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8/3/2019 Ja Zu Deutschland
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PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER SERIES
WORKING PAPER NO.170 NOVEMBER 2009
THEGERMANCONSTITUTIONAL COURTSAYS Ja zu Deutschland!
DANIELHALBERSTAM AND
CHRISTOPHMLLERS
GERMAN LAW J.,VOL.10-8,(2009)
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TheGermanConstitutionalCourtsays"JazuDeutschland!"DanielHalberstam&ChristophMllers
UniversityofMichigan,AnnArbor
UniversityofGttingen,Germany
AbstractIn announcing the decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional
Court or FCC) on the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty, the Presiding Justice of theSecondSenatesummedupthejudgmentbyproclaiming: TheGermanBasicLawsaysyestothe Treaty of Lisbon. The decision has since receivedmuch praise from commentators for
havingstruck
down
only
the
existing
version
of
an
accompanying
federal
law
while
preserving
GermanysratificationoftheTreatymorebroadly. Thedecisionisthuslikenedtoanotheractofjudicialcooperation,theFCCs1992decisionontheMaastrichtTreaty.
This short comment explains what is old and what is new about the FCCs current
decisionaboutEurope. ThecommentexposestheFCCshighlydeceptiveinvocationofhavingtakenaEuropefriendlystanceininterpretingtheGermanBasicLaw. Thediscussionexposesthemyriadcontradictionswithintheopinionandthedecisionsstrangeconsequencesboth in
terms of the concreteworkings of the EuropeanUnion and in terms of its grand theory of
democracy. The comment highlights the FCCs mistaken understanding of the EuropeanParliament,theprofoundfailureoftheCourtsreflexiveideaofstatesovereignty,andtheway
inwhich
the
opinion
condemns
Europe
to
aperpetual
state
of
deficiency.
In
all
this,
the
Federal
ConstitutionalCourtinstallsitselfasthesolearbiterofGermanysconstitutionaldestinyevenabovethepeoplethemselves.
AsubversiveopinionwithmoretwistsandturnsthaneventheFCCitselfcomprehends,thedecisionultimatelystandsasacrudespeechactassertinglittlemorethanthepoweroftheCourtitself.
Daniel Halberstam, Eric Stein Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School [Email: [email protected]].
ChristophMllers,ProfessorofPublicLaw,UniversityofGttingenLawSchool[Email: [email protected]].
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Halberstam&Mllers 2TheGermanConstitutionalCourtsays"JazuDeutschland!"
ByDanielHalberstam&ChristophMllers
[in10GERMANLAWJOURNALNo.8(2009)]
A. IntroductionInannouncingthedecisionoftheBundesverfassungsgericht(BVerfG FederalConstitutionalCourt)onthe
constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty,1 the Presiding Justice of the Second Senate summed up the
judgmentbyproclaiming: DasGrundgesetzsagtJazumVertragvonLissabon.
B. RepetitionTheGermanCourtrepeatsmuchthathadbeensaidbefore. Mostfundamentally,theCourtexplainsonce
againthat
it
views
the
European
legal
order
as
asecondary
order,
derived
from
that
of
the
Member
States. TheCourtcontinuestocomparetheEuropeanUniontointernationalorganizationsbyrepeatedly
discussing international and supranational organizations2 in one breath. Once states transfer
sovereignpowerstosuchaninstitution,3thelattermayindeeddevelopindependentlyandshow[]a
tendency of political selfenhancement.4 And yet, the Member States remain the masters of the
Treaties.5 ThefunctionalConstitutionofEurope,i.e.theprimarytreaty lawconstitutingthepowers
of theUnion, simply remains an abgeleitete Grundordnung, i.e. a derivative legal order. So, too,
EuropeancitizenshipisaderivativestatusthatdoesnotchallengetheexistenceoftheGermanpeople
(Staatsvolk).6
As in theMaastrichtCase, theCourtmakesway for theapplicationofEuropean lawwithinGermany.
European law does not preempt Member State law in the sense of annulment but forces back
conflicting
Member
States
law
to
allow
for
the
application
of
Community
law.
7
The
Court
pledges
to
adheretotheoldSolangecompromiseandrefrainfromreviewingEuropeansecondary lawandactsfor
theircompatibilitywithfundamentalrightsas longastheEuropeanUnionguaranteesanapplicationof
fundamental rights that in substance and effectiveness is essentially similar to the protection of
fundamentalrightsrequiredunconditionallybytheBasicLaw.8
Daniel Halberstam, Eric Stein Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School [Email:[email protected]]. Christoph Mllers, Professor of Public Law, University of Gttingen Law School [Email:[email protected]]. ThankstoDieterGrimmandtheparticipantsintheSIASSI2009seminarforhelpfuldiscussions,andtoMatejAvbeljforpointingouttheCourtsmisstatement regardingnationalrepresentationintheEuropeanParliament.
1 Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, available at:http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html.2See,e.g.,id.atpara.237.3Id.atpara.231.4Id.atpara.237.5Id.atpara.231.6Id.atparas.34650.7Id.atpara.335.8Id.at191(citingBVerfGE73,339(376,387);BVerfGE102,147,(164)).
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TheLisbonDecision 3
Unsurprising, then, is theCourtselaborationof the impossibility thatGerman state institutionswould
grant the EuropeanUnion license to determine its ownpowers (KompetenzKompetenz).9 Similarly
unsurprising isthe insistenceonGermanyspowerto leavetheUnion,which, intheCourts(somewhat
sloppy) view, would not be an instance of internationally problematic secession, but merely the
withdrawalfromaStaatenverbundthatisfoundedontheprincipleofreversibleselfcommitment.10
The
LisbonTreaty
presents
no
problem
in
this
regard,
11
especially
as
it
now
makes
the
previously
existing
right
ofwithdrawalexplicit.12
C. InnovationDespiteamplerepetitionoftheMaastrichtrefrain,theCourtdidmanagetocoversomenewground
bothattheconcrete levelof imposinglegalrulesaswellasatthe levelofconceptualizingtheEuropean
andMemberStatelegalorders.
I. OperationalMatters
1. BlockingPasserelle
Thecentral
innovation
of
the
Courts
Lisbon
Case
concerns
the
so
called
passerelle
clauses,
which
allow
the Council tomove from unanimity to qualifiedmajority voting or from the special to the ordinary
legislativeprocedure.13
Theseprovisionsgivenationalparliamentssixmonthstovetoaproposedswitch
inprocedure. TheCourt,however,fusestherepresentativeoftheGermangovernmentintheCouncilto
itsnationallegislaturebyholdingthatGermanysrepresentativeintheCouncilmustinnocaseagreetoa
changeinprocedureunlessanduntilthelegislaturehasvotedonthematter. Silenceonthepartofthe
BundestagandBundesrat,theCourtexplains,is . . .notsufficient forexercisingthisresponsibility.14
Moreover,withregardtothegeneral(asopposedtosubjectmatterspecific)bridgeclauses,avotebythe
legislatureisnotenough. HeretheCourtrequirestheGermanlegislaturetotaketheextrastepandpass
alawtoratifywhattheCourtdescribesasachangeinprimarytreatylawwithinthemeaningofBasicLaw
Article23(1).15
2.The
Curious
Case
of
the
Emergency
Brake
TheCourtevensubjectsthesocalledemergencybrakesystemtoaforced legislativevoteto instruct
Germanys representative in the Council. In the course of considering certain legislative proposals
concerningcriminal law16
andsocialsecurity,17
aCouncilmembermayraiseanobjectionthatsuspends
9Id.atpara.233(citing,amongothers,89BVerfGE155,187f.,192,199).10
Id.atpara.233.11
Id.atparas.29899.12
See,e.g.,id.atpara.329.13
See,e.g., id.,atpara.316. Seealso,TreatyofLisbonAmendingtheTreatyonEuropeanUnionandtheTreatyEstablishingthe
EuropeanCommunity,
Dec.
13,
2007,
art.
48(7)
2007
O.J.
(C
306)
1[hereinafter
Lisbon
Treaty]
(general
bridge
clause);
Lisbon
Treaty
art.31(3)(CFSPbridgeclauseCouncil);ConsolidatedVersionoftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion,May9,2008,art.81(3),O.J.C115/47, at78 (2008) [hereinafter TFEU] (family law);TFEU art. 153(2) (social rights);TFEU art. 192(2) (certainenvironmentalprovisions);TFEUart.312(2)(multiannualfinancialframework);TFEUArt.333(2)(enhancedcooperation).
14 Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 413, available at:
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html..15
Id.atparas.319and413.16
TFEUarts.82(3)&83(3).
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Halberstam&Mllers 4considerationofthemeasureandrefersthemattertotheEuropeanCouncil.
18 Theseprocedurespushin
theoppositedirectionasthepasserelleclauses,suspendingthemoreCommunityfriendlyprocedurethat
wouldbeusedabsentinterventionbyaMemberState. Nonetheless,theCourtsubjectstheseemergency
brakesalongwiththepasserelleclausestoanaffirmativeinstructiononthepartoftheBundestagand,
whereappropriate,theBundesrat.
TheCourts
decision
on
the
emergency
brake
provision
leads
to
arather
surprising
result.
Recall
that
in
theemergencybrakeprovisionsthemoreCommunityfriendlyprocedure isthedefaultprocedure. This
procedure is only set aside upon the objection of a Member State representative in the Council.
Nonetheless,theCourtholds:
[T]he German representative in the Council may only exercise this
right of the Member States on the instruction of the German
Bundestagand,totheextentthatthisisrequiredbytheprovisionson
legislation,theBundesrat.19
Thishasthreecuriousconsequences. First,theGermanrepresentative intheCouncilcannot invokethe
emergencybrakeagainstthewishesofparliament. IftheGermanparliamentchoosesnottoinvokethe
emergency brake, then neither can the German government. This stands inmarked contrast to the
situationunder
the
passerelle
clauses,
where
the
German
government
as
well
as
the
German
legislature
mustagreebeforethemoreCommunityfriendlyprocedureisused. Second,theGermanrepresentative
in the Council cannot act at all with regard to the emergency brake provision in the absence of
parliamentary instruction. Thismeansthat iftheGerman legislature isdeadlockedorotherwisefailsto
act,themoreCommunityfriendlyprocedurewillbeused. Here,too,theCourt,most likelyunwittingly,
pushesinfavornotagainstintegration.
Third,theCourtspeaksonlyaboutinstructingtheGermanrepresentativeintheCouncil,sayingnothing
abouttheGermanrepresentativeintheEuropeanCouncil. ThismeansthattheGermanlegislaturemight
instruct the German representative in the Council to invoke the emergency brake only to have the
Germanrepresentative intheEuropeanCounciltothrowthematterbacktotheCouncilthus liftingthe
brakealtogether.
3. ImpliedPowers,theFlexibilityClause,andUltraViresReview
IndiscussingtheUnionsflexibilityclause,theCourtopenswithatendentiousslightofhand. Itsuggests
that the doctrine of implied powers is, in principle, nothing unusual in the scheme of European
integration. TheCourt likenstheeffective interpretationofpowers(wirksameKompenzauslegung)to
theU.S.doctrineofimpliedpowers, (citing the InternationalCourtof JusticecaseonReparationfor
Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations), and to the French doctrine of effet utile in
internationaltreatylaw.20
AlthoughtheCourthereaddsaparentheticalcitationtoPierrePescatorefor
an understanding of the latter concept especially as regards European law, the main gist of the
17TFEUart.48(2).
18UnderArticle48TFEU,theEuropeanCouncilmaythenterminatethelegislativeprocess,asktheCommissionforanewproposal,
orreferthematterbacktoCounciltoproceedwiththe legislativeprocess. UnderArticles82and83TFEU,theEuropeanCouncilmayonlyreferthematterbacktotheCouncilafteraunanimousvoteanddoesnotappeartohavetheoptionofrequestinganew
proposalfromtheCommission. UnderArticles82and83TFEU,however,nineMemberStates,mayalsochoosetoproceedonthebasisoftheclosercooperationprovisionsoftheTreaty.19
Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 400, available at:
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html(emphasisadded).20
Id.atpara.237.
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TheLisbonDecision 5paragraphsuggestsaninternational,asopposedtoconstitutional,understandingofimpliedpowers.
21 A
constitutional understanding of implied powers that invokes the U.S. tradition would have had to
grapplewiththepowerfulvisionof impliedpowers laidout inJusticeMarshallsopinion inMcCullochv.
Maryland. TheCourtssimplecitationto international lawassomehowrepresentativeoftheAmerican
traditionofimpliedpowersisaratherunderhandedwayofavoidingthiscomparison. Weareleft,then,
withnoargumentfortheCourtswatereddownunderstandingoftheimpliedpowersdoctrineinEurope.
The Court further subjects any Council decision to resort to the general implied powers provision of
Article 352 TFEU to a ratification law pursuant toBasic LawArticle23(1). The Lisbon Treaty lifts the
currentlimitationofArticle308EC(whichdemandsthattheuseofimpliedpowersservethegoalsofthe
internalmarket) toallow the invocationof impliedpowers in the serviceofallpoliciesdefined in the
Treaties.22
IntheCourtsview,thisnewgenerality leavesthescopeofthe flexibilityclause illdefined
and,thus,tantamounttoaninvitationtosubstantive,fundamentaltreatychanges.23
TheCourtalsosees
thisasraisingconcernsinlightoftheconstitutionalprohibitionagainstgrantingtheUnionplenarypowers
or against delegating to theUnion thepower to determine itsown competences.24
Accordingly, the
Courtsays,theflexibilityclausecanonlybekeptwithinconstitutionalboundsbysubjectingitsexerciseto
aratificationlaw.
Finally,theopinionhighlightsthepotentialforultraviresreviewintheCourtitself. Afterreiteratingthe
possibilityof
such
review,
which
had
already
been
laid
out
in
the
Maastricht
Case,
the
Court
elaborates
significantlyonthisideahere. ItengagesintheratherinterestingargumentthattheEuropeanfriendly
application of constitutional law demands that the Court engage in ultra vires review itself. More
importantly,however,theCourtexpresslylaysouteachofthevariouspossibilitiesforsuchreviewunder
currentprocedures. Anditcloseswithwhatlookslikeaninvitationtothelegislaturetocreateadditional
typesofproceedingsbeforetheCourtthatareespeciallytailoredtoultraviresreviewandidentityreview
to safeguard the obligation of German bodies not to apply in Germany, in individual cases, legal
instrumentsoftheEuropeanUnionthattransgresscompetencesorthatviolateconstitutionalidentity.25
4. CollectiveSecurityandInternationalRepresentation
In theLisbondecision, theCourtsuggests for the first time that theEuropeanUnion iscurrentlynota
systemof
collective
security
within
the
meaning
of
Basic
Law
Article
24(2).
It
says
that
even
ifthe
EuropeanUnion...weretobedeveloped intosuchasystem,nosupranationaldecisionmakingcould
control the specificdeploymentofGerman troops.26
This raises the interestingpossibility thatefforts
suchasthecurrentGermannavaldeploymentonthecoastofAfrica,whereGermantroopsaresubjectto
ajointEUcommand,areunconstitutional. UnderArticle24oftheBasicLaw,Germanymayonlyrestrict
itssovereignpowersoveritsowntroopsinthecontextofasystemofcollectivesecurity. IftheEUdoes
notcurrentlyqualifyassuchasystem,thenGermanywouldpresumablyhavetomaintaincommandover
itsowntroopsunlesstheinterventionisauthorizedbytheUNorNATO.
The Court similarly treads unreflectively into international terrain by suggesting, without warrant or
argument, that states have to keep their formal status as a contracting party in an International
21
Id.
at
para.
237.
22TFEUart.352(1).
23 Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 327, available at:
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html..24
Id.atpara.328.25
Id.atpara.241.26
Id.atpara.255.
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Halberstam&Mllers 6OrganizationsothattheirmembershipwillnotbecompletelymediatedbytheEuropeanUnion.
27 The
WTO is thecase inpoint. TheCourt seems toassume thatWTOmembershipmustbeorganizedbya
mixedagreementunderwhichMemberStatesremainparties. TheCourttellsusthatiftheEUalonewere
amemberof theWTO, theGerman statewould somehowbedeprivedof itsproper function in trade
negotiations. But it isfarfromclear,withregardtothepowerstheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilfor
example,whatthisdoctrinecouldmeanfortheinstitutionalstructureof international law. Indeed,one
mightwell
argue
that
the
Court
frustrates
the
national
interest
it
seeks
to
serve.
Under
the
existing
conditions of a European Customs Union it seems odd that the European member states would be
inevitablycommittedtofragmentingtheircommonEuropeannegotiatingpower. Inanyevent,thereal
practicalimpactoftheCourtsdecisiononthispointisdebatable.
II. ImaginingaUnionofMemberStates
1. Statehood(re)gained
FortheCourt,democracy isaconceptthat is limitedtoastatewithapeopleand itsterritory. Without
eitherdrawingoninternationalorconstitutionallawtomakeitsclaimsexplicittheCourtemphasizesthe
idea of territoriality. The basic point seems to be to define European territoriality and European
citizenshipasderivativephenomena. InsodoingtheCourtdoesnotstrugglewithprimaryorsecondary
lawon
citizenship,
borders,
or
security.
Instead,
it
immunizes
itself
from
these
potentially
burdensome
considerations. Europe without borders is merely accessory to the state territory of the member
states.28
So,thestateisastatebecauseitisautonomous;itisautonomousbecauseitisastate.
2. TheEuropeanParliamentDismissed
InordertoensureamonistconceptionofEuropeandemocracyviathenationalpoliticalprocesstheCourt
mustdeprive theEuropeanParliamentof its legitimacy. Itdoessowithaproblematicbutwellknown
move,thejuxtapositionofparliamentarismanddemocracy,apatternbelongingtotheworsttraditionsof
Germanconstitutionaltheory.29
TheCourtbelittlesthegrowingemancipationofParliamentariansfrom
their roleasmembersofnationaldelegations and theirgrowing constitutional selfperception aspan
Europeandelegateson a leftrightdimension.30
Nordoes it creditParliaments remarkable efforts to
controlthe
Commission.
All
this
is
rendered
worthless
because
of
the
European
Parliaments
election
procedure.
The Court states correctly that the voting mechanisms to the European Parliament do not function
accordingtoastrictruleofdemocraticequality,one(wo)man,onevote. Asaconsequence,however,the
CourtdeniesanyclaimonthepartoftheEuropeanParliamenttodemocraticrepresentation. TheCourts
statist logicassumesthat, ifthere isnopeoplethere isnoparliament. Asthere isnoEuropeanpeople,
theEuropeanParliamentisnotarealparliament,i.e.apopularrepresentation(Volksvertretung).Itisonly
a second chamber, a logic that en passant denies the United States Senate as well as the Swiss
Stnderatitscharacterofdemocraticrepresentation.31
27Id.atparas.37475.
28Id.atpara.345.
29CARLSCHMITT,DIEGEISTESGESCHICHTLICHELAGEDESHEUTIGENPARLAMENTARISMUS(1923).
30SeeDanielHalberstam,TheBrideofMessina:ConstitutionalismandDemocracyinEurope,30EUR.L.REV.775(2005).
31 Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 286, available at:
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html..
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TheLisbonDecision 7Atwin fallacy liesburied inthisargument. On theonehand, thedistinctionbetweena representative
parliamentandanonrepresentativesecondchamberthatisnotstrictlyapportionedaccordingtoone
persononevoteisspecifictoGermany. IntheGermanpoliticalsystemthesecondlegislativeorgan,the
Bundesrat,comprisesrepresentativeoftheLndergovernments. Asabodycomposedofexecutives,itis
not, strictly speaking, a parliament. But to draw on this distinction to undermine the representative
quality of the European Parliament belies the Courts assertion that the standards it applies to the
EuropeanUnion
do
not
reflexively
repeat
national
constitutional
law.
Ontheotherhand,theCourt isnotevenabletogiveacoherentdescriptionoftheGermaninstitutions.
Elsewhereintheopinion,itclearlyidentifiestheBundesratasachamberofanationalparliament.32
If
theBundesrat,anonegalitarianrepresentationofthestates executives,istreatedlikeaParliament,then
theEuropeanParliamentmust,afortiori,betreatedasone,too.
There is more. The almost FrenchRepublican egalitarian demands the Court applies are especially
irritatinggiventhefactthattheGermanfederalsystem isoftendiscussedasaprimeexampleofanon
majoritarian political system.33
Onemight argue in favor of the Court that it insists on at least one
egalitarianbody inademocraticorder. But even this isnot convincingbecauseegalitarian legitimacy
necessarily disappears in thejoint decisionmaking procedure. According to the Courts logic, a law
makingprocedure that requires the consentofBundestag andBundesrat,which is regularly the case,
couldeven
violate
the
democratic
principle
of
the
German
Basic
Law
in
Germany.
That
aGerman
court,
operatinginasystemthatisnotoriousforfederaldeadlock,sovigorouslyadvocatesastrictmajoritarian
conceptionofdemocracymustbeoneofthedecisionsbiggerironies. Andthefactthat,accordingtothe
decision, the Federal government acting at the European level must at times be controlled by both
Bundestag andBundesrat, leads to a final shortcircuit. To borrow from thewords of the Court, the
Germansystemitselfmightbeoverfederalized.
CaughtinitsowncontradictionstheCourtlooksforcontradictionsintheEuropeanlegalorder. TheCourt
holds that the electoral law of the European Parliament shows an assessment of values that is in
contradictiontothebasisoftheconceptofacitizensUnionthat[theUnion]hasofitself.34
Thealleged
contradictionstemsfromthefactthattherepresentation intheEuropeanParliamentdoesnottakeas
its nexus equality of the citizens of the Union (Article 9 TEU Lisbon), but nationality.35
But this
assessmentof
the
European
law
is
flatly
wrong.
An
Italian
citizen
who
lives
in
Lithuania
votes
for
the
Lithuaniancontingent intheEuropeanParliament. ASpanishcitizenwho lives inGreececanstandasa
candidateforelectionsoftheGreekcontingenttotheEuropeanParliament. Itisaterritorialnexusthatis
created by the right to free movement that defines the representative structure of the European
Parliament. Thatmightnotliveuptoanystrictidealofdemocraticequalitybutitstillhasa logicthatis
connectedtotheratherprofoundideaofEuropeancitizenship.
3.AnUnnecessaryTheoryofNecessaryStateFunctions
Forquitea longtimeastrangecommonplace inGermanconstitutionalscholarshiphasbeenthe lackof
anyStaatsaufgabenlehre,that is,atheoryofwhatnecessarytasksthestatemustfulfill.36
Itwashoped
thatscholarsmightdefinethisfieldinapurelyconceptualeffortwithoutanyreferencetothenecessarily
32Id.atpara.407.
33 GERHARD LEHMBRUCH, PARTEIENWETTBEWERB IM BUNDESSTAAT (3d ed. 2000); Fritz Scharpf, TheJointDecision Trap: LessonsfromGermanFederalismandEuropeanIntegration,66PUB.ADMIN.239(1988).34
Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 287, available at:http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html..35
Id.36
SeeCHRISTOPHMLLERS,STAATALSARGUMENT146n.67(2000).
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Halberstam&Mllers 8opendemocraticprocess. Thisdreamofa conceptualdeductionof thebeingoressenceof the state
Wesenanditsagendasnevertookconcreteform. Instead,itremainedanostalgicsentimentaboutwhat
mighthavebeenacompletetheoryofthestate.37
It isnoaccidentthatsucha theoryhasneverbeenwritten.38
Inadifferentcontext, theUnitedStates
SupremeCourthasalsostruggledwith,and retreated from,comprehensivelydefiningwhatconstitutes
traditionalareas
of
state
regulation.
39
An
open
democratic
process
makes
it
difficult
to
define
in
any
comprehensivewaywhatareasof legislation form thestatesnecessary tasks. Tobesure,any such
theorywould, indeed,helpusdrawmetaconstitutional linesaroundthepowerofthestate. Anysuch
doctrine could then protect the state from various forms of disaggregation, privatization, as well as
Europeanizationand internationalization. Still, inGermany,thedreamofaStaatsaufgabenlehreproject
haslongbeenforgotten.
Forgotten? Suddenly and without precedent the Courts Lisbon Case develops its own
Staatsaufgabenlehre. TheCourtdefines five areas inwhich the statemust take a role: Criminal law
(substantialandprocedural),warandpeace,publicexpendituresandtaxation,welfare,andcultureand
religion. Thesetasksare,accordingtotheCourt,especiallysensitive fortheabilityofaconstitutional
state todemocratically shape itself.40
But is thereany theoryorargumentbehind this list? We find
none in theopinion. TheCourtmerely refers to itsown imaginationofpastsovereignty. Theopinion
assertsthat
seit
jeher,
since
ever,
the
state
has
fulfilled
these
tasks
as
an
expression
of
its
sovereignty.
This is obviously not the case. The welfare function of the European nation state has often been
describedasthebeginningoftheendofthe ideaofsovereignty,asthepointofdissolutionofthestate
into society.41
Religionwasadecisive topicof theWestphalianTreatySystem that standsat thevery
beginning of the modern concept of sovereignty in Public International Law, a concept the Court
otherwise explicitly endorses. Religiondidnotbelong to state sovereignty at the verymomentof its
invention.42
Ontheotherhand,whatabouttheomissionofCivilLaw inthe list? Despitethefactthat
GermanBGB,theCivilCode,wasthecentralcodificationofthenewlyfoundedGermannationstate,the
Court does not even mention this area of law as being special to the German states identity or
sovereignty. Andwhat about the controlover currencya field thatoften hasbeenmentioned as a
classicalprerogativeofthestate? Fromeitherahistoricalorasystematicperspective,thelistmakesno
sense.
Then again, why does the Court classify just the five areas on its list as necessary parts to state
sovereignty? Theanswer is simple. Thetheoryof theCourt isaposthocargument in supportofa
preordainedresult.
37Thisfeelingseemstoberathercommon. See,e.g.,CHRISTOPHMLLERS,DERVERMISSTELEVIATHAN(2008).
38TheclosestbookmaybefromHansPeterBull. SeeHANSPETERBULL,DIESTAATSAUFGABENNACHDEMGRUNDGESETZ(2ded.1977).
39 Forthedevelopmentoftraditionalcomponentstatepowers,see,e.g.,NationalLeagueofCitiesv.Usery,426U.S.833 (1976);
Garciav.SanAntonioMetropolitanTransitAuthority,469U.S.528(1985);NewYorkv.UnitedStates505U.S.144(1992);Printzv.UnitedStates521U.S.898 (1997);UnitedStatesv. Lopez,514U.S.549 (1995). In the contextofU.S. federalism, theSupreme
Courtssubstantive
distinction
between
the
areas
of
state
and
federal
powers
is
notoriously
undertheorized,
as
is
the
Courts
proceduralororganizationalunderstandingofcomponentstateautonomy. See,e.g.,DanielHalberstam,Comparative FederalismandtheIssueofCommandeering,inTHEFEDERALVISION213(KalypsoNicoladis&RobertHowseeds.,2001).40
Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 252, available at:http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html..41
ThepioneeringauthormaybeHaroldLaski. SeeHAROLD J.LASKI,STUDIES INTHEPROBLEMOFSOVEREIGNTY (1924).Butseealso the
worksofLonDuguit.42
STEVEND.KRASNER,SOVEREIGNTY:ORGANIZEDHYPOCRISY7980(1999).
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TheLisbonDecision 9The only concrete holding of the decision with its myriad treatiselike passages strikes down the
Begleitgesetz, the accompanying statute that organizes the participation of the Bundestag and the
Bundesratwith regard to thepasserelleprovisionsof the treaty. According to the Court, the Federal
government in certain areas cannot agree to a passerelle procedure that shifts from unanimous to
majoritydecisionmakinginthecouncilwithoutconfirmationbyparliament. Asaninitialmatter,itseems
rather questionable whether this mechanism increases the effectiveness of parliamentary control.43
Whatis
most
striking,
however,
is
that
the
policy
areas
that
define
sovereignty
map
perfectly
onto
the
subjectmatterofthespecificpasserelleclausesthatareatissueinthiscase.
OnecannotbutsuspectthattheCourtdesigneditstheoryaroundtheonlyresultitcouldpossiblyachieve.
Without becoming responsible for the fall of the LisbonTreaty on the one hand, but with the firm
intentiontoshow itsreadinessto intervene,ontheother,thetreatmentofthepasserellewasaperfect
target. This small result thus wags a metaconstitutional theory that no proper constitutional
interpretationcouldcreate.
Thedeep ironyofthispartofthedecision lies inthefactthattheallegedtheoryofthesovereignstate
simply stems from a negative reading of the European Treaties. There is no convincing systematic
argumentwhyotherpolicyareasdonotnecessarilybelongtothestate. WhattheCourtdeemstobe
protected are merely the leftovers of European integration recycled as necessary elements of state
sovereignty.A
more
devastating
bankruptcy
of
asolipsistic
theory
of
the
state
is
hard
to
imagine.
4. TheConstitutionalDoublebind
TheCourtleavesEuropeinadoublebindacombinationofmutuallydefeatingcommands.44
Ontheone
handwe learnabouttheforbiddenfinalityofaEuropeanBundesstaat. Ontheotherhand,thecurrent
levelofintegrationissaidtofailminimalconstitutionalstandardsforaEuropeanpolity. ThemoreEurope
seekstodeepenitspolity,then,themoreitrunsupagainsttheprohibitionsoftheGermanconstitution.
AtsomepointEuropeanintegrationmuststoportheGermanswillhavetogiveuptheirconstitution.
The treatment of the European Parliament is a case in point. The Court dismisses the legitimacy
achievementsoftheEuropeanParliament. But itdoesso inreviewingwhethertheTreatyrespectsthe
democraticprinciples
that
the
German
constitution
demands
of
European
integration.
But
why
does
the Court examine the European Parliament at all if, as the Court suggests, all democratic legitimacy
stems from the Member States? The answer is that the Court seems to accept that the European
Parliament delivers some additional legitimacy to the EU as long as the EP does not become too
important,i.e.ofequalimportancetotheCouncil.
The suggestion that theParliamentadds legitimacy to theUnion seems to contradict theCourtsown
explicit thesis that the frameworkofdemocracy issomethinginviolable thatcannotbebalanced.45
Moreover,theargumentabouttheEPsadded legitimacycreatesastrangeambivalenceinwhichtheEP
somehowremainsbothanecessaryelementandathreattotheconstitutionalityofEuropeanintegration.
TheCourtshowsasimilarambivalenceinreviewingEuropeanSocialPolicy.46
Ontheonehand,European
integration cannotbeapurelymarketorientedproject. Thiswould violate theGerman constitutional
obligationto
promote
the
social
principle
in
the
EU.
On
the
other
hand,
it
would
be
even
more
43SeeinfraPartC.
44GREGORYBATESON,STEPSTOANECOLOGYOFMIND159338(1999).
45 Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 216, available at:
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html..46
Id.atparas.39394.
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Halberstam&Mllers 10dangeroustoerectacompleteEuropeanwelfaresystemandtherebyestablishaEuropeanBundesstaat
throughthebackdoor.
These ambiguities, thejuxtaposition of numerous commands pulling in opposite directions, create a
doublebind. WhateverEuropedoesinwhateverwayitdevelopswouldseemtoviolatethestandards
setforthbytheCourt. Theremightbetoomuch,andtheremightbetoolittleparliamentarylegitimacy;
toomuch
or
too
little
social
standards,
and
so
on.
Notwithstanding
its
grand
announcement
that
the
BasicLawhas renouncedall formsof politicalMachiavellianism, theCourt turnsout tobeawicked
strategistitself. Readcarefully,itsdecisioncondemnstheEUtofinalitinastateofperpetualdeficiency.
C. TheRoleoftheConstitutionalCourtI. InstructingtheGermanParliamenttoInstructtheGermanGovernment
TheLisbondecisionurgestheGermanBundestagtocontrolthegovernmentinawaythattheparliament
itself could have done but did not do. Early commentators of the decision were quick to criticize
parliament for its failure and to congratulate the Court for its democratic sensitivity.47
But did the
BundestagreallynotknowwhatitwasdoingwhenitdecideduponthesocalledAusweitungsgesetz(i.e.
thenowunconstitutionalstatutethatorganizestheparticipationoftheBundestagandtheBundesrat in
theprocess
of
European
integration)?
Political science has taught us that parliamentary control of international negotiations between
governmentsisanextremelyproblematicandoftenfruitlesseffort. Thetwolevelgameofgovernments
in the internationalarenahasoftenbeendescribed,48
andthere isso farnoconvincingremedy toput
national parliaments in a stronger position in such settings. This is particularly problematic in
parliamentary systems inwhich themain responsibility of themajority is to back and strengthen the
government.49
TheauthorsoftheBasicLaw,evermindfulofthedemiseofWeimar,wereespeciallykeen
to guarantee the stability of the government. It seems quite improbable that formal obligations of
parliamentaryconsentwillmateriallyenhanceParliamentspolitical influence intheEuropeandecision
making procedure. Parliament will not have more substantial influence but it will be explicitly held
politicallyresponsiblefortheresultsthataredefinedbythegovernment.50
TheCourtsprofessionofconcernabouttheutterdestructionoftheGermanconstitutionseemsstrange
in lightof its failure tograpple substantivelywith the singlemost importantprovisionon the subject:
BasicLawArticle23. Thisprovision,whichbringstheprojectofEuropeanintegrationintotheframework
of theBasicLaw,expressly requires that theFederalgovernmentadhere to theordersof theGerman
Bundestag. Theexplicit ideaoftheprovision isthattheGermanparliamentmay,butneednot,commit
theFederalGovernmenttoacertainposition intheEuropeancontext. Thisnormexpressesrespectfor
thedemocraticwillofthelegislaturethatseemsespeciallywellsuitedtoaparliamentarysysteminwhich
theparliamentarymajorityregularlyhasthesamepoliticalagendaastheGovernment. Onewouldthink
that the framers of Article 23 meant to provide a comprehensive statement of the constitutionally
requiredrelationshipbetweenParliamentandGovernmentinmatterspertainingtoEuropeanintegration.
47See,e.g.,HeribertPrantl,Verfassungsgericht zu Lissabon-Vertrag - Europische Sternstunde, SDDEUTSCHEZEITUNG,July1,2009.
48RobertD.Putnam,DiplomacyandDomesticPolitics: TheLogicofTwoLevelGames,42INT'LORG.427(1988).
49WALTERBAGEHOT,THEENGLISHCONSTITUTION69(1967).
50Inadditiontothat,thereisacertainironyinthefactthatinothercasesofforeignrelationslawtheCourttookjusttheopposite
stance. Inmany cases regarding theparliamentaryparticipation in thedevelopmentofNATO, theCourt didnotonly refrain to
developconstitutionalduties forparliamentaryparticipationbut,tothecontrary,defined itsconstitutional limits. BVerfGE68,1;
BVerfGE104,151.
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TheLisbonDecision 11TheCourtdoesnotengagewithanyofthisandsimplyholdsthattheprovisionsoftheAusweitungsgesetz
violateBasicLawArticle23(1),whichisthegeneralnormrequiringthatGermanyparticipateinEuropean
integrationaccordingtodemocraticstandards. TheCourtdoesnotseemtoconsiderthepossibilitythat
Article 23(1) may not be the relevant norm, as Basic Law Article 23(3) provides the definitive and
comprehensive statementof the constitutionally requiredprocedural standard that shouldgovern this
case. TurningtoBasicLawArticle23(3),however,wouldbeinconvenient,giventhattheBundestagand
theBundesrat
specifically
adhered
to
its
provisions
during
the
deliberations
on
the
ratification
of
the
LisbonTreaty.
ThedecisiontosetasidethespecificnormofBasicLawArticle23(3)infavorofinvokingthemoregeneral
normofArticle23(1)onlymakessenseinlightoftheCourtsmassiveEuroskepticreservationsexpressed
inthecourseofanalyzingthestatute. BecausetheCourtisconfrontedwithaspecificconstitutionalnorm
thatseemstogovernthecaseathand,theopinionmustturntoagrandtheoryofdemocraticlegitimacy.
Italsoneedsasuperconstitutionalnormtotransformthistheoryintolegalargument.
This iswhereBasic LawArticle79(3)comes in. Thenormativebasis for transforminghigh theory into
insuperable doctrine is the socalled eternity clause. This norm imposes certain unalterable
constitutionalstandards, includingtheprincipleofdemocratic legitimacy. TheCourtseemsto interpret
Article23(1)inthelightofArticle79(3)togivethefirstnormahigherstatusallintheserviceofbypassing
themore
specific
Basic
Law
Article
23(3).
But
Article
79(3)
was
not
meant
to
protect
Germany
against
Europe. It was meant to prevent the German state from a new 1933, from a slow slippage into
totalitarianism without an obviously illegal break. Though nobody in the constituent Parliamentary
Councilbelievedthatanynormcouldsaveapoliticalorder,thenormwouldnonethelessserveasasign
fortheidentityofthenewdemocraticconstitution. ItisthushighlydubiousthatBasicLawArticle79(3)
wasmeanttopreservethesovereigntyoftheGermanstatewithintheprocessofEuropeanintegration.
TooperationalizethetheorythatEuropeandemocracyisgroundedexclusivelyintheMemberStates,the
Court conjures up the idea of a modification of treaty law (Vernderung des Vertragsrechts)51
that
needstheexplicitconsentoftheGerman legislature.52
Vernderung isanotherkeyterm intheCourts
elaborateopinionthatmustbeexaminedwithcare. ItsignifiesthemodificationoftheTreatiesthatisnot
a formalamendment (whichwouldbe termedaVertragsnderung). Onemight,ofcourse,argue that
everysubstantial
reinterpretation
of
the
Treaties
is
amodification
of
the
treaty
of
the
former
kindnot
allofwhichcandemandafreshroundofratification. Moreover,theTreatyofNiceknowsmanyexplicit
textualprovisionsthatallowforwhattheCourtwouldnowtermmodifications,suchasthepossibility
to change the number of European Commissioners or Advocates General on the ECJ by unanimous
decisionofthecouncil.53
ButtheCourtdoesnotobjecttothese. Instead, itseemstoobjecttothose
modifications that were somehow not sufficiently defined in the Treaty. We are generally left to
wonderwhatthismeansinpractice,butonethingisclear: byintroducingthetermofVernderung,the
Courtinstallsitselfasthearbitertodistinguishperhapswiththehelpofitsflawedadhoctheoryofstate
functionsbetweenthemodificationsthatrequireratificationandthosethatdonot.
PerhapstheCourtsmostplausibleweknowitwhenweseeitobjection istoArt.352TFEU,thenew
FlexibilityClause. ThenearuniversalapplicabilityofthisclausethreatenstoleavethescopeofEuropean
competences truly open ended. But to submerge this real concern in a host of unsubstantiated
judgments,as
the
Court
did,
obscures
the
real
question
of
articulating
more
precisely
and
more
usefully
51 Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 409, available at:
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html..52
Id.53
TreatyEstablishingtheEuropeanCommunity,Dec.24,2002,art.213(1)(3),2002O.J.(C325)33,120[hereinafterECTreaty];EC
Treatyart.,222(2).
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Halberstam&Mllers 12what should be done about Article 352 TFEU and why. To be sure, Article 352 TFEU may well be
overbroad. ButifeveryinvocationofArticle352TFEUdemandsratification,eventhemorelimitedresort
toArticle352TFEU formarketpurposes (which theCourtapproved intheMaastrichtCaseabsentany
specialnationalratificationprocedure)willnowbemuchharderthanitwaseverbefore.
TheremainingjudgmentsontheGermanparliamentsrelationwiththegovernmentseemhighlysuspect
aswell.
It
is
unclear
why
the
specific
passerelle
clausesor
even
the
general
passerelle
clauseshould
be
subjecttonationalratification. Tobesure,theseclausestightenEuropeanintegration. Butthescopeof
thistighteningisperfectlydefined. Therearenumerousclausesthatprovideforqualifiedmajorityvoting
andtheordinarylegislativeprocedure. Whattheseproceduresentailisperfectlyknown. Indeed,choices
betweenthetwoformsofdecisionwithregardtoasinglepolicyareaalreadyexist,asinthefamoustwin
articlesof94 and95ECor themanyprovisions that allow for a choiceof governancebydirectiveor
regulation. Moreover,theMemberStatescouldclearlyhaveoptedtosubjectalltheareascoveredbythe
variouspasserelleclausesdirectly to themore integrateddecisionmakingprocedureon suchmatters.
ButtheCourtgivesnoreasonwhythisgreaterpowerdoesnotincludethelesserpowerexercisedhere.
TheCourtsdecisionontheemergencybrakealsomakesnosensewhatsoever. Here,theCourtsubjects
the invocation of the emergency brake to the prior consent of the German legislature. Although
integration enthusiasts shouldwelcome the interesting and almost certainly unintended result of this
holding,54this
part
of
the
opinion
does
not
safeguard
Germany
from
any
creeping
loss
of
power.
II. SuperCounterMajoritarianism
The idea that the eternity clause of Basic Law Article 79(3) protects German sovereignty (or
statehood)isanacademicinventionofthe1980s.55
IntheLisbonCasetheCourtnowusesthisnormto
createasomewhatirritatingchoicebetweentwoalternatives: ThepeopleofAdenauer,Brandt,andKohl
whowantcontinuedEuropeanintegrationandempowermentoftheEuropeanparliamentinathoroughly
democraticspiritmustremainwithintheboundsdeterminedbytheCourtorelsetheGermanpeople
mustgiveupitsconstitution.
Inarathersurprisingtwist,theCourtseemstoexpanditsreviewingpowerbeyondalllimitstoreachfor
judicialcontrol
even
of
the
pouvoir
constituant
of
the
German
people.
Given
the
general
carelessness
of
theopiniononemightthinkthepassagesinquestionsaremerelyaccidental. Butasthereatleastthree
referencestothisidea,weshouldtaketheCourtatitsword. TheCourtstates,forexample,thatArticle
23(1)oftheBasicLawdoesnotbindtheGermanstate,buttheGermanpeople.56
Inotherpassages,
the Court explicitly leaves openwhether the German people themselvesmight not be bound by the
eternityclause.57
If thiswere true,however, therecouldbeno revolutionaryescape intoaEuropean
federationfortheGermanpeoplewhatsoever.
Finally,theCourttakesBasicLawArt.146(whichenvisionsthattheGermanpeoplemaygiveitselfanew
constitution)tocontainarightthatcanbeinvokedbyindividualsinCourt.58
Thisideaisconceptuallyso
absurdthateventheCourthasahardtimeexpressingit. Welearnthatthisisapreconstitutionalright
thattheBasicLawmerelyconfirms.59
TheCourtexplainstheideainits,bynowcharacteristicmove,of
54SeesupraSectionB.
55SeeMLLERS,supranote36,atCh.17.
56 Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 229, available at:
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html..57
Id.atpara.217.58
Id.atpara.180.59
Id.atpara.179.
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TheLisbonDecision 13denyingwhatitsupports: ThefactthatArticle146oftheBasicLawdoesnotestablishan independent
claimthatcanbeassertedbyaconstitutionalcomplaint...isnotcontrarytothepossibilityoflodginga
constitutionalcomplaintagainstthelossofstatehood. Forthisdoesnotruleoutthataviolationmaybe
challenged under Article 146 of the Basic Law in conjunctionwith the fundamental rights and rights
equivalenttothefundamentallaws....60
Allin
all,
the
revolutionary
act
of
constitution
making
is
down
sized
to
an
ordinary
act
that
is
henceforth
underreviewoftheCourt. Accordingtothedecision,thepeoplewhowantademocraticrevolutionmust
petitiontheCourt.
D. ConclusionThe German Federal Constitutional Court has never made true on theMaastricht Cases promise to
reviewEuropeanactsundertheultraviresdoctrine. InnocasesinceSolange I61
hasCourtreviewedor
struck down an act of the European authorities. Maastricht had come to look like a hollow threat,
especiallyaftertheCourtpassedontheopportunityto intervene intheBananaCase.62
Thecaseofthe
LisbonTreaty,therefore,putconsiderablepressureontheCourttoshowitstruecolors. Woulditsoften
the project of national constitutional review or give some kind of new credibility to its claims in the
MaastrichtCase.
AsthenakedjudgmenttouchesonlyuponGermanstatutorylaw,theentiredecisionseemsratherlikea
performativeutterance inwhich theCourtunderlines itsown importance ina strange combinationof
rhetoric and verbosity. The Lisbon Case takes over 421 paragraphs tomake several confused points.
Indeed,theCourtsopinionmightmakeeventhemosthardenedcriticnostalgicfortherelativeclarityof
theMaastrichtCase,whichtooklessthanhalfasmanywordstoreviewahistorictreatyamendmentthat
gavesubstantialnewpowerstotheEuropeanpolity,erectedtheEuropeanUnion,establishedaCommon
SecurityandDefensePolicy,andcreatedanewcurrency.
HastheCourtsaidJazumVertragvonLissabon? Wethinknot.63
60Id.atpara.180.
61
BVerfGE
37,
271.
62BVerfGE102,147.
63Thereisonerathernicepointintheopinionatparagraph415. Article1,4(3),cl.3oftheActExtendingandStrengtheningthe
Rights of theBundestag and the Bundesrat in EuropeanUnionMatters provides that in formulating theGerman governmentspositionwithregardtothegeneralbridgeclause,theBundesratandBundestagcaneachoverridetheothersinvocationoftheveto.As theCourtproperlypointsout,however,only theBundestagcanoverride theBundesratssuggestionofaveto. Toallow theBundesrattooverridetheBundestagsveto,isamisunderstandingofGermanconstitutionallaw. Wecouldnotagreemore.