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published online 27 September 2013Journal of Social WorkWerner Schirmer and Dimitris Michailakis

1WorkThe Luhmannian approach to exclusion/inclusion and its relevance to Social

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Article

The Luhmannian

approach to exclusion/inclusion and itsrelevance toSocial Work1

Werner SchirmerDepartment of Social and Welfare Studies, University of

Linkoping, Linkoping, Sweden; Center for Social Theory, GhentUniversity, Ghent, Belgium

Dimitris MichailakisDepartment of Social and Welfare Studies, University of

Linkoping, SE, Linkoping, Sweden

Abstract

Summary: Although the concept of social exclusion is central to the academic discip-line of social work, there is not much theoretical clarity about what it actually means.For instance, exclusion is used as a synonym for poverty, marginalization, detachment,unemployment, or solitude. We argue that the systems-theoretical framework devel-oped by the German social theorist Niklas Luhmann (19271997) provides the con-ceptual tools to understand inclusion and exclusion in a theoretically adequate way thatis highly relevant to Social Work.Since there is scarcely any literature on Luhmanns work in the field of social work notwritten in German, this article aims to provide a systematic introduction to the

Luhmannian theory of society with respect to the distinction of inclusion/exclusionand its relation to social work to an English-speaking audience. Findings:After a presentation of some basic concepts, it will be argued that exclusionis not a problem per se nor is inclusion always and per se unproblematic. TheLuhmannian approach suggests that inclusion and exclusion are operations of socialsystems that treat human beings as relevant addresses for communication. Againstthat background, systems theory gives a clear and accurate description of what socialwork can (and cannot) do in terms of inclusion/exclusion. Applications: The main purpose of social work is exclusion management. Exclusion

management involves working on the social addresses of individuals with the aim of

Corresponding author:

Werner Schirmer, University of Linkoping, Campus Norrkoping, Norrkoping 60174, Sweden.

Email: [email protected]

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improving their attractiveness for other social systems, a (re)orientation towards beingincludable. It appears in three forms: exclusion prevention, inclusion mediation, and

exclusion administration.

Keywords

Exclusion, inclusion, Luhmann, social work theory, systems theory

Introduction

It is probably a commonality in the literature that one raison detre of social work

is to deal with social exclusion. It is likewise a commonality that there is not much

theoretical clarity on what is actually meant by the term exclusion. A review of

the pertinent literature in leading Social Work journals and textbooks (Axford,

2010; Buchanan, 2006; Dominelli, 1999; Hallero d & Larsson, 2008; Heikkila &

Sihvo, 1997; Pierson, 2010; Sheppard, 2006; Taket et al., 2009; Washington &

Paylor, 1998) shows that the concept of exclusion is rarely underpinned by social

theory, and the term is often used as a synonym for poverty, marginalization, i.e.

people detached from participation in society, especially deprived of a job, money,

family, friends, etc. Furthermore, there is often the normative misunderstanding

that the occurrence of social exclusion is per se a problem, with the consequence

being that inclusion is seen as the solution.Drawing on the framework of social systems theory developed by Niklas

Luhmann, we will argue that exclusion and inclusion are pairs of a binary distinc-

tion and that they play a crucial role in understanding the relation between society

and the individual as well as for the societal function of social work. In the German

literature, there is a considerable body of work applying and developing

Luhmanns general theory of social systems to the case of organized social help

and its relation to society (Baecker, 1994; Bommes & Scherr, 2000b; Fuchs, 2000).

However, as there is scarcely any work published in international journals (among

the exceptions are Scherr, 1999; Villadsen, 2008; Wirth, 2009), the aim of thisarticle is to provide a systematic introduction to the Luhmannian theory of society

with respect to the inclusion/exclusion distinction and its relation to social work to

an English-speaking audience. We will draw on Luhmanns original work as well as

on that of the most important Luhmann scholars in Social Work. The article begins

with a contextualization of Luhmannian systems theory within general systems

theory and in relation to social work (Systems theory and social work).

Starting out with differentiation theory, the section Luhmanns theory of society

offers a clarification of the key component of Luhmanns concept of modern soci-

ety, i.e. functional differentiation into systems such as the economy, politics, sci-ence, religion, etc. Further, the relation between function systems and organization

systems is discussed. The section Society and the individual deals with the often

misunderstood relation between human beings and society in Luhmanns theory.

This part will map out in detail how human beings, despite being part of the

2 Journal of Social Work 0(0)



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environment of social systems, are crucial as psychic systems and persons.

While the first two sections are very abstract, they are necessary steps in order to

comprehend the description of the inclusion/exclusion distinction in the last sec-tion. This is the pivotal section, as it shows how people are included in and

excluded from social systems. It is argued that exclusion and inclusion are not

per se problem and solution, respectively. On the one hand, inclusion as such

can be problematic; on the other hand, exclusion is an operative requirement for

modern society.

Nonetheless, inclusion in some function systems and organizations is vital for an

adequate social life. Against that background, systems theory argues that the spe-

cial function that social work fulfils for society is exclusion management, which

occurs in three forms: exclusion prevention, inclusion mediation, and exclusion

administration.

Systems theory and social work

Before we start developing Luhmanns account of systems theory, a few words need

to be said about the relation between systems-theoretical approaches and social

work. The biologist von Bertalanffy is usually seen as the founder of general sys-

tems theory (von Bertalanffy, 1968). However, for the social sciences, it was

Parsons whose path breaking book The Social System had a clear focus on

systems already about 20 years earlier (Parsons & Smelser, 2012 [1951]). As pointedout by Payne (2002: 272f), the social work textbooks by Goldstein (1973) as well as

Pincus and Minahan (1973) were the first to introduce systems thinking into social

work. Goldstein emphasizes that clients are to be understood as parts of social

systems; likewise the relation between client and social worker can be described as a

system. Pincus and Minahan mention the relevance of resource/support systems

and their relation to clients. Furthermore, there is a whole tradition of cybernetic

and systemic approaches in psychiatry, psychology, and family therapy, foremost

by Bateson (1972) and the Palo Alto-School around Watzlawick, Beavin, and

Jackson (1967) that had considerable impact on social work (see Kleve, 2007). Thecommon denominator of all these different systems-theories is that they refuse to

analyse phenomena in isolation (e.g. people and their behaviours) but consider

these as elements of a system. In other words, people and actions are placed

within a context and studied in their relation to other people and actions. The

main focus is then on the relations between these elements and the emergent,

systemic effects which cannot be explained by the mere properties of the elem-

ents. Additionally, systems-theoretical approaches are interested in how these elem-

ents together form a system, i.e. a unity which due to its distinctive properties

differentiates itself from an environment.Although there is this general compatibility between many systems-theories,

there is also what an external observer might call a division of labour. On the

one hand, there are approaches within social work, psychotherapy, family therapy,

etc. which aim to solve clients problems and/or improve the relation between client

Schirmer and Michailakis 3



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and social worker/therapist. These approaches are interventionist insofar as their

underlying idea is that interventions are more successful when considering systems

theoretical insights. On the other hand, there are systems-theories that are orientedmore towards gaining knowledge; these share the underlying idea that systems-

theory offers insights more appropriate for understanding the world than non-

systemic theories. Examples are the complex frameworks by von Bertalanffy,

Maturana, and Varela in biology or Parsons, Weick, Wallerstein, and Luhmann

within the social sciences.

Social work as an applied science is basically interventionist but in order to be

good at this, it draws from interdisciplinary sources of knowledge, such as biology,

medicine, psychology, sociology, pedagogics, etc. Hence, in the same way as bio-

logical, cybernetic or psychological systems-theories provide relevant insights that

can be used within social work in order to make interventions better, we can argue

that Luhmanns sociological systems theory provides equally relevant insights for

social work. The focus lies, as mentioned above, on a better understanding of the

social conditions of inclusion and exclusion, and this shall be shown in the follow-

ing sections.

Luhmanns theory of society

Functional differentiationThe Luhmannian theory follows the well-established sociological tradition of dif-

ferentiation according to which society is not understood as a single unit (such as a

collective of people) but in terms of difference. This assumption has many prede-

cessors in social theory. Just think of the Marxist difference of bourgeoisie and

proletariat, Webers polytheism of value spheres, Simmels intersecting social cir-

cles, or a bit more recently the Habermasian difference of life world and systems.

Luhmanns approach is, more specifically, an enhancement of the functionalist

strand of differentiation theory following primarily Durkheims social division of

labour and Parsons differentiation of the social system into four function systemsknown as the AGIL scheme. In line with these authors, Luhmann assumes a func-

tional differentiation of modern society (Luhmann, 1997: 743ff).

But unlike earlier versions of systems theory (mainly Parsons), Luhmann does

not consider action as the unit of the social. Instead, he takes interdisciplinary

developments of second-order cybernetics (Von Foerster, 1984) and communica-

tion theory (Shannon & Weaver, 1972; Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1967)

seriously and defines communication as the key element of social processes

(Stichweh, 2000). Accordingly, Luhmann understands society as the comprehensive

social system encompassing all communication. The difference between the socialand non-social realm is equivalent to the difference between communication and

non-communication. Everything that is not communication is exterior to society,

like human beings with their bodies and minds. We will return to this point later in

the article (see the section Society and the individual).




6/21

It is important at this stage of our analysis to note that society consists of

communication systems (not assemblies of people or patterns of social actions).

The way to approach the analysis of social phenomena is to analyse communicativestructures. According to Luhmannian systems theory, contemporary society is no

longer primarily structured by social stratification or geographical differences.

Obviously, these differences persist but only in the form of secondary, collateral

orders. Instead, the core characteristic of society is differentiation into a number of

communication systems such as the economy, politics, law, science, religion, medi-

cine, education, social help, etc. What these systems have in common is that they

fulfil a function for society, i.e. they solve a specific reference problem for society.

Politics, for instance, solves the problem of order by providing collectively binding

decisions (Luhmann, 2000a); the economy deals with the allocation of resources

under conditions of scarcity (Luhmann, 1988a); science helps to advance know-

ledge (Luhmann, 1990). Function systems fulfil their particular functions exclu-

sively, i.e. no other system in their environment is competent for this specific

function. As Luhmann puts it:

The political system cannot replace the economic system, the economic system cannot

replace the educational system, the educational system cannot replace the legal system,

the legal system cannot replace the political system, because no functional subsystem

is able to solve the core problems of another system. (Luhmann, 1988b: 120)

On the basis of their functional primacy, the function systems achieve operative

closure (Luhmann, 1997: 748). Operational closure means that the systems struc-

ture their communications based on their unique observation code (also known as

guiding difference). Examples are payment/no payment for the economic system,

true/false for science, ill/healthy for the medical system, or lawful/unlawful for the

legal system. Due to its specialization, each system is hypersensitive to specific

events that its unique guiding difference allows it to see; it is blind and therefore

indifferent to everything else. The function system codes reduce the enormous

complexity of the world to a small window of relevance. The economy, forinstance, is sensitive to the world in terms of commodities and prices, but not to

truthfulness, aesthetic values, or political expedience. The legal system transforms

every event in the world into a potential legal problem, depending on its (un)law-

fulness. Science focuses on whether knowledge is methodologically and theoretic-

ally tenable, while it is indifferent as to whether this knowledge contradicts

microeconomic rationalities or the catechisms of leading religious congregations.

Religious communication, in turn, observes in terms of immanence or transcend-

ence, no matter how irrational or methodologically devious this might look from

other functional perspectives.Their observational code and operative closure not only allow function systems

to distinguish their own communications from the communications of other sys-

tems. At the same time, they also create mutually incompatible function-specific

constructions of (i.e. information about) society. The functionally differentiated




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society is therefore characterized by a fragmentation of values and descriptions of

social realities (Luhmann, 1998). In this regard, modern society is not a single unit

but a multiplicity of incongruent function system-specific views of it.

Organizations and function systems

With the shift toward functional differentiation, modern society has reached a

degree of complexity and interdependence between subsystems unprecedented in

earlier societies. This is partly a result of the primary structure of society but also of

another line of social differentiation that needs to be taken into account, namely

the differentiation of levels of communication systems into society (i.e. the level of

function systems), organization systems (e.g. governments, churches, business cor-

porations, schools) and face-to-face interaction systems (e.g. meetings, court trials,

church services, dinner parties; see Luhmann, 1982).

In this section, we concentrate on organization systems and how they relate to

function systems. The organization is a type of social system which reproduces

itself through a recursive network of decisions and which discriminates between

members and non-members (Luhmann, 2000b). In contrast to function systems,

organizations have two special features: they can have a hierarchical structure and

build up complex arrangements of behavioural expectations; they have a commu-

nicative address (Luhmann, 1997: 834f) which enables them to communicate with

other organizations.Organizations normally operate within the context of function systems. We can,

for instance, easily consider banks and businesses as organizations in the context of

the economy; schools in the context of education; churches in the context of reli-

gion; hospitals in the context of medicine; research institutes and universities in the

context of science; parties, governments and non-governmental organizations in

the context of politics; or courts in the context of law. However, it is important to

note that organizations are operatively distinct from their function systems; they

follow their own internal routines (such as decision procedures, membership rules,

micropolitical rationalities). The more complex they are the greater their capabilityof internal differentiation (for example into different departments, subdivisions,

work groups). This produces an unbeatable advantage over function systems. As

we outlined above, the logic and guiding difference of one function system cannot

be subsumed in another. One simply cannot observe legally from an economic

perspective. The horizon of the economic system contains only economic distinc-

tions and therefore provides economic criteria. But an organization (or individual)

can shift from one perspective to another. In this way, communication in organ-

izations is necessarily linked to several function systems. That is, in producing

decisions, they can utilize a multiplicity of codes (e.g. economic, legal, scientific,etc.) simultaneously (Andersen, 2003). Although a business corporation is mainly

active in the economic system with the goal to generate a profit, it may have its

legal department to work out contracts, its research department to develop prod-

ucts, and its training centre to educate personnel. Similarly, a research institute




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operates mainly within a scientific context, applying valid and reliable methods and

verified theories in order to gain new knowledge, but it cannot do so without taking

care of funding and legal contracts with its personnel. It is apparent in bothexamples that the codes of function systems are subordinated to the rationalities

and purposes of organizations. A business corporation conducts research in order

to improve the competitiveness of its products on the market in serving its main

goal of making a profit. In this regard, it also becomes obvious that organizations

do not represent their function systems. Banks and corporations are not the

economy nor is a national research council science or the Roman Catholic

Church the religion. Organizations follow their own (albeit bounded) rational-

ities, which are not always in line with the normative semantic stock of function

systems. We will see later in the section Inclusion, exclusion, and social work that,

for this reason, function systems and organizations handle inclusion and exclusion

differently.

Society and the individual

Human beings, psychic systems, and persons

Before we proceed in our elaboration of inclusion and exclusion in modern society,

we must discuss the role human beings are assigned in systems theory. In the

humanist tradition followed by many social and political theories, human beingsare commonly seen as the unit of social processes (the subject, the actor, the

individual). The Luhmannian theory of social systems, however, rejects the idea

that people of flesh and blood are the constituent parts of society. With its roots in

general systems theory, this theory distinguishes several types (and emergent levels)

of systems such as machines, living cells, organic systems, neuronal circuits, psychic

systems, and social systems. As noted in the previous section, social systems are

communication systems (Luhmann, 1995). Taking this communication-theoretical

point of departure seriously, there is only the possibility to regard the human

being fully squarely, with body and soul, as part of the environment of society(Luhmann, 1997: 30).2 The human being has no conceptual place in Luhmanns

social theory simply because it cannot be unified in one single system comprising,

among others, a number of chemical molecules, a complex biological organism, a

consciousness and social characteristics (see also Brunczel, 2010: 201). Societys

constituent parts are thus not human beings, but communications and nothing

other than communications (Luhmann, 2002: 156ff).

This theoretical manoeuvre has given rise to many misunderstandings and sharp

criticism (with respect to Social Work, see for example Kihlstro m, 2012; Klassen,

2004). A common objection from critics is that society is inconceivable withouthuman beings.3 However, Luhmann certainly does not claim that a human society

can exist without human beings. On the contrary, without the body and the psychic

system communication is impossible. Yet Luhmann adds: It is also impossible

without carbon, without moderate temperatures, without the earths magnetic field,




9/21

without the atomic bonding of matter (Luhmann, 2002: 157). The question which

then arises is: in what ways do people appear in (the context of) society according

to Luhmanns systems theory? There are two ways that need mentioning here; oneis the psychic system and the other is the form of person.

Psychic systems. Psychic system is the term systems theory assigns to human con-

sciousness, that is, a system of perceptions and thoughts (Luhmann, 1995). It is

important to recognize the operational difference with social systems: a social

system cannot think, a psychic system cannot communicate (Luhmann, 2002:

165). Accordingly, no transfer is possible between a psychic and a social system

and vice versa, i.e. no perceptions can enter communication (Brunczel, 2010: 48)

[a]nd one must also be aware that the systems are opaque to each other

(Luhmann, 2002: 165). Opaqueness implies that [o]ne can neither confirm nor

refute, neither interrogate nor respond to what another has perceived. It remains

locked up in consciousness and nontransparent to the system of communication as

well as to every other consciousness (Luhmann, 2002: 158).

Obviously, in social interaction the body and the mind of human beings are

involved. But it should be noted that peoples thoughts and bodies do not become

elements in interaction systems. So if person A perceives something (for example a

slight headache), person B will not know about this unless she tells him about it. If,

however, she does tell him, B can learn about her headache but cannot perceive the

headache himself. Thus, B needs to believe As statement (or look for non-communicative indicators for verification). Communication develops a momentum

which cannot be predicted or controlled by participating human beings. If B now

replies (truthfully) that he cannot feel the pain himself, A might be emotionally

upset and react by saying Are you doubting my words? B might then wonder

why A is overreacting to Bs seemingly harmless statement but, fearing further

escalation, he simply says No, of course I believe what you say.

Communication can only process a fragment of what is thought by a conscious-

ness. As can be seen in this brief example, social systems and psychic systems

operate as environments to each other, triggering events with potential communi-cative relevance.

The form of person. There is a correlate in social systems which is complementary to

psychic systems as part of the environment of communication, which is the form of

person. Luhmann defines person as follows:

The term person here shall [. . .] describe a unit that can be referred to by commu-

nication, thus something that only exists in communication and only for communi-

cation. Communication can only work if it can distinguish who utters something andwho is involved just passively by understanding. (Luhmann, 2000a: 375)

Communication needs authors and addresses, i.e. senders and receivers of mes-

sages. It is communication, which, during the management of its




10/21

self-simplification, generates. . .points of attributability, which then appear as

acting (uttering) persons (Fuchs, 1997: 60). As Luhmann notes, [p]ersons are

identifications that do not refer to any operational mode of their own. They are,thus, not systems (Luhmann, 2005a: 141). Seen from that perspective, the differ-

ence between persons (as a product of communication) and their psychic systems

(as a precondition for communication) becomes obvious. Persons are the addresses

that specific communications can be attributed to, i.e. this concept enables it to be

determined who said what and allows the attribution of actions to one individual

and not another. The same human being can be addressed as a different person in a

different setting. For example, somebodys opinion may be considered important

when it comes to cars but not child rearing, so he could be addressed as an expert in

the first case and as a non-expert in the second. We are clearly speaking about the

same human being, but a different person, contingent on the communicative con-

text. The same human being can be addressed as different persons, for example a

Wall Street investment banker whose reckless strategy brought enormous profit to

his company at the cost of workers and farmers can be described as a genius, hero,

lucky guy, greedy yuppie, or irresponsible servant of capital: the same human

being, a different person, contingent on the observing system. To summarize,

through the concept person Luhmann can do justice to the fact that human

beings are anything but irrelevant in his theory, he can do justice to the operative

difference between social systems and psychic systems, and he can do justice to the

sociological fact that the way people appear in social systems is highly variable.In other words, the form of person is the device by which social systems include

human beings in (and exclude them from) communication processes.

Inclusion, exclusion, and social work

How modern society includes persons

The concept of inclusion is the link between human beings and society in

Luhmanns theory. In line with the starting point of communication theory, inclu-sion means that human beings are held relevant in communication (Luhmann,

2005c: 226), i.e. they are considered as communicative addresses, as persons, as

bearers of roles, as accountable actors (see Nassehi, 2002: 127). The way persons

are made relevant (and irrelevant) to communication depends on the structure of

society. Prehistoric segmentary societies as well as ancient and medieval stratified

societies considered human beings wholly as part of segments (a clan, a tribe) or

strata (such as nobles, peasants, or slaves). Membership in families and clans more

or less completely predefined the societal place a person belonged to as well as his/

her life opportunities (Braeckman, 2006; Luhmann, 1997). To be included thenmeant to be perceived as part of one and only one social system (i.e. the clan,

tribe, family, or stratum).

The transition to modern, functionally differentiated society has significantly

changed the relationship between society and individuals. Let us keep in mind




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that functional differentiation implies that society is the (unity of the) difference

between many incommensurable function systems, each fulfilling its own function

and observing with each its own code. Accordingly, their way of addressing humanbeings is fundamentally different than those of the subsystems of previous societies.

Persons are now included in many different function systems, although only in

regard to system-specific operations (Luhmann, 1997: 765). This means that per-

sons do not participate in function systems as a whole but as carriers of function-

ally relevant roles. There are two types of roles through which people can be

included in function systems: performance roles and layman roles (Stichweh,

1988).4 Performance roles are the roles function systems need to fulfil their societal

functions and their performance for other systems. Examples of performance roles

are entrepreneurs and traders in the economic system, researchers in science, doc-

tors in medicine, politicians in politics, teachers in education, priests in religion,

social workers in the system of social help, journalists in the media, judges and

attorneys in law, etc. On the other hand, there are layman roles, which are asso-

ciated with the performance roles in a complementary way. Laymen are the recei-

vers/recipients of the systems performances carried out by the performance roles.

Examples are buyers/consumers in the economy, patients in medicine, voters/

taxpayers/citizens in politics, pupils in education, believers in religion, clients in

social help, readers/watchers in the media, convicts/witnesses in law, etc. In both

cases, the term role implies that they embrace highly scripted behavioural expect-

ation structures. However, there are obviously enough degrees of freedom in theway individuals (as persons) can carry out these role scripts (some individuals are

less successful than others and ultimately can become relevant as clients of social

help; see below).

The shift to functional differentiation implies that inclusion in society and its

subsystems is no longer determined by family membership, i.e. by class or ethnic

background. In modern society, inclusion takes place through a variety of specia-

lized systems, operating according to their specific symbolic codes and programs.

Whether one is considered relevant as a communicative address now depends on

whether one can meet the expectations the various function systems and organiza-tions have of persons (Bommes & Scherr, 2000b: 80). It is obvious that inclusion

via performance roles requires more skills, education, and qualities than via layman

roles. For example, becoming a doctor, judge, or scientist requires the successful

mastery of many years of study. In contrast, layman roles are, in principle, open to

everyone. It is via layman roles that function systems provide a universalism of

inclusion (Bommes & Scherr, 2000b: 96) according to which everybody who fulfils

the function system-specific requirements is admitted to politics, law, the econ-

omy, science, health or education (Bommes & Scherr, 2000b: 96).

No inclusion without exclusion

Up to now, most of the discussion here has dealt with inclusion. However, as

Luhmann notes: It only makes sense to speak of inclusion if there is exclusion




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(Luhmann, 2005c: 226). This is not only a logical necessity but also an empirical

fact. As we said, human beings are not part of society but part of the environment.

In terms of inclusion/exclusion, they are excluded from society, both as organic andpsychic systems. At the same time, they are included in function systems as persons

via specific (performance and layman) roles; they receive their specific social

addresses in function systems. As we also argued, the form of person refers to

different aspects of individuals in relation to different social contexts. Function

systems can only observe their own specialized image of the individual.

Everything they observe is formed according to function-specific operational

modes. Hence, they do not address the whole individual but only functionally

relevant aspects of the individual (Brunczel, 2010: 169; Wirth, 2009: 414), while

disregarding, i.e. excluding, the rest of the individual as irrelevant to their oper-

ational mode. Inclusion in one function system (being addressed in one specific way

by that system) means, then, by definition, exclusion of the rest of the individual

at the same time. The included (addressed) aspect of the individual is relevant

while the excluded (non-addressed) parts are irrelevant, as explicated by Bommes

and Scherr:

By receiving addresses in communication, i.e. by being addressed as children,

youth, parents, experts, scientist, laymen, etc. and thus as persons, their relevance to

an ongoing communicative event in education, science or religion is designated and

concurrently their irrelevance to other things, e.g. the childrens irrelevance to scienceor the scientists irrelevance to matters of creed. (Bommes & Scherr, 2000b: 77)

In contrast to pre-modern societies, which include human beings comprehensively

and exclusively in one multi-functional social system (such as a family, corporation,

or monastery), inclusion in modern society takes the form of partial multi-

inclusion, i.e. partial inclusion in a number of different mono-functional systems

(Braeckman, 2006: 70). Individuals are included specifically in social systems, in

figurative terms only as slices, but as many different slices in many different

social contexts (remember Simmels intersection of social circles). An individualas a whole remains somewhere in the environment of the function systems, i.e.

excluded. In this regard, Luhmann speaks of exclusion individuality (Luhmann,

1989: 158; see also Hillebrandt, 1999). Among other things, this concept implies

that individuals have to integrate the great variety of behavioural expectations

outside of society, i.e. in their minds (psychic systems).

Inclusion and exclusion and the role of organizations

While functional systems operate on the basis of universal inclusion (in principle,any individual can be included in either a performance or complementary role),

organizations operate on the basis of very limited, strictly defined inclusion. As a

rule, hardly anybody is included; the great majority of people are excluded from

most existing organizations (Jo nhill, 2012: 394). To state this as a formula: while




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function systems are open to everyone, organizations restrict access and are closed

to almost everyone (Nassehi, 2005: 189). Organizations include (and exclude)

people on the basis of membership (Luhmann, 2000b). They alone define the con-ditions of membership, which not only cover certain formal entry requirements

(such as minimum age, competence, legal track record, and health condition as well

as ascriptive criteria such as gender, ethnic and religious affiliation, etc.) but also

behavioural expectations (fulfilling defined tasks, quality of performance, etiquette,

etc.). Failure of the latter could jeopardize membership.

It is a matter of course that different organizations require different competences

and behaviour than others depending on whether the organization is a court,

school, business, government, church, social care provider, etc. The same is true

of different functional and hierarchical roles; not only does a high-ranked

manager need more leadership competences than an assembly line worker but

also more morally proper behaviour when representing the organization to the

outside world.

As we outlined for function systems, the distinction between performance roles

and layman roles is important for organizations as well. Performance roles almost

always require membership (or they are marked as an explicit exception, for exam-

ple freelancers or consultants). Layman roles sometimes require membership (such

as citizenship, membership in tenant associations, unions, immigrant associations,

sports clubs, country clubs, matriculation in universities); if they do not imply

membership, they at least require fulfilment of specific conditions (such as financialcapabilities, religious confession, dress code).

Often these differences of inclusion levels are symbolized by spatial boundaries,

such as counters in banks and public administrations or personnel only signs in

shops and restaurants. Performance roles sit behind the counter and have access to

the backrooms (representing inside), whereas layman roles (customers, clients, citi-

zens) are allowed to enter the front rooms, which represent a limited form of

inclusion; excluded people are not even allowed to gain entrance (or they might

get the attention of security personnel).

It should be apparent from the preceding paragraphs that inclusion is not to beconfused with equality. Despite the semantics of equality (Reich & Michailakis,

2005), universal inclusion does not mean equal inclusion (Nassehi, 2002).

Especially within organizations, inclusion and inequality do not contradict each

other. The difference between performance roles and layman roles already indicates

this. There are different gradations of inclusion via performance roles in organiza-

tions which are unequal in terms of salary, status, power, influence, and accumu-

lated knowledge. For instance, nurses, plaintiffs, and research assistants are

without a doubt also performance roles in their respective systems, but clearly of

lower status than high-ranking professions. As Bora (2002) showed with the exam-ple of law, there are also many different gradations of layman roles in that system:

even if everybody (including children and people with severe cognitive impair-

ments) has a basic legal capacity, not everyone is capable of being guilty or able

to draw up contracts.




14/21

In this regard, inclusion is not only not the same as equality, but inclusion can

even be the reason for more inequality (Brunczel, 2010: 225; Nassehi, 2002). This is

a co-product of the very operational modes of the function systems. The educa-tional system produces good and bad students (with high and low grades), and only

those with good grades will be eligible for higher education; the economic system

produces rich and poor people, and only those who already have property (and

other financial assets) will get better interest rates and larger loans. The legal system

produces model citizens and criminals, and those who already have a criminal

record are likely to be convicted again. It is important to see that all these examples

are effects of inclusion, not of exclusion. Inclusion in modern society can lead to

cumulative effects of inequality, which is also indicated by an overlap between the

performance role(s) an individual holds and the quality of his/her layman roles

(Miller, 2001: 106). Holders of high-ranking performance roles (chief physician,

CEO, professor, etc.) receive a high income, have high status, and usually have a

high level of education, which then enables them to take on layman roles at higher

levels in terms of price, status, exclusivity, etc. The reverse is true for holders of

low-ranking performance roles (such as cleaner, manual labourer or janitor), whose

inclusion via layman roles in other systems is usually also of lower quality.

Exclusion as a problem

Exclusion individuality is a type of exclusion that is not per se a problem; it israther a structural requirement of modern society since function systems can only

operate properly by not including human beings as a whole. Exclusion then refers

not only to a structural precondition but to an empirical consequence of functional

differentiation (Bommes & Scherr, 2000b: 94). Furthermore, nor is exclusion from

organizations a problem per se simply because of the empirical fact that everyone is

excluded from most organizations and included in only a few.

There is, however, another type of exclusion, which is commonly seen to be far

more problematic. If inclusion means that people are considered relevant by social

systems, exclusion means the opposite. Exclusion designates the situation wherepeople are not considered relevant participants in communication and therefore are

not given a communicative address (Luhmann, 2005c: 244). As a result, this means

that such human beings cannot benefit from the performances the function systems

offer (such as education, knowledge, wealth, legal protection, medical treatment,

etc.) because they are not considered interesting enough for the system (Miller,

2001: 92) according to the selection criteria which apply equally to everyone regard-

less of class, ethnicity, gender, etc. Exclusion can imply either that their entry (as

performance or layman roles) into a system is not possible or that their remaining

within the system is at stake (Miller, 2001: 92). Apparently, exclusion from somefunction systems (e.g. the media, arts, religion, or science) is less problematic in its

consequences for the individual involved than exclusion from the economy, pol-

itics, law, medicine or education. Individuals in modern society need income, the

right to vote, the right to defend themselves before a court, access to medical




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service and education, etc. (Luhmann, 1997: 744). The key to an adequate life in

modern society is inclusion not only via layman roles, thereby participating in the

performances from function systems, but via (at least one) performance role(s).Assuming that individuals are rewarded via performance roles for their perform-

ances, performance roles are the way to ensure survival (Miller, 2001: 106), not just

in terms of payment but in terms of identity, self-esteem, access to partnership, etc.

With a few exceptions (such as free artists), performance roles of function sys-

tems are associated with organizations, and as noted, people need to fulfil restrict-

ive requirements in order to be considered relevant by organizations, that is,

included as a member in their performing function. People can find themselves

in precarious situations on the way to exclusion, if the income from one perform-

ance role is not enough to secure economic survival, or if their qualifications or

other attributes (such as racial and ethnic identity, gender, age, health, physical

impairments) do not fit the official or unofficial requirements of organizations.

In contrast to function systems, organizations do not need to adhere to seman-

tics of equality or universal inclusion. For them it is not a problem if an individual

is not relevant enough for inclusion as long as there are many other individuals

available to carry out the tasks. It is one effect of modernity that despite the basic

universalism of inclusion not everybody is actually needed. While function sys-

tems are structurally autonomous and thus separately select whether an individual

meets the requirements for inclusion and is given a communicative address, there

are so-called cumulative effects of exclusion. Failure to meet the requirements ofsocial systems is often empirically interdependent. Exclusion from one system can

seriously hamper the chances of inclusion in other systems. Without citizenship

documents, be it domestic or foreign (exclusion from politics), someone will have

difficulty getting a job in the official labour market, and therefore difficulty getting

a loan, a lease for housing, medical care, etc. (Luhmann, 1997). As a result, people

in such situations run the risk of becoming increasingly irrelevant and tend to fall

off the radar of function systems completely. Terms such as excluded, home-

less, and unemployed refer to the limited relevance of some persons to certain

function systems and organizations (Bommes & Scherr, 2000b: 77), which (para-doxically) make them highly relevant to the system of social help, that is, includable

via its layman role of client.

Social work as exclusion management

The empirical fact that social systems (especially organizations) cannot operate

without excluding persons (due to limited available positions, lack of resources,

insufficient skills, etc.) stands in stark contrast to the normative expectation of

universal inclusion at the level of function systems. For the modern welfarestate, being a granter and advocate of inclusion and equality within its territory,

exclusion tendencies create problems of political legitimacy and, ultimately, of

social order. In order to counter this, the welfare state has a wide array of tools

at its disposal (including citizenship rights, social insurance, economic




16/21

compensation, pensions, and compulsory education). As is apparent in a historical

and regional comparison, Western welfare policy has reduced economic poverty to

a minimum, but it has not been able to eliminate the marginalization of particulargroups in many regards other than poverty; hence these groups have increasingly

been subject to restitution attempts by social work.

The crucial difference between the welfare state and social work lies, according

to Bommes & Scherr (2000b: 75), in the extent of generalizability. Whereas social

security programs apply to anybody in a standardized way (mainly defined by

legally determined claims to benefits), social work is a secondary safeguard

(Scherr, 1999: 21) which becomes active only for individual cases that fall outside

the regular security mechanisms. These cases cannot be resolved by standardized

measures but require specific, case-sensitive treatment by skilled, competent social

workers.

Accordingly, the task of organized help by social work cannot be feeding the

poor, as was the case with Christian charity, but more specifically the manage-

ment of social exclusion (Scherr, 1999: 18) in concrete cases. Exclusion manage-

ment involves working on the social addresses of individuals with the aim of

improving their attractiveness to other social systems, a (re)orientation towards

being includable (e.g. teaching an illiterate person to read and write, offering med-

iating therapies and consultation to clients). In this context, Peter Fuchs speaks of

social work as re-organizing addressability (Fuchs, 2000: 162).

There are three types of exclusion management. First, individuals whose inclu-sion in (some) social systems is problematic or precarious (e.g. ex-convicts on

probation, undisciplined pupils, undocumented workers) receive exclusion preven-

tion (Bommes & Scherr, 2000a: 76; Miller, 2001: 108). The second type, inclusion

mediation, focuses on individuals who have (temporarily) lost their social addresses

in some social contexts but who want to and, in principle, can be prepared for

re-inclusion (e.g. cured long-term sick patients, soon to be released prisoners, clean

ex-drug addicts). The third type refers to individuals who, for whatever reasons,

have no prospect of regular inclusion; for these cases, social work offers exclusion

administration (Bommes & Scherr, 2000a: 76; Miller, 2001: 108), e.g. creating newways of inclusion beyond societal contexts such as special housing, special schools,

psychiatric wards, and retirement homes.

The latter examples indicate that in modern society exclusion hardly ever means

total exclusion from society. Most exclusions are transformed into (other kinds of)

inclusions. For instance, criminals are excluded from most parts of society but at

the same time included in prisons, corrective educational institutions, or psychiatric

wards. There they do not simply receive an address; on the contrary, they receive a

very clearly defined address with a very specific role.

Generalizing from this particular context, we can speak of exclusion roles. Asroles are typical forms of inclusion, this term seems paradoxical: exclusion as a

specific form of inclusion. However, this form of inclusion is different than regu-

lar inclusion in function systems and organizations. Alongside those already men-

tioned, there are other examples of exclusion roles such as beggar, homeless person,




17/21

illiterate, illegal immigrant, etc. All of them are excluded from at least one of the

vital social realms (the economy, housing, education, or the political system). In

contrast to being excluded, an exclusion role is not simply the product of exploit-ation, marginalization, discrimination, or poverty but should instead be seen as a

kind of regulatory mechanism of modern society, which in most cases gives the

person a special status. It lies in the nature of the specific normative and semantic

stock of social work5 to regard these exclusion roles as candidates for help and

support. Social work transforms problems of inclusion/exclusion into cases of

individual neediness (Bommes & Scherr, 2000a: 76), depending on whether they

are considered legitimate recipients for help or not (Baecker, 1994; Luhmann,

2005b). According to Fuchs, the main communicative operation of social work

is to declare cases (Fuchs, 2000: 165), thereby transforming needy individuals into

clients. Client is the exclusion role of an individual included in the context of

social work. The role of the client is in fact the layman role of social help.

This is the very mode by which social work includes persons in its specific way of

operation (declaring cases as clients and treating them by helping). In that way,

social work makes excluded individuals (who lack social addresses in other con-

texts) communicatively relevant by providing them with their own social address.6

Although inclusion in the context of social work may be the better alternative

compared to complete exclusion (and the risk of starvation), it should not be

confused with inclusion in other function systems or organizations. Social work

can manage and restore the addressability of its clients by mediating education,healthcare, therapy, consultation, etc. In this way, it can help its clients regain

attractiveness and communicative relevance to function systems and organizations,

improving their chance of inclusion. However, social work itself cannot include

clients in these other systems (Fuchs, 2000: 161; Wirth, 2009: 414); this will be done

by the respective systems themselves or not.

Inclusion in social help via the layman role of client then is a substitutional

inclusion (Baecker, 1994: 103; Bommes & Scherr, 2000a: 76), substituting for

regular inclusion in function systems and organizations. Social work is successful

at the very moment substitutional inclusion is no longer necessary, that is, when aclient regains his/her addressability for other social systems. This has the paradox-

ical consequence that inclusion as a client (which itself is an exclusion role), in case

of successful intervention, is turned into exclusion work from social help (Fuchs,

2000: 165). If, however, the inclusion of an individual remains substitutional, and

as Baecker sharply concludes, inclusion has to be seen as failed. . .the question

then is only to what extent and how long society can bear failed inclusion

(Baecker, 1994: 103).

Conclusion

In this article, we presented a theoretization of the distinction between inclusion/

exclusion based on Niklas Luhmanns theory of social systems. The high complex-

ity of Luhmanns theory made it necessary for us to elaborate extensively on the




18/21

background in the theory of societal differentiation and communication theory. In

our view, the insights provided by the Luhmannian approach are highly relevant

for social work: neither can one simply assume that exclusion is bad and inclusiongood nor is exclusion per se the problem and inclusion the solution. Sometimes

inclusion itself can be the source of a clients problems and exclusion might indeed

be a (partial) solution. Inclusion and exclusion are operations of social systems that

treat human beings as relevant addresses for communication. In modern, function-

ally differentiated society, people are included in many different social systems but

only partially (while being excluded from the rest). Inclusion, therefore, always

necessitates exclusion; neither is there total inclusion nor exclusion.

Luhmannian systems theory can give a clear and accurate description of what

social work can (and cannot) do in terms of inclusion/exclusion. Social work

becomes active when inclusion in function systems that are vital for social existence

(for the economy, education, health, etc.) fails. The purpose of social work is

addressability management, i.e. to make individuals whose inclusion in function

systems and organizations is at stake relevant as social addresses. Like other sys-

tems, social work has its own mode of inclusion: it holds people relevant to its own

operations as clients. Luhmann scholars in the academic field of social work speak of

substitutional inclusion because social work substitutes for clients inclusion in other

systems by temporarily including them in the context of social help. If social work

successfully fulfils its tasks, clients should regain their addressability and attractive-

ness for function systems and organizations. However, it should be noted that socialwork cannot include human beings in any other system. Social workers need to take

into account that the conditions for inclusion are system-specific, i.e. they are dif-

ferent for different social systems, and they may lead to different outcomes.

Problematic cases of inclusion/exclusion can be analysed with regard to the involved

social systems (function systems and organisations) and their specific conditions for

inclusion/exclusion. Accordingly, successful interventions can be tailored to the

specific constellation of system requirements and clients preconditions.

The purpose of this article was to lay out the theoretical premises of the

Luhmannian approach to inclusion and exclusion and its potential for socialwork, both the academic discipline and the practical field. This was necessarily

on a very general and abstract level covering the unity of the highly differentiated

field of social work. Future research has to show what this looks like on more

concrete levels in the various specialties of social work practice.

Acknowledgements

The authors want to thank Lars So rnsen and the anonymous reviewers for helpful com-

ments on a previous version of this article.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial,

or not-for-profit sectors.




19/21

Notes

1. Upper case letters refer to the academic discipline of social work; lower case letters refer

to the practical field of social work.2. This and the following translations from German are made by the authors.

3. Bardmann and Hermsen (2000: 90) comment somewhat ironically: This has not only

been regarded as an unnecessary complication of the theoretical landscape, it has pri-

marily been evaluated as an unforgivable attack on the individuality of the human

subject.

4. Sometimes, the latter are also called audience roles or complementary roles.

5. Up to now, there has been disagreement as to whether social work constitutes a function

system (Baecker, 1994; Fuchs, 2000; Hillebrandt, 2010) or not (Bommes & Scherr, 2000b;

Scherr, 1999). For the present article, this question is of minor importance.

6. This address, however, brings some disadvantages to individuals who carry the label ofneediness since it stigmatizes and (perhaps falsely) indicates future or even permanent

neediness, dependence, etc. which communicates unattractiveness to organizations.

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