Intelligence and Ethics: The CIA'S Covert Operations byDavidCanon DepartmentofPolitical Science,IndianaUniversity This agency is conducted in a splendid way.As has been said, spying is spying.. ..Youhaveto make up yourmind that youare going to have anintelligence agency andprotectitas such, andshut your eyes some and take whatis coming. John Stennis, November1971' Itwasnaiveto suppose inthe first place that such an agency could he broughtinto beingwithoutbecominga Frankenstein.Itisevenmore naive to suppose that it can go on in its present form without unhinging the government itwascreated to protect, NormanCousins,July 8,1978' The world is quite capable ofgoing to hell without the help ofthe CIA. NormanBirnbaum, January1979' The CIA recentlysuffered through a periodofCongressional scrutiny and moraloutragefromapublicstillreelingundertheunsettlingeffectsof Watergate.This attentionwastotallyforeign t o an agencyaccustomed t o limitedaccountabilityandvirtualindependenceinmostofitsactivities. Many claim that the CIA has not been the same since, partly because of the crisis ofconfidence it has suffered worldwide,partly because of the all-time low in employee morale, and mostly, as critics from the rightmaintain, be- cause it has been shackled by unreasonable limits imposed on it by a reform- mindedadministration. Critics from the left, while acknowledging the need for anationalintelligenceagency,believethat the potential for abusestill exists and that not enough has been done to insure that the "excesses"of the CIA'S first thirty years do not occur again. In recent months this opinion has come from a shrinking minority,as such ethical considerations lose appeal during a periodofheightened militarismand patriotismbrought on bythe crisesin Iran and Afghanistan.A definite sentiment exists in Congress t o simply"unhandcuff'theCIA,hopingthatU.S.interestsmaybebetter protected.' 198THE JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIESSpring This paper will examine the CIA'srole in the international power struggle by briefly outlining the formation and early history of the CIA, then by dis- cussing the developments of the last twenty years that led to the crisis,and nextbyexamining the early attempts at control and reform.Finally Iwill outlineandassessthe various policy options:from the coldwarriorswho wantto returnto theoldAllenDulles CIA to the humanistswhobelieve that any covert activity is immoral and must be outlawed. After evaluating the trade-offs that inherently exist in such acomplex issue, I will recommend the alternative thatI believe to be in the best interest of the United States as a partofthe worldcommunity. I.The EarlyHistoryofthe CIA The needfor an agency that would centralize intelligence gathering became obvious after the terrible tragedy ofPearl Harbor.'Intelligence at the time had some idea that an attack was possible, but there was no single voice that dictated a loud enough warning. This lack of a centralized apparatus proved to be disastrous; shortly afterward, William J. Donovan recommended that such an organizationbeformed. The Office of CoordinatorofIntelligence wasputintoexistence,whichlaterwassplitintotheOfficeofStrategic Services (OSS), underDonovan,and the Office ofWarInformation.The patternofcombiningspecialoperationswithinformation-gathering that wasestablished intheOSS isstillfollowed today.Trumandisbandedthe OSS on September 20,1945, and formed the Bureau ofIntelligence and Re- search. Anotherexecutive orderset up the NationalIntelligence Authority and under it, the Central Intelligence Group. Two motivating factors led to the formation of the CentralIntelligence Agency underthe NationalSecu- rity Actof1947: I.the American rise to worldpowerafter WW 11,the abandonment of our prewar isolationism, andall the responsibilities thatthis change entailed; and 2.the perceivedSoviet threat to this newpositionofpower.6 Itappearedthat the CIA wasformed to serve two purposes: I. to gather information aboutthe capabilities andintentions offriendly andun- friendly nations (and to discern betweenthe two); and 2.to evaluate itandpresent it insome usefulform to policy-makers.' Mostofthe CIA'searly activities were centered on uncovering as much informationaboutRussia as they could.Because the earlierconcentrated intelligence efforts hadbeencentered exclusively on GermanyandJapan, the U.S.really hadlimitedinformation on its newrival.In the late forties andearly fifties,hundredsofmenwereemployedandmassiveresources wereusedinaneffortto amassasmuchinformationaspossible.Illegal bordercrossings were usedfor everything from obtainingsoil samples, to testing for radioactive fallout, to interviewing anyone who would talk. Soon 1980COVERT OPERATIONS AND ETHICS199 itbecameevident thatsimple intelligence gathering wouldnotsufficeand thatan additional function was needed to fill the void between normal for- eignpolicyactionsandarmedintervention.Questionswereimmediately raisedas to the legitimacy ofthe new branchreferred to as Special Opera- tions,covertactivities,orclandestineoperations.PresidentTruman, amongothers, saw these activities as deviating from the original intentof the 1947 Act. Fifteen years after the CIA'S inception Truman said, "Inever hadany thought that whenIset up the CIA thatit wouldbeinjected into peacetime cloak and daggeroperation^."^Directors ofOperations have al- waysliberally usedthe fifth clause ofthe CIAsection ofthe1947 Actto justify its actions.The clause, which is similar in its ambiguity to the Com- merce Clause ofthe Constitution, gave the CIA the right "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence activities affecting national security.. .."9Thismandate,referredtoasthe"otherfunctions"clause, wasfurtherlegitimizedbyaNationalSecurityCouncilOrderin1948, shortly after the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, which gave the CIA responsibility for"political,psychological, economic, andunconventional warfareoperation^."'^In1949 the CIA gained more powerfromthe CIA Act,whichexempted itfromdisclosinginformationaboutitsemployees and allowed itto spend taxpayers' money "without regard to the provision of law and regulations relating to the expenditures of government funds."" These laws gave the CIA unprecedentedspecial status in carrying outbu- reaucratic activity. The CIA was something new and exciting, and was held inhigh public esteem in an era ofintense Cold War. A complete understanding of the expansion of the CIA in the early fifties mustinclude anawareness ofthe interestingrelationshipthatexistedbe- tween theState Departmentandthe CIA because ofthe Dullesbrothers. John Foster Dulles reflected the American ethic in the Eisenhower adminis- tration.He spoke ofthe "containment"ofCommunism; butwhen it came to actual interference in the affairs ofother nations,the State Department made itclear thatwewouldnot"adoptthe eviltactics ofsubversion and secretmanipulationpracticedbytheCommunistenemy."12Meanwhile, John Foster'sbrother, Allen Welsh Dulles, Director of the CIA, was carry- ing out covert operations that did everything from fixing elections to leading military coups. This dualism of US.foreign policy, openly claiming our be- liefinself-determinationandcovertlycreatinghavocaroundtheworld, probablywouldhavedevelopedwithouttherelationshipoftheDulles brothers,butits magnitude was intensified because of the reducedfrictions between the State Departmentand the CIA that would naturally arise with such conflicting policies."The system of checks and balances was reduced and the CIA virtually hada free handin all ofits operations. The CIA rapidly took advantage of its new extensive powers and started making its presence known around the world.In the first ten years, major covert operationswere carried outinBogota,Burma,Costa Rica,Korea, 200THE JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIESSpring Laos, Guatamala, Indonesia, Iran, China, and Taiwan. Many of these were seenashugesuccesses,especially coupssuchasthe"bananarevolt"in Guatemala-essentiallyaBayofPigs that worked."Manyofthese cases have recently come under fire for causing death and destruction that byfar outweighanygainsforthe"freeworld."Forexample,inIndonesiathe CIA-inspired coup that removed President Sukarno from power led to the death ofat least 500,000 people and the imprisonment ofhundreds of thou- sandsmoreinconcentrationcamps."TherecentcrisisinIrancertainly castsdoubtonthedecisiontoputtheShahandhisCIA-createdsecret police force into power in1953. The operations ofthe CIA in the early years reflected the national senti- ments at the time. The cold war was at its peak with anticommunist feelings running high. With the present Watergate-aroused moralism and awareness ofpublic opinion,itisdifficult to comprehend the"nationalsecurity iiber alles"mind-set that dictated the apathetic attitudes toward human rights in situationsof"containingcommunism."Typical ofthis"endsjustifythe means"approachwas the testimony ofa DullesCIA agent in theChurch Committee investigations of1975: Wenevergaveanythoughttothislineofreasoning[objections to violations of human rights], because we were justnaturally pragmatists. The one thing we were concerned about was this:Will this course ofac- tionwork; will we reach the objective that we desire to reach? Asfar as legality isconcerned, morals or ethics, it wasneverraisedbymyselfor anyoneelse.Ithinkthissuggestsreallythatingovernmentwe are amoral. l6 Though perhaps amoral, the CIA was perceived bythe policy-makers as working in the nation'sbest interests, and so no objections were raised. This viewofthe CIAdictated the administration'sdualistic policyas discussed earlier. Forexample,concerning Indonesia,Eisenhower maintained,"Our policyisoneofcarefulneutralityandproperdeportmentalltheway throughso as notto be takingsides where itisnoneofourbusiness."At thatverymoment dozens ofCIA B-26's were flyingfromManila to aid in therevolt."The CIA wasinits heyday. 11.The Fall From Grace The CIA was operating under the principle, "Dowhat you have to but don't get caught," realizing that despite national security priorities the public may notsympathize if some ofthemore extreme activities were revealed. The integrity of the government had to be protected bycutting a line be- tweenthesponsorsandtheactorsofcovertactivities.Withtheembar- rassmentoftheU-2 planeoverRussiain1960,thepublic wasno longer accepting all thedenials. Therefore,theconcept of"plausibledenial" was developed todetermine whentheadministrationwouldbeable to deceive 1980COVERT OPERATIONS AND ETHICS201 the American public. If it was felt the public would buy the line, the action wouldbe carried out. Much work went into the formation ofcover stories, butin the1961 BayofPigs debacle the denial was implausible even to the most naive. The shabbily handled invasion and explanation were so comical (ortragic)thatCastrocommented, "EvenHollywoodwouldnottryand film such a story."lB This incident marked the beginning of the end of public confidence in the CIA.In general the Bay ofPigs was not viewed as immoral but as a failure because it was not successful. If we had used more air support it might have beenanotherfeather inthe CIA'scap. Tokenoversightwasconductedbytheexecutive branchandCongress throughthe ForeignIntelligence Advisory Board and the Intelligence Sub- committee ofthe ArmedServices committee.Little restraintwasactually imposed, as isrevealedbycommittee chairman John Stennis' commentin November1971: This agency [the CIA] is conducted in a splendid way.Ashas been said, spying is spying.. . .You have to make up your mind that youare going to have an intelligence agency and protect it as such, and shut your eyes some and take whatiscoming." Senator Stuart Symington complained, "Iwishhis[Stennis']interest in the subject haddeveloped to thepointwhere heheld justone meetingofthe CIA subcommittee this year, justone meeting!"20 Despite occasional leaks and minor problems, the CIA's covert operations were running in high gear, accounting for over halfof the CIA's total budget. TherooffinallycavedinonDecember 22,1974, whentheNewYork Times rananarticle bySeymour Hershrevealing theCIA's"dirtytricks" that are now so well known: bribing politicians, undermining governments, spreading lies,conducting experiments withmind-altering drugs,building stocks ofpoison,contaminating food supplies, arming secret armies to re- voltagainst national leaders, and above all, plotting to assassinate foreign leaders.Director WilliamColby confirmed most ofthe allegations in a re- portsent to Henry Kissinger. Top men resigned and the crisis that virtually paralyzed the CIA wasunderway.The House underOtisPike, theSenate underFrankChurch, and theJustice Department all conducted investiga- tions that confirmed many ofthe public'sworst suspicions. The Justice De- partment's 683-page report of"questionable activities" and the multivolume Congressional reports left the public screaming for the reform ofan agency that had seemingly lost touch with reality and had adopted the methods and accepted thevaluesystem ofthe "enemy."" Even more unsettling were the facts revealed byformer CIA agents who hadquitandwere "tellingitall."ItwasrevealedthatRichard Helms bla- tantly lied to the Senate about the CIA'sinvolvement in Chile on February 7, 1973.2William ColbyperjuredhimselfbeforetheChurchcommittee in 202THE JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIESSpring 1975 whenhe tried to deny U.S.involvement in Angola. Both of these men wereintheunenviable positionofhaving to choose betweentwo "ethical imperatives," either honoring the oath ofsecrecy for the CIA or telling the truthunderoath.Itisatoughdilemma andbothofthemenoptedfor former,Colby saying, I found myself ina position ofconflict. I had sworn myoath to protect certain secrets. I didn'twant to lie. I didn'twant to mislead the Senate. I wassimply trying to findmywaythrough a verydifficult situati~n.~' Judge Parker did not see it that way and convicted Colby of perjury,giving himthemaximum$2,000 fineandsaying, "Publicofficialsateverylevel, whatever their position,like any other person,mustrespectand honor the Constitutionandthe laws ofthe Unitedstate^."'^ Itiseasytosympathize withthese men'sdilemma.They bothbelieved theywereactinginthenation'sbestinterestandsaidtheywoulddo the same thing againifthey hadto.Itis much harderto justifythe action of Henry Kissingerbefore the same Church committee.JohnStockwell, who at the timewasOperations DirectorinAngolaandwasamemberofthe NationalSecurityCouncil,revealedthatKissingerpresidedoverthe meetingoftheNSCthatapprovedofaprogramtoorganizeandsupply mercenary armies and then subsequently went in front of Congress and de- nied any involvement in Angola.'>The secrecy (and the deception that goes withit)oftheCIAcanbejustifiedas beingindispensable forthe organ- ization,butwhenitoverflows into the policy-making arena,serious ques- tionsofthe subversion ofthe whole democratic process can be raised. This, then, brings the problem to the point where the American public no longerhasanyconfidence intheCIA,andtheCIAhasbeendeemedin- competent and unable to serve our interests. The crisis of confidence and in- effectivenessof the CIA are merely symptoms of the problem which critics from the right say will besolved ifthe CIA is given backits oldpowerto protectAmericaninterests.ManyfeeltheCIA'S problemscontributeto America's apparent inability to deal with international crises, as in Iran and Afghanistan. Others insist there are inherent problems in covert operations thathavebeencausingtheincompetence andthattrade-offswithhuman rightsaretooseveretojustifycovertoperationseveniftheydowork. The main questions are then: to what extent is the CIA compatible with the American system, or necessary to preserve it;andhowcan wehave an ef- fective intelligence agency, which is essential for survival in today's complex world,butyetdoes nottramplehumanrights?In otherwords,are ethics and intelligence contradictory terms, and if they are which must we choose? 111.Reform ofthe CIA-Whatis Needed? Reformofany bureaucracy is difficult, buttackling the CIA has proven to beataskofmonumentalproportionsastheinertiaandresistanceto 1980COVERT OPERATIONS AND ETHICS203 change, generally observable in government, isslowed even further bythe "sacredcow"statusofnationalsecurity. Two aspects oftheCIAare the targets ofmost reform discussions: the controversial covert political opera- tionsandthecovertmeansofobtaininginformation.Athirdfunction, counter-intelligence, is usually regarded as immune to the reforms because ofitsuniversallyrecognizedimportance.Reformproposalshavetaken dozens ofdifferentapproaches.I willexamine fourpossibilities (actually, three alternatives and the status quo), bearing in mind both historical prece- denceandfuture implications inassessing theirrespective meritsandlia- bilities. The "Minimal Decision:" StatusQuo.WhenAdmiral Stansfield Turner recently tookover thestruggling CIA,itappearedhehadthe rightinten- tions,butmostofhiseffortsbackfired.Inordertorestorepubliccon- fidence,hecutbackcovert operationsandfired400clandestine officials. Tad Szulc viewed this act as having a worse effect on employee morale than all the investigations andrevelation^.^^Turner'snext move was to attempt totakecontrolofthewholeintelligence apparatus,making theDefense Department the CIA'smainantagonist for this period. It became obvious to President Carter that action was needed to improve theaccountability,integrity andeffectiveness oftheCIA.Accountability wasprovidedforintheHughes-Ryanamendmentof1974 withrequire- ments for Senate briefingsandPresidential approval ofcovert operations. With Colby and Kissinger proving that non-accountability through perjury was still possible, Carter established the Intelligence Oversight Board, com- prisedofformerGovernorofPennsylvaniaWilliamScranton,former SenatorofTennessee AlbertGore,andWashington attorneyThomasL. Turner. They are responsible for reviewing intelligence activities and report- ing any problems to the President.2' In addition,Carter issued Executive Order #I2036 on January 24,1978, showing a commitment to more openness in intelligence functions and more protectionfor individual rights. Its main points outlawed all covert opera- tionsintheUnitedStates(exceptwithexecutive approval),outlawedas- sassinations,restrictedCIAcontractswiththeacademic worldandnon- governmentinstitutions,restrictedthesurveillanceof"U.S.persons"to overseas (except with approval of the President and Attorney General), and put counter-intelligence under the direction ofa new committee.The effec- tiveness of the CIA was to be bolstered by the National Intelligence Tasking Center, which centralized activities, and by the Policy Review Committee of theNSC,which"definesandestablishes prioritiesforintelligencecon- sumers."In addition, Stansfield Turner was given more power inpreparing the CIA'sbudgetandin otherareas.2' Criticism flew frombothsides, as isusually the case withminimal deci- sions such as this.Opinions ofthose who thinknothing concrete came of 204THE JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIESSpring theorderaresummedupbytheDirectorfortheCenterforNational Security Studies: It isa sad commentarv that a Presidential directive instructine the intel- -ligence agencies to respect the Constitution and to act in a lawful man- ner is hailed as reform. Given vast conduct. enforcine the Constitution. -wouldindeedbea reform, butitisnota reformwhichtakes one very far, since the meaning of these phrases is not spelled out and they mean far differentthings whenputinto practice." Acloser lookat the executive orderreveals that,whileitreasserts consti- tutional,ethical behavior,itis also riddledwithmanyloopholesthatwill allow continued abuses and basically ignores the issue of covert political ac- tivity.The attempts to reorganize the agency seem to have backfired as well. Although the order concentrates on protectingthe rights ofAmericans, substantial guarantees still do not exist. Electronic surveillance and physical searches are authorizedundervague "nationalsecurity" guidelines andthe AttorneyGeneralisgivenexcessive powerinauthorizingdomesticcovert actions.Itshouldbeobvious inthe light oftwo recent convictions ofAt- torneys General thattoo much power should notbe placedin one person's hands.)O Theheaviestcriticism camefrompersonsintheacademiccommunity who claimed that academic institutions would still be used as a cover for in- telligence. Morton Baratz, general secretary of the American Association of University Professors, warned, "The order will leave the door open to unac- ceptable intrusionsbythe intelligence agencies incolleges anduniversities throughoutAmerica.")'Specifically,thestatusquoallowsprofessorson sabbatical to be usedfor covert activities and allows other purchases ofin- formation "iftheappropriate seniorofficialsare informed."Inaddition, professors will be allowed to secretly workfor the CIA if no remunerations are i nvol ~ed. ' ~ Otherconcerns have beenraised about the status quo'sprotectionofthe covert leadership and the maintenanceof thatpowerful branchdespite at- tempted reorganization.The main effect of the Stansfield Turner reductions ofclandestine operations was to fill the highest executive positions ofother branches withthe fired personnel.The newleadership didnotspend much timeonlimiting activities;insteaditcompartmeiltalized the more suspect activities so fewer people would be responsible. E. Drexel Godfrey laments: Thus,apictureemergesof ahighlycompartmentalizedbureaucracy whosedirection hasbeenlargelycontrolled byofficialswithlongex- perienceinthe seduction of other humanbeingsandsocieties.'' Thecriticisms expressedare serious ones;theyshowabasic doubtinthe government'sabilitytocontrolwrongdoingsandtoprotecttheConsti- tutional rights ofU.S.citizens. It also shows an unwillingness to accept de- cisions made bythe Attorney General and the President regarding national 1980COVERT OPERATIONS AND ETHICS205 securityas anendinitselfwhilesubverting constitutionalrightsinthe process.34 Criticisms from the right were equally severe but in a different vein.With an "1told you so"attitude, they scoffat the critics from the left who com- plainoftheintelligence failures in Iran and Nicaragua. The reformists are viewed as responsible for the problems by crippling the CIA with "foolish, inflexible,andunrealisticrestrictions,"andyetwantinganeffective agency.15 Specific problems inthestatus quo aretheextension ofConstitutional rights toforeigners residing intheUnitedStates and excessivecontrolby Congress andotheroversight committees. The first isviewedas impeding effectivecounter-intelligence by giving potential KGB agents the same rights to warrants from the Attorney General that U.S.citizens possess. Account- ability can be damaging by providing a source for possible leaks and by cut- tingdownontheefficiencyoftheCIAthroughforcing continuouscon- sultation when speedier action maybeneeded. Furtherdisgust is expressed in the status quo'slack ofcensorship exerted over the breaking ofthe oath ofsecrecyandtherevealingofclassifiedinformationbyloose-tongued agents who have blown covers and who, in at least one case (Richard Welch in Athens), may have led to the death of the exposed agent.36 William Evans sees the CIA as being weakenedfurther byexisting laws. Thecombinedeffect of these provisions isto make our already palsied intelligence agenciesfeeblerstill, andtomakeitextremelylikelythat any data obtained despite the restrictions wouldbe leaked to the outside worldthrough one or another of the hundreds ofcrevices." Attempts at reform seem to have fallen short of everyone'sexpectations. Stansfield Turner and President Carter both have exhibited interest in reor- ganizing the CIA to respectability, and some benefits can be observed, such as the CIA'S apparent transitionfrom a "military-intelligence mentality" to one thatencompasses theeconomic, political, andsociological factors af- fecting this complex world.While intentions were good,the minimal deci- sion in the form ofExecutive Order #I2036 is unacceptable: reformists cry about loopholes, and hardliners fume over handcuffing restrictions. Some- thing needs t o be done: the United States' image is at a low ebb right now, andatthispointtheCIAhasdone nothingtoalterthat,andindeed,its activities may go a long way in explaining hostile, anti4J.S.feelings world- wide. AlternativeProposal# I . Inconsideringpolicyalternatives,willcovert operations inherently end in abuse and lead to the undermining ofeffective intelligence, orare presentproblems due to structuralandoperationalde- fects? A strong case can be made for the latter. William Colby blames past "excesses"on the CIA charter that gave the agency too much latitude in op- erations.He quipped,"Ifyou had given the Fish and Wildlife Service that 206THE JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIESSpring kindof charteritwouldhavegot introuble."3B Othercurable defectsal- readyraisedarerestrictivereportingrequirementsanddamagingintelli- gence leaks. Anothersurmountableproblemassociatedwithcovertoperationsisits apparent responsibilityfor intelligence failures. One source of failure is the existenceofvestedinterests;forexample,inIrantheoperationists' overriding interest in protecting listening posts on the Soviet border deluded themintobelievingthattheShah'sopponentswere"numerically insignificantand potentiallyimpotent."39 Asecond causeoffailure liesin preconceived ideas,as withthe CIA'S tendencyto viewthe Third World as weak and unable to affect worldpolitics.This gross distortion ofreality led tofailurest o predicttheYomKippurWar,the Araboilembargo,and subsequentpricehikes.'O To solve these problems and to strengthen covert operations, the follow- ing policy alternative is proposed. 1.Divorce overt andcovert operations into two separate, independent branches. 2.Formanew,trulysecretintelligence branchfor covertoperations.Itwillbe composedofafeweliteagentswhohaveproventhemselves intheclandestine service. They willlive privately and beaccountable to a small office that willre- port to the CIA Director. There will be no production requirements, no leaks, no bureaucracy, andnolarge system to service.+' 3.CIA willcontinue to operate, but only inthe overt collection ofinformation to provide the President withupdates on current issues. 4.Setupacommission comprisedofCongressionalleaders,businessmen,labor leaders, media personnel, and academicians, that willprovide a public statement. oflong-term foreign policy goals and objectives. This will serve as a guideline for covert andovertoperations." 5.Outlaw all publishing ofclassified material byformer CIA agents. The rationale for this planis summed up byKenneth Adelman, "Whatthe nation requires is national intelligence that is so tough, shrewd, and ruthless that no trend or fashion will ever again screen data or warp per~eption."' ~ Obvioustrade-offsexistwithhumanitariananddemocratic ideals,but giventhepresentconservatismand recentlossofAmericanprestige,this proposal is likely t o be metwithwidespreadapprovalfrom large segments of the population.As time drags on, memories of the CIA'S abuses dim;a gradualloss ofpublic conscience,agrowingfeeling ofnationalism,and a needt o reassertourpowercanbeobserved.The publicistiredofbeing pushedaround by countries such as Iran, and astrongerCIA should help. These attitudes are expressed by A. L.Jacobs, a former CIA clandestine of- ficer withnineteenyearsexperience: Wemaybededicated to the moralideals ofpeace,self-determination, andhumanwelfare-butinthe attainmentofthose ideals there isthe overriding ethic of all nation-states, namely survival." This policy alternative recognizes the needfor intelligence and secrecy. It 1980COVERT OPERATIONS AND ETHICS207 would eliminate detailed oversight, and the new status of covert operations would assure professionalism. Agents would be protected by eliminating in- formation leaks, a point being widely supported in Congress, where several bills to achieve that protection have been proposed.The policy commission wouldsee thatnationalprioritiesweresetandfollowed. The outstanding point is the separation of overt and covert operations to assure that conflict- ing interests will not affect information and to enhance the integrity and ef- fectiveness ofbothbranches. Oppositionforthisplanwillcomefromthosewhothinkasecretin- telligence branchwillopen the doorfor more abuses.Jacobsanswers this argument saying thatsecrecy is an indispensable attribute, and is initself a nationalethic, "justas the secrecy of the ballotbox and of grand jurypro- ceedings are accepted precepts of our nationalmorality."45 To compare the vote,theveryfoundationofdemocraticsociety,withsubversive"dirty tricks," and then justify both in the name of secrecy is absurd; serious ques- tionsaboutthe desirability ofsecrecy can be raised. The oppositionto thisplan can be crystalized into two arguments: a.given the current climate of worldwide political activism and nationalism, covert activities cannot bekeptsecret;. and, b.evenifsecrecycouldbeassured, covertactsare notthewaythatourforeign policyshould hecarried out, or as Herbert Scoville puts it, "We cannot adopt the reprehensible tactics ofthosewe are ~pposing."'~ This second argument is a value judgment stating the humanitarian point of viewand can be discarded ifone putshigherpriority on nationalsecurity. Butthe firstargumentstrikes attheheartofthe proposaland,if proven valid,wouldseriously undermine the arguments for its adoption. The American public hasbeenprotectedfrom knowledge ofCIA activ- ities by the practice of"plausibledenial" and the dualism ofaction policy; buttheexistenceofthis"hearnoevil,see no evil"atmospheredoesnot mean the rest of the world has been equally ignorant.What was revealed to theAmericanpublicintheCIAinvestigationswaswell-knowntothe countries involved.John Stockwell maintains,"TheUnited States has been responsibleformoreactsofviolenceandterrorismforpoliticalreasons than have all ofthe other countries and liberation movements ofthe world putt~gether."~' The people ofChile knew where those $13.4 million came from to subvert the Allende ~ampaign. ' ~Nicaraguan citizens knew who was still supporting their oppressive leader, Somoza. It was no secret to the Iran- ians who was responsible for the powerofthe Shah and Savak. For these reasons covert political activity cannot beacceptable; infernational secrecy isimpossible intoday'sworld.Theendresult,ifsuchactivities are con- tinued,willbethefurtherdecayofAmericancredibilityandprestige abroad.Everyone wonders why America is hated so much, but, while some of it can be attributed to scapegoating, the scapegoat was not singled out at random.Tom Wickeragrees with thisassessment ofanti-U.S.feeling and 208THE JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIESSpring abhors a return to covert operations; "Indeed,with 'CIA'a knee-jerk phrase evokinganti-Americanism around the worldwiththe CIA's realrecord of bloodshed,blunder, and ineptitude from Chile to Iran, a return t o that kind of intervention makes little more sense than re-running the Bay of Pigs."44 Additional opposition would be voiced by the free-speech advocates who would abhor the censorship of former agents. Moralistic arguments against covertoperations willberaisedlater;theycenteraround the premise that nationalsecurityisnotanendinitselfand thatabusesofhumanrights cannot beallowedto continue underits guise. Alternative Proposal #2. An alternative t o unrestrictedcovert operations would be t o revamp the status quo so as t o protect human rights t o a greater degreeand providefor more opennessand control.This proposalwillat- tempt to maintain the balance between flexibility and accountability,while recognizing the needfor national securityand democratic control.Heavier weight will be placedon the latter to avoid the "minimaldecision" status of the presentsystem.Thisplanwouldcontain the following points. 1.Outlawallpoliticalcovert activity exceptincases uhere: a) thePresidenthas determined a rreatncedto ~rotectourinterfit, and -"national security;" b)thisneedispresentedtoselectedcommitteesofCongressanditis shown that overt operations willnot suffice;and, c)the authorization for any covert activity is approvedin writing at sev- eral points before actual implementation, culminating withPresiden- tial approval. 2.Covert activity involving the gathering of information willbeconfined to infor- mation that has immediate and direct relation to the violation of a law or is neces- sary for the administration ofa law.so 3.The budgetfor the CIA'scovert and overtoperations willbemadepublic. 4.Allelectronic surveillance and physical searches ofUS. citizens must be author- izedbya court order. 5.Congress will beauthorized to make public more information regarding the CIA that does nothave "topsecret" classification. This proposal takessignificant steps to assure that the democraticprocess will be preserved.Governmentactivities are supposed t o have the "consent of the governed,"but in the past there could be no consent because the pub- lic did not know to what it was consenting. This goes along with the Jeffer- sonian idealof informing the public.He once said: I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers ofthe society but the peo- plethemselvesandifwethinkthemnotenlightenedenoughtoexercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them,but to inform their discretion." All the same arguments usedagainst the restrictivenessofthe status quo are applicable here, and to a greater degree. One additional objection could be raised:the jeopardizingof national security by making the CIA's budget 1980COVERT OPERATIONS AND ETHICS209 public. Critics maintain that too much valuable information would be given out to theRussian as well as the American public. In actuality, publishing the CIA'S budget wouldno more jeopardize national security than does the publicnatureofthedefensebudget.Inaddition,covertspendingsare "riddledwithwaste,"andinan eraoffiscalrestraintitwouldbein the nation'sinterest to control this multibillion-dollar operation.s2 Anobjective analysis would showthatthe only activities controlled by this plan are those that are not really essential to national security and that are notresponsible for most ofthe abuses. It appears this proposal would achieveadesirablebalance,giventhepresentadministrationandCIA leadership, butthere are no inherent protections when leadership changes. In setting guidelines for covert operations,the national security loopholes leaveoneinextricably tiedtohuman judgmentandvalues.Personally,I tend to cringe at the thought ofwhat powers the CIA might begiven were Ronald Reagan to beelected this nextfall. Another fact that prevents inherent controls over the CIA is the nature of theoversight process.There isan inevitable "Catch 22"involved-weare dependent on the integrity ofthe CIA. Who gives the information desired? Who decides how much information will be given? The same agency that is being monitored."Inviewof the recent perjury oftwo CIA directors be- fore the Senate this seems like a very thin guarantee ofdemocratic control. Alternative Proposal #3.What then is the solution to restoring the CIA'S effectiveness and integrity? Perhaps the answer can be gained byreturning to the original goalsexpressedin the1947 NSAct:the collection anddis- semination ofinformation. When these goals became distorted, trouble was sure to arise. NormanBirnbaum mused,"Whyshould aproblemofpoli- tical technique, dealt withreasonably well byother nations,prove so diffi- cult?"s4 Theobviousanswerliesinthevocalandprincipledopposition voicedinouropensocietywhenthegovernmentdeviatesfromwhatis viewed as acceptable. In theSoviet Union the KGB can operate at willbe- cause there isno voicedopposition.In the UnitedStates this cannothap- pen;wemustreturnto thedemocratic ideals uponwhichthis countryis based.The Soviet Union'sviewing of the Third World as a playground for its covert operations does not mean that we can do the same. Attimes we seem to fulfill the prophecy of George Williams, the famous Harvard theo- logian who said, "Becautious when choosing your enemy, for you will grow more like him."s5 We must break away from this patternand recognize the realities ofa newinternationalpoliticalenvironment. The ThirdWorldis no longer taking its cues from the superpowers; blocs ofnonalignedstates are being formed and nationalistic feelings are running high. This is not the time for imperialistic interventions in the name of our national security. The integrity andeffectivenessoftheCIAandpositiveimageoftheUnited States can be revived only ifthis fact is recognized and ifour priorities are revised. 210THE JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIESSpring Intelligenceisneededmorethaneverinthisinterdependentworld;we needt oknowtheeconomicandpoliticalintentionsand motivesofevery nation.This must be done through an understanding of their cultures, atti- tudes and feelings,not by intervention in their internalaffair^.'^ This can he accomplishedby the following proposal. 1.Abolish all covert operations, except those involving counter-intelligence, which mustbepurelydefensive innature. 2.Set up a commission, as in point #4 ofthe first alternative, to develop long-range goals foroven operations. 3.Strengthen overt intelliaence aatherina bvmakine better use of foreian embassies and putting more empiasis ; n tecbnolo&almeansof getting information. 4.Recruit foreien CIA aeents who are more svmoathetic toward and knowledaeable -aboutthe co&yto whichthey willbeakgned. 5.Make the operating budgetofthe CIA public. The benefitsof the planare obvious:the integrityofthe agencywillhe restoredwithabove-boardoperations,democratic controlwillhe assured, andinformationgatheringwillbecomeprofessionalandaccurateonce again. National security will be protected by aggressive counter-intelligence that willmonitorand reportactivities by the KGB and other hostile spies. Acareful analysis and assessmentofthe costs and risksassociated with thisproposalmustbecarriedoutbeforeafinalrecommendationcanbe made.The arguments against the planwouldfall under three points: a.overt intelligence gathering will not supply crucial information which can only be obtained byspies andcontrolled sources; b.weneed covert activities for our survival and to further our interests abroad; and furthermore, sinceothercountries carryoutcovertoperations, ourmoralistic stand would put us at a disastrous disadvantage because the Russians would react to an announcement of the termination ofCIA covert operations bystepping up theirownoperations all over the world;l'and, c.wehavearesponsibility toprotectourallies,andifcovertsupport weretobe discontinued theywouldsuffer harms underCommunist oppression that are far greater than any costs associated withcovert operations. The first point can be easily refuted.People who make this assertion point t o the highly compartmentalizednature of the Kremlin and other controlled societies and maintain that any really valuable information can he obtained onlythroughsubversiveme a n~. ~8Tothecontrary,covertinformation sources rarely provide any new information; even when contacts are made, suchas inthe celebratedPenkovskycaseofthe earlysixties,theyusually serve t o substantiate existingdata.The questionablevalidityofthe covert source rendersittotallyuselessin time of crisis,as itmust always be con- firmed by some technical system anyway.59 One can imagine the reaction in the U.N.ifAdlaiStevenson hadpresentedevidencesuppliedbyaCastro defector as proof ofRussian missiles,rather than photos from a U-2plane. Conceivablyit could bearguedthat covert informationsources are useful for their support function,but this is also doubtful whenthe phenomenon I980COVERT OPERATIONS AND ETHICS21 1 of "disinformation"is considered. Covert human sources are extremely dif- ficultto come bysinceRussianspies are well-trained. Whenacontactis made one can never be sure ifhe is a bona fide defector or someone planted bythe KGB.In the lattercase,once a KGB agent is accepted as aninfor- mant,lieswillbetakenforrealintelligence.Sometimes the effect canbe disastrous as in the case of dissident Anatoly Shcharansky who wasturned in bysuch a " c ~nt a c t . " ~~Covert sources are even less significant whenone considers thatnonrecruiteddefectors,who make upa large percentage of all sources, can still be utilizedbyovert intelligence operations. The latter two points involve national security questions and a view of the Soviet threat as being of utmost concern. These arguments were summed up verywellbySidney Hook: Those who on a priori grounds condemn an action without regard for its consequencesinpreservingthestructure ofdemocraticfreedomare guilty atthe veryleastofblatanthypocrisy.. . .We mustrecognize the evil we do even whenit is the lesser evil. Butifit is truly the lesser evil, thenthosewhocondemnitorwouldhaveusdonothingatallare morally responsible for the greater evil that mayen~ue. ~'Two implicitassumptions are made in this statement: that covert opera- tions are in fact the lesser evil and that covert operations support the "struc- tureofdemocraticfreedom."Bothoftheseassumptionscanberefuted, thus destroying the justification for covert operations.If covert operations do upholdthe "structureof democratic freedom,"then itis merely a value judgmentin determining the relative costs ofletting a nationfall to com- munismandpreventingsuchanincident.Ifcommunistexpansion inthe Third World is perceived as a threat to our nationalsecurity, then anything to stop itcould be justified.The fact is, the CIA'S covert operationsoften subvertdemocraticideals.Inaddition,JohnStockwell maintains,"Very fewofthose[covert] operationshavehadanythingto dowithnational securityinterestsoftheUnitedstate^."^^InmanycasestheCIAhas supportedorputintopowerregimes thatare atleastas repressive as the communistoneswearetryingtosubvert.Brazil,Iran,BritishGuiana, Indonesia, Guatemala,and Ecuador are all cases in point.Perhaps the best exampleisthetragedyofVietnam,whichwouldhavebeencompletely avoided had the CIA allowed the immensely popular Ho Chi Minh to take power.Instead, the CIA supported the anticommunist Diem, and the rest is history. It is almost absurd to consider the tremendous loss of human life as being anything butwasted,and wouldhe so even ifthe United States and the CIA hadbeen"victorious"over the expanding Communists. 1V. Conclusion In arriving at a final policy recommendation,all ofthe trade-offs and risks ofeach alternativehave to be carefully weighed.The communist threatis realandcannotbeignored.Itisnaiveto assume thattheSoviet Union 212THE JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIESSpring would follow our example and stop intervening in the activities of other sov- ereign nations.It is equally naive, though, to assume that the United States cancontinuetooperateunderthedualistic,hypocriticalforeignpolicy which it has pursued for the last thirty years, and yet maintain any degree of internationalcredibility. It has been shown that covert operations are unac- ceptablebecause:a)theirintentionofpreservingdemocracyisfarout- weighed bythe repressive regimes that we put into power; b)they intensify anti4J.S.feelings worldwide because covert operations do not remain secret in the nations concerned (just as Americans would be outraged if the Demo- cratic Party received most ofits campaign contributions from the KGB,or ifCBS and NBCwere supportedby secret funds);61 c)they subvert demo- cratic ideals at home in that democratic consent is impossible because of the secret nature of covert operations (oversight and secrecy are inherently con- tradictory terms); and d) they force usto adopt the immoral tactics ofthe "enemy." TheSovietthreatwillbecontrolledpartiallybythesame phenomenon thathasbeena thorn in the side ofthe UnitedStates-therise ofnation- alism in the Third World.When this does notholdtrue, the United States will still be able to intervene in international emergencies; but under the sug- gestedpolicyitwillactovertlyfromapositionofmoralleadership.Ina case such as in Portugalrecently, where a vocal,Soviet-led, minoritywas swaying an election, it was determined to be in our national interest to inter- veneandcounterbalancetheSoviet influence.IfittrulywasinPortugal's interest, and therefore also in ours, an overt act ofaid would be justifiable. JohnStockwell supports this view: Isubmit that true inhence over worldaffairs is nevergained bycovert operations.Itisrather theforce ofthe relationships among the coun- tries that produces positive influence. Wewould befurther ahead inthe worldifwe haddirect andopen and honest relations with c~untries.~' The CIA would still operate to gather information essential to the carrying outofforeignpolicy,butnolongerwouldwebeshackledbycynicism, "plausibledenial,"andacontradictorydualism.Wewouldbethemoral leaders of the world,with the worldas our judge. NOTES 1.Brian O'Cannell,"Doing Away With Covert Activities,"America,March 13, 1976,p. 205. 2.NormanCousins,"Whatisan Americanto ThinkAboutthe CIA?," Saturday Review, July 8.1978.p. 40. 3.NormanBirnbaum."Failure ofintellieence.". Nalion.Januanr.20.. 1979.. .D.42.-4.CharlesMore,"CIACharterAgreementisExpected,"LouisvilleCourierJournal, JanuaryIS,1980, p.2. 5.Roberta Wohlstetter,"Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight." Foreign Anairs 44(October 1965):695-696. 1980COVERT OPERATIONS AND ETHICS213 6.David Wise and Thomas B.Ross, Thelnvisible Government (New York: Random House, I W) ,p.4. 7.William J.Barnds, "lntelligence and Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of a Democracy," Foreign Affairs 47(January1969): 282. 8.Wise,The InvisibleGovernment, p.96. 9.O'Connell. "CovertActivities." . o.. 204. 10.Harry~o' sitrke, "America'sSecretOperations:Aperspective,"ForeignAffairs53 (January1975): 340. 11.Wise,The InvisibleGovernment, p.%. 12.Ibid..pp.98-99. 13.Ibid., p.99. 14.Stockwell's comment would be chronologically accurate ifhe had called the Bay of Pigs a "BananaRevolt" that did not work.The comment was made in JohnStockwell, "ACIA Trip-FromBelief,toDoubt,toDespair,"TheCenterMagazine(September-October 1979): 27. IS.Peter Singer, "Foreswearing Secrecy,"Notion(May 5,1979), p.490. 16.E.Drexel Godfrey,Jr., "EthicsandIntelligence,"Foreign Affoirs 56 (April1978): 628. 17.Wise,The hvisibleGovernment, p.137. 18.Ibid.,p.62. 19.O'Connell, "CovertActivities,"p.205. 20.Wise,The InvisibleGovernment, p.xi. 21.Frank Church, "Covert Action: Swampland of American Foreign Policy," The Bulletin of the AtomicScientists (February1976), p.9. 22.Godfrey,"EthicsandIntelligence," p.625. 23.ThomasPowers, "Inside the DepartmentofDirty Tricks,"Atlantic (August 1979), p.62. 24.Ibid., p.63. 25.Stockwell, "ACIA Trip,"p.26. 26.Tad Srulc,"Shaking Up the CIA,"NewYork Times Magazine,July29,1979, p.13. 27.Ibid.,p.IS. 28.David Binder, "lntelligence Service Reorganized with Tighter Rules on Surveillance,"New YorkTimes, January 23,1978, p.I .29.George Lardner,"Congress Overlooks Oversight: Missinglntelligence Charters,"Notion (September 2,1978). p.170. 30."IntelligenceNeedsReform,ReformNeedsIntelligence,"NewRepublic(FebruaryI I, 1978). o.5. 31.R. J. ' ~ki t h, "Clash in Congress Over the Honorable Schoolboy:Hearing on the National lntelligence Act,"Science(September 1,1978), p.7%. 32.Ibid. 33.Godfrey,"Ethicsand Intelligence,"p.632. 34."Carter vs. the Constitution:The FrankSnepp Case," NewRepublic (March 4,1978), p. 13. 35.Binder, "lntelligence Service Reorganized,"p.1. 36.Singer, "Foreswearing Secrecy,"p.488. 37.William Evans,"ANewandBetterCIA,"NationalReview(July 6,1979). p.863. 38.Stansfield Turner,William E. Colby, Mitchell Rogovin, Thomas I. Emerson, and Morton Halperin, "Freedom and the lntelligence Function: A Symposium," The Center Magazine (March1979). p.59. 39.Kenneth Adelman and Robert F. Ellsworth, "Foolishlntelligence,"Foreign Policy, (Fall, 1979), p.154. 40.Ibid., p.156. 41.Rositzke, "AmericanSecret Operations,"p.346. 42.Ibid.,pp.350-51. 43.Adelman, "FoolishIntelligence."p.159. 44.A. L. Jacobs,Reply to Godfrey, "Ethics and Intelligence,"Foreign Affairs 56 (July1978): 868. 45.Ibid., p.869. 214THE JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIESSpring 46.HerbertScoville,Jr.,"IsEspionageNecessaryforOurSecurity?"ForeignAffairs54 (April,1976): 483. 47.Stockwell, "ACIA Trip,"p.58. 48.O'Connell,"CovertActivities."o.204... 49.Tomwicker,"ItmakeslittlesensetoletCIAresumecovertoperations,"Louisville Courier Journol, January16,1980, p.11. 50.William E.Rogovin,inTurner,"Intelligence Symposium,"p.46. 51.Wise,The Invisible Covernmenl, p.7. 52.Lardner,"Congress Overlooks ~vmsight,"p.169. 53.MortonHalperin'spointprettywellestablishesthatoversightandsecrecyarecontra- dictory terms.If one takes an absolutist stand on preserving democratic control, this point alonewoulddestroythesecondproposal.Thisabsolutismisfairlyextreme,thoughin dealingwithpoliticalrealities this policyoptionisaboutthebestthatliberalreformists could hope for, and therefore, althoughit was cast aside fairly abruptly, it is not a "straw man"~ r o ~ o s a l .. .(Senate liberals. such as BirchBavh.have been oushine for bills similar to Ihbspi n. ; This oplion ;auld be ionsidered a mmimaldccls~oninthat;tdoc,notentirely plcasecilhcrside ofthe ,,we,buti t is one lhal*odd rwrwe xide\preadsupportfrom the non-absolulcr ~ l o r m~ r l ~ . C\puundinglhcmorer.xrrr.mr. w w *as.MortonHalperin,in Turner, "Intelligence Symposium,"p.58. 54.Birnbaum,"FailureofIntelligence,"p.42, 55.Church."CovertAction,"p.10. 56.Turner,"Intelligence Symposium,"p.48. 57.O'Connell."CovertActivities."o.205... 58.Jacobs.InCiodfrrs. "Ethicsandln~clligensr,"p.814. 59.Epstein."WarWlthmtheCIA,"p37. M) . "HumanRlphls fur Spies," NewXepubltr(Oitober14,1978), p. 9-10 61.Scoville, "IsEspionage Necessary?"p.485 62.Stockwell, "ACIA Trip,"p.27. 63.O'Connell,"CovertActivities," p.205. 64.Stockwell, "ACIA Trip,"p.28.