Military Review May 1979

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THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE US ARMY

Published by

US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

Fort Leavenworth. Kansas 66027

LIEUTENANT GENERAL J . R. THURMAN

BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT A R ~ E R

i

ComlT)andant

Deputy Commandant

MILITARY rEVIEW STAFF

Colonel E d ~ a r dM Bradford EdItor I n ChIef

EDITORIAL STAFF L,eutenant Colonel Jam,e W Walton.Managmh Editor Lieutenant Colonel Ernest L Webb,ASSOcfatJ EdItor, Major Arthur F Torres. Latm AmericanEditor

IPRODUCTION ISTAFF M ~ DIXIe R. Dom,ngup.z ProdllctJon Ed,tof r Amo& W

Ga lrl'ha,. Prtnr'' '9 Olf,c(;>'

C R C U L A n O N ~Capla n -jar,\; l A c ~ e rJr Assoe.are ErNoT Sergpanl r ~ 1O a sfel ' A Aqu,',lar Adrn,n.st lal .ve Suf)er.",so

MR ADVISI)RY BOARD

EX OfFICIO ;ene'dl Donn A Starr\< Commander Tra,n,ng and DoctrineCommand L e u l p n d n lGenpral J R l h u r m n Commande' Comb'f lf 'd A u n s[enrer lI,IIaJor Gpneral Homer D Smith Commander Log stlcs Cente MalorGpnpral H I : ~ p , .MOIH h , e f US Army Reserve Major General laVern Weber Cfllef NatIonal Guard Bureau Malor Gpneral Frpd-K Mahaffe'l' D e p u f ~(omm, lndef Combmed .4rms Combat Dellp10pment A c t , ~ vand CombInedArms 1r.1 '1.9 D e V P / o p m e ~ sAct,v.ty Millor General BenjamIn L Ha,,,sonCommandt Admmls t ra t lo f Center Bngdd1er General J J Broph,\, ASSIstanTDeputy (omrnandPf Com ,ned Arms ( o m b a t Developmpnt Acr'Vlty a11d

Combo/led AriS 1 r a l n l n Q ~ v e l o p m f > n t sA c t , ~ . f y

ACTIVE C o l o n ~ 1T E Blagg Df'partmenf of TactIcs. Colonel Warnp 0 MpadI Deparrmem lot fritJcar,on and Currrcu/um Aftalls ColOnel J' E Salton

Dpparrmpnl )If Rf'source anagf 'ment Colonel R A Manion Depar(me11f 1Unified and Combrned On ratIons Dr Oudle T Cornish JOlin F M o r f l ~ o n

l I a , f 1 Md, ar y History C lonei Carl Acree NalJonal Guard Buteau Mr Ro \

~ ~ : I i ~ f f ~ ; v e ~ : ; : e ~ : ; , e ~ c t ~ ; :~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ m ~ ~ ; ~ ~ e I A : ;T ~ : ; : ~ 9 C ~ : ~ ; ; : : :Act/ lnry L , e u ~ f n a n tColonE'l Joseph E Burlas uS Arm\, Japan and IX Corps

Major VV J Chantelau Admrnlstrat lon ( e n t e r Malor C W McinniS lag,st lcsI enter (OIOIle l Patrick 0 Ch,solm Fot'C'es Command Colonp H r ChapmanDe/l , lr tmell l I Command .J ,


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ilitary ReviewVOLUME LIX MAY 1979

CONTENTSPAGE 2 FIGHTING OUTNUMBERED AND WINNING

by Major Robert P Straut US Army Reserve

11 SOVIET CLOSE AIR SUPPORTby Captam RIchard F Rlccardelll US Army

and Captam Gary L Jackson US Army

21 NEW TACTICS AND BEYONDby DavId F. Porreca

30 IN MEMORIAM THE FIRST BERLIN CRISISby Martm Reuss

39 US NATIONAL SECURITY AND MIDDLE EASTERN OILby Major Robert R Ulm US Army

NO 5

50 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE DOES NOT MAKE CIVIL DEFENSE UNNECESSARYby J F Wallace

60 CHINESE DEFENSE STRATEGY A HISTORICAL APPROACH

by Major Stanley E Henning U S Army

68 TEC- THE NEW DIMENSIONby Major Joseph E NIckens Sr US Army

75 REVIEWS

78 LEnERS

80 NEWS

87 STUDIES

88 BOOKS

the best from other journals

contemporary readmg for the profeSSIOnal

MILITARY REVIEW,s published monthly ~ English and Spanish and quarterly, Portuguese Use offunds for prmtmg thiS publication approved by Headquarters Department of the Army 30 May 1978Controlled Circulation postage paid at Leavenworth KS 66048 and Topeka KS 66608 Subscnptlon$1200 per year US and APO/FPO. $1400 foreign Single copies 1 50 US and APO/FPO. 1 75foreign Address all mall to M,litary ReView. USACGSC. Fort Leavenworth. KS 66027 Telephone(913) 6845642 or ~ T O V O N5525642. Unless otherWise stated. the Views herein are those of the

. authors and are not necessarrly those of the Department of Defense or any element thereof BasIs ofoffiCial distribution S one per general officer and one per five field grade officers

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ort Leavenworth Hall of ame

32d Inductee M a j o r G e ~ e r a lEben Swift, Jr 4 May 1979

As a soldier, scholar and teacher, General Eben Swift had a significant influence on the US Army as i t entered the 20th century. His innovations as ateacher

whilea t Fort Leavenworth

wereimportant

factors' inthe preparation

of World War I officers, and his teachin'gs played an important role in theirsuccess.Swift was born in Texas on 11 May 1854, and appointed to the US MilitaryAcademy from Kentucky in 1872. Although commissioned infantry, heshortly thereafter transferred to cavalry. He served for II years with hisregiment in the West, participating in the Big Horn and Yellowstone Campaigns in 1876. Hi , first break from the line came when Swift became General Wesley Merritt 's aide-de-camp in 1887.In 1893, Swift went to Leavenworth to bec :bme one of Arthur Wagner's

assistant instructors in the history of military art. This four-year periodallowed him the opportunity to improve the preparation of future cammanders, After analyzing the failures of Napoleonic battles" Civil Warbattles and Franco-Prussian War battles, Swift concluded that the absence ofa systematic means of issuing orders led directly to the misunderstandingswhich ofttimes resulted in failure.To overcome the confusion of order issuance, Swift created simple tactical forms to meet various situations. The standard form was a five-paragraph order which gave information on the general situation, the objective,the disposition of troops and tasks assigned the command, instructions on

logistic support, and instruction on communications. Not only did this provide a form for issuing orders, but i t also created a systematic method tosolve tactical problems. 'A further advance in tactical instruction a t Fort Leavenworth was the introduction of the kriegspiel, or map games. Swift led the way in refining thisGerman technique and applying i t to an American military classroom.

Swift departed Fort Leavenworth in IS98 to serve in the Caribbean. Hereturned to Fort Leavenworth in 1904 as the assistant commandant of thenewly reopened school and as senior instructor in military art. Swift's tour atLeavenworth was curtailed when he was called to become the director of theWar College in 1907. Under Swift, the War College Division of the GeneralStaff began to develop into the capstone educational experience for Armyofficers.From 1910 until his retirement in 1918, General Swift served with troops inthe Philippines, New Mexico and Mexico, and France. He was appointedchief of the American mission to I taly and commander of the Americanforces in Italy. \In the final analysis, General Swift's contributions to'the US Army helped itstransition from a frontier Army to one of world prQminence. His contributions a t Leavenworth and the War College helped shape America'.s destiny.


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MILIT RY REVIEW

enemy intp an uphill fight. Light infantry attrited the enemy as farforward as possible and tried to coercehim into deployment. As soon as theadvancing force came within range, he

was subjected to an intense barrage ofmissiles in the form of javelins.The Romans apparently considered

thl defense to be an essentiallyoffensive operation, or a t least anopportunity to resume the offensive. Asthe enemy approached th maindefensive line. the legion almostalways charged. e can only speculatethat this physical effort had astimulating effect on the troops, thusallowing them to retain the offensivesplrit rather than sitting in positionawaiting the enemy blow. After ashcirt, violent melee, the second echelonwould advance, pass through the firstto engage the enemy while the first fell

I back to regroup. Meanwhile, the thirdechelon, h a v ~ n gbeen resupplied w,ithjavelins, continued the missile barrageon the enemy s second line.

The fluidity and movement of the

battle placed a premium on disciplineand organization. Roman forces, undereffective leadership, thus enjoyed atremendous advantage over barbarianarmies and were consistently able todefeat much larger forces. (See Figure1.)

While there is no cbmparison of thelethal effects of modern weaponsversus those of antiquity, an in-terestin'g point can be made in thecomparison of bat t le casual t iesbetween defeated and victorious forces,The winners usually e x p e r i ~ n c e d

relatively light losses while thedefeatea army s casualties were oftencatastrophic.

r

I ROMAN BATTLE TACTICS1

I

II

I I~l t r n ' ~ h p t S

\ r f l o t ~ILrghT InfanTrv;

\ 3 d ~i~ C J C JIt . . . . . . . . .

A Skirmishers delayed. then fell back to thicken 3d echelJn

B After miSSile barrage. 1st echelon charges to engage enemy

C After short VIolent actIOn, 2d echelon moves forward through the gaps while1 st echelon f lls b ck to regroup .

Figure

\

4


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j

I

MILITARY REVIEW

W TERLOO

BRITISH

[ JiWATBRLOO

BritIsh infantry regiments stood f i rm to foil a penetration and delay the French untilBlucher s forces arrive on the field and strike the French flank

FIgure 3

(Wpllington) opposing a gallant Frenchfoe (Napoleon) gained a place inhistory at Waterloo (815). While manyfactors contributed to Wellington svictory, not the least of which was thevalor of the British infantry regiments,he' employed some techniques whichcan be applied to modern warfare.

Wellington took great efforts toavoid the exposure of his troops todirect artillery fire by positioning themon rpverse slopes whenever possible.He followed British army doctrine byusing light infantry as s k i r m ~ s h r sinfront of the main ba ttle area. While thesquare formation of the BlJitish infantry regiments of that d y ~ resentedan opportune target for cont mporaryweapons, it, nonetheless, inimizedcaHualtipR by maintaining rigid discipline and afforded the opportunityfor its officprs to x r ~effective control.

. Finally, one cannot fail to ap-

pteciate Wellington s optimum use ofterrain. The French were forced tocharge :: tross open, muddy fieldswhich hindered not only their cavalrybut the emplacement of their field ar -tillery. The French failure to effect arapid breakthrough exposed their flankto B1iicher's Prussians and sealed thefate of Napoleon." (See Figure 3.)

A World War I example of a majordefensive victory of greatly outnumbered troops, and one of the mostcrushing defeats of an attacking army

in , history; is that of the Battle ofTarmenberg (1914). With the_Russiansadtancing in two columns against theGerman Eastern front, General Paulvon Hindenburg was called fromretirement and placed in command. Heimmediately appointed General ErichLudendorff as his chief of staff, andthe two rushed to meet the threat

The German plans in the East had


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been to conduct an elastic defense todelay the Russians until the Westernoffensive (the Schlieffen plan) wascompleted. The fact that the field armys t a f f h a d a l r eady d rawn up

counterattack plans almost identical tothose envisioned by Hindenburg andLudendorff is Ii prime example of theuniform thinking of the German armyGeneral Staff. 7

In the north, a single Germancavalry division delayed the attackerswhile the rest of the corps slippedsouth to attack the slow-movingRussian column. The Russian Second

Army was encircled and completelydestroyed. The Germans then turnednortheast to engage the Russian FirstArmy, but a counterattack spoiled their

IGHTING OUTNUM ERED

plan to execute a second doubleenvelopment.

In three weeks, the invadingRussians had been defeated in detail,losing 250,000 men ~ ~ s tof theirequipment and trains. ure of eachof the advancing colu ns to communicate with the other, extended l inesof supply, lack of reconnaissance andcomplete disregard for security contributed to the Russian disaster. Theability of the defenders to conduct anorderly withdrawal while in contactwith superior forces and, then, when

. the opportunity presented itself, shift

direction and defeat the enemypiecemeal, was instrumental in theirvictory. (See Figure 4.)

In 1939, obviously fearful of

TANNENBERG DEFEAT IN DETAIL

Russian Mansurian Lakes

F

8 = : : : : - - ~__ _

RussianSecond rmy

A single German cavalry division delays the Russian First Army while Eighth A r m yunits moved south to envelop and destroy the Russian Second Army, Completingthe action in the south, the German army shifts north t engage the Russian FirstArmy,

FIgure 4


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MIlIT RY REVIEW

German intentions in the Baltic region,the Soviet Union demanded permissionto occupy the southern portion ofFinland. When the Finns refu6ed andmobilized their army, the Soviets at

tacked, thus initiating the famousWinter War. The Russian forc:es

totaled nearly one million as opposedto 300,000 Finns, most of whom werehastily organized reservists.

Soviet forces hurled themselvesagainst the Mannerheim line, a WorldWar II system of fortifications interlaced into the rugged terrain, butwere thrown back. Finnish battalion

sized units, operating independently,conducted a mobile defense againstother attacking forces in the denseforest regions of eastern Finland.Hampered by the intense cold andrough terrain, Soviet units boggeddown and, w t ~ their supply Jinel ;interdicted by Finnish harassing aci.tions, . were effectively cut off. Theseunits were then systematically surrounded and destroyed.

The only. sector which afforded theSoviets maneuver room to concentratetheir superior strength and firepowerwas against the Mannerheim line.Fifty-four divisions, supported bytremendous artillery preparations,hammered at the defenders. After twoweeks' of continuous attacks and appalling losses, the Russians finallyachieved a breakthrough.

With no chance of fore ignassistance, the Finns had to capitulate.The Finnish defense had utilizedtactics which had been specificallydesigned for the tettain and weatherconditipns. Well-led, disciplined troops,using bit-and-run tactics to disruptenemy.: communications and supplyeperations, inflicted an estimated600,00q casualties on the Russian

juggernaut while taking only 70,000themselves. 9

One of the great defensive epics ofWorld War II was German GeneralErich von M,anstein's res is tance

against the Russian winter offensive of1943. After the fall of Stalingrad,Manstein reorganized his Army GroupDon and conducted a brilliant mobiledefense, punctuated by a series ofsuccessful counterattacks. Keepingtheir lines intact, the Germans fenback, inflicting heavy losses on theenemy who held a 7-1 numerical edge.Manstein had traded space for a

chance to attrite the Red Army. He wasrewarded by Hitler by dismissal. l

The German Ardennes offensive{Battle of tpe Bulge) was thej.\ lastmajor offensive ~ t o nof World War II.Breakthrough of the Allied lines wasattempted in the Saint-Vith and.Bastogne area of Belgium with a drivetoward Antwerp to cut the Allies intwo. Under cover of fog and snow, 24,divisions struck the United States VCorps taking them by complete surprise.

While the US front-line divisions(106th and 28th) were shattered, theshoulders of the penetration held, thuscanalizing the German advance.Stubborn resistance at Saint-Vith andBastogne slowed the advance andallowed the Allies to shift their forcesto meet ,the threat. Finally, Alliedcounterattacks and air superioritystopped the advance and -eventuallyreduced the salient. Germany had exhausted its' offensive capabilities.(See Figure 5.)

We have examined just a few of them a n y s ign i f i c an t defens iveengagements in history. To summarizesome of the common principles ofdefensive battle, it would be wise to


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FIGHTING OUTNUM ERED

B TTLE OF THE BULGE

BritIsh)

IThe German breakthrough is canalized when US forces hold the shoulder of thepenetration. Determined defense at Saint Vith and Bastogne slow the Germanadvance and permit Patton and Hoc ges to drive into the enemy flanks.

F gure 5

note that all the defenders mentionedmade maximum use of terrain. Terrainas a combat multiplier can enhance theeffectiveness of friendly weapons andreduce our vulnerability to enemyWE'apons; it can provide cover andconcealment and mask the dispositionof our forces; it can be used to canalizethe enemy advance into selected killzones; and i t may prevent the enemy

from concentra t ing his combatstrength at anyone point. -Man-madeobstacles may further add to the effectiveness of the terrain.

In each of the examples cited here,the defenders managed to rt tain thesp r t of the offense. This had a decidedpsycholoirical effect on the troops andincreased their ability to counterat-tack and resume offensive operations

when they were presented with the

9

opportunity. Successful defensivestands have caused the attacker tospend his r e ~ o u r e sat a furious paceand have often resulted in the advancing force becoming disorganizedand confused.

The alert defender then may bepresented with the chance to cave inthe enemy flanks or to decimate hisscat tered disorganized forces in

piecemeal fashion. Wha1 began as adetermined effort to check an enemyadvance could well develop into anopportunity to deal him a crushingdefeat. Defensive planners must notlose sight of this fact. When the lastassault is stopped, the fight has just.begun. The enemy should never beallowed to retire from the field in anorderly fashion.

The single most jmportant-in-


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MILITARY REVIEW

gredient in all defensive victoriesseems to be discipline. A massiveoffensive assault is designed to have ashattering effect orl the defender.Troops must be conditioned to acceptunfavorable od9s and have confidencein their leaders and themselves. Theyshould be trained to fight as smallindependent units even i f cut off orisolated.

A series of tenacious defensive actions. such as the one at Bastogne, can

~ ~ \ . J ' O '0\((', thf ' Npl , l r,1n BomlJ

, 3 4 , Dup , 'Od\ T N Dupu,H,HVll j Hdlpt ' l R o w I\j ~

3 / b j p }

4 Ib id P 71b /b,rJ p 357

1970

Ne &week 1} Ap l 1918 P

6 Alben A fl.ot. i'l. C1llo eoF1 at War SIfdlf> lY Ta({,[s M.Jv1 9 7 ) p b

have the cumulative effect of slowingan enemy advance and preventing ~breakthrough. Elastic defenses' indepth may bend but cannot be allowedto break. Mobile reserves should beavailable to contain a threatenedpene t r a t i on and se rve as acounterattack force. Finally, the individual soldier must be allowed toexercise his initiative to devise themeans to stop and destroy the attacking force.

NOTES

7 Barbara Tu(ilman TIle Guns of Augus t Mdcmdlan Co N y1961 p 326

8 A l e ~ a n d e lSotlhen,ts.,.n A u g u ~ tN,neteen Fourteen FarrarSMau


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> . l -: ' ...

_ . ;...AI. '_.-. '~ S

Capta in Richard F. Riccardel l i , US Armyand Cap ta in Gary L. J a c k s o n , US Army

Since the Oder-Neisse field exercises in 1969. the Sovietshal e made a substantial effort to improve their groundat tack aircraft for( e without diminishing their ( ounterair( apabilities. This effor t has been refle( ted in the groundat tack ( omponent o f frontal al,iation. Under the operationaleontrol o the ground force commander. the ground atta( k( omponent will fun( tion in concert with motorized infantry.armor and arti l lery to maintain the momentum and ( on-t inui ty o the at tack and provide a means for sustaini ;g the100-kilometer daily advances postulated for offensiveoperations.,

THE objectives of Soviet groundattack aviation have changed

little since World War II. Characterizedby attacks on artillery, armor; infantry, strongpoints and the coveringof watercrossing operations, groundattack (GA) aviation acts as an ex-tension of the ground force com-mander's artillery. By destroyingpockets of by-passed forces andeliminating targets not deAtroyed by

artillery, GA aircraft will act as a forcemultiplier. Additionally, these aircraftcan be expected to break up enemyc o ~ n t e r a t t a c k sand proviqe flanksecurity.

GA aviation will also support theground ~ o m m a n d e r sefforts in thefollowin ways: the destruction of tac-t ical. nu lear delivery systems andcontrol posts, the neutralization ofartillery and e l i m i n a t i ~ nof reserves,

11


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particularly at choke points such asnarrow passes, river-crossing sites androad junctions_ 2

G ircraft Inventory

Soviet aircraft designed for GAmissions have increased substantiallysince 1970 in variety, number andquality. The basic charactpristics andordnance capabilities are depicted inFigure 1 These aircraft have beenconfigured to optimize air-to-ground

support capabilities, particularly incannon and rocket armament.A new wrinkle in ground support is

the introduction of the Mi 24 Hindhelicopter. Former Defense Researchand Engineering director Malcom R.Currie has noted that the HindDversion is the most heavily armedhelicopter in the world and that it

carries sophisticated weapon deliveryand fire control equipment.'" Tworegiments of Hinds have been deployedin the Group of Soviet Forces inGermany.' It appears that the Hindhas supplemented the Mi Hiphelicopter which filled the tank killerrole until the Hind was il}troduced.

Fixed Wing ircraft n G Aviation

There are striking similaritiesbetween the techniques employedduring the Great Patriotic War andthe doctrine published today eventhough many changes have beencaused by developments in air defense,

. electronics, speed and employment asrelated to nuclear warfare. Today, aircraft can no longer hover over

12

enemy locations for long periods asthey did in the war because of theaccuracy of modern air defensesystems; large sorties with multiplebombing and strafing runs by the

same aircraft are no longer the rule;5and high altitude flight would I besuicidal by today's standards. 6 i

Soviet emphasis on close support ofground troops may be traced to the1930s when Soviet aircraft wereassigned to geographic military districts. Because the district commanderswere responsible only for their areas, 'their aviation elements assumed the

role of suppor t ing ground forcemaneuvers. Hence, Soviet aviationbpcame an arm of the ground forcecommander's arsenal and an extj nsionof his artillery.7 It should then be of nosurprise that two-thirds of Soviet airstrength in World War II was devoted

. to ground force support."Certain World War II practices may

be expected to be used today, including,the phasing of attacks, maintainingthe tempo of attack and use of surprise.In the war, tactical air support wasdivided into two phases. The firstphase, or preparation period, wastimed to coincide with artillery firesagainst enemy artillery emplacements,strongpoints, headquarters and communication centers. The goals were to

.disrupt communication and troop

control and to neutralize separatestrongpoints.

The second phase, or -air supportstage, centered upon protecting groundforces in breakthrough operations,providing additional fire support toinfantry and tank units, neutralizings t rongpo in t s , rese rves andcounterattack groupings and providingadvance reconnaissance. 9

Other .aspects of GA aviation


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CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

SOVIET G R O U ~ DA/ITACK AIRCRAFT'

lM I 2 4 Su 78 Su 1 7 2 0 22 Su 19 MIG214 MIG27 Flogger 0

'ndelles Hind Fitter A flUer Cl Fencer A FishbedA B OJ

IJ K f L

Year deployed 1971 72 1959 1972 19741968 7 1 19761970 1977

Overall length (meters) 1 6 9 9 1 7 3 7 21 65 21 28 1 5 7 6 1 6 8

Wingspan rotor diameter 1 7 0 5 8 9 2 1 2 9 5 10 B ' 7 1 5 B 1 6 / 1 4 24Imln'max) m e t e r s l ~ 1 8 0

Armament

C a n n ~ n s A Mode l 2NR 30mm 2NR 30mm 23mm Gsch J Model 1 6 barrel 2 3 m m1 2 7 m m guns In guns In gun and tWin t W i n 23mm Gathng.gunM w i n g s w i n g s 2 3 m m g u n s gunso Model under fuselage4 ~ 2 3 m m

Gatlingg u n s '

Bombs Up to 7 - 7 5 0k g 2 ' 7 5 0 k g 6 '500kg 250 to Conventlonat 8 500kg or250kq ' f . 2 500kg 0 ' 500kg 16 250kg .4-S00kg 6 - OOOkg Nuclear Nuclear 1 x 1000hg

capability

GUided Mlss.lps' 4'AT2 2-AS7 Kerry 2 'AS7 Kerrv 4-ASMs 4 ~ A S 7SwatterM'SSI P'i 8

Ma.,mum Range 360 500 700) 2 0 0 0 1 11S 1 300RadIUS Km

3 2 , S 5 4 - 1 6 5 7 m m 4-16 57mrn or 4-16 or 4-32' 57mm and 4 ~ 3 S5 516 521 S24'0ockets Tvpe rockets or 10 160mm 57rnm rockets 240mm57mm 10-160mm rockets or rockets -hollow rockets 4


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suddenly arising missibns. 21 rImportant planning considerations

in helicopter employment include: first,coordination with fixedwing aircraftfor mutually supporting strikes 22 whilefighter aircraft fly overhead cover;2Jsecond, coordination with artilleryelements. In a'recent exercise, artilleryfired upon targets already destroyed byhelicopters b e c u ~ eof poor coordination. 2 ' Finally, as in fixed-wingaviation, low-altitude routes to objectives are planned to take advantage ofte r ra in and avoid ant ia i rcraf tsystems. 25

,Forested areas and folds in thetertain will provide ambush sites fqr

popup firing,20 and camouflage paintwill assist in concealment. 7 Additionally, Soviet military writers havenoted that helicopter pilots have beenextensively practicing night attacksusing rockets and machineguns. R

The popup technique of firing hasgained considerable notoriety for its

projected success on the battlefield. Asobserved in the December 1977 rmedForcesJournal this technique is likelyto be extraordinarily effective. In citing

Red Flag exercises conducted inJune 1977, the Journal reported that ofthe 56 times attack helicopters exposed themselves to enemy forces, theywere spotted only 39.5 percent of ,thetime.

Terrain and weather conditions permitting, Soviet helicopters need not usethe popup. They may fire fromground-level concealed positions . Also,they may conduct l o w l e v e l ~ s t i a f i n gruns with machineguns and rockets 29

and, a t a higher altitude, even dropbombs. 3u

Afte r l a u n c h i n g o rdnance ,helicopters will evade antiaircraft fireby using such maneuvers as sharp left

15

LOSE IR SUPPORT

or right turns and prompt departure atlow alt i tude using te r ra in andvegetation masking. 3

I t appears that gunships will normally fly in groups of four aircraft.Two or more of these flights mayoperate in the same area, with onegroup acting as a diversion to drawattention and antiaircraft fire whileanother group closes in for theattack. 32 Or sequenced attacks on multiple axes may be attempted,3 3 f onepass ' is not sufficient, flights mayconduct additional passes, probablyfrom different directions. .

Helicopter and Fixed-Wing Aircraft Tactics

GA aircraft can be expected, as theyapproach the target area, to utilize thebasic tactical techniques of low-level,contour and nap-of-the-earth flying.Additionally, helicopter movementmay resemble US Army concepts fortraveling, traveling overwatch andbounding overwatch, Movement byplanes will probably be formationdependent because the aircraft havelimited view to the front and maximumvisibility to the right and left sides (seeFigure 2).

There appears, to be no set rule forthe number of planes used in a sortie

although the Soviets usually operate inpairs or multiples of two. Normallytraveling at speeds of less than 500knots, aircraft will penetrate enemydefenses a t less than 1,000 feet aboveground level. 35

Rocket and missile attacks (Figure3 would be best suited against mobileground targets, while employment ofbombs (Figure 4 would be effectiveagainst stationary or hardened targets.
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0

eForward visibility isextremely limited

e This is the area wherethe fighter will be mostlikely to see the target

Source Field Manual 90-1 (HTF), Employment of Army Aviat ion Units in aHigh Threa t Envi ronment (How to Fight). Department of the Army.Washington. D Co. with Change 1. 20 May 1977 . p 2-12.

FIgure 2

Bombing techniques will vary andmay include high-altitude release(gravity drop), dive bombing from highaltitude, dive-toss release, low-altitudebomb aiming system and low-levelpenetration (popup and laydown). h

A basic rule for missions will be, thorough plann ing and ta rget

detection on the first run at the objective. Also, the time from target'acquisition to overflight of the objective will be measured in seconds,

16

thus reqUIrIng acute perception andprecision bombing and strafing bypilots.

The Ground Air liaison System

Soviet doctrine recognizes that tactical air operations require highlyorganized, firm, continuous controland coordination;' The air force s


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frontal aviation contains tactical airarmies which are subordinated inwartime to a front commander and inpeacetime t o a military district orgroup of torces outside of the Soviet

Union. 9

_This system originated in a 1942

reorganization which eliminated theattachment of air divisions to groundarmies and placed all frontal air assetsunder an air army commander subordinate to a front c o m m a n d e r ~ OThe airarmy commander function as thedeputy commander for air mia-tters ferthe front. j

Attack from a combat turn

CLOSE IR SUPPORT

The front commander allocatesspecific responsibilities to the air commander and decisions are made on themission types numbers priorities andareas of interest as well as type of

assistance the groundforces willprovide. 42 The following elements inplanning. are then developed by thefront s t f ~including the air officers:

L a n ~ s Crossing points over the front line. Air-ground signal procedures. Target designation means_ Coordination with air defense

forces.'3

Source: V. Pavlikov, Air Support for Ground Forces, Soviet ilitary Review,December 1967, pp 13-14

Figure 3

17
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Bomber maneuver steep c l i m b

\\\

\

\\

Bombing f rom cl imbPosit ion of the plane:

~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~~ = = . ~ r : = ~ ~ ~ Q

1 a t the moment o f targ(l t detect ion ,P,nme"l Pr.n1tng 011,(1;'

O C T A u g ~ 11 948 V:ulume ly 1 9 4 7 1 9 4 9 0> (,/ P 274 1=-01 Ihl;' olj,(.,al {\::,pO \ of

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. , ,[1, d, ' ~ ' ' ' . ' , l J U , 1900J PI' 1 1 ~ 1 I

.\1artl1l RCl l .. S It> a hu,tonan for thf' ArmyCorp of Enfll12l'l>rs, "Tashmf.,'tull, DC. Her t 'C t ' l l l ' d n H A. from Penns,)-it'ama State m -l er.,lf, and an J l A and Ph D (rum Dukf>[ ' n i l f ' r .,a,'" III' has t a u ~ h (GI'rman hli:J(ary a t(;1'or; ':la Southern., C u l l ~ ~ rand \ 'J1'gtnla1'1J \{CC}lIlH J n ~ t l f l i t f >and S ta t e L'l l11 'cr : : , l tvand , ' > ( ' n t'd at' command hlMoflan. es Arm)LfI.#l.' flC,> Center, Furt Lcf', Vlr; Jnla

o ,Active Guard In Puerto Rico Adds Battalion The Army National GuardIn Puerto RICO IS so alive and well at 111 percent of ItS authOrizedstrength that the Army IS ad91n9 another Infantry battalfon to the 92d

I Infantry Brigade's force structure thereThe add-on battalion IS expected to be ready In about two to three

. years Its initial cadre will come from 92d overages The Army NationalGuard In Puerto RICO has a proven record of sustaining personnel

, strength at high percentage figures over extended periods of t ime:I

38


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Major Robert R. VIin VS Army

The 1978 oil crisis caught the United States short. Altholu:ghthere had been many forecasts that o u r i n c r e ~ i n gdependence on oil would cause serious problems, no oneforesaw these problems coming to the fore in the early1970s. The emergence o the oil weapon found the in-dustrialized countries o the West without an 1 coordinatedor coherent policy to deal with the problem. Fortunately, theUnited States did not resort to gunboat diplomacy ormilitary power in response to the problem. The Departmento f Defense as the largest single user o f our nation's energy is

faced with a multitude o f problems as a result o f the energycrunch: less fuel a t a higher price, a larger portion o f themilitary budget a t the expense o f equipment and trainingand, possibly, a reduced state of readiness. While ournational security depends largely on our mili tary posture,the problems o f maintaining an uninterrupted flow o oilfrom the Middle East are diplomatic and poli t ical in nature.Our use o force probably would be counterproductive. TheUnited States must develop a coordinated energy policy,explore and develop alternate energy sources and exercisegood diplomacy to ensure the flow o f foreign oil continues.

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Intr9duction

MNY Americans have forgotten

the oil crisis of 1973 when gas-oline prices d o u b l ~ dovernight, services t a t i o ~ sfrequently ran out of gas andrumots spread that the oil companieswere : manipulating the Americanpublic for profit. For many Americans,this Was just another short-term in-conveni'ence, and some method wouldbe found to turn on the oil once again.Howeyer, the fact remains that a few

Arab states put the United States in anawkwprd situation.

How could we have been so blindnot to have realized our vulnerabilityto oil imports? Why didn't we have aplan :to c:ounter this threat? Manygovernment officials cquld foresee atime when our increasing dependenceon oil would cause us serious problems.However, they were either not heard or

not in a position to make any impacton the government bureaucracy... In 1926, Professor John Ise of theUniversity of Kansas published a bookentitled The United tates Oil Policy.He realized that domestic oil would notbe sufficient to sustain oqr rapidlyindustral ized nat ion. In lookingaround the world, Professor Iseremarked that the Near East, includ-ing Mesopotamia and Persia, hadtremendous oil potential bas'ed on thecharacter of the land and geologicalindicators.

His views were confirmed in 1944by the DeGolyer report which providedsome clue to the extent of Middle Eastoil reserves. 1 At that time, the UnitedStates led the world in oil production.In 1973, the Middle East was theworld's leading oil producer with 60

4

percent of the petroleum reserves. 3Professor Ise recognized that the

United States was dependent upongreat wealth to maintain its standardof-living and indu ~ i a lactivity. WhatIse cQuld not foresee was that theUnited States in 1973 had overtaxed itsoil resources and was consuming 30percent of the world's petroleum.

In 1948, the former petroleum ad-ministrator for war, Harold Ickes,stated that Beyond a few local rulesand regulations, the United States hadno oil policy.'" The consensus duringthat period was that supplies were

ample for current needs and appearedto be ac equate. In 1973, the oil crisiswas upon us. Prices soared, suppliesdwindled and deep concern wasreflected in the Congress and thepublic at large.

How, then, did this shortage of oilimpact on the national security of theUnited States? This article is inresponse to that question.

In order to understand nationalsecurity and the policy which derivesfrom it it is necessary to examine theelements of national security. For themost part, security connotes physicalsecurity of a nation and the forcesrequired to guarantee it. However,

governments cannot define theirsecurity solely on the basis of militaryforcesin,being or planned.'" Foreign,domestic, economic and other areas ofnational interest and concern havebecome intimately integrated to theextent that foreign policy and nationalsecurity policy have become in manyways identical. 6/ The House Committee on Fpreign

Affairs.in October 1972 examined theissue of national security. In theeconomic context, Congress has statedthat:


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. . . a viable U.S. economy is vital tthe security interests of the UnitedStates because it makes possible theresources needed by whatever militaryestablishment Congress decides upon. 7

Thus, t h ~ linkage is made betweenthe economic well-being of the stateand the military force which i sprovided to protect t ~state. Congressfurther states that US nationalsecurity also e p e n ~upon the abilityto protect the access to overseassources of raw materials and ensurethe safety of American in ;estmentsabroad.

General George A Lincoln, formerdirector of the Office of EmergencyPreparedness, stated that:

. . . energy and energy policy [is] ofcentral importance t the U.S. nationalsecurity and It would be impractical tdivorce energy from national securityor foreign policy considerations: U.S.national security could be threatenedby economic and political factors inenergy supply.

No doubt the linkage is fonnedbetween oil, as a prime source ofenergy, and US national security as itpertains to the socioeconomic pulse ofthe nation.

Emergence of the Oil artels

The energy crisis did not occurovernight. Despite repeated warningsby leading individuals in the academiccommunity and government to establish a coherent international oil policy,the United States was not prepared forthe 1973 oil embargo. In order to havea better understanding of how andwhy the oil embargo came to be used, itis necessary to discuss briefly the

41

NATIONAL SECURIT Y AND il

background of Arab oil solidarityTo say that the Arabs are united on

all issues is a fallacy. However, theyall share a common aspiration andthat is to rid themselves of foreigndomination. The major oil companieswere the visible instruments of exploitation in the Middle East. Once theArab oil-producing slates found theywere powerless to deal with the oilcompanies concerning oil revenues,they formed an oil cartel. On 14September 1960, the Organization ofPetroleum Export ing Countries(OPEC) was formed.

The founding members wereVenezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iran,Kuwait and Iraq. OPEC has sinceexpanded to include Algeria EcuadorIndonesia Libya Nigeria Qatar andthe United Arab Emirates.

The initial aims of the OPEC ares o m e w h a t b r o a d in cha rac t e r.However, two are of particular importance: the need for a steady income for

producing countries and an efficient,economic and regular supply of oil tothe consuming countries. Initially, theoil companies refused to deal with theOPEC, insisting that their agreementswere with individual countries and assuch they would only deal with therepresentative of those governments.Eventually, the companies were forcedto capitulate and deal with the OPECwhich presented a unified front concerning the price and availability ofoil.

In 1968, the Organization of ArabPetroleum Exporting Countries(OAPEC) was formed by Saudi Arabia,Kuwait and Libya. This organizationwas an Arab OPEC which was fonnedostensibly to:

. . . keep oil matters out of thepoliticization and bureaucracy of the


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Arab League and in the hands of thosecuuntries who had oil. Anuther u'asthat t would become a vehicle forcommon Arab i n v e s t m e n t s inpetroleumrelated projects.'

Whatever the -reason for its formation, it proved to be a useful inRtrument for coordinating the Arab oilembargo of Octo her 1973. By 197:3, theOAPEC had grown to include all theArab oil producers except Oman- tha tis, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq,Qatar, Syria and the United ArabEmirates, as well as the three founders.

Tne organization of the oilproducers and their ability to imposean effective oil embargo on theWestern World was recognized by theUS Congress. During congressionalhearings into the oil shortage inDecember 1973, it w a ~noted that:

The Arab oil state,s have been ableto inflzct a serlOUS all shortage un theindustrzalzzed natlOns of the noncommunist world due to their ability topresent a united front to a disorganizedgroup of uil consumzng nations.

One may ask the question: Whywould the oilproducing states denytheir petroleum to the Western World ifthe price they receive is consideredfair? The answer, of c o u r ~ eis noteconumic but political. The USpresence in the Middle East is a contradiction.

On the one hand, the United Stateshas a favored position because i t hasnever been a colonial power in theMiddle East, its dealings with the oilprodu.cing. states through the multinational corporations have been fairand, lastly, many of the' leaders andprofessionals in the region have beeneducated in the United States or inAmerican-sponsored universi t ies

abroad. On the other hand, the United

42

States is the major supporter of Israelmuch to the' disple.asure of the Arabstates. Therefore, the Israeli question ,is, the central issue and has been sosince the formation of the PalestineMandate in 1920.

The Arabs have attempted to usethe emb'argo at least three times to putpressure on the West in order fOT theArab states to reach their objectives.During the Suez War of 1956, an oilembargo was imposed against theBritish and the French as partners in aconspiracy with the Israelis.

In 1967, President Nasser of Egypturged Middle East oil producers to haltproduction. However, none of thestates had the financial reserves toc a r r y o n without the aid of revenuefrom the oil companies. Saudi Arabiaheld out for one week and lost over 30million in revenue. Kuwait resumed'production next, having lost just under

, 1 million a day.' The Western World, did not feel the pinch b e c a u ~ eIran and'

Venezuela stepped up production andtook advantage of the shortagescaused by the Arab states.

Even more Important to the failureof the 1967 embargo was the fact thatthe United States imported very littleArab oil, and the shutin capacity ofthe United States oil fields were con-siderable.'l

On 29 August 1967, the Arab oil

nations met in Khartoum to discussthe situation. Most realized the worstsufferers from the embargo were the oilstates themselves. Leonard Mosley inhis work, Power Play:.oil in the MiddleEast, conclude;;:

The greatest weaknesses o f theMiddle East oil states have alwaysbeen their (nability to stand together inan emergency and their susceptibility

to bribery artd corruption.
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In 1973, however, this thesis wasdisproven.

The oil import picture for the UnitedStates changed dramatically duringthe period 1967 to 1973. Increased

concern' for the environment by theAmerican . public caused legisla'tionrequiring the .use of oil as a preferredfuel over coal in many industries. Tl;tisfact, coupled with a C'3ntinuingdomestic rate of growth and decliftingUS oil reserves, substantially increased the percentage of oil importsfrom abroad.

When the 1973 Arab oil e m b ~ g ostruck, the United States was caughtin an energy crisis for which it had nocontingency plan. This time, the Arabstates were coordinated, financially setand ready to unleash their oilweapon. By 1973, the Arab oilproducers knew the United States wasusing 25 million barrels of Arab oil perday either a t home or supplyingmilitary forces abroad. I' .

In contrast, the US government was

not aware of its 'degree of dependencyon imported oil. Congress declared,Only since November [1973] has the

Nation discovered the full dimensionsof U.S. increasing dependence on oilfrom the Arab states. lb Thought to befive to six percent dependent on Arab

. oil, it was determined the UnitedStates was 14 to 18 percent dependent.Altogether, the United -States mustimport more than 30 percent of thepetroleum' it needs for domestic consumption. I?

Nearly a year before the 1973 oilembargo, the House Subcommittee onForeign Relations conducted hearingsconcerning the foreign policy implications of the energy crisis. GeneralGeorge A. Lincoln was asked:

t9 react to a scenario which set

43

N TION L SECURITY ND OIL

a 1980 Arab threat to cut offoil to theUnited States unless the countrywithdrew its support for Israel.General Lincoln said he did not believethat such a scenario was likely.I8

John C Campbell, senior researchfellow, Council on Foreign Relations,was asked:

how serious were the chancesfor a total ad cutoff from Middle Eastproducers). Mr Campbell did not thinkthat there would be a total cutoff, evenin the event of . an ultimatum overIsrael. 9

Many Middle Eastern specialists,however, did not agree with GeneralLincoln or Mr. Campbell. In May 1973,Mr. Simon, the Energy Czar,testified before the Senate that hebelieved the Middle Eastern oilproducers had accumulated sufficientmonetary reserves to enable them to

shut down and tolerate a shut downfor a longer period than we, a consuming nation, ~ o u l tolerate 2 0

While there seemed to be concern on

the part of some in. the Congress todetermine the degree of US dependenceon imported pil, there was a. generallack of consensus concerning thepotential threat and its consequel1ces.

Emergence of the Oil Weapon

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War was theseminal event in the emergence ofArab oil power. Hanns Maull, in hiswork Oil and Influence: The OilWeapon Examined, states that the oil

. weapon:signifies any manipulation of

the price and/or supply of oil by ex-porting nations with the intention ofchanging the political behaviour of the


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MIlITARY R VI W

consumer natlOns [andl oil power is thepou'er which s tems from t hedependence of the consumer nations onOil. '

These definitions are useful to thisdiscussion because the terms oilweapon and oil power are notabstract terms; each has force and hasbeen applied with reasonal;Jle success.

At the outbreak of the ArabIsraeliconflict in 1973, the oil ministers of theOAPEC, encouraged by ,Egypt, im-posed a total embargo on' the UnitedStates and the Netherlands for theirsupport of IsraeL Saudi Arabia was on

the horns of a dilemma: as a friend ofthe United States on the one hand anda mbmber (some would say leader) ofthe Arab world on the other.Regardless of the possible reaction bythe United States, Saudi Arabia hadlittle choice but to use the oil weapon.Hanns Maull writes: .

refusal to support front linestates With the Oil weapon would haveincensed public opinign leading to ahigh risk of vlOlence, strzkes, and sub-uersiue actlOn agaznst oil installations,directed from the outside with the helpof a large Palestine community m theGulf, 21

Initially, Saudi Arabia: supported a production cut

policy but opposed embargoing theUnited States and the Netherlands.However, when the President's [of theUS] $2.2 billion military assistancerequest for Israel was made public,Saudi Arabia changf'd its position andthe embargo went into effect. 2 3

The reaction to the embargo inWestern Europe-which receives mostof its oil through the refineries in theNether lands-was one of deep concern.The oil weapon had a telling effect on .the members of the European CO/Dmon

44

Market. A study mission to the MiddleEast reported: .

It seems that many of the nations ofEurope live in fear of each new Arabrequest and will react to almost anydemand the Arabs make of them interms of restricting movement of eithercrude od or refined products.

It was subsequently reported inDecember 1973 that:

Israel was nafurally deeply disap-pointed by the role of Europe before,durmg, and after the recent war. Oil isjudged by Israel to be the principalmotivat ion for these European

policies.The significance of the oil weapon

has been demonstrated-i ts effects areknown. According to one source:

The effects of the 1973 Arab em-bargo [in the US] were higher in-flation, some increased unemployment,and a 1.5 percent decline in real output,associated both with the loss of fuelsand price hikes and with concomitantmarket uncertainty.2

Another author compares the periodof the oil embargo with the 1962 Cubanmissile crisis as a dramatic case studyrevealing significant principles. of con-temporary world politics. 27 Accordingto the US Congress'in December 1973,

The burgeoning U.S. energy crisis hasdealt our Nation the most seriousthreat to its national security sinceWorld War 11. 28

In a military sense, the impact ofthe oil embargo is more profound andfar-reaching . The very physical sur-vival of the United States rests withthe viability and credibility of itsarmed forces. Our military-ind.ustrialcomplex is energy intensive. In 1949,the Nat iona l Petroleum Counci lremarked that oil was A primew ~ p o nof victory in two world wars, It
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is a bulwark of our nat ionalsecurity. That statement today couldbe changed to read the bulwark,given the urgency of our times.

The Department of Defense is the

largest sil).gle user of the nation'senergy. George Marienthal, deputyassistant secretary of defense, stated:

We account for approxlmately 1.7percent o f the total national eon'sumptlOn. . Our peak petroleum re-qUlrements, the amount estimated tosupport full wartlme conditioris, zncreases b y a factor of three or {ore. lU

In light of these requirements,lwe as

a nation are dependent upon assuredavailability of critical energy resourceslargely' beyond our direct control.Because of the demands for energyusage by the military, the sharp rise infuel costs due to the 1973 oil embargohad an impact on readiness. These fuelcosts had to be absorbed by \manyunits a t the expense of other programswhich simply lost out because of the

shortage of funds. The result was areduced level of training and aprogram of austerity to live within theimposed budget.

Previously, I stated the oil embargohad far-reaching effects. In 1977 (50months after the embargo), GeorgeMarienthal stated:

There has been a strong cons'ensusamong the Joint Chiefs of Staff and'

the Military Departments that recentpetroleum levels of the operating forceshave been at least margznally ade-quate to maintain force readineJs .

Additionally, in February t 1978,Secretary of Defense Harold . rownstated:'

I c anno t repor t tha t ourforces . are as ready as' I would likethem to be . Our necessary effortsto conserve fuel have meant reductions

5

N TION L S E U ~ I T YND Oil

in ground combat training exercises,Navy steaming hours, and flyinghours for all services . . . . 2

( ince the future energy situationp r o b a b l y will not improvesignificantly, we may have to accept areduced state of military readinessunless the allocat ion of energyresources is reoriented toward nationaldefense.

f the Arabs have the oil weaponand seek to use it against the UnitedStates, do we have a counter.o/eapon touse against them? Unfortunately not.Dr. Henry Kissinger once remarked

tha t the United States suffers from theimpotence of power. We h a:ve so muchmilitary strength and internationalpolitical power we are not permitted toact as lesser states. The exercise of ourpower must be with great restraint anddue concern for the world communitya t large.

In May 1973, just five months priorto the outbreak of war in the Middle

East , the US Senate conductedhear ings concerning energy andforeign policy. The discussion centeredaround a US government official'spronouncements concerning thepossible use of force to securepetroleum from the Middle East.Robert E. Hunter of the OverseasDevelopment Council commented:

I think it is absolutely critical for usto do nothing . [we should] make noplans , m a k e no th rea t slor] even discuss such a horrendouspossibility Even just (l;sc'ussing itis likely to make our difficulties withthe oil producing state's worse. J

The hearings concluded with thegeneral consensus that no one in aresponsible position in governmenth ~ made any pronouncements con-cerning the' use of force. One month


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MILIT RY REVIEW

Constellallon

uft 'r the wur hud begun, the aircraftcarrier Constellation and threewarships sailed into the Indian Oceanand entered the Persian Gulf.

[his {{ as the first Instance In morethan 2.5 years that an Amencan air-craft carria had been In 'the Gulf, OnJanuary 12th, another U.S, carTl r-the nuclear powered Enterpnse-entered the Indian Ocean,

Certainly, the protestations by theUS government officials' followed by a"showing of the flag" in the PersianGulf must have alarmed s.ome of theArab lead 'rs.

When questioned about possibleintervention in the Middle East, SheikYamani, the Saudi oil mInIster,responded that the Arabs would

destroy the oil fields before they couldbe captured. Consideril'l.$ that Arabsmake up approximately R percent ofthe oil field work f ~ r c ethere are fewwho doubt their capability to do so. Forsome observers, however, the Westerngovernments erred in refusing to useforce aga ins t , t h e Arab OPECmembers, or even contemplate itseriously. h

Technical hazards, destruction of

46

production facilities likei y and growing'concern over Soviet air and sealiftcapability dictated caution. Thereseems to ce a lingering tendency in theUnited States to reach for a weaponwhenev 'r trouble erupts. In the case ofthe Middle East, the use of force wasnot a viable alternative, for many ofthe reasons cited above. Howeve'r,probably the most ominous was thepossibility of touching off a super-power confrontation.

Dr. Kissinger was asked whetherthe United States had consideredmili tary action in response to the oilembargo. He replied:

A [ ery dalll?erous course. We shouldhal'e learned from Vietnam that it iscaSlcr to get Into a war than to get outof it. I am not sayinl? that there s nocircumstances where we would not useforce. But it is ~ n thinl? to use it ill therase of a dispute over price, it s dnother/( here there s some actual stranoMulatwll of th .. llldustrialzzed world. ,

t is abundantly clear that Dr.,Kissinger would rather negotiate asolution than bomb the oil fields, butone wonders if indeed there was achoice.

Epterpnse


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U Policy Toward the Middle East

Current US concern for the MiddleEast is focused on three objectives:

1 To insure that the region doesnot fall under the control of an outsidepower hostile to the United States andits allies.

2 To secure the survival of Israelas a national statc on normal termswith its Arab neighbors.

3. To insure the continuedavailabillty of Middle Eastern oil on

acceptable terms to our Western Eu-ropean allies and of late to the UnitedStates itself. 7

To achieve these objectives,diplomacy must prevail over the use ofmilitary force. At present, many of theoil-producing states with their greatnational wealth are firmly on the pathto modernization-committed to economic development and rising stand

, ards of living. They will be less able inthe future to afford the sacrifices implicit in the use of the oil weapon as apolitical weapon.

The oil reserves of the Middle Eastare considered to account for 60percent of the world's petroleum, andestimates are revised upward each yearas new fields are located. At firstglance, it seems that the world oil

situ


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dr'll 17 ::,,ptpmh.r 1972 a n d 3 OUober 1912 ~ U P f > I , n r l ' n d P p rrefD " C u r n ~ " l t . ,US [;OVl>rnrnent Pronl,,,\; OH.c.. W.] ' , I l " 'Yh)n D (' 9 / 2 p 342

9 nu)r Tl h A R.)rgPI F"t>ry ' r P " I J { ' f ' ~0//1110' W, , ' l a Arab S t a f e ~01tilt ' P [ ' / ~ ' ' ' "Gul l (en lo'r lor I ' l t ' SllJdv c, F S ) 5"., ."on )0 d"ll31 fIJld\ 1 9 / 3 5ulJt:'r,n -"lI"S ' u L h " ~Londe" [n ' J lD75 pI

2'J H ) " ' l ~Maull TI)I" /,1.,lIIlp l a s ' ,11{1I1W I " r e l n d / ' ' ' ' ' ' ) 5 V ~ l f " jP a n I TI,p ' ' ' '1 ' London [,-.g 197') P2 '

NATIONAL SE;CURITV ANDOil

, 3 11,(> U n ' l t ' l l S t , j / e ~0 " Sl or tdf)e ana lIlt; Afab Israel i Coofl , ( tUJ' ( , / I,

24 flJ"1 Pnnt ,ng OH,C(;' Vliasll'''glOn D C l q 7 3 0 7

26 MalOI D.1n,ef Vv Ctl r.,tmdn I'lnll M.Jfnr VlieSlpy < C'drk

F f: =01t ~ ; v ~; ~ : 1 \ 1 r J l 2 1 ' r J

M,It l I ~

Power /IA'/Ij r ~

Rf ' . e '.

28 l i l t Unl l eu State< Or Ilorray' . J / IU lJl[ ' ArJD Isr lef , [ , I f I / I ( 1OIl ( I I p ~

29 H".,k n ~ ' h I (I P 103 0 Gl'Olqt> Mdt.",,,\ tdl E : n e ~ l VDoD I.""~ " ' . J I ' r ~ Ou of I h l ' [ 'SAC(;SC HI' ha::. ~ ( ' n ' ( ' dt/; () t { ) u r ~i f l

III ' Nt'puhli( of \.'it'lnam and a ~ U'aJ plan:;.o i l I f f ' r and IWl.'wn nif l / 'cr tt) Central ArnJ )Group, ( ' I ' l / f r a l Europt', jor the 56th FlI'ldArttilcT.\ UnJo ad(' rPcr:.-rhl11#)

USACGSC Master's Degree Theses. The 1978 MJi'lary ReView Index

(December 1978) carried a listing of Masters Degree Theses preparedby the students of the Master of Military Art .and SCience degreeprogram The Combined Arms Center Research Library cannot supplycopies of these theses. All theses are entered Into the DefenseDocumentation Center. Cameron Station. Virginia. wh,ch w,1I providecop,es to qualified users Other users may buy copies from the NationalTech'l,cal InformatJon Service. 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA22161 Access,on numbers for the theses can be obtained from theCombined Arms Center Research Library, (913) 684-2544 or AUTOVON552-2544

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t ro

C N D I ND E F E N C EQ U R T E R L Y

Nuclear eterrence

~ e s Not Makeivil efense

Unnecessary

J. F Wallacp

Th(' ( 'oncept o mutua l assur('d destru('tion, appropriatelyat., .onym('d MA D, has allOlc('d US pol icymakers l ' i r tually toit.rnor( l'il'il d('fells(' agains t nu('lear attack. This inat tent ionhas b( ( n 1l ( I( omed by thp US puhlic which is psyclwlogica/ly disposcd to i gnor ing th(' unth inkab le o anuclear h o l ( ) ( a u , ~ t .Th(' So,,;et Union's dril 'e for nuclearsuperiori ty, h O l l ( ~ ( r ,coupl( 'd u'i th i ts civil def('ns(' programnOll l( at CS th(' Unit( 'd States in a posit ion o unilaterall 'ulll( 'rability. W( can no longer ' ignore t h ~ issue; nogOl 'crnm('nt has th(' moral r ight to dismiss measures which

could sat 'e mil l ions o Iit'es. A n effecti l 'e civil defenseprogram could be cost-( 'ffectil '( ' through the use o exis t ingfaeiliti( 's. t would also prol'id(' greater f lexibil i ty for thepr( 's ident at a mom( 'nt o crisis. Knowledg.e thai measureshad b( ( n lah('n to sat 'e mil l ions would s t rengthen hisbargaining posit ion. Conl'ers( 'ly, th(' lach o such measuresrenders the nat ion 's population hostage t o : the nuclearthr( 'ot, s(,I 'erely l imi t ing the pr( 's iuent 's options.

Ren nleli from anarlran Defence Quarterly Volume 8 Number 1 Summer 1978 Published by Defence Publlcahonsloronto GII1,HIO f anada Copyrrgtlt ' 1975

50


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THE American doctrine of strategicnuclear deterrence through mutualassured destruction (MAD) leading tostrategic stability, which has reignedsupreme for the past decade, i ~ nowbeing seriQusly challenged. The con-tinuing Soviet drive for superiority inthe field of strategic weapons has comeas a distinct shock to a great manyWesterners, and revelations of thenature and direction of Soviet civildefense programs are undermining theconcept of MAD. Ironically, manyWestern strategic analysts had writtenoff civil defense as irrevelant to

modern strategic thinking.One can hope that the tremors have

reached those in Canada responsiblefor our military and nonmilitarydefense policies. For too long have theybeen using the crutch of deterrence asa substitute for defense. Most certainly,their rigidity 0 thought based uponthe myth of no survival excluded anypossibility of developing realistic civil

defense programs. The development ofeffective emergency programs, whichwould ensure Canada s ability tosurvive should deterrence fail, willrequire a major modification of apolicy which now overemphasizesplanning to counter relatively minorand. in most cases, inconsequentialpeacetime emergencies.

he l m ts of Destruction

Unfortunately, most people haveonly the vaguest ideas about the effectsof nuclear detortations. Yet an ade-quate, though not necessarily com-prehensive, knowledge of whathappens is basic to understanding whycivil defense is important and why the

51

IVil EFENSE

debate on n u c l ~ rdefense and warstrategy continues.

When a nuclear weapon detonates,it releases energy in the form of blast,light and heat, and nuclear radiation

(both initial and residual or fallout.)2The extent of damage and casualtieswhich will . result from t\; e energyrelease will depend on a number offactors, including the size and designof the weapon, whether i t ,was explodedon, under or over the surface of theland or water. The important thing toremember is that against each of theeffects, except in the ground zero area,

protection and protective actions arepossible.The best forms of protecti on are

ei ther preat tack evacuation ofthreatened areas or some type ofshelter, either fallout or antiblast. Theformer is designed to give protectionagainst radiation fallout but providesonly some modest incidental protectionagainst heat and blast, while the

latter, depending upon designedstrength, will provide protectionagainst all effects. And, contrary to amythology popularized by anticivildefense bureaucrats, they are not tooexpensive for governments to provide.

A word needs to be said aboutresidual radiation or, as it is commonlycalled, radiation fallout. This form ofcontamination, carried aloft by theexplosion to form the famil iarmushroom cloud and then graduallydescends to the ground, could con-taminate an area downwind from theexplosion of some 7,000 square miles.

The dust particles making up theradiation fallout m a y o r may not beseen- the radioactivity itself cannot beseen, felt or smelled. The danger ismost Severe in the first few hours afterthe explosion; after two days, it has


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MILIT RY REVIEW

lost 99 percent of i ts s t rength.However, in areas where the priginalintensity was high, fhe remaining onepercent could be dangerous. Hpnce,protectIOn in the first few hours is veryimportant. ,

There could be longterm healthpf"fecls from being expospd to Horne ofthe fission products or us a result ofexposure to fallout radia t ions .However, WIth proper control measuresand publw educatIOn. the severity oft hesc cffeets can also be substantiallyredu('pd.

A 1 )fl, report of the United Nutions'

sec re t a ry g e n e r a l I l l u s t r a t e sdram uti cally the overall effects of a 1megaton explosion over a city of approXImately one million persons asfollows:

li:dlld b ~ 1>1..,[ and hpnt : 7fl.flilil Killtd ),,, r "UIn l ' ' l n i a l l o u t llI.fHIII InJull',j )[). )f)() l Il1l1JlHPd . s u n l \ ) r ~ IIO OOIl

Such f igures d r a m a t i c a l l y

"dpTTlol1strate tlw frightful l'onsequen('l'S for h u m a n i t ~ should an all-outwar pver mvolve the use of nuclearweapons agalllst unprepared CIties."

E T T l p h a s i ~added.)

Strategic Stability and Nuclear Deterrence

The stratPgic nuclear relationshipbptween the $oviet Union and theUnited States is a constantly changingphenomenon. For the first years afterthe first two atomic bombs had exploded over Japan. the United Statesfor all intents and purposes enjoyed astrategic superiority over the SovietUnion, and the :doctrine of massiveretaliation camEi to form the basis ofdeterrence to rontain what were

52

perceived to be Russian threats tonational existence:'

However, the Russian detonation ofa thermonuclear weapon 1953, soonto -be followed by the missile and

putnik sllccesses in 1957, led many inthl' Cnitcd Statps to believe that their

, suppriority w ~ not going to last verymuch longer. Also, by the mid1950s,the Soviets had deploy'ed short rangem l s ~ i l e swhich cOljld reach most of theUS Strategic Air Commnnd b a ~ e ~thenrimming Hussin' The doctrine ofmassive retnliation based on USstrategic superIOrity came to an abrupt

pnd, but it was not until the mid-1960st h a t t he present Western un- 'df 'rstanding of what const i tutes 's t ra tegic stabil i ty and btrategirn uelem deterrence was renchcd.

Up until 19f12, the Cnited Statesstill enjoyed an overwhelmingsuperiority in s t ra tegic nuclearwen pons and, with the growth of theseforces over the next few yenrs, attained

a capability whereby it was said that itcould absorb a Soviet first strike andthen retaliate with an assured secondstrike which, according to Robert Mcl'."amara, would ensure the assureddestruction of the ~ v i e tUnion. nutthe new Soviet initiatives in thestrategic weapons field, following theirclumsy attempt to correct the strategicimbalance by siting medium-range

missiles in Cuba, convinced RobertMcNamara that soon the Soviet Unionwould have its own second-strikecapability.

As a consequence, McNamarabegan to doubt his earlier belief about

. the effectiveness of damage-limitingsystems in blunting enemy attacks. Hewas thus led to place reliance solely ona policy of s t ra tegic offensivedeterrence to provide for the defense of


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the United States.Mcl\ 'amara's thinking had moved

in a few years from the preCubaposition of .strategic superiority andassured destruction to one of MADAssured destruction had been definedas:

an abilzty to Inflict . an unacceptable degree of damage . evenafter absorbing a first strike In thecase of the Soviet Union I would judgethat a capability on our part to destroysay, one fifth to one quarter of herpopulation and one half of her n dustrial capacity u'ould serve as a'n

erfectwe deterrent.'The assured destruction theme

bemme mutual when he attributed thissame capabi l i ty to the Soviets.Henceforth, because of MAD he andhis supporters believed that neitherside would be able to escape intolerabledamage, hence deterrence had beenachieved.

By the end of t he 1960s Mc

Namara 's doctrine of mutual assureddestruction was coming under hostileCrItIcIsm. The unques t i onab l evulnerability of the United States population did not sit easily in the mindsof many. The Western and certainlythe American, interpretation of justwhat constitutes deterrence is stillunder dispute. Y

The Faltering of IVIl Defense

When the iron curtain drew to aclose across Europe in the late 1940smost Western nations reintroducedcivil defense programs which had beendi;banded at the conclusion of th'e warin Europe. For the next 15 years, civil

defense was recogn ized by

5

IVil EFENSE

governments as a necessary com-ponent. of the defense strategy ofnations. Civil delense was certainlyone of the damage-limiting systemsadvocated by the Kennedy administration in the Uniteli States.' : Yet a fanfare of emotional criticismgreeted the publication of HermanKahn's book On Thermonuclear War. OKahn had dared to suggest thatnuclear war was not only a distinctpossibility but that civil defense wasindeed a factor which, if properlyorganized and executed would notm ~ nthe total extinction of mankind.

But:for reasons that were again

psychological rather than l o g ~ a lthemerican public reacted vwlently

against the fallout shelter programstudies proposed by Kahn andaccepted by the Kennedy administration.

As the debates over the issues ofstrategic defense and offense con-

tinued, the majority of the 'strategistsbecame obsessed wi th thetechnicalities of weapons systems.They ignored or soon dismissed civildefense as not being significant. Butthe most stunning blow to civil defensecame with the introduction of the MADconcept. Civil defense was junked as adestabilizing factor in the concept ofdeterrence through strategic stability.

The blind acceptance of MAD wasdevastating to civil defense. t became .the refuge of politicians who acceptedwillingly and without thought that ifdeterrence failed the result would be

annihilation'. Why waste funds oncivil defense? In most Western coun-tries and certainly in Canada, themili tary-uneasy and unwilling com-panions of civil defense officials

deserted this facet of national security


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MIlITARY REVIEW

happy that civil defense would nolonger be a competitor for thp defensedollar. The irony is that while themilitary have not yet shown how theypropose to fight a nuclear war, or howthey would defend the nation againstnuelear attaeits, th few civil defenseadvomtes lpft werp prepared to offersome sort of prPHl'l'iption t6 savemillions of lives.

Tlw civil defender reasoned tha td 8pite thp eatastrophic nature ofnut'lear ,war, civilization would not bed p H t l O ~ e dand that people who survlved would wish to continue to live.Bel'llai'


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other words, the civil defense payoffcommences with the first dollar,wljereas several: hundreds of millionsmust be expended before active defensebecomes viable.

f a country is r ~ l l yserious about aprogram and makeR the best use ofexiHting organizations and facilities,costs will not be overwhelming, and inno case would they come close to thoseneeded to meet the costs of operatingmil i ta ry es tabl i shments . Unl ikemilitary systems which become obRolete due to technological advances,most civil defense installations andequipment such as radiation .detectiondevices or hardened control centerswill remain effective until the day theydisintegrate. Another:

strength o{ civil de{ense is thati { a new method o{ delivering nuclearweapons IS invented [such as the nelLcruise missile]. the ciull de{ensemeasures designed against existingweapons would probably b.e equallye{{ectlVe agaznst the nell threat

The breadth and depth of aneffective civil defense program cannotbe expeeted to increase if it is cont inually subjected to the process ofstops and star ts so evident in pastCanadian programs. t must beplanned and be in place qefore anattack -is launched. To be fullyeffeetive, it mlist cope with the immediate preattack and attaek problems

and also with the longer term problemsof postattack survival, recovery andrehabilitatioh. The relatively goodstate of civil defense preparations incountries like Russia, Sweden andSwitzerland was not achieved overnight. t is the result of continuedgrowth over many years of planninga n d implemel).tation of a broadspectrum of civil defense measures.

55

IVil EFENSE

The Smaller llies

An aspect of the strategic picturetoo often ignored is the relationship ofallies to the overall posture of strategicnuclear deterrence. Undoubtedly, thestrategic weapons held by Britain andFrance are worrisome to the Soviets,but it is highly doubtful that the otherNATO allies really enter Americancalculations of strategic posture. Froma eivil defense point of view, Canadaand the other smaller allies shouldbear two situations in mind. t isconceivable that a nuclear exchangecould take place between the two superpowers on ly -Canada could haveradiation fallout deposited across thesouthern portions of the country, and,therefore, patterns of fallout beingsubject to the vagaries of upper levelw i n d ~eivil defense would be needed inal l areas within JOO miles of theborder.

At the same time, even if one agreeswith those who suggest tha t effectiveeivil defense is destabilizing, one mustquest ion whether civil defensepreparations made in Canada willalter any strategic factor or decision.Alliance commitments could drawCanada into a war which eventuallycould involve the use of nuclearweapons, but an appropriate level of

preparedness in Canada should not behindered as it has been by the fantasythat what is done by Canada will upsetthe strategic balance.

Another consideration which is especial1y pertinent to our Western allies,but which should not be dismissed byCanadians, is the current NATOdefense strategy which calls for aconventional response to any Soviet


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MILIT RY REVIEW

incursions into Western Europe. Inorder 'to raise the nuclear threshold inthe face of growirrg Soviet conventional strength, the United States hasbeen encouraging the development of

more conventional forces by its allies.Thus, if the ppriod conventional war 'is of any duration at all, cities andtowns in European countries would, inall probability, e attacked with nonnucll 'ar weapons during the socalledconventional phast'.

t would be foolish to think thatconventional war would' be lessdestructive, and thus more desirable,tqan ; 'uclear war or that strategicdelivery systems would not be used

. against civil populations. Modprn conventional wars have resulted in far

56

more civilian casualties than thoseinflicted on military forces, a factwhich makes it difficult to justify thefragility of civil defense preparationsin most NATO co mtries.

The Soviet View

The recent revelations of Sovietcivil defense programsl are nothingnew to students of civil defense. TheSoviets realize th&t nuclear war would

e an unparalleled disaster, but, a t thsame tiTf' th y believe that victorywill come to the sidp which has madethe best efforts in its defense posture. 'ThE' present chief of Russian civil

A JOint militarycIvilian IVIldefense leam on a nuclear.bIOlogical and chemical recon-naissance exercise. Marker flagsare mscflbed contammalion


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Soviet border guards carry out anuclear; biological and chemicalreconnaissance exercise

defense is Colonel General A T,Altunin, He received this appointmentin 1972 and holds the rank of deputydefense minister. according theprogram a position of some status inthe defense arrangements of the SovietUnion,

This is in striking contrast to thesi tuation in Canada where theprogram has been buried and stifled inthe defense departmen t for the past 10years t is claimed that the recentsophistication' of the program "datesmore or less from 1972 and the signingof the Soviet-American BM anti-ballistic missile) Treaty. which mayhave inhibited one aspect of active or

7

CIVIL DEFENSE

strategic defense"" but did not impedethe furtherance of passive defensemeasures and training for survival.

Certainly. the Communist Partyand the Sovi,et government have setcivil defense "extraordinary andcrucial tasks," including protection ofthe people as a pr imary role.preparations to ensure a workingnational economy in wartime "andorganization and training so as toper fo rm e s sen t i a l rescue andemergency repair work,"" Whereascivil populations in the West have beenled to believe in the futility of civildefense. the Soviet people are told that:

lthuugh the dis ussed means of


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MlliTARV R VI W

destructIOn are called mass meansthey will not destroy masses of people,but ollly those lrho neglect the studymastery and the use of theserneasures 1

Through its plans to evacuate thepopulation from p ~ o h h l etargets, it issuggested that direct effects casualtiescun be kept down to less than 1pl'rcent of the population. Plans include the marrying of evacuees tospecific collective farms where theywill l i teral ly dig in to achieveprotection against radiation fallout.E v a c u a t i o n p l a n n i n g i s now

pamlleling a new emphasis on antihlast s u; ters, the aim being eventualshe:ter protection for the whole population, and a variety of trainingprogram" and exercises begun in thesC'hools to create a public "buttressedby a nationwide and Increasingly in-tpnsive civil defense program.".'

Other a reas of Civil defensepreparation have received considerahle

attention, The evidence indicates thatfrom the highest to the lowest organsof government, protected facilities arein being from which the leaders wouldIw able to provide direction and controlof their war effort and defense. Theprovision of essent ia l protect ivem e a s u r e s to r e n d e r i n d u s t r i a lmachinery usable after an attack alsoreceives priority attention. Thus, whilethe 130viets appear t be evading theformula for MAD through i tsprotection programs for industry andthe people, the United States is leavingits population naked.

Despite the cynicism often ex-pressed 'about the effectiveness ofSoviet civil defense, it would be wise topay heed to Paul H, Nitze's observation that:

. . . what is plain is that they have

58

made . . . an approach to the problemof luclear war that does assume to ade ree incomprehensible to Americansthat nuclear war could happen andthat the Soviet Union could survil'e.":'

onclUSIon

Up to this point. consideration Ihasbeen :given to the principal fadtorswhich r ~ v e lthe place of civil defensein the strategy of deterrence throughstrategic stabil i ty. Without dis

regarding the uncertaint ies concerning the effects of nuclear attack,and accepting the near impossibility ofachieving protection close to groundzero, there is absolutely no uncertaintyahout the technical possibilities ofproviding_ protect ion aga ins t all

.significant effects.Working from this premise, it is

entirely conceivable to develop around.

it a civil defense program which woul(\be effective. An important feature ofthe deterrent strategy based on MADwas that the civilian population wouldnot be protected by civil defense andother damage-limiting systems, but,instead, would become hostages to thegood behavior of the two sides_ It wasthus incomprehensible to the sup-porters of this theory tha t the Sovietswere striving for and likely to achievesuperiority. As a consequence, theUnited States has let itself slip backin to a pOSitIOn of u n i l a t e r a lvulnerability.

Civil defense certainly has not beena major factor in the Western conceptof deterrence, but i t was and still is animportant factor in the Soviet Union'scurrent drive for security throughstrategic nuclear superiority. t would


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be well" however, to consider otherthan strictly technical matters whentrying to determine the value of civildefense.-

First, if it did, exist at the moment ofa crisis, the effect might tend to result,as Bernard' Brqdie has suggested, "incourageous ra ther than cravenpolitical decisions." Second, suchprotectio,(l as can be achieved can bejustified on strategic as well as onh u m a n j t a r i a n g rounds , for nogovernment has the moral right todismiss measures whicH could result inthe saving of miliions of lives whichmight otherwise perism

What in effect creates deterrence isnot the current concept of strategics t a b i l i t ~I t is the existence of a sufficipnt number of weapons and forcestogether with the will to use themshould national or alliance interestsdemand it; it also depends on thewillingness to accept the certainty ofbeing hit in return.

The decision to go to war or torespond to international intimidationwill be determined when a nation'sleaders feel the objectives it is seekingare strong enough to override the inevitability of a p'unishing responsefrom an opponent. Yet, in coming tosuch a decision, the knowledge tha treasonable preparations have beenmade to protect the civil population, as

opposed to leaving them as nakedhostages, ,could stiffen the resolvp ofleaders to mept the challenge to thenation's integrity or existpncp.

J F Wallace ha," h('('n ('onn('ctf'd lI 111hCanadian C l l l l d( ' [ ( Ul ( ' {rom 1949 to 1977.dunng ['l'hlCh hl' {died a l lumhcr of SC l1lOrposltlOns. mcludlllA that of head of the( ) r ~ a n l Z a t i ( } n

59

CIVil DEFENSE

NOTES

1-' 5 G l a ~ ~ f o n eThe t fleets 01 Vuclear Weapons RevFsedEditIon SuperinTendent of Documents US Government Pr,n ,ng0ll'C8 I/vdf>hlnqlon DC 1974

2 Another effect e1eclromdgnel1c pulse s an electrical Impulf>8produceCl by high vleld 8l1plOSlons Just above the atmosphere It COulddIsrupt p pctt,e power or telecommunications but .1 IS not dangerousto I'v,ng tllings

3 The lIulhor of Ih,,,, article W I I ~ p s " ' P dIPsts M'Id Ihelr results InNevada These leSls proved concluslvel" to him thai prof cellon w a sIndeed feds,ble

4 A Leg.Jult and G. Llndsp" The D y n a m l ( ~af the Nuclear8alanCl ' Cornell Un'l/er",t" Press Ithaca N 'r 1974 p 38

5 Ib ,d p 39 6 E:.scolt Re'd ' ,me of Fear and I-Iopp Tile fV/al Commll/ee Super,nlend(>nl01

Documents u S Governm.enlProrlong 01l,(p \l\rJS'l,nglon DC 22 JaflUan,. 19689 Bernard Brodie War dnd P o t , r l ( ~Ca':.sell & Co Lond,,)n E:.og

1


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from Mao Tse-tung which attempts tomake the best of a bad situation byplanning to trade spacE' for t i m e - ayielding defense strategy. On the otherhand, the Chi"nese hi8torieal experiencel'l'veals a n o t h ~ rstrategy designed toachieve a dl'cisive engagement wellforward-a forward defense strategy.TIm; article seeks to identify the sourceand reveal the essence of these twodefense strategips through an analysisof selected Chinese wrltll lgs onmilitary thought and historical experienee.

Yielding Defense Strategy

N at surpris ingly, the currentChinese yielding dl'fense strategy ish a ~ e don the military thought of MaoTse-tung. However, the roots of Mao'sthought run depp into the fertile soil ofthe Chinese past. His key militarywritings, to include Pro h/PIII S ofStrat ,.;)' /1/ C h l n a ~Rpl'ullltlfll1aryWar, Proh CIIIS f Strategy lIZ [,u


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MILITARY REVIEW

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Military Review May 1979

Documents

Transcript of Military Review May 1979