6.1

[Workingdraft.Pleasedonotcirculateorcitewithoutauthor’spermission]Melos’Prospects.WarandinterstaterelationsChapter6ofTheGreeksandtheRational(provisionaltitle)Draftof2019.10.2617,900words.ABSTRACT. This chapter concerns relations between states, exploring both zero-sum conflicts and non-zero-sum bargains. Plato’s Republic addresses war and inter-state bargaining in the idealized state of Callipolis. War brings issues of chance, risk, and probability assessment to the fore. Plato’s discussion of the military training of the young Guardians establishes that the senior Guardians are capable of assessments of risk, based on their expert measurement of the probability that a given battle will be won or lost. Thucydides’ history is an extended treatment of interstate conflict, bargaining, and decision-making under uncertainty. He offers the Athenian empire as a case study in rational cooperation among unequal states, predicated on calculated costs and benefits. Athens’ imperial policy rested on the rationality of fear and self-interest. Because the empire, modeled as a “stationary bandit,” could credibly commit to low taxes in exchange for high levels of cooperation, rational subjects had no reason to defect from the coalition. But defect they did. Thucydides’ Mytilene narrative (book 3) explores the motives of the defectors and the implications for Athenian imperial policy. The limits of rationality are foregrounded in Thucydides’ Melos narrative (book 5), centered on the failed bargain chronicled in the Melian Dialogue and ending in the destruction of Melos. That outcome was inefficient (as well as unjust and tragic) in that it benefited neither party. It was the result, Thucydides suggests, of failures of practical reasoning. The Melians failed to recognize that the Athenians were credibly committed to destroying Melos should the Melians refuse to join the coalition. The Athenians failed to see that the Melians had predicated their choice on the psychologically intolerable prospect of great loss, rather than on calculations of expected advantage, based on a realistic assessment of probabilities. WarandinterstaterelationsintheshadowofwarwereconstantsintheworldoftheclassicalGreekpoleis.WarsbetweenGreekstatesrangedfromrelativelyminorterritorialdisputestoexistentialstruggleswiththepotentialofhighcasualtiesorevenstatedeathforthelosingside.Whileclassical-erawarsbetweenGreekstatestendedtobefoughtaccordingtocertainsharedcultural

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norms,therewerenobindingrulesconstrainingthebehaviorofcombatantsorvictors.Normscouldbeignored,reinterpreted,orwantonlyviolated.Warwasaprimarysourceofuncertaintyandriskforindividualsandstatesalike.Thebackgroundcontextofinter-staterelationsintheGreekworldmayfairlybedescribedasanarchic,insofarastherewasnointernationalorganizationcapableofsettinglimitsonconflict.1

Yettheworldofthepoleiswasfarfrom“awartothedeathofallagainstall.”Thegrimzero-sumgameofwarofexterminationwasplayedinthecontextofnon-zero-sumbargaininggames.Thesetooktheformof,forexample,alliances,treaties,andconventionsbetweenstates–bilateralormultilateral,onequalorunequalterms,withvaryinglevelsofmutualresponsibilityandcommitment,withorwithoutfixedterms.Interstateagreements,andinstitutionalizedrolesforindividuals(e.g.proxenoi,theorodokoi)andgroupsthatfacilitatedthoseagreements,wereubiquitous.2

Collaborativerelationsbetweenstatesrangedfromthefreeagreementsamongrelativeequals(initsstrongestformfederalism,forexampletheAchaeankoinon),tohegemonyinwhichastrongstateledacoalitionoflesserstates(Sparta’sPeloponnesiansummachia),tofrankdominationofsubjecttributarystatesbyanimperialpower(Athens’archê).3Meanwhilerelationsbetweenstateswerecomplicatedbytheendemicpossibilityofintra-stateconflict(stasis).Stasistypicallyconcernedthequestion“whowillrulethepolis?”–andachangeinonestate’srulingbodycouldhaveprofoundknock-oneffectsoninter-statealliances.Likeinter-statewars,staseisrangedinintensityfrombriefviolentinterludeswithfewcasualtiestoexistentialcrisis.4 Theconditionsofwarandinter-staterelationsbringissuesofinstrumentalrationalityintoespeciallysharpfocus.Motivationsofself-interestanddivergentpreferencesoveroutcomessoughtbyindividuals,groups,andstatesstandoutclearlyagainstthebackgroundofhotandcoldwar–violentconflictandthethreatofconflict.ThehighstakesofGreekwarandthecomplexityoffactorscontributingtoconflictsinandbeyondthecity-stateworldmeantthathighlysalientchoiceshadtobemadeunderconditionsofuncertainty.Thelevelofuncertaintymightbelessenedbyreferencetorelevantinformationandtoreasonableinferencesfromobservablesigns.Ifuncertaintycouldneverbeeliminated,itcould,intheviewofsomeGreektheoristsandstatesmen,bemanaged,asmeasurablerisk.

Factorsofchance,uncertainty,andriskwereespeciallypressingintimesofwar.Andthatinturnmeantthataccurateassessmentoftheprobabilityofvariousoutcomesbecameanimperativeforstatesurvival.Yetinformationrelevanttochoicesaboutfightingoralliancewasoftenincompleteandasymmetric.Thismeantthateventhemostexpertriskassessmentsbythemostrationaldecision-makersmightendinchoicesthatwerecatastrophicforeitherside.5Rationalchoicesbased

6.3

onpreferences,beliefs,andexpectationsmightbeconfoundedbydecision-makingbasedonprospects–onhopefulreasoningthat,fromthepointofviewofexpectedadvantagemaximizers,over-weightedthevalueofcurrentresourceendowmentsrelativetofuturegainsandlosses.6AllofthisisreflectedintheextensivetraditionofGreekwritingoninterstaterelations.WarandthethreatofwarfeaturesprominentlyinmanygenresofGreekliterature.HerewefocusprimarilyonthehistoriographyofThucydides.But,asinotherchaptersofthisbook,theissuescanbeclarifiedbypreliminaryreferencetoPlato’spoliticalphilosophy.6.1.WarandriskinPlato’sRepublic

Inchapter3wesurveyedthetransitioninPlato’sRepublicbook2fromthehealthyFirstPolistothe“luxurious,feverishpolis”thatwilleventuallybecomeCallipolis.ThetransitionwasrequiredbecauseofGlaucon’semphaticpreferenceforalifethatincludedvariousluxuries.Socrateshadtoaccommodatethatpreference,soIargued,becausehehadpreviouslyagreedthatGlaucon’sneo-Thrasymachean“Gygeswiththering”accountofhumanmotivationandinstrumentalrationalitywouldbethechallengehemustanswerindemonstratingtheintrinsicvalueofjustice.

AccommodatingGlaucon’stasteforluxuryandthepsychologyitassumeshastheimmediateeffectofsharplyincreasingthetotalpopulationoftheimaginedpolis.Thisisbecausemanyoccupationalspecializations,unnecessaryintheFirstPolis,willbeneededtomeettheanticipateddemandforluxurygoodsandservices.Theincreaseinpopulationrequires,inturn,anexpandedstateterritory,onelargeenoughtobecapableofsupportingthemall.Socratesassumesthattheimaginedpolisthatistobeconstructedthroughreasonedargumentwillbelocatedinaregionthatisalreadydividedintocity-states,eachjealouslyguardingitsborders:“Wewillhavetoseizesomeofourneighbor’slandifwearetohaveenoughpastureandfarmland.”Glauconquicklyacceptsthisnecessityasinevitable(373d).Thelogicalnextstep,saysSocrates,must,therefore,bewar(373e).

Socratespausesatthispointtogeneralizetheargument,notingthatheandhisinterlocutorshadnowuncoveredtheoriginsofwarin“thesamedesiresthataremostofallresponsibleforthebadthingsthathappentopoleisandtheindividualsinthem”(373e).Thosedesiresare,aswehaveseen,arefor“moreandmore”–forluxuriesinexcessofwhatisnecessaryforlifeinasimple,healthycommunity.Thus,theoriginofwarbetweenstatesislocatedintheself-interestedmotivationsandinstrumentalreasoningthatIdescribed,inchapter1,asthepremisesofaGreekfolktheoryofpracticalreasoning.TheegoisticThrasymacheanvariantofthefolktheoryleadsustosupposethatthegoalofapowerfulstatewillbetoruletyrannically,initsowninterest,overweakerstates.

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ThesoldiersoftheimaginedstateoftheRepublic–whoturnouttobethemilitary-expertGuardians,perdiscussioninchapter3–willbeemployednotonlytoseizetheterritoryofneighbors,butalsotodefendthestate’snow-expandedterritoryandpossessionsagainstinvasionsbyneighboringstates(373e-374a).Thechoicesofthoserivalstatesinrespecttowarare,therefore,assumedtobemotivatedbypreciselythesortofreasoningSocrateshadjustestablishedaswar’sorigin.TheGuardians’roleisprovidingCallipolis’militarysecurity,inthefaceoftheendemicmilitarythreatcreatedbythemotivation,atthelevelofthestate,tomaximizeof“Gygean”goods,“toseektogetmoreandmore.”Thatmotivation,conjoinedwiththerequirementthateachindividualsticktohisowntasks,requirestheestablishmentofaclassofGuardianswithaspecializationonviolenceprovision(374e).Yet,aswehaveseen(above,chapter3),Guardiansaredangerous:IndividualswithsuperiorviolencepotentialandThrasymacheanmotivationswoulddestabilizetheharmoniousinternalorderofthestate.AddressingthatthreatbyeliminatingtheincentivesoftheGuardianstousetheirexpertiseinwaragainsteachother,oragainsttheproductiveclasses,istheoriginaljustificationforthespecialeducationoftheGuardiansandforthedistinctivesocialrulesthatconstrainthecircumstancesoftheirlives.

Inbook4oftheRepublicPlatoreturnstothequestionofinter-staterelationshipsbetweenpoleis.Eachpolisisunderstoodasaself-interestedcollectiveagent,seekingtofurtheritsownadvantage.InaninterchangewithAdeimantus,Socratesconfirmsthat,asCallipolisdevelops,theproducingclasseswillownland,finebighouses,andfurnishingstomatch(419).ButtherewillbelimitstothewealththattheGuardianswillallowinthepolis(421e-422a).TheGuardiansthemselves,whoarebothwarriorsandrulers,willpossessnowealth.Thequestionthenarises:HowwillCallipolis,lackingstate-levelcapitalresources,beabletocompetesuccessfullyinawaragainstagreatandwealthyrivalpolis,especiallyapolisthathadgatheredtoitselftheresourcesofmanyotherpoleis(422a,422d)?

Socrates’answerhasthreeparts:FirstisthesimpleclaimthattheGuardians,beingfull-timeexpertsatwar,willbesuperiorfighters(422b-c).Nextcomesanargumentbasedonrationalcalculationofoutcomesandexpectations:CallipoliswillsendenvoystoanypolisthatwasintheprocessofdecidingbetweenattackingCallipolis(perhapsinalliancewithotherpoleis)orjoiningCallipolisinamilitaryallianceagainstsomeotherpolisorcoalition.Callipolis’envoysareinapositiontomakeanofferthat,Socratesclaims,willbetoogoodforanotherpolistorefuse,giventheassumptionofstate-levelself-interesteddesireformoreandmoreandthecapacityofstatestocalculatetheiradvantagethroughinstrumentalreasoning.Callipolis’envoyswillmakethefollowingoffer:“Wemakenouseofgoldandsilvernorisitlawfulforustodoso,butitislawfulforyou:somakewaralongwithusandyoucantakethepropertyofouropponents.”Socratesthenasks,“Doyousuppose

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any[state]thatheardsuchaproposalwouldchoosetofightagainsthardandleanhounds[Callipolis’Guardians],ratherthanfightwiththeaidofthehoundsagainstfatandtendersheep[theresidentsofotherpoleisandtheirpossessions]?”(422d).7HerePlato’sSocratesreprisesThrasymachus’(Republicbook1)metaphorinwhichthestrongtreattheweakassheepfitforconsumption.

Finally,Socratesconcludes,allotherpoleis,lackingCallipolis’fine-tunedharmonicunity,arepresumptivelydividedagainstthemselves,especiallyalongclasslinesofrichvspoor.Assuch,theycanbeassumedtoberelativelyweakandliabletocivilconflict(422d-423a).Onceagain,Callipoliswillbeinapositiontoexploittheself-interestofinstrumentallyrationalopponents,thistimebysidingwithonefactionagainstanother:“ifyouapproachthem[theresidentsofotherpoleis]asmany[factions]andoffertogivetotheone[faction]thepossessions,capacities,andindeedtheverypersonsofanother[faction],youwillalwaysfindmanyalliesandfewenemies”(423a).8Hereweseeacloseapproximationofthe“primitivepreferences”ofwealth,power,andsexthatfeaturedasuniversalmotivatorsinGlaucon’sneo-ThrasymacheanchallengeinRepublicbook2.Insum,inPlato’sRepublic,theconditionsofinter-stateconflictareexplicitlymodeledontheinstrumentalrationallyassumedinthefolktheory.

Oneotherwar-relatedpassageintheRepublicisespeciallyrelevanttoourinvestigationoftheroleofpreferences,beliefs,andexpectationsinGreekconceptionsofpracticalreasoning.IndescribingtheeducationoftheyoungmaleandfemaleGuardiansinbook5(theGuardians,bothauxiliaryguardianwarriorsandtrueguardianswhograduatefromwarriorstorulers,nowincludewomen),Socratesmakesthepointthatitisalwaysbeneficialforthechildrenofcraftsmentoobserveeldermastercraftsmenatwork,evenbeforethechildrenarethemselvesabletotakeanactivepartinthecraft(467a).This,hesays,extendstothecraftofwar.

TheyoungGuardians-in-trainingwillbetterlearntheircraft,andthusthepoliswillbebenefited,ifthegirlsandboyshavethechancetoseefirsthandwhattheywillbeexpectedtodoasadults.ThusitisestablishedthatCallipolisprefersthatitsyoungGuardiansbeexposedtowarwhilestilltooyoungtofight.ButGlauconraisestheobviousconcern:placingchildrenonabattlefieldwouldendangerthem.That,henotes,couldresultinaseriouspublicharm:IftheyoungGuardiansintrainingarekilledwhileobservingabattle,thefutureofCallipoliscouldbeforfeit.WithreferencetoFigure6.1,Glauconseemsinitiallytopreferoutcomeα:nothavingbeensenttobattle,thechildrenwillsurvive.Ineffect,heproposestoignoretherestofthedecisiontree,sothevalueofhavingchildrenobserveabattleisforegone.

[Figure6.1abouthere:ElderGuardiandecisiontree]

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InresponsetoSocrates’prodding,Glauconagrees,however,thatthe

children’sexposuretowarishighlydesirable,because(perthepremiseofthevalueofobservationtotrainee’s)itisadvantageoustothepolis.Moreover,andcrucially,heacknowledgesthatthisdesiredoutcomeisworthsomerisk:“[Socrates]’Doyouthinkitmakesaslightdifferenceandisnotworthsomerisk(axionkindunou)whethermenwhoaretobewarriorsdoordonotobservewarasboys?’[Glaucon]‘No,itmakesagreatdifferenceforthepurposeofwhichyouspeak’”(467c).9Therefore,itcannotbethecasethatthepotentialoutcome“childGuardiansexposedtowar”shouldsimplybeforegoneinordertoguaranteetheirsafety.Butatwhatlevelofriskdoesthedangeroflosingthechildrenbecomesogreatastojustifyforegoingthebenefitoftheirearlytrainingthroughobservation?ToanswerthequestionofhowtheeldersofCallipoliswillchoosebetweenexposingthechildrentobattle(thusbenefitingthepolisbygivingyoungGuardianstherighttraining,attheriskofendangeringthem)andnotexposingchildrentobattle(thusbenefitingthepolisbypreservingtheirlives,atthecostofforegoingthebenefittothepolisoftheirearlytraining)Socratesproposesthatriskcanbecorrectlymeasured.

ThefactorSocratesintroducestoenableweighingthevalueofearlytrainingagainsttheriskofearlydeathistherelativedangerousnessofagivenbattle.SocratesassertsthattheGuardian(collective)parentsofthechildGuardianswillnotbeignorantaboutwhichcampaignsaredangerous(i.e.relativelylikelytoresultinabattlefielddefeatforCallipolis)andwhicharenot(defeatisunlikely);indeedtheyaresaidtobeasknowledgeableaboutthismatterasanyhumanbeingcouldeverbe(467c-d).10Here,Socrateshasestablishedapointthatishighlyrelevanttoourinvestigationoftheprocessesinvolvedinpracticalreasoning:Heassertsthataccuratemeasurementofriskispossible(withinhumanlimits)andheclaimsthatsuchmeasurementisamatterofhumanlyattainableexpertise.11

Whilenoquantitiesareassignedtopossibleoutcomes,itisreadilyapparentthat(withreferencetoFigure6.1)aspecifiablevalue(b)isbeingsetontheexposureofchildrentobattle.Thatvaluemustbeweighedagainstthevalue(s)ofthechildren’ssurvival.Inordertodecidebetweenthechoices“sendchildrentobattle,enablingthemtoobserve,butperhapsalsotodie”(resultingeitherineitherapayoffofs+borapayoffof–s)and“donotsendthemtobattle,guaranteeingtheirlivesbutdenyingthemthechancetoobserve”(payoffs),theprobabilityofthechildren’ssurvivingthebattleobservationexperiencemustbeestimated.Thoseresponsibleformakingthedecisionarepresumedtohavethekindofexpertisethatenablesthemtomeasurethelikelihoodofvictoryordefeatinbattle.

Theprobabilityofthesurvivalofchildrensenttoobservethebattleisinitiallyassumedtobeafunctionoftheprobability(p)thatthebattlewillnotbetoodangerous,i.e.thatitwillbewonbytheGuardianwarriors.Theelders“dothe

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math”ofcalculatingvalues(sandb)againstprobabilities(win:lose)andtherebymakearationalchoiceandactaccordingly:Ifp(s+b)>sthenthebestchoicewillbe“exposechildrentobattle.”12Becausetheeldersarepresumedtohavetherightexpertise,acleardecisioncanbemadeineverycase:Theupshotis:“theywilltakethechildrentosomecampaignsandnottoothers”(467d).

ItisworthnotingthattheexpertiseoftheelderGuardiansisappliedtoallpotentialmilitarycampaigns,andthatsomecampaignsthatwillbeengagedbyCallipolis’warriorsareestimatedtohavearelativelyhighriskfactor–toohightobringalongthechildren.Accordingly,wemustrejectanynotionthatCallipolis’rulersareinfallibleintheirjudgmentsabouttheoutcomeofthepolis’militaryconflicts.TheGuardianscannotbecertainofwinningeverycampaigntheymustfight,buttheycanestimatethelikelihoodofvictory.Socrates’confidenceinthefactorsthatconducetoCallipolis’long-termmilitarysuccessisnotbasedoncertainty,butontheexpectationthatovertimethepoliswilldowellenoughagainstrivalstosustainitselfthroughthecorrectestimationofprobabilities.

ThemilitaryexpertsofCallipolissendoutthechildrenasbattleobserversonlyifthereisahighprobability(p)thatthebattlewillbewonandthatthechildrenwill,therefore,bothobserveandsurvive(expectedoutcomeγ).Thechance(1-p)thatthechildrenwillbekilled(outcomeβ)iscorrespondinglylow.YetSocratesdoesacknowledgethat,evenafterexpertmeasurementofthedangerousnessofeachcampaign,thereremainsacertainlevelofrisktotheobserver-children:“butnevertheless,aswesay,theunexpectedfrequentlyoccurs.”13

ThechanceoftheunexpectedoccurringinthebattleisindicatedbythenodeslabeledN(ature)onFigure6.1.Althoughthelikelihoodofthingsnotgoingasexpectedinthebattlehasbeencalculatedtobesmall,itisnotzero.Glaucon’sinitialworryseemsnowtorecur.Counterfactually,shouldthechildrenbeobservingwhileonfoot,andtheunexpected(Guardiansaredefeated)weretooccur,thechancethattheywoulddie(expectedoutcomeδ)wouldbehigh,whereastheirliving(outcomeε)wouldbeamatterofmereluck.Socratesthereforeproposesasortofbackupinsuranceplan:TheelderGuardianswillarrangeforthechildrentoobservethechosenbattlesonlywhilemountedonfastandmanageablehorses,“sothat,shoulditbenecessary,flyingoff,theyshallflee.”14

Thegoalofthehorsebackobservationplanistoreducethemortalityrisktotheobserver-childrenintheeventofthelow-probabilityresultofanunexpectedbattlefielddefeat.Socratesseekstogainthehighlyvaluedpayoffb(“exposureofchildrentobattle”)atthelowestpossiblerisktothepolisthattheywillbelost.InFigure6.1therangeofpossibleoutcomesintheeventoftheunexpectedisillustratedbyoutcomesδtoη:iftheobserver-childrenwere(counterfactually)onfoot,theywouldbehostagetothechanceof“theunexpected”intheresultofthebattle.Thatgoalofreducingriskisachievedbyintroducingasecondhigh

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probability(pʹ):thatflightonhorsebackwillsucceed.Thesecondprobabilitycombineswiththefirst(p:thebattleisassessedasrelativelylowrisk)toincreasethechildren’soverallchanceofsurvival:Combiningthetwoprobabilitiessubstantiallyreducestherisktothechildren((1-p)(1-pʹ)<(1-p)).

Thechanceofthechildren’suntimelydemisehasstillnotbeenreducedtozero(thosewhofleemaynonethelessbecaught:outcomeη).Thereremainsapersistentneedforaccuratemeasurementofrisksinordertocalculatetheexpectedpayoffsofallpossibleoutcomesandthustomaketheright,expectedadvantagemaximizing,decisionaboutsendingornotsendingthechildrenoutonagivencampaign.Thekeypoint,forourpurposes,isthatthedecisionismadeonthebasisofrankedandweightedpreferences,beliefsaboutthestateoftheworld,andexpectationsbasedontheassumptionthatprobabilitiescanbeaccuratelymeasured.Theupshotisthatrationalchoicesamongdifferentcoursesofactionaremadeonthebasisofexpectedadvantage.TheadvantagewithwhichSocratesandhisinterlocutorsareconcernedisthatofthepolis.ThereisnohintinthissectionofRepublicbook5ofaconcernforthechildrenasautonomous,rights-bearingbeingswhomustbetreatedasendsinthemselves.Thedecisionprocessisentirelyinstrumental,aimedatdeterminingwhatoptionchoiceisexpectedtobemostadvantageoustothepolisasacommunity.6.2.Thucydidesonpower,risk,andstate-levelrationality Plato’scommentsonwarintheRepublicwerewrittenintheaftermathofthePeloponnesianWar.ThereferencetothethreattoCallipolisposedbyagreatandwealthypolis,onethathadgatheredtoitselftheresourcesofmanyotherpoleis,seemstransparentlytorefertoAthens’empireofthelaterfifthcenturyBCE,thedramaticdateoftheRepublic.ThetopicofAthens’imperialpower–howitwasacquired,sustained,andultimatelylost–isacentralthemeofThucydides’history.Athens’AegeanempireistreatedbyThucydidesasaspecialcaseofbuildingandpreservingacoalitionofstatesthroughnon-zero-sumbargainingbetweenpartiesofdifferingstrengths.Makingsociallyvaluablebargainsis,inThucydides’analyticnarrative,facilitatedbyanaccuratecalculationofpotentialrisksandbenefits.Thesocialbenefitrealizedbythosebargainsis,however,potentiallythreatenedunderthezero-sumconditionsandincreaseduncertaintyassociatedwithexistentialwar.Thucydides’textmay,reductively,bethoughtofasananalysisoftheinterplaybetweenzero-sumandcooperativegames. Theextendedconflictthatweareaccustomedtocall“thePeloponnesianWar”isdescribedbyThucydidesas,“thewarbetweentheAtheniansandPeloponnesiansandthealliesoneitherside”(2.1).TheinitialpremiseofThucydides’analysisofthewaristhattheGreekworldhaddividedintotwosuper-coalitionswithsomestrikinglydifferentorganizationalcharacteristics:Athens’

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maritimeempire,createdandsustainedbynavalpower,andSparta’sland-powercenteredPeloponnesianLeague(1.1,1.18.2).

AsIhavearguedindetailelsewhere,Thucydidesmaybeunderstoodasapoliticalscientist,inthathishistoricalnarrativeofeventsisaimedatempiricallytestingthevalidityofatheoryofstate-levelpower.Thattheoryismeanttopredictandtoexplainthebehaviorofgreatandsmallstatesinthefaceofpowerasymmetries.15MuchoftheactiondescribedinThucydides’narrativeconcernsattemptsbyhegemonicstatestopreservetheircoalitions,andattempts,especiallybyAthens,toexpanditscoalitionbyrecruitingnewstates.Thequestionsofunderwhatconditions,withwhatmotives,andwithwhatexpectations,agivenstatewouldchoosetojoinacoalition(ornotto),toremaininacoalitionortodefectfromit,arecentraltoThucydides’analysis.

Thucydides’theoryofpoweris,Iwillsuggesthere,builtontheassumptionthatGreekstatescan,undertherightconditions,beunderstoodasrational,expectedadvantagemaximizing,collectiveactors.Suchstateshavecoherentpreferences,establishedmethodsforgatheringandforassessinginformationrelevanttoformingreality-trackingbeliefsaboutthestateoftheworld.Theyalsohavemethodsforcorrectlymeasuringprobabilities–insomethinglikePlato’ssense(above)ofestimatingriskaswellasishumanlypossible.AlthoughThucydidesdoesnotreducestate-levelpreferencestothemaximizationofGlaucon’sprimitivetriadofwealth,sex,andpower,ortoSocrates’(Republicbook5:above)triadof“possessions,capacities,andpersons,”hedoespositthatstatesseektoensuretheirownsurvivalandthewelfareoftheircitizens.Aswithindividuals,therationalstatepredicatesitschoicesonastrategicassessmentofconstraintsimposedbythepresumptivelyrationalbehaviorofotherstate-levelplayersinthegame.

Acentrallyimportantfactorintherun-uptothePeloponnesianWarwasthegrowth,aftertheendofthePersianWars,ofAthenianpower.Thatgrowthwasmanifestinitslargeandeffectivenavalforces,itsimmensecapitalresources,andtheincreasingsizeandstabilityofitsimperialcoalition.Bycontrast,SpartanpowerisdepictedinThucydides’textasgreat,butrelativelystable.UnlikeAtheniancapital-intensivesourcesofpower,Sparta’spowerispredicatedontheinherentlylimitedbodyoffightingmenthancanbemusteredbySpartaanditscoalitionpartners.Thucydidesfamouslyasserts(1.23.6,cf.1.33.3,1.88,1.118.2)thatitwasSparta’sfearofAthens’growingpowerthatistheunderlying–fundamentalalthoughunobservedbymostcontemporaries–causeofthewar.Athens’growthinpowerfulnessis,inThucydides’account,aproductofpoliciesthatarecloselyassociatedwiththegeneralPericles,butextendbacktothePersianwareraleadershipofThemistocles.Thosepolicieswerepredicatedontheintegratedtriadofanavyofwarshipscapableofprojectingstatepower,massivecitywallsand

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securesupplylinestoensurestatesecurity,andcapitalresourcestopayforanimmensepoolofskilledhumanlabor.16

ThucydidesassociatedtherationalityofAthensasastate(Chapter5)withitsleaders’foresight–thatis,theirabilitytogaugeriskaccurately.Accurateriskcalculationwasbasedonacarefulassessmentofmaterialresources:armedforces,infrastructure,capitalreserves(2.13.3-6).Itwasfurthermorepredicatedonunderstandingthe“types”ofthevariousplayersintherelevantgamesofdomesticpoliticsandinterstaterelations.Withtherightinformationaboutresourcesandtypes,Athens’leaderswereinapositiontoformulateandupdatereality-trackingbeliefsandthustopromotestatepoliciesonthebasisofthecommunity’sexpectedadvantage.ThehighlysuccessfulThemistoclean-PericleanimperialpolicyoftheearlyandmiddlefifthcenturyBCEwaspredicatedontakingfrequent,substantial,andcarefullycalculatedrisks.Whilesomeventuresfailed(e.g.1.110.4),overalltheAthenianimperialledgerwaspositiveinthedecadesbeforethePeloponnesianWar(2.36.2-3,2.41.4).Inbrief,Athens’policy,basedoncalculatedrisk-taking,provedeffectiveingrowingAthenianpower.Bycontrast,Sparta,intheerafromtheendofthePersianWarstotheoutbreakofthePeloponnesianWarwasrelativelyrisk-averse.SpartanpolicyaimedatmaintainingSparta’sprominentpositionasahegemonofamajorcoalition.Lackingindividualleaderswiththecapacitytocalculatethebenefitsassociatedwithrisk,andthustendingtoregardriskonlyasdangerofloss,Spartawasnotinapositiontoincreaseitspower.17

Thucydides’narrativeshowshowandwhythesurvivalandwelfareofweakandstrongGreekstates(andthusoftheirresidents)couldbeadvancedbyrationalbehavior,andlikewisecompromisedbyviolationsofrationality.Thatbehaviorisreadilymodeledbynon-zero-sumbargaininggames.Undertherightconditions,rationalcooperationbetweenasymmetricallypowerfulstateswasmutuallybeneficial,enablinggrowth(moresecurity,higherlevelsofwelfare,thuslargerandwealthierpopulations)overtime.TheGreekworldhad,asThucydidespointsout(Thuc.1.13),progresseddramaticallyinbothwealthandsecuritywithinhistoricaltime.Thatprogress,Thucydidessuggests,wasfacilitatedbyinter-stateagreementsenteredintobyadequatelywell-informed,rationallyself-interestedpartiescapableofcalculatingexpectedadvantage.18AthensintheageofThemistoclesandPericleswas,forThucydides,amodelofthestrongandsuccessfulcity-statethathadbenefitedbybothrationalrisk-takingandcooperativebargaining.

But,asThucydidesemphasized,majorGreekstatesalsosoughtatleasttomaintain,andinsomecases,toexpandtheirpowerattheexpenseofpowerfulrivals.Whenmorethanonestrong,expansioniststatewasinplay,asinthehypothesizedterritorialexpansionofthe“feverish”cityinthesecondbookofPlato’sRepublic,therewasazero-sumcompetitionoverlimitedresources.Thetendencyofmajorstatestoseek“moreandmore”wealthandpoweratthedirectexpenseof

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rivals,throughexpandingcoalitionsandgainingcontrolofstrategicresources,is,inThucydides’history,aprimarycauseofinter-stateinstability.Athens’risingpowerwas,forThucydides,anotable,butnotuniquecauseofinstability;theambitionofSyracusetodominatethepoleisofSicilyisanothercaseinpoint.

Becauseofpriorcooperativecoalition-building,therequirementsofinter-statecompacts,andthemultiplicityofflash-points,zero-sumconflictsbetweenmajorstatesledtoscaled-upwarsbetweenever-largercoalitionsofstates.ThePeloponnesianWarwas,inThucydides’view,theultimateproductofthatdynamic.Underidealconditions,rationalstates(orcoalitionhegemons)mightavoidgoingtowar,basedoncompleteandsymmetricalinformationconcerningrelativestrengths,accuratemeasurementofrisks,andcalculationofthelikelycostsofconflict.But,asThucydidesrecognizedandJamesFearon(1995)hasshownformodernity,underreal-worldconditionsofincompleteorasymmetricinformation,rationalstateswillfallintocostlyconflicts.Thesize,complexity,andinstabilityofa“worldsystem”definedbytwocoalitionsledbystateswithdifferent“types”anddifferentratesofgrowthcontributedtothedifficultyofestimatingtherelativepresentandfuturestrengthsofthekeyplayersintherunupthePeloponnesianWar.

Moreover,Thucydidesrecognizedandtookaccountofsignificantdeviationsfromstate-levelrationality.Giventhefactofpreferencediversityandvolatileinterest-basedfactionswithinstates,andinlightoftherangeofdecision-methodsemployedbystateswithdifferentpoliteiai,itwasnotcertainthatagivenstate,atagivenmoment,wouldmanifestthesortofinstrumentalrationalitythatGlaucon’schallengetoSocratesinRepublicbook2claimsasauniversalfeatureofindividuals.

Statesdidnotalwaysmaximizeonasinglematerialfactor(e.g.power)orevenonastraight-forwardpackageoffactors(e.g.powerpluswealthplushonor/reputation)contributingtoadvantage.Theymightinsteadseektosatisficeacrossseveralfactors,including“moral”factorssuchasjustice,fairness,autonomy,andethnic,regional,orhistory-basedloyalties.Moreover,aswewillsee,statesmightnotmeasureprobabilityaccurately.Andeveniftheydid,theymightnotemploythekindofcost-benefitjudgmentsinmeans-endreasoningthatwereassumedinwhatwearecallingtheGreekfolktheoryofpracticalreasoning.

Thesourcesofirrationality(behaviorthatisoffthepredictedpathfollowedbyself-interested,instrumentallyrational,expectedadvantagemaximizingactors),andtheeffectsofirrationalplayonthepossibilityofcorrectmeasurementofriskandthusonactualoutcomes,constituteasecondmajorthemeofThucydides’analytichistory.Onceagain,hispointisnotthatthecourseofeventsissimplyirrational,norisitthatprobabilitiesareincalculable.Ratherhispointisthatanexpertdecision-maker,oneemployingthecompletetoolsetofpracticalreason,musttakeintoaccountnotonlyuncertaintyandconstraints,butalsothelikelihoodthatsomeplayersinthegamewilldeviatefromthepathofrationalchoice.

6.12

Understandingtheconditionsthatmakethatkindofdeviationmorelikelyis,Iwillsuggest,anoverlookedaspectofthelessonsThucydidesintendsanastutereadertolearnfromatextthatisexplicitlydidactic(Connor1984).6.3.Rovingandstationarybandits

Thucydides’reviewofearlyGreekhistorybeginswiththepremisethatinearliesttimes,beforetheemergenceoforganizedstates,allGreekslivedinunsettledandpenuriousconditions.Thereasonfortheirpovertywastheinabilityofsmall,unwalledcommunitiestodefendthemselvesagainstpredationsbymobilebanditswhorovedatwillbylandandsea(1.2).Themotiveofpiraticalstrong-meninraidingunwalledsettlementswaspersonalgain(kerdos)andbuildingcoalitionsoffollowersthroughsharingtheloot(1.5.1).19Wallscapableoffrustratingraidscouldnotbebuiltbecauseearlycommunitieslackedadequatecapitalforinfrastructureimprovements.Thebandits,whomovedfreelyacrosstheGreekworld,mightnevercomebackatoaplacetheyhadonceraided.Therefore,theyhadnoreasontoberestrainedintheirlooting.Residentsofcommunitiesexposedtopiraticaldepredations,expectingtobestrippedofalltheypossessedbypirates,hadnoincentivetoamasscapital.Allactedrationallyandtheresultwasgeneralpoverty.ThesituationispreciselythatdescribedbythepoliticalscientistMancurOlson,indefiningtheincentivesof“rovingbandits”andthosewhoaretheirvictims.20Meanwhile,suchshort-termconcentrationsoflocalpower(dunameis)asmightbeachievedinmorefertileregionsofGreecewere,Thucydidesnotes,quicklydissipatedthroughacombinationofinternalstrife(staseis)andthecupidityofoutsiders(1.2).

ThesolutiontothisPanhellenicpovertytrapwastheprovidentialemergenceofasinglehegemonicpower,withafixedbaseofoperations,inpossessionofasubstantialnavy.ThefirstsuchpowerknowntoThucydideswasMinos(1.4).Unlikethepiraticalrovingbandits,Minosoperatedfromapermanentbase,hispalaceontheislandofCrete.InOlson’sterms,hewasastationarybandit.Assuch,Minoshadalongertimehorizon:hehadanincentivetopromotethegrowthofprosperouscommunitiessolongastheycouldbetaxedinwaysprofitabletohimself.So,againunliketherovingbandits,Minosdidnotsimplyloot.Rather,asThucydidespointsout,heexercisedhegemonyover(ekratêse)thebetterpartoftheAegean.Heruled(êrxe)andalsofirstcolonizedtheCyclades,drivingoutnon-Greekresidents.Generalizing,Thucydidesstatesthatthestrongestcommunities,havinggreatestcapitalresources,madesmallerpoleisintosubjects(hupêkooi)1.5.3).

Minosalsohadgoodreasontoseektosuppresstherovingbanditswhowerehisrivalsforresourceextractionandwhoselootingsuppressedthedevelopmentofstable,taxablecommunities.Thucydidesnotesthatinadditiontohisrulingandcolonizing,“inallprobability,”(hôseikos)Minossought,totheextentpossible,to

6.13

suppresspiracy.Themotivationforallthisactivitywasself-interest:Minos’“desiringthathisrevenues(prosodoi)shouldcometohimmorereadily”(1.4).21AsMinos’navyreducedthedangerofpiracytoGreekcommunitieswithinhiszoneofcontrol,permanentsettlementswereestablishedonthecoasts,tradeincreased,andthewealthofcommunitiesgrew(1.8.2-3).Fortheirpart,weakercommunitiesrecognizedthevalueintradingtheradicalinsecurityoftheeraofrovingbanditsfortherelativesecurityofarationallyself-interestedhegemon:Thucydidesnotesthat,motivatedbynewopportunitiesformaterialgain(tônkerdôn),theweakeraccepteddomination(douleia)bythemorepowerful(1.8.3).

TheoperativedynamicofearlyGreekhegemonywas,accordingtoThucydides’analyticnarrative,self-interestonthepartofstrongandweakalike–withtheimplicitprovisothatthestrongmusthavegoodreason(astablebaseandlongtimehorizons)toseektheirprofitsbyrulingandtaxingratherthanbyraidingandlooting.Undertheseconditions,therecouldbesustainedeconomicgrowth:Thegrowingprosperityofsmallcommunitiesmeantthatahegemonicstatecouldamasssignificantcapitalresourcesbytaxingthosecommunitiesatasustainablelevel.

Thekeypointisthat,whiletheearlyGreekinter-stateorderwasbuiltupfromhighlyasymmetricalrelationships,andwhiletheasymmetrywasexpressedasdomination(douleia),therelationsbetweenrulingstatesandsubjectstateswerepredicatedonabargain.Themotivationtoenterintothebargainwas,bybothparties,thedesireforprofitsunavailableoutsidethebargain.Realizingthoseprofitsdemandedconditionsofrelativestabilityandacrediblecommitmentonbothsidestodefersomerewardsbymakingcapitalinvestmentsaimedatfuturebenefits.22Inbrief,thegameplayedbyrovingbanditsandvulnerablecommunities,resultinginanequilibriumofpoverty,wasreplacedbyagameplayedbetweenastationarybanditandsubjectcommunities,agamethatproducedanequilibriumofgrowth.

LaterimperialandcolonialGreekpowersfollowedthepatternestablishedbyMinos:emergentlocalnavalsupremacy,accompaniedbysuppressionofpiracy,hostilitytonon-Greekpopulations,dominationofweakerstates,andcolonization.ThucydidesoffersfirstCorinth,thentheIonians,Samos,andthePhocaeansasexamplesofplacesthatdevelopedrelativelypowerfulnaviesandmanifestedoneormoreofthefeaturesofwhatwemaythinkofastheMinoshegemonicparadigm(1.13-14).Thucydides’generalizesthepoint:Ineachcaseanavywasasourceofstrength,resultinginmonetaryrevenues(chrêmata),andrule(archê)overotherstates(1.15.1).23Bycontrast,hesays,amongearlyGreekstatesthatlackednavies,therewereneithergreatcoalitionsofstatesnormajorwars.Violentconflictswerelimitedtotheusualsmall-scaledisputesoverborderlands.TherewereneitherhegemoniesoftheasymmetricMinossort,norlarge-scaleconfederationsofequals(1.15.2).

6.14

Athensinherited,and,underPericles’leadershipperfected,theMinosparadigmofnavalpower,colonization,hostilitytonon-Greekpopulations,andsubjectionofweakerstates.BythetimeoftheoutbreakofthePeloponnesianWar,mostofAthens’formerlyfreeallieshadbeenreducedtothestatusoftributepayingsubjects(1.19,1.96).Thucydidesiscertainlyrighttosupposethatthiswascoalition-buildingonascaleunequalledbyearlierGreekhegemonies.Basedonepigraphicevidenceandpopulationestimates,atitsheight,Athens’empireencompassedsome300communitiesandperhapstwoandahalfmillionpersons–roughlyathirdofthetotalGreek-speakingpopulation(Ober2015:17-18withtable2.3).ButThucydideshadshownhisreaderthatAthensfollowedawell-troddenpath,andthatthepathwaspredicatedonbargainsbasedonmutualadvantage.6.4.Justifyingempire

Thucydides’analyticnarrativeofGreekdevelopmentbeforethePeloponnesianWarseemsquiteclearlytobebasedontheGreekfolktheorysketchedinearlierchapters.Heassumesself-interest(notablymanifestinseekingwealthandpower),asaprimaryhumanmotivation,onethatextendsacrossthelevelsofindividuals,socialgroups,andcommunities.Decisionsaremaderationally,onthebasisoftheexpectationofadvantagemaximization,inlightofthemovesavailabletootherplayers,greatandsmall.WhileThucydideswas,aswewillsee,wellawareofhonor-seekingasamotivationforaction,heexplicitlydenigratedthebindingforceofvoluntaryoaths(1.9.1)inexplainingtheoriginsoftheTrojanWar.Heranksfear(phobos)abovehonorablereciprocity(charis)asthemotiveinducingtheleadersofGreekstatestojointhepowerfulAgamemnonofMycenaeintheexpeditionagainstTroy(1.9.3).

Fear,forThucydides,isthedarktwinofdesire.Fearoflossofwhatonecurrentlyhas,orofbeingdeprivedoffuturegains,isapowerfulmotivator,arisingfromthesamekindofcalculationsofadvantagethatdrovePlato’sGygestoseek“moreandmore.”FearisfrequentlycitedbyThucydides’publicspeakersasajustificationforthebehaviorofstates.Forexample,inawell-knownpassagefrombook1,unnamedAthenianspeakers,whojusthappentobeinSpartaonunspecifiedbusiness,respondtochargesagainstAthensbySparta’sallies.Inthesepassages,Thucydidesneatlysumsuptheinstrumentalrationalityofthefolktheory,asitisappliestointerstaterelations.

…we[Athenians]didnotacquirethis[empire:archê]byforce(biasomenoi)…theallies(summachoi)cametousoftheirownaccordandaskedustoassumetheleadership.Itwasunderthecompulsionofcircumstances(katênangkasthêmen)thatweweredrivenatfirsttoadvanceourempiretoitspresentstate,influencedchieflybyfear(hupodeous),thenbyhonor(timê)

6.15

also,andlastlybyself-interest(ôphelia)aswell.Afterwehadonceincurredthehatredofmostofourallies,andseveralofthemhadalreadyrevoltedandthenbeenreducedtosubjection,andwhenyou[Spartans]werenolongerfriendlyasbeforebutsuspiciousandatvariancewithus,itnolongerseemedsafetorisk(oukasphales…kinduneuein)relaxingourhold.Foralldefectorswouldhavegoneovertoyou.Andnomanistobeblamedformakingthemostofhisadvantages(xumpheronta)whenitisaquestionofthegravestdangers.24

TheAtheniansreemphasizethepointsmadeinthefirstpassagewithacounterfactual,aclaimabouthumannature,ageneralargumentlinkingstrengthanddomination,andafinalassertionthattheSpartansarejustascalculatingoftheirinterestsasaretheAthenians:

…ifinthePersianwaryou[Spartans]hadheldouttotheendinthehegemonyandhadbecomeunpopularinitsexercise,aswedid,youwouldcertainlyhavebecomenolessobnoxioustothealliesthanweare,andwouldhavebeencompelledeithertorulethemwithastronghand,oryourselvestorisk(kinduneuein)losingthehegemony.Thusthereisnothingremarkableorinconsistentwithhumannatureinwhatwealsohavedone,justbecauseweacceptedanempirewhenitwasofferedus,andthen,yieldingtothestrongestmotives—honor,fear,andself-interest—declinedtogiveitup.Nor,again,arewethefirstwhohaveentereduponsuchacourse,butithaseverbeenanestablishedrulethattheweakeriskeptdownbythestronger.Andatthesametimewethoughtwewereworthytorule,andusedtobesoregardedbyyoualso,untilyoufelltocalculatingwhatyourinterestswere(tasumpherontalogizomenoi)andresorted,asyoudonow,tothepleaofjustice…25

TheAtheniansthengoontoclaimthatthepracticeofAthens’imperialrule(i.e.the“taxationrate”intermsofforcibleextractionofresources)wasmoremoderateandtheAtheniansthemselvesmoreattentivetojusticethanrequired(byimplicitcomparisonwithastrictcost-benefitcalculation).Theyofferasecondcounterfactualasproofofthepoint:AnyotherpowerfulstateinAthens’placewouldhavebeenlessmoderate,lessattentivetoequity(1.76.3-4).Or,wemightsay,anotherstatewouldhaveactedmorelikearovingbanditwithshorttimehorizons,andlesslikearationalstationarybandit,playingacooperationgamewithalongtimehorizon.

Thucydides’AtheniansinSpartaassertthatactinginself-interestisauniversalrule.ButThucydidesinpropriapersonadidnotencouragehisreaderto

6.16

supposethatrulersactingaccordingtotheirindividualself-interestinvariablyledtothegrowthofastate’spoweroritswealth.Henotesthatinthepast,asaGreekstategrewlargerandwealthier,itspoliteiaoftenchangedaccordingly:Tyranniesreplacedhereditarykingshipsinmanypoleis(1.13.1).TyrantstendtoberegardedintheGreektraditionasproto-typicallyself-interested.AccordingtoThucydides,fromtheperspectiveofstatedevelopment,theGreektyrantsweretoonarrowlyself-interestedtoamounttomuchinthelongrun:Thetyrants’focusontheirprivateaffairs,theirownbodilysafety,andtheirpromotionoffamilymemberstopositionsofauthorityledthemtoranksecurity(asphaleia)aboveallotherpolicygoals(1.17).26Asaresult,tyrant-runstateswereoverlyriskaverseandsotheywerenoteworthyonlyfortheirlackofmajoraccomplishments.

Thucydides’readerwillsoonbeintroducedtothesimilarlyrisk-averseSpartans,whoareaccusedbytheirallies,theCorinthiansofbeingexcessivelynarrowlyself-interested–incontrasttotherisk-takingAthenianswhoconsistentlylooktothecollectiveinterestoftheirstate(1.68-71,withOber2010).YetthetyranniesinmostGreekstateswereeventuallyoverthrown–bySparta(1.18.1).WiththecreationofaPeloponnesus-basedleagueofoligarchies(1.19)Spartaalsofinallybroketheearliertrendoftheabsenceofmajor,long-lastingcoalitionsamongland-basedstates.

OneofThucydides’explicitmotivesinrecountingthehistoryoftheroughlyfifty-yearperiodfromtheendofthePersianWarstotheoutbreakofthePeloponnesianWar(478-431BCE)wastoexplaintheoriginsandgrowthofAthens’empire(1.97.2).27AfterestablishingthevoluntarynatureoftheoriginalconfederationofAegeanstates,asananti-PersianallianceunderAthenianleadershipandfinancialmanagement(1.96),hisfocusturnstoaseriesofdefectionsfromthealliance(1.98).HerethehistoricalnarrativeconfirmssomecentralclaimsmadebytheAthenianspeakersinSparta,above.

Theprimarycauses(aitiai)ofdefectionbyAthens’allieswere,Thucydidesasserts,failuresbythesubjectalliestoperformtheirdutiesintermsofsupplyingwarshipsorfunds,ortheirunexcusedabstentionfromagreed-uponmilitaryoperations.DefectionsoccurredbecausetheAtheniansenforcedthetermsoftheoriginalagreementstrictly(akribôs);thiswassometimestakenbadlybycommunitiesofpersonswhowereeitherunusedtoperformingmandatedservicesorunwillingtodoso(1.99.1).28Thucydidespointsout,however,thattheconditionsinwhichthealliesweresaddledwithmandatorymonetarycontributionsweretheresultoftheallies’ownpreferenceorderings.TheyhadpreferredpayingmoneytoAthensandstayinghometotakingontheburdenofbuildingandmaintaininganavythemselves.29Asaresult,whenanalliedstatedidchoosetodefect,andwhenAthensrespondedwithmilitaryforce,thealliedstateenteredtheconflict“withoutpreparationandwithoutexperience”(1.99.3).Aweakstatethatvoluntarilyentered

6.17

intoacooperativebargainwithastrongerstate,andprofitedaccordingly,might,Thucydidessuggests,finditselfwithouttheabilitytoexitthebargainifandwhenthehegemon’scapacitytocoercegrewasaresultofinvestingitsshareoftheprofitsinpowerratherthanmerelyinwealth.ThequestionthenwaswhethertheAthenianempirewouldcometobeprimarilybasedoncoercion,orwhetherthebargaincouldbecalibratedsuchthatsubjectswouldcontinuetorecognizethattheyprofitedbytheirsubjection.

6.5.Empire-SubjectGame

ThepassagescitedabovefromThucydides’book1,whenreadinconjunctionwiththerestofThucydides’longnarrativeofthewar(seebelow),allowustothinkofThucydides’“Minos-Athensparadigm”ofhegemoniccoalitionasagame.Thegameisplayedbetweenastrongstate(E)inpossessionofalargenavy,andaweakerstate(S)thatisapotentialoractualsubjectofthestrongstate.Thegameisnon-zerosum,insofarasbothEandSstandtogainfromcooperation.Cooperationtakestheform,first,ofEprovidingprotectiontoSagainstrovingbanditsand/orthird-partystate-levelthreats.ProtectionisofferedatacostlowerthanSwouldpayinprovidingforitselfthroughitsowncapitalexpenditureson,forexample,wallsandwarships.ProtectioninturnoffersenhancedopportunityforStoinvestinwaysthatleadtohigherfutureprofitsandtogainfromimprovedconditionsforlucrativeexchangewithotherstates.Transactioncostsdropasrisksfrompiratesandthird-partyaggressorstatesarereduced,andthroughthecoordinationfunctionsprovidedbyE(forexample,acommoncoinage).Ontheotherhand,EstandstogainbytaxingSataratethatisinexcessofthecoststoEofprovidingprotection.Eisalsoamajorbeneficiaryoftheimprovedexchangeenvironment.Thegameremainscompetitive,ratherthanbeingamatterofpurecoordination,becauseEisassumedtoprefertoextractmaximumrevenuesfromS,intheformofmonetarytaxesandrequiredservices.SpreferstopaythelowestpossibletaxratewhilemaximizingtheadvantagesitgainsfromitssubjectiontoE.ThegameissetoutinextensiveforminFigure6.2.

[Figure6.2abouthere:EmpireGame]Theimperialstate(E)movesfirst,decidingatwhatleveltosetthetaxforits

services(protection,coordinationleadingtolowertransactioncosts).TheoptionsamongwhichE’schoiceismadeareschematicallylistedasLow(Egainslittleornothingfromprovidingprotectionandcoordination;S’scostofsubjectionisthereforeverylowanditsprofitshigh);Medium(E’srevenuessubstantiallyexceeditscosts;S’scostsarethereforesubstantialanditsprofitsomewhatlower);orHigh

6.18

(Eextractsresourcesinapredatorymanner,leavingSwithlittlesurplusandthusdrivingdownthevalueofS’ssubjectionofEtonearorbelowzero).

InresponsetoE’stax-settingmove,thesubjectstate(S),ifnotyetinsubjectiontoE,decideswhethertosubmitvoluntarilytoE.IfSisalreadysubjecttoE,itspopulationdecideswhethertomakesubstantialcapital(human,social,andfinancial)investments,deferringshort-termpayoffsinexpectationoflong-termgains.WeassumethatSprefers,allthingsconsidered,toinvestinthefuture,andwilldosounderreasonablygoodconditions.Ineachcase,S’schoiceisschematicallycharacterizedasHigh(Ssubmitswillinglyifnotyetsubjected,makesextensivecapitalinvestmentsifalreadysubject);Low(grudgingsubjection;limitedcapitalinvestments);orResist(seektoavoidsubjectionortodefectfromthehegemonicsystem).

IntheeventthatSchoosesResist,N(ature)decidestheoutcomebyalottery.Dependingontheoutcomeofthelottery,S’sresistancewilleitherSucceed(Sstaysoutofthehegemonicsystemifnotyetsubject,or,ifalreadysubject,successfullyleavesthecoalitionandthusisfreedfromtherequirementofmonetarytaxesandservice)orFail(Eforciblyimposesorre-establishesdomination).InthecaseofFail,EcoercivelyimposeswhateverconditionsorpunishmentonSthatEdeemsfit.

TheoutcomeoftheResistancelotteryisdeterminedbytheprobabilityofSuccess,setatsomepointbetween1and0.Theprobabilityofthesuccessofresistancedependsonavarietyoffactors,includingtheresourcesofEandS,whetherothersubjectsjoininresistance(forcingEtodivideitsattentionandresources),thepossibilityofaidfromotherpowerfulstates(whichmaymeanexchangingtheexistingEforsomeEʹ(e.g.AthensforPersiaorSparta).Smustcalculatetheprobabilityofsuccessandthevalueoffreedominordertodecidewhen(ifever)ResistoffersahigherpayoffthaneitherHighorLowcooperation.

E’spayoffsaredeterminedbythetaxesitcollectsfromSandtheadvantagesitgainsfromcoordination,lessthecosttoEofprovidingprotection,coordinationservices,andenforcement.Epreferstosetthetaxrateashighaspossiblerelativetothecostsofitsservices.E’spayoffsarereduced,however,ifSchoosesaLowlevelofcooperation,becauseE’sshareofcoordinationbenefitsdeclinesandthecostsofextractingrevenuesandofprovidingprotectionincreasewithS’slackoffullcooperation.E’spayoffisverylowintheeventthatSResistsandtheresistanceSucceeds.Inthiscase,EpaysthecostofwhateverfailedeffortsitmakestoforceStosubmit,losestheimperialrevenuesgeneratedbyS,andmustconfronttheknock-oneffectsofsuccessfulresistanceamongitsothersubjects.IfSResistsandtheresistanceFails,E’spayoffishardertodetermine:EmustpaythecostsofforcingSinto(orbackinto)submission.EmayprofitbypunishingSbyconfiscatingS’sresources.Butifthepunishmentisharsh,Emayloseresourcesduetothelong-term

6.19

degradationofS’seconomy(withpotentialnegativeeffectsfortheeconomyofitshegemonicdomain).

S’spayoffsareconditioned,first,onthevaluetoSoftheprotectionandcoordinationservicesprovidedbyE,lessthecostofmonetarytaxesandS’sservicerequirements.ThatvalueofprotectionwilldependonS’sassessmentofthreats(e.g.Persia,pirates)thatareblockedbyEandontheperceivedvalueofthecoordinationthatisspecifictobeingwithinE’szoneofdominion(e.g.theadvantagesthataccruetousingastandardcoinageissuedbyE).S’scostsincludemonetarytaxes(phoros),themoraleffectoflossofautonomy,thepossibleimpositionofagarrison,possibleinterferenceinlocalgovernment,andtheuncertaintyassociatedwithperiodicimpositionofnewrules(e.g.theAthenianCoinageDecree).InthecaseoftheResistchoice,thepayofftoSofFailwillbedeterminedbyE’schoiceofpunishment;ifEchoosestopunishseverely,thepayofftoSfromResist-Failwillbeverylow.IftheResistchoicesucceeds,thepayoffisthevalueoffreedomlessthecostsofself-protectionandthelossofwhatevercoordinationadvantagesaccruedtoSfrombeinginE’szoneofdomination.Perabove,Scalculatestheexpectedadvantageofresistancebasedontheprobabilityofitssuccess.

Ifwebracket,forthemoment,theResistoption,wecaneasilyworkouttheoutcomebasedonordinalpreferences(listedinFigure6.2)ofEandSbybackwardsinduction.IfEchoosesHightax,thenSprefersLowcooperation,eliminatingoutcomeα.IfEchoosesMediumorLowtax,SprefersHighcooperation,eliminatingoutcomesζandκ.Workingbackonthegametree,Enowchoosesbetweenβandε;Echoosesεwithitshigherpayoff.Sotheequilibriumsolutionofthegame,withouttheResistoption,isaMediumleveloftaxationbyEandHighcooperationbyS.ThatoutcomefitsThucydides’original“Minosparadigm”inwhichtheweakvoluntarilysubmittothestrong,withadvantagesaccruingtobothintermsofgrowthinmaterialwealth.But,aswehaveseen,inthecaseofAthens,fairlysoonaftertheoriginalcoalitionhadbeencreatedonavoluntarybasis,someofAthens’alliesdidinfactseektoleavetocoalition,thus,inthetermsofourgame,choosingtoResist.Afewstatescontinuedtotrytodefectfromthecoalition,evenafterAthenshadprovedeffectiveinsuppressingearlierdefections(thussuggestingthattheprobabilityofSucceedwasrelativelylow)andinthefaceofharshAthenianpunishments(showingthattheconsequencesoffailurecouldbesevere).Andyet,asThucydides’narrativedemonstrates,AthensdidnotfaceacascadeofdefectionuntilverylateinthePeloponnesianWar,afterAthenshadraisedtaxesonsubjectsandbattlefieldreverseshadweakenedAthens’coercivecapacity.

InordertocalculatetheexpectedadvantageofdefectiontoanygivenS,wewouldneedtoknowtheprobabilitythatitsresistancewouldbesuccessful.Thatmightbeassumedtobefairlylow,basedonthehistoricalexperiencerecordedbyThucydides.Butanaccuratemeasurementoftheprobabilityofsuccessforany

6.20

specificSatanyparticularhistoricalmomentwillvarywiththeseveralfactorsalludedtoabove.WewouldalsoneedtomeasurethevalueoffreedomtoaparticularSataparticularmoment,whichisveryhardtodetermine.Itisclear,however,that,ifweholdconstanttheprobabilityofSuccess,asEsetsthetaxratehigher,theexpectedadvantageofresistancetoSincreases.EcannotbecertainthatsettingthetaxrateataMediumlevel(orevenataLowlevel)willensurethatSwillsubmitwillinglyandwillnotdefect.ButEcanbequitesurethatsettingthetaxrateHighwillreduceS’sincentivetocooperateataHighrate,andwillincreasethelikelihoodthatSwillchoosetoresist. ThegamesuggeststhatarationalEshould,underordinarycircumstances,avoidtheHightaxrate,whichwillloweritspayoffduetoareductioninthelevelofcooperationbySandwillincreasethelikelihoodofcostlyresistance.Ifwehavesetthepayoffstoresistanceintherightgeneralrange(fromverylowtoveryhigh),resistancebySresultsatbestinalowpayofftoE,andatworstataverylowpayoff.Thus,evenifEhasahighprobabilityofsuppressingresistance,Eshouldseektoavoidconditionslikelytoprovokeresistance.Likewise,unless(1)theprobabilityofsuccessfulresistanceissubstantiallyhigherthanseemstobeimpliedbyThucydides’book1narrativeand(2)itvaluesitsfreedomfromthehegemonicsystemveryhighly,SoughttoavoidresistanceinfavoroftherelativelyfavorableequilibriumofMediumtaxesandHighcooperation.

Nevertheless,asweseefromThucydides’narrativeofthewaryears,imperialAthensdidsometimesraisetaxesfromwhatwemightreasonablycallaMediumtoaHighrate.AndAthens’subjects,andpotentialsubjects,didsometimesseektoresist.Sowhatwashappening?Clearly,theexigenciesofwarledtosomespecialcircumstances.Answeringthequestionofwhetherthosespecialcircumstanceschangedthecalculusemployedbyrationalstateactors,orwhetherthesechoicesconcerningtaxesandresistancewereviolationsofthe“folktheory”sortofinstrumentalrationalitythatThucydidesseeminglyattributestostatesinthepassagesofbook1consideredabove,isamongthemanychallengesthatThucydides’extraordinarytextposestoareaderconcernedwithhumanmotivationandpracticalreasoning.Here,weconsidertwofamoustestcases:therevoltofMytileneandAthens’conquestofMelos.6.6.MytileneResistsandFails.Acasestudy. In428BCE,themajorpolisofMytilene,amongthefewstatesintheAtheniancoalitionthatstillprovidedwarshipsratherthanpayingtribute,joinedmostoftheotherpoleisofLesbosinseekingtodefectfromtheAthenianimperialcoalition.ThucydidesnotesthattheoligarchicleadersofMytilenewishedtorevoltevenbeforetheoutbreakofthewar,butthattheyhadfailedtosecureSpartansupport(3.2.1).Theyweresubsequentlycompelledtocommenceoperationsbeforethey

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intended,becausenewsoftheirpreparations(ship-andwall-building,hiringmercenaries)wasconveyedtoAthensfrommultiplesources(3.2.2-3,3.4.2).TheMytileneanseventuallysecuredapromiseofaidfromSparta,butthePeloponnesianfleetsenttosupporttherevoltwasdilatoryandineffective.Mytileneanbattlefieldperformancewasmediocre.Aplantoarmthelowerclassesbackfired.Theattempteddefectionendedinsurrenderayearlater,inthefaceofacoordinatedandhighlyeffective,althoughverycostly,Athenianmilitaryresponse.30

Withtherevoltcrushed,theAthenianshadtodecideonpunishment:moderateorsevere?ThatquestionwasansweredinthecourseoftwomeetingsoftheAtheniancitizenassembly.Atthefirstmeeting,thedecisionwastoexecutetheentiremalepopulationandtoenslavethewomenandchildren.Theseveredecisionwasrevisitedathastily-calledsecondmeeting.Thucydidespresentsthemoststarklyopposedpositionsatthissecondmeetingthroughtwospeechesinthefamous“MytileneanDebate.”TheprominentdemagogueCleonurgedthattheoriginaldecisionbesustained;theotherwiseunknownDiodotusadvocatedforasubstantiallylighterpunishment.Diodotus’proposalnarrowlypassedonahandvote.Intheaftermath,onCleon’smotion,somethingover1000Mytileneans,thoughttobeheavilyimplicatedinplanningandcarryingouttherevolt,wereexecuted.TheagriculturallandofMytileneandtheotherLesbianpoleisthathadjoinedintherevoltwasconfiscatedanddistributedtoAtheniancolonistswholeaseditbacktotheoriginalowners.WhilethepunishmentexactedwasmoderatecomparedtotheseverepunishmentadvocatedbyCleon,Mytilenehadclearlypaidahighpriceforitsfailedattemptatdefection.31

Inhishistoricalnarrativeoftheseevents,andaseriesofspeeches–byMytileneanenvoystothePeloponnesianLeaguemeetingatOlympiaandbyaPeloponnesiancommander,aswellasbyCleonandDiodotusintheAthenianassembly–ThucydidespresentshisreaderwithadetailedaccountofthefactorsenteringintotheMytlileneandecisiontoresist,thetimingandnatureoftheAthenianresponse,thereasonsforthefailureoftheresistance,andtheargumentsofferedonbothsidesintheAthenianassemblyabouthowtopunishtheMytileneans.Thucydides’historyoftheMytileneanresistanceanditsaftermath,alongwiththeMeliannarrativeconsideredbelow,servesasacasestudyofempire-subjectrelationsandasatestofthetheoryofpowerandempirethat,soIhaveargued,isdevelopedinThucydidesbook1.

ThehypothesisthatThucydidesmeanttheMytileneanandMeliannarrativestotestatheoryofpowerpredicatedonwhatwehavebeencallingthefolktheoryofpracticalreasoningissupportedbytherhetoricoftheAtheniansatSpartainbook1(above),bytheAthenianassemblyorators,CleonandDiodotus,intheMytileneanDebate,andbytheanonymousAtheniansintheMelianDialogue.IneachcaseThucydides’Athenianspeakersdeployasimilarvocabularyofpower,similar

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premisesabouthumanmotivations,similarclaimsforthepriorityofinterestsovermoralconsiderationsofjustice,andasimilarfocusonthelikelihoodofsalientoutcomes.Ineachcasethespeakersbuttresstheirpositionswithreferencetocounterfactualscenarios.But,contrarytotheapparentconfidenceoftheAtheniansinSpartathatthetheoryleadsinevitablytospecificreal-worldpolicies,thereisstarkdisagreementbetweenCleonandDiodotusabouthowtoproceedinpunishingtheMytilenans.And,aswewillsee,theinstrumentalargumentsoftheAtheniansatMelosfailtopersuadetheMelianstoactinawaythatisconsistentwithexpectedadvantagemaximization.Thucydideshas,itseems,offeredhisreaderbothacleararticulationofthefolktheoryasitappliestointerstaterelationsandademonstrationofthepracticallimitsoftheapplicabilityofthattheorytoreal-worldinterstatepolitics. Thucydides’accountoftheMytileneanrevoltanditsaftermath,bothinnarrativepassagesandthespeeches,isrifewithstatementssuggestingthatstatesactinaccordancewithinstrumentalrationality.Whilethereareoccasionalhand-wavingreferencestojusticeandright(bytheMytileneansatOlympiaandbyCleon),theprimarymotivationofstatesisassumedbyallpartiestobetheirownself-interest.32Statesandindividuals(especiallymilitarycommanders)receiveinformationthatresultsinupdatedbeliefsaboutthestateoftheworldthatareinturnthebasisforcalculationsofrisk,decisions,andconsequentactions.33Therearefrequentallusionstoindividualsandstatesmakingchoices(orbeingpresumedtomakechoices)onthebasisoftheirexpectations,whichareinturnpredicatedontheirassessmentsoflikelihoodandtheirattitudestowardriskandchance.34 TheMytileneanenvoystothePeloponnesianLeagueatOlympiaseektomakearationalcasefortheirdefection.TheyadmitthattheyjoinedtheAtheniancoalitionvoluntarily(3.10.2-4),butclaimthattheirattitudechangedtofearfulnessafterthePersianswerenolongeranimmanentthreatandAthensbeganmakingitsalliesintosubjects.(3.10.4).35Atthatpointitseemedtothemunlikely(ougareikos)thattheAthenianswouldallowMytilenetoremainfree,sincenowtheyhadthepowertodootherwise(3.10.6).TheMytileneansassertthattheirfearswereexacerbatedbytheincreasingpowerdifferential:Athenswas“growingsteadilymorepowerfulandwemoredestitute”(3.11.1).36Theyofferageneralizationbasedonrationalfearconjoinedwithriskaversion:Theonlysecurebasisforanallianceisabalanceoffear,soeachside,althoughdesiringtoviolatetheagreement,isdeterredbyexpectationoffailure(3.11.2).37Clearlybythetimeoftherevolt,therewasnoparitybetweenAthenspowerandthatoftheMytileneans.But,thePeloponnesianslisteningtothisargument(andThucydides’reader)mightwellwonder,hadthereeverbeen?

TheMytileneansproposethattheAthenianshadthusfarleftthemfreeasasignaltootherpotentialalliesthattheircoalitionwascrediblycommittedto

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growingviathevoluntarychoicesofsubjectstates–sinceMytilenehaditsownwarships,thechoiceofsupportinganavyorpayingtributewas,itappeared,uptothenewcoalitionmember.TheydetailAthens’long-termstrategy:Leadthestrongerstatesinmilitaryactionsagainsttheweakstatesfirst.Thatleavesthestrongerstatesstrippedofpotentialalliesandlesscapableofresistancetothestrongest(3.11.3-4).Theyclaimthat,“We[AthensandMytilene]acceptedeachotheragainstourjudgment(paragnômên);fearmadethemattentive(etherapeouon)tousintimesofwarandustheminpeace.”38

ThepointseemstobethattheAthenians,whilerationallypreferringtosubjectMytilenefromthestart,didnotdosobecause,aslongastheywerebuildingtheircoalitionandfightingPersia,theAtheniansneededthesignalofvoluntarymembership,neededMytilene’shelpinsubjectingtheweak,andwereconcernedthatMytilenemightswitchitsalliancetothePeloponnesianLeague.Later,whentheAthenianshadgrownmorepowerfulandmostofMytilene’spotentialallieshadbeensubjectedbyAthens,theMytileneanscametofeartheAthenianswhonowhadlittlereasontofeartheconsequencesofreducingMytilenetothelevelofmeresubject.Thebalanceoffearhavingbecomeasymmetrical,Mytilenekeptquiet,whilesecretlypreparingforrevolt.Asymmetricalfearamongallieswas,bytheMytileneancalculus,inherentlydestabilizingofthestatusquo,andthusmotivatedthechoicetoresist.

TheMytileneans’statedjustificationfordefectionfromtheAtheniancoalitionisentirelybasedonexpectations:theirownanticipatedlossofadvantagesinthefaceofchangingrelationsofpowerandfear.Theycitenothingthatisparticularlybadintheircurrentsituation:Mytileneremainedfreeandnon-tributary.But,inacloseparallelwiththemotivationoftheSpartansattheoutbreakofthewar(perThucydides’analysisat1.23),giventhesteadygrowthofAthens’powerrelativetotheirown,theMytileneansanticipateadisadvantageousoutcome.Absenttheirpreemptiveaction,theyregardthatbadoutcomeasinevitable.

Allthatfitsneatlywiththepremisesofthefolktheory.But,uponamoment’sreflection,questionsarise.WhyhadtheMytileneansbeenincapableoflookingdownthegametreeattheundesirableoutcomeofsuperiorAthenianstrengthforcingthemintoovertsubjection?WhydidtheyagreetojoininsubjugatingtheweakerstatesifthegamepredictablyendedincatastrophicAtheniansuperiority?TheMytileneanschosetheircourseofactionbasedonacalculationofexpectedadvantage,buttheywere,itseems,inadequatelyexpertatassessingtherelevantstateoftheworldandmeasuringtheprobabilities.TheyclaimtohaveupdatedtheirbeliefsinlightoftheconditionsthatarosewhenPersiaceasedtobeathreat.Butinchoosingtoresist,theyevidentlydiscountedthechancethatinformationabouttheirpreparationswouldbebroughttoAthensandwouldleadtoatimelyAthenianresponse.Theyunder-estimatedAthens’capacitysimultaneouslytomount

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defensiveandoffensivenavaloperations.Theyover-estimatedthevalueofSparta’spromisesofaid.TheymiscalculatedthelikelyresponseoftheMytileneanlowerclassestobeingarmed.TheresultwasthefailureofMytilene’sresistance–aresultthat,Thucydidesimplies,couldhavebeenforeseenbyastatesman(likePericles)withadequateinformationandthecapacityaccuratelytomeasurerelevantprobabilities.

Inmakingtheirdivergingargumentsforpunishment,CleonandDiodotusaddressthequestionoftheMytileneans’motivesfordefecting.Cleon’sargumenthingesoncastingtheMytileneansasviciouscriminalswhohadwillfullycarriedoutaggressiveanddamagingactions,hadbeenapprehended,andnowmustpayfortheircrimes(3.38.1,3.39.1-2,3.40.1).Heemphasizesthattheoffensewasdeliberate(3.40.1).ButhealsocharacterizestheMytileneansasincapableofreasoningclearlyaboutmeansandends.Theyfailedtotakeintoaccountrelevantinformation:“Thefateofthoseoftheirneighborswhohadpreviouslyrebelled,andhadbeensubduedbyus,wasnolesson(paradeigma)tothem.”Theywereincapableofcorrectlyweighingthevalueoftheircurrentsituationagainstimaginedfuturegains:Theprosperity(eudaimonia)theyenjoyed(asaprivilegedmemberofthecoalition)didnotmakethemhesitateinattemptingtheirrashactions.Andso,“boldlyconfidentinthefutureandwithhopesthatexceededtheircapacity(dunamis)butfellshortoftheirwishes(boulêsis),theydeclaredwar,seeingfittovaluestrengthoverjustice.”39

Inbrief,CleoncharacterizestheMytileneans,enmasse,asdevoidofanappropriatesenseofjustice,asthesortofincurableThrasymacheanegoistsalludedtoin(Plato’s)Protagoras’accountofsocialdevelopment(Chapter2).Cleonseestheempireasthesocietythatmustbeprotectedagainsttheproliferationofegoisticbehaviorthroughtheexterminationofincorrigibles.But,unlikeProtagoras,hecharacterizespunishmentasvengeance,noteducation.CleonaddressestheAtheniansasemotionalindividualswhowereunfairlymadetoexperienceintensefearandangeruponlearningoftheMytlieneanrevolt.Heurgesthemnowtomaximizetheirownsubjectivehappinessbyexactingrevengeonthosewhowillinglycausedthemthatemotionalupset(3.38.1).

Cleonseekstoconjoinhislegalisticargumentaboutcollectiveguiltandhisemotionalargumentforthesubjectivevalueofvengeancewithastateinterest-basedargumentforseverepunishment:Punishingwillfuldefectorsatthesame(moderate)levelasthosewhowerecompelledbyanenemytodefectwillleadotherstatestochoosedefection,meaningAthenswillrepeatedlybeforcedtorisklivesandtreasureinputtingdownrevolts.Moreover,evenwhentherevoltsfail,thesubjectpoleiswillberuinedandrevenueslost(3.39.7-8).Therefore,heurgestheAssemblytoconjoinjusticewithAthenianinterestsandtopunishtheMytileneanswithdeath(3.40.4).Heconcludesthatpunishingtheguiltyastheydeservewillbea

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salutaryexample(saphesparadeigma)toAthens’othersubjectstates,teachingthemthatrebellionmeansdeath(3.40.7).

DiodotusreprimandsCleon,firstforfocusingonMytileneanguiltratherthanAthenianinterests,asifthecontextwerealawcourtratherthanapolicy-makinglegislativeassembly(3.44.1,4)andthenforover-estimatingthedeterrenteffectofdeathpenalties.HecharacterizestheMytileneans’motivesfordefectingandtheirfaultyinstrumentalreasoningastypicalofaflawed(fromthepointofviewofrationalchoice-making)humanpsychology:Buoyedbyhope,peoplealwaystakefoolishrisks(kinduneuousi);noindividualattemptssomethingdangerouswhilebelievingthathewillfail.(3.45.1).Likewise,everysubjectpolisthatresistssupposesthatitsownresourcesoritsallianceswillenableittosucceed(3.45.2).Ofcoursetheircalculationsarefaulty,but“allarebynaturepronetoerror,bothinpublicandprivateaffairs.”40Realhumansare,inbrief,nottheperfectcraftsmenofself-interestassumedinThrasymachus’andGlaucon’sversionsofthefolktheory.

Diodotuscontinues:Thetendencytomakeerrorsincalculationisnotamatterofspecificmaterialcircumstances:Povertyencouragestheboldnessofnecessity;plentystimulatesattitudesofarrogance(hubris)andgreed(pleonexia);andeveryotherconditionoflifehassomecorrespondingpassion(orgê)thatpromotesrisk-taking(3.45.4).Hope(elpis)conspireswithdesire(erôs),“theonedevisingtheenterprise,theotherrepresentingthechancesasfavorable”;41andtogethertheyoverpowerobservationsofdanger(3.45.5).Chance(tuchê)playsarolebecause(asPlatonotes:above)unexpectedthingsdoinfacthappen.Focusingonthat(howeverremote)possibilityinducesrisk-takingbythosewithinadequatemeans.Thistypeofestimationerrorisespeciallytypicalofstatescontendingforthehighstakesoffreedomandempire,because,whenactingaspartofacollectivity,eachindividualover-estimateshisowncapacity(3.45.6).Theresult,Diodotus’audienceisledtosuppose,isanunrealisticassessmentofcollectivecapacity.Insum,“itissimplyimpossibleandutterlyabsurdtosupposethathumannature,whenbentuponsomefavoredproject,canberestrainedeitherbythestrengthoflawsorbyanyotherterror”(3.45.7).Thus,neitherrulesnorfearcanbecountedontoleadwillfulhumanstoactaccordingtoarationalcalculusoftheirmaterialinterests.

Forallhisemphasisontheirreducibleroleofirrationalityinhumanaffairs,DiodotusfocusesinsistentlyonAthenianinterests,which,heasserts,arebestservedbymoderatingthepunishmentoftheMytileneansandattendingtotheeffectsthatpresentpolicywillhaveonfuturechoicesandoutcomes(3.44.1-3).Henotesthatpunishingrebellionwithdeathwouldensurethatthosewhodorevolt(astheywill,givenhumanproclivitytoerrinformulatingbeliefsessentialtomeans-endreasoning)haveanincentivetofighttotheend.Everyrevoltwill,thereforedestroythesubjectcityandwithitAthens’revenues(46.1-3).Theanswertotheproblemof

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resistanceisnotretrospectivepunishment.Ratheritisforward-lookingandcarefuladministration(epimeleia:3.46.4)–presumablythismeanssettingthetaxrateatalevelthatwillencourageinvestmentanddiscourageresistance–andwatchfulguardingandproactivemeasuresaimedatpreventingsubjectsfromeverformingtheideaofresistance(3.46.5-6).Moreover,sinceitisnotpossibletopreventallrevolts,Athensshould(likePlato’sCallipolis,above)exploitfactionaldifferences.Athenshasanobviouswaytodothatbyconsistentlysupportingthelowerclassesagainstlocalelites.ExecutingthemassesofMytilenealongwithitseliteleaderswouldfatallyundermineAthens’currentdemocraticadvantageas“thefriendofthedemos”ineveryGreekstate.(3.47.2-4).Insum,itissimplyimpossibletoconjoinjusticeandAthenianinterests,asCleonvainlyurges(3.47.5);afuture-oriented,soundandwellreasonedpolicy(eubouleuetai)ismoreeffectiveagainstadversariesthansenselessforce(ischuosanoiai:3.48.2).

GiventhatThucydidesisopenlyhostileinhischaracterizationofCleon,andevidentlydisgustedbytheprospectofthemasskilling,thereaderisledtofavorDiodotus’policyofrelativeleniency.ButtheattentivereaderwillnotbesurprisedbythesplitAthenianvote.TheinstrumentalrationalityoftheGreekfolktheoryisthegoverningpremiseofbothspeeches,and,accordingtoThucydides,guidesthebehaviorofallrelevantparties–Athenians,Mytileneans,andSpartans.But,bybook3,Thucydidesinpropriapersona,alongwiththevariousspeakersinhistext,hasacknowledgedthat,inpractice,thefolktheorycannotaccuratelypredictactualbehaviorofcollectivitiesor,therefore,ofstates.

Theproblemisnotthattherelevantactorsdonotimaginethattheyareactingrationally:makingchoicesbasedonrankedpreferences,updatingreality-trackingbeliefs,andaccuratelymeasuringtherelevantlikelihoods.Rather,theproblemisthatpeople,whenactingascollectivities,areoftenmistakenintheirbeliefsabouttherelevantstateoftheworldandtheyallowhopeandgreed(amongotherpassions)tobiastheirassessmentsofchanceandrisk.Thatbeingthecase,itisunclearhowarationaldecision-makeroughttoproceed–evenassuming,asThucydidesdoesnot(Ober1998chapter2),thatacollectivepolicy-maker,liketheAtheniandemocraticassembly,wascapableofsustainingrationalityintheabsenceofaPericles-likeleader.Ifthechoicesofotherplayersinthegamearesimplyunpredictable,thereisnoobviouswaytochooserationallyamongavailableoptionsinsettingimperialpolicy.

Andyet,aswesaw,ThucydidesclearlyexpectshisreadertobelievethatThemistoclesandPericleshadbeenabletomakerationalpolicyinthefaceoftheseuncertainties.Steppingbackfromthepossibilityofrationalityinthephenomenalworld,asitisexemplifiedbythehistoricaleventsdescribedbyThucydides,mightThucydides’readerreasonablyhopetodevelopa“Periclean”abilitytoexplainand

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perhaps,therefore,predictthedirectionandlevelofdeviationsfromrationalbehavior?ThatquestionrecursintheMeliannarrativeofbook5.

6.7.Melos’prospects Inthesummerof416BCEAthensdispatchedalargefleetagainstthemodest-sizedAegeanisland-polisofMelos.42ThegoalwastoforcetheMelianstojointheAtheniancoalitionasasubjectstate.Thucydidescataloguestheexpedition:30Athenianwarships,sixfromChios,twofromLesbos;3100hoplites(1600Athenianand1500allied);300archersand20mountedarchers(5.84.1).43AthenshadattackedMelosadecadebefore.A60-shipexpedition(withanunknownnumberofhoplitesandarchers),ledbythegeneralNicias,ravagedMelos’territoryin426BCE(3.91.1-3).TheMeliansrefusedtosubmitandNiciasmovedalongtopre-plannedoperations(3.91.4)againstBoeotiaandLocris.The416attackevidentlyhadMelosasitssoletarget(5.114.2).TheAthenianforcesoccupiedMelianterritorybutbeforetheycommencedravagingtheAthenianssentenvoys,whosoughttonegotiatetermsofMeliansurrender(5.84.3).TheenvoysspokeincamerawithMelos’oligarchicrulers(haiarchaikaihoioligoi),havingbeendeniedanaudiencewiththeMeliancitizenmasses(plêthos5.84.3).Afternegotiationsfailed,theAtheniansbeganasiege,buildingawallaroundthecity;thebulkoftheAthenian-ledforcesthenreturnedhome.TheMeliansattackedthesiegeworkstwiceinthecourseofthenextmonths,inflictingsomecasualties.Athensrespondedbysendingreinforcementsandsteppingupoperations.Thecitywasbetrayedfromwithin,leadingtheMelianstosurrender.ChoosingtheseverepunishmentoptionthathadbeennarrowlyrejectedintheMytileneanDebate,theAtheniansexecutedtheremainingmalepopulationofMelosandenslavedthewomenandchildren.Theylatersentout500coloniststooccupyMelos’territory(5.114-115). ThucydidesoffershisreadersanaccountoftheultimatelyfailednegotiationsbetweenAthenianenvoysandMelos’rulersintheformofadialogue,agenreemployedinextendedformnowhereelseinhistext.Asaresultofnon-negotiablediscursiverulessetbytheAtheniansattheoutset(5.87)thedialoguefocusesinsistentlyonstateinterests,reality-trackingbeliefs,risk,andexpectations–ratherthanjustice,rights,andwrongs.TheAtheniansstateexplicitlythatbothsidesinthenegotiationmustacceptasthepremiseofthenegotiationsastrong(intermsdevelopedabove:neo-Thrasymachean)versionofthefolktheory:Thepowerfulwilldojustastheyplease(perGygesandthering,inthepresentcasethismeansrulingoverothers).Theweakmusteithersubmitorbedestroyed(5.89).

[Figure6.3abouthere:MelosGame]

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TheAthenianenvoysassume,however,thatthenegotiationisanon-zerosumbargainingsituation,inwhichbothsideshavesomethingtogainbystrikingadeal(seeChapter4).Fortheirpart,theAthenianspreferMelos’peacefulsurrendertofightingbecauseitavoidsthecostsoffightingandbecauseitisinAthens’interest,justasitisintheinterestoftheMelians,thatMelosbepreserved.ThisisclosetoDiodotus’argumentintheMytileneandebate,totheeffectthatlivesubjectsareavaluableresource.44WithreferencetoFigure6.3,theAthenianspreferoutcomesα/β:afterMelossubmitsAthenschoosesataxratebetweenmoderate(α)andheavy(β).Theenvoyssuggestthattheirpreferenceisforα:TheyaremakinganofferthatwillallowtheMelianstoretaintheircountrywhilepayingtribute(5.111.4).Thisisinlinewiththe“Minos-Athens”modelofanimperialregimeofmoderatetaxationandhighcapitalinvestment,alogicthathadsustainedAthens’empiretothispoint(above).Herethemodelissummedupinanapothegm:“thosewho,whilerefusingtosubmittotheirequals,yetcomportthemselveswiselytowardstheirsuperiorsandaremoderatetowardstheirinferiors—these,wesay,aremostlikelytoprosper.”45

TheMeliansaskhowitcanbeintheirinteresttobeenslaved.TheAtheniansreplythatitistotheMelians’advantagetosubmitbeforethey“sufferthemostterriblethings”(patheintadeinotata),justastheAthenianswillgainby“notdestroyingyou”(mêdiaphtheiranteshumas:5.101-103).ThisisthemostexplicitstatementinthedialogueaboutthelikelylevelofpunishmentshouldtheMeliansresistandfail.Thedestructiontheywillsufferisworsethanslavery;itispresumablydeath.ThethreatisreiteratedintheAthenianssummation:theMeliansshouldreflectmanytimesintheirdeliberationthatitisthefateoftheir“oneandonlyfatherland”(patris)thatisatstakeintheirdecision(5.111.5);theimplicationisthatiftheyfighttheywillloseeverything.ThekeypointintheAthenianbargainingpositionisthatbecausetheMelianshavenorealisticchanceofwinningafight,theyhaveaBATNA(bestalternativetonegotiatedagreement:seeChapter4)ofzero.TheAthenianBATNA,destroyingMelos,whileitislessgoodthanthebargaintheenvoysseek,isnotsimilarlylow:subduingMeloswillnotbeterriblycostly. TheMelians’top-rankedpreferenceisforMelostoretainneutralityandfortheAthenianssimplytogoaway(outcomeη).Thatis,theyseeka“thirdroad,”neithersubmittingnorfighting(compare.Chapter1:Herodotus’GygesandtheQueen’s“tworoads”).ThatthirdoptionisunavailabletotheMelians,however,astheAtheniansstateexplicitly,becauseitisAthens’leastpreferredoutcome.TheAtheniansarecrediblycommittedtofightingifMeloswillnotsubmit,becausetoacceptMelianneutralitywouldbeafatalsignaltotheothersubjectsofAthens’weakness.Athens’choicetosendoutalargeforcewiththeannouncedpurposeofsubduingMeloswasawayofbindingthestatetothemastofimperialexpansion.Iteliminatedtheriskthatsomepersuasiveargument(justice,pity,expedience)would

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bluntAthens’resolvetoconquertheislandpolis.BackingdownwouldrevealthatAthenslackedthewillandthemeanstogainitspreferredends(5.94-99).Assuch,allowingMelostobeneutralwouldthreatenthesurvivaloftheempire. Withthetop-rankedthirdoptioneliminated,theMeliansmustchoosebetweensubmittingwithahighprobabilityofoutcomeα(paymoderatetax)andfighting.Iftheychoosetofight,theywilleitherwinorlose.Winninggivesthemagoodoutcome(γ);losingmeansthatMeloswillbepunishedatsomerate,chosenbytheAthenians,betweenmoderateandsevere(δ/ε).Aswehaveseen,theAthenianenvoysrepresentthepunishmentaslikelytobesevere.

AssumingthattheMelianstakethethreatofseverepunishmentseriously,theymustacceptthatiftheylose,theywillendupwithnothingbutothers’memoryoftheirhavingfoughthonorably:nofatherland,property,orlives.So,iftheMelians’choiceistobemadeinaccordwiththeprincipleofexpectedadvantage,itwillbedeterminedbytherelativeweightofthevaluetheyplaceontheircurrentcondition(independentandtaxfree:Current),theremainder(Current–(Tax+Honor))leftthemaftersubmittingwithoutafight,andtheprobability(p)ofwinningorlosingafight.TheAtheniansseektodemonstratethat(1)attachingvaluetoHonorisfoolish:itisdishonorableindeedtosubmittoanequalwithoutafight,butnodisgraceattachestosubmissiontovastlysuperiorpower;(2)Honoraside,Current–Taxisofverysubstantialvalue;theMelianswillbeprosperousunderAthenianrule;(3)theprobabilityofMelianvictoryisnearzero(5.111.2). Fortheirpart,theMeliansclingstubbornlytotheideathatHonorisofhighvalueandtheyproposeaseriesofreasonstobelievethattheyhaveachanceofwinning.Theiroptimism,characterizedbytheAtheniansasadestructivelyvainhope,restsonthreenotions(1)thegodsmayfavortheminlightofthejusticeoftheircause;(2)theSpartans,theirkinsmen,mightsendthemaid;(3)theunexpectedcanhappen:thereisalwaysachanceofthingsturningoutfavorably.TheAtheniansbluntlyrejectthesehopefulthoughtsascontrarytoreason:Thegods(iftheyexist)areimpartialandthemselveslivebytherulethatthestrongmustrule.TheSpartansactintheirowninterestevenmoreconsistentlythandootherpeople;moreover,theyareriskaverse.SpartahasnointerestinchallengingAthensatsea.(5.104-110).TheenvoysareclearlyexasperatedbytheMelians’suppositionthathopingisaformofpracticalreasoning,andbytheirconflationofmerechancewithcalculatedprobabilityandriskassessment(5.104.2-3). Readersinterestedininstrumentalrationality,asThucydidesclearlybelievesweoughttobe,areleftwithapuzzle.TherewascertainlyasolutiontothebargainingproblemfacingtheAtheniansandtheMelians:bothsideswouldhavebenefitedfromstrikingabargainthatleftMelosintact.TheMeliansdonot,inThucydides’text,seemtobeHomericintheirhyper-valuationofhonorandsubsequentmemory,norsoreligiouslydeludedastoputfullfaithindivine

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salvation.Sotheyapparentlymadethewrong,seeminglyirrational,choicetofight.Why?Thatquestionhasoftenbeenaskedandtherecanbenodefinitiveanswer.PerhapstheMeliansheldbeliefs(insomeaggregateofgodsandSpartans)thatfailedtotrackreality.PerhapstheyputtoomuchweightontherecentprecedentoftheirsuccessfulresistancetotheNiciasexpeditionof426BCEandmiscalculatedthelikelihoodthatAthenswouldgiveupafterashortsiege.PerhapstheythoughttheAthenianswerebluffingwhentheyalludedto“themostterriblethings.”

Whilethereistextualreasontothinkthateachofthosefactorswasinplay,therepeatedemphasisintheMelianDialogueonthedifferencebetweenhopeandreason,assessableriskandmerechance,pointstoasomewhatdifferentexplanation:TheMelianswerenotsimplybadatthereasoningprocessesinvolvedinmaximizingexpectedadvantage.Theywere,instead,operatingwithadifferentconceptionofpracticalreason.Theydidnotweighlikelygainsagainstlikelylossestochooseacourseofactionleadingtooutcomeaimedatmaximizingexpectedadvantage.Rather,theybasedtheirdecisiononareferencepoint,theircurrentcondition;theintolerableprospectoflossesthatleftthembelowtheirreferencepoint;andacorrespondingconvictionthattheremustbesomewaytoavoidthatloss.Ihaveargued,inanarticlewrittenwithTomerPerry(OberandPerry2014),thattheMelianDialoguecanbestbeunderstoodinlightoftheprospecttheorydevelopedbyDanielKahnemanandhisco-authorsandcollaborators.46HereIreiterateafewofourconclusions.

InthefaceoftheAthenianthreat,theMelianoligarchsmadeagamblethatwasill-advisedfromtheperspectiveofrationalityasexpectedadvantagemaximization.Insodoing,theyactedjustasother(modern)humanspredictablydowhentheyaredrivenbythehopeofsomehowavoidingthehighprobabilityofalargeloss.Over-valuingtheircurrentcondition,anddiscountingtheremaindertheywillretainaftertheloss,theyimaginetheconditionofsalvationtoovividly.Theyhopeagainsthope,“astrangebutall-too-humanturnofthought,”47thattheywillbeabletoretaintheirstatusquo.Inthiscase,thestatusquoisMelos’standingasanindependentstateandtheoligarchs’ownpositionofauthorityinthatstate.

AstheAthenianenvoyspointouttotheMelians,thereisverylittlechancethattheMelianswillwininafight,andtherebykeepthestatusquo.TheMeliansdonotdisputethisfact:Theyseeminglyacknowledgethattheyhaveslimchancesofvictoryinthecaseofmilitaryconfrontation.Astheirrepresentativessay:“you[Athenians]maybesurethatweareaswellawareasyouofthedifficultyofcontendingagainstyourpowerandfortune,unlessthetermsbeequal”(5.104).Butthentheyseemtocomeupwithascenariothatmiraculouslyevenstheodds:Sincetheunexpectedcanhappen,whoistosayitwon’t?ThedisputebetweentheMeliansandtheAthenians,accordingtoThucydides’narrative,wasnotduetodeepdisagreementaboutthefacts;theactualoddsofsuccesscanbetakenascommon

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knowledge.Moreover,wehaveseen,theAtheniansalsomakeitcleartotheMeliansthatincorporationintotheempirewillmeanonlylimitedlosses:IftheMelianssubmitwithoutafighttheywillbepeacefullybroughtintowhatamountstoanAthenianco-prosperitysphere.Thecurrentrulingoligarchsmaylosetheirmonopolyonpoliticalpower.Taxeswillcertainlyincrease,sinceMeloswillpaytribute.AndofcourseMeloswilllosethecovetedstatusofindependentstate.ButtheMelianswillkeeptheirlivesandproperty(lesstaxes).

Fromtheviewpointofthe“Minos-Athens”variantofthefolktheory,theMeliandecision-makers,facedwithanuncertainprospect,oughttochoosebetweentheexpectedvalueassignedtodifferentpossibleoutcomes,basedonmaterialadvantageandprobability.Therationalchoicewillbetheonewiththegreatestexpectationofmaterialadvantage,onceprobabilityhasbeenproperlyfactoredin.Thegreatertheprobabilityofanoutcome,thegreaterweightitshouldhave.TheMeliansshouldweighthetinychanceofkeepingeverything(thestatusquo:theirreferencepoint)againstthecertaintyofkeepingasubstantialfractionofwhattheycurrentlyhave.Whateverprobabilitiesonemightassigntothetwopossibilities,thegeneralsituationisclearenough:thereisaminutechanceofkeepingthestatusquobutitiscertain(presumingthattheAthenians’claimthatsubmissionwillnotentaildestructioniscredible)thattheMelianscankeepasizablepartofwhattheyhaveiftheysubmit.Thatremainderis,however,notcountedbytheMeliansasavalue,butasalossrelativetotheirreferencepoint.

TheseeminglyirrationalchoiceoftheMelianrulerstogambleeverythingonthefainthopeofretainingtheircurrentpositionseemstotaketheAthenianenvoysbysurprise,butitwouldnotbeunexpectedtoanyonefamiliarwithwhatKahnemanandTverskycall“lossaversion.”48KahnemanandTverskyshowedthatmostpeoplearerisk-seekerswhentheyarefacedwithaprospectivechoicebetween(1)asmallchancetoavoidanylosspairedwithacorrespondinglylargechanceofsufferingagreatloss,and(2)thecertaintyoflosingmuchoftheircurrentendowmentwhileretainingasubstantialpartofit.Offeredthechoicebetweenatinychancetokeepeverything(avoidingallloss)andthecertaintyofhighcosts(losingalotbutfarfromall),mostpeoplewillirrationallychoosetogambleontheslightpossibilityofavoidingthegreatloss.Fortheoutsidechancetolosenothingtheybetagainstahighlikelihoodofcatastrophe.AsKahnemanunderlinesthecircumstancesandconsequencesofthisformofreasoning:“peoplewhofaceverybadoptionstakedesperategambles,acceptingahighprobabilityofmakingthingsworseinexchangeforasmallhopeofavoidingalargeloss.Risktakingofthiskindoftenturnsmanageablefailuresintodisasters.Thethoughtofacceptingthelargesurelossistoopainful,andthehopeofcompleterelieftooenticing,tomakethesensibledecisionthatitistimetocutone’slosses.”49ThissomberassessmentexactlydescribestheMelians’situation,theirdecision,anditsoutcome.

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TheAthenianspeakersintheMelianDialogueareexasperatedbecausetheybelievethatthebetterchoicefortheMeliansisobvious,basedontheirseverelyconstrainedoptionsandthenear-certaintyofthedisastrousoutcomeshouldtheychoosetoresist.LikeGygesconfrontedwiththeQueen’sguardsinHerodotus’story,theyareconfrontedwithadirenecessity,havenothirdoption,andunderthecircumstancesoughttochoosetolive.Moreover,theAtheniansemphasizethatAthens’long-time-horizonapproachtoempireis,relativetothepredationsofarovingbandit,advantageoustoitssubjects(5.111.4).TheAthenianscouldsimplytakeeverythingbyseizingtheislandbyforce;theydonotdosobecauseAthensplaysthegameofEmpireaimingatmaximizingreturnsinthelongrun.Thisisthesubstantive(asopposedtomerelyprocedural)reasonthattheAtheniansclaimthatthenegotiationcanbecarriedonunderthebannerofepieikeia–equitabilityorfairness:TheenvoysareinfactmakinganofferthatisoverallbetterthanwhatAthenscoulddemand.50YettheMeliansstubbornlyrefuse,actinginaccordwiththeirloss-averseprospectivereasoning,turning,inKahneman’swords(citedabove),“amanageablefailureintodisaster.”

ThepointreadersmaytakeawayfromThucydides’Meliannarrativeisthathumanchoice-makers,whenfacedwithverybadoptions,are,fromthepointofviewoftheGreekfolktheory,notonlyirrational,butpredictablyirrational.Thismeansthataninstrumentallyrationalplayerinabargainingsituationwillneedtotakeaccountofthelikelihoodofdeviationfromplaybasedonexpectedadvantage.Anyplayerawareofthisaspectofhumannature–whichistosay,inthevocabularyofprospecttheory,anyonewhoisawareoflossaversion–shouldanticipateafailuretoemploytheexpectationprinciplewhenanotherplayerisconfrontedwithdireprospects.HavingpaidproperattentiontotheargumentsonbothsidesoftheMelianDialogue,Thucydides’carefulreaderwillanticipateafailureofpracticalreasonunderstoodinthetermsofexpectation-basedinstrumentalrationality.TheAthenianenvoys,makingtheirargumentsasiftheywerefacinganinstrumentallyrationalplayer,didnotdosoandtheresultwasthefailuretostrikeamutuallybeneficialbargain.Thegamedevolvesfromnon-zero-sumtozero-sum.TheMeliansloseeverythingandtheAtheniansgainlessthantheywouldhavehadthebargainbeenstruckonthetermstheyhadoffered.

HadtheAthenianenvoyshadamoresophisticatedideaofthedifferencebetweenreasoningfromexpectationsandfromprospects,theymighthavetakenthelikelihoodofan“irrational”Melianchoicetoresistintoaccount.Butwouldthathavemadeadifferenceintheend?Couldthebargainingproblemtheyfacedbesolved,inlightoftheofAtheniancommitmenttotheconquestofMelos?TheAtheniandemos–offthestageofThucydides’Meliannarrative,butever-presentintheconsciousnessofhisreader–hadevidentlydecided,whenauthorizingthe

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expeditionagainstMelos,tostakeAthens’credibilityasanimperialpoweronsubduingtheislandpolis.HadthatdecisionalreadysealedtheMelians’fate?

Moreover,thereadermayconcludethatbycommittingthemselvestoexpandingtheirempire,theAthenianshadabandonedthepossibilityofreturning,inacredibleway,tothestatusquoanteofPericles’originalnon-expansionstrategy(1.144.1,2.65.7).Asthereaderwilllearn,inthenextbookofThucydides’history,theimpossibilityofacredibleAtheniancommitmentnottoexpandwillprovetohaveseriousconsequencesaftertheAthenianshavelaunchedanexpeditionagainstSyracuse.WhentheAtheniansseektorecruitalliesinSicilyandsouthernItalytheirassertionstotheeffectthattheirmotivationwasfearandnotgreedaregreetedwithskepticism.PotentialalliesrejectAthenianoffersofcooperation.51Didtheseeminglycasual(perhapsconsensual?InanyeventnotproductiveofadebateregardedbyThucydidesofworthrecording)choiceoftheAthenianassemblytoincorporatelittleMelosintotheempiresubstantiallyincreasethelikelihoodthatAthenswouldenduplosinginSicily,andthenultimatelylosingthePeloponnesianWar?ItisbyposingthosesortsofquestionsthatThucydidesmaylayclaimtomakinganenduringcontributiontoancientandmoderntheoriesofrationalityandchoice.

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Figure6.1.ElderGuardians’decisiontree.Notes:Notes:E=ElderGuardians;seniorarmedforcesofCallipolis;p=probabilityGuardianswinorlosebattle(=risktochildren);p’=probabilitychildrenescapefrombattlefieldonhorseback;s=valueofchildren’ssurvival;b=valueofchildren’sobservationofbattle.

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Figure6.2.Empiregame.E=Empire(Athens);S=subjectorpotentialsubjectstate;N=Nature(lotteryoversuccessorfailureinresistance).

E" S"

S"

S"

N"

N"

N"

Medium"

Low"

Low"

Low"

α"

θ"

ζ"

δ"

β" γ"

ε"

κ"

ι"

η"

μ"

λ"

Outcome( Path( Payoff(((E,S)(

α" ΗH" 5,1"

β" HL" 3,2"

γ" HRS" low,"v."high"

δ" HRF" low,"v."low"

ε" MH" 4,4"

ζ" ML" 2,3"

η" MRS" v."low,"high"

θ" MRF" low,"v."low"

ι" LH" 2,5"

κ" LL" 1,2"

λ" LRS" v."low/medium"

μ" LRF" low,"v."low"

)"

)"

)"

p"

p"

p"

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Figure6.3.MelosGame.Notes:M=Melians;N=Nature;A=Athenians;p=probabilityMelianswinorlosethefight;r=rangeofAthens’taxationonMelians;r’=Athens’rangeofpunishmentofMelians.

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