'" ,

Revi~W I

Military Thp Profpssional ~Joul'nal of thp l~S Arm~ , March 1981

,THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE US ARMY

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BRIGADIER GIENE~AL ROBERT H. FORMf"l\j Depu1y Commandant

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Military Review VOLUME LXI MARCH 1981 NO! 3

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CONTENTS

NEW DOCTRINE FOR THE DEFENSE by Colonel Clyde J. Tate. US Army. and

Lieutenant Colonel L. D. Holder. US Army THE SUPERPOWERS' TUG OF WAR OVER YEMEN

by Malor John B. Lynch. US Army FIELD ARTILLERY INTEROPERABILITY

by Major Rolland H. Berry Jr . US Army EXTENDING THE BAITLEFIELD

by General Donn A. Starry. US Army SOVIET AITACK HELICOPTERS. RETHINKING THE THREAT

by Captam Steven A. Frith. US Army CLAUSEWITZ

by Colonel Walter von Hobe. Federal Republic of Germany Army AN EMERGING TRIAD OF POWER

by Colonel Robert L. Dtlworth. US Army SOVIET RADIO-ELECTRONIC COMBAT IN WORLD WAR II

by David R. Beachley REVIEWS the best from other loumals LEITERS NEWS BOOKS contemporary reading for the professIOnal

MILITARY REVIEW IS published monthly In English and Spanish and quarterly In Portuguese Use of funds for printing this publicatIOn approved by Headquarters. Department of the Army. 25 April 1980 Controlled CIrculation postage paid at Leavenworth. KS 66048 and Kansas City, Me) 64106 English-language sub-

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(' . .. Winners ~::~nd AJI--) The voting is in, and the winner of the 1980 Mlhtary RevIew Award for Excel- i lence in Tactical Writing is Colonel Robert E. Wagner, commander of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Nuremberg, Germany. His article "Active Defense and All That," which appeared in the August issue, has earned him the $250 prize money and a certificate attesting to his scholarship.

The second-place article was "Gain the Initiative With an Armored Raid" (June) by Major Richard P. Geier. Third place went to "The Warsaw Pact Short-Warning Nuclear Attack: How Viable an Option?: Parts I and ll" (October-November) by Major Donald L. Mercer. These authors were not the only winners, however. The Tactical Writing Awards Program has inspired numerous officers to share their thoughts on tactical concepts and battle doctrine. This presentatIOn of differing perceptIOns and the frank discussion of problem areas has been instrumental in stimulating professional thought and the broadening of our professional knowledge base. Such a trend works for the betterment of us all; In the end, the winners are the men we lead and the country we serve. As General Omar Bradley once said, "For most men, the matter of learmng is one of personal preference. But for Army officers, the obligation to learn, to grow In their profeSSIOn is clearly a public duty." The MIlztarv RevIew is also a winner, for in publishing these articles MR serves as a major forum for the professional growth of the US Army.

To those who have won the laurels, our congratulatIOns. To those who have contributed to the forum, our thanks. To the entire officer corps, our encourage-ment to join the discussion, to air your views and to share your thoughts. Specifically, we encourage you to submit your article for consideration in the 1981 awards program. Many excellent articles have been received already, but

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Colonel Clyde J. Tate, US Army, and Lieutenant Colonel L. D. Holder, US Army

The Army's defensive doctrine has been a center of contro-versy sincc its publication in 1976. In the near future, Field Manual (FMI 100-5, Operations, will bc republished. Its ap-proach to defense will retain the classic purposes of defense -to gain time, conserve forces, stop the enemy and to win -but will also emphasizc the need to suit the form of the defense to the operational situation at hand and stress the use of offensh'e tactics in the conduct of the defense. Initia tive, violence, integration and depth will be the foundations of the new manual's attempt to provide the Army with doc-trine suitable for units of .. II types in all parts of the world.

N o TACTICAL subject has provoked as much debate m the US Army as that of the active defense. Gallons of ink have been spIlled and dozens of Jeep h,ods dented in a~guing the merIts and deficienCIes of our defenSIVe doctrine and in trying to define its essence.

Certainly, this debate has been worth-while: Th'e quality of the exchange has been hIgh; fresh concepts have been

elaborated'm crItIcizmg and defendmg current ideas; and most serving officers have been stimulated into closer examina-tion of the operational problems of de-fense, including the effects of electronic warfare and nuclear, biological and chemical weapons It is likely that the debates engendered by the actIve defense wIll be that doctrine's greatest legacy to the Army.

March

The central question of how we should defend, however, has not been fully answered. Critics have identified weak-nesses in current doctrine while support-ers of the active defense have stressed Its realism and its principal strengths Still, no real synthesis has appeared, and, today, with a new edition of FM 100-5 in draft, arguments are still swirling around the Army's defensi ve concept.

This article is presented to return the debate to its start point by outlIning the form defensive doctrine will take in the Army's new field manuals. It attempts to clarify questIOns raised by the doctrine of 1976 and establish a line of continuity be-tween that concept of defense and the con-cept which will be described m the new FM 100-5. Its thesis is that defenSive oper-ations will vary greatly With operatIOnal conditions and that no smgle technique of defense can be universally apphcable.

Whatever form is chosen must he exe-cuted With the greatest possible VIOlence to allow the defender to seize the mltlatlve at the earliest opportunity aVaIlahle. Our new approach to the d['fense must con' tmue to stress concentratIOn, economy of force secunty and combat In depth, but It must alse emphaSize speed, maneuver and surprise far more than the active defense does.

The Background

Much of the problem With current de-fen.sive doctrine hes m a misunderstand-Ing of what was origInally Intended The tactics described In the 1976 editIOn of FM 100-5 were Intended to provide gener-al guidance suitable for applicatIOn in any circumstances but specifically deSigned to handle the "worst case"-war in Europe. In fact, the manual sets out very

1981

NEW DEFENSE DOCTRINE

few hard and fast rules and allows con-Siderable latitude to commanders in or-ganIzmg the defense.

In the conferences preceding the writing of FM 100-5, senior commanders agreed that this latitude was a necessity. They also concurred in emphasiZIng the impor-tance of maneuver and the necessity of reclamllng the initiative at the earliest pOSSible opportunity when defending. The exact form of defense was understood to be variable, depending on the factors of mISSIon, enemy, terrain and troops avail-able IMETT) m each case. In short, the doctrine designed for our manuals and actually written into FM 1005 was nota-bly flexible and delIberately nonrestric-tive. In fact, Initially, it was simply called 'The Defense."

Wbat developed, unfortunately, in the doctrine's extensIOn Into other manuals (notably FM 71-100, Armored and Mech-anzzed D;vlsl~n OperatIOns {How to FIght! I and In its applIcation In the field was a highly structured and rigid conceptIOn of how to defend. ThiS stylized version ofthe "actl ve defense" called for deployment of defendIng forces "well forward" behmd coverIng forces of a single typt' With a nar-rnwly der;ned miSSIOn. It ngorously pro-hlhIted the retention of substantial re-serves for fear of thmnIng out committed forces to an unacceptable degree and called Instead for concentration by lateral move-ment along the forward edge or the battle area 1 FEBA I.

Depth was to be achieved by maneuver, but, m execution, this was often translated into a retrograde which ended With a hnear defense at the brigade rear bound-ary. Offensive action WIthin the defense was anathematized beca use of the antic-Ipated numerical advantage of the enemy, but risks In the form of stripped-out flank sectors were recognized as a necessity.

The requirement for defending well for-

MILITARY REVIEW

ward in Europe, continued analysis of the 1973 Middle East War and the numerical inferiority of our deployed forces in Europe all played a part in reducing the original conception of a flexible defensive doctrine into a dogmatic set of rules. But even more influential in the process was the exag-geration ~f the mechanical-technical as-pects of war which accompanied the pub-lication of FM 100-5.

The manual's introductory assumptions about the lethality of the battlefield en-couraged the growth of a tendency to over-stress firepower factors in relation to all others. The fighting system comparisons and the hit probabihty-kill probability charts of the manual oriented doctrinal development in an extreme and unfortu-nate direction. As the theme of firepower dominance was developed, the rough com parlsons necessary to mlhtary estimates degenerated into a form of deceptively pre-cise mathematics for staff college students, war game designers and maneuver um pires. The "advantages of the defender" (meaning the operation of directfire weapons from covered positIOns) assumed such value that counterattacks or resump-

. tion of the offensive became too risky to be seriously considered.

Simulations, in particular, remforced this view with their crude comparisoris of fire-power potential. Moral factors, the effects of enfilading fire and the impact of sur prise which have decided so many real bat-tles were acknowledged as incalculable and totally suppressed. Maneuver, which is the means through which these effects are obtained, was similarly discounted. Equations replace~ tactics on the game boards, and realism suffered as a result. The art ofterram appreciation and utiliza-tion was forsaken for ratios. Tenacity, sur-prise and seizing upon opportunities pr~seilted by a vulnerable enemy were lost in the "calculus of battle."

4

Using the methodology of our war games, Stonewall Jackson's flank blow at Chancellorsville would have been defeat-ed by the firepower score of Oli ver O. Howard's corps even though the Union rifles were, for the most part, stacked around the campfires. The audacity which won Napoleon the Battle of Austerlitz would have c;ost him dearly in today's computer assisted simulations.

By 1978, the flexible concept of defense conceived at the preliminary planning conferences had hardened into an inflexi-ble set of rules for a single type of defense. Surely, this was not the intent of its origi-nal "fathers." It was this rigidly limited form of defense which attracted most of the attention of critics and prompted the long series of debates which still goes on.

Toward a New Defensive Concept

If we are to make proper use of the les-sons we have learned in studying and debating current doctrine, we must restate our defensive doctrine carefully and pre-cisely. Our reVised doctrine must incor-porate the strengths of current thought and the improvements urged by construc-tive critics. Our doctrine must be specific enough to guide commanders in devising effe'ctive tactics but sufficiently flexible to be useful in any part of the world under any conditions of combat. Doctrine was never intl"nded to be dogma, and effective use of sound doctrine requires the judg-ment of its user.

While retaining our appreciation for the destructiveness of weapons, we must also consider the human factors which in-fluence operations, the advantages ob-tainable through maneuver-particularly. offensive maneuver-and the changing nature of terrain throughout the world.

March

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It is also Important that our restated de-fensive doctrine reflects the needs and im-portance of light forces as well as mech-anized and armored units, maintains the time-tested emphasis on combined arms cooperation, takes full advantage of new units and weapons and devotes adequate attentIon to the special challenges of nuclear-chemical warfare and the simul-taneous battle in depth.

To meet these challenges, the new de-fensive concept will propose concentration on foul' key elements. These are initiative, VIOlence, integration and depth.

Initza{lt'e is the attacker's greatest ad-vantage It must be seized from him tem poraI'lly whenever possible and finally wrested from him altogether. ThiS re-quires more than mere reaction to his at tack: The defender must counter the at-tacker's initiatives With his own and pre-vent him from dictating the pace of battle throughout its course.

VIOlence is the essence of decIsive com-bat. The defender must concentrate com-bat power rapidly In response to the attack and then deliver a stunning counterstroke to halt and shatter the attacker. Nuclear fires are especially valuable In dealing such a blow, but the modern conventional weapons already in our hands also make us capable of concentrating fires against an attacker on very short notice. Mounted ground maneuver forces, air maneuver units and airborne/airmobIle forces can all move fast, strike qUIckly and finish rapid lyto defeat enemy forces piecemeal.

IntegratIOn is the coordination of every weapon, unit and system aVaIlable In pur-SUIt of victory. Since the defender is nor-mally outnumbered, it is of particular importance that he use hiS strength fully, economically and effiCiently, multiplYing

1981

NEW DEFENSE DOCTRINE

its actual force through full exploitation of every advantage. Fires, barriers and maneuver must be meshed perfectly and carefully fitted to the ground. Air and ground operations must be fully comple-mentary. Nuclear and conventional weap-ons, electronic warfare, combat support and logistical support must also be harnessed to the commander's concept if the defense is to succeed.

Depth is Important on both sides of the line of contact. We must see deep into the enemy's territory so that we can fight a Simultaneous, coordinated battle against him throughout the depth of his forma-tIOns. We must organize our defenses In suffiCient depth to permit us to absorb the shock of the attack and regain the initia-tive Surveillance and long-range fires are the keys to fighting the enemy from his first appearance forward of the line of contact to separate his forces and deny him the concentratIOn and early success he requires. Closely coordinated maneu-ver and fire through the entIre depth of the defended area are also vital to break-ing up the enemy's momentum and defeating his forces.

These four fundamentals characterize all defensive operations and set objectives for their conduct. They do not dictate how the battle is to be organized.

The exact form of defense cannot be standardized. It will depend on the com-mander: the terrain and the factors of METT. The commander may defend well forward or in considerable depth if he is not specifically reqUIred to hold a desig-nated position. He may even choose to pre-empt thf' attacker with spoiling attacks if conditions favor such tactics.

The actual range of defensive optIOns is very Wide. It can be visualized as a con-tinuum of combinations which proceeds from an absolutel:t static position defense

MILITARY REVIEW

at one extreme to a totally dynamic form of defense at the other. Between these poles, there are almost infinite possibilities for the combination of position and maneuver. Neither extreme is practical as a form of defense for a sizable force-the most dy-namic defense requires some static frame-work, and the most powerful strongpoint needs at least an internal reactIOn force. In practice, commanders will combine active and positional elements in propor-tions to suit each situatIOn.'

When a defensive mission is restrictive, terraIn limits maneuver or the troops available are of limited mobilIty, a pre dominantly positional defense will be chosen When the opposite conditions exist, a commander may elect to base his defense on mobl IIty, seeking to defeat the enemy by fire wi thin the defensi ve sector and by carrYIng the fight to the enemy by early counterattacks Into the flanks and rear of his formations.

The figure summarizes this concept graphicall.

Within a defensive concept, the com-bination of active and positional elements may be based on the geography of the bat-tlefield (as at Orsha where Gotthard Hein-rici defeated superior forces by concen-trating on a single strong position sup-ported by a wide screen and lateral rein-forcement) or on the capabilities of the forces at hand (as at Kharkov where Erich von Manstein used infantry to limit the Russian per:etration and then liquidated it with armor). Forces of markedly dif-ferent mobility can cooperate in such de-fenses. Light infantry, for instance, can hold strongpoints, forested areas, villages or towns to facilitate the maneuver of armor units while denYIng otherwise ex cellent avenues of approach to the enemy.

The basic organization of the battlefield will not change. A covering force will still be used to provide security to the defender and to begIn pestruction of the enemy's leading forces. The decisive battle will continue to be fought in the main battle area (MBA). And a rear area will still be

Range of Defensive Techniques Available to Maneuver Units

Static

Terrain RetenllOn

organized for the support of operations. However, greater freedom will be allowed to commanders in organizing their de-fenses, and new emphasis will be placed On the tactical interdictIOn battle con-ducted simultaneously in the area beyond the line of contact, giving depth and flexi-bility to the defense.

The covering force battle provides warn-ing of the enemy's approach and informa tion on the nature of his attack. Covering forces may be large or small, d!'pending On the operational conditions and the com-mander's plan for the defensp. Whatever its size, the covering force must protect the defending main body from surprise and direct observation

If the covering force IS a heavy one, It can also provIde substantial reaction tIme to the defending commander by sloWIng the enemy's approach and destrOYIng hIS leading UnIts. When the covering force succe!'ds in stopping some attacks or IS not challenged at all In some parts of the battlefield, It can remain forward, per-mIttIng the main force to concentrate against the most serIOUS threats and con-trollIng forward areas whIch offer obser-vation and attack of the enemy's flanks.

Whatever ItS compOSItIOn or functIOn, the covering force must be viewed as an integral part of the dpfense WIth a speCIfic role to play In the commander's concept of operation. It can screen areas in whIch enemy progress is acceptable while delay-ing, defending or even attackIng else-where to provide a greater degree of res is-tance and protection.

. In any case, its fundamental missions will remaIn to establIsh and maIntain con-tact WIth the enemy: determine the strength, location and general directIOn of enemy attacks; and deceIve the enemy as to the location of the main defenses.

The MBA battle IS the deCISIve battle fought along and behind the FEBA by the

1981

" NEW DEFENSE DOCTRINE

defender's major forces. Within the MBA, all forces available to the defender are combined to structure the battlefield with fires, barriers and maneuver to create op-portunIties to stop the enemy, Isolate his forces and defeat him. A careful intelli-gence preparation of the battlefield pre-cedes deployment of defending forces to in-dIcate where the defender must concen-trate initially and where he can expect to Interdict the enemy's approach and fight him In depth.

The operatIOns conducted in the MBA depend on METT. The commander may choose a static, terrain-oriented form of defense, a dynamic defense based pre-dominantly on maneuver or a balanced operatIOn whIch combines position and maneuver In appropriate measure. The commander's preference, the operational situation and the terrain available to him will all influence his chOIce, but almost every defense wIll contain elements ofpo-sltlOn and movement. Thus, in any defen-sIve Operf

MILITARY REVIEW

The defender must aSSlJme the offensive to gain full advantage of his successes in stopping or separating enemy forces. He must take every opportunity to crush iso-lated attacking units and attempt to de-stroy the enemy's supporting forces by maneuvering over indirect approaches to firing positions behind and on the flanks of the attacker. These counterstrokes are most effective when the enemy's initial impetus has been checked by the defense and he is bringing up forces to overcome the resistance.

Moving between carefully sited ob-stacles under .the cover of planned direct and indirect fires over familiar terram, the defender's mobile forces can inflict terrific damage on undeployed forces, artillery and command posts from offset firing posi tions. The psychological shock induced by this exercise of the initIative bv the de-fender can be paralyzmg to an'dttacker whose plans are suddenly :iisrupted by the appearance of unidentified forces to his rear.

Air maneuver units and airmobile forces can be employed in such counter-strokes when the attacker's concentrated forces are moving on narrow axes which permIt movement between them. The long range of infantry and attack helicopter weapons and the improved effects of long-range artillery make such tactics even more reahstic. .

The other distinctive features of our new defensive doctrine are greater freedom to retain sigmficant reserves and a stated need for commanders at levels above brigade to fight an extended battle beyond the FEBA.

Reserves are necessary in the defense to meet unexpected contingencies, reinforce threatened areas, eliminate penetrating enemy units and strike the attacker when opportunities arise. The size of the re-serve will depend again on METT, but

8

some reserve is essential to any defense. The improved mobility of the Abrams tank and the infantry fighting vehicle will enhance the range of reserve forces and increase their effectiveness when they are committed.

The tactical interdiction effort begins before the enemy closes with the defend-er's maneuver force, goes on throughout the decisive battle and, in many instances, will continue after direct contact between the main forces of combatants has ended. This deep interdiction battle is the re-sponsibility of army, corps and division commanders. When fighting a significant-ly larger enemy, the deep battle may de-termine ultimate success or failure.

In all cases, it can enhance the defend-er's chances of success by disrupting the enemy at long range, breaking up his coor-dination and momentum and battering his follow-on forces before they can be com-mItted. Alr-dehvered weapons, tactical nuclear arms, aIr maneuver units and im-proved surveillance systems make battle at extended ranges practical now. New weapons on their way to the field-FASCAM (family of scatterable mines) systems, the Copperhead. the Multiple Launch Rocket System and others-promise to make tactical intetdiction even morE' effecti ve

This battle in depth also extends to the rear where enemy forces may penetrate or be inserted. It may even have to be fought on the flanks of corps and divisions when gaps are created by the use of nu-clear weapons. The corollaries of such !'ton-linear combat are increased responsibili-ties for senior commanders (who can no longer be completely absorbed in concen-trating the force and allocating resources), a changed view of the rear area and com-bat service support and a need for closer coordination between the Army and the Air Force. Our coordination with the Air

March

Force for the deep battle will be partIcular-ly important SInce the Air Force will carry many of the sensors and weapons which make long-range combat possible.

The "new" defensIve doctrine clearly bears many marks of its predecessor. Other connections are more subtle. In combInIng the statIc and dynamic forms of defense, it consummates what the doc-trIne of 1976 Intended and places Impor tant new emphasIs on offensive maneuver and tactical in.terdiction.

Colonel Cl .. Je J Tatt' I.'> dIrcctor (If thj> Depal! mt'n! IIf Tuctlcs. USA('(;SC lIe rn'clt'cd a B 5 from A10Ullt SI Mar;'., Culle~(' of .Han/ancl alld 1'; a g1{ulttntt' III thl! {TSA(,GSC al/(l the Armv War Collq:c Iii- IWb C011ll1lalldrd In/alltn u/Ills and 5(,/,,('11 uS ,Ille(. Uf/cnt.c Committee Df'part. men! of Ttl~'llu, [TSACGSC

NEW DEFENSE DOCTRINE

The new formulation will be less pre-scriptive and more elastic, but it does not really represent revolutIOnary change. The best defensive commanders, from Hannibal at Cannae to Bruce C. Clarke at Saint-VIth, have uniformly sought to fit their forces to the ground and the enemy. Also, they have c'lnsistentiy capitalized on every opportunIty to seize the initiative and strIke, constructing their defenses ac-cording to Clausewltz as "a shield of blows." We must do the same. "4..

Llcutenant Colonel L D IIolder IS a doctrine U'nteru llh thrDepartment o{Tactlcs. L'SACeSC' lIe reLen'ed a R A from Teta~ P & M UnwerSlt\, an AI A from Ilarrrord Umverslly and 15 a grad-uate of the USACGSC lIe has commanded troopt> In Germany and Vlctnam and sen'ed as S3, 2d Armored Cavalry Reglment

Cruise Missile Tries Water Wings. An overwater test of the US Air Force air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) was successfully completed late last year when the Boeing AGM868 was recovered in mid-air by an Air Force HH53 helicopter (MR, Nov 1979. pp 84-85). The flight was primarily designed to examine the Inertial navigation system. The specially equipped helicopter snatched the missile at the end of Its flight as it floated toward the Pacific Ocean off the coast of Southern California.

1981

The flight lasted approximately three and one-half hours and was the fifth in a series aimed at preparing the missile for operational use.

The miSSile was staged from the Air Force Flight Test Center at Ed-wards Air Force Base. California, and conoucted over the Pacific Mis-sile Test Range near Vandenberg Air Force Base and Point Mugu. California. The nearly 21-foot-long miSSile was launched from under the wing of a 852 bomber.

Amid the swirling sands of southern Arabia. the United States and the Soviet Union are competing for influence over the "poorest yet most populated country of the peninsula -North Yemen,'" Why? In this article. the background and reasons for North Yemen's seesaw flirtations with the East and West are examined,

Major John B. Lynch, US Army

The Superpowers' Tug 0' War OverYemen

10 March

GEOGRAPHY

T HE Yemen Arab Republic INorth Yemen) IS a small country located In the southwestern corner of the ArabIan Peninsula Just north of the passageway between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, Its eastern boundary with Saudi Arabia and southern boundary wIth the People's Democratic RepublIc of Yemen (South Yemen) have not been conclusively

TUG OF WAR OVER YEMEN

established (Figure 1l.2 Apart from a hot, dry coastal plain

hugging the Red Sea, called the Tihama, the rest of the country is mountainous, It rIses steeply from the coastal plain to a high mountain plateau on which rests San'a, the capital, at an elevatIOn of over 7,000 feet. 3 The Tihama IS barren and sparsely populated, Generally, it is sepa-rated from the sea by swamps and lagoons, An arid wilderness stretches inland to the foothills of the central hIghlands, Rainfall in this area is sparse, yet, because of Ir-rigatIOn systems, the area is conducive to

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1981

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MILITARY REVIEW

the cultivation of tobacco, dates and cotton.'

In contrast, the mountamous interior of the country reaches elevations in excess of14,000 feet Rainfall is relatively heavy, varying from 15 to 32 inches per year in the north and southwest mountam regions respectively. This condition, coupled with an ingemous irrigation sys-tem deVIsed centunes ago," has served to make Yemen one of the mDSt fertile areas on the Arabian Peninsula. The climate and fertility of the soIl permIt the cultivation of almost every fruit, vege-table and gram Imaginable.

DEMOGRAPHY

The population of Yemen IS estImated at 6.5 millIon. with an annual growth rate of 3 percent. Only about 10 percent of the populatIOn is urbanized Other national ities on the peninsula are, for the most part, nomadic. The Yemenites, however, are predommantly sedentary and dwell in llamlets and small towns strewn throughout the countryside. The great-est concentrations are found on the moun-tain plateaus and are engaged m farm-mg Although prImarily of Semitic origin, the population does show evidence of NegrOId strams confined mostly to the Tlhama regIOn.

The people are dIvided religiously be tween the two major Islamic relIgIOUS sects. The Zaidi community of the Shi'a are located in the northern, central and eastern regions of 'the country, and the Shafe'i community of the Sunni reSIdes primarIly m the south and southwest por-tions of the country. Another sect, the Ismailis, are relatively few in number and are generally found in the remote mountain villages.b

12

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Pre-Islamic Period

RIch in hIstory, Yemen is the former home of enumerable ancient ciVIlizations, the most notable being the kmgdom of Sheba' The remains of both the Great Dam at Marib and the temple of Queen Bakis still stand in testimony to the great-ness of this civilization. Figure 2 depicts the kingdom of Sheba nearly one cen tury B.C

A decline in trade coupled with inva-sions by Abysslnians, Persians, Romans and EthIOpians led to the demIse of those ancient Yememte kmgdoms"

Arab Conquests

The legions of Islam Invaded and con-quered the Yemen in the seventh century and qUIckly spread their religIOn among the mhabitants, thereby underminIng the JeWIsh and Christian influence of prevIous rulers." FIgure 3 portrays Yemen's boundarIes as an Islamic state.

Ottoman Rule

Yemen remained under Arab control untIl the 16th century when it was con-quered by the Turks and nommally assimIlated into the Ottoman Empire for the next four centuries. '" Turkish control was never wholly effective and was prin-cipally restricted to the Tihama. The ZaidI imam and his mountain followers jealously protected their independence against foreign domination. In fact, because of the Turks' inability to subju-gate the mountains, they withdrew from Yemen altogether in 1636 for a couple of centunes.' ,

March

TUG OF ~ YEMEN

The remains of the Great Dam at Marib

Figure 2 Figure 3

1981 13

The remains 01 the temple 01 Queen Bakls

Suffice It to say that the Turks maIn-tained varying degrees of control over Yemen from the 16th century onward, with the last total occupation being from 1872 to 1918 when Ottoman troops were withdrawn after World War I I Figure 41."

The Road 10 Independence

In 1904, Imam Yahya led a partially successful revolt agaInst the Turks and was subsequently elected Imam of Yemen." Another Yahya-Ied revolt m 1911 resulted m the Treaty of Daan I' This truce splIt the rountry mto two ad-minIstratIve dIVISIOns and set the stage for Yahya to take thp reins upon the evacuat Ion of the Turks.

WIth that -done, he moved qUIckly to unite the country under a smgle author-Ity, qUite a chore for a country that had been dIvIded mto minor pnnclpalItIes and mcorporated Into a large empIre by for-eign conquerors" Y ahya then laId the theoretical claIm to Aden Ithen a British colony), as well as other lands which nOW compi'ise the country of South Yemen.

After a reIgn of 43 years, Imam Yahya

TUG OF WAR OVER YEMEN

was assassinated in 1948 in an unsuc-cessful coup, but not before Yemen was admItted into both the Arab League and the UnIted N"tions. Imam Sa If ai-Islam Ahmad, Yahya's son, succeeded him and rulpd for 14 years before succumbing to an assassin's bullet His reign is pri-manly noted for frequent border clashes With the Aden Protectorate of which he laId claIm. HIS successor, whose reign lasted only one week, was overthrown by an army coup led by Colonel 'Abdallah al-SalaI'. ThIS re';',~~l. abolished the Imamate and esta~hed the Yemen Arab RepublIc. l ..

Imam Muhammad al-Badr surVIved the coup and retreated north where the ZaidI tnbes rallIed behind hIm. At the re-quest of the new regIme, Egypt dIspatched men and equipment to assist m combating Badr and hIS royalIst forces who were beIng backed by Saudi Arabia and Jordan. A bloody CIvil war raged on untIl 1970 when royalist leaders accepted inte-gration under the republican regime as a result of an informal peace settle-ment arrIved at during talks between the SaudiS and republican leaders.

Smce that time, Internal as well as external struggles have plagued North Yemen. This VIOlent perIOd will be diS-cussed in detail later in thIS article.

YEMEN AND THE SUPERPOWERS

Pre-Civil War Period

As mentioned earlier, the long-runnmg dIspute between Britain and Yemen over the latter's irredenta, Aden and the Protectorates, resulted in VIOlent border clashes during the reign of Imam Ahmad. In an attempt to further show his disdain for the BrItIsh, as well as bolster his

15

MILITARY REVIEW

nation's defenses, Ahmad solicited the aid of another British enemy, the Soviet Union 17 Thus, on 1 November 1955, Yemen and the Soviet Union concluded another treaty of friendship and com-merce.'" It was, as we will see anon, much more substantive than the one agreed to in 1928.'9

Almost immediately, the Soviets pro-vided $30 million in milItary assIstance whIch Included vintage tanks, bombers, small-arms weapons, antiaircraft guns and a small training cadre.20 ThIs move Inspired other Communist bloc coun-tries to establish trade agreements WIth Yemen.2l

Given that the leadershIp in M05cow had seemingly nothing In common WIth the feudal Imamic regime in San'a, what then motivated the Soviets to de-vote so much effort to thIs ImpoverIshed state'? The answer to thIs question rest,; In the fact that Yemen was, and remains today, a spoke in a MIddle East regional policy wheel desIgned by the SOVIets to enhance theIr Influence and facilItate their global expansion." SpecIfically, a foothold in Yemen was Important to Moscow for the following reasons:

First, they could reduce BntIsh in-fluence in the regibn by continuing to nurture the "antl-Imperaflst" sentIment breWIng in the area, lJ

Second, a considerable amount of US trade and a large portIOn of oIl exports to the West were transported through the Suez Canal vIa the Red Sea. Contl'Ol of the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb by the USSR could have a severe impact on W"stern trade,24

ThIrd, Yemen's strategic location could provide the SovIets with an excel-lent staging area for future endeavors into East Africa,25

Fourth, the area was a potential source of oil and other natural resources.2"

16

FIfth, and finally, Yemen could be used by the Soviets as a base for po-litical propaganda, as well as support for other Arab radicals on the peninsula.2?

Having now reviewed Soviet interests in Yemen, it IS lIttle wonder that Moscow jumped at the opportunity to befriend the Imam. In addition to the military as-sistance deSCrIbed above, the Soviets also prOVIded in excess of $20 million in eco-nomIc aId to the YemenItes prior to the civil war ThIS aid included the develop-ment of a port complex at Hodeida and a jet airport at San 'a. It is no coincidence that these faCIlities were deSIgned to ac-commodate the Soviet aIr and sea fleets!" An ancillary benefit of this aid was that it prOVIded the Yemenites with much-needed lInes of commUnICatIOn, thereby contributIng to their economic growth.

It was not untIl 4 March 1946 that the United States recognized the complete and absolute Independence of Yemen. Two months later, a treaty of frIendshIp and commerce was SIgned, as well as an agreement to exchange diplomats. 2 " In 195 I, the j mam requested conSIderable US aId and assIstance. Washington, however, was unWilling to grant the re-quest presumably because officials feared that such aId would be used against the I3ritish in Aden.

For the next six years, US involve-ment in Yemen was confined to mostly philanthropic and cultural ventures. As US Investments in the Persian Gulf in general, and the Arabian Peninsula in partIcular, took on significance, US policymakers sought to protect thIS eco-nomic stake in the region. It did so by shunning its indifferent attitude toward the imamate In favor of a benevolent ap-proach, thereby attemptIng to buy in-

. fluence: ltl It was at this point that the true impact

March

of Washington's decision not to support the imam m his time of need became clear Now the Americans needed him, and he knew It. His ambivalence toward the Umted States caused him to allow nomi-nal US presence in Yemen primarily to serve as a hedge against total domina-tion by the Soviets. 1I

In January 1959, Yemen accepted Its first mstallment of US aid which con slsted of foodstuffs Subsequent trans-actIOns generally involved food and medical supplIes. The only substantive project undprtaken by the Umted States m Yemen was the constructIOn of a modern highway which connpcted Mocha with San'a. Total US outlays m eco nomic aid to Yemen during the period amounted to $16 mIllion.'i MIlitary as-slstancp for thp same penod amounted to a mere 51,000. jl

The Era of Civil War

FollOWIng the 1962 revolutIOn whIch overthrew the imam and established the Yemen Arab Republic, and through-out the subsequent civil war, the SOVIets contInued to providp unambiguous sup-port to the YemenItp leadershIp In fact, economiC aid alone had almost tnpled by 1965." The extent of milItary assistance durmg thIS perIod IS some-what more difficult to gauge smcr the Soviets employed Egyptian prOXIeS to carry out their program. Indications are that total Soviet expenditures in military aid durmg the period totaled $70 mIl lIon."

'The Soviets were in part ~essured to mtenslfy their economiC blitz in Yemen because of efforts by the People's Re-public of China and the United States to reduce Soviet influence. The Chmese and Americans mamly confined their efforts to road construction projects. But the

1981

TUG OF WAR OVER YEMEN

Soviets provided a health, education and welfare package whicli! resulted in the establishment of a cement factory, fish-enes, a hospital, several schools and a stadium, as well as roads. 36

Direct Soviet involvement in the war prior to 1967 was limited to the establish-ment of a military mission specifically deSigned to help train YemenIte troops:" However, the Soviets were forced to de-viate from this policy in 1967 when a series of complex developments threat-ened to undermIne their stake on the peninsula. First, Gamal A. Nasser's 88,OOO-man expeditionary force was with-drawn from Yemen precipitated by cir cumstances surroundmg the Middle East War. Then, a coup snipped the strmgs on Moscow's marionette in San'a, President Salal. These occurrences placed the suc-cess of the republicans m jeopardy.

Soviet policymakers were quick to em-brace the new leadership in San'a and pledged to fill the void left by the Egyptian withdrawal. Almost at once, Moscow dis-patched a shipment of emergency mIli-tary supplies, as well as technologically advanced aircraft. IndicatIOns are that Soviet pIlots actually flew some combat missions. JH It IS considered that thiS prompt Soviet reactIOn, combined With continued milItary assistance, ensured the surVivability of the republican regime in Sana.'9

In 1968, followmg the Withdrawal of the British from Aden and the birth of the independent People's Democratic Repub-lic of Yemen, the Soviets began to shIft their attention southward In an effort to gain another foothold in the area. By 1971, Moscow had scaled down its economic ald to North Yemen significantly m order to focus on the Marxist South Yemen. Mili-tary aid had been cut off in 1970.'" The reasons for this major policy shift will be addressed later.

17

MILITARY REVIEW

Washington's hesitation to recognize North Yemen further hindered any US efforts to expand its influence in Yemen41 despite the fact that it invested $36 mil-lion in economic assistance during the pe-riod 1962-67,42 The fledgling republican regime was involved in 'a bloody fight for ,its very survival and wanted bullets, not beans, to aid its cause-a commodity the United States was unwilhng to provide,4,' Instead, WashIngton sought to bring about peace through diplomacy and mediation, a strategy that proved to be ineffective,

In a surpnse move that caught US policymakers off guard in 1967, San'a severed diplomatic relations with Wash-ington because of American involvement in the Arab-Israeh war 44

Conciliation: The Path to Peace

By 1968, It was clear that General Has-son al-'Amri, President Salal's succes-sor, was seeking ways of ending the war, In a concIliatory move, he opened up com-munications WIth tnbal defectors and former royalists to ascertam the best way to aSSimilate the royalists into hiS regime 'Amri's expressed concern for restoring central control of his govern-ment rather than prolongmg the fight-ing Impressed the Saudis The conserva-tive trends exhibited by the San'a regime encouraged Kmg Falsal to open secret contacts In January 1969, result-ing in an informal peace settlement.

The Soviet UnIOn understood the im-plicatIOns of reconcilIatIOn between these two Arab nelghbo,"s and realigned its priorities, The Soviets discontinued mili-tary aid completely and provided Just enough economic assistance to maIntaIn a positive relationship with the Yemen-ites." Now, Moscow was free to trigger another economic bombardment on the

18

Arabian Peninsula. The target, South Yemen, was vulnerable to a penetration. Ports, airfields and other facilities leu by the British were more sophisticated n those of North Yemen and mol' than tempted the Kremlin. Similar ideo ogical beliefs and mutual needs led to a short courtship and early marriage bet een Moscow and Aden.

NORTH-SOUTH FIGHTING: EAST-WEST INVOLVEMENT

The stnfe-ridden Yemenites found the decade ofthe 1970s as tumultuous as any period of their turbid history. Once again, the socioeconomic development of these indigent people was relegated to second-ary importance by a political leadership preoccupied with war, crises and coups, and pestilence

In 1970, with the Soviets on sabbatical m South Yemen, the mutual needs of the SaudiS and Yemenites combined to allow these former enemIes to put their Inimical past behmd them and get on with the bUSI-ness at hand-namely, stability and development Tempered by the disastrous effects of a severe drought, the initial results of this major shift In Yemenite foreign policy must have be'en encourag-ing to 'Amri. Albeit signs of initial progress were evident, continued growth was contingent on sustenance provided from outSide sources. 4h

The Yememtes insatiable need for economic aid prompted San'a to initiate a resumption in relations with the United States In 1972. Despite political rhetoric to the contrary,47 Washington's support to Yemen between 1972 and mid-1976 was tepid at best. US pohcymakers seemed content to let the Saudis and other bene-factors bear the brunt of the costs since

March

US interests had already been placated. It appears that Washington provided

just enough aid during this period to keep taut the string of relationship with Saudi Arabia. The United States knew that an expression of less than full commitment in Yemen would jeopardize relations wIth the SaudIs. In thIs regard, the United States provIded $16.8 mIllion In eco nomic aid and a mere $200,000 In milItary aid'S as opposed to the Saudis who granted over $100 millIon annually in economic assistance alone. 4

MILITARY REVIEW

United States to prove its resolve by pro-viding a cadre to assIst in the training, maintenance and administration of em-ploying this arsenal. W{th the "Vietnam syndrome" alive and well. one can under-

" stand Salih's suspIcions. In May 1979, the Soviet Union's mili-

tary adVIsory team in North Yemen totaled more than 200 as compared to eight mIlitary men from the United States.'" Indications are that Salih con sidered the quantIties of his US-supplied weaponry Insufficient com-pared to that of the Soviet-supplIed South Yemen. Beyond that, he was dissatis-fied with the pace of delivery which was contingent upon Saudi ArabIa's paymg for the hardware.'"

Then came the shock. In mid-September

1 DepaHfTl8ntofSlareBullE'lm 14 Jul'l 1975 074 2 The north SOuth boundary waf, demarcated In 1904 nol b". lrp

Yernerllte people tul b". Bnj'5h and Tur1

41 Wenner Of] CIt P 202 aM McLane op CIt D 113 AUhough Salal announced the establ'shment of t'le Yemen Arab Republic on 27 September 1962 It wa50 not unlll 19 December 1962 thaI tM United Stales granted recogmtlon to tile republican regime SovIet recognllt 1971 and R,ct'a'd M fI,r'~on F-orelgn As-s Deal Red Faces lor US

J lIer'20 lor SaLJdls The OmSllan Suerlce MonllOf 29 November 1979 P 1 and Fred 5 Hoffman Reds Arm 'femenlS The Kansas Glly Slar 13 5pptemtJer 1979

60 W,lloam 5allre 50vlels M,.:I~lng Inroads In Yemen The Kansas Oty T'mes 4 December 1979

61 The M'lltury Balance 1919 19BO Tt's Ifl\ernatlonal ,>'lsillule for Slrateq'c Stud,es London E.ng

Major ,John B Lynch lS an a"''>l::.tQ'lf pro/!' ... sur of 111ll11ar\ .'1Cl('llcr nt Old Drunllll01l l'1I1

1981

l t'THt .... :\'or{nlh, \"lrgl1l1a Ife r(,( ell'cd a B S m ({)ml11('rCe and bUSllH'~

The aim of interoperability is to facilitate smooth and effective operation of multinational forces. This article looks at considerations affecting a US field artillery brigade's participation in such a force.

Field Artillery Interoperability

Major Rolland H. Berry Jr., US Army

ON EVERY major US exercise in Germany, US units practice inter-operability with allied forces. Among the most active are US field artillery Units, particularly in operations with the Bundeswehr. Interoperability is US policy.! In fact, equipment standardiza-tion is too. But, for many reasons, eco-nomic sovereignty being foremost, it is the opinion of this writer that standardization is a difficult at best dream-at least in the near to midterm. One need only look at the perceived relative differences in the US "active defense" and the German "posItion defense" to see that even the standardiza-tion of tactics is a near-term impossibility.

Interoperabihty, on the other hand, "the ability of systems, units or forces to provide services 'to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together,"2 is possible and indeed practiced by US forces in Europe. Some would contend that inter-operability has not been just a buzz word

in US Army, Europe, since about 1974 but, rather, a necessity." If it was not a buzz word, it certainly has been a state of mind that allowed doors to open for activities that might not have been conducted.

The purpose of this article is to examine one aspect of interoperabIlity-a US field artillery !FA) bngade augmenting Ger-man dIvisional field artillery. The per tinent questIOns are: What is the best use of the FA brigade In this situation? How is the German division commander lIkely to employ it? What are the interoperability

INTEROPERABILITY

considerations of such an arrangement? Some basic assumptions have been

made which admittedly reflect the bias of the writer:

Interoperability is absolutely neces-sary to modern coalition warfare.

Standardization is a questionable objective in the near to intermediate time frame.

German nondivisional FA will not be available to augment US divisional FA during the defense of NATO territory.

NATO would be the defender against an armored Soviet attack in Europe {at least the lead maneuver echelons will be armoredJ. j

Many artIcles and discussions support the first assumption: InteroperabilIty is a necessIty in NATO.4 Just how far down in the command structure interoperabllIty can or should be conducted is subject to some debate. It appears that brigade or higher level interoperability is the most desirable." However, in FA terms. this may be an FA brigade/group or a US FA battalIon supporting German elements. Second, the Impossibility of achieving standardizatIon is best explaIned in an Army magazine article titled, "Standardl zation: In Search of the Holy Grail." If the title does not tell all, the concluding state ment of the article does: "The standardiza-tion effort will test the skill of NATO's leaders to the utmost."6

With regard to the third assumption, German corps artillery, ifit exists at all in a particular corps, has no more than three battalIons-probably of light artillery.' US-deployed corps artillery consists of 10 to 15 battalions of heavy and missile artillery, and It can reasonably be ex-pected that reinforcements from the United States will contain FA brigades and battalions. Simple arithmetic indi-cates the validIty of this assumption that, if any artillery reinforcement IS provided,

MILITARY REVIEW

INTER OPERABILITY - The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to

J. operate effectively together. -Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1

it will be US FA supportmg German. Concerning the fourth assumption, the

lead echelons of a Soviet attack in Europe will probably be an armored force, against which conventional FA is not very effec-tive. However, a significant portion of FA supporting that attack and command vehicles controlling that attack are not armored.8 That is a vulnerabilIty.

Current US Field Artillery Thinking

US FA doctrine is currently being con figured by forward thinkers in the FA community to take advantage of thIS vulnerability. The US FA target acquisi. tIOn capability (currently a target acquisi-tion battery) has been moved from non-dIvisional artIllery to the direct control of the division artillery.

Current US FA phIlosophy is that the proper role of an FA brigade is attachment rather than the tradItional mIssion of reinforcing or general support reinforcing to the division artillery. Such actIOns can easily be interpreted as additional and more responsive FA support for maneuver force generated targets.

However, thIS mterpretation must be tempered by a careful readmg of a recent incisive analysis of "Field Artillery Employment in the Active Defense" (Mlhtary RevIew, February 1980). Of the several excellent points made in the article, one is of greatest interest here. The author argues that FA priorities in the

24

acti ve defense should be normally weighted toward, first, Soviet artillery and, second, target acquisition equipment and, third, command and control facilities.

The definitive US doctrine, Field Manual !FM) 6-20, FIre Support in Com-bzned Arms Operations, dl!fines the target acquisitIon battery as the main component of FA target acquisition. FM 71-100, Armored and Mechamzed DWlsion Opera-tzons, says that diviSIOnal field artillery can acquire targets from several sources, including the target acquisition battery, fire support teams and aerial observers.

The US diviSIOn operations manual does not hst any combat electronic warfare intelligence sourc~s as a target acquisition capabIlity for divisional FA. FM 6-20 further says that the target acquisition battery produces counterfire targets almost exclusively. Certainly, the fire support team and aerIal observers will not locate enemy command posts or enemy target acquisition equipment except by pure luck.

Aside from the observation that doctri-nally it would appear that US intelligence and US FA operations within US divisions should do a better job of "inter operability ," the purpose of the foregoing discussion is an attempt to portray the orientation of the US field artilleryman as he prepares to support German elements. It should be quite clear that the US FA is oriented to attacking counterfire targets rather than command and co~trol targets.

The following discussion explains why the US FA brigade is the primary tool the

division artillery has for the counterfire task. The reason is that there are four FA battalions in an armored or mechanized division artillery, three m direct support and, whether artillerymen like it or not, controlled by maneuver brigade com-manders. The fourth battalion is virtually "given" to the direct support battalion located in the area of the expected pene-tration. The division artillery commander IS left with:

A tactical operations center (TOe) which FM 6-20 says:

... has been reorganized and augmented {or counter{ire management ... This pro vldes the commander and FSCOORD [{Ire support coordinator! the Single source management o{the dIVISIOn cou nter-

INTER OPERABILITY

{ire program . ... The TOe IS responsible {or collecting data, targeting, and appzyzng the best fire support means to de{eat the threat.

A target acquisition battery which produces exclusively counterfire targets.

Three and four heavy cannon battal ions (the Lance battalions having been retamed under corps controll.

An FA brigade headquarters. The likely use of US FA brigade assets

by US division artillery, then, is for counterfire. The need for the FA brigade assets must be obvious to US commanders since there is currently no move afoot to diminish the numbers of nondivisional artillery battalions. In fact, the need is obvious to German force structure

Members of the German III Corps and US V Corps on a recent field exercise in the Federal Republic of Germany. The soldiers are preparing communications for installment of a fire direction center.

MILITARY REVIEW

planners who are in the process of pro-curing additional corps artillery.

Interoperability Considerations

Numerous documents, not the least of which is FM 100-5, OperatIOns, purport to describe the factors affecting interoper-ability of US forces working with German or other allied forces. An article con cerning the work in 1976 of a trinational division sums it up rather succinctly as language-trained liaison teams; communi cations compatibility; and standardization of arms, logistic support and doctrine 10 A more realistic approach is taken by FM 100-5 which lists 13 factors that, with some reduction in clarity, can be reduced to language, liaison, clear command relationships and knowledge of allied doctrine.

Language. Language study is a problem that is being addressed by US Army, Europe," but, in the writer's opmion, IS not gomg to be solved from the US side in the near term. Language is a very important interoperability consideration, just as standardization is very important, but It I~ not going to be solved in the fore-seeable future

LWlson. Given the language problem, liaison IS the recognized solution. It is

. clearly recognized that knowledgeable US liaIson officers must head competent and fairly large, well-equipped liaison teams. FM 100-5 says:

Team members should be bilzngual, and must be knowledgeablJe of organIzatIOn, procedures, and equIpment of both US forces and other NA TO countrzes with which they will be operating. (Emphasis added.)

Although FM 100-5 does not say it, the most important aspect of that statement is

26

that a US liaison team must be knowl-i' edge able concerning US organization,

procedures and equipment. The Germans already know what their capabilities are -the US liaison officer must know what his forces' capabilities are. In general, if the US liaison officer is not considered capable of being the operations officer of the US force from which he comes, it is not likely that he will be able to interpret the thinking ofthe US operations officer to a German operations officer, no matter what the language capability. Equipment requirements of the liaison team are also important, but they have been discussed extensively in other publications and so will not be explored further here.

Clear command relationships. Clear command relationships are also very important-quite simple in theory but exceedingly political and difficult in practice. Simply stated, lines of national authority and NATO authority must be clear. The NATO authority must be supported by national authOrity in all but the most blatant cases. Detaileddiscussion ofthis interoperability factor is beyond the scope of this article.

Knowledge of allIed doctrzne. The knowl-edge of allied doctrine gets at the main point of this article. What is the German division artillery commander likely to do with a US FA brigade? It appears that he has two options. The first is to employ the battalions separately, very likely assign-ing the tactical mission of Feuerlfeteilzg-ung (fire participation\. ,

This mission is translated most of the time as general support reinforcing, and it has a very familiar ring for US field artillerymen. The mission is really more analogous to the US reinforcing mission, but the Germans have a tactical mission they call Peuerverstizrkung-literally, reinforcement of fires (reinforcing) which is for yet another purpose.

A lot of work has been done on this fa~et of interoperability. A clear, con-cise discussion of tactical FA mISSIOns is in the VII Corps Multinational Inter-operabIlity Handbook and "Interoper-ability-Key to Success in Allied Opera-tions" (Field ArtIllery Journal, July-August 1977)' The conclusions of the FIeld Artillery Journal article are basical-ly that aggressive, intelligent lIaison could have solved just about all problems of interoperability during the tactIcal exercise described. The problem of am-mUnition was not addressed.

However, an after-action report of a similar exercise (Joint GYM-X. 9-10 August 1977) as well as a NATO tactical doctnne study {conducted by the 1st Infantry DiVIsion I Forward 1 and Panzer Brigade 30 In 1974 and 19751 Identified ammunitIOn selectIOn, supply and ac-

INTEROPERABILITY

countability as the critical FA inter-operability problems. Of the problems associated with this option of the com-mander, ammunition logistics is a major one. Although these are the problems most frequently studied, the German di-vision artillery commander appears to have a second option: giving the US FA brigade the counterfire mission.

German Use 01 a US Field Artillery Brigade

The German usc of a US FA brig e in the counterfire role appears to e the most synergistIc use of avaIlable field artillery assets. Even so, what will the German diVision artIllery commander do

A Bundeswehr inspector general exits a jointly operated fire direction center of the 3d Armored Division, V Corps, and the German III Corps in a recent field exercise in Hohenfels, West Germany

MILITARY REVIEW

with this additional field artillery asset? From the point of view of the US field

artilleryman, the use of the FA brigade in the counterfire role fills a vacuum in the German force structure. If executed prop-erly, it avoids many traditional FA inter-operability problems such as differences in tactical missions, fire missIOn formats and ammunition logistics. Also, it gains all the advantages of unity of command and mission-type orders .being given to a brigade-size headquarters of one nation-ality from the division artillery com mander of another nationahty.

German defensive tactics can be characterized as maneuver-oriented!2 as opposed to the US firepower-oriented approach or; further, as a position de-fense!3 as opp.osed to the US active de-fense. In any case, German defensive doctrine is to hold teI;rain and positIOns and "use maneuver to create conditions for surprise and shock .... "11 The use of the US FA brigade in the counterfire role complements the maneuver-oriented ap proach. Soviet artillery can be expected to bombard any defensive positions. There-fore, the German maneuver commander must either shift maneuver forces or \lse the additional firepower assets of an FA brigade to reduce the Soviet capability to direct fire at will on forward defensive positions.

Such use complements German tactics but does not impose the US firepower-oriented approach On the German division commander There is great emphasis in German defensive doctrine on creating conditions that call for the employment of the reserve in the counterattack.!5 It may well be that the appropriate use of the fire-power available from the assets of an FA brigade during a counterattack would be to seal a penetration or to provide counter-battery fires. In either case, centrally con-trolled US F A battalions would be of

28

more use to the German division com-mander than ones parceled out to rein-force brigade-artillery (US direct sup-port FA) battalions. The correct tactics may well pr.ove again to be the opinion of the "senior officer present."

Counlerfire Role Inleroperabilily

How can the US FA brigade propedy execute the counterfire role for the Ger-man division? By considering the four fac-tors of interop~rability-language, liai-son, clear command relationships and knowledge of allied doctrine-we find the following. The language skill requirement is mimmized by the proposed arrange-ment except at the brigade TOC where language 'capability becomes quite im-portant. The US FA bngade has two liai-son teams already constituted that are in-tended for full-time use ilt the US division artillery, thereby ehminating the require-ment to form ad hoc liaison teams for in-teroperability.

The requirement for knowledge of al-lied doctrine is reduced sigmficantly. The fires of US battalions are controlled by a US FA brIgade headquarters, thereby eliminating any liaison or language or command relationship problems. Instead of four or five battalion headquarters hav-Ing interoperability requirements, the reo quirements exist only at the FA brigade TOC. The interoperability capabilities can be pooled at brigade. Clear command relationships are enhanced for the same reasons.

The critical juncture of this whole ar-rangement is the interface of the German target acquisition battalion and the US FA brigade TOC. Since a US FA brigade does not contain a target acquisition sec-

tion, target data must come from the

March

German divIsIOn artillery target acqUIsi-tion battalion. There are several ways to do this. The easiest and most efficient is to collocate the headquarters of the target acquisItion battalion of the German divi-sion artIllery with the US FA brigade headquarters as shown schematically m the figure.

The normal tactical employment of the German target acquisition battalion head-quarters is apart from the diVIsion artil lery TOC. With the proposed arrange-ment, it stays apart from the dIvision ar-tIllery ,!,OC-only now a US FA brigade TOe is collocated with the target acquisi-

INTEROPERABILITY

tion battalion headquarters. Targeting in-formatIOn of a counterfire nature is passed dIrectly from the target acquisition battalion headquarters to the US FA bri-gade TOC which generates counterfire mISSIOns.

The German division artillery com-mander commands rind controls his target acquiSItion battalion and takes the target mformatIOn he or his headquarters desires through normal German communications channels. The FA brigade locates its or-ganic liaIson teams with the German divi-sion artillery to facilItate close coopera-tion.

Tactical Schematic

x x

1981

Counterfire Radar

x

German Control all German battalions

Sound

Batteries

Flash

x

x x

US Brigade Control all US battalions

Collocate

29

MILITARY REVIEW

Conclusion

The major problem created by the pro-posed solution to the FA interoperability problem is that the normal German method for using more than one artillery headquarters of brigade-size in the dIvi-sion area is to assign one headquarters to control fire support in half of the division sector and the other to the other half of the sector. Such an arrangement probably would not work. or at least would create more problems than it would solve. if one headquarters were German and the other US. Howev,"r, so many interoperabIlity

1 Army Regulation 34 2 Ratlonal.18l1on Standardlzat,on ana Inreroperabihty Department 01 the Arm~ w2[,hlngton DC 15 May 1979 021

2 JOint Cposis of Staff Publicahon 1 Department Of Defense D1ctronal} of Military ana ASSOCIated Terms Oepartl"'1enl :I' Defense WashIJ'gton DC 3 Seplembe' 1974 p 180

3 L leutenanl Colonel WIII'am B Howerton and lV'alor Phlll D W Childress lnleroperabillty- Ke\t to Suer-ess I" Allipd Operallof''> Field Artillery Journal JUly August 1977 PO 6668

4 For el(amp1e see Ibid or l,eu'enant A.ust,n Bay The T ".,ahonal ~Irsl Fo ........ ard Arm~ February 1977 DO 14.17

5 NATO Tacllcal Doctrine Study ot l::;t Intantry D,VISion (Forwaro) and Panzer Brigade 30 119751 rep'oduced on Reterence BOOk I RBI' 00 3 (nferooerat)/f/fy of BritiSh German anCl US {'orees uS AIm\, CQ'1l'TId01d and Gereral Stall Co(leg8 Fort Leavenworth Kan JUly 1979

6 Caplal" Richard M Saunders Standardization In Search Of Ina Holy Grall Army Februa!) 1979 pp 14 20

7 RS 1003 100{erOperablhty 01 British German ana US FOrces 00 Cit p212

NOTES

problems are eliminated by the arrange-ment proposed in this article that those created appear to be minimal. . The proper way for a German di vision to

employ a US FA brigade is in the counter-fire role or at least in a centrally controlled mode to support the counterattack. It appears quite likely to this observer that a German division commander would do just that.

This article has not addressed nuclear warfare. and that is certainly one of its limitations. The implications of tactical nuclear coalition warfare should be ex-amined to determine the effect on the proposed counterfire role oCa US FA bri-gade augmenting a German division_

8 C N Donnell>y T achcal PrOblems F aCing the Soviet Army Recent Debales In the Soviet Mlllla!) Press Part I Mthtary Rev'ew June 1979 pp , 8 26 condenSed from Interna/lOnal Defense ReView VOlume 11 Number9 1976

9 RB 1003 lnteroperabM'I of BntlSh German ana uS Forces op or p29

10 Bay.op Cit 11 General George S 81ancnard Language Interoperabi'l!y- A Key

lor Increased E ftecllVeness If! NATO Military Rev'eVr OctOber 1978 pp 5663

12 Lieutenant Colonet Steven l Canby NATO Strategy Pohtlcal Military PrOblemS of Divergent Interests and Operallonal Con. cept M,/lJary Re.llew April 1979 p 57

13 MulJma!lonal Iflteroperab!J!ry HandbOOk Department of the Arm)' US VII Corps Motlrlngen GE 15 June 1976

14 Canby. 00 elc 15 AS 1003 Interop8rabl)l/y 01 Brlfl['h German ana uS Forces OP

CIt pp 3 23 and 3 24

Major Rolland II Berry dr Ui U Ilh the Flcld

30

Arfdlery Sectwn. US V Corps, Frankfurt, Ger-mall} He receIved a B S from Vlr,lfulW Poly-techmc Instllute, an M A from EU'itcrn Kentudz} llnlt'erslt)' and l~ a 1980 graduate of the L\sACGSC He has commanded ballerlc,.;;, 111 Germany, the Continental Umted States anu the 4th lnfantr .... Dlvlswn, Vletnam He has bert'cd as senIOr ~lde.de-camp /0 the commanuwg Menerai, US Army Arr Defense Center. Fort Bhss. Te.xas, and as asslstant to the commandtng general, US VII Corps Artrllery, In Germany .

The combined capabilities of acquisition, targeting and weapons systems available to the commander today are astounding. The author contends that these systems, sup-plemented by new ones being fielded, allow the COnif'\ mander to "see" far beyond the front line of troops onto an "extended" battlefield, a battlefield upon which the full potential of our weapons must be exploited if victory is to be attained. While the idea of the extended battlefield is not new, the author argues that the extended attack must be an integral part of every Army combat unit's capability.

Extending the Battlef eld General Donn A. Starry, US Army

MILITARY REVIEW

THE extended battlefield concept primarily deals with war in areas of the world where there ar' large num-bers of relatively modern. well-equipped forces who use Sovret-style operational concepts and tactics. Quite naturally. therefore. the threat against which the concept is designed is typified by the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe. the larger aggregations of mechanized forces in the Middle East or the threat from the north 'in Korea.

The concept emphasizes the a II too frequently ignored or misunderstood lesson of history that. once political authorities commit military forces In pursUit of pohtlcal aims. military forces must win something. or else there will be no basis from which political authorities

. can bargain to win politically. Therefore. the purpose of military operations cannot be simply to a vert defeat, but, rather. it must be to Win.

This article does not .propose new and radical ways to fight the battle to win. Rather. it describes an extension of the battle and the battlefield which is pos-sible to accomplish now and which, If ap-plied. will reinforce the prospects for winning.

The extended battlefield is not a new concept. It IS a more descriptive term for indicating the full potential we must realize from our acqUisition. targeting and weapons systems .. The battlefield ayd the battle are extended in three ways: First. the battlefield is extended in depth. with engagement of enemy Units not yet in contact to disrupt the enemy timetable. compJicate command and control and frustrate his plans. thus weakening his grasp on the initiative.

Second. the battle is extended forward in time to the point that current actions such as attack of follow-on echelons. logistical preparation and maneuver

32

plans are interrelated to maximize the likelihood of winning the close-in battle as times goes on.

And. lastly; the range of assets figuring in the battle is extended toward more emphasis on higher level Army and sister service acquisition means and attack resources.

What emerges is a perception of the battlefield in which the goal of collapsing the enemy's ability to fight drives us to unified employment of a wide range of systems and organizations on a battlefield which. for corps and divisions, is much deeper than that foreseen by current doc-trine. The word "doctrine" is used advisedly. It must be acknowledged atthe outset that there is probably little set forth In this article which is not already being done and done well in some opera-tional units. The purpose of this article is less to suggest innovation than it is to pull together many good ideas for making extended attack an integral fea-ture of our combat capability-in all Units.

In essence, Our message can be dis-tilled In four primary notions:

First. deep attack is not a luxury; it is an absolute necessity to winning.

Second. deep attack. particularly In an environment of scarce acqUisition and strike assets. must be tightly coordinated over time with the decisive close-in battle. Without thiS coordinatIOn. many expensi ve and scarce resources may be wasted on apparently attractive targets whose destruction actually has little payoff In the close-in battle. The other side of this coin is that maneuver and logistical planning and execution must anticipate by many hours the vul-nerabilities that deep attack helps create. It is all one battle.

Third. it is important to consider now the number of systems entering the force in the near and middle-term future

March

(see Figure 1). These are not~' t weapons of greater lethality and great I' range, but automated systems and co munication systems for more responsiv command control, as well as sensor s stems to find, identIfy and target the e emy and to assess the effectiveness of d ep attack.

Finally, the concept IS designed to be the umfymg Idea which pulls all these emerging capabilities together so that, together, they can allow us to realize theIr full combmE'd potential for winning

The extended battlefield is not a futur-Istic dream to remain on the shelf until all new systems are fielded. WIth minor adJ'ustments, corps and divIsions can and must begm to learn and practIce fight-ing the extended battle now-during 1981. The payoffs in read mess for combat will be enormous, and Implementing the concE'pt today means that we are buIlding the receptacle mto which every new system can be plugged Immediately,

EXTENDING THE BATILEFIELD

minimizing the buildup time to full capability.

To ensure that the extended battlefield concept is understood m the full context of the integrated conventional-nuclear-chemical battlefield, this article will first review, in a broad sense, major aspects of the concept. Then, it will describe how, by attacking assaulting and j follow-on echelons simultaneously, the prospects for winning increase dra-matically

The Concept

In peacetIme, the purpose of mili-tary forces, especially in the context of operatIOns m areas critIcal to US in-

'\ terests, is to reduce to a minimum what-ever incentives the enemy's leadership mIght perceIve as favorable to seek-

A Substantial Step Toward Future Capabilities

e') (Command, control. commUnications and intelligence)

esws (Corps support weapon system) GlCM (Ground-launched crUise missile) MlRS (Multiple launch rocket system) FASeAM (Family of scalterable mines)

Figure 1

1981

..-;::::===771986

SOTAS (Stand-off target acquISition system) TAeFIRE (Tactical fife directIOn)

33

MILITARY REVIEW

ing military solutions 'to political problems. In NATO, in the Middle East and in Korea, our defensive strategy must extend beyond simply denying vic-tory to the other side. It must, instead, postulate a definable, recognizable (al-though perhaps limited) victory for the defender. Enemy leaders must be made to understand clearly that, if they choose to move militarily, no 10l).ger will there be a status quo ante-bellum-something to be restored. Rather, the situation they themselves have created is one which will be resolved on new terms,

As the strategic nuclear balance teeters, so grows the enemy's percep-tion of his own freedom of action at theater levels-conventional and nuclear. Theater forces should not be considered solely as a bridge to strategic nuclear war. They are weapons which must be considered in the context of a war-fighting capability.

These considerations dictate that NATO strategy must, from the outset, be designed to cope with the Soviet con-ventional-nuclear-chemical-combined arms-integrated battlefield threat. The growing threat of nuclear capabili-ties elsewhere suggests this strategy to be appropriate in other critical areas as well.

The Warsaw Pact/Soviet-style strat-egy embraces two fundamental con-

cepts~ In the first,. mass, momentum and

continuous combat are the operative tactics Breakthrough (somewhere) is sought as, the initiator of collapse in the defender's system of defense.

In the alternative, surprise is sub stituted for mass in the daring thrust tactic. In NATO, this could involve a n\lmber of BMP regiments in independent attacks which, without warning, w01lld seek to deny to defendJ.ng forces the op-

34

portunity to get set forward. Both tactics are essentially maneuver-based schemes whose purpose is to disrupt the opera-tional tactics of the defender, albeit by different methods.

The ileed for deep attack emerges from the nature of our potential enemies-their doctrine and their numerically superior forces. Whether our enemy is stylistically echeloned as shown in Fig-ure 2 is not really critical. What is im-portant is that superiority in numbers permits him to keep a significant portion of his force out of the fight with freedom to commit it either to overwhelm or to bypass the friendly force. The existence of these follow-on echelons gives the enemy a strong grip on the initiativl' which we must wrest from him and then retain in order to win.

NATO strategy (and defensive strat-egies in other key areas of the world as weI!) must be designed to' preserve the territory, resources and facilities of the defended area for' the defender. In none of the critical areas of the world, those to which US forces are likely to be commit-ted, is there sufficient maneuver room to accGmmodate a traditional defense-in-depth strategy. The defense must, therefore, begin well forward and proceed aggressively from there to destroy enemy assault echelons and at the same time to slow, disrupt. break up, disperse or destroy follow-on echelons in order to quickly seize the initiative and go on the offense.

The operative tactics by which US forces seek to implement the operational con-cept set forth above must provide for qUick resolution of the battle. under cir-cumstances that will allow political authorities to negotiate with their ad-versaries from a position of strength. This is so because the enemy generally enjoys a short-term advantage in ability

March

The Second-Echelon

Threat

EXTENDING THE BATTLEFIELD

Figure 2

to mobilize addItional forces qUIckly. Clearly, then, one purpose of the battle concept must be to pre-empt the pos-sibility of prolonged military operatIOns. Further, these operatIve tactics should seek simultaneously to:

Deny enemy access to the objectives he seeks

Prevent enemy forces from loading up the assault force fight with reinforc-ing assault echelons and thus achIeving by continuous combat what might be denIed them by a stiff forward defense.

Find the opportunity to seize the initiative-to attack to dostroy the in.tegrity of the enemy operational scneme, forcing him to break off the attack or risk resounding defeat.

Because of the enemy's advantage in numbers, attack of follow-on echelons must always begin when those echelons are relatively deep in enemy territory. If an outnumbered defender waits until

1981

hIS numerIcally superior foe has pene-trated the defender's territory to mount a counterattack, it is always too late to brIng effectIve forces and fires to bear to defeat the incursion. This would espe-cially be the case if theater nuclear weapons are consIdered necessary to defeat the penetration.

Therefore, on an integrated battle-field, systems designed to defeat enemy assault elements, to disrupt follow-on forces and to seize the initiative by attack must be able to deliver conventional and/or nuclear fires throughout the spec-trum of the battle-throughout the dopth of the battlefield.

Key to a credible war-fighting capa-bility on an integrated battlefield are:

Sensor/surveillance systems to pre-vent surprise attack in peacetime and provide necessary targeting/surveillance information in wartime.

Delivery systems-dual capable,

35

MILITARY REVIEW

with suffIcient range, accuracy and lethalIty to hoHenemy follow-on echelons at risk in peacetime and to attack them successfully in wartime.

Command control sufficient to mte-grate all-source intellig~ce in near real time in peacetime and in wartime and to provide that intellIgence and target-ing informatIOn to maneuver force em-ployments in near real time as well.

The operative tactics which support such an operational concept of an inte-grated defense well forward are:

See deep and begin early to disrupt. delay, destroy follow-on/reinforcmg echelolls.

Move fast against the assault echelons.

StrIke assault echelons quichly so as to prevent them from achieving their objectives.

Fmish the opening fight against

assault ana follow-on echelons rapidly so as to go on the attack and finish the battle against the assault armies before follow-on armies can join the battle.

Areas of Interest and Influence

In the executiolO of such a set of opera-tive tactics, there must be a division of responsIbilities among commanders. Just as the means with which com-manders see and fight the battlefield vary so should their primary areas of in-terest vary.

As shown in Figure 3, each level of command has a dual responsibihtv. Each must attack one of the enemy's echelons and must see, or determine the intentions' of, a follow-on echelon Doctrinally, we say that the enemy's first-echelon divi-

See and Attack in Depth / _____ 2d I;'l~~IOfl '''' ml"ll\ _?d !'f~P'(tr illt'~IOf" __ }d ec'1elol"l atfr'e~

:0 -!'l t'lL''; ,0-48 'lou., 12 hOu'~ B'Eddt'

12 ~1111~

Figure 3

36 March

sions, the regiments in front of the assault divisions, as well as the follow-on regi-ments, are the responsibility of the defending division.

In an attack, those same echelons would also be the division commander's re-sponsibilIty. The brigade commander fights first-echelon assault regiments. The .division commander fights the first-echelon assault divisions. The corps commander fights first-echelon armies. It is the corps commander's reo sponsibility to find and disrupt the ad-vance of second-echelon divisIOns of first-echelon armies before they be come a part of the firstechelon problem.

At the same time, the corps commander IS very Interested In whe:'e the second-echelon army of the (ront IS deploYIng. At corps level, he must tie mto natIOnal target acquisition systems and other sur-veillance means to get Information con-cerning where that army IS and what It is doing HIS primary responsibility In battle fighting has to do with the follow-on echelons.

Attacking the Follow-on Echelons

For such a division in areas of interest and influence to be effective in war-time, it must be frequently practiced duro mg peacetime. It IS crItical for us to real ize that, as the enemy achieves the echelonment so necessary for his suc-cess, he inherently creates vulnerabd itlE:s-targets. These same vulnerabilItIes provide us with the opportunity to put threat second-echelon forces at great risk. But only through repetitive exercise can we capitalize on his vulnerabilities.

What we must do is practice acquiring and targeting Warsaw Pact UnIts now-during peacetime-so we will be pre-

1981

EXTENDING THE BATTLEFIELD

pared to attack them if need be. In ad-dition, we can do careful intelligence preparation of the battlefield and thus be prepared to attack high-value targets. Such targets incl ude fixed bridges and mobIle sites that will cause threat foJlow-on echelons to bunch up and present them-selves as attractive targets. Additionally, attacking other high-value ta