Marrin Rethinking Analytic Politicization 2012

Submission Draft to Intelligence and National Security

Accepted as part of special issue on Politicization

Forthcoming 2013

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Rethinking Analytic Politicization

Stephen Marrin: [email protected] or [email protected]

Politicization as a term used in intelligence studies is poorly defined, conceptualized, and

operationalized. Despite the negative connotations associated with the word politicization

that equate it with a form of corruption, it is not entirely clear what it is a corruption of.

In short, the concept of politicization is for the most part analytically useless. This article

critiques the existing status quo conceptualization for being overly broad and

insufficiently nuanced, explores the nature of analytic politicization as a subset of

politicization writ large, and replaces it with a narrower conceptualization that explains

what makes analytic politicization bad and deserving of condemnation.

Specifically, the differentiation between political violence (a value neutral term) and

terrorism (inherently condemnatory) based on the failure of the latter to be appropriately

discriminate in its application of political violence can provide us with a conceptual

framework to use to distinguish value neutral aspects of what is conventionally

considered to be politicization from those aspects that are inherently bad or lead to

negative outcomes. In both cases what matters is not the effect of the action but the intent

of the actor. Based on this evaluation, one can conclude that much of what is considered

to be politicization in a corrupted sense is really just a naturally-occurring consequence of

analysis and interpretation in a policy or political context.

PROBLEMS DEFINING ANALYTIC POLITICIZATION

The formal definition of politicization is quite malleable and as a result there is much

confusion in both literature and practice regarding its nature. In 1987, Harry Howe

Ransom, an intelligence scholar and Professor Emeritus at Vanderbilt University,

observed that “the term politicization has multiple meanings.” He then went on to

identify three different kinds: (1) partisan politicization, “when an agency or an issue has

become ….a point of contention between organized political groupings, normally

political parties;” (2) “popularization, or publicity, which generates public debate over

ends and means (frequently leading to) bipartisan politicization;” and (3) “when

intelligence estimates are influenced by imbedded policy positions. When preferred

policies dominate decision making, overt or subtle pressures are applied on intelligence

systems, resulting in self-fulfilling intelligence prophecies or in “intelligence to please”

that distorts reality.”1

Despite the negative connotations associated with politicization, neither of Ransom’s first

two definitions inevitably lead to bad outcomes. Ransom is most interested in explaining

why politicization occurs, and his core argument is that all three kinds of politicization

are more likely “when the varied interests of America’s plural society are at odds over the

ends and means of foreign policy” and intelligence becomes caught up on the resulting

conflict.2

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]



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This is a value neutral conceptualization of politicization. That intelligence becomes

intertwined with politics is an inevitable byproduct of the intentional production of useful

knowledge to support foreign policy and national security decisionmaking. Such

decisionmaking occurs within a political or policy context, so the fact that intelligence

becomes embedded in politics should not be a surprise. Instead, the existence of this kind

of politicization should be expected as part of the normal policymaking process. That an

issue becomes a point of partisan contention or is debated publicly could be good or bad

depending on context. To adjust Robert Jervis’ observation about intelligence failure

slightly, “any specific instance of (politicization) will, by definition, seem unusual, but

the fact of the (politicization) is itself quite ordinary.”3

Yet the last of Ransom’s definitions, with its reference to “‘intelligence to please’ that

distorts reality” is more interesting precisely because it has an inherently negative

connotation. According to Jack Davis, a longtime analytic methodologist at the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA), this form of politicization is “the distortion of analysis by

setting aside or otherwise failing to meet the standards of objectivity in setting forth

information and judgments in order to support a world view or policy preference.”4

Specifically, this kind of politicization involves the incorporation of policy preferences

into the analytic product as a corruption of the intelligence analysts’ de facto ethos of

independence and objectivity.

In terms of consequence, this form of “analytic politicization” (a new term used to

distinguish it from other forms of politicization) is viewed as bad because of the

implication that political desires and pressures can push the expert analysis and advice

further from the truth and this can result in poor decisions or outcomes. Analytic

politicization can lead to policy failure by preventing decisionmakers from incorporating

into their policy discussions information indicating problems or potential for problems in

their preferred course of action. As a result, decisionmakers can be overly optimistic,

possibly even deluded, about the prospects for success of the policies they implement.

According to this conceptualization, then, preventing analytic politicization is a part of

the process of improving national security decisionmaking and foreign policy outcomes.

But how does one know when analytic politicization is occurring?

There have been only a handful of efforts to define the analytic form of politicization

with enough precision to operationalize the concept in the real world. One effort to define

politicization--part of a task force set up by former Director of Central Intelligence

Robert Gates in the early 1990s--observed that politicization can involve “forcing a

product to conform to a policymaker's view or delaying a product thought to offend a

policymaker.”5 The problem with this definition is that forcible, outright, obvious

analytic politicization--where the decisionmaker overtly pressured or threatened

intelligence analysts, who then changed or distorted their analysis to conform to this

pressure--rarely if ever occurs.6

Delaying the production of analysis that might offend, on the other hand, is more difficult

to identify and represents a shift of attention from a simple definition of analytic



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politicization to one that is much more nuanced and subtle. Two British scholars have

pointed out the need to address the more implicit variations of analytic politicization in

which “the producers of finished intelligence ….launder, tailor and even distort their

product through various tacit means, none of which requires an obvious intervention in

the analytical or reporting process.”7

Some of these techniques are described in detail by John Gentry, a former CIA analyst,

focusing on how the review, editorial, and managerial process involved in producing

finished intelligence analysis can shape and change its substantive conclusions. Gentry

explains how managerial suggestions couched in the form of editorial feedback that take

political reactions of consumers into account really amount to orders, constituting an

implicit form of politicization.8 He then goes on to describe how “more generally, senior

intelligence officers employ a variety of methods to move analysis in a direction of their

liking.”9 After looking at the issue, Gentry suggests that politicization entails “the

alteration of an otherwise objective, methodologically sound course of the conception,

production, and review of an intelligence product to serve a personal, bureaucratic,

ideological, policy, or political purpose.”10

Using this definition, analytic politicization may have nothing to do with politics or

policy at all, but rather is conceptualized as the distortion of the analytic product for any

of a number of reasons including personal and bureaucratic. For this reason, Jennifer

Sims made a clear differentiation between politicization (for political purposes) and

privatization (“the use of intelligence for personal or private institutional ends”).11

Unfortunately, this differentiation has not been adopted by other observers who tend to

characterize incidents of privatization as politicization. For example, Joshua Rovner

suggests that analytic politicization may result from the presence of embedded

assumptions in intelligence analysis that may match those possessed by policymakers,

intelligence parochialism related to careerism and how that shapes their analysis, similar

issues related to bureaucratic parochialism, and the scapegoating of intelligence for

policy failures which may “inspire reciprocal hostility, creating incentives to distort

intelligence.”12

This approach combines privatization and politicization together under

the broad framework of the causes of analytic distortion.

Paul Pillar has also addressed some of these kinds of indirect politicization in the context

of the intelligence analysis on Iraq prior to the Iraq War. Pillar describes how

decisionmakers can discourage analysis that challenges the efficacy of favored policies

while at the same time encouraging analysis that supports those same policies. As he put

it, “intelligence analysts -- for whom attention, especially favorable attention, from

policymakers is a measure of success -- felt a strong wind consistently blowing in one

direction. The desire to bend with such a wind is natural and strong, even if

unconscious.”13

Pillar suggests that given the inherent uncertainty and ambiguity in intelligence analysis,

in the case of Iraq WMD the differences between sound and flawed analysis “had to do



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mainly with matters of caveat, nuance, and word choice.”14

Like Gentry, Pillar also

suggests that politicization can be found in the streamlined review process for reports

consistent with policy preferences.15

Finally, Pillar suggests that “another form of

politicization…is the sugarcoating of what otherwise would be an unpalatable

message.”16

At this point analytic politicization becomes quite subtle indeed.

This shift of the definition of analytic politicization from the forced distortion or

corruption of the analysis (black) to something that is more nuanced (a shade of gray)

makes it more difficult to operationalize analytic politicization in a way that is useful for

practitioners. As former CIA analyst Jennifer Glaudemans put it, “politicization is like

fog. Though you cannot hold it in your hands, or nail it to a wall, it does exist, it is real,

and it does affect people’s behavior.”17

But how do you operationalize a concept that is ‘like fog’? In 1996 CIA attempted to do

so, with its definition of politicization as “an unprofessional intrusion by intelligence

analysts into the policymaking process, characterized by the skewing of information and

judgments to support or oppose a specific policy or general political ideology. The

analysts’ unprofessional manipulation of information and judgments can be deliberate –

for example, to please a policymaker or under pressure from an intelligence manager...

The distortion can also be unintentional, arising from poor tradecraft practice.”18

This CIA definition brings in two additional gray-like dimensions. Specifically, the

inclusion of “judgments (that) oppose a specific policy or general political ideology”

means that analysis that runs counter to policy preferences can also be considered

politicized in addition to those that favor decisionmakers’ preferred policy. Also,

according to this definition analytic politicization can be unintentional due to poor

tradecraft practice, muddying the conceptual waters even further. Both of these

extensions of the notion of politicization are logical if the goal is to improve intelligence

analysis by removing any source of inaccuracy. But in both cases they are also

counterintuitive given the popular and prevalent conception of politicization as the

intentional distortion of analysis in a way that is consistent with policy preferences.

Finally, in 1999 the then-CIA Ombudsman for politicization said that “politicization is

something that is as hard to prove as it is easy to charge-- in large part because it takes

you into the area of intent, something usually very difficult to prove in any

environment.”19

As a result, politicization “is not a term you’ll find …defined in any

Headquarters or Agency Regulations. The politicization of intelligence is an issue of

professional ethics, not of law or regulation.”20

So now the identification of analytic politicization is more a matter of perception than

fact-driven investigation. In order to identify what is or is not analytic politicization one

must first make a judgment call as to whether the analysis in question is either overly

supportive of or challenging to policy preferences and then closely examine both analytic

intent (intentional distortion) and tradecraft practice (unintentional distortion) to

determine whether it is a legitimate difference of opinion or analytic politicization. The



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same intelligence analysis could be either politicized or not depending as much on

perception of intent as fact.

The subjectiveness inherent in the determination of analytic politicization is problematic.

Even John Gentry acknowledges that some analysts can see analytic politicization when

none actually exists. As Gentry says, “some undoubtedly are too quick to see

politicization….A few take personal criticism too hard. A few fail to recognize fully the

need to compromise in the production of CIA “corporate” products. Some indeed are

whiners or malcontents. Some are poor analysts.”21

These analysts, then, see analytic

politicization—or the pressure to politicize--when all that is going on is an effort to

improve their analysis. More recently, Gregory Treverton has reinforced this point when

he says that for the intelligence analyst “hurt feelings and damaged egos being what they

are, a reviewer’s criticism could easily seem—or be stigmatized as—politicization.”22

Treverton goes on to say that “analysts could purport to see a policy agenda behind any

criticism of their prose.” As Jennifer Sims observed in the context of the Gates hearings,

“where some observers saw martyrs, others saw careerists with bruised egos and

frustrated personal ambitions.”23

This is significantly problematic from a conceptual

standpoint; is analytic politicization in the eye of the beholder?

Thus far this discussion of analytic politicization has relied on definitions derived from

intelligence agencies that produce analysis. Since these definitions emphasize distortion

in the analytic product as that which distinguishes politicization from legitimate analysis,

this implies that intelligence analysts are the sole source of politicization. While

decisionmakers can pressure analysts to politicize their analysis, or reward analysts who

do, politicization (or distortion) of intelligence analysis is not something that

decisionmakers can do. Therefore, preventing analytic politicization hinges on strict

accountability to professional ethics rather than outright regulative prohibition.

Inappropriately Broadening the Definition

Despite this implication, however, some scholars have been conceptualizing and defining

the term differently, adding decisionmakers and policymakers to the list of actors who

can politicize. This is similar to Ransom’s first two definitions but now the emphasis has

changed. Rather than addressing this kind of broader polititicization as bringing the

intelligence into the world of politics and political disputes, it is now being used to

describe situations where decisionmakers selectively use analysis to support their

positions, both as part of a partisan dispute or to advance a particular agenda.24

Sometimes the terminology of politicization is employed when decisionmakers

cherrypick information in order to make their decisions. It is also sometimes used to

describe backstopping, or the search for information to support a decision already made.

These new usages do not conform to any of the three definitions of politicization that

Ransom put forth, suggesting that a fourth definition has appeared in the literature. This

is analytic politicization as applied to decisionmakers. Now, when policymakers try to

ensure that they acquire certain kinds of analytic support for their policies such efforts are

sometimes described as a form of analytic politicization. It is almost as if the norm of



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objectivity and independence that applies to intelligence analysts is now being applied

inappropriately to the decisionmakers themselves. As a result, the use of the term in

actual cases or controversies regarding the distortion or corruption of the intelligence

function has become much more widespread precisely because it is beginning to equate

policymaking with politicization.

A broader definition of politicization also makes differentiating analytic politicization

from appropriate use of intelligence analysis in decisionmaking more difficult, leading to

differences in interpretation over what is, and what is not, politicization. With this

broader definition of politicization, operationalizing the concept becomes very difficult if

not impossible. For example, is politicization the corruption of the analysis (analytic

politicization) or perceived efforts to corrupt it? If pressure is defined as politicization as

well, how is the legitimate challenge or question distinguished from the illegitimate

pressure?

As the discussion over the Iraq WMD intelligence case illustrates, one person’s

legitimate questions about the reliability or validity of intelligence judgments are another

person’s perceived pressure to change those judgments to conform to what the questioner

wants to hear. Jeffrey Cooper, in a monograph published by the CIA, has observed that

the intelligence community “too often treats probing questions as attempts to “shape”

(that is, “politicize”) analyses rather than genuine inquiries into the quality of evidence

and the strength of inference chains.”25

This means that legitimate efforts by

decisionmakers to understand the logic underlying the analysis could be perceived as, and

subsequently condemned as, politicization.

Using an even broader definition, Gregory Treverton ultimately defines politicization as

“commitments to perspectives or conclusions, in the process of intelligence analysis or

interaction with policy, that suppress other evidence or views or blind people to them.”26

He goes on to say that, by using this definition, “politicization can have at least five

different if overlapping meanings” which can apply simultaneously, including: “direct

pressure from senior policy officials;” a “house line” on a particular subject” leading to

the suppression of alternative interpretations; “Cherry picking” (and sometimes growing

some cherries), in which senior officials, usually policy officials, pick their favorites out

of a range of assessments;” the asking of leading questions or asking questions

repeatedly, and “a shared ‘mindset,’ whereby intelligence and policy share strong

presumptions.”27

While both Rovner and Treverton appear to be trying to protect and advance national

security by first diagnosing and then mitigating the various ways that political

commitments can distort perception of truth or reality, or decrease receptivity to

unwelcome interpretations, this approach makes the concept of politicization so broad as

to make it unusable. If “cherry picking” or “question asking” is politicization, then what

distinguishes politicization from policymaking? If something as simple as substantive

agreement, a shared mindset between analysts and decisionmakers, constitutes

politicization, how can it possibly be a bad thing?



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This recent work on politicization fails to distinguish distortion in the analytic product

from policymaker desire for (and in some cases, effort to) pressure or otherwise change

the intelligence analysis they are provided with. This defines politicization in such a way

as to equate the political use of intelligence with politicization. From a conceptual

consistency standpoint, this is a significant problem. But even more generally, what

meaning does politicization have as either a conceptual construct or operationalized in the

real world of intelligence analysis as a “thou shalt not” if there is no agreement on how to

define it, identify it, or prohibit it?

PREVAILING CONNOTATION BUILT ON A FLAWED MODEL

One explanation for why politicization is bad is that it is the distortion of intelligence in

such a way as to provide “intelligence to please” that violates the independence or

objectivity of the process. Independence and objectivity are key values embedded in the

intelligence enterprise intended to provide decisionmakers with unvarnished truth, so far

as intelligence professionals understand it. By speaking “truth to power” they are helping

to ensure that national security is protected and national interests promoted.

Politicization, then, threatens that value because it prevents policymakers from knowing

what is really going on, and that prevents them from being able to adjust policy to

address emerging problems. As a result, politicization is bad; a corruption of the way the

process should work.

Or is it? Because when you look closer at the core values that politicization is a violation

of--independence and objectivity—it is not clear that they are even achievable. Instead,

both independence and objectivity appear to be unreachable ideals; the world the way

some think it should be, but not the way it is. The prevailing conception of politicization

is based on an idealized model of the intelligence analysis process and its role in

decisionmaking that is flawed and does not have much real world validity.

As has been argued elsewhere,28

the “standard model” of the role of intelligence in

decisionmaking appears to be based on the presumed sequencing of intelligence

collection to intelligence analysis to national security decisionmaking. According to the

standard model, intelligence organizations were created separate from decisionmakers; to

select facts and provide an objective assessment of them as an effort to get at one true

answer which is then conveyed to consumers to be incorporated into their policy

deliberations. Sherman Kent suggested that while this could be done by policy staff, they

lack the independence necessary to ensure that the decisionmakers are “well-informed”

which includes provision of the “stubborn fact they may be neglecting.”29

The value of independent and objective intelligence collection and analysis is, therefore,

to provide decisionmakers with the inconvenient fact or unwanted interpretation.

According to Roger Hilsman, this approach to separating intelligence and policy ensures

that “by having one man collect facts without thinking of policy and another use the facts

to make policy, one at least guarantees that the policy man will have to face the

unpleasant facts that do not support his policy. … Thus the policy man who has become



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wedded to an incorrect policy can be faced with the unpleasant facts which he has

ignored and be made to see the one right solution.”30

Presumably this provision of the inconvenient fact or unwanted interpretation will

improve policy by preventing decisionmakers from fooling themselves into believing that

their policies are or will be successful when more pessimistic indicators exist. Because of

this emphasis on objectivity, intelligence scholar Michael Handel described “ideal

intelligence work” as “objective, autonomous, and free of political pressures.”31

The standard model and its praise of objectivity and condemnation of analytic

politicization is deeply embedded in the intelligence literature and the normative

judgments that scholars and practitioners bring to bear when evaluating how intelligence

analysts and decisionmakers should interact. But does the literature support the

assumptions and premises that underlie the standard model’s incorporation of intelligence

analysis into decisionmaking? After examining the intelligence studies literature, it

appears that the answer to this question is “no.” In the real world, independence and

objectivity do not appear to have much value at all.

Analytic Objectivity Does Not Exist

There are three significant problems with the standard model. The first problem is with

the premise that intelligence analysts are objective assessors of the aggregate raw

intelligence. The expectation of objectivity appears to be based on an assumption that

intelligence analysts are ‘idealized policy experts’ bringing neutral authority to bear on

policy.32

As a result, Glenn Hasted has suggested that intelligence analysts are perceived

to be like other experts in government in that they provide their ‘objective’ input into an

inherently political policy process as an expert intermediary between knowledge and

action.33

The problem with this assumption is that analytic objectivity in an absolute sense does

not exist. According to University of Virginia history professor Allan Megill,

“objectivity” in an absolute sense involves “representing things as they really are,” while

“objectivity” in a procedural sense “aims at the practice of an impersonal method of

investigation or administration.”34

Objectivity in intelligence analysis is intended in this

procedural sense, by excluding both analyst and decisionmaker preferences and therefore

subjectivity due to motivated bias. This was clearly Sheman Kent’s model as he argued

for the importance of having the intelligence analysis function independent of

decisionmaking.35

However, as Megill goes on to observe, this kind of procedural effort

to achieve objectivity is conducted under the presumption that this process will better

enable the attainment of “truth,” or “representing things as they really are.”36

In other

words, the premise that procedural objectivity is based on is to approximate absolute

objectivity through the elimination of subjectivity.

But subjectivity cannot be eliminated even through procedural mechanisms. According to

the standard model, independence of intelligence analysis from decisionmaking is a

procedural way to eliminate motivated sources of bias or subjectivity, and bring the



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analyst closer to absolute objectivity. As Kevin Russell has argued, however, even with

this kind of independence intelligence analysts’ determination of likelihood of any

particular situation is inherently subjective because they do not have accurate models like

weather forecasters do to use to derive the calculations of likelihood.37

As a result, intelligence analysis, like the social sciences it is based on, contains a

relatively high level of ambiguity in terms of the meaning of data and this causes

relatively high levels of uncertainty and error in analytic conclusions and estimates. The

weather forecaster’s foundation in a scientific discipline provides much less opportunity

for incorporation of analytic judgment, subjective though it may be, to explain and

forecast the weather as compared to the intelligence analyst whose explanations and

forecasts of international developments are much more uncertain and therefore much

more subjective.

Independence Does Not Lead to Objectivity or Truth

This brings us to the second problem with the standard model: it appears to embrace an

inductive model of intelligence analysis where the independent evaluation of data will

bring one closer to the truth. For example, at one point Sherman Kent, in seeing analysts

come to significant analytic disagreement while looking at the same set of data, suggested

that “the fact that there have been such differences of opinion among supposedly

objective and impartial students who have had access to substantially the same material,

is evidence of someone's surrender to his external pressures.”38

The only reason Kent can

think of for two groups of analysts to come to different interpretations is that one bowed

to external political pressures. This is an example of Kent falling prey to the inductive

fallacy, that facts either speak for themselves or, when aggregated, that a set of data has a

single, optimal, interpretation.39

But various experts have been taking issue with the implication that intelligence analysis

is inductive, including Willmoore Kendall in 1949, Roger Hilsman in 1952, Klaus Knorr

in 1964, Thomas Hughes in 1976, Richards Heuer in 1999, and many more since then.40

All of these experts from the 1940s onwards take issue with the assumption that

intelligence analysts can get closer to the truth because of their independence from

policymaking. Specifically, they argue that subjectivity is inherent in the analysis process

due to the reliance on constructs known variously as conceptual or cognitive frameworks,

mental models or normal theories which are necessary in order to infer meaning from

incomplete data. As Thomas Hughes observed in 1976, facts alone have no meaning—in

other words, facts do not speak for themselves--but rather aquire meaning when they are

integrated into what he calls “ideas” or conceptual frameworks.41

This is a point that

Richard Betts has also made; that conceptual frameworks are not just useful in the

interpretation of intelligence; they are absolutely necessary.42

But these conceptual frameworks, by their very creation and use, impose biases and

preconceptions on the resulting analysis and interpretation. As Richard Betts observed,

“Some degree of bias is inevitable. …(Bias) simply means the general view of

international reality, the set of assumptions that any analyst has about how the world



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works, the notions that form the complex of intellectual shortcuts that help analysts make

sense out of information. Good analysts will question their own biases and revise them in

the face of contrary evidence, but they cannot get along without some set of working

assumptions.”43

Even if analysts are independent from policy or objective in a procedural sense they still

will not be able to acquire the ‘one true answer’ (using Hilsman’s phrase) or truth (as per

Megill’s concept of objectivity) which is implicitly the goal of the analytic process in the

standard model. This means that the accuracy of any particular intelligence analysis may

depend as much on the conceptual framework employed in a deductive way to derive

meaning as from the inductive accumulation and assessment of the data itself. In this

environment, multiple legitimate interpretations of the same situation are possible.44

But even more significant than the existence of conceptual frameworks is that multiple

frameworks can exist simultaneously that can interpret the same fact in different ways,

based on the set of assumptions that are embedded in the conceptual framework. Since

we cannot scientifically verify the objective likelihood of any of the different

interpretations, subjective assessment is inherent to the process. Since all intelligence

analysis involves at least some degree of subjectivity, this makes the argument that

intelligence analysis as objective truth hard to sustain when it then intersects with policy.

As Thomas Hughes points out, ideas—meaning the combination of fact and

interpretation-- are used and abused by people, including policymakers with power and

agendas.45

This interplay of fact, concept, and agenda means that any particular fact or set

of facts can be interpreted any number of different ways based on the concepts and

agendas doing the interpretations. This is significant, because it means that some form of

interplay between fact, concept and agenda may be necessary for intelligence to influence

policy at all.

This is a very important point. If multiple interpretations are possible from the same set

of data, how can one imbue the intelligence analysis with any more credibility or

legitimacy than an analysis of the same situation produced by decisionmakers? Why is

the intelligence analysts’ possession of independence as a proxy for procedural

objectivity assumed to imbue the analysis with greater accuracy?

In fact, it is entirely possible that decisionmakers could employ more accurate conceptual

models in their evaluation of the same set of raw intelligence and come up with an

assessment that is different from, and more accurate than, that produced by intelligence

analysts. Sometimes policymakers have more accurate understandings of international

relations than intelligence analysts do due to their expertise, knowledge and alternative

sources of information. 46

For example, Robert Gates has said “that on more than a few

occasions, policymakers have analyzed or forecast developments better than intelligence

analysts.”47

Or, as former National Intelligence Council vice chair Graham Fuller has

observed, “sometimes the policy-maker’s analytic instincts might be better than the

analyst’s… (Q)uality of judgment may be found anywhere.”48



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Would the positive influence of this more accurate policymaker judgment on intelligence

analysis be considered politicization as well? This kind of influence involves exactly the

same mechanism as that posited for the negative outcomes of politicization, but has a

positive outcome instead. If the problem is with the mechanism of influence

(incorporation of decisionmaker insight, understandings and influence in intelligence

analysis) then how can a bad thing (the influence) result in a positive outcome (more

accurate assessment)?

While decisionmaker preferences and to a lesser degree assessments are invariably

portrayed as negative in the intelligence literature, presumably because of the incentive

for policymakers to be influenced by motivated bias, the inclusion of such preferences

and assessments in intelligence analysis can have either positive or negative effects on

policy depending on the accuracy of the policymaker assessments. The expectations built

into the standard model are unable to account for such positive influence of policy on

intelligence, further highlighting its limitations as a foundation for the conceptualization

of politicization.

Intelligence analysts can try to be objective, and they can try not to bring their underlying

biases regarding the meaning of the information to the table when decisionmakers are

debating policy options. But bias cannot be completely removed. Even if procedural

efforts to achieve objectivity are followed and decisionmaker preferences are not taken

into account, the fact that absolute objectivity is not attainable undermines the rationale

for a nominally objective contribution of analysis into the policy process especially when

the analysts possess different starting assumptions, or cognitive frameworks, or biases,

than the respective decision makers do.

Decisionmakers Ignore Inconvenient Intelligence

Finally, the third problem with the standard model is that there is no evidence that it

works in improving foreign policy or national security decisionmaking. Implicit in the

standard model is an assumption that when decisionmakers are confronted with

assessments from experts that differ from their own, they will change their assessment,

and by implication their policies, to bring them into conformity with what the experts

believe. On receiving the inconvenient fact or unwanted interpretation, policymakers

would realize the errors of their ways, incorporate this new knowledge into their

deliberative processes, and use it to change policy for the better. If decisionmakers were

willing to adjust their policies then perhaps there is some value of ‘speaking truth to

power’ (assuming that intelligence analysts in fact have some advantage in getting closer

to absolute objectivity and truth). But there is little evidence to indicate that this actually

occurs.49

Policymaker disregard of intelligence analysis is so prevalent that it forms its own theme

within the intelligence studies literature. Perhaps most indicative of this tendency is

Robert Gates’ observation that based on his experiences in working for five Presidential

administrations, “the usual response of a policymaker to intelligence with which he

disagrees or which he finds unpalatable is to ignore it.”50

This is worth repeating; Gates is



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suggesting that the usual response of a decisionmaker to the inconvenient fact or

unwanted interpretation is to ignore it. Perhaps this is because just as intelligence

assessment appears to involve some form of deductive process, so does decisionmaking.

When decisionmakers are provided with analysis that differs from their own

interpretation, perhaps due to the use of a different conceptual model, the analysis is

usually ignored.

As Roger Hilsman observed in 1952 while describing intelligence analysts whose

analysis is ignored by decisionmakers, “it is, of course, a humiliating experience to feel

useless and unimportant.”51

Then Hilsman goes on to describe the views of one

humiliated analyst who said “Before they did anything else, policy people should call on

intelligence for the information and an estimate. Then they should make their policy. In

reality, however, policy was made without intelligence or was only supplemented by

intelligence. Intelligence people always had to analyze what had already happened, or

merely to give support for policy decisions that were already made. Intelligence did

nothing but hack work and research. In practice, the thing was all backwards.”

When one reads the writings of Sam Adams, or Mel Goodman, or John Gentry, or Paul

Pillar, the disillusionment of the analyst in the face of the policymaker’s decision to

ignore their analysis is obvious. So what is the value of independence? Why speak truth

to power? In the case of Vietnam, you have Sam Adams complaining that he was not

listened to. In the case of the Gates Hearings, you have Mel Goodman and others

complaining that they were not listened to. In the case of the Iraq War, you have Paul

Pillar complaining that he was not listened to. All of them use the term politicization

because they think someone else was listened to instead who provided the decisionmaker

with the intelligence that they wanted to hear. Are these cases of what James Wirtz has

called “policy-to-please” when analysts desire to or even pressure “intelligence

consumers to modify policies in response to estimates”?52

Now we are at the crux of the issue related to politicization and independence: because

there are a number of different analyses possible from almost any single set of data, the

only way to tell the difference between someone who is distorting their analysis to curry

favor with or influence policy for partisan purpose (ie. politicizing it) versus actually

believing in their interpretation of the situation is to know their true intent, and as the

CIA ombudsman for policitization observerd, that is something very hard to do.53

In the

end, a lot of the politicization controversy may really be sour grapes complaining by

those whose interpretations lost in the competition for influence over decision. Analysts

who have not had the influence they thought they should have had may shout

“politicization” even though the actual analysis itself might be—given the information

available--a legitimate interpretation if perhaps different from their own.

Because of these and other problems with the standard model, over the years there have

been various efforts to counter the pernicious effects it has had on normative expectations

of the influence that analysis should have on policy. For this reason, some authors have

criticized the standard model by comparing it to “mythology,”54

or “theology,”55

or



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suggesting that its “belief in a ‘strictly professional intelligence process’ is nothing but an

idealized normative fiction,”56

or that it may be “an unrealistic application of ‘pure

science’ norms to areas where fact and value are inseparable and judgment must

preside.”57

Yet despite these criticisms, the standard model’s praise of objectivity and condemnation

of analytic politicization remains deeply embedded in the intelligence literature and the

normative judgments that scholars and practitioners bring to bear when evaluating how

intelligence analysts and decisionmakers should interact. As a result, because absolute

objectivity is both embedded in the standard model of intelligence analysis production

and an unattainable goal, intelligence professionals have struggled for literally decades to

pursue objectivity—or prevent subjectivity and politicization--while at the same time

maximizing relevance to and influence on policy. In the end all that has been

accomplished has been confusion in concept and ineffectiveness in practice.

WHAT MAKES ANALYTIC POLITICIZATION BAD?

What is needed is a better understanding of the intersection of analysis and decision than

that provided by the standard model. A more accurate conceptualization of the role of

intelligence analysis in decisionmaking, relying more on a deductive rather than inductive

approach to both analysis and decisionmaking, portrays it as a duplicated and subordinate

assessment function providing a check on decisionmaker judgment rather than the

foundation for it.58

With this model as a starting point, it is clear that there can be many possible legitimate

interpretations of the same set of data. As a result, legitimate differences of opinion are a

natural part of the process; analysts can disagree with each other, decisionmakers can

disagree with analysts, analysts can disagree with decisionmakers, and decisionmakers

can disagree with each other. Some interpretations may be better than others but, contrary

to Sherman Kent’s interpretation, disagreement in and of itself is not a sign that there is

anything wrong or corrupted. Nor are policymaker decisions not to accept and use the

analytic assessments that are provided to them. There is a negative normative judgment

associated with analytic politicization (to the point that Betts calls politicization a

“fighting word”59

) but it is not entirely clear what exactly it is a corruption of. So what

makes analytic politicization a bad thing?

To achieve conceptual consistency one could reconceptualize the term in a descriptive

rather than pejorative way; defining analytic politicization in its broadest sense,

weakening the opprobrium that it is associated with. As the term becomes associated with

actions that are intrinsic to the intelligence function, it should—over time—become

solely descriptive of the use of information to create and implement policies rather than

condemnatory. The result would be politicization as something that is, not something that

is bad.

Richard Betts has taken this approach in his study of politicization. He has suggested that

some forms of politicization may be necessary for intelligence to influence policy for the



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better. In other words, he conceptualizes moderate politicization as something that could

be interpreted as “good.”60

Betts’ approach is to suggest that the term should be

considered afresh, without the pejorative assumption. According to Betts, the core of

what constitutes “bad” politicization is the fabrication or distortion of “information to

serve policy preferences or vested interests.”61

But he goes on to say that “the strict

definition of politicize is not ipso facto pejorative” but rather “to give a political tone or

character” or “to bring within the realm of politics.” Since policymaking and the use of

intelligence occurs within the realm of politics, Betts suggests that what passes for

politicization in an intelligence context is really “normal controversy” on other issues. So

his approach is to view politicization not as a pejorative, but rather as a value-neutral

descriptive term, with some “bad” manifestations as well as some “good” ones.

The problem with this is that there is a negative connotation associated with politicization

that is unlikely to be changed even if academicians and practitioners begin to use it in a

value-neutral descriptive way. More useful might be the approach taken by Glenn

Hastedt who uses the term “publicization” to describe the public use of intelligence to

advance political or policy agendas rather than employing “politicization” as an umbrella

term.62

Publicization does not have the same negative connotation that politicization has,

and provides an opportunity to parse out the descriptive value-neutral use of intelligence

in decisionmaking from those that are inappropriate and thus deserving the label

politicization. Additional efforts like this would provide a descriptive taxonomy of

activities that currently are labeled politicization but do not have negative connotations.63

At the same time that the various kinds of politicization are relabeled to more effectively

distinguish one from another, it is also important to identify exactly what makes analytic

politicization inappropriate and rebuild the pejorative meaning of the term around that

aspect. This involves isolating on the aspects of politicization that is inherently bad or

worthy of condemnation and to then limit the use of the term solely to that aspect of

politicization. A model for doing this can be found in the study of political violence in

general and terrorism in particular.

What Makes Terrorism Bad?

Like politicization, the term ‘terrorism’ contains the same sort of normative judgment and

is implicitly condemnatory. But not everyone possesses the same norms. Sometimes we

agree with the way the label ‘terrorist’ is used. Sometimes we do not. A closer

examination of the word terrorism reveals that what some people perceive as bad others

perceive as good. The classic example in terrorism studies is the observation that a

terrorist from one perspective is a freedom fighter from another. The difference in

normative expectation frequently has more to do with whether or not one agrees with the

goal that the terrorist or terrorist group is fighting for rather than anything intrinsic to the

actions taken by the terrorist or terrorist group.

As a result, in the study of terrorism there is a conceptual differentiation between the

descriptive term political violence and the pejorative term terrorism. Political violence is

a term that can be used to describe the range of violence pursued for political ends; from



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war to insurgency to terrorism. As a value-neutral term, it does not make a value

judgment about the acceptability or legitimacy of this violence but rather takes its

political nature as a descriptive characteristic. By way of contrast, the term terrorism is

implicitly condemnatory. So what is it about terrorism that makes it a form of

unacceptable or illegitimate political violence deserving of special condemnation?

Although a number of scholars have tried to create a single, universal definition for

terrorism, they have not succeeded. A good place to start, though, is Bruce Hoffman’s

definition of terrorism as: “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through

violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change” with its specific

criteria being that it is political in aims and motives, violent or threatens violence,

designed to cause fear beyond the immediate victim or target, and perpetrated by a

subnational group or nonstate entity.64

This definition helps clarify one unacceptable

form of violence (terrorism) from another (crime) due to the latter’s lack of political

purpose or intent to cause fear. It also helps distinguish war from terrorism by specifying

that terrorism can only be committed by non-state or substate actors. But there are a few

problems with it as well.

First, all of Hoffman’s criteria except for the last regarding the non-state nature of the

group could be used to condemn actions taken by governments during wartime. This

means that an action taken by a government may be deemed acceptable as warfare but the

same action taken by a subnational group or nonstate entity could be considered terrorism

and thus morally reprehensible. This is a double standard based solely on the status of the

group as state or non-state, and as such requires additional examination.

Second, there is nothing in Hoffman’s definition that prevents it from being applied to

insurgents or revolutionaries that we might believe are pursuing legitimate, justified ends

with the goal of promoting freedom, democracy, and self-determination against the forces

of tyranny and oppression. Are these good terrorists? Maybe they are freedom fighters?

For example, the kinds of terrorists that might fit Hoffman’s definition but be inconsistent

with the negative normative judgment about the action include the American

Revolutionaries who participated in the Boston Tea Party, or the Irgun, a forerunner

group that helped create the state of Israel. In both cases, the terrorists in question may

have (arguably) been justified in terms of the violence committed to advance their

particular political agendas. If violence can be committed by legitimate state actors to

pursue national interests--not even a positive vision for the world, but pragmatic power

acquisition--why is violence conducted by non-state actors in pursuit of a positive vision

(as they see it) of the world a bad thing? Is violence necessarily bad if it is put toward

good ends?

This is a crucial point: can terrorism be good? Or is there something intrinsic to the term

terrorism itself that has a negative connotation, implying that the action described should

be condemned? And if there is, does the existence of good terrorism mean that there is a

conceptual problem with the definition of the term? How can a bad thing be a good

thing? Or maybe we just have not yet defined the best criteria to use to make that



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distinction between good and bad political violence. So there is a problem with

consistency of the normative framework applied and there is nothing in the definition of

terrorism that makes it inherently bad. In the end, Hoffman’s definition does not provide

a framework for clarifying what it is about terrorism that is worthy of condemnation.

A more refined approach to the definition of terrorism requires distinguishing its

activities from more conventional forms of violence applied in warfare. This can be done

using Just War Criteria. While these criteria are usually used to evaluate the justification

of political violence conducted by state actors, the same framework can also be used to

evaluate the justification of political violence by non-state actors.65

In using the Just War Criteria to evaluate terrorist action, it becomes clear that the key

criteria that separates the kind of political violence that deserves moral condemnation and

that which can be evaluated with more equanimity is “discrimination.” Discrimination in

this context means ensuring that any violence employed is targeted against combatants

rather than non-combatants. This does not mean that non-combatants or civilians cannot

be killed. Sometimes such deaths, tragic as they are, are the unintentional byproduct of

legitimate, justified warfare. They become collateral damage, as per the modern day

euphemism.

The key distinction here in operationalizing the criterion of discrimination is intent. If the

intent is to target an enemy, and the targeting was mistaken or the missile goes off course

or civilians get caught in the crossfire, then civilians may die but we can excuse it or

justify it as an awful cost of war. Yet the specific, intentional targeting of non-combatants

or civilians is something different; an indiscriminate violation of moral norms established

for the just use of violence. It is the intentional targeting of non-combatants or civilians

that makes the violence bad. Discrimination, then, becomes the defining criteria to use in

addressing the normative issues related to evaluating the justification of political

violence. If a state violates this criterion in wartime, it would be considered a war crime.

But if a non-state actor violates this criterion, then it would be considered terrorism.

Given that there is no such distinction in intelligence studies between acceptable

differences of analytic interpretation from unacceptable analytic politicization, we can

use the foregoing discussion as a model for deconstructing and parsing the terminology

of politicization as part of the re-conceptualization process.

Intent Makes Analytic Politicization Bad

The argument made here is that intent may be useful to distinguish analytic distortion

worthy of condemnation from other forms of analytic distortion. Just as one cannot

distinguish legitimate political violence from illegitimate terrorism based solely on the

end result, good politicization cannot be distinguished from bad politicization based

solely on how ideas or concepts influence interpretation. Instead in both cases that

determination must hinge on a judgment of intent.



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First, the act of politicizing must be committed by an intelligence analyst rather than a

decisionmaker. So decisionmakers sometimes incentivize (reward, co-opt, pressure) the

provision of information or analysis to support their views or a particular policy option.

But it is important to point out that decisionmakers are not themselves distorting the

analytic product. Even though an incentive may be present, only an analyst can distort the

analytic product to create “intelligence to please.” Therefore decisionmakers cannot

commit analytic politicization.

Policymaker desire for intelligence analysis that supports their agendas is, in this

extended analogy, roughly equivalent to the insurgency’s political leadership desiring an

effective attack against the adversary. But desire to achieve objectives alone is not an

adequate reason to condemn the decisionmaker. In the terrorism example, if the leader of

an insurgent group’s political wing presses his military leadership to identify suitable

targets for achieving the objective, he is no more committing terrorism than a

decisionmaker who questions the intelligence analyst to explain and defend his or her

interpretation of the situation.

Just as the military leadership should not suggest and then indiscriminately attack a

civilian target just to make the political decisionmakers happy, or else a war crime may

result, neither should the intelligence analyst distort his or her findings in accordance

with what the decisionmaker wants to hear. In other words, perceived or even real

pressure alone is inadequate as a basis to make the determination that analytic

politicization has occurred. If the analysts control the message and politicization is

defined as the inappropriate distortion of that message, then decisionmakers cannot be

responsible for analytic politicization.

Second, the key criteria for distinguishing legitimate analytic differences of opinion from

analytic distortion worthy of condemnation as politicization is the intentional changing of

analysis to conform to (or oppose) policymaker preferences. Unintentional changing of

analysis to conform to policymaker preferences, while sloppy and leading to the same

consequences (distorted analysis) is a different case, just as it is in the threat or use of

political violence.

What matters most is intent. Government militaries can kill civilians without being

accused of war crimes so long as the attack was proportional, discriminate, and aimed at

opposition forces (i.e. civilian deaths were unintended collateral damage). Similarly,

insurgents or non-state actors can kill civilians without being condemned as terrorists so

long as the same criteria apply to their actions. The argument here is that the same kind of

equivalency should exist in the field of intelligence analysis and politicization. Intentional

distortion of the message is to be condemned, while unintentional distortion, unfortunate

or tragic though it may be, is not analytic politicization.

It is that simple; the presence of intent alone is the sole mechanism to use in

distinguishing legitimate differences of interpretation or unfortunate unintentional

distortion from the intentional form of analytic politicization that should be condemned.



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PARSING AND PREVENTING ANALYTIC POLITICIZATION

For conceptual coherence and consistency it is important to identify precisely why

analytic politicization is a bad thing. Politically-driven violence provides a useful prism

with which to view the concept of politicization because just as there are many different

views regarding the acceptable use of violence, there are many different views regarding

the appropriate intersection of intelligence and policy. Pacifists opposed to the use of

violence in one domain might be equivalent to purists in the other who have objections to

the intersection and engagement of intelligence and politics. In both cases they might be

viewed as idealists hoping for a perfect world and both frustrated and disappointed by the

one they encounter. Alternatively, there are those in both camps who fight to win

regardless of consequence; they believe the ends justify the means and are perfectly

willing to do whatever is necessary to win regardless of whether that involves

indiscriminate use of force or intentional distortion of the analytic product. These are the

two extremes. Somewhere in the middle is everyone else. Use of a single set of criteria

hinging on the significance of intent can provide conceptual clarity and a means to

adjudicate between these different perspectives.

An implication of this argument is that politicization as a term is over-used partly due to

the norms of analytic politicization being inappropriately applied to condemn

decisionmakers for their use of intelligence analysis in a way that is entirely consistent

with their responsibilities. Most of us accept that complete independence and separation

from politics is an unreachable, idealistic vision for intelligence analysis; that politics is

necessary for the healthy functioning of democracy, and that the interplay of intelligence

and politics is necessary in the same way that political violence is sometimes necessary,

and perhaps even a good thing.

One byproduct of democracy is that policymakers frequently cherry pick information to

sell their policies to the general public. People in democracies want to be convinced that

their elected leaders know how to solve their problems. They are not interested in what

may be the truth: that there is a lot policymakers do not know; that they think the

proposed policy may work to solve the problem but are not really sure. Now what

political leader is going to be able to convince people to support his policy with that kind

of message? So in order to make the message more appealing to the electorate, the

politicians strip out uncertainty and ambiguity, and present their case with more

confidence than they really possess. They use information to support their case in the

same way that a lawyer does—to convince the jury, and win.

In this context, what is the difference between politicizing and policymaking? Cherry

picking information to make a case and then using that information to sell the case to the

electorate may actually be a normal part of politics and decisionmaking. Is this really a

bad thing? Maybe this is a form of politicization that really is not bad at all; on the

surface it may have similarities to analytic politicization, but in reality is just normal

policymaking. As a result, according to one intelligence scholar, “the putatively desirable

‘nonpolitical’ relationship between intelligence estimators and policy makers is a fiction.



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It would not be desirable to separate analysis and policy, even if it were possible.

However, a politicized relationship between analysis and policy need not be corrupt.”66

Which brings us to the second implication of this argument, that preventing corruption of

the analytic product requires that intelligence analysts retain a strong sense of

professional identity and integrity. This is something that Robert Gates identified in the

early 1990, suggestion that “the first line of defense against politicization and analytic

distortions is our own personal integrity” with “the absolute integrity of our analysis” as

“the most important of the core values” of the professional intelligence analyst.67

Reinforcing these points, Melvin Goodman, coincidentally one of Gates’ harshest critics,

comes to the same conclusion; that prevention of politicization requires analytic integrity.

Even though Goodman believes Gates himself politicized analysis when he worked at the

CIA, he says that “in the final analysis, the only protections against politicization are the

integrity and honesty of the intelligence analysts themselves as well as the institution of

competitive analysis that serves as a safeguard against unchallenged acceptance of

conventional wisdom.”68

If what makes analytic politicization a corruption of the process is the intent to distort,

then prevention of that corruption requires the creation and promulgation of an analytic

code of ethics that has at its core the requirement for integrity based on individual

judgment and a fair reading of the information available. This does not mean that the

intelligence analyst can or should be objective, for objectivity is not possible. Nor does it

mean that independence from policy and other efforts to protect the analyst from the

negative effects of motivated bias will result in a more accurate assessment than that of

the policymaker. Nor does it mean that analytic consistency or inconsistency with

policymaker preferences matters. All that is required to prevent analytic politicization is a

fair reading of the information available combined with integrity in its interpretation and

honesty in its communication. Accordingly, the motto of the intelligence analyst should

not be related to ‘seeking truth’ or ‘speak truth to power’ but rather ‘call it as you see it.’

1 Harry Howe Ransom. “The Politicization of Intelligence.” Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a

Democratic Society. (Ed. Stephen Cimbala). Transnational Publishers. Dobbs Ferry, NY.1987.(25-46). 26. 2 Ransom, 44.

3 Robert Jervis. “Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq.” The Journal of Strategic

Studies. Vol. 29. No. 1. February 2006. (3-52).11. 4 Jack Davis. “Facts, Findings, Forecasts, and Fortune-telling: Defining the Analytic Mission.” Studies in

Intelligence. Fall 1995. 5 Conversation with the-then CIA Ombudsman for Politicization. December 15, 1999.

6 Paul R. Pillar. Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq. Foreign Affairs. Mar- Apr 2006. V85 N2. 15-27.

7 Anthony Glees and Philip H.J. Davies. Spinning the Spies: Intelligence, Open Government, and the

Hutton Inquiry. The Social Affairs Unit, London. 2004. 41. 8 John Gentry. Lost Promise: How CIA Analysis Misserves the Nation.” University Press of America,

Maryland. 1993. 230-231 9 Gentry 233.

10 Gentry, 233-234.

11 Jennifer Sims. What is Intelligence? Information for Decisionmaking. U.S. Intelligence at the

Crossroads: Agendas for Reform. (Eds. Roy Godson, Ernest R. May, and Gary Schmitt). National Strategy

Information Center Inc. 1995. (3-16.) 5.



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12

Joshua Rovner. Pathologies of Intelligence-Policy Relations. 2005. Unpublished paper. 61-64. 13

Pillar, 15-27. 14

Pillar, 15-27. 15

Pillar, 15-27. 16

Pillar, 15-27. 17

US Senate. 1991. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Hearing on the Nomination of Robert M.

Gates, of Virginia, to be Director of Central Intelligence. 5 November 1991. 102nd

Congress.

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/Z?r102:S05NO1-73: 18

Conversation with the-then CIA Ombudsman for Politicization. December 15, 1999. 19



Gentry, 246. 22

Gregory Treverton. “Intelligence Analysis: Between “Politicization” and Irrelevance.” (Eds. Roger

George and James Bruce.) Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations. Georgetown

University Press. Washington DC. 2008. (91-104). 92. 23

Sims, 5. 24

For example, see Scott Lucas. “Recognising Politicization: The CIA and the Path to the 2003 War in

Iraq.” Intelligence and National Security, 26: 2 (2011). (203- 227). 205-208. 25

Jeffrey R. Cooper. Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intelligence Analysis.

Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Dec. 2005. 34. 26

Treverton, 93. 27

Treverton, 93. 28

For more on the standard model, see Stephen Marrin. “Intelligence Analysis and Decisionmaking:

Methodological Challenges.” Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates. (Eds. Peter Gill, Stephen

Marrin, and Mark Phythian). Routledge. 2008. 131-150. 29

Sherman Kent. Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. Archon Books, Hamden CT. 1949.

(Reprinted 1965). 182. 30

Roger Hilsman. “Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs.” World Politics. April 1953. (1-45).

12-13. 31

Michael Handel. “The Politics of Intelligence.” Intelligence and National Security. Vol. 2. No. 4. (Oct

1987). (5-38.) 7. 32

See chapter 2, “A Theory of the Politicization of Expertise” in Bruce Bimber. The Politics of Expertise in

Congress: The Rise and Fall of the Office of Technology Assessment. SUNY Press. 1996. 12. 33

Glenn Hastedt, “The New Context of Intelligence Estimating: Politicization or Publicizing?,” in

Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society (ed. Stephen J. Cimbala) Dobbs Ferry, NY:

Transnational Publishers Inc., 1987: 54. 34

Allan Megill. “Introduction: Four Senses of Objectivity.” (Ed. Allan Megill) Rethinking Objectivity.

Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994. (1-20). 1. 35

See chapter on intelligence producers and consumers in Kent, 180-206. 36

Allan Megill. “Introduction: Four Senses of Objectivity.” (Ed. Allan Megill) Rethinking Objectivity.

Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994. (1-20). 1. 37

Kevin Russell. “The Subjectivity of Intelligence Analysis and Implications for the U.S. National Security

Strategy.” SAIS Review. Winter-Spring 2004. (147-163). 157. 38

Kent, 198. 39

For more on the inductive fallacy as applied to intelligence, see: Klaus Knorr. “Foreign Intelligence and

the Social Sciences.” Research Monograph No. 17. Center of International Studies. Woodrow Wilson

School of Public and International Affairs. Princeton University. June 1, 1964. 40

Willmoore Kendall. ‘The Function of Intelligence’ World Politics. 1/ 4. (July 1949) pp.542-552. 41

Thomas L. Hughes, “The Fate of Facts in a World of Men: Foreign Policy and Intelligence-Making,”

Headline Series #233 New York: Foreign Policy Association, December 1976, 10. 42

Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, 46. 43

Richard K. Betts. “Intelligence for Policymaking.” Washington Quarterly (Summer 1980) (118-29) 126.

Note that Betts’ definition of bias is not that of a subjective preference shaping the assessment, but rather

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/Z?r102:S05NO1-73



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intended in the scientific sense of ‘bias’ meaning something that shapes our perception in such a way as to

prevent the achievement of perfect accuracy. 44

See Richards Heuer’s distinction between data-driven analysis and concept-driven analysis at: Richards

Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. CIA: Center for the Study of Intelligence. 1999. 59-62. 45

Hughes, “The Fate of Facts,” 10. 46

At times this more accurate understanding is due to possession of more accurate models or cognitive

frameworks; at other times it is due to their expertise, knowledge and alternative sources of information. 47

Gates, “The CIA and American Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 66, no. 2 (Winter 1987-1988). (215-

230). 221. 48

Graham E. Fuller. “Statement of Graham E. Fuller, Former Vice-Chairman, National Intelligence

Council, CIA.” For the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 1 October 1991. 11. As cited in John

Gentry. Lost Promise: How CIA Analysis Misserves the Nation.” University Press of American, Maryland.

1993. 244. 49

Stephen Marrin. “Intelligence Analysis and Decisionmaking: Methodological Challenges.” Intelligence

Theory: Key Questions and Debates. (Eds. Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, and Mark Phythian). Routledge.

2008. 131-150. 50

Robert M. Gates. The CIA and American Foreign Policy. Foreign Affairs. Winter 1987-88. Vol. 66. No.

2. 215-230. 227. 51

Hilsman, “Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs,” 23-24. 52

James J. Wirtz. Intelligence to Please? The Order of Battle Controversy during the Vietnam War. Political

Science Quarterly, Vol. 106, No. 2 (Summer, 1991), (pp. 239-263). 262. 53


National Estimates: An Assessment of the Product and the Process. Intelligence Monograph. Center for

the Study of Intelligence. Central Intelligence Agency. April 1977. 37-38 55

Thomas L. Hughes. “The Fate of Facts in a World of Men: Foreign Policy and Intelligence-Making.”

Headline Series #233; the Foreign Policy Association. New York. December 1976. 5. 56

Michael I. Handel. “Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise.” The Journal of Strategic Studies.

V7. N3. (1984). 235. 57

Richard K. Betts. “American Strategic Intelligence: Politics, Priorities, and Direction.” Intelligence

Policy and National Security. Eds. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Uri Ra’anan. The Macmillan Press. 1981.

(245-267). 257. 58

Stephen Marrin. “Intelligence Analysis Theory: Explaining and Predicting Analytic Responsibilities.”

Intelligence and National Security. 22:6 (December 2007). 821- 846. 59

Richard K. Betts. Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security.

Columbia University Press. New York. 2007. 67. 60



Glenn P. Hastedt. The New Context of Intelligence Estimating: Politicization or Publicizing? Intelligence

and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society. (Ed. Stephen J. Cimbala). Transnational Publishers, Inc.

Dobbs Ferry, NY. 1987. (47-67). 63

See, for example, Glenn Hastedt’s effort to parse out different kinds of politicization in this issue. 64

Bruce Hoffman. Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press. 2006. 40. 65

For a good discussion of the employment of just war theory to terrorism, see: Andrew Valls. “Can

Terrorism Be Justified?” Ethics in International Affairs : Theories and Cases, Andrew Valls, ed. Lanham,

MD : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000. 65-79. Also see: Scott Lowe. Terrorism and Just War

Theory. Bloomsburg University. 1-7. 66

Stephen J. Cimbala. Introduction. Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society. (Ed.

Stephen J. Cimbala). Transnational Publishers, Inc. Dobbs Ferry, NY. 1987. 1-23. 67

Robert M. Gates. “Guarding against Politicization.” Studies in Intelligence 36, no. 5 (1992): 5-13. 68

Melvin A. Goodman. The CIA and the Perils of Politicization. International Policy Report (A Publication

of the Center for International Policy). March 2008. (1-9). 9.

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