October 2019 Dear Colleagues,

Please find attached the CVs of economics PhD students on the job market from Arizona State

University. Our recent graduates have placed in some of the world’s top universities and published in

the profession’s top journals. We are excited about the work of this year’s class and expect that they

too will change the way economists think about important issues. In addition to their research, all of our

students have substantive independent teaching experience. Please do not hesitate to email me at

Econ.PhD@asu.edu with any questions.

Sincerely,

Edward Schlee

Professor of Economics and Placement Director

Arizona State University

Name Education (all schools UG & Grad) Research/Teaching Fields email address 

Job Market 

Paper/Dissertation Title Link to website Committee/Advisors

Ahmet Altinok

Integrated BS and MS in Teaching Mathematics (2012)  Bogazici University‐TurkeyMA in Economics (2015)  Bogazici University‐TurkeyPhD in Economics (2020), ASU

Matching, Contract Theory,  Game Theory,  Public Economics, Political Economy aaltinok@asu.edu Dynamic Many‐to‐One Matching

https://aaltinok.wixsite.com/mysite

Chair‐ Hector Chade  Alejandro ManelliAmanda FriedenbergNatalia Kovrijnykh

Eric González Sánchez

B.S. in Information Systems at University of Chile (2010)M.A. in Economics at Georgetown University‐Alberto Hurtado University (2012)      PhD in Economics at Arizona State University (2020)

Economic Theory, Microeconomics, Mechanism Design, Bargaining, Game Theory. ericgs@asu.edu

Bargaining with Interdependent Outside Options

https://sites.google.com/asu.edu/ericgonzalezsanchez/

Chair‐ Alejandro Manelli Eddie SchleeHector Chade

Diana MacDonald

BSc Business Administration (Universidad Adolfo Ibanez, 2008)MA Management Science (Universidad Adolfo Ibanez, 2009)MA Applied Economics (Universidad de Chile, 2012)PhD Economics (ASU, 2019)

Applied Theory, Search and Matching demacdon@asu.edu

Foster Care: A Dynamic Matching Approach www.dianamacdonald.com

Chair‐ Hector Chade Alejandro ManelliAmanda Friedenberg Kelly Bishop

Sophie Mathes

B.S. Economics at University of Mannheim (2012) Additional coursework in Mathematics at Heidelberg University (2012‐2015).PhD Economics at ASU (2020)

Environmental, Urban, Health, Applied Micro smathes@asu.edu

The Dynamics of Residential Sorting and Health on a Warming Planet sophie-mathes.com

Co‐Chair‐ Nicolai Kuminoff    Co‐Chair‐ Alvin Murphy Alexander BickJonathan KetchamKelly Bishop

Tomás Sanguinetti

B.A. Economics, University of Buenos Aires, Argentina (2011)          M.A. Economics, University of Torcuato di Tella Buenos Aires, Argentina (2013)PhD Economics, ASU (2020)

Health Economics, Public Economics, Insurance Markets, Decision‐making under risk and uncertainty.     tpsagui@asu.edu

Chair‐ Nicolai Kuminoff               Daniel Silverman Edward SchleeJonathan Ketcham

Nazim Tamkoç

BA Economics at Bogazici University (2012)         MA Economics at Bogazici (2015)MS Economics at ASU (2019)PhD Economics at ASU (2020)

Macroeconomics, Economic Development, Inequality mtamkoc@asu.edu

Production Complexity, Talent Misallocation and Development nazimtamkoc.com

Chair‐ Gustavo Ventura Berthold Herrendorf Domenico Ferraro

Job Market Candidates 2019-2020

How Do Couples Choose Individual Insurance Plans? Evidence from Medicare Part-D

Job Market Candidates 2019‐2020 

Ahmet Altinok 

aaltinok@asu.edu  

Website | CV 

Job Market Paper: 

Dynamic Many‐to‐One Matching  

Eric González Sánchez ericgs@asu.edu 

Website | CV 

Job Market Paper  Bargaining with Interdependent Outside Options 

Diana MacDonald Diana.MacDonald@asu.edu  

Website | CV 

Job Market Paper  Foster Care: A Dynamic Matching Approach 

Dissertation Committee 

Chair‐ Hector Chade  Amanda Friedenberg  Natalia Kovrijnykh Alejandro Manelli  

Research/Teaching Fields 

Matching, Contract Theory, Game Theory, Public Economics, Political Economy 

Research/Teaching Fields Economic Theory, Microeconomics, Mechanism Design, Bargaining, Game Theory. 

Dissertation Committee 

Chair‐ Alejandro Manelli Hector Chade Eddie Schlee 

Research/Teaching Fields 

Applied Theory, Search and Matching 

Dissertation Committee Chair‐ Hector Chade  Kelly Bishop Amanda Friedenberg  Alejandro Manelli  

Placement Director- Eddie Schlee Ed.Schlee@asu.edu Placement Coordinator- Laura-Jean Talts Laura-Jean.Talts@asu.edu

Job Market Candidates 2019‐2020 

Sophie‐Marie Mathes 

smathes@asu.edu  

Website | CV 

Job Market Paper 

The Dynamics of Residential Sorting and Health: Implications of Climate Change in the U.S. 

Tomás Sanguinetti 

tpsangui@asu.edu 

Website | CV 

Job Market Paper  

How Do Couples Choose Individual Insurance Plans? Evidence from Medicare Part‐D 

Nazim Tamkoç 

mtamkoc@asu.edu 

Website | CV  

Job Market Paper 

Production Complexity, Talent Misallocation and Development 

Research/Teaching Fields 

Environmental, Urban, Health, Applied Micro 

Dissertation Committee 

Co‐Chair‐ Nicolai Kuminoff  Co‐Chair‐ Alvin Murphy  Alexander Bick Kelly Bishop  Jonathan Ketcham  

Research/Teaching Fields Health Economics, Public Economics, Insurance Markets, Decision‐making under risk and uncertainty 

Dissertation Committee 

Chair‐ Nicolai Kuminoff Jonathan Ketcham  Daniel Silverman  Edward Schlee 

Research/Teaching Fields 

Macroeconomics, Economic Development, Inequality 

Dissertation Committee 

Chair‐ Gustavo Ventura Domenico Ferraro Berthold Herrendorf  

AHMET ALTINOKLast updated: October 2019

Arizona State UniversityDepartment of EconomicsP.O. Box 879801Tempe, AZ 85287-9801

Phone: +1 (480) 738-9128Email: aaltinok@asu.eduWebsite: www.aaltinok.wixsite.com

Placement Director: Eddie SchleePlacement Coordinator: Laura Talts

Ed.Schlee@asu.edu 480.727-7824Laura-jean.talts@asu.edu 480.727.7931

Personal InformationTurkish Citizen / Permanent US Resident (in progress)

English (fluent), Turkish (native)

EducationPh.D Economics, Arizona State University. Tempe, Arizona. Expected, 2020

Committee: Hector Chade, Amanda Friedenberg, Natalia Kovrijnykh, Alejandro Manelli

MS Economics, Arizona State University. Tempe, Arizona. 2015

MA Economics,Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey, 2015.

Integrated B.S and M.S. in Teaching Mathematics, Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey, 2012.

Research Fields- Primary. Applied Theory, Microeconomics

- Secondary. Matching Theory, Contract Theory, Political Economy, Mechanism Design, Public Economics

Working Experience- Instructor:

Arizona State University. Tempe, Arizona. Fall 2019Courses: Game Theory and Economic Behavior - ECN 416 (in progress)

Arizona State University. Tempe, Arizona. Fall 2018 - Fall 2019Courses: Math for Econ: Bootcamp - ECN 594 - PhD CourseEvaluation: 5.9/7.0

Arizona State University. Tempe, Arizona. Summer 2018Course: Principles of Microeconomics - ECN 212Evaluation: 6.2/7.0

- Teaching & Research Assistant:

Teaching Assistant, ECN 312, Intermediate Microeconomics, ASU, Spring 2017, Spring 2018

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Teaching Assistant, ECN 414, Advnced Microeconomics, ASU, Fall 2016Teaching Assistant, ECN 714, Microeconomic Analysis II - PhD Course, ASU, Spring 2016Research Assistant, Prof. Alejandro Manelli, ASU, Fall 2016Research Assistant, Center for Economic Design, Bogazici University, Fall 2013- Spring 2014Teaching Assistant, EC 512, Microeconomics II - MA Course, Bogazici University, Spring 2014Teaching Assistant, EC 483, Special Topics in Game Theory, Bogazici University, Spring 2014

Honors, Scholarships and FellowshipsCompletion Fellowship - Graduate College, ASU, Fall 2018

Dissertation Progress Award - Department of Economics, ASU, Spring 2018

Academic Performance Award - Department of Economics, ASU, Spring 2017, 2018, 2019

Publications

”Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project under Time-Inconsistency,” with M. Yılmaz, Journal of Eco-nomic Behavior & Organization, January 2018, 145: 114-140.

Working Papers

“Dynamic Many-to-One Matching” (Job Market Paper)Abstract. We study many-to-one matching markets in a dynamic framework with the following features: matching isirreversible, participants —exogenously— join the market over time, each agent is restricted by a quota, and agentsare perfectly patient. A form of strategic behavior in such markets emerges: the side with many slots can manipulatethe subsequent matching market in their favor via earlier matchings. In such a setting, a natural question arises: canwe analyze a dynamic many-to-one matching market as if it were either a static many-to-one or a dynamic-one-to-one market? First, we provide sufficient conditions under which the answer is yes. Second, we show that if theseconditions are not met, then the early matchings are “inferior” compared to the subsequent matchings. Lastly, weextend the model to allow agents on one side to endogenously decide when to join the market. Using this extensionwe provide a rationale for the little unraveling observed in the US medical residency matching market compared tothe US college admissions system.

Work in Progress

“Group Lending, Sorting, and Risk Sharing”Abstract. Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) are designed to improve the welfare of the poor. Group lending withjoint liability is the standard contract used by these institutions. Such a contract performs two roles: it affects thecomposition of the groups that form, and determines the properties of risk sharing among their members. Eventhough the literature suggests that groups consist of members with similar characteristics, there is evidence also ofgroups with heterogeneous agents. The underlying reason is that, the literature lacked the risk sharing behavior ofthe agents within a group. This paper develops a model of group lending where agents form groups, obtain capitalfrom the microfinance institution, and share risks among themselves. I show that the composition of the groups is notalways homogeneous once risk sharing is included. In such cases, first best is achieved since heterogeneous groupslead to homogeneous society, eliminating the role, that reports to the MFI play in this set-up.

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ReferencesHector Chade (chair)Professor of EconomicsW.P. Carey School of BusinessArizona State UniversityHector.Chade@asu.edu

Amanda FriedenbergProfessor of EconomicsEller College of ManagementUniversity of ArizonaAfriedenberg@email.arizona.edu

Natalia KovrijnykhAssociate Professor of EconomicsW.P. Carey School of BusinessArizona State UniversityNatalia.Kovrijnykh@asu.edu

Alejandro ManelliJPMorgan Chase ProfessorW.P. Carey School of BusinessArizona State UniversityAlejandro.Manelli@asu.edu

ERIC GONZALEZ SANCHEZ https://wpcarey.asu.edu/economics-degrees/candidates-on-the-market

ericgs@asu.edu

ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY

Placement Director: Eddie Schlee ED.SCHLEE@ASU.EDU 480.727-7824

Placement Coordinator: Laura Talts LAURA-JEAN.TALTS@ASU.EDU 480.727.7931

Office Contact Information

CPCOM 415D

Tempe, Arizona 85287-9801

Cell phone number: 480-375-5246

Undergraduate Studies:

Bachelor of Science in Information Systems, Universidad de Chile, with honors, 2010.

Graduate Studies:

Arizona State University, 2014 to present, PhD in Economics.

Thesis Title: “Bargaining with Interdependent Outside Options.”

Expected Completion Date: May 2020.

Georgetown University-ILADES, Universidad Alberto Hurtado, 2011-2013, Master of Arts in

Economics, summa cum laude.

References:

Professor: Alejandro Manelli Professor: Hector Chade

Department of Economics

501 E Orange St, CPCOM 490H

Arizona State University

Tempe, AZ 85287-9801

Department of Economics

501 E Orange St, CPCOM 455F

Arizona State University

Tempe, AZ 85287-9801

480-965-4682

alejandro.manelli@asu.edu

480-965-4714

hector.chade@asu.edu

Professor: Edward Schlee

Department of Economics

501 E Orange St, CPCOM 490D

Arizona State University

Tempe, AZ 85287-9801

480-965-3531

ed.schlee@asu.edu

Teaching and Research Fields:

Economic Theory, Microeconomics, Mechanism Design, Bargaining and Game Theory.

Teaching Experience:

Fall, 2019 Intermediate Microeconomic Theory, Arizona State University, Instructor.

Fall, 2017

Spring, 2018

Microeconomic Analysis I (PhD class), Arizona State University, teaching

assistant for Professor Edward Schlee.

Microeconomic Analysis II (PhD class), Arizona State University, teaching

assistant for Professor Alejandro Manelli.

Summer, 2017

2015-2019

Fall, 2011

Fall and Spring,

2010

Intermediate Macroeconomic Theory, Arizona State University, Instructor.

Teaching assistant for undergraduate honors classes and other undergraduate

courses at Arizona State University.

Microeconomics I (M.A. class), Georgetown University-ILADES Universidad

Alberto Hurtado, teaching assistant for Professor Lucas Navarro.

Teaching assistant for undergraduate courses, Universidad de Chile.

Research Experience and Other Employment:

2013-2014 Research Center for Social Complexity, Universidad del Desarrollo, researcher.

2010-2012 Universidad de Chile and Universidad Alberto Hurtado, research assistant.

Professional Activities:

2017 Journal of Economic Theory, reviewer.

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

2018 Performance Bonus and Dissertation Bonus, Department of Economics, Arizona

State University.

2017 Best writing performance in comprehensive exam, Department of Economics,

Arizona State University.

2013

2012

2006-2010

2006

Best academic performance, Master of Arts in Economics, Georgetown

University-ILADES, Universidad Alberto Hurtado.

National Scholarship, Conicyt, for graduate studies.

Honor Roll, School of Economics and Business: Best academic performance each

year, Bachelor of Science in Information Systems, Universidad de Chile.

National Scholarship, Juan Gomez Millas, undergraduate studies.

Research Papers:

“Bargaining with Outside Options” (Job Market Paper)

I study a split-a-pie bargaining problem between two agents. The types of both agents determine the value

of their outside options-- I refer to this as interdependent outside options. The presence of interdependence

in outside options, brings relevance to the enforcement power of the mechanism designer. Since

mechanisms potentially reveal information about the other player, if players cannot be forced to stay with a

proposed outcome (non-binding arbitration), they might claim the outside option, given the updated

beliefs. Outside options are inefficient, thus, first best mechanisms assign zero probability to the outside

options for every report. I derive a necessary and sufficient condition for these mechanisms to be

implementable. The condition suggests that inefficiency is triggered by unbalanced forces at conflict. The

condition is the same for non-binding and binding arbitration, considering binding arbitration, the case

when proposed outcomes can be enforced. Furthermore, the potential information leakage problem is

bypassed with first best mechanisms, because they can be taken not to reveal any information. Conversely,

if first best mechanisms are not possible, some information is revealed by the mechanism. I solve for the

second best mechanisms with binding arbitration and find a condition under which they can be

implemented under non-binding arbitration. With this I show that non-binding arbitration can be as

effective as binding in terms of efficiency. I analyze some properties of the second best mechanisms, in

particular, leakage of information and ask whether the mentioned equivalence between binding and non-

binding arbitration can arise or break, in general.

“Cold war in Eastern Island: Building Moai as costly signal for military strength” joint work with Paul

Seabright, Miguel Fuentes, Ricardo Guzman and Carlos Rodriguez-Sickert.

Between the years 1250 C.E. and 1500 C.E., the ancient Rapa Nui sculpted over 900 moai, representing the

clans’ ancestors. The moai era was a long period of peace. During 250 years that it lasted, the island’s

population grew from a few hundreds to 7,000 people or more (maybe as many as 17,000). But for some

reason, around 1500 A.D., moai building was halted, a fratricidal war ignited between the clans, and as a

results the Rapa Nui civilization collapsed. We claim that the clans used the moai to signal their military

power, which was not directly observable. The stronger the clan, the larger the moai it built. Using the

information conveyed by the moai sizes, the clans negotiated a division of the island’s resources, without

having to resort to war to determine who were the most powerful clans. The moai functioned as credible

signals of military power because the most powerful clans were also the most efficient moai builders. We

formulate a game-theoretic model that lends plausibility to our hypothesis and also shows conditions for

breaking the process of construction observed.

Research Papers in Progress

“Persuading to not be elected: Communication and incentives for team performance”

Given a set of agents, the team, one of them must be chosen to be a leader. Each agent has private

information about their leadership skills. Once the leader is chosen, each member chooses an action and

the outcome is determined jointly by the actions of all members and the skills of the leader. The team

needs to define a rule to assign a leader of the team and to split the outcome. I am interested on defining

the rules of sharing the outcome and assigning the leader that maximize the total welfare of the team, as

well as, analyzing the impact of particular rules in terms of welfare. In particular, I find that there are

scenarios where low type productivity members do not want to persuade the rest of the team that they have

high leadership skills, because if they are elected leader, the team would rest on their claimed high

leadership ability and choose suboptimal actions, I refer to this as persuading to not be elected. On the

other hand, there are scenarios where low types could benefit from convincing the rest that they are good

leaders because they can induce high effort from the rest of the team and adjust their own action according

to the true type of the leader. The strategic disclosure or concealing of information of the designer of the

mechanism can help to discipline the incentives of the team members for truth telling and choosing higher

types leaders.

“Optimal regulatory policies with synergies” joint work with Gino Loyola.

We study the problem of a regulator that needs to define rules for mergers of companies that may have

synergies. Each company has private information about its type that influences the payoffs obtained when

competing, for instance how cost efficient a firm can be. At the same time, the pair of types of two firms

merging determines the synergies that they can obtain. Two highly efficient firms merging can have

synergies when merging. In this context, is not always the case that the regulator wants competing firms all

the time. In certain cases mergers are preferred for welfare reasons, however, the need to put incentives for

truth telling ties the regulator to not allow as much mergers as he wants.

Language and IT

English fluent, Spanish native.

IT: C++, Java, PHP, E-Views, Stata, Matlab, GAMS, Mathematica.

Diana E. MacDonald

Last updated: November 2018

Arizona State UniversityDepartment of EconomicsP.O. Box 879801Tempe, AZ 85287-9801

Phone: (480) 845-2227Email: demacdon@asu.eduWebsite: www.dianamacdonald.com

Personal Information US Citizen / ChileanPersonal Information English (fluent), Spanish (native)

Education

Ph.D Economics, Arizona State University. Tempe, Arizona. Expected 2019

MA Applied Economics, Universidad de Chile. Santiago, Chile. 2012

MA Management Science, Universidad Adolfo Ibanez. Santiago, Chile. 2009

BSc Business Administration, Universidad Adolfo Ibanez. Santiago, Chile. 2008

Research Fields

Primary. Applied Theory, Empirical Microeconomics

Secondary. Matching, Contract Theory, Family Economics

Teaching Experience

Instructor

Arizona State University. Tempe, Arizona. Fall 2018Courses: Principles of MicroeconomicsEvaluation: 5.9/7.0

Universidad Adolfo Ibanez. Santiago, Chile. Fall 2009 - Fall 2013Courses: Game Theory, Industrial OrganizationEvaluation: 6.1/7.0

Teaching Assistant

Honors Microeconomics, Arizona State University. Spring 2018

Honors Business Statistics, Arizona State University. Spring 2018

Intermediate Microeconomics Theory, Arizona State University. Spring 2017

Managerial Economics (MBA course), Arizona State University. Fall 2015/Fall 2016/ Fall 2017

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Honors, Scholarships and Fellowships

Edward Rondthaler Award, Arizona State University, 2018

Best Progress Towards Dissertation, Arizona State University, 2017

Best Oral Presentation for Third Year Paper, Arizona State University, 2016

Department of Economics Performance Award, Arizona State University, 2015-2018

Experiences

Visiting Student. Ecole Polytechnique, Universite Paris-Saclay. Paris, France. May-Jun 2016

Research Assistant to Professor Amanda Friedenberg. Arizona State University. Spring 2015

Visiting Student. Instituto de Matematica Pura e Aplicada. Rio de Janeiro, Brasil. Jan-Feb 2012

Junior Consultant. Cognus Chile. Santiago, Chile. Mar 2009 - Feb 2010

Research in Progress

“Adoption from Foster Care: A Dynamic Matching Approach”

Abstract. Unlike adoption from private agencies, parents experiment by fostering a child beforeadopting. This feature leads to endogenous foster destructions and foster transitions into adoption.Using confidential data, I document stylized facts of this market and develop a two-sided dynamicmatching model consistent with features and facts of the market. I assume children and parentsface uncertainty about the quality of the match. I find that foster destruction is not only a resultof ‘bad’ foster matches being dissolved but it is also driven by children’s decision to experiment‘better’ matches. Experimentation allows agents to maintain ‘good’ matches and avoid ‘bad’ fostermatches. Yet, since transfers received by parents when adopting are strictly smaller than whenfostering, parents in ‘good’ foster matches might not have incentives to transit into adoption. Thefollowing trade-off arises: parents forgo part of the monetary transfer to eliminate the risk that thechild leaves the foster match. How much parents are willing to forgo depends on the likelihood thatthe child finds and forms a preferred foster match. I find that less demanded children are at higherrisk of parents substituting adoption for fostering.

“Assortative Matching with On-the-Match Random Search” with Hector Chade

Abstract. On-the-match search is a natural and realistic feature of partnership formation in manymarkets, such as labor and marriage markets. Incorporating on-the-match search adds a trade-offabsent in models where agents are not allow to search while matched. In our model, agents not onlycare about the payoff received from the match, but also the probability that the partner leaves andthey become unmatched. Hence, in equilibrium, partners who produce higher payoffs are not alwayspreferred since there is a higher probability that they leave to form a new match. Moreover, given thatmatch-status and match-partners evolve over time, we are needed to provide a suitable definitionfor Positive Assortative Matching (PAM). A sorting exhibits PAM if the conditional cumulativedistribution function over matches is increasing in the agents’ attributes. When agents attributescan be either low or high, the sufficient conditions ensuring that our definition of PAM will arisein equilibrium are weaker when on-the-match search is allowed than when it is not. If utility is

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strictly non-transferable and the payoff function is strictly increasing in the partner’s attribute thenthe equilibrium sorting exhibits PAM. For transferable utility, an strictly increasing and strictlysupermodular function suffices.

“The Unintended Consequences of Paying Parents to Adopt: Evidence from Min-nesota’s Foster Care System” with Kelly Bishop

References

Hector Chade (chair)Professor of EconomicsW.P. Carey School of BusinessArizona State UniversityHector.Chade@asu.edu

Kelly BishopAssistant Professor of EconomicsW.P. Carey School of BusinessArizona State UniversityKelly.Bishop@asu.edu

Amanda FriedenbergProfessor of EconomicsEller College of ManagementUniversity of ArizonaAfriedenberg@email.arizona.edu

Alejandro ManelliJPMorgan Chase ProfessorshipW.P. Carey School of BusinessArizona State UniversityAlejandro.Manelli@asu.edu

Sophie MathesLast updated: August 30, 2019

Arizona State UniversityWP Carey School of BusinessDepartment of EconomicsP.O. Box 879801

Tempe, AZ 85287-9801

Email: s.m.mathes@asu.eduHomepage: http://www.sophie-mathes.com/

Personal

Citizen of Germany

Languages: German (Native), English (fluent), Spanish (fluent)

Doctoral Studies

Ph.D. Economics, expected 2020, Arizona State UniversityAdvisors: Nicolai Kuminoff, Alvin Murphy

Research interests: Environmental Economics, Health Economics, Urban Economics

Undergraduate Studies

2012-2015: Mathematics, Ruperto Carola University of Heidelberg

2009-2012: B.Sc. Economics, University of Mannheim - Thesis advisor: Michèle Tertilt, PhD

Research Projects

Dynamic Model of Residential Decision-Making. Analyze how individual heterogeneity in age andhealth systematically affects residential decisions. Estimate valuation of amenities for different statesof health and age.

Pollution Poverty Trap. Document that lower-income seniors over time fare worse in terms of health.Research how health shocks translate into income shocks and trigger residential resorting into inexpen-sive, more polluted areas. Pollution exposure then leaves individuals more vulnerable to subsequenthealth shocks.

Using Location Choices to Value a Statistical Life. It has been shown that places of residence havea causal effect on mortality. Combine this insight with information about variation in prices acrosslocations to estimate the Value of a Statistical Life from a new angle.

Sophie Mathes 2

PresentationsScheduled10/2019: ECN PhD Reunion Conference, W.P. Carey Scool of Business, Arizona State UniversityPast08/2019: “Egg-timer”, Sloan Summer School in Environmental and Energy Economics,

UC Berkeley07/2019: 94th Annual Conference WEAI, San Francisco06/2019: 2019 ASHEcon Conference, Washington DC05/2019: 2019 AERE Summer Conference, Lake Tahoe NV04/2019: Seminar, Department of Economics, Arizona State University09/2018: Seminar, Center for Environmental Economics and Sustainability Policy,

Arizona State University08/2018: Camp Resources XXV, North Carolina State University03/2018: Seminar, Department of Economics, Arizona State University

Honors and Awards2019: Graduate College Travel Award, Arizona State University

Travel Grant, ASU Graduate and Professional Student AssociationPerformance Award, Department of Economics, Arizona State University

2018: Performance Award, Department of Economics, Arizona State University

2016: Graduate Teaching Assistant Award, Department of Economics, Arizona State University

2012: Thesis Award “Elisabeth Altmann-Gottheiner” for outstanding theses in the field of genderand diversity research, Department of Gender Equality, University of Mannheim

Memberships

American Society of Health Economists, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, UrbanEconomics Association

Research Experience

2017: Arizona State University, Research Assistant to Prof Alexander Bick

2013: German Council of Economic Experts, Research Assistant

2012–13: University of Mannheim: Research Assistant to Prof Michèle Tertilt

2011–12: University of Mannheim: Research Assistant to Prof Thomas König

2009–10: University of Mannheim: Research Assistant to Prof Markus Frölich

Sophie Mathes 3

Teaching Experience

2019: Instructor, Intermediate Microeconomics (ECN 312), Arizona State University

2016: T.A., Mathematics for Economists (ECN 770), Arizona State University,Prof Andreas Kleiner

2014: T.A., Empirical Methods in Economics (undergraduate level), Ruperto CarolaUniversity of Heidelberg, Prof Melanie Arntz

ReferencesNicolai Kuminoff (co-chair)Associate ProfessorDepartment of EconomicsArizona State Universitykuminoff@asu.edu

Alvin Murphy (co-chair)Associate ProfessorDepartment of EconomicsArizona State Universityalvin.murphy@asu.edu

Kelly BishopAssistant ProfessorDepartment of EconomicsArizona State Universitykelly.bishop@asu.edu

Jonathan KetchamDistinguished Research ProfessorDepartment of MarketingArizona State Universityketcham@asu.edu

Alexander BickAssociate ProfessorDepartment of EconomicsArizona State Universityalexander.bick@asu.edu

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TOMÁS SANGUINETTI

November 2019

tpsangui@asu.edu

https://sites.google.com/view/tomas-sanguinetti/home

Placement Director: Edward Schlee ED.SCHLEE@ASU.EDU 480.727-7824

Placement Coordinator: Laura Talts LAURA-JEAN.TALTS@ASU.EDU 480-727-7931

Office Contact Information

Department of Economics

W.P. Carey School of Business

CPCOM 425A

501 E. Orange Street

Arizona State University Tempe, AZ 85287-9801

P.O.Box 879801 Phone: 480-965-6880

Tempe, AZ 85287-9801 Cellphone: 480-577-4280

Undergraduate Studies

Posgrado en Economía, Universidad Torcuato di Tella, Argentina, 2013

B.A in Economics, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2011

Graduate Studies: Arizona State University (2015 – present)

Dissertation: Decision-Making in Health Insurance Markets

Expected completion date: June 2020

References

Nicolai V. Kuminoff (Chair) Jonathan Ketcham

Associate Professor

Department of Economics

Arizona State University

480-727-9802

kuminoff@asu.edu

Earl G. and Gladys C. Davis Distinguished

Research Professor in Business

Department of Marketing

Arizona State University

480-965-5507

ketcham@asu.edu

Edward Schlee Daniel Silverman

Professor

Department of Economics

Arizona State University

Professor/Rondthaler Chair

Department of Economics

Arizona State University

480-965-3531

ed.schlee@asu.edu

480-965-4832

Daniel.Silverman.1@asu.edu

Research Interests

Applied Micro, Health Economics, Public Economics, Decision-making under risk and uncertainty.

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Teaching Experience

Summer, 2019 Intermediate Microeconomic Theory, ASU, instructor

Summer, 2018

Fall, 2019

Spring, 2019

Fall, 2018

Fall, 2017

Spring, 2017

Macroeconomic Principles, ASU, instructor

Advanced Honors Microeconomics, ASU, Prof. Edward Schlee, TA

Economic Development, ASU, Prof. Manjira Datta, TA

Advanced Honors Microeconomics, ASU, Prof. Edward Schlee, TA

Environmental Economics, ASU, Prof. Michael Hanneman, TA

Environmental Economics, ASU, Prof. Michael Hanneman, TA

Research Experience and Other Employment

2012-2015 UTDT Business School, Research Assistant for Juan José Cruces

2009-2011

2007-2008

Ministry of Industry, Argentina, Technical Advisor

Ministry of Production of the Province of Buenos Aires, Technical Advisor

Presentations

2019 Arizona State University Economics Department Reunion Conference

2019 Arizona State University General Economics Workshop

2018 Arizona State University General Economics Workshop

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships

2018-2019

2018

2018

Performance Bonus Award, Arizona State University

Best oral presentation (Comprehensive examination), Arizona State University

NBER Health Economics Research Boot Camp Participant

Working Paper Abstracts

How Do Couples Choose Individual Insurance Plans? Evidence from Medicare Part-D

Job market paper

This research is the first economic study to investigate how couples make enrollment choices in

individual insurance markets. I leverage administrative records for Medicare Part D enrollees to

distinguish widows and divorcées from married couples. I estimate a stochastic choice model of

household demand that takes into account risk aversion, expenditure risk, risk sharing, and inertia. I use

the model estimates to study how coordination within couples and interaction between couples and

singles affects the way that markets adjust to policies designed to nudge individuals toward choosing

higher value plans, particularly with respect to adverse selection. The data reveals striking facts about

insurance choice. I find that 78% of couples decide to ``pool" by buying the same plan. This figure

remains constant even for couples with extremely different health risk. My estimates imply that

monetary value of plan pooling to the average couple is approximately half their monetary value of

inertia, $1,584 vs $3,152. I use the model estimates to conduct several counterfactual policy experiments

and find that nudging consumers to choose the plans that maximize their expected utility in a

hypothetical deregulated environment without risk adjustment and premium subsidies would increase

couples' welfare by 11% and decrease singles' welfare by 2% on average. Adding the federal

government's current risk adjustment formula increases the disparity between welfare gains for couples

and welfare losses for singles. Additionally adding the federal government's current formula for

subsidizing plan premiums causes the policy to generate average welfare gains among both couples and

singles of 36% and 5% respectively

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Stochastic Dominance Tests of Health Insurance Enrollment Decisions

(with Jonathan Ketcham and Nicolai Kuminoff)

A growing empirical literature aims to design and evaluate policies that manipulate “choice

architecture” to nudge consumers toward making certain types of decisions. This research agenda is

motivated by evidence that consumers behave in ways that violate parametric approximations to

conventional economic models of utility-maximizing decision-making. We develop a new non-

parametric framework to evaluate the robustness of this evidence to assumptions about the parametric

form of utility. Our framework uses stochastic dominance rankings to assess the quality of consumer

decision-making under uncertainty when consumers choose among a finite set of objects that are

differentiated by price, risk and quality. We use this framework to develop measures of decision-making

quality at both the extensive margin (e.g. choosing an object off the efficient frontier) and the intensive

margin (e.g. distance from the frontier). We apply the methodology to assess the quality of consumer

decision making in Medicare Part D markets for prescription drug insurance markets from 2006 to 2010.

Work in Progress

How Do Social Interactions affect Private Decisions? Evidence from Health Insurance Markets

(with Jonathan Ketcham and Nicolai Kuminoff)

Individual choices are influenced by social interactions. When making important financial decisions,

individuals often seek advice and information from family, friends, neighbors, and specialists. In this

paper, we assess the value of information provided by social networks in retirement communities.

Retirement communities vary in their opportunities for social interaction. Some communities are

designed for seniors to be entirely independent; others are organized around fully or partially assisted

living. This variation makes retirement communities an ideal “laboratory” to investigate how peers and

specialists affect individual decision-making. We observe approximately 15,000 seniors making

repeated health insurance enrollment decisions in Medicare Part D between 2006-2010 before and after

entering a retirement community. We leverage migration decisions to identify how their choices are

affected by those of their peers. We also use measures of decision-making quality constructed in a

companion paper to investigate how decision-making quality is affected by the various types of social

interactions that different retirement communities afford.

M. NAZIM TAMKOÇSeptember 2019

Arizona State UniversityDepartment of EconomicsP.O. Box 879801Tempe, AZ 85287-9801

Office: CPCOM 415FPhone: (480) 570-5422Email: mtamkoc@asu.eduWebsite: www.nazimtamkoc.com

Placement Director: Eddie Schlee ed.schlee@asu.edu (480) 727-7824Placement Coordinator: Laura Talts laura-jean.talts@asu.edu (480) 727-7931

Doctoral Studies

Arizona State University, 2015 to presentPhD, Economics, Expected Completion Date: May 2020Research and Teaching Fields: Macroeconomics, Development Economics, Inequality

References

Gustavo Ventura (chair)Professor of EconomicsArizona State UniversityGustavo.Ventura@asu.edu, (480) 965-5881

Berthold HerrendorfProfessor of EconomicsArizona State UniversityBerthold.Herrendorf@asu.edu, (480) 965-1462

Domenico FerraroAssistant Professor of EconomicsArizona State UniversityDomenico.Ferraro@asu.edu, (480) 965-5498

Previous Studies

MS, Economics, Arizona State University, Tempe, U.S., 2019MA, Economics, Bogaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey, 2015BA, Economics, Bogaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey, 2012

Teaching Experience

Instructor2019 Summer: ECN 211 Macroeconomics Principles, ASU2018 Summer: EC 489 Statistics for Incoming M.A. Students, Bogaziçi University2017 Summer: EC 205 Macroeconomics I, Bogaziçi University

Honors and Grants

CSEL Smith Research Grant (ASU, 2019)CASEE Fellowship (ASU, 2015, 2016)

Conferences

2019: ASU PhD Reunion Conference2018: Midwest Macroeconomics Group Meeting in Vanderbilt University

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Research Papers

Production Complexity, Talent Misallocation and Development (Job Market Paper)Abstract: I study the organization of production across countries, as summarized by the number of managers perplant, the number of workers per manager and the mean size of plants in terms of employment. First, I documentthat in the manufacturing sector, richer countries tend to have (i) more managers per plant, (ii) less workers permanager and (iii) larger plants on average. I then extend a knowledge-based hierarchies model of the organization ofproduction where the communication technology depends on the managerial level in the hierarchy and the abilitiesof subordinates. I estimate model parameters so that the model jointly produces plant size distribution and numberof managers per plant in the U.S. manufacturing sector. I quantitatively evaluate the effects of information andcommunication technologies, as well as size-dependent distortions that are studied in the development literature.I find that both higher communication costs and size-dependent distortions reallocate employment and outputtoward simpler forms of organizations with fewer managers per plant and smaller plant size. My results show thata 10% increase in communication cost parameters can account for a 35% decrease in the aggregate output withouthaving a significant effect on the number of managers per plant. On the other hand, size-dependent distortionshave bigger effect on output relative to similar studies that ignore organizational differences among productionunits. I find that when the largest, more complex, plants face distortions that are twice as large as distortions facedby smaller plants, output declines by 33.4% and the number of managers per plant falls by 30%.

Bribery, Plant Size and Size Dependent DistortionsAbstract: In this paper, I study the relationship between bribery, plant size and economic development. Briberyis a transfer from one party to government officials in order to ‘get things done’. Using the Enterprise Survey, Idocument that small plants spend higher fraction of their output on bribery than big plants do. Then I develop a onesector growth model in which size-dependent distortions, bribery opportunities and different plant sizes coexist. Iconduct two sets of exercises in order to quantify the interplay of size-dependent distortions and bribery. First, Icalibrate model parameters to generate plant size distribution of the U.S., by assuming the U.S. is free of distortions.Then I introduce size-dependent distortions to the undistorted economy and evaluate their effects with and withoutbribery opportunities. I find that size-dependent distortions become less distortionary in the presence of briberyopportunities and the effect of such distortions on the plant size become reversed since bigger plants are able toavoid from distortions by paying larger bribes. Subsequently, I calibrate the model with distortions and briberyopportunities to Turkish data. My results indicate that changes in the distortion level do not affect output andsize significantly because managers are able to circumvent the distortions by adjusting their bribery expenditures.However, the removal of distortions can have a substantial effect on both the output and the mean size. Output inTurkey can increase by 12.3%, while the mean size can increase by almost double.

Cross Sectional Facts for Macroeconomists: Wage, Income and Consumption Inequality in Turkey (with Orhan Torul),R&R at Journal of Economic InequalityAbstract: In this paper, we investigate the evolution of Turkey’s wage, income and consumption inequalities thor-oughly following a cross-country comparable methodology via the Turkish Statistical Institute’s Household BudgetSurvey and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions micro data sets. We first show that Turkey’s wage, incomeand consumption inequalities all exhibit downward time trends over the 2002-2016 period, which aligns well withthe rapid minimum wage growth over the period of interest. We further show that in these time trends, while wageinequality estimates display strong countercyclicality, income and consumption inequalities exhibit rather acycli-cal time-series movements. Second, we report that while recent education premium estimates of Turkey are similarto those in the early 2000s, gender and experience premiums, as well as residual wage inequality component de-crease over time. Finally, we show that Turkey’s income and consumption inequality estimates exhibit similar timetrends with moderate level differences, and these trends are robust to the choice of inequality metrics. As the firstof its kind in its depth, robustness and cross-country comparability, we aim that this paper contributes to a betterunderstanding of Turkey’s economic inequalities.

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