Creating a Code of Ethics for Intelligence Analysis

Stephen MarrinAssistant Professor

Intelligence Studies DepartmentMercyhurst College

Erie, PA 16546smarrin@mercyhurst.edu

Paper Prepared for Roundtable on Intelligence Ethics #3

International Studies Association ConferenceChicago, IL

2 March 2007

Intelligence analysis is currently professionalizing, but a corresponding code of ethics--a necessary component of every profession--is still in rudimentary stages. Before an effective code of ethics can be created, analysts and ethicists will have to address the multiple entities that the analyst has ethical obligations to, and resolve the dilemma regarding what to do when the interests of those entities conflict.

In a prior article addressing the nature of intelligence analysis professionalization and the role that a code of ethics plays in this process,1 my co-author—Dr. Jonathan Clemente—and I advocate the creation of an overarching American Intelligence Analysis Association (AIAA) modeled on the American Medical Association. We used the AMA as a model because it played an important in the professionalization of medicine, and we believe the AIAA could play a similar role for intelligence analysis.

As part of our argument, we observe that an important function of the AIAA would be to develop a code of ethics for intelligence analysts because “many different kinds of intelligence analysts—both within and between organizations—can be bound together through a single code of ethics that can be standardized across the broader intelligence analysis community.”2 In this way, the code of ethics would “provide a mechanism for integrating the different intelligence analysis disciplines and specialties into a coherent whole” in the same way that the AMA’s code of ethics dedicated to improving the health of the patient provides a mechanism for binding its different specialties together.3

We suggest the AIAA would be an effective way to bring together intelligence analysts from the national security, law enforcement and business intelligence arenas into a single coherent profession. An analytic profession is not the only kind of profession that could develop out of the broader intelligence community, but it is one of them. As Michael Davis, an expert in professional ethics, observes, “Each profession is a continuing discussion. . . . To join a profession is, in part, to enter that discussion, gaining some control over a common enterprise by giving up the right to act as a mere individual.”4

Accordingly, defining the characteristics of the participants in the discussions can be an important determining factor in the direction of the future professionalization process. Specifically, intelligence analysis could be considered a profession because its practitioners use similar techniques to achieve the same goal: providing information to improve decisionmaking in all of their respective fields.

As of today, however, the code of ethics for intelligence analysts is still quite rudimentary, consisting in essence of independence and objectivity. But “the CIA has begun articulating a code of ethics for intelligence analysts based on the doctrine

1 For example, see Marrin and Clemente’s “Modeling an Intelligence Analysis Profession on Medicine.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Vol. 19. No. 4. (Winter 2006-2007). 642-665. Also see: Marrin’s “Intelligence Analysis: Turning a Craft into a Profession.” Proceedings of the 2005 International Conference on Intelligence Analysis. McLean, Virginia. May 2005. 2 Marrin and Clemente, “Modeling…” 657-658. 3 Marrin and Clemente, “Modeling..”, 657. 4 Michael Davis. Codes of Ethics, Professions, and Conflict of Interest. Professional Ethics. V1N1&2. 190.

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espoused by Sherman Kent in the 1950s and 1960s. …Frans Bax, the founding Dean of the CIA’s Kent School, enumerated a list of principles for intelligence analysis, including a focus on policymaker concerns, avoidance of a personal policy agenda, intellectual rigor, a conscious effort to avoid analytical bias, and a willingness to consider other judgments.5 In sum, the principles form a rudimentary code of ethics that all intelligence analysts should follow as they do their analysis.”6

Recent “additional work on the applicability of ethics to intelligence analysis—including the derivation of ethical principles and the development of a professional code of ethics—is being done by” members of the International Intelligence Ethics Association (IIEA).7 In addition, the January 2007 Intelligence Community Directive Number 200--which articulates the principles that govern the ODNI’s oversight of intelligence community analysis--appears to be an extension of the Kent School’s analytic principles, thereby expanding and deepening the analytic code.8

One issue that has not yet been addressed is the question of which “client” the analyst has the greatest obligation to. Dr. Clemente and I have pointed out that a “characteristic of every profession is a distinctive code of ethics which promulgates ideals of service to a society’’9 as well as to the client, who, in the case of intelligence analysis, is the decision maker. But the nature of the code can matter a great deal in terms of the autonomy of the intelligence analyst and his or her relationship with decision makers.

Specifically, the agency model ‘‘takes the professional to be the assigned agent of the will or decisions of the client . . . who directs the professional to achieve the client’s aims’’ within constraints defined by the norms of the profession.10 By way of contrast, the fiduciary model ‘‘sees the professional as acting in the best interest or for the benefit of the client’’ with ‘‘authority to act . . . ceded to the professional’’ based on trust.11 In the absence of a formal code of ethics, controversies have continued to arise over the appropriate relationship between intelligence and decisionmaking.”12

Most intelligence analysts appear to embrace a fiduciary model, and for the most part so do most decision makers. But complications for analysts arise when either the decision maker embraces the agency model—in which the analyst is perceived to be on the staff of the decision maker, and will provide analysis that supports his or her policy preferences

5 Jack Davis, ‘‘Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis.’’ The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers, Volume 1, Number 5, November 2002. The entire list of these principles can be found in Marrin’s “CIA’s Kent School: Improving Training for New Analysts.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Vol. 16. No. 4. (2003). 630-631. 6 Marrin and Clemente. “Modeling….” 652. 7 Marrin and Clemente, “Modeling…”, 652. Also see the IIEA website at: http://intelligence-ethics.org/8 For an adaptation of ICD 200 into a code of ethics, see: John Lunstroth. “Analyst’s Code of Ethics.” Unpublished paper. February 23, 2007.9 Stephen F. Barker, ‘‘What is a Profession?,’’ Professional Ethics, Vol. 1, Nos. 1&2, 1992, pp. 73–100.10 Carol Gould, ‘‘New Paradigms in Professional Ethics.’’ Professional Ethics, V1, N1&2, 1992. 144–45.11 Ibid. 12 Marrin and Clemente. “Modeling…” 648.

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—or when the decision makers may not be using the intelligence analysis in ways that support the analyst’s other obligations to society.

This latter point raises a separate question regarding who the ultimate ‘client’ of the analyst is. The analyst writes for the decision maker, but is the focus on the needs of the decision maker, or the people in whose interests the decision maker is acting? In the national security context, is the ultimate client the national security decision maker or the American people writ large? And are there any implications in being able to speak ‘truth to power’ depending on whom the analyst’s primary obligation is to?

In the national security context, the obligations to society are directly subsumed under the obligation that the decision maker—elected or appointed—has to the people of the country to whom his or her service is ultimately in the interest of. In a democracy, the government has an obligation to act in the interest of the people. But if the decision makers appear to be trying to advance a more parochial interest that does not appear to be on behalf of the people, does the analyst have any obligation to inform them of how decision makers may be ignoring or misusing the analysis they are producing?

There are no hard and fast answers to these questions. Rather, the answers must be developed organically through continued discussions within the ranks of intelligence analysts regarding the kind of code of ethics that will enable them to support their decision making client while at the same time ensuring that support is consistent with their other obligations to the broader society.

This emphasis on discussion and the participation of the practitioner also highlights the importance of professional associations as places where these kinds of discussions can take place. One way to professionalize intelligence analysis at the national level would be to have the Office of the Director of National Intelligence set standards for intelligence analysts across the entire intelligence community, focusing on recruitment, hiring, training, development, and all the other areas of professional practice—including the development of a code of ethics. And this is already happening to some degree.

However, the downside of this kind of top-down professionalization process is that it would likely be evolutionary--by building on programs and practices already in existence-- and would not provide a mechanism for improving intelligence analysis at the state or local levels or in private industry. So while this method could work for one particular group of intelligence analysts—those at the national level under the authority of the DNI--it doesn’t address the needs of the occupation more broadly.

Instead, the needs of the occupation as a whole are better addressed not by any authority, but bottom-up by the practitioners themselves. If a code of ethics for intelligence analysis is developed, the practitioners are the ones who should develop it, preferably within the framework of a professional association. And as professional discussions continue, the practitioners themselves will be able to decide what they want their code of ethics to be, and how to balance their obligations to the decision maker as well as to the society at large.

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