authority among the Palestinians, it is

goingtobeverydifficulttocometoafinalstatus

agreement.

When you were a chief Israeli negotiatorwith Syria during negotiations in 1993, itwas really the first time thatSyria and Israel came close to a

peace agreement. During thattime the Syrian position was: full peace for full withdrawal.The Israeli demands were:quality peace, normalization andwater issues. In the background,the Oslo peace accordspresented a window for peacebetween Palestinians andIsraelis. Since then a lot haschanged. What would acomprehensive Arab-Israeli

peace agreement mean for theregion?

Comprehensive peace would

meana lotbecause the realproblems

of the region go well beyond the

IsraeliPalestinian conflict. The main

problems are overpopulation, discrepancy

between populations and resources, unequal

distribution of financial resources, and regional

demography. Without massive investment in

development projects, creating jobs for the

unemployed, and raising the standards of living

in the Arab world, there will not be political

stability in the region. So, comprehensive peace

wouldmeanafirststeptowardsinvestinginand

addressingtherealunderlyingproblems.

In my experience working on bilateraltrade negotiations between Palestiniansand Israelis, Ive often heard a number ofPalestinians say that the only reasonIsrael even considers peace is to open upthe borders totake advantage of businessopportunities that would present

themselves.iii Do you believe there is any

truth to that argument? If not, from wheredoes that argument stem?

No.Butthisargument isnotsurprising.Ina

state of conflict there are always these mutual

complaints and paranoia. Ive also heard an

argument fromPalestinianswhobelieve that the

Israelis actually want to control them

economically, replacingone formofcontrolwith

another, and Palestinians will end up being

providersofcheap labor toamorepowerfuland

sophisticatedIsraelieconomy.

So this is not the only

argumentin

town.

What position do youforesee the U.S. playingin creating anenvironment for a peaceagreement betweenIsraeli and Syria, andhow would that affect theregion?

Its not a peace

agreement, but an

improvement of relations.Of

course, peace between Syria

and Washington would

includeanAmericandecision,

as itwas in the 1990s, to try

and work out a peace deal

betweenSyriaandIsrael.AndquiteafewIsraelis

would be supportive of that. It wouldnt

Without massive

investment indevelopment projects,creating jobs for the

unemployed, andraising the standardsof living in the Arab

world, there will not bepolitical stability in the

region. So,

comprehensive peacewould mean a first steptowards investing in

and addressing the realunderlying problems.


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necessarilybe something negative that America

wouldneedtopushdownthethroatofIsrael.The

obstacles to AmericanSyrian understanding are

notfoundintheGolanissue,butmoreinthefact

thatSyria isseenasan Iranianclient. I think the

U.S.will demand Syria distance itself from Iran

with as precondition to building a future

relationshipbetweenWashingtonandDamascus.

But Ipersonallybelieve thatas longas theBush

administrationisinplace,thispeaceagreementis

notlikelytotakeplace.However,iftheU.S.were

able topullSyriaaway from the Iranianorbit, it

wouldbeadiplomaticcoup.But Idont think it

couldhappensoon.

How could you make ithappen?

Youopen

aconfidential

dialogue.

You lay your cards on the table

andtrytoplaythemwell.Itsnot

easy. But this is not easy if the

Syrians,aspartof thispackage,want theU.S. to

recognize their supremacy inLebanon.TheBush

administration is not going todo that.The next

administrationmaybeyes,maybeno. Its avery

difficultsituation.

The situation with Libya was also difficult

considering Gaddafis nuclear weaponsprogram and support for terrorist groups.But in the wake of the U.S. invasion ofIraq, he has bowed to American pressureand moved towards reform. What lessonsin diplomacy can be drawn from this fordealing w ith rogue regimes?

Libya represents a great American success

story.Itslimited,butforGaddafitodismantlehis

nuclearprogramandceasetoengageinterrorism,

thiswas a greatdiplomatic coup for theUnited

States.

Could you see something similarhappening from American pressure onIran?

Not right now. Iwould have loved to see

this,butIdontseethatnow.

Iran was one of the first nations torecognize Israel, and had a close politicalalliance with Israel during the era of thePahlavi dynasty. Though hostility towardsIsrael accompanied Khomeinis rise topower and the Islamic revolution in Iran, is

there anything from the previous narrativethat could be built upon in terms ofrepairing the current relationship betweenin Israel and Iran?

It doesnt translate immediately. But it

showsthatthereisnounderlyingnationalconflict

betweenIranandIsrael.Itsnotgoing tohappen

anytime soon,but at some point in the future a

closerelationshiporatleastanormalrelationship

could be restored. But for that

therewouldhave tobe a change

of

regime.

This

is

an

absolute

precondition.

In an article you wrote forthe Israeli daily Haaretz, you

stated that time is not a neutral factor,passivity does not lead anywhere, and onewho does not take initiative, even on adifferent front, will find himself ultimately

reacting to the initiatives of others. ivCould you touch on this in the context ofinitiatives taken by other regional powers?

Iwrote

that

paragraph

against

the

opinion

ofsomeIsraeliswhothinkthatallwehavetodo

isplay for time,just sitonour assetsand try to

protect them. Norman Podhoretz, the editor of

Commentary, has said that the Cold War ended

becausetheU.S.hadthenerveandabilitytostay

the course until the SovietUnion collapsed.He

believes that Israel should do the same and

somethingsimilarwillhappen.Idontthinkso;I

thinkweshouldreact.

React--like the recent Israeli attack inSyria?

Ican touchon that,but the truth is Idont

know. I can only speculate. I assume that the

Israeli raid had to dowith ajoint SyrianNorth

Koreanventurethathadanucleardimensiontoit.

There is no real

national conflictbetween Iran andIsrael.


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Ithinkthatisanissueofhugeproportions.But,in

a very peculiar way, there is a conspiracy of

silence:Syriacannotadmitthatitwascaughtred

handed with the North Koreans, the Bush

administration doesnt

want to destroy its deal

with North Korea, and

Israel is not interested in

pushing Syria into a

defensive corner. And,

therefore, this great story

remains under the radar.

Thesituationisreminiscent

oftheEgyptianIsraelisituationbetween1971and

1973,whenSadatspokeofbothmakingpeaceand

going towar, and ended up going to war and

makingpeace later. I hopewedonthave to go

throughthe

same

sequence

again.

High oil prices and the overthrow ofPresident Saddam Hussein's regime haveemboldened Irans position of power inthe region. Meanwhile, Iran continues tobuild nuclear facilities, sponsor terroristgroups, and threaten to destroy Israel.But attempts to isolate and stop Iran frompursuing this course have failed. Whatrole should Israel play in Irans movestowards regional hegemony and nuclear

weapons? I verymuch hope that Israel can restrain

itselfandnotjumptotheheadoftheline.Thereis

no realnationalconflictbetween Iranand Israel.

Andweshouldnotcontributetoaperceptionthat

wearenationalenemies.Anditshouldnotalsobe

portrayed as an Israeli problem. Its a global

problem, even if the restof theworld refuses to

recognizethatitisso.And,therefore,wearetobe

discreet, cooperatebehind the scenes, and try to

encouragetherightaction,butnot,asIsaid,jump

tothe

head

of

the

line.

A number of American presidentialcandidates have argued the need to openup a dialogue with enemy countries likeIran and Syria. The Bush administrationhas for the most part stuck to its Axis ofEvil line, which avoids fostering

dialogue. What are your thoughts onnegotiating with enemy countries?

Youcanhavesecretnegotiationsandsecret

diplomacy, similar to what the U.S. had in the

daysofKissingerbetweenChinaandtheVietcong

asapreludetoamajorbreakthrough.Ithastobe

secret;not in thepublic limelight.Andhopefullyyou could identify common ground and find a

diplomaticsolution to theproblem. Ifyou finda

solution,wonderful.Ifyoudont,thenyouknow

thatyouhaveexhausteddiplomaticmeansbefore

militaryactionneedstobetaken.So,Imactually

allforit,ifitsdonetherightway.

What is the advantage of a secretconversation versus open dialogue?

Open dialogue is monitored. It is very

difficultto

negotiate

when

you

have

to

give

a

daily report to journalists about what was

accomplishedthatday.Itisverydifficulttomove.

There isa time forpublicdiplomacy,atacertain

place and point. But it must be precededby a

secretnegotiationthatisnotmonitoredbymedia

and publics, where you can make substantial

progressandbegintobuildsupportforwhatever

agreementistakingshapebeforeyoucomeoutto

thepublicarena.

How would you describe the generalsentiment of negotiations in the MiddleEast? How do your personal relationshipsand feelings evolve when negotiating onsuch a high level? Where do you start?

Youhavetobuildtheserelationships.Itsa

businesslikeenterprise.Butatthesametimeyou

need to build a human relationship (not that

anyone is going to make a concession to you

becauseyou smile inacertainway).Thehuman

chemistry isavery important component inany

negotiation.

What about when negotiations fail? Whatare some of red lines that would make amilitary response imperative?

Well,letstaketheraidinSyria.Letssaythe

prospectofSyriaacquiringnuclearcapabilityisa

redline.SyriasendinglargearmyintoJordanisa

I think that much of the

damage done toIsraels c redibility as a

military ally wasrectified with the raid in

Syria.


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red line. An attack from across the border

shellingisaredline.Therearemanyredlines.

What about red lines wi th the Gaza Strip?

Gazaisagoodexample.Israelcan,notthat

it should, come to live with Qassam rockets

landing inSderot,buta largerrocket landingon

some strategic asset that we have near or in

Ashkelon, which is amajor city, is a quantum,

qualitative change. And I think that if

Palestinians hit Ashkelon or a strategic facility

nearAshkelontherewillbemassiveIsraeliaction

intheGazaStrip.

Until now, Qassam rocket attacks haveoriginated from the Gaza Strip. What ifthat problem evolved to the West Bank,

where a Qassam rocket could hit the heartof Israel, shut down air traffic, andseverely damage the economy? How willthat affect future plans for Israeliwithdrawal?

Israelwants a defensive perimeter around

theairportsothatitssafefrommissiles.

What lessons can the U.S. apply to Iraqfrom Israels evacuations from the GazaStrip or Lebanon?

WhatcomesimmediatelytomindinIraqis

ifyou

withdraw

unilaterally

you

have

to

expect

civil war and enemies taking over. You lose

control.Youcutyourlosses,butyoulosecontrol.

Af ter the Second Lebanon war, vo icesfrom the American defense establishmentbegan to question if Israel was a strategicasset or a liabilit y for the U.S.? What stepscould be taken to strengthen the strategicnature of this relationship?

Whateverraid

took

place

in

Syria

on

September 6 took care of that question. I think

that much of the damage done to Israels

credibilityasamilitaryallywasrectifiedwiththe

raidinSyria.What lessons can you impart to futureMiddle East diplomats and negotiators?

The first is patience. Negotiations in the

Middle East need tobe conductedwith a lot of

patience.Americans, and oftentimes Israelis, are

always

in

a

hurry.

Secondly,

both

Americans

and

Israelis look with contempt upon haggling and

bargaining:youpayapriceforthatintheMiddle

Eastbecausebargainingispartofthegame.Ifyou

dontbargainandletupyourposition,youlose.

The views and opinions expressed in articles arestrictly the authors own, and do not necessarilyrepresent those of Al Nakhlah, its Advisory andEditorialBoards, or theProgramfor SouthwestAsiaand Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The FletcherSchool.


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Mylrea - Interview with Itamar Rabinovich: Walking the Tightrope of Middle East Diplomacy

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