III. Problems of Turkey and Azerbaijan With Armenia

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III. Problems of Turkey and Azerbaijan with Armenia

The Karabakh Problem

mer Engin LTEM*------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This essay will include a brief history of the Karabakh problem which constitutes themost important conflict in the South Caucasus and analyze the invasion by Armenianforces of Azerbaijani territories, international efforts directed at the solution of theproblem, the main resolutions adopted by international organizations on this issueand the benefits regional countries stand to gain from the settlement of the conflict.

Karabakh and Mountainous Karabakh are two different geographical terms.Karabakh is the approximately 18.000 km2-sized area between the Kura and Araxrivers of Azerbaijan and Lake Sevan (Gke Gl) of Armenia. Of this region 4300km2 is mountainous and commands strategic value. This region has been calledNagorny (mountainous) Karabakh by the Russians and constitutes today the point ofconflict between the Azerbaijanis and Armenians. This area is now called Karabakhonly, mainly because of practical reasons.

The Russian Empire, primarily due to geo-strategic concerns, created the Karabakhproblem approximately two centuries ago. At the outset of the 19th century, Turkicpeoples and especially Azerbaijanis were in the majority and Armenians constituted aminority in the regions that are modern day Karabakh and Armenia. The majority ofthe Armenians lived in the Ottoman Empire and Iran. Karabakh, which in the Turkishlanguage means black garden or black vineyard, was a Khanate composed mainly ofAzerbaijanis.

After gaining control of the Caucasus, the Russian Empire followed a policy ofincreasing the Armenian population in the region, as it was convinced that this wouldmake administering the area easier [1]. With this aim, the Russian Empire especiallytried to move to the Caucasus those Armenians living in Iran and the eastern part ofthe Ottoman Empire. Parallel to this development, a part of the Muslim population ofKarabakh migrated to the other regions of Azerbaijan and to Ottoman territories. TheRussian policy of moving Armenians to the Caucasus was successful in eventuallychanging the ethnic composition in the area and particularly in Karabakh. While theArmenians continued to move to the Southern Caucasus throughout the 19thcentury, with the exception of some areas, they did not become a majority in many

regions. However the flow of Armenians from Eastern Anatolia to the Caucasus afterthe Balkan Wars and the migration of approximately 420.000 Armenians [2] to theregion during and following World War I led to Armenians forming a majority in theregions that modern day Armenia is comprised of.


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The Russian policy of moving Armenians to the Caucasus yielded the followingresults: the increase of Armenians in the Caucasus made it difficult for the Moslempeoples in the region to unite against the invading Russian forces and preventedthem from cooperating against the Russians with Iran and the Ottoman Empire - thetwo Moslem powers in the region. The Armenians under Russian control played an

important role in the revolt of the Ottoman Armenians and the propagation of the ideaof an independent Armenia. It was under the same influence that the OttomanArmenians sided with the Russian army in the First World War. On the other hand,settling Armenians in Karabakh also led to a serious conflict between Azerbaijan andArmenia that occasionally escalated into armed conflict.

With the collapse of the Russian Empire an Armenian state was created in theCaucasus in 1918. The Svres treaty, which essentially liquidated the OttomanEmpire, granted to the Armenians vast territories in East Anatolia. The Armeniansinitiated a war to take possession of the said territories but were defeated by the

Turkish forces and accepted the boundaries in force today. Soon after Armeniaceased to exist as an independent state and joined the Soviet Union.

After all of the Caucasus came under Soviet control, the Mountainous KarabakhAutonomous Oblast (region) was created and attached to Azerbaijan. According toArmenian sources [3] this region with an overwhelmingly Armenian population wasattached to Azerbaijan because the Soviets were practicing the policy of divide andrule. Stalin, who as a native of Georgia knew the conditions in the Caucasus verywell drafted the following map: Nakhichevan is separated from Azerbaijan through anArmenian corridor. Thus Azerbaijan loses direct contact with one of her importantprovinces. Furthermore, Turkey is prevented from becoming a neighbor ofAzerbaijan. Karabakh is attached to Azerbaijan, thereby creating a source ofcontinuous discontent between Azerbaijan and Armenia, forcing the two parties toresort to the mediation of Moscow.

During the Stalin era occasional demands of Karabakh being attached to Armeniawere met with harsh reactions from Moscow. For instance, it has been claimed thatone of the reasons for the assassination in 1936 of Khanjian, the First Secretary ofthe Armenian Communist Party, can be traced back to the Karabakh problem [4].

After the Second World War the USSR demanded from Turkey not only control of theTurkish Straits but also the provinces of Kars and Ardahan and simultaneously itcalled on the Armenians of the diaspora to settle in Armenia, thereby furtherstrengthening the existing nationalism in Armenia. However the Soviets tried hard toallow this nationalism to be aimed abroad only (in other words towards Turkey) whileattempting to keep the same sentiment from impacting on national problems such asKarabakh.

The Karabakh problem could only reemerge in the atmosphere of relative freedomthat followed the death of Stalin. At this time some personalities from Karabakhapplied to Moscow on numerous occasions and demanded that the area be joinedwith Azerbaijan. Clashes that erupted in 1988 between Azerbaijanis and Armeniansin Khankendi, the capital of the region that was now known as Stepanakert showedthat there was a strong tendency in Karabakh for joining Armenia. It also appears


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that this tendency was being covertly supported by Armenia. The Armenian diasporawhich always pursued dreams of creating a greater Armenia also wanted to seeKarabakh being a part of Armenia. Moscow disregarded these requests, which ifgranted, would upset the existing order. In 1973 Boris Kevorkov became head of theKarabakh Communist Party and while serving in that capacity maintained the status

quo as demanded by Moscow. During this 15 year period, those asking to joinArmenia were accused of engaging in Dashnak propaganda.

Mikhail Gorbachev became Secretary General of the Communist party in 1985 andtried to implement the much needed reforms that the conservative party cadres hadbeen preventing. Gorbachev demanded these reforms to be founded on certain basicprinciples such as restructuring (perestroyka), openness (glasnost), democratization(demokratizatzia) and new thinking (novoe mysshlenia). Thus an era of relativeliberalization started in the USSR, causing long unvoiced complaints to surface andnationalistic sentiments to gain strength. Strong nationalistic currents emerged

quickly in Armenia and Karabakh, demands that Karabakh be annexed to Armeniawere made and street protests organized.

A serious crisis erupted between Azerbaijan and Armenia when the latter supportedthe demands of Karabakh. As the USSR was breaking up, it could not be decisiveenough to overcome the crisis. Soon after these developments it became moreconcerned with trying to preserve its presence in the region and to that endimplemented policies that often supported Armenia but sometimes Azerbaijan aswell. The USA and European powers had no real influence in the region at that time.While stating that they supported peace initiatives, on overall they followed a policy ofnon-involvement. This created a very conducive conjecture for Armenia.

In February 1988 protests were being held in Karabakh and in Armenia. TheKarabakh Parliament (110 of the 140 members were Armenian) decided on February18, 1988 that the region should be annexed to Armenia. However the CentralCommittee of the Communist Party of the USSR rejected this decision citing that thiswould be harmful to relations between nationalities and that it was a product of theprovocation of national extremists. In the meantime the protests had grown and100.000 persons had gathered in the Opera Square in Yerevan on February 22. The

protests only stopped after Gorbachev delivered a calming speech on February 26and agreed to meet with representatives of the Committee for Karabakh that hadbeen elected in Yerevan. However, clashes erupted between Azerbaijanis andArmenians in Baku and Sumgait when Azerbaijanis living in Armenia were attackedand had to flee. The clashes in Sumgait on 28-29 February resulted in the deaths of26 Armenians and 6 Azerbaijanis. 197 were wounded [5].

Despite the ban, protests continued and on March 12, 1988 the Karabakh Parliamentpassed another resolution renewing the demand to be annexed to Armenia. On May21,1988 the First Secretaries of the Azerbaijani and Armenian Communist Parties,Bagiraov and Demirchyan respectively, were relieved of their duties by Moscow,ostensibly for health reasons. Suren Haroutunian in Armenia and Abdul RakhmanVezirov in Azerbaijan replaced them [6].


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On June 15 the Armenian Parliament decided to request from the AzerbaijaniParliament and the Supreme Soviet that Karabakh be incorporated into Armenia.This decision was based on Article 70 of the Soviet Constitution which stated that theUSSR was an integral, federal, multinational state formed on the principle of the rightto self-determination of nations and voluntary associations of equal Soviets. On the

other hand the Azerbaijani Parliament decided on June 17 that the decision of theArmenian Parliament was null and void, based on Article 78 of the SovietConstitution which stated that the territory of a Union Republic could not be alteredwithout its consent. From a purely legalistic point of view, it is clear that the region ofKarabakh, which is not a Soviet Republic, could not resort to the provisions of Article70 of the Soviet Constitution.

After the Parliament of Armenia, on July 12, 1988 the Parliament of Karabakh alsodemanded immediate secession from Azerbaijan and incorporation into Armenia asan autonomous Oblast to be known by its ancient name Artsakh [7]. On July 18, this

was discussed in the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the demand wasrejected. This decision prompted large protests and strikes in both Armenia andAzerbaijan.

Moscow, considering the inability or unwillingness of the local administrators ofArmenia and Azerbaijan in resolving the Karabakh issue, established the SpecialAdministrative Committee for Nagorny Karabakh and appointed Arkady Volsky ofthe USSR Communist Party Central Committee as its chairman.

On November 24, 1988 a state of emergency was declared in Azerbaijan in Ganja(then known as Kirovabad) and Nakhichevan. Three days later the party leaders ofthe said town and region were dismissed. Troops began evacuating Armenians fromthese regions. In the weeks following this event tens of thousands of Azerbaijanisfled Armenia and a similar amount of Armenians fled Azerbaijan. According tostatements made in Moscow, 87 died in the incidents and 1500 were wounded.158.000 Armenians fled Azerbaijan while 141.000 Azerbaijanis fled Armenia and15.855 weapons were seized [8].

On December 7, 1988 an earthquake struck Armenia and caused the death of close

to 25.000 persons. Even this tragic incident did not stall the protests in Armenia. In atelevision address on December 11, Gorbachev denounced those that were trying toexploit the earthquake for political aims. Armenian nationalists had spread rumorsthat evacuation of the devastated areas would be used as a pretext for dispersinglarge numbers of Armenians outside of their homeland.

In face of the incessant turmoil, Moscow adopted a tougher stance at the beginningof 1989. The members of the Karabakh Committee in Armenia who had beenorganizing the protests were arrested and a curfew was declared. Furthermore, asignificant number of changes were implemented in the Communist Parties and localgovernments in Azerbaijan and Armenia. On January 28, 1989 the Prime Minister ofAzerbaijan Hasan Seyitov was relieved of his position due to health reasons andreplaced by Ayaz Mutalibov. In Karabakh the First Secretary of the Communist PartyGenrik Pogosian also retired due to health reasons. Furthermore, Karabakh was


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placed under direct rule from Moscow on January 12, 1989 [9]. It was stated thatKarabakh would retain its status as part of Azerbaijan.

These drastic measures implemented by Moscow brought about relative calm forsome time. However a few months later protests started in Armenia demanding the

release of those that had been arrested previously. In Karabakh - now under thedirect rule of Moscow- clashes between the Azerbaijanis and Armenians in Maycould only be prevented through the intervention of Soviet troops. On August 16 aNational Council in which only Armenians participated was established in Karabakh.

The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet ended direct rule from Moscow overKarabakh on November 28, 1989. The Special Committee for Nagorny Karabakhwas also dissolved. However Soviet troops remained in Karabakh. Thus, theoreticallyKarabakh was returned to Azerbaijan. Yet the Supreme Soviet demanded fromAzerbaijan that it pass new legislation guaranteeing full and real autonomy for

Karabakh. As a reaction to Karabakh being returned to Azerbaijani rule, theArmenian Parliament and the Karabakh National Council passed a resolution onDecember 1, 1989 stating that Karabakh was a part of a unified Armenian Republic.According to this resolution Armenian laws would apply in Karabakh and theKarabakh National Council was accepted to be the legal Government for the region.In Azerbaijan this decision was protested at a rally organized by the Popular Frontwhich was increasingly gaining strength as a political movement. Approximately halfa million persons attended the rally. Furthermore, the railroad to Armenia wasblocked for a week.

In January 1990 the Armenian Parliament decided to extend the provisions of itsbudget and election laws to cover Karabakh. When the Armenian decision regardinga unified Armenia was found to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Soviet inMoscow, the Armenian Parliament voted to allow itself to veto legislation approved byMoscow [10]. These decisions displayed clearly that Armenia was on its way toindependence and that it had the desire to annex Karabakh.

In Azerbaijan, during protests organized by the Popular Front and attended by amajority of persons who were refugees from Karabakh and Armenia, the Government

was called upon to reassert full sovereignty over Karabakh, or resign. Karabakh wasreturned to the administration of Azerbaijan on November 28 but order could not berestored.

On January 13, 1990 fighting erupted between Azerbaijanis and Armenians in Baku.60 persons died in a few days and most of them were Armenians. On January 15 theSupreme Soviet in Moscow decreed to the dispatch of armed forces to Azerbaijan tostop the violence. The troops were authorized to use firepower. The Supreme Sovietalso declared a state of emergency in Karabakh, and the adjacent regions ofAzerbaijan as well as in Baku. In the meantime, in Baku protests demanding theresignation of the Government were still underway and barricades were beingerected on the outskirts of the city. The USSR deployed 11.600 troops to Azerbaijan.Along with the 6000 troops already in the country the total number of Soviet troopsexceeded 17.000. These units launched an attack on Baku from sea and land on


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January 19. According to official sources 82 died in street battles. The figure was ashigh as 600 according to the Popular Front. On January 20 the First Secretary of theAzerbaijan Communist Party Abdul Rakhman Vezirov resigned and Ayaz Mutalibovwas assigned to replace him. Hasan Hasanov became Prime Minister [11].

The fact that 750.000 gathered in the largest square of Baku for the funeral of thosekilled by the Soviet troops displayed that the resistance against the USSR enjoyedwide popular support. However, Soviet troops continued to resort to force on January24 and 43 leading members of the Popular Front were arrested. A military decreebanned all strikes and protests and introduced a 30 day administrative detentionperiod without trial. Baku returned to relative peace. Evacuation of the Armeniansand Russians in Baku was suspended after the Popular Front agreed to guaranteetheir safety but more than 30.000 had already been evacuated. According to officialfigures, the death toll in the clashes in Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani and Armenianborders in January 1990 exceeded 200. The representatives of the Popular Front of

Azerbaijan and the National Movement of Armenia met in Riga, the capital of Latvia,on January 24. On February 15 they agreed to a cease-fire and the release ofprisoners. However low intensity hostilities continued between the two sides. OnFebruary 13 railway traffic resumed. The Supreme Soviet in Moscow pointed out thatefforts of the central authorities to normalize the situation in the Transcaucasus hadachieved no positive results and ordered authorities of Armenia and Azerbaijan toenter into talks to conclude a treaty aimed at restoring trust. Upon this, theAzerbaijani and Armenian Prime Ministers met in Tblisi but could not produce anyresults.

In the meantime Moscow issued a decree ordering all illegal armed groups todisband and surrender their weapons or face a crackdown by security forces or armyunits. This decision was pertinent not only for the armed groups in the Caucasus butfor those in Central Asia as well. It was also a warning for the Baltic States whereunrest was rising. The newly elected Armenian Parliament voted to suspend theapplication of this decree on Armenian territory.

The new Parliament established following elections in Armenia convened on July 20.On August 4, 1990 Levon Ter- Petrosian was elected Speaker of the Armenian

Parliament. This office was the equivalent of Head of State. The candidate of theCommunist Party, Vladimir Movsisian received only 80 votes whereas Ter-Petrosianreceived 140. Vazgen Manukian was appointed Prime Minister [12]. Both Ter-Petrosian and Manukian were members of the Karabakh Committee mentionedabove. The fact that these persons were elected to the highest offices in Armeniashowed that Communist rule in Armenia had effectively come to an end.

On August 23, 1990 the Armenian Parliament adopted a Declaration ofIndependence. According to this, the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic wasrenamed as the Republic of Armenia. It was stated that Armenia was a self governingstate, endowed with the supremacy of state authority, independence andsovereignty. It was also stated that only the constitution and laws of the Republic ofArmenia were valid for the whole territory of the Republic of Armenia. According tothe Declaration, military units of other countries and their military bases could be


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located on the territory of the Republic of Armenia only by the decision of theArmenian Parliament. The Republic of Armenia was to conduct an independentforeign policy and could establish direct relations with other states and national stateunits of the USSR. Armenia was to create its own currency, national bank, tax andcustom services and its own system of education. As is evident, Armenia would

become a fully independent state. However the Declaration did not state thatArmenia was declaring independence from the USSR. It appears that Armenia, whilebecoming de facto independent tried at the same time to preserve the protection ofthe USSR.

In the Armenian Declaration of Independence only a passing reference is made tothe union of Armenia and Karabakh because it is assumed that the two are alreadyunited. In fact this union was not legal since it had not been approved either byAzerbaijan to which Karabakh was attached or the USSR which had a say over thestatus of the independent region.

In the meantime, it must be pointed out that the Armenian Declaration ofIndependence also contained an article on Turkey. Article 15 of this document reads:The Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task of achieving internationalrecognition of the 1915 Genocide in Turkey and Western Armenia. This article notonly accepted the claims of genocide which Turkey categorically rejected, it wentfurther to state that international recognition would also be sought. The same articleimplied also that by referring to Eastern Anatolia as Western Armenia, the territorialintegrity of Turkey was not being recognized. In line with this thinking, Armenia stillhas not declared that it recognizes the Kars Treaty of October 13, 1921 whichestablished the border between the two states and which had been signed by theArmenian SSR.

In brief, the Declaration of Independence has caused Armenia to become embroiledin conflict with Azerbaijan due to Karabakh and led to conflict with Turkey as well,due to claims of genocide and by not recognizing Turkish territorial integrity.

When few months later the hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the borderregions intensified, Soviet troops helped Azerbaijani forces in accordance with the

Moscow decree mentioned above. This was met by the protests of Armenians. Ter-Petrosian blamed the Soviet leader of cooperating with Azerbaijan to both punish thenationalistic Government of Armenia and uphold the Communist regime inAzerbaijan. Gorbachev had prepared a new Union Treaty, in a last effort to save thecrumbling USSR. Azerbaijan signed this treaty alongside eight other SovietRepublics while Armenia refused to become party to it [13].

While the hostilities were continuing Russian President Yeltsin, and Kazak PresidentNur Sultan Nazarbayev were able to achieve a cease-fire agreement betweenArmenia, Azerbaijan and Karabakh on September 24, 1991. According to thisagreement all armed groups were to disarm and withdraw from Karabakh, leavingbehind only Soviet troops. Hostages were to be freed and people returned to thevillages they had been obliged to abandon. An estimated 800 people had died inclashes since 1988 and therefore the cease fire agreement was received well. Yet in


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the clashes that occurred 2 days later 15 were killed. It was difficult to claim thateither Azerbaijan or Armenia was in complete control of the armed groups. OnNovember 20 an Azerbaijani helicopter carrying a high ranking officer as well ascivilians was shot down. Armenia did not accept Azerbaijani allegations regarding theincident. It is worth noting that shortly before the incident Azerbaijan had cut off gas

supplies to Armenia.On November 21, 1991 the Azerbaijani Parliament annulled the autonomous statusof Nagorny Karabakh which would be governed henceforth by National Unity Council[14]. The next day the USSR called on Azerbaijan and Armenia to abrogate all actsthat would change Karabakhs legal status. Both states accepted this decision whichwas in favor of Azerbaijan Karabakh being legally attached to it.

The Referendum on the independence of Armenia from the Soviet Union was held onSeptember 21, 1991 and witnessed a record turnout of 95%. 94% voted in favor of

independence from the Soviet Union [15]. On September 23 Armenia declaredindependence. The independent Armenian state covered 29.800 km2 and had apopulation of 3.283.000. The Nationalist Party to which President Ter-Petrosian alsobelonged was ruling Armenia. The Armenian Communist Party had ceased itsactivities in August.

In Azerbaijan only Ayaz Mutalibov joined the presidential elections of September 9,1991. The Popular Front represented the rising political force in the country but waspreoccupied with internal problems. On October 18 the Azerbaijani Parliamentdecided on independence. The referendum on December 29 affirmed this decision[16]. The newly created Republic of Azerbaijan was 86.600 km2 in size with apopulation of 7.023.000. The country was being administered by Ayaz MutalibovsCommunist Party.

The Armenians in Karabakh held a referendum in parts of the region under theircontrol and declared their independence on December 10, 1991 [17]. On December28 they held parliamentary elections. 11 of the 81 seats in the new parliament werereserved for Azerbaijani Parliamentarians. Yet as the Azerbaijanis had notparticipated in the elections and considered them to be illegitimate, the seats were

left vacant. On January 3, 1992 the Armenian Parliament recognized theindependence of Karabakh. On January 8 Artur Mkrtchyan became Head of State[18]. In the meantime Karabakh applied for membership in the Commonwealth ofIndependent States but was not admitted.

According to the 1979 population census of the USSR the population of Karabakhwas 160.000, of which 75 % were Armenians and the remainder Azerbaijanis [19]. Asthe Azerbaijanis fled or were forced to leave the region due to war, approximately120.000 Armenians had remained in Karabakh when independence was declared.

In response to Karabakh declaring its independence, Azerbaijan placed the regionunder direct Presidential rule on January 2, 1992 and Salam Memetov was maderesponsible of the administration of the area. Yet this appointment was of littleconsequence since Azerbaijan did not control a large part of the said territory.


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The USSR ceased to exist on December 21, 1991. Eleven of the former Republics,including Armenia and Azerbaijan created a loose union amongst themselves andnamed it the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Baltic States andGeorgia did not join.

Turkey recognized the independence of Armenia two days before the United Stateson December 24, 1991. Prime Minister Sleyman Demirel sent a message toPresident Ter-Petrosian and asked that territorial integrity and the inviolability ofborders is respected [20]. This message was aimed at the indirect claims on Turkishterritories voiced in the Armenian Declaration of Independence. Turkey was alsodisturbed by the allegations of genocide in the same document. When Armenia didnot change its position on these issues Turkey did not establish diplomatic relationswith Yerevan.

On the other hand the Government of Demirel tried to establish good relations withArmenia. Armenia received its energy in the form of natural gas from the USSR andalso from the Metsamor nuclear power plant. Due to the difficult internal situation inGeorgia there was frequent disruption in the supply of gas. The nuclear power plantutilized outdated technology and would frequently be shut down as well. Turkeysupplied Armenia with electricity during these dire economic times and donated100.000 tons of grain. Turkey also undertook significant efforts for the resolution ofthe Karabakh conflict. Prime Minister Demirel summarized Turkish policy in thefollowing statement: To stay away from the conflict and to utilize diplomatic means toresolve it [21]. This moderate policy, however, did not bring about a change in theArmenian stance on Karabakh or the demands it directed at Turkey.

When Armenian forces started the invasion of Karabakh, Turkey tried to helpAzerbaijan without upsetting Turkish-Armenian relations. The USA and Europeancountries had adopted a position favoring Armenia as they were under the influenceof the Armenian diaspora. The Demirel Government insistently cautioned that otherstates should not take sides in the conflict, that a new Israel should not be created inthe Caucasus and that Armenia may become unwilling to negotiate if it felt thesupport of European states [22]. On the other hand, much `humanitarian aid` was

being provided to Armenia from western states. Turkey allowed this aid to transit itsterritory and airspace but strictly controlled the shipments fearing that they maycontain weapons.

This moderate policy of the Demirel Government towards Armenia drew muchcriticism in Turkey. On numerous occasions opposition leaders such as Blent Ecevitand Mesut Ylmaz accused the Government of following a passive policy. As we shallsee below, President Turgut zal had a similar opinion. In many Turkish cities ralliesagainst Armenia were organized.

When Turkey started helping Azerbaijan, Armenian politicians begun to disagreebetween themselves about the policy to follow regarding Turkey. Raffi Hovannisian,the Foreign Minister of Armenia, who was also an American citizen in his speech atthe Istanbul meeting of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers on September


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10, 1992 voiced the claims of genocide and also said that Turkey had lost the neutralposition it had initially displayed on the Karabakh issue. Hovannisian also said thatTurkey should not make the resolution of the Karabakh conflict a pre-condition fornormalization of relations with Armenia [23]. Furthermore, Hovannisian was critical ofPresident Bush for US neutrality in the Karabakh conflict. Hovannisian resigned at

the request of President Ter-Petrosian on October 16, 1992.The disintegration of the USSR had a negative reflection on the Karabakh conflict.The USSR could legally determine who would administer this region and how.Problems had decreased when it had chosen to temporarily administer the regionitself. On the other hand, the USSR also had the authority to send troops to theregion. However when it became clear that the USSR would disintegrate the troopsin and around Karabakh started to retreat, causing an escalation in the clashesbetween the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis. Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, Commanderin Chief of CIS, after the Hodjali massacre ordered the withdrawal of troops stationed

in Karabakh and on the Armenia-Azerbaijan borders areas. He also told his troops todestroy all weaponry which could not be removed. However withdrawal of Soviettroops took time and did not start until June. Some of these forces remained inArmenia and later Russian military bases were set up in this country.

Hostilities in Karabakh increased in February 1992. Azerbaijani Foreign MinisterHseyin Sadkov and his Armenian counterpart Raffi Hovannisian met in Moscow onFebruary 20 and called for a cease-fire. They also requested the granting of accessfor humanitarian deliveries. In the meantime, the Azerbaijani Parliament refused toendorse a peace plan of President Ayaz Mutalibov that called for cultural autonomyfor Karabakh within Azerbaijan.

On February 25, 1992, Armenian forces took the town of Hodjali which lay to thenorth of Hankendi (Stepanekert). One source reported that more than 600Azerbaijani civilians were killed, 127 wounded and 487 were taken prisoner [24].Some have observed that the 366th Regiment of the Soviet Army (which had not leftthe region yet) had also participated in the assault [25]. Yet there is no indication thatMoscow had ordered such an attack. Another source indicated that discipline hadbroken down in numerous parts of the Soviet Army, with many of the troops

deserting, selling their weapons or shelling one or the other side of the conflict inreturn for money [26].

The Hodjali massacre caused great anger in the Azerbaijani public. Ayaz Mutalibov,who was trying to find a solution to the conflict in line with Moscows wishes resignedfollowing massive demonstrations and accusations of failing to save Azeri lives inKarabakh. Yakup Mehmetov was appointed interim President.

The Hodjali massacre also caused great sensitivity in Turkey. Protests wereorganized in Istanbul. In an interview with the Financial Times President zalproposed a blockade of Armenia to support Azerbaijan [27] but the DemirelGovernment was more cautious and sought the support of the Russian Federation,USA and France in obtaining a cease-fire. Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet etinproposed a six point peace plan to the concerned parties, international organizations


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and members of the UN Security Council. However Armenia refused to examine thisplan, accusing Turkey of not being neutral.

On the other hand Iran succeeded to bring together in Teheran representatives ofAzerbaijan and Armenia on March 15, 1992 and had them sign an agreement

envisaging a cease-fire and the lifting of economic sanctions. Although there weresome skirmishes, generally the provisions of the said agreement were implementedfor sometime.

During the CSCE Foreign Ministers meeting held in March 1992 in Helsinki, it wasagreed that a peace conference in Minsk comprising Azerbaijan and Armenia wouldbe convened with the participation of a delegation from Karabakh as observer.Furthermore, the USA, the Russian Federation, Germany, France, Italy,Czechoslovakia and Turkey would also join the conference. Preparatory meetingswere held in Rome but the conference could not be held because the Armenian

Administration of Karabakh would not accept the status of observer. The countriesthat were to join the conference accepted to work together for the resolution of theKarabakh conflict under the Minsk Group name. Despite the fact that it has beenunsuccessful, the Minsk Group has remained the primary party responsible for theresolution of the conflict until today.

On May 8 Armenian forces took the town of Shusha. With the loss of this town almostall of Karabakh was now in Armenian hands. Armenian forces then targeted regionsoutside of Karabakh and on May 17 took Lachin, thereby enabling Armenia andKarabakh to be joined by a land corridor.

The loss of the historic city of Shusha caused upheaval inside Azerbaijan. TheAzerbaijani Parliament blamed acting President Yakub Mehmetov for setbacks andreinstalled ex- President Mutalibov on May 14. Mutalibov cancelled the presidentialelections scheduled for June 7 and declared a state of emergency in Baku. The nextday 20.000 Popular Front supporters occupied the Parliament and PresidentialPalace. Mutalibov fled and Isa Kamber was made President until elections.

In the meantime, one day after Shusha fell Armenian troops launched an attack on

the town of Sadarak in Nakhichevan, near (10 km) the Turkish border. LikeKarabakh, Nakhichevan was an independent region attached to Azerbaijan.Armenian nationalists always claimed the region, stating that it was a part ofhistorical Armenian lands. The simple fact that like Karabakh, the wordNakhichevan is not known as a word with meaning in the Armenian language shouldbe sufficient to counter this claim. On the other hand, unlike Karabakh, the populationof Nakhichevan is Azerbaijani.

Turkey took a close interest in Nakhichevan because of the common border with thisregion as well as due to the fact that it was one of the parties that with the SovietUnion, Armenia and Azerbaijan established the status of the said region with the1921 Kars Treaty.

The assault on Sadarak caused concern in Ankara. Since the Armenians had easily


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occupied Karabakh, there were fears that they could do the same in Nakhichevan.The Council of Ministers met and decided that Armenia had to be warned that Turkeywould not allow the occupation of Nakhichevan and would not accept a change in thepresent borders [28]. At the same time the President of Nakhichevan, Haydar Aliyev,requested military assistance from Turkey. Azerbaijani interim President Isa Kamber

stated that the 1921 Kars Treaty authorized Turkey to militarily intervene inNakhichevan. The Commander of the Turkish Army General Muhittin Fsnolu saidthat the armed forces were prepared for a potential operation [29].

Blent Ecevit, one of the leaders of the opposition, was demanding that Turkeyintervene in Nakhichevan as soon as possible, warning that if Armenia were tooccupy the region it would start demanding territories from Turkey [30]. PrimeMinister Demirel was saying that an immediate military operation was not in question[31]. President zal, on the other hand, was of the opinion that the territories thatArmenians had occupied in both Karabakh and Nakhichevan must be taken back and

that Turkey too had some responsibility in seeing this done [32].

At the same time the Commander in Chief of the Forces of the Commonwealth ofIndependent States, Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, was expressing that a third countryjoining the conflict could lead to World War III [33]. On 15 May 1992 - three daysbefore the assault in Sadarak - a defense agreement had been signed in Tashkentbetween five CIS countries, including Russia and Armenia but excluding Azerbaijan.According to this agreement the signatory states would assist each other if theirsecurity would be endangered. This meant that the Russian Federation would haveto assist Armenia if its security would be threatened.

The Turkish Government seemed determined to resolve this crisis through diplomaticmeans. With this aim it contacted all concerned states and internationalorganizations. To quote Prime Minister Demirel; Armenia was placed in a diplomaticstraight jacket [34]. This initiative resulted in the USA, England, Iran, Georgia, EUand NATO issuing statements stressing that borders could not be changed with theuse of force. The Nakhichevan crisis finally ended when the Russian Federation alsocriticized Armenia and declared that it would not support illegal activities.

One issue that needs to be addressed regarding Nakhichevan is whether in fact theprovisions of the Kars Treaty or Moscow Treaty both concluded in 1921 enableTurkey to militarily intervene in the said region. With the Moscow Treaty Turkey andthe USSR agreed to Nakhichevan becoming an autonomous entity under theprotection of Azerbaijan. Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia agreed to the same statuswith the Kars Treaty. There are no provisions in these Treaties as to how the partiesare to act if the treaties are violated and therefore there is also no mention of whetherthe parties have a right to use military force. This being the case, each state will haveto determine what course of action it will take if the autonomous status ofNakhichevan is violated.

Returning to events relating to Karabakh, the Presidential elections in Azerbaijan thatwere held on June 7, 1992 were won by Abulfaz Elchibey, the leader of the PopularFront. Azerbaijani forces launched a counteroffensive on July 12 and in the


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followings days took the town of Mardakert (Adara) in the north east of Karabakh aswell as about 15 villages in the same region. The success of the Azerbaijani forcescan partially be attributed to the fact that they had received their share of weaponsfrom the disintegrated USSR [35].

Azerbaijan reclaiming Mardakert caused a crisis in Karabakh and the Governmentresigned. A state of emergency was declared. A Defense Committee which wasinvested with governmental power until the end of the war was established andRobert Kocharian was appointed to head it. He was a close associate of theArmenian President Ter-Petrosian.

The success of Azerbaijani forces in Karabakh led to Armenia reviewing itsfundamental policy regarding Karabakh. On July 8 the Armenian Parliament passeda resolution in which it pledged consistent support for Karabakh and the rights of itspopulation and went on to state that any document referring to Karabakh as being

within the structure of Azerbaijan would be unacceptable [36]. Thereby Armenia hadrefused any solution to the Karabakh conflict according to which the said territorywould remain within the boundaries of Azerbaijan.

The fighting concentrated in Lachin, namely around the corridor that had beenestablished between Armenia and Karabakh. The cease-fire mediated byKazakhstan on August 28 was violated, as was a second cease-fire, brokered byRussia on September 25. The offensive that Azerbaijani forces staged with the aim oftaking control of the Lachin corridor was repulsed. In December the Armenian forcesinitiated an attack through which they regained most of the territories which they hadpreviously lost.

As was pointed out above, Azerbaijan had signed an Agreement to join the CIS.However in a vote on October 7, 1992, the Azerbaijani Parliament decided not toratify this Agreement. A few days later on October 12, Russian President BorisYeltsin and Azerbaijani President Abulfaz Elchibey signed a treaty of Friendship,Cooperation and Mutual Security in Moscow [37]. According to this agreement theparties would respect each others territorial integrity, inviolability of their borders andtheir independence. They were also committing to not resorting to use of force or the

threat thereof, not intervening in internal affairs and respecting human rights. Theprinciples regarding territorial integrity and the respect for the inviolability of borderswere in favor of Azerbaijan. It is noteworthy that since Armenia claimed thatKarabakh had never been a part of independent Azerbaijan it did not consider itselfto be in violation of any of the mentioned principles.

1993 started with a joint peace initiative of Presidents Bush and Yeltsin. On January3 the two leaders issued a statement calling for an immediate end to the bloodshedand resumption of peace negotiations under the aegis of the CSCE. Yet thehostilities continued, albeit at a lower intensity, as it was winter.

Armenia in particular went through a difficult winter that year. Industrial productionceased for two weeks. On January 23, the entire country was left without lightingwhen Azerbaijanis in Georgia blew up a section of pipeline bringing gas to Armenia.


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Prime Minister Khosrov Haroutunian resigned. The new Prime Minister HrandBagratian stated that the top priority was to be solve the food and energy crisis. WithU.S. help Armenia received 13 million Dollars credit from the World Bank and 59,4million Dollars credit from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development[38].

While the opposition in Turkey continued to criticize Karabakh policies, theGovernment pursued its peace initiatives. Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet etindeclared during a visit to Azerbaijan that Turkey and Russia had drafted a threestage plan aimed at ending the conflict. According to this plan, in the first phase theparties would declare a cease-fire. In the second phase all foreign military personnelaround Karabakh would withdraw and finally, in the third phase all roads toAzerbaijan, Armenia and Nakhichevan would be opened. But continuing fightingprevented the plan from being considered.

The Armenian forces took the town of Kelbajar on April 4, as well as its surroundings,thereby establishing a second corridor between Karabakh and Armenia. About40.000 Azerbaijanis fled the region as a result of the assault. Armenian troops alsoattacked southwards from Karabakh towards the town of Fizuli. Like Lachin, bothKelbedjar and Fizuli were Azerbaijani lands outside Karabakh. The fact that fightinghad spilled over from Karabakh into Azerbaijan constituted an escalation. Armeniadenied that its regular troops were involved in the fighting and pretended that thosefighting in this campaign were Armenians from Karabakh. However it was difficult tobelieve that the Armenians of Karabakh who numbered at most 120.000 peoplecould easily overcome Azerbaijan with a population of 7 million.

When Kelbajar fell Turkey took two decisions: First it stopped all scheduled andcharter flights to or from Armenia. Second, it brought the matter to the SecurityCouncil. The Chairman of the Council issued a statement on April 7, expressingserious concern about developments as well as a call for a cease-fire and withdrawalof Armenian forces from occupied areas. However Turkeys proposal that theSecurity Council condemn Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan was rejected.

The fall of Kelbajar once again displayed the differences of opinion between

President zal and the Demirel Government. Prime Minister Demirel continued tostate that there would be no Turkish military intervention in Armenia [39] whilePresident zal stressed that the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict was no longer definedby the issue of Karabakh and had taken the form of the dream of greater Armenia,therefore forcing Turkey to take military precautions. He said that military maneuverscould be conducted on the Armenian border and pointed out that in this day and agenothing could be achieved without taking a certain amount of risk [40].

Turgut zal died unexpectedly on April 17, 1993. Elchibey and Ter-Petrosian metwhen both came to Ankara to attend his funeral. It was decided that negotiationsshould resume under the auspices of the OCSE.

On the other hand, the Security Council passed Resolution 822 on April 20, 1993 anddemanded the immediate cessation of all hostilities and hostile acts with a view to


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establishing a durable cease-fire as well as immediate withdrawal of all occupyingforces from the Kelbedjar district and other recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan.The Council furthermore urged all parties concerned to immediately resumenegotiations for the resolution of the conflict within the framework of the peaceprocess of the Minsk Group of the CSCE. The Resolution reaffirmed also the respect

for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the region, the inviolability ofinternational borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force. As there was nodoubt that Kelbedjar and its surroundings were territories of Azerbaijan, this wordingwas in favor of Azerbaijan. On the other hand mention of the invasion of the Kelbajardistrict by the local Armenian forces left the impression that Armenia was notresponsible of the occupation of Azerbaijani lands. Furthermore, the usual criticism ofthe aggressor was not included in this Resolution. Finally, there was no mention ofwhat the Security Council would do if its demands would not be met. In short, thisResolution was not of the substance to stop the aggressors.

Three days after this Resolution was adopted Turkey, Russia and the U.S. tabled apeace plan. The plan called for the withdrawal by mid-May of Armenian forces fromKelbedjar which would be followed by a two month cease-fire during which CSCEsponsored negotiations would resume. Azerbaijan accepted the plan. The ArmenianGovernment described the plan as positive but refused to approve it, claiming thatthe Republic of Karabakh required clarifications. A slightly amended version of theplan was approved on May 26 by Azerbaijan and Armenia but Karabakhs ArmenianAdministration rejected it on the grounds that it failed to provide guarantees for thesafety of the population and failed also to end the Azerbaijani economic blockade[41].

Meanwhile the Elchibey regime in Baku was losing power due to military defeats thatwere being suffered at the hands of the Armenians. Colonel Suret Huseinov who hadbeen stripped of his rank for disobeying orders rebelled in Ganja. He repelled theforces of the Azerbaijani Army and began advancing on Baku. This led to theresignation of Prime Minister Panah Huseinov and the Speaker of Parliament IsaKamber. On June 15, 1993 the President of Nakhichevan, Haydar Aliyev, waselected Speaker of the Azerbaijani Parliament. Unable to prevent the advance of theforces of Huseinov, Elchibey left for Nakhichevan on June 18 but he did not resign.

On June 21 Huseinovs forces entered Baku and he declared for himself all thepowers of the Head of State. The Parliament stated that Elchibey was incapable ofeffective control over the situation in the country or of performing his function andhanded over presidential powers to Aliyev. Huseinov was appointed Prime Ministerand Supreme Commander [42].

This confusion in Azerbaijan had presented the Armenians with the opportunity toattack once again. Mardakert, the last major town in Karabakh still held by theAzerbaijanis fell on June 27 and a Russian brokered cease-fire was declared. Threeweeks later, on July 24 Armenian forces attacked again, this time taking the town ofAgdam to the north of Karabakh as well as its surroundings.

The Security Council called into emergency session by Turkey, convened on July 29,1993 and passed Resolution 853 that contained the same elements as Resolution


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822. It differed in stating that it condemned the seizure of the district of Agdam andall other recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan; it also condemned all hostile actionsin the region, in particular attacks on civilians and bombardments of inhabited areasbut the wording did not clarify who the aggressor was or who was being condemned.Furthermore, the Resolution urged the Government of the Republic of Armenia to

exert its influence to achieve compliance by the Armenians of the Karabagh region ofthe Azerbaijani Republic with Resolutions 822 and the acceptance by this party of theproposals of the Minsk Group of the CSCE. This wording allowed one to infer that theaggressors were the Armenians of Karabakh. The only substantial positive aspect ofthe Resolution was that although indirectly, it affirmed that Karabakh belonged toAzerbaijan.

It was clear that with such wording, Resolution 853 would have as little effect on theArmenians as Resolution 822. Indeed, shortly after Resolution 853 was passed,Armenian forces took Jebrail on August 18, Fizuli on August 23, Kubatly on August

31 and Goradiz on September 3. At this point Russia intervened and established acease-fire.

The towns mentioned above are very close to Iranian border and the Azerbaijanisfleeing from the Armenians had to take refuge there. Since this region of Iran isinhabited by ethnic Azerbaijanis, the Iranian Government wanted to prevent the influxof refugees and to do so, approximately 1000 Iranian troops entered Azerbaijaniterritory. This was seen as an escalation in the Karabakh conflict and was met withthe protests of concerned parties, including Turkey. The problem was overcomewhen Iran agreed to build facilities to house 100.000 Azerbaijani refugees displacedby the Karabakh war [43].

It was observed that the Armenian side felt uneasy when the Turkish military units onthe Armenian border were reinforced. President Ter-Petrosian called PresidentDemirel on September 6 and voiced his concern, pointing out the it was not they whowere responsible for the events but the Armenians of Karabakh. Demirel respondedby saying that the occupation of Azerbaijani territories was causing an outrage inTurkey and that the occupation had to be stopped immediately [44].

At the same time there were important internal developments taking place inAzerbaijan. In a referendum held on August 29, 1993, 97,5 % of the participantsstated that they had no confidence in Elchibey. Aliyev won the Presidential electionson October 3, securing 98,8 % of the votes [45].

After coming to power Aliyev took two important decisions.

The first was to make Azerbaijan a member of the CIS. The most important criticismRussia directed at the Elchibey Government had been regarding its unwillingness tomake Azerbaijan a member of this organization. It was speculated that the Russianpolicy of siding with Armenia on the Karabakh conflict could be traced to Azerbaijaniunwillingness to join the CIS. Now it was expected that Russia would implement amore balanced policy. However Azerbaijan continued to suffer defeats in Karabakhafter it became member of the CIS.


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Aliyevs second important decision was to sign an agreement with a consortium ofwestern oil companies led by BP on November 2, 1993. Thereby Azerbaijan not onlyopened a path to significant financial resources but also found it easier to voice itsviews in the United States.

On October 14, 1993 the United Nations Security Council passed another Resolutioncalling upon all parties concerned to make effective and permanent the cease-fire.This new Resolution numbered 874 reiterated the main points of Resolutions 822and 853. The Resolution furthermore called for the implementation of the timetableconcerning the withdrawal of forces from recently occupied territories and theremoval of all obstacles to communication and transportation. None of the partieswas condemned.

Ten days after Resolution 874 was passed, Armenian forces violated the cease-fire

and attacked the Zengelan region of Azerbaijan. Approximately 50.000 Azerbaijaniscrossed the Arax River and fled to Iran. The Security Council passed Resolution 884on November 12, 1993 and as had become standard practice at this point, reiteratedthe principles of the previous Resolutions. Furthermore, it stated that continuation ofthe conflict in and around the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan and the tensionsbetween Armenia and Azerbaijan would endangber peace and security in the region.It also stated that it condemned the violations of the cease-fire and particularly theoccupation of the Zengelan district and the city of Goradiz, attacks on the civiliansand the bombardments of the territory of Azerbaijan. The resolution demandedimmediate cessation of armed hostilities, withdrawal of occupying forces from theZengelan district and the city of Goradiz and from other recently occupied areas ofAzerbaijan and strongly urged the concerned parties to make effective andpermanent the cease-fire and continue to seek a negotiated settlement of the conflictwithin the context of the CSCE Minsk Process.

On December 21, 1993, Azerbaijani forces launched a counter-attack. Theysucceeded in retaking Goradiz and Agdam and seized some territory in the Kelbajarregion as well. Although a cease-fire that would come into effect on March 1, 1994was signed as a result of a Russian initiative, low intensity fighting continued. On

March 22 Armenian forces went on the offensive and retook almost all of the abovementioned regions. These last hostilities showed that Azerbaijan could not liberate itsoccupied territories while also proving that Armenian forces could not advance anyfurther. This situation made a lasting cease- fire possible.

On May 9, 1994 Rasul Kuliev, the chairman of the Azerbaijani National Assembly,signed in Bishkek a cease-fire protocol which had already been signed by thechairman of CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly and the chairs of Armenia, Karabakhand Kyrgyzstan legislatures. In summary the protocol called for a cease-fire anddeployment of international forces to act as peacekeepers. The ratification of theprotocol in the Azerbaijani Parliament met some difficulty. Some opposition deputiesclaimed that the protocol had effectively recognized Karabakh as an independententity and that it sanctioned the deployment of Russian troops in the region under theguise of a peace keeping force. After reassurances given by President Aliev that


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Russian troops would not be permitted into the conflict zone, the Parliament ofAzerbaijan ratified the protocol [46].

Thus the hostilities that had been ongoing for six years came to a halt but althoughten years have passed since then, peace could not be established between

Azerbaijan and Armenia.The main reason for the defeat suffered by Azerbaijan in Karabakh is the internalturmoil in the country and the implementation of inconsistent policies. While a singlePresident starting from independence until cessation of hostilities ruled Armenia,Azerbaijan saw three. Furthermore, Mutalibov and Elchibey did not leave their officesunder normal circumstances and the country witnessed numerous power strugglesthat at times superceded the conflict in Karabakh. Yet another factor that complicatedaffairs for Azerbaijan was that its successive Presidents did not follow similar policiesregarding Karabakh. Mutalibovs pro-Moscow policies did not bring about a solution.

Elchibey disregarded Moscow entirely and his pan-Turkish policies did not find widesupport in either Turkey or the Turkic states of Central Asia. It was during his tenurethat the Armenians took certain Azerbaijani territories outside Karabakh. HaydarAliyev made Azerbaijan a member of the CIS, hoping that Russia would then bewilling to assist to only find that this would not be the case and that he would have towitness the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani towns such as Agdam, Fizuli, Jebrail,Kubatly, Goradiz and Zengelan.

As for Armenia, the insistent policy it had been pursuing to separate Karabakh fromAzerbaijan since the 1960s finally paid off during the disintegration of the USSR. Ithas been argued that since an annexation of Karabakh by Armenia would haveconstituted a violation of universal principles such as the inviolability of borders andrespect for territorial integrity, the Armenians of Karabakh were used as proxies thatcould utilize the argument of a peoples right to self-determination, thereby separatingKarabakh from Azerbaijan and declaring an independent state. This fictitious state,however, was not recognized by anyone.

On the other hand, economic measures implemented by Azerbaijan and Turkeyagainst Armenia coupled by roads frequently severed due to internal unrest in

Georgia quickly turned Armenia into a country under a blockade. The economic crisiscaused about one million Armenians to move to other countries, mainly Russia. TheArmenian economy could not develop and funds sent by the diaspora and aidreceived from the World Bank and the European Bank for Construction andDevelopment became vitally important.

Another result of the Karabakh conflict was that Armenia became dependent on theRussian Federation. Russia became Armenias primary economic partner. Armenianeeded Russian support in nearly all fields and gave this country military bases. Intime, Armenian authorities saw the benefits of a more balanced approach and tried todevelop closer ties with the U.S. and EU states. This policy termed complementaritycould not be properly implemented due to the dependence of Armenia on Russia.Today Armenia essentially looks like a satellite of the Russian Federation.


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As for Turkey, it tried to establish and maintain good relations with Armenia. With thisaim, Turkey became one of the first states to recognize Armenia, supplying thiscounty with electricity and delivering 100.000 tons of grain. Armenia however, wascaptive to its historic prejudices and strived to gain recognition for its claims ofgenocide while at the same time it refused to recognize the borders of Turkey. On the

other hand Turkeys assistance to Azerbaijan was limited. To compensate this almostpassive policy, Turkey conducted intense diplomatic activities aimed at halting thefighting and reaching a lasting solution that would take into consideration Azerbaijaniinterests. These efforts did not yield any tangible results. In short, the Turkish policyof establishing good relations with Armenia while simultaneously contributing to theresolution of the Karabakh conflict was unsuccessful.

The Russian Caucasus policy could be summarized as regaining the influence thatthe USSR has had in this region. However because it chose to support separatistactivities in Abkhazia and Adjaria, Moscow has serious problems with Georgia and

because of the policies it followed regarding Karabakh it has considerable difficultieswith Azerbaijan. This made Armenia Russias sole close partner in the region andthis status was further augmented when Russia obtained military bases in Armenia. Itis pointed out that the two states are in a strategic partnership today. This closerelationship shows that the Karabakh conflict cannot be resolved without thecontribution of Moscow.

Regarding the U.S. certain facts must be taken into consideration when analyzing itsCaucasus policy in general and Armenia policy in particular. Due to strategicconsiderations, the U.S. wishes to see security established in the region andtherefore supports the solution of the Karabakh conflict. However a politically activeArmenian diaspora in the United States operates as much in favor of Armenia andKarabakh as it does against Turkey and Azerbaijan. For instance, although it wasAzerbaijan that was attacked, Congress cited the Azerbaijani blockade of Armenia tomake an amendment in the Freedom Support Act (Section 975), thereby preventingthe U.S. Government from granting humanitarian assistance to Azerbaijan. Onefactor that is in favor of Azerbaijan is its very significant oil reserves. The fact thatAzerbaijan gave western companies the right to produce and transport its oil washighly appreciated in the United States.

After the cease-fire in Karabakh, the CSCE Minsk Group accelerated the negotiationprocess. Starting in 1997 the Group conducted its efforts through the Russian,American and French co-chairs. Azerbaijan complained that these countries lookedmore favorably upon the Armenian position; Russia due to strategic considerationsand France and the U.S. due to the Armenian diaspora. Nevertheless these threestates have continued to guide the peace process until today.

A plan prepared by the Minsk Group co-chairs in May 1997 gave Karabakh anautonomous status within Azerbaijan and the right to its own constitution. It alsocalled for the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijani provinces and the townof Shusha, which would be policed by OSCE forces. Karabakh would be granted thestatus of a free economic zone [47]. This plan was accepted by Azerbaijan.


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The President of the region of Karabakh, Robert Kocharian, became Prime Ministerof Armenia in May 1997. Arkady Gukasian won the Presidential elections inKarabakh in September and went on to reject the Minsk Group plan, claiming that itdiscounted the achievement of independence. He then proposed the creation of afederal or common state in which Azerbaijan and Karabakh would be of equal status.

In December 1997 the Minsk group presented to the parties a plan that was said tocontain a few stages. According to this plan Armenian forces would first pull out of allAzerbaijani territories except for Shusha and Lachin and the refugees would beallowed to return. The status of the Shusha and Lachin corridors would bedetermined later.

In Armenia there were differences of opinion regarding the proposal of the MinskGroup. Armenian President Ter-Petrosian described the demands for independencefor Karabakh as unrealistic [48] and favored a step-by-step approach to the

resolution of the conflict. The Armenian administration in Karabakh stressed that allissues relating to the conflict should be resolved simultaneously and insisted onindependence. As expected, Prime Minister Kocharian supported the view voiced inKarabakh. When his opinions on Karabakh were not supported by the ArmenianParliament President Ter-Petrosian resigned on February 3, 1998. Under the term ofthe Armenian Constitution Prime Minister Kocharian became acting President untilpresidential election. In the second round of voting held on March 30, Kocharian waselected President.

A OSCE peace plan tabled in November 1998 envisaged the formation of a commonstate comprising Azerbaijan and Karabakh. However this plan was rejected byAzerbaijan under claims that it threatened its territorial integrity. Azerbaijan statedthat it supported the earlier proposal of the Minsk Group which provided for broadautonomy for Karabakh within Azerbaijan [49]. Later, on February 21, 2001Azerbaijan made public the plans prepared by the Minsk Group. It became evidentthat the Common State envisioned gave Karabakh de facto independence, with itsown constitution and armed forces and the right to veto any legislation enacted bythe Azerbaijani Parliament.

The mistrust that Azerbaijan felt towards the Minsk Group led to the two Heads ofState of Azerbaijan and Armenia to meet directly. The Minsk Group only played therole of facilitator. According to press reports during their meetings in March 2001 inParis and in Key West in the U.S. in April, the two Presidents agreed on the followingformula: Karabakh will legally belong to Azerbaijan but will enjoy a very broadautonomy. Armenia will be connected to Karabakh via a corridor and Azerbaijan willbe connected to Nakhichevan with a similar corridor. It appeared that these corridorswould be in Lachin and Meghri [50]. Armenian forces would pull out of the areas theyhad occupied and the railroad would resume its operations. This formula failed todeliver a result but the fact that the Heads of State as well as Foreign Ministerscontinued even today to meet raised hopes for an eventual settlement.

The Karabakh conflict was dealt with by some international organizations as well.


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Above we have described the Resolutions passed by the UN Security Council. Inthese resolutions affirmation of the respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity of allstates in the region, the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility ofthe use of force for the acquisition of territory were laid out as principles to beadhered to. Statements demanding the withdrawal of all occupying forces from

occupied areas of Azerbaijan and expressing that Karabakh is a region of theRepublic of Azerbaijan run contrary to the Armenian claims that Karabakh is anindependent state that has taken territories that are in fact its own. However theSecurity Council Resolutions did not point out Armenia as an aggressor and did notcondemn this state for its actions.

The Council of Europe started taking a close interest in the Karabakh conflict afterAzerbaijan and Armenia became members of this organization in 2001. Regardingthis conflict, most recently the Parliamentary Assembly of this organization passedResolution 1416 on January 25, 2005. This Resolution deserves to be examined

closer since it is very recent and all European states are represented in the Councilof Europe.

In this Resolution it is stated that the Parliamentary Assembly regrets that more thana decade after the armed hostilities started, the Karabakh conflict remainsunresolved. It goes on to point out that hundreds of thousands of people are stilldisplaced, living in miserable conditions and stresses that considerable parts of theterritory of Azerbaijan are still occupied by Armenian forces and that separatist forcescontrol the Karabakh region. The Resolution states also that hostilities led to ethnicexpulsion and the creation of mono-ethnic areas which resemble the results of ethniccleansing. The Resolution adds that independence and cessation of a regionalterritory from a state may only be achieved through a lawful and peaceful processbased on democratic support by the inhabitants of such territory and not as aconsequence of an armed conflict leading to ethic expulsion and the de factoannexation of such a territory to another state.

Furthermore the resolution reads as follows: The Assembly reiterates that theoccupation of a foreign territory by a member state constitutes a grave violation ofthat states obligations as a member of the Council of Europe and goes on to remind

that Armenia and Azerbaijan committed themselves upon their accession to theCouncil of Europe to use only peaceful means for settling the conflict and to refrainfrom any threat of using force against their neighbors.

In the Resolution, reference is made to UN Security Council Resolutions 822, 853,874 and 884 and Resolution 853 is particularly stressed. Also, member states areurged to refrain from the supply of any weapons and munitions which might lead tothe intensification of the conflict or continued occupation of territory.

The Resolution goes on to reaffirm the right of displaced persons from the area ofconflict to return to their homes safely and calls all members to provide humanitarianaid to the hundreds of thousands of displaced people.

In the Resolution, regarding the future status of the region, the Assembly calls on the


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Government of Azerbaijan to establish contacts without preconditions with politicalrepresentatives of both communities from the Karabakh region.

In the Resolution the Assembly suggests that if the negotiations under the auspicesof the Co-Chairs fail, Armenia and Azerbaijan should consider resorting to the

International Court of Justice.Clearly Resolution 1416 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe isnot in accordance with Armenian views. Particularly two aspects are to thedisadvantage of the Armenian side; the first is that Karabakh can not have anindependent status since a lawful and peaceful process based on democratic supportby the inhabitants of this territory, as required by the Resolution, did not take place inKarabakh. On the contrary, the Azerbaijanis were expelled from their homes andsome were killed. This meant that an armed conflict leading to ethnic expulsion hadtaken place as stated in the Resolution. Secondly, the Resolution expressed that

considerable parts of the territory of Azerbaijan were still occupied by Armenianforces and went on to stress that the occupation of a foreign territory by a memberstate constituted a grave violation of that states obligations as a member of theCouncil of Europe. While falling short of being an open condemnation of Armenia,these words were nonetheless harsh criticism.

In all the literature on the Karabakh conflict, the least mention is made of the positionof the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) on this matter. In fact, thisorganization has taken numerous decisions regarding the conflict since 1994. Mostrecently the OIC Foreign Ministers in their meeting in Istanbul on June 14-16 2004,passed a Resolution numbered 10/31-P.

The highlights of the said Resolution can be summarized as follows: It stronglycondemned the aggression of the Republic of Armenia against the Republic ofAzerbaijan, considered the actions perpetrated against the civilian Azerbaijanipopulation in occupied Azerbaijani territory as crimes against humanity andcondemned looting and destruction of the archeological, cultural and religiousmonuments on the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Furthermore it demanded thestrict implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions 822, 853,

874 and 884, and withdrawal of Armenian forces from all occupied Azerbaijaniterritories including the Karabakh region and strongly urged Armenia to respect thesovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

This OIC Resolution called on the UN Security Council to recognize the existence ofaggression against the Republic of Azerbaijan and demanded that the necessarysteps under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to ensure compliancewith its resolutions are taken [51]. The Resolution condemned aggression against thesovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and decided to take coordinatedaction to this end at the United Nations. Furthermore it called on all member states toinstruct their Permanent Representatives at the United Nations in New York, whilevoting at the UN General Assembly, to give absolute support to the issue of territorialintegrity of Azerbaijan.


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The Resolution expressed full support for the three principles of the settlement of thearmed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, contained in the statement of theOSCE Chairman-in-Office at the 1996 Lisbon OSCE Summit. The three principlesmentioned are; the territorial integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the highest degreeof self-rule of the Karabakh region within Azerbaijan and guaranteed security for this

region and its entire population. These principles were not ratified in Lisbon sinceArmenia did not accept that Karabakh remained within Azerbaijan.

The Resolution asked all states to refrain from providing any supplies of arms andequipment to Armenia and to use such effective political and economic measures asrequired in order to put an end to Armenian aggression and the occupation ofAzerbaijani territories.

Lastly, the Resolution called for enabling the displaced persons and refugees toreturn to their homes in safety. It also stated concern over the severity of

humanitarian problems concerning the existence of more than one million displacedpersons and refugees in the territory of Azerbaijan and urged all member states toextend their contributions to these people. Furthermore, it requested all memberstates, the Islamic Development Bank and the other Islamic Institutions to renderurgent financial and humanitarian assistance to the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Clearly the OIC fully supports the Azerbaijani position in the Karabakh conflict,strongly criticizes Armenia and views some actions of this state as crimes againsthumanity. With more than 50 members, the OIC has a significant presence,especially in the United Nations. One incident displaying the weight of the saidorganization was witnessed when Azerbaijan demanded that the Karabakh conflict isdiscussed at the United Nations at the end of October 2004 and was opposed bymost of the OSCE members who believed that such a course would harm the effortsof the Minsk Group. Ultimately it was the votes of the Islamic countries that allowedthe issue to become an agenda item at the General Assembly.

The resolutions passed by the UN Security Council, Council of Europe and OIC arenot of a compulsory nature. However it is not realistic to assume that internationalconflicts can be settled without adherence to principles adopted by these

organizations. These include the respect for territorial integrity, the inviolability ofborders and refraining from the use of force to gain territory. That is why although ithas been occupying Karabakh and some Azerbaijani territories for twelve years,Armenia has been unable to attain the acceptance of any party regarding its claimsthat Karabakh is an independent state or that it requires parts of Azerbaijani territoryto defend Karabakh.

A prompt resolution of the Karabakh conflict will be very beneficial for Armenia. Theeconomic restrictions that Turkey and Azerbaijan are currently applying will be liftedand Armenia will able to reach Europe and the near east via Turkey. This, in turn, willhave a profound effect on the Armenian economy. For Armenia, solving its problemswith its neighbors will signify an improvement in the capacity for obtaining credit aswell as bilateral and international aid. On the other hand this country will be able todivert significant funds now allocated to defense expenditures to urgently needed


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development projects. In short, Armenia will develop rapidly if it resolves theproblems with its neighbors. For all this to be possible, it is expected of Armenia thatit accepts that Karabakh is attached to Azerbaijan within the framework of a verybroad autonomy and that it pulls out of the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. On theother hand, for Karabakh it is economically more advantageous to be incorporated

into Azerbaijan and not Armenia.Azerbaijan also stands to benefit significantly from the resolution of the Karabakhconflict. The war psychology that has been evident for close to 15 years will bedispelled, solutions will be found for the problems of the internally displaced personsand refugees and vast resources used for defense will be utilized in other areas. It isonly to be expected that Azerbaijan, having solved the Karabakh conflict and with theoil revenue it stands to collect, will become the most powerful state in the SouthCaucasus.

If the conflict is resolved, the influence of the Russian Federation over Armenia willgradually weaken. It is also to be expected that the Russian bases in Armenia willclose down eventually. On the other hand it is also possible that the resolution of theconflict and the peaceful atmosphere this will create will have a positive reflection onthe other conflicts in the region such as in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Chechnya.This would be to the benefit of both the Russian Federation and Georgia.

Iran has supported Armenia because it feared the possibility that its own 15 millionstrong Azerbaijani community may want to unite with those Azerbaijanis across theborder. Therefore, an Azerbaijan that has solved the Karabakh conflict and hasattained a higher economic standard will not be welcomed by Iran. Yet since thisconflict can not continue indefinitely, Iran must work on resolving its potential ethnicproblems by establishing good relations with Azerbaijan and by granting its non-Farsipopulation broad cultural rights.

The resolution of the Karabakh conflict will be in the interest of Turkey in thegeopolitical sense since it would signify a major improvement in security in theCaucasus and signal the emergence of a more powerful Azerbaijan. In addition, theopening of the border with Armenia will increase trade with this country and also

allow the utilization of Armenian roads for transportation to Azerbaijan. However themain problem for Turkey in its relations with Armenia is not the Karabakh conflict butthe fact that Armenia does not recognize the territorial integrity of Turkey andcontinues its allegations of genocide. Therefore, the resolution of the Karabakhconflict will not be sufficient for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations and itwill be necessary to ensure a parallel solution to these bilateral issues as well.

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* Ambassador (Retired)

[1] mer Gksel yar, Sovyet-Rus D Politikalar ve Karaba Sorunu (Soviet-Russian Foreign Policies and theKarabakh Issue) Alfa Yaynlar, stanbul, 2004, pp.227-216[2] Kamuran Grn, Ermeni Dosyas, Trk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 1983, p.227[3] Donebdian and C. Moutafian, Artash, Histoire du Karabagh, Sevig Press, Paris 1991, p.93[4] Ibid, p.95[5] Keesings Contemporary Archives, Record of World Events, London, 1988-2000, V:34, p.36034


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[6] Keesings, V:34, p.36035[7] Keesings, V:34, p.36036[8] Keesings, V:35, p.36471, 36490[9] Keesings, V:35, p.36402[10] Keesings, V:36, p.37169[11] idem[12] Keesings, V:36, p.37664[13] Keesings, V:37, p.38078[14] Keesings, V:37, p.38582[15] Keesings, V:37, p.38418[16] Keesings, V:38, p.R120[17] Keesings, V:38, p.38733[18] Mkrtchyan was shot death at his home on April 14, 1992. Karabagh Parliament called his death an accident.On that subject see Patrick Karam and Thibault Mourges, Les Guerres de Caucase, des Tsars la Tchtchnie,Librairie Perrin, Paris 1995, p.91[19] P. Donabdian and C. Mutafian, p.93[20] Ayn Tarihi, December 24, 1991 ( Ayn Tarihi (History of the Month) is published by the Turkish DirectorateGeneral of Press and Information on the web site www.byegm.gov.tr )[21] Ayn Tarihi, March 19, 1992[22] Ayn Tarihi, February 12, 1992

[23] Ayn Tarihi, September 10, 1992[24] Araz Aslanl, Tarihten Gnmze Karaba Sorunu (Karabakh Issue from History to Present Day) in AvrasyaDosyas (Eurasian File), Volume) 7, Number 1, 2001, Ankara, p.404[25] Thomas De Wall, Black Garden, Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, New York University Press,New York, 2003, p.170; Thomas Goltz, Azerbaijan Diaries, M.E. Sharp, New York, 1998, p.124 and Araz Aslanl,p.404[26] Idem, p.312[27] Ayn Tarihi, March 7, 1992[28] Ayn Tarihi, March 18, 1992[29] Ayn Tarihi, March 19, 1992[30] Ayn Tarihi, May 19, 1992[31] idem[32] Ayn Tarihi, May 21, 1992

[33] Kamer Kasm, The Nagorno Karabagh Conflict from its Inception to the Peace Process, in ErmeniAratrmalar/Armenian Studies, Number 2, ASAM, Ankara, 2001, p.174[34] Ayn Tarihi,[35] The military heritage of the USSR was distributed by the Tashkent Agreement May 15,1992 between theSoviet Republics. Azerbaijan obtained 220 tanks, 285 guns and 220 military vehicles. But its share of 100 planesand 50 helicopters was not delivered. On that subject see Nazm Cafersoy, Elibey Dnemi Azerbaycan DPolitikas, Bir Bamszlk Mcadelesinin Diplomatik yks, (Azerbaijan Foreign Policy During EchibeyPresidency, June 1992-June 1993, Diplomatic Story of a Struggle for Independence) ASAM, Ankara, 2001, p.73[36] Keesings, V:38, p.39018[37] Keesings, V:38, p.39156[38] Keesings, V:39, p.39332[39] Ayn Tarihi, April 8, 1993[40] Ayn Tarihi, April 7 and 13, 1993

[41] Keesings, V:39, p.39475[42] On October 6,1994 President Aliev dismissed Suret Huseinov as Prime Minister in the wake of a coup attempt[43] Keesings, V:39, p,39650[44] Ayn Tarihi, September 6, 1993[45] Keesings, V:39, p.39694[46] Keesings, V:40, p.40019,20[47] Keesings, V:43, p.41710[48] Keesings, V:43, p.41878[49] Keesings, V.44, p.42636[50] mer E. Ltem, Facts and Comments, in Ermeni Aratrmalar/Armenian Studies, Number 2, ASAM, Ankara,2001, p.211[51] Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter of the United Nations is related to the Action with respect to threats to thepeace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. This action could be realized by measures involving or not

involving the use of armed force)


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III. Problems of Turkey and Azerbaijan With Armenia

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