Juris 6th Sen

8/17/2019 Juris 6th Sen

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Jurisprudence

CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, PATNA

Project on:-

Legal Rights

Submitted To: Prof. (Dr.) Manoranjan

(acult! for "uris#rudence)

Submitted $!: Su%irti Shi%ha

Roll &o.: ' Semester: *+, rd ear


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Ackno!ed"e#en$

The #resent #roject on the Legal Rights’ has been able to get its final sha#e /ith the su##ort

and hel# of #eo#le from 0arious 1uarters. M! sincere than%s go to all the members /ithout

/hom the stud! could not ha0e come to its #resent state. + am #roud to ac%no/ledge

gratitude to the indi0iduals during m! stud! and /ithout /hom the stud! ma! not be

com#leted. + ha0e ta%en this o##ortunit! to than% those /ho genuinel! hel#ed me.

2ith immense #leasure, + e3#ress m! dee#est sense of gratitude to Dr. Manoranjan kumar ,

acult! for "uris#rudence, 4hana%!a &ational La/ 5ni0ersit!, for hel#ing me in m! #roject.

+ am also than%ful to the /hole 4hana%!a &ational La/ 5ni0ersit! famil! that #ro0ided meall the material + re1uired for the #roject. + /ould also li%e to than% m! #arents /ithout /hose

blessings6 the com#letion of this #roject /as not #ossible.

+ ha0e made e0er! effort to ac%no/ledge credits, but + a#ologies in ad0ance for an! omission

that ma! ha0e inad0ertentl! ta%en #lace.

Last but not least + /ould li%e to than% 7lmight! /hose blessing hel#ed me to com#lete the

#roject.


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RESEARCH %ETHO&OLO'Y

The #roject is basicall! based on doctrinal method of research.

AI%S ( O)JECTIVES*

To understand and criticall! anal!sis the meaning, significance and nature and sco#e of

juris#rudencial conce#t of legal right. The researcher further aims to ma%e in de#th anal!sis

of the role of conce#t of legal right in modern legal s!stem.

SOURCES O+ &ATA*

The follo/ing secondar! sources of data ha0e been used in the #roject-

$oo%s

2ebsites

Hpo$-esis*

The researcher assumes that e0er! Right has a corres#onding dut!.


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Con$en$s

Tri!o" o. Ri"-$, Wron" /nd &u$

Le"/! Ri"-$s in Wider Sense * Ho-.e!di/n Jur/! An/!sis

T-eories o. $-e +unc$ion o. Ri"-$s

W-/$ Kinds o. En$i$ies C/n 0e Le"/! Ri"-$1-o!ders2

Conc!usion

)i0!io"r/p-


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Tri!o" o. Ri"-$, Wron" /nd &u$

8Right9 is one of the conce#t studied in "uris#rudence. Rules are e3#ressed in terms of

conce#ts and conce#ts are the tools of judicial reasoning.

7 /rong is an act contrar! to the rules of right and justice. La/ consists of rules to regulate

human conduct. These rules #rescribe rights and duties for the smooth administration of

justice. 2hen there is a breach of duties and 0iolation of right , la/ ste#s in /ith its remedial

measure. The conce#t of right and dut! are closel! connected /ith the conce#t of /rong. The

conce#t of /rong arises because dut! has not been #erformed and because a right has been

infringed.

+. 2rong

. To be understood in t/o senses ; +njuria and


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II3 &u$ies

43 Positi0e acts of dut!: beha0ior is regulated chiefl! through duties. 7 dut!

is an act /hich one ought to do. To sa! that a man is under a dut! means

that he ought to #erform a certain act. et not all acts /hich a man has to

do constitute his dut!. Dut! consists in #ositi0e acts /hich a mann has to

do constitute his dut! Dut! consists in #ositi0e acts and not in just

restraining from doing something. 7 dut! not to re0eal something is a

negati0e /a! to describe a #ositi0e dut! to %ee# silent.

53 >ught? ha senses : the idea of ought? in la/ must be understood in

senses:

• +t ma! connote conduct /hich is due (obligation or dut!) e.g. !ou

ought to #a! !our debt

• +t ma! connote #ro#riet!(correct or acce#ted usage)

• +t ma! connote the effecti0e menas to an end e.g. if !ou /ant to

tal% to @ b! tele#hone, !ou ought to ring him u#.. Dut! and obligation distinguished: 7 dut! must be distinguished from an

obligation. 7 t!#ical e3am#le of an obligation is one that results from

ma%ing a #romise. The #erson ma%ing the #romise of his o/n accord has

incurred an obligation unli%e in the case of a dut! /here a #erson has the

dut! #rescribed b! la/ /hether he /ants it or not.

A. 7n!thing that ougth to be done ? is dut! : Dictates of common moralit!

li%e that one should not %ill or steal- neither fit in the meaning of dut! nor

obligation in the strict sense of the ter. et la/!ers s#ea% of an!thing

/hich ought to be done or ought not to be done as a dut! in the loose sense

of the term. +n juris#rudence, the term dut! is used and discussed on this

loose sense.

B. Moral and Legal Duties: Duties are either moral or legal. The! are #artl!

coincidental and #artl! distinct. 7dulterated mil% ma! not be sold /hether

%no/ingl! or other/ise is a legal dut!. $ut it is not a moral dut! if selling

ta%es #lace /ithout the o/ner?s %no/ledge that it is adulterated.

III3 Ri"-$s

. 7sserts belongingness : the conce#t of right is a 0er! im#ortant and a

significant one in an! ci0iliCed societ!, Right is a conce#t ot /hich a 0er!

liberal use in made b! a #erson in order to assert that something belongs to

him6 in order to assert that if ta%en a/a! he has the right to get tot bac%6

and to e1uall! assert that he is entitled to get the State assistance=court

assistance in getting it bac%.

. Rigth has a corres#onding dut!: Right and dut! are closel! lin%ed. or

e3am#le , /hen @ s!as that he has a right to a #iece of land /hat he means

that is under a dut! to gi0e him the #ossession. Thus ascribing a right on

one #erson is to im#l! that someone else is under a corres#onding dut!.

. +ntrests #rotected b! moral and legal rules: Rights are defined as intrests #rotected b! moral or legal rules. et rights and interests are not identical.


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+nterests are things /hich are to a man?s ad0antage. To sa! that a #erson

has an intrestt in his re#utation means that ti is to his ad0antage to enjo! a

god name . to sa! that he has a right to re#utation means that others ought

not to ta%e it a/a! from him i.e. that others ought not to defame him.

Thus for e3am#le, 7 #urchases a house from $ for R. la%hs, here

• 7 is thr o/ner of a right.

• $ is the subject to dut!.

• 7ll other #ersons also are the subject of dut! because the right

a0ailable to 7 is a0ailable aganinst the /orld at large.

• 4ontent of the right is the non ;interference /ith the #urchaser?s

• 3cusi0e use of the house.

• Subject ;matter of the house.

• Title of the right is the con0e!ance deed li%e the sale deed.

+n the same e3am#le $ /ould be the o/ner of the right to recei0e Rs. la%hs from 7 being

the consideration amount for the sale of the house . $ut here the subject of dut! is 7 alone as

$ can demand #a!ment from 7 alone. This is because the content of the right is to recei0e

#a!ment from the bu!er alone and is therefore a0ailable onl! against the bu!er.

Thus e0er! right in0ol0es a three-fold relation in /hich the o/ner of it stands:

• +t is right against some #erson.

• +t is a right to some act or omission of such #erson.

• +t is a right to some thing to /hich that act or omission relates.

or e3am#le, in State of Rajasthan 0. 5nion of +ndia, the court did not agree /ith the

contention that right to remain as Member of the 7ssembl! and to dra/ salar! for B !rs is

right to #ro#ert!.

7n o/nerless right is not recogniCed b! la/ though it is not a legal im#ossibilit!. et

o/nershi# of the right ma! be contingent or uncertain. or e3am#le, a be1uest for the benefit

of the unborm #erson is a contingent right on the unborn #erson until it is born.

7 right must ha0e an o/ner and also an object in res#ect of /hich the right e3ists. >bject of

the right is the thing in /hich the o/ner of the right is interested. +t ma! be a material thing

li%e a house or land or it ma! be immaterial thing li%e re#utation, co#!right, commercial

good/ill, etc.

Le"/! Ri"-$s in Wider Sense * Ho-.e!di/n Jur/! An/!sis


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The term Elegal rightE is also used in a /ider sense to include an! legall! recognised interest

/hether it corres#onds to a legal dut! or not. +n this generic sense, a legal right ma! be

defined as an addition or benefit /hich is conferred u#on a #erson b! a rule of la/. Rights in

this sense are of three different %inds, 0iC., rights in the strict sense, liberties and #o/ers.

(a) 7s regards the rights in the strict sense, there are legall! #rotected interests corres#onding

to legal duties im#osed u#on others.

(b) The legal liberties of a #erson are the benefits /hich he deri0es from the absence of legal

duties im#osed u#on him. Those are the things /hich he can do /ithout being #re0ented b!

la/. 7 #erson has a right to do /hate0er he #leases /ith himself but he has no right or libert!

to interfere /ith others.


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(c) 7ccording to Salmond, a power is an abilit! conferred u#on a #erson b! la/ to determine,

b! his o/n /ill directed to that end, the rights, duties, liabilities or other legal relations, either

all b! himself or b! other #ersons. 7ccording to


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e3ercise of the legal #ositions /hich are connected /ith each other b! means of logical

relations of entailment and negation.


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right=no-right) and those in the last t/o columns (liabilit!=immunit! and #o/er=disabilit!) are

jural o##osites, i.e. t/o legal #ositions that negate each other. $efore 0enturing to discuss

each t!#e of right and sho/ing the im#ortance of their relationshi# in modern juris#rudential

thin%ing and our #ractices in0ol0ing rights, it needs to be stated that all of the


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+n short, libert! is merel! an absence of a dut! to abstain from the action. The correlati0it! of

this jural relationshi# sho/s that the #erson against /hom the libert! is held has a no-right

concerning the acti0it! to /hich the libert! relates. This, ho/e0er, does not mean that he

himself does not ha0e a libert! to interfere in the acti0it!. Su##ose that + am irritated b!

#eo#le /ho smo%e in m! 0icinit!. P meets S (smo%er) in a #ublic #lace, /ho starts to smo%e

in P?s #resence. P as%s him to sto#, but S tells P, he has a ErightE to smo%e here (gi0en the

absence of an! legal #rohibitions). S is confusing his entitlement.


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+n short, a #o/er is oneEs abilit! to alter legal (or moral) relations. or instance, P can ha0e

the #o/er to enter into a contract /ith S /hereb! he agrees (for a consideration) to refrain

from smo%ing in P?s #resence. Thus, P has the #o/er to change their legal relations in that P

ma%e S contractuall! bound. S, thus, has a liabilit!, /hich is correlati0e to #o/er, in that he is

liable to ha0ing his legal relations altered b! P?s e3ercise of #o/er.


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such as D/or%in,I !mlic%a,G ant and Macinnon /ho see% to justif! rights, mainl! in

terms of the 0arious 0alues the! ser0e. 7rguabl!, this adds unnecessar! com#le3it! to the

nature of rights.

OPPOSITES AN& CORRELATIVES


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Ar$ic!e 49*

The state shall not den! to an! #erson e1ualit! before la/ or the e1ual #rotection of la/s

/ithin the territor! of +ndia.

State shall not- &egati0e dut!

Re/son/0!e c!/ssi.ic/$ion*

Though state is im#osed /ith negati0e dut! not to den! to an! #erson e1ualit! before la/ or

the e1ual #rotection of la/s but certain times, the state can den! on the basis of reasonable

classification. 4ertain times, state is conferred /ith this #o/er.

Ar$ic!e 4: 6;7*

&othing in this article shall #re0ent the state from ma%ing an! s#ecial #ro0ision for /omen

and children.

P>2R (ST7T)(O) L+$RT(2>M&) (-)

L7$+L+T (2>M&) (O) D+S7$+L+T (ST7T) (-)

$ut, this #o/er to ma%e s#ecial #ro0ision for /omen and children is cou#led /ith libert!.

State is not under an! dut! to ma%e s#ecial #ro0ision for /omen and children. State ma! or

ma! not be.

T-eories o. $-e +unc$ion o. Ri"-$s


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T-e Wi!! T-eor /nd $-e In$eres$ T-eor

There are t/o main theories of the function of rights: the /ill theor! and the interest theor!.

ach #resents itself as ca#turing an ordinar! understanding of /hat rights do for those /hohold them. 2hich theor! offers the better account of the functions of rights has been the

subject of s#irited dis#ute, literall! for age.

2ill theorists maintain that a right ma%es the rightholder 8a small scale so0ereign.9 More

s#ecificall!, a /ill theorist asserts that the function of a right is to gi0e its holder control o0er

anotherEs dut!. our #ro#ert! right diagrammed in the figure abo0e is a right because it

contains a #o/er to /ai0e (or annul, or transfer) othersE duties. ou are the 8so0ereign9 of

!our com#uter, in that !ou ma! #ermit others to touch it or not at !our discretion. Similarl! a

#romisee is 8so0ereign9 o0er the action of the #romisor: she has a right because she has the

#o/er to /ai0e (or annul) the #romisorEs dut! to %ee# the #romise. +n


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un/ai0able rights are some of the most im#ortant rights that /e ha0e: consider, for e3am#le,

the un/ai0able right not to be ensla0ed. Moreo0er, since the /ill theorist holds that all

rights confer so0ereignt!, he cannot ac%no/ledge rights in beings inca#able of e3ercising

so0ereignt!. 2ithin the /ill theor! it is im#ossible for incom#etents li%e infants, animals, and

comatose adults to ha0e rights. et /e ordinaril! /ould not doubt that these incom#etents canha0e rights, for e3am#le the right not to be tortured. A 2ill theories also ha0e difficulties

e3#laining #ri0ilege-rights, /hich are not rights of authorit! o0er others.

The interest theor! is more ca#acious than the /ill theor!. +t can acce#t as rights both

un/ai0able rights (the #ossession of /hich ma! be good for their holders) and the rights of

incom#etents (/ho ha0e interests that rights can #rotect). The interest theor! also ta#s into

the dee#l! #lausible connection bet/een holding rights and being better off.


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right-holder ma! demand of others, /here 8demand9 im#lies the #ermissibilit! of com#elling

#erformance or e3acting com#ensation for non-#erformance. Li%e the /ill theor!, such

accounts center on the agenc! of the right-holder. The! do not turn on the right-holderEs

#o/er o0er the dut! of another, so the! do not share the /ill theor!Es difficult! /ith

un/ai0able rights. The! ma!, ho/e0er, ha0e more difficult! e3#laining #o/er-rights.Demand theories also share the /ill-theor!Es challenges in e3#laining the rights of

incom#etents, and in e3#laining #ri0ilege-rights.

>ther recent anal!ses of /hat rights do for right holders attem#t to combine the strengths of

both of the leading theories. Sreeni0asan #uts for/ard a h!brid anal!sis of the claim-right

that grafts the interest theor! onto the /ill theor!: here the function of the claim-right is to

endo/ the right-holder /ith the amount of control o0er anotherEs dut! that ad0ances her

interests. 4ruft (GGA) suggests an inclusi0e anal!sis /here all rights are 8of 0alue9 in

securing the right-holderEs autonom! or interests. 2enar (GGB) abandons the idea that all

rights ha0e an! single function at all, describing instead se0eral distinct functions that rights #erform.

Ron/! &orkins T-eor

T-e ri"-$ /nser $-esis

. Su##ose the legislature has #assed a statute sti#ulating that Fsacrilegious contracts

shall henceforth be in0alid.F The communit! is di0ided as to /hether a contract

signed on Sunda! is, for that reason alone, sacrilegious. +t is %no/n that 0er! fe/ of the legislators had that 1uestion in mind /hen the! 0oted, and that the! are no/

e1uall! di0ided on the 1uestion of /hether it should be so inter#reted. Tom and Tim

ha0e signed a contract on Sunda!, and Tom no/ sues Tim to enforce the terms of the

contract, /hose 0alidit! Tim contests. Shall /e sa! that the judge must loo% for the

right ans/er to the 1uestion of /hether TomEs contract is 0alid, e0en though the

communit! is dee#l! di0ided about /hat the right ans/er is >r is it more realistic to

sa! that there sim#l! is no right ans/er to the 1uestion'

'. D/or%in, I'B, #. I

>n a rhetorical le0el, a FrightF is a %ind of claim that a #erson can ma%e to the #erformance or non-#erformance of a #olitical act of a certain descri#tion. Such is D/or%inEs /ell-%no/n


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account of rights Fas trum#s.F $! this account, someone claiming a right to a #olitical act is

claiming that those in a #osition to #ro0ide it cannot justifiabl! refuse to do so for utilitarian

or /ealth-ma3imiCing reasons. That is, the! cannot justifiabl! refuse on the ground (ho/e0er

sincerel! the! belie0e it and ho/e0er true it is in fact) that not #ro0iding the act /ould on the

/hole lead to results that better ser0e the full range of legitimate interests in or of the

communit! and its members.

7ccording to D/or%in, rights reflect ideas about o0erriding demands, issuing from (or

attributed to) s#ecific indi0iduals /ithin the societ! for res#ect for them and their #ositions.

7t the core of D/or%inEs notion of a right is the idea of there al/a!s being certain constraints

on a #olitical societ!Es use of the #o/ers it #ossesses, as a societ!, to act in /a!s that

contra0ene certain demands attributed to indi0iduals (or grou#s) for res#ect for them as such

and, therefore, for certain of their needs and /ishes.

Sometimes, legal decisionma%ing a##ears to be guided mainl! b! considerations of indi0idual rights. Sometimes, it seems to be guided mainl! b! considerations of the

social conse#uences. Sometimes, these t/o modes of guidance tug to/ard different

outcomes. That is /h! la/!ers and judges often e3#erience a sense of being #ut to a choice

bet/een the t/o modes. This e3#erience is misleading, though, insofar as it ma! suggest that

the distinction bet/een conse1uentialist and non-conse1uentialist moral theories ma#s

directl! onto the distinction bet/een right-based and goal-based moral arguments. +t doesnEt,

and hereEs /h! not: 2hen /e sa! a #erson has a right to something (t!#icall!, to being treated

or not treated in a certain /a!), /e must ha0e a reason for sa!ing so, and the reason need not

be a non-conse1uentialist reason: it ma! 0er! /ell be a conse1uentialist, e0en utilitarian sort

of a reason.

>ne of D/or%inEs most interesting and contro0ersial theses states that the la/ as #ro#erl!

inter#reted /ill gi0e an ans/er. This is not to sa! that e0er!one /ill ha0e the same ans/er (a

consensus of /hat is FrightF), or if it did, the ans/er /ould not be justified e3actl! in the

same /a! for e0er! #erson6 rather it means that there /ill be a necessar! ans/er for each

indi0idual if he a##lies himself correctl! to the legal 1uestion. or the correct method is that

enca#sulated b! the meta#hor of "udge


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D/or%in does not den! that com#etent la/!ers often disagree on /hat is the solution to a

gi0en case. >n the contrar!, he claims that the! are disagreeing about the right ans/er to the

case, the ans/er


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W-/$ Kinds o. En$i$ies C/n 0e Le"/! Ri"-$1-o!ders2

There has been much dis#ute amongst #hiloso#hers as /hat to %inds of entities can be right-

holders. 4orres#onding #rett! much to the general dis#ute about the 0er! nature of rights,some ha0e argued that an! entit! /hich /ould benefit from the #erformance b! others of

legal duties can be a right-holder6 others that it has to be an entit! /hich has interests6 others

that it has to be an entit! ca#able of e3ercising some %ind of control o0er the rele0ant legal

machiner!. 7nd there are 0ariants of all these #ositions.

There has to be a sense in /hich legal s!stems can confer rights on such entities as the!

#lease. This is because it has long been recogniCed that legal s!stems can regard as legal

#ersons such entities as the! #lease. +n ngland, for e3am#le, the 4ro/n? has, for centuries,

been regarded as a legal entit!, although /hat this means in terms of office-holders, far less

the actual human beings /ho occu#ied those offices, has changed greatl! o0er that time.Li%e/ise, all modern societies recogniCe the legal e3istence as #ersons of com#anies or

cor#orations and fre1uentl! of such entities as trade unions, go0ernment de#artments,

uni0ersities, certain t!#es of #artnershi#s and clubs, etc.

>ne of the most contentious areas in recent !ears has been /hether !oung children, the

se0erel! mentall! ill, non-human animals, areas of endangered countr!side, etc, can #ro#erl!

be regarded as legal right-holders. 4learl! an!one /ho has locus standi before a court must

be a holder of some rights /ithin the s!stem. $ut it does not seem to follo/ automaticall!

that an entit! /hich does not, or /hich is #h!sicall! or mentall! inca#able of bringing a legal

action, is not thereb! a right-holder. or it ma! be the intention of the s!stem that the interestsof that entit! should be re#resented b! another #erson. i0en then, that all these entities ma!

be #rotected b! la/, and that someone can bring some %ind of legal action to ensure that

those duties are enforced, /hen /ould /e sa! that the entit! itself is a right-holder and /hen

not

The ans/er /ill often turn u#on /hether one embraces an interest- or a choice-theor! of

rights. Mac4ormic% (IKH), for e3am#le, argued that an! theor! of rights /hich could not

accommodate childrensE rights must be deficient, and this /as a reason, in his 0ie/, for

ado#ting an interest theor!. 2ellman (IIB), on the other hand, claims that to assert that 0er!

!oung children or the se0erel! mentall! ill can ha0e legal rights is to distort the conce#t of aright, since the! lac% the rele0ant control of the legal machiner!. +nstead, he argues, the

rele0ant rights should be seen as belonging onl! to those /ho can bring the rele0ant actions

on their behalf. or e3am#le, in his 0ie/ a 0er! !oung child /ould not ha0e a right not to be

negligentl! injured b! the conduct of another. Rather, it /ould be the case that the childEs

#arent had a right that their child not be negligentl! injured. >ne difficult! about this #osition

a##ears to be that it does not easil! s1uare /ith the rele0ent remedial rights (e.g., to damages)

that the la/ /ould recognise. +n this e3am#le the la/ /ould clearl! com#ensate the childEs

loss in being injured, not the #arentEs loss in their child being injured (though the latter might

be a se#arate ground of action in some s!stems).


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Conc!usion

7 #erson ma! be said to ha0e a right /hen another or others are bound or oblige b! la/ to do

or forbear to/ards or in regard of him. 0er! right, /hether moral or legal im#lies the action

or #assi0e furtherance b! other of the /ishes of the #art! ha0ing the right. 2hene0er one is

entitled to such is said to be their dut!. 2hen such furtherance is onl! e3#ected b! the #ublic

o#inion of the societ! in /hich the! li0e, it is their moral dut!. 2here it /ill be enforced b!

the #o/er of the state to /hich the! are amenable, it is their legal dut!.

7 dut! is an act or forbearance com#elled b! the state in res#ect off a right 0ested in another

and the breach of /hich a /rong. S#ea%ing of a right indicted that /e are loo% in at the legal

#rotection of an interest from the stand#oint of those /ho must refrain from interference /ith

the interest. +n /hich 0ies of the matter, e0er! right im#lies a correlati0e dut!.

+t is generall! acce#ted that rights and duties are related in such a /a! that the rights of one

#erson entail the duties of another #erson. Thus, rights and duties are correlati0es and there

can be no right /ithout a dut! li%e there can be no #arent /ithout a child. Rights and duties

are t/o #hases of the same thing. Rights are considered to be essential for the e3#ansion of

human #ersonalit!. The! offer to the indi0idual a sufficient sco#e for free action and thus

#re#are ground for self-de0elo#ment.

Rights and duties are co relati0es. +f there are are duties to/ards the #ublic, there are rights as

/ell. There can be no dut! unless there is some #erson to /hom that dut! is due. 0er! right

or dut! in0ol0es a bond of obligation. The e3istence of a right is a necessar! condition for the

e3istence of a dut!.

The stud! of conce#t of right is 0er! essential #art of the stud! of "uris#rudence as it hel#s

the la/ students, la/!ers and e0en judges in understanding the true nature of the 0arious

rights #ro0ided b! the legal s!stem. *arious rights can ha0e different nature. Some rights can

be claims and thus corres#onding duties /ill be im#osed on some other #ersons /hereas

certain rights can be in the nature of libert! /hich /ill be the ad0antages /hich accrues to

someone due to lac% of dut! on himself. There are certain rights in the nature of #o/er also,

/hich #ro0ide the abilit! to the #erson to change the legal condition of others /hereas certain

rights are in the nature of immunit! /hich ta%es the #o/er of other to change one?s legal

condition. 5nderstanding this distinction bet/een four different terms used for the rights in


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/ider senses and their distinction from claims, i.e. rights strict sense, /ill hel# us to

a##reciate the im#ortance and im#act of the rights conferred b! the legal s!stem. Placing a

right on


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)i0!io"r/p-

)OOKS RE+ERRE&

4oleman "ules Q Sha#iro Scott, "uris#rudence and #hiloso#h! of la/, &e/ or%, o3ford

uni0ersit! #ress, GG.

Roscoe Pound, IBI, urisprudence - Page HB

Mahajan *.D, "uris#rudence Q legal theor!, eastern boo% com#an!, fifth edition, GGH.

Sharma o%ulesh, 7n introduction to juris#rudence, fifth edition, GGK.

itCgerald P ", Salmond on "uris#rudence, T/elfth edition, +ndian conom! Re#rint, GG.

WE)SITES RE+ERRE&

www.desi$anoon.co.in%&'(&%')% *urisprudence+notes+ legal+ concepts.html

plato.stan,ord.edu%entries%legal+ rights %

htt#:==scholarshi#.la/.u#enn.edu=cgi=0ie/content.cgiarticle'GQconte3t#ennla/re0ie/

htt#:==engagedscholarshi#.csuohio.edu=cgi=0ie/content.cgiarticleIIKQconte3tcle0stlre0

htt#:==///.austlii.edu.au=au=journals=Mur5"L=GGB=I.html

htt#:==#lato.stanford.edu=entries=rights=

https://www.google.co.in/search?biw=1366&bih=643&tbm=bks&tbm=bks&q=inauthor:%22Roscoe+Pound%22&sa=X&ei=o8pXU7fnC4SCrAfRuYCIDA&ved=0CDMQ9AgwAQhttp://books.google.co.in/books?id=6tCMDqb54OQC&pg=RA3-PA165&dq=RELATIONS+BETWEEN+RIGHTS+AND+DUTIES+IN+JURISPRUDENCE+SALMOND&hl=en&sa=X&ei=o8pXU7fnC4SCrAfRuYCIDA&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAQhttp://books.google.co.in/books?id=6tCMDqb54OQC&pg=RA3-PA165&dq=RELATIONS+BETWEEN+RIGHTS+AND+DUTIES+IN+JURISPRUDENCE+SALMOND&hl=en&sa=X&ei=o8pXU7fnC4SCrAfRuYCIDA&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAQhttp://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8023&context=penn_law_reviewhttp://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8023&context=penn_law_reviewhttp://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2997&context=clevstlrevhttp://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MurUEJL/2005/9.htmlhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/#2https://www.google.co.in/search?biw=1366&bih=643&tbm=bks&tbm=bks&q=inauthor:%22Roscoe+Pound%22&sa=X&ei=o8pXU7fnC4SCrAfRuYCIDA&ved=0CDMQ9AgwAQhttp://books.google.co.in/books?id=6tCMDqb54OQC&pg=RA3-PA165&dq=RELATIONS+BETWEEN+RIGHTS+AND+DUTIES+IN+JURISPRUDENCE+SALMOND&hl=en&sa=X&ei=o8pXU7fnC4SCrAfRuYCIDA&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAQhttp://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8023&context=penn_law_reviewhttp://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8023&context=penn_law_reviewhttp://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2997&context=clevstlrevhttp://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MurUEJL/2005/9.htmlhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/#2


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