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    10 Azerbaijan: search for identity andnew partnersSHIREEN HUNTER

    IntroductionOne of the most significant _ albeitM ikh a i I Go.b" ch.u, s . .C-for* p"r i.i., "*", :il:t:;l'r:. ;:ilTf :::.: J:ural particularism, drive foi poliri."l indepe'denci, and the rise of aariety.of popular movemenrs ,l,.oughooi rhe USSR.In rhe Baltic republics, Georgiai u-J er-.nia, from rhe beginningopular movements. have had ^ ,i.^, n"tl.,arrrt focus, poriticaty and cul-urally' They arso have had a clear r.rr. or ,1.i. .*i.-"ilii.nrnrio.,,which is toward Europe and the.$7esr.In rhe Muslim republics, by conrrast, the enhanced ethnic and culturalarticularism and self-asserrion has l"d ro-.o'furio., ".no'g'riJp.opt. ".,ahe elite regarding their nation.t r.li-iJ.nriry and rhe dile*iJn of rheirxrernal ties' Indeed, these repubrics are ,o.n t.r*..; ;;;;;ilres of cur-ural and polirical arrractlon.Grearer freedom of cultural expression, prus the diminution in Russia,solitical and culturar threar, h""; ;;;; ord ethnic, culrural, and rerri_orial rivalries and confricrs. They havei.J ro ^ reinrerpretarion, and oftenisrortion,- of geographic and hir;;i;J;"cts and evenrs with rhe clearurpose of forging a new sense of narional identity. The resurt has beenncreased risk of intra_ and.inr.._..pulii. ilostility and conflic.1The loosening of bonds u.t*..n tt.-..iuutr."

    "r,a in..."rr"r aurhoriryn Moscow, and rhe complere airrJrri", of rhe Soviet Union, haveroughr the question of htw aiii.r."i'r.publics would rerate ro rheirmmediate neighbors and ro ,h. b;;;;.; ll,.rn"rio.,"l community to rheore' The larter is of grear imporrance to the neighboring stares and to rhex-tra-regional powers,, l1.lud,ine rhe grear powers. No clear patterns ofnrera*ion birween the Musrim ..pu.-bri., ""a.ii.i. ;ilil;";ave yermerged' Nevertheless, rhe'enrire dour.r Rri" has become the focus ofegional and inrernational competition for infl,r.n...It is clear, however, thar-the Muslim ..pJii.r' relations wirh the oursideorld, in particurar with their ".isib;;;';. "rh.;i;i;;j"'""r"r,,.r, *,,xpand. It is also clea1.1h1r U. keenly interesred in rhe

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    {pMap l0.l The Caucasus

    Azerbaiian: sed,'t lt t,,rheir ci;;ra.irers. In particular, wirh growing inter;r, r,,,,, rrepi:irircs and Muslirn srares, the dynamics of Midcllc I , , ;affecr rhe outside rs' views of evenrs in rhese republics, .rr,,ltheir approach toward rhem. The great powers, noraLrly, rl,, rwould be keenly interested in rhe patterrr of relations wlr,, t,between these republics and their neighbors, especially ,,, ,, iregions as Transcaucasia. This interesr is natural becaus,.rl,, ithese relations would affecr regional policics, including, r{ 1,,,,,,.1of power far beyond rhe region's immediate viciniry. 1.,,,United Srates and Western counrries would want to see lrrrl.as a Western NATO ally enhanced in this region and in (.< rrr, ,lthat of Iran contained.How rhese new interactions would affect these republics nr, !!. , ,opments and the shape of regional polirics in Cencral and \,,r,,r,are still hard to predict. Whar is clear is thar rheir impar:r r,, i ,rwould be significant.The impact would be most dramaric if these republics w(.r( ,,independence and have no mediating center, and somewhat l. ., , ,,,,,if they were to rentain within the Commonwealrh - even il ,, , , rwith Russia and other Slavic republics. This would be so 1,,,,,,within a loose confederal strucrure the central authoriry in M,,,,,,,have some inf'luence over issues of foreign relations. In this , ,likelihood, Moscow's prioriries and irs policy uis-d-uis rhe rrr r1.t,lstates would have consideratrle influence in derermining the.1,.,,, ,their relarions and nor merely the larrer's own proclivities.z The ( ,,,,,..wealrh of Independent Srares, if ir can achieve a unified milir.rri r.could reduce the risk of intra- and inrer-republic conflicr. But rl,, .,.,union's dissolution a'd the proliferarion of 'ational armies has ,,,,,,the risk of such conflicts, as well a conflict between rhese reDrrr,l,,their neighbors- This is so because new states often use foreign..,,,,,,,,foster their national uniry.Paradoxically, the chance for regional cooperarion could also ,,,, ,,as the newly irrdependent and ecr-rnomically weak republics seek t. r,1,

    the Russians with new economic partners.The Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan provides an excellenr c2rsr. trwhich to observe rhe evolution of these diverse and often conrra.r,forces and their inreracrion as rhey shape rhis country's self-image,,,,,rperceptions of its surroundings and.irs own place in ir.Azerbaijan's hisroric legacy, its mixed ethno-cultural makeup, irs s,,ian divisions, and the multipliciry of irs minorities make the task of ti,oping a new national identiry and charting a new course for the co..outside the context of the soviet Union a challenging, and porenrially (tablilizing, process.The same characreristics offer opportunities for the republic ro f,,

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    rreen un ernew and sarisfying ties wirh its two big neighbors, Iran and Turkey, butthey also entail risk of conflicr, especially wirh lran.A more problematic issue for the republic would be rhe furure of irsrelations with neighb.ring Armenia, with whom it has been locked in along and bloody conflicr. Indeed, the dynamics of Azerbaijan's relationswith Armenia could also affect rhe course of its relations with Iran andTurkey.Azerbaijan's developments would have implicarions beyond its borders.An excessively pan-Turk-isr cultural policy and irredentisr philosophywould increase rhe risk of regional conflict involving lran and Turkey, in

    addirion to Azerbaijan. However, an approach whi& drew on all aspectsc>f Azerbaijan's rich and mulri-faceted iultural heritage could become acatalysr for new thinking on regional ries and ^n imperus ro broaderregional cooperation involving lran, Turkey, and p.ih"p, even orherTranscaucasian republics.Azerbaijan's experience would also have implications for other Muslimrepublics. In short, developmenrs in Sovier Asia would have ramiGcationsfor a vast region strerching from the Black sea ro the persian Gulf. Thus,while sovier republics' ries wirh the new commonwealrh, and even Russiaalone will remain of key importance, other regional ties may very wellbecome more significanr. Therefore, rarher rhan merely chronicling recenrevents' political changes, and similar issues, it is more imporrant ro analyrethe process of nation-building in sovier Asian republics in its historical andcultural conrexr, and in light of current dynamics of regional and inter-national politics. Ir is also imporrant ro analyze rhe scope and characrer ofties which are devel.ping between these republics, their neighbors, andother stares. _It is equally important ro see how rhese republic!' neighborsview their developments and their impact on their own securiry andI n rerests,Perhaps even more imporrant is a crirical rook at many of the currenrlvaccepted definirions of ethniciry, rerritories, borders, erc. and how theyhave evolved as they apply ro soviet Asia. The history of rhis region wasfrozen somerime in the mid nineteenth cenrury. Then the commurists rriedto write a new history and ethnography for it. whar is currentry happenrngis. the resumprion of hisrory, but with all rhe baggage of Soviet hisro.ogr"-phy. How this resumption of history would ""i"ta is what would deter-mine the furure of rhese regions and rheir neighbors.

    Where is Azerbaijan?In January 7990 a number of soviet Azerbai janis tore down borde r posrson the soviet-Iranian frontier, The impression was rhen created rhar theworld was witnessing something akin to the crumbling of rhe Berlin wail,which heralded the reunification of the rwo Germanies.3

    Azerbaijan: search for identity 229The narionarists of Azerbaif an's popurar Front (ApF) and orhers rried toconvey such an image to international observers. They called for rhe reuni_'carion of the so-cated "No*hern" .r,d ..sourh.r;1';;;;;,ans. The1,artributed the separarion of the two regions ," " nirro.r. consprracy3.j,X::.Ir"ris,t Russia and Iran in 1808 under the ,"..n, oi,i. Treaty ofIn addition ro w^alting reuni'carion, Sovier Azerbaijani narionalists -fficial and non-official.-.h-ave-a very L*r.nr,u" norion of the ter.torialcon6nes of whar thev cail "sourhern Azirbaiian.,' Ic;;;il^rl ,n"-, ,h.erritory of so-called S3uth...r Azerbaijan exrends as far as centrar Iran.some urtra rationarists go even fr.rh., tr,"" ir* il"-;;;;; Azerbai_anism, and arg;ue in favor of a pr.,-rurkirt "pp.or.h uis-r)-uis lran. Theyay char Soviet Azerb-aijan's goar shourd be to unire all of lran,s Turkic_speaking population.sThe inaccuracy of the norion of two Azerbaijans divided as a resurt of .imperial conspiracies is beyond "ny do,rfi fo. "ny .ui..r-. ;i imparrialhisrorian' The history of 'Russo-Ira.ri"r *^., and the character of therearies signed trerween the two srares and ,1. r".i i[u,;" i;;; of rurk_manchai (1828) is known in lran ", ih. ..Shameful,, (Nangin) rearyshows rhar there was no deal struck b.r*..n Iran and Russia ar Azerbai-an's expense. R.ather, the separation of rhe currenr rerrltory of sovier Azer_baiian from Iran *'s a. creai .o.r..qu..,.. of Russia's imperial expansion.

    This is not ro s,ggesr rhat these lands - or rarher, rh.i, li."i f.,rd"l lo.dr,or at least some of rhem _ may nor have wanted independence from lran,alrhough most crf rhem fought on lran's ,id. during rh.';;;;.r"rt rs mereryto point to the ^ollowness of the theory of Russo_"perri;, ;;rp;;".y.In November -r'91'9,,rheAzerbaiian ielegarion ar the paris pi"." .onr.r-ence presented to the Iranian.de.legation *"which was not admirted to rheI:f ",::J';:n::;'[".':ilJ'.:[.,T:;'I;:if [:;iH::T[".ffi l*ilielarions'7 However' realizing that Iran was not capabre of protecring themagainsr rhe Russians, in Article d of the proposed rreary the Azerbaijanissaid that thev needed rhe same.kinq "-f h.ro ri.,at rhe B.i;iri";;;.-"ruppor.dro give Iran in the contexr of the 1919 Anglo_persian ,.."ry, *t,iJi, *ouldave made Iran a virtua.l British p.or..ro."i..Th.rr, nr.rU"i;^" *is wi''.,go accepr condirions that the lranians rebeiled "g"irri-I".'rr,l r.rni".,arliament de6ed Britain and refused to ."tify ,h. ;;;r;.'consequently, nothing came out of these Iran-Azerbaijan conracrs.These poinrs are noted here in order ro b;i;"." the rhesis of rhe universarappeal of pan-Turkism.ro the Azerbaij"rri, ,, rhe time, and the inevirabregravitarion of Azerbaija" :":"..d Turkey. Moreover, .u* -o.o_,n.r,lpur5s of Azerbaijan's pan-Turkic movemenr had before dabbled in otherideologies and had triej an lran-orienteJ rr."..gy.For instance, Mohammad Amin Rasul_Za?eh, the president of rhe

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    230 Shireen HunterMusawat parry, was first a sociarisr and a member of the sociarisr-orientedHimmat" parry' He spenr many y."* i" Iran and prbrirr";; newspapern Tehran cailed |ran_e-Now i.:u.* -i."n,,). i; ;;r';;; afrer beingxpelled from rran.fbr his lefrisr id.u, thur ne wenr ro Turkey and becamen ardenr pan-Turkisr.8 The facr is thar t,a rtra cri on, r ra n a n d Tu rkey, ;., ^;. .;;d'ii: ?;1,,Lil"".r;l:.,'ijj j:,;: :jhan mere erhnic o. .ulru."l. "rn"iiy,'pr"cticar considerarions of whicharrner could be more herpfur h^s deier-ined rhe poliricar orientatron ofzerbaijani intellecruals und politi."i ".ri",rrr.hus' the facts behind th. c.."rio' oi.n. .o.**192o republic and irshilosophy are somewhat differeni fr"-'rr,. myth rhat su.rtunds its cre_rion and currentrv acrs. as a.h.isroric foint of ..f.;..";;;lizerbaijaninarionalists and rheir vision of the fut.rre-

    ^r Ylr:.rhe- repubric of Azerbaijan *o, n.r, creaced in r9lg, rheir choicer name was not "vercomed by the Iranian Azerbaijanis, eve. those whoad their own grievances against rhe cenrrar governmenr in Tehran. Forxample, according to, Ahrnad Kasravi, the anci_cenrer movemenr rn rheranian Azerbaiian under rhe r.J;;;;i;'"; Mohammad Hussein Khiabanioyed wirh rhe idea of changing,t. null'orrl. 1.".i".'pi"""t... to Aza-istan ("The Land of Liber,i"lit" "r r"r-ro be .onfused wirh or subsumed;1!;:,*::y;T",f,,.., r[is also di,pur., the norion p.;;.;;; by somep o u r i n g o r p " n - R,.,1'. ;:T:::Jl : J:?," li' ;,::.+r;?: i l.f I ::*".J; ;as spurious as the soviet Union and rhe Iranian leftists used the notion o[ne Azerbaijan being separaced arri'cia,y in order ro promore separatisrendencies in the Iranian Azerbaijan. Theiesc exampre of rhis policy werehe efforrs of the sovier Union ir rs+] ,"1er up an auronomous govern-ent in rhe Iranian Azerbaijan rhrough rhe manipurario,' "iir,.-j*sence ofoviet rroops in rhat reglon.Ir was also after rhe sovierization of rhe region and, in parricurar, in rhetalinisr period rhar 6rst ,t. *o.i, '*".irr..." and ..sourhern,, Azerbai_an became common in Soviet a"__.rro.r. Moreover, rhe Democratrcarty of Azerbaijan and rhe co--orri*'nl.ry "r Soviet Azerbaijan begano promore rhe rhesis of the oppression of sourhern Azerbaijanis by whathey called "chauvinist persians,"r, t., rnte. years, long before the soviereform movement and rhe rise of ""r;;r;;; groups, communisr readers ofhe Soviet Socialist Republic "r ar..u"ii",i ralked abour rhe reunificarionof the rwo Azerbaijans. .For .*o-pt., ,i.'head of rhe Azerbaijan KGB,aidar Aliev, who larer became " ;;;;;, of rhe polirburo, said rn 19g3hat he hoped rhar the two,Azerbailans *ourd b. "ri;; ;;;,ii*T,Jr,r.r,-.., E:.n roday many of rhe -orr'.*i.._J l...d..,rirr claims roward rheranian Azerbaiian emanare from rhose wrthin ,h. S;;;;; ir.rU"i;u'ational movemenr rhat are Iranian-origin i.rtirtr. ror insrance, a promi-enr exponent of this view is Rasul siam"ek, one of the leaders of an unoffi_

    Azerbaijan: search for identtty 23lcial organization in_sovier Azerbaijan called Brrlik (,,L)niry,,). He is froran and was a member of rhe r.ftirt g.re..ill" *r""0 ii-' ,]""'i"ir.o Fedayt-Khalgh, which is scill engaged i" .fi"lreglme in Tehran.t2 esrtne activities against rhe currcIr is no secrer rhar rhe sovier Union consisrenrry fotowed a duar tracolicy toward Iran,.namely, gooa ..r"rions at state revel and crandestirnfiltration through.lefti* i"rJ.r. Hi*or,.",y, ,t.l"ri.r-il.ri"i;"n con:::::,'',il?"i':i ,'*jffii5:i PI;v;; i-p"'i""'"'"i', '" T*i,ing a'The Azerbaijan communist parry remained .influential after 19g9, firsided by the prese.nce of. sovier ;;;;;: ,1.1, "ur'"irffi#: narionatisarb' changes in rhe. leadership rr"".'..'r"r*d from facrionar comperrtirrirhin rhe communist-parry "rra no.-L.."ur. of the eliminarion of irnfluence' Thus, benearh the..* trJ-.. -u.,y or-ri.-oii'-rnar.r, ourrirudes roward inte-rnar "r,d .*t...,"r irru., ,rrri "rr..t ortt,ool and poricyn Azerbaijan even afrer the d.p"r,ui. oTpresident Muralibov.Moreover' popurar -orr.rn..,r, in ioui., Azerbaiian-Jil not deuer,r1xacrry rhe wav rhey did i1 01he1 ..puuir.. cerrainry che so-cated Azer-aijan Popular Fronr, particularry thor. .1.*.r,cs who are alrowed ro l;ccrive, is not fury.represenrarive of the range of popurar views in theepublic' Additionalry, rhe-re. it " *id.rp..ad suspicion ihar there has becrrdeal berween eremenrs of th. co*mu'r-,lr,.rtrutishment and certain acri_isrs o[ the popurar Front. Thus, -r-r"i ,l*y say does no, n...rrurily reprc-enr rhe views of all Azerbaijani, o. .u*ihe majoriry.In facr, despire the prominence rhat rhe popular Fronr acquired in l9g9nd 1990, making ir seem roday to u. u.ry powerfur, it is very dif'curt r

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    232 Shireen HunterIn that case, separatisr movements could develop in lran seeking unifi-cation with Soviet Azerbaiian. This type of movement, if supported by theSoviet Azerbaijan, could lead to armed conflict wich Iran.It is clearly logical for rhe Sovier Azerbaijanis ro wanr ro promore therhesis of geographic, historic, and ethnic unity of the region and the notionof Russo-Iranian conspiracy. The unificarion of rhe two regions wouldenhance the economic and political position of the new unit by expandingits size and increasing its resources. In the more immediate future, SovietAzerbaijanis make no secret thar they want to use the lranian Azerbaiianexpatriate community in order to Promote their position in Europe and inrhe United States, and to attract their capital. However, so far 'they havenot been very successful. In the future, roo, if Iran's economic and politicalsituarion improves and the process of privatization and the opening of theeconomy continues, and the regime conrinues to woo the exiles back home,most Azerbaijani investors are likely to go back home to lran rather thanffy operating in a society that in the last seventy years has lost much of itsmercantile and entrepreneurial skills and is likely to be politically unstablefor some time.

    However, there is an even more immediate and pressing reason for thishistoric revisionism. The Soviet Azerbaiianis, by focusing on foreignenemies, are trying to foster a separate national idenrity for themselves.This is clearly admined in conversations with Azerbaiiani intellectualsonce rheir thesis is challenged with valid historic arguments. 'Whatever themotives behind this policy, rhe achievemenr of this goal will not be easyand its political costs could be very high. Although not clearly spoken, it isclear thar in talking about unification the Soviet Azerbaijanis see them-selves as the leader and the senior partner in a united Azerbaijan, althoughin order to attract the lranians, they proclaim that Tabriz would be thecapital of the new state. There is a thinly disguised - and hardly iustified -sense of superiority among Soviet Azerbaijanis, or ar leasr rhe Baku inrel-lectuals, uis-i-uis the lranian Azerbaijanis. This artitude, however, showslack of understanding of the Iranian Azerbaiianis' characteristics. It isdoubtful that the Iranian Azerbaiianis in Tabriz would want to replaceTehran's authority with that of Baku, even if the nominal capital wasTabriz. Even within Iranian Azerbaiian, local differences are significant'These differences are even more pronounced with Soviet Azerbaijanbeyond the immediate border villages. The long period of Russificationand recent trends toward what could be called "Turkeyization," asopposed to mere Turkification, have made even the two dialects vastlydifferent.Moreover, while some Iranian Azerbaijanis may want greater autonomyand even independence from Tehran, it is unlikely that, with few excep-tions, they would like to be subsumed in some sort of confederation under

    Azerbaiian: search for identity 233the Iranian Azerbaijanis' proud and independent nature and the rarherdisdainful attitude of the Russians, and even cerrain Turkish intelligentsia,toward them as rough and unrefined would acr as significanr barriers.Beyond the st:cular, a-religious intellectuals, religious af6niry wirh orherIranians would conrinue ro affect rhe masses'attitude, such schemes couldonly succeed in two cases: (1) a collapse of cenrral aurhoriry in lran; (2)profound regional and inrernational changes leading to a total redrawingof regional nraps. The latrer development, however, almost inevitablywould also mean the disintegrarion of Turkey, as well as Iraq and perhapsothers.It is in the recognirion of these facs thar in rhe last year, officially rhecurrent goveflrmenr of the republic and even the APF have roned downrheir nationalist rhetoric. There is no more ralk of immediate reuni6cation.There is not even talk of serring a rimetable for reunificarion, Rarher, therhesis now promoted is rhat of "one people living wirhin rwo states." Thisdiminution in the narionalist and irredenrisr rheroric is parrly due to rhefact that popular reacrion in the Iranian Azerbaijan ro calls of unificationwere subdued" True, some Iranian Azerbaijani inrellecruals. both in Iranand abroad, are receprive to such ideas.15 Many of rhem, howeverr aremotivated by their opposirion to rhe currenr Islamic regime rarher rhanseparatist feelings. Consequenrly, as one member of rhe Academy ofSciences of Azerbaijan SSR rold me, many Soviet Azerbaijanis began ro sayrhar before making unificarion a principal goal they should 6rst find our ifthe Iranian Azerbaijanis wanr ro unite with rhem.There has also been a grearer realizarion on the part of soviet Azerbai-jani leadership of differences berween the cwo people. Indeid, an official ofthe so-called vatan Jamiyati (The Homeland Association), an organizarionpredating perestroika, wirh rhe goal of atrracting Iranian Azerbaiianis roldme that rhe two people 6rst need to become reacquainted wirh one anotherbefore talking about uni6cation.Another reason has been rhe realization by Sovier Azerbaijanis rhat uni6-

    carion may not necessarily mean rhe separation of rhe Iranian Azerbailan andits joining with rhe Sovier republic. Rarher, rhere may be the risk rhat ar leastsome Soviet Azerbaijanis, parricularly those speaking Iranian dialecrs, maywant to join Iran. In fact, a soviet academician admirted to me thar in placeslike Lankaran, and heavily Shi'a border areas, mosr people would like ro loinIran. Moscow's influence, which is concerned about its own relations withIran, also contribured to rhe lowering of nationalist rheroric. Moreover, aslong as there was a chance to keep most of the Union togerher, it seemed thatMoscow woulcl try its best to keep Azerbaijan within the Union, even if otherTranscaucasian republics such as Armenia and Georgia became indepen-dent.16 But a unired and thus expanded Azerbaijan may be less easily per-suaded to remain within the new Commonwealth.

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    234 Shireen HunterMoreover, it l'nay hope that it would be able ro keep an expanded Azerbai-jan in its orbit. However, after the acceleration of the process of the SovietUnion's disintegration following the failed right-wing coup of August1991, this point has been made moot. With Azerbaijan becoming com-pletely independent rhe campaign for reunification with the Iranian Azer-baiian could begin in earnest again. Whatever transpires in the future, ir isclear that the issue of historic confines of Azerbaijan will acquire morethan academic interest.

    Ethnic and cultural legacy and compositionAzerbaijan's ethnic, sectarian, and linguistic composition and the char-acter of its cultural legacy also contribute to its problems of defining a newnational identity, and determining the nature of irs relarions with irsneighbors.Azerbaijani nationalists are proud of their ancient history and ofrenrefer to rhat. Meanwhile, most of them insist on the pure "Turkicness" ofAzerbaijan, both ethnically and culturally, throughout its history. It isimportant to make a distinction between the Soviet Azerbaiian and theIranian Azerbaijan. From ancient times, after the massive introduction ofIranian people into the region, and until the introduction of Arab and

    Turkic elements in later centuries, the Iranian Azerbaiian has been eth-nically solidly Iranian. In ancient rimes, however, Albania or Eran or whatis now Soviet Azerbaijan had had a more mixed population, includingsome of the Iranian family of Indo-Europeans.lT Another difference is thatthe area that is now Soviet Azerbaiian historically has been more vulner-able to migratory pressures, including those by Turkic tribes. Most his-torians agree that the gradual Turkification of Azerbaiian began in thetenth or eleventh century. Prior to that, for nearly 3,000 years, in addi-tion to indigenous inhabitants, particularly in Soviet Azerbaijan (thepeople of the Caucasus), the dominant ethnic group in the region was theIranian branch of Indo-European tribes.The rise of rival Safavid and Otroman empires in Iran and what is riowTurkey in the fifteenth and sixteenth cenruries accelerated the Turkifi-cation trend. While the Safavids were lranian, their court was heavilyinfluenced by Turkic elements. Thus, while disputed, the theory that manyAzerbaijanis are linguistically Turki6ed Iranian people has merit. Cer-tainly their physical characteristics are more similar to lranian people thanto other Turkic people such as the Turkmen, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, etc. Thus, thecurrent thesis of Soviet Azerbaijani nationalists rhar Azerbaiian has alwaysbeen one hundred percent Turkic is not valid. It is, of course, to be notedhere that extrem pan-Turkists in Turkey, and in Soviet Azerbaijan,believe that such ancient people as the Sumerians, Chaldeans, Iranian Par-rhians, and even Kurds and Medes, were Turk. And they date the existence

    Azerbaiian: searcb for identity 2.1 5of Tr:rl :.: 1.,_,301. in Central Asia, Asia Minor, and elsewhere ro 5,000 yc,rrrbefcie ri-ri '1.'irrh of chrisr.r8 Hcw,ever, even som of the sovier Azerbaij,rrrlnarionair'tis in privare adnrit ro these hisroric inconsistencies and recogrrrethe more mixed ethnic and culrural background of rheir counrry, incluclrngthe existence of a strong Iranian element.The reason for emphasizing Turkic puriry, ir was explained ro me by lsoviet Azerbaijani political scientisr, is political expediency. The narirrr-alisrs believe rhat rhis arrirude is iusrified in order ro forge a srrong Turkienational identity. orher issues, including conflict with Armenia. are alsrrmanipulated for the same purpose.le Moreover, being fuily aware of rhesrrength of Sovier Azerbaijan's ties wirh Iran, rhis atritude is parrlv ainrc,lar preempring and preventing porenrial atrracrion toward lran. ofGcials.,lrhe curre.t governmenr of Soviet Azerbaijan, which is srill dominared lrvthe old Communisc esrablishmenr, albeir in a narionalisr garb, sancrion rlrrr' policy. Until rhe developments following the failed coup of August 199 l,and in view of the close link between rhe Azerbaijani leadershif wirh tlrrcenter' so, ir appeared, did Moscow. similarly, such views also srrrr'wesrern proclivities which wanr Turkey ro emerge as the scrongest inllrrence in Azerbaijan.Therefore, views which challenge rhis ultra-Turkic narionalisr theory .lhistory are nor openly aired. Bur there are some indications that such views

    exist. According to rhe chairman of the political science departmenr of rlrcAcademy of sciences of Azerbaijan, only 3 percenr of people in Azerbaijrrrrhold the view rhat rhe ethnic and hisroric origins of Azerbaiian is conncc.red rvirh that of other Iranian peoples,zo There is some reason to believethar rhere may be a much larger number of people who support rhis view.For insrance, according to the same academician, there is a widesprearlcampaign of insulc and discredir in sovier Azerbaiian aimed ar rhe IraniarrAzerbailani historian-scholar Ahmad Kasravi, a prominenr proponent olrhe Iranian origins of Azerbaijan's history and culture. The main chargcagainst Kasravi is rhar he was an Iranian narionalist and a pan-lranist. Thiscreates the suspicion thar Kasravi's views may be more popular rhanadmitted openly. otherwise, such a campaign seems fruitless "rd m.o,rspirited.whar is imporranr for the furure of Azerbaijan is how irs peopre willchoose ro de6ne themselves irrespecrive of historical facts or rhe preciscerhnic n.rix of the popularion. If these people see rhemselves as pure Turksor predominantly Turk or Turkified, then rhat is what rhey wili be. If rhcydevelop a differenr vision of rhemselves, then rhar view would mold theirself-identity. Neverrheless, manipularion of these facrs by various groupsinside rhe counrry, in rhe region, and even by outside powers would havcan impacr on rhe evolurion of the soviet Azerbaiianis' self-image. Forexample, an official policy of Turkeyization through more exrensive cul-tural contacts wirh Turkey, reform of language, and rhe propagation o1

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    236 Shireen Huntercglrural pan-Turkism through the mass media, would deeply affect theself-perception of the nexr generation. A different policy would have adifferent i-p".t. Irrespective of the ultimate outcome of this search fornarional identiry, the exaggeration of one aspect of the regional andpopular culture could in the process become highly divisive'^ These issues are also nored here because of their implications for thefuture character of the republic's relations with irs neighbors. For example,overemphasis on Turkic purity would certainly complicate efforts to createcloser ties with the Iranian Azerbailan.A culturally pan-Turkic policy on the part of Soviet Azerbaijan islikely to be jarring ro most Iranian Azerbaijanis. This would be par-ricularly the case if Soviet Azerbaiian were to become a cultural satrapyof Turkey. There is already a trend in this direction, ar least in Baku.The efforts to rid Azerbaiian's Turkic dialect of Persian words and theintroducrion of modern Turkish idioms and, in general, a vasr increase inTurkey's cultural influence from music ro writing there will make com-munication between the two Azerbaiians more difficult. This is sobecause the modern Turkish and the Azerbaijani Turkic dialect are notmutually understandable, particularly to non-educated people, or at leastnot easily.Pasr efforrs on the part of separatist movements in the Iranian Azerbai-jan, mosr notably thar of the Democratic Party of Azerbaiian sponsored bythe Soviet Union in the 1940s to impress a Turkic character on the regionby, among other things, instiruring instructions in rhe Turkick dialect, didnot succeed.Admittedly part of this failure was due to the anti-religious and socialistcharacrer of the movement which offended the masses' religious sensibili-ties. But a large part of the Azerbaiiani intelligenrsia - including someleftists - were also against the anti-lranian dimension of the Party's ideol-ogy.2r Therefore, barring widespread disaffection of the lranian Azerbai-ianis from the rest of rhe country, which is not very likely alchough notincoqceivable, rhe current emphasis on the part of Soviet Azerbailaninarionalists and leadership on ultra-Turkic nationalism coupled with pan-Turkic rendencies is likely to deepen the barriers berween the two Azerbai-jans rather than bring them closer together.Moreover, these attitudes would make rhe development of a distinct..Azerbaijani" identiry wirh both irs Turkic and lranian dimensions moredifficulr. The failure to develop such an identity, in turn, could alienateorher ethnic groups within Soviet Azerbaiian since the population of thisrepublic is not solidly Turkic. There are, for example' Iranian-originpeople with special Iranian dialecrs called "Tati" and "Taleshi," as well asKurds and Dagestanis. In the Iranian Azerbaiian, a large parr of rhe'Western Azerbaiian is inhabited by non-Turkic, Indo-EuroPean' Iranian-origin Kurds and hence, ethnically and linguistically part of Kurdistan.

    Azerbaijan: searcb for identity 237These ethnic diversities further illusrrate rhe unrealism of the norion of"Northern and southern" Azerbaijans forcibly separared that now musr bereunited"The Communist regime was responsible for a sysremaric reinterpre-tation of the region's hisrory and culture.22 Ir downplayed Azerbaijan'slinks with Iran and emphasized rhe differenes between rhem, hopingeventually ro incorporare rhe Iranian Azerbaijan into the Soviet srare. Thispolicy also 6r neatly into rhe overall Soviet srraregy of developing separarererrirorial an

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    238 Sbireen Hunterother affinities thar has been rhe reason for Azerbaijan's closeness withIran.During rhe evenrs of winter 1989*1990 rhar sarv an or-rtpoiiring ofnationalist and' auronomisr senrimenrs, Sovier aurhoriries, includingMikhail corbachev himself, blamed disturbances on "Muslim fanatrcs."He accused lran of igniring the 6res of fundamenralisr fervor and warned itto stay our of rhe republic's affairs. The reaction of Azerbaijani nationalisrsro these accusarions was negarive and ringed wirh a.nger. They, in rurn,accused the soviets of wanting to !urn western oprnion againsr the Azer,baijanis in their conflicr wirh Armenia by accusing rhem of fundamental-ism. since then, borh rhe Soviet Azerbailani aurhorities and rhe NarionalFronr leaders have srrenuously rried ro downplay religious dimensions ofthe republic's popular movements.23cerrainly there is no valid evidence which would support rhe accu-sarions made by the sovier aurhoriries rhat rhe Azerbaiian national move-nrent was a religious fundamentalist movemenr. However, rhe playirrg-down of rhe Islamic elemenr by both governmenral aurhoricies andNarional Front personaliries also seems exaggerared. As long as rhere are1o _trulv democratic polirics in sovier Azerbaiian, ir would be exrremelydifficulr ro ascertain the stre.grh of different tende.cies in the republic.Indeed, Azerbaijan's political scene since the srationing of Soviet rroops inthe republic in Jan'ary 1990 has been characterized by a compromisebetween segmenrs of the old Communist esrablishmenr and elemenrs of theNational Fronr' This became quire clear during the ocrober 1990 parlia-mentary elecrions. Many political parries and rendencies existed clandes-rinely but were not allowed to operate freely.Islamically oriented groups, including pro-Iranian groups bur also pro-Turkish Islamists such as rhe followers of rhe yeni Musavat partesi alsoexist, but mostly in clandesrine form.2a An opinion poil taken in Baku inearly l99o showed thar only 3,8 percent of Baku's popularion favored theesrablishment of an Islamic republic and only 1g.9 percenr favored fullinregration into the Islamic world. However, 76.7 percent favored estab-lishing conditions and instirutions which would satisfy the religious feel-ings of Muslims and 97.0 percenr welcomed the opportuniry ro learn moreabout Islamic culture.25The point ro be srressed here, however, is thar Baku - like many othercapitals - is not typical of rhe resr of rhe counrry. This is parrly due ro thefact that in the last 150 years rhere has been a large influx of foreign ethnicand religious elements into Baku. Moreover, secularization is alwaysstronger in urban centers. Indeed, it is believed that religious feelings arevery strong oucside of Baku and especially in the villages.26 Therefore, it isconceivable rhat a republic-wide poll would have shown a more balancedbreakdown berween Islamic and other orientations among the popularion.what is clear is that there is growing inrerest in religion in therepublic

    -:,,zerbaijan: searcb for identity Z3vanc ff:,i:,j/ rl'roseus are reopening. ,\zerbaijani authoriries want ro li.onrr'c'i over the direcrion of rhis *,-:,,emenr and influenc. ir, For.xou,1'1uthey ir'lend ro rransrare the Koran i,rro ir".i rurkic diarect and prob:rhcontrol religious instruction, Therr: is a fe4r rhar interesr in 'rerigi,,instruction would direct _Azerbaijan Muslims roward Iran becauschi'ism, particularly now that n"ry'srti'" ."les of Iraq t,"u. u""nEsrroyerTurkey, here too, r..T:.ro_be raking " l;;l by sending Turkish religi.uinsrrucrors to the repu.blic. Even thelaudis

    "re fu'din! egffiirr,'ir,r,r,,rors in Azerbaijan' The Iranians are not totaily absent from the scereirher'27 How rhe rerigious element *ourJ pray.in ,r," f.o..rr-oimorclirrgzerbaijan's national.identity and i.r fotii."t orienration is not cle,rwhar is clear is thar religion would "ff..;;; artitude of many Azerbaijnrrrro their surroundings and especiaily io-irJi, ,*o neighbors with whrrrthey have so many affiniries.-Ho*.u.r, ii *ould be only one factor, rrrrperhaps not the most imporrant one, in chis process,Modernization and requirements of developmenrAs in mosr Mr"rsrim,lands, rhe quesr for modernization and deveropnrcrrhas been a significanr force in *rr"t ir ""* Azerbaijan independent over rrrclast century and a half. In the ninete.rrri ...,ru.y, rhose Azerbaijanis trr*rwelcomed Russian rure felr rhat by "rro.iori.,g-wirh Russia it,"y *o,,r,lhave a berter chance of deveropinj r -oJ..n economy and society. -I'lresame considerarions were paitlv- responsible f". ;h; ;;;;' of pr'octoman tendencies among certain Azerbaijan intetectuars. As Irarr'reconomic and polirical decrine accelerared in the niner..rrth l.rrtury ",r,1he perceprion of orroman Turkey as rhe most advanced of the tw'uslim srares grew' coupred wirh che i"., "r Turkey hr;;;;; ioortror,r inEurope' the number of.soviet.Azerbaijanis reanin! ro*"rir,i.t.y rtr,,grew. Afrer rhe Bolshevik revolurion, rio, rhor. S&i.i a*.U"lr:"ri, *f,,referred to remain wirhin the new sour.t ,rrr., rather than join Turkey ,rran, did so because rhey viewed tt. nurrirn, as rhe more advanced.The issue of development and modernization has arso been a cenrrllissue in sovier Azerbaijan, and in rt," "rri,,ra. of the soviet Ar.rurri.,,,,toward their ries wirh Moscow, their ,,eighbors, and the outside worrrr,The A'erbaijani governmenr and inreiliglntsra want to move cioser r,those who could besr h-elp rhem deuerop ,"h.i, ..o.,o*ic and technorogrt.rlbase. Thus, until the failed coup, ^!;f9;; rhe Sovier economy was ,rshambles'.many did not see much betler arternarives ro conrinur.rleconomic links to Moscow. Even after the coup, and despite showirrggreater reluctance to sign any new economic union treaty, Azerbaijan tlrrlnot burn irs economic bridges to Moscow- The greater "*r".iiorr-ro*.,.turkev among many soviei Azerbaijani rn,.rr..r"J, ;;;rr";;, du. n,their perceprion thar Turkey h"r -"i. gr.", ,rria., in economic dever''

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    24A Shireen Hunterment, not merely because of their pan-Turkism or ethnic af6nity. By con-trast, Irarl's political and economic problems over the last ten years make icnot a very attractive partner for development. Another consideration isaccess to Europe and to the West in general. This considerarion also favorsTurkey since it is viewed as a conduit to the'West.Moreover, the Azerbaijanis want to develop a positive image whichcould help them in their conflict with the Armenians. The Western coun-tries, especially the United States, have made no secret of the fact that theywould like to see Turkey emerge as the dominant influence in Soviet Asiafrom the Caucasus to Central Asia.28 They feel thar as a secular pro-'Western state, the Turkish presence would enhance Western influence.Some'Western countries feel this may compensate Turkey for not beinginvited to join Europe.However, the inconclusive result of the Turkish parliamentary electionsof November 7991., growing problems of the Turkish economy, rheincreasing threat of Kurdish separatism, and divisions within the Turkishpoliry on how to deal with this problem cloud Turkey's future. ShouldTurkey's economic and political problems worsen, it would affect itsleadership aspirarions in Azerbaijan and in Central Asia..What is clear is that imperatives of economic development and modern-iz.ation would have a very important impacr on rhe orientation of SovietAz-erbaijanis. These considerations may even prove more significant rhanrhat of ethnic, linguistic, religious, and other bonds in deciding the nature,,f their regional links.

    Ilalancing the two neighborsAs we have observed, rhe nationalist rhetoric and the general culrurerrt'rrcl in Soviet Azerbaijan is distinctly pan-Turkic and pro-Turkish. Therrrrrjority of Azerbaiian intellectuals and National Front leaders make no..r't ret that they see Kemalist Turkey and Mustapha Kemal as the model tol','t'rnulated. Some of them have even talked about the possibility of creat-

    rrr1,.:r confederation with Turkey which larer could extend to the Central,\,,r:rn Republics. This view was, for instance, expressed by a number of,'\l'l:rnembers including Ebulfez Aliev in an interview published in theI rrr kish daily Miliyel on July L6, 7990. However, pro-Turkish tendencies,,r ,irrongest in Baku and within the intelligentsia. There is some evidencerlr.rr in border areas wirh lran and among the more religiously-oriented, ",,r1 1-ropulation, pro-lranian senriments are stronger.lrr the last two years a number of agreements on economic and commer-, r.rl tooperation have been signed between Turkey and the Azerbaijan'."|t lrr addition, direct air links between Istanbul and Baku have been, .,,1'lished. There has recently been.talk of building a bridge over River\r r'. rn order to facilitate communication with Turkev.2n Telecommuni-

    Azerbaijan: searcb for identity 241,carion linkage has also _expanded. yer, while Turkey is emergrng as rhefavored partner, ties wirh Iran are nor ignored.Indeed, similar economic and .omme.cial agreemenrs have been signedwirh lran.,, In addition to wanring ro maximize rheir economic gains, theauthorities do not wanr to antagonize Iran. Thus rhere is a desir. ro ar leasrkeep a semblance of balance between the rwo neighbors. Moreover, theaurhoriries realize rhat .antagonizing lran would i"-p.. rheir plans ofintensifying contacts with rhe Iranian Azerbaijan ".,d thu, reduce thechances of a future unification of the two regions. Moreover, given Azer_baijan's problem with neighboring Armenia and .u.n porrib'ie rensionswith Georgia, ir cannor ajford ro engender Iranian hosrility as well.The question of balancing ties is nor limited only ro..ono*,i. "nd poliricalareas and exrt:nds even ro cultural issues. For example, during rhe debate overchanging rhe,:urrent cyrillic alphaber into eirher rhe Arabic o"r iuti, ,.ripr, inaddirion ro the inrrinsic merits of the two, rhe impacron relarions with Iranand rurkey vras also considered. concern was expressed that in the case ofchoosing Arabic scripr, Iran's culrural influence mighr become overwhelm_ing, and in tht: case of Larin, rhat of Turkey. The deblre was finally settled infavor of Latin, hence.favoring Turkey. But in making rheir choice, the Azer-baijanis had zrlso had their furure ries with the WesIin mind-Nevertheless, in late 1991 rhere were signs of grearer willingness on rhepart of Sovier Azerbaijanis to allow a more visitle lranian .Jlr,r.rl p..r_'. ence. Parricularly significanr has been rhe agreemenr berween the twocounrries rhat allows Iran ro set up " g.ou.,J sarellire sration in Bakrr,sRadio and relevision company which would enable sovier Azerbu,l"r,i, roreceive Iranian television. They have also agreed to joinrly produce pro-grams in both Persian and in Azerbaijani dialect, including^a 90_minureweekly program. If these progra.ms are implemenred, rhey *Juld go a longway to restore the current imbalance in Turkey's f^uo..JiIn addition to trying to balance rheir two big neighbors and cultural kin,the Azerbaijanis are rrying to expand their direcr ties wirh o(her counrriesas parr of rheir drive. ro enhance their independent national identiry anainrernarional personality. Thus diplomatic relarions were esrablished withEgypt, a trend likely to extend to other Muslirn counrries. B.,t Azerbaijrn

    has even reached agreements with Israel on economic and technicalcooperarion. 'rhis is ,a posirive developmenr. The more indepeJ..,r ,h"republic becornes in these matters, the better it is to h"u. .orrrt.rctiu. ."1"_tions wirh many stares in the region, thereby mitigating the fear of becom_ing dominated by one or rhe ocher.Views from Ankara and TehranAs could bc expecred, evenrs in Sovier Asia have been keenly followedby both Iran and rurkey. The amirude and approach of each .o.',.rrr" ,o

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    1.42 ,Shrre.q Flunterrt"-'nrs in thar area have been determined both by their hisroric tres and byileir currenI d,orraestic condirions and aspiratior,r, ", *"ii""r^ti" ayr,"*l.uf internarional politics.The evenrs af r9g9_r990 in sovier Azerbaijan faced both T,urkey andran wirh their 6rst serious policy rest uis-d-uis rh. s"iil rut"rrri-r, popurarovements' Turkey's immediate response ro disr.urban.., irr'ar."u.rju'as exrremelv cautious and weil in accord,wirh ;; [;;irr'p.,n.ipt., ofurkish foreign policy. Fore*an'pt., "rt.d about Turkey,s view of evenrsn soviet Azerbaijan-f1esldent. t'"o"i'ii? of Turkev said Turkev wasoncerned sorely wirh irs own internal probrems ""d;'h;;. Azerbaijanrisis was an internar affair of rh. soui.t union. He further added tharurkey did nor nurture aspirations of a Turkish empire thar wourd encom_ass the Turkic repubrics tr rn" soui.iunion. Rarher, Turkey wourd con_inue to folrow Araturk's poricy of non--.nrurrgil.;l i""r".1,* disputesnd the principle of "peace rn tir. Ho-ll"r,d; pi."f" ;; ,h" v';;?o.,,More imporranrry, ozal srressea ri. Jrrr.r.nces between the Azerbai-anis and rhe Turks. He said ,1,. er.ri"iir'r,i, ,r" Shi;" ";; ;tho.rgf, er"._aijani dialect is crose to Turkish ,h;i;;. separare. ozar arso commirtedhe ulrimate sin from ,t " p..rf..ri"J "i p.""_rurkisrs in Turkey and inzerbaijan by saying thar- the'Azerbailanis, being shi'as, were more aoncern of Iran.r2 Ozal's speech ...rr.d ,

    ripples in snku. olat', .i,"r f"ri,-;;;;i,;ff.T'rh:;::l il*:,:",il:eader oI the socialist parry, said Ozal,s ,.f.r..r.. ." ,ir.T,]."i_!ni." ,ptl,as causing rifts between- Turkey's citizens of different denominations.suleiman Demirer; rhe reader "r ovpl"Jprime minis.., oiiu.t.y, saidhar Ozal's srirem"nr, ignored th" ,.J", principles upon which rheurkish republic was foinded. gut.ni-E..uir, leader of the osp, accusedzal of irresponsibilitv in pushing rlr. soui.r i".ri"liirir;;;;j rran.i3here were also demonst."riois ;; ;;k"r" and Isranbui d.--.anaing uore acrive Turkish rore in Azerbaijan. since then, r".r.llrr'p"rr.y ,o*".dzerbaijan, and in general uis_d_uis Soviebecome more acri visl -,,rn ring., of ;-i,fi :?, n""rt, :li":;." ::1*:;ype' To begin wirh, ozar senr his wif. ser.,ra ro Azerbaijan to reassure thezerbaiiani leaders that Turkey *"t n* i.aifferenr ro their siruarion. Andollowing rhar, conracrs botrr "r "rnti"i'lnd unofficiar levels berweenTurkey and Sovier Azerbaijan in.r."*J dramaticalry, incruding a visir byresi&nt_ Turgur Ozal in the spring "f br'i.This changed Turkish attitude rln**i I grud,r"r bur fundamenrar shifrn Turkey's foreign policy o.i..rtrtior, ,.frecring borh do-.rii. i.r,.top_ments in Turkey and internarionar c-hanges, especiaily rhe end of rhe cordar' A discussion of changes in Turkish-foreign poticy ir u.y.Jri e scope*,iT:;:fJ rI::' onty lertain .,,*,r"r^p;i,,i. p.,rin*i ,o ,* ,,.,ayThe 6rsr poinr is thar in the last few years Turkey has been going

    :: 1-..."nt-"dating the newly de*;;l.T; 4r_'Lrrs E\- wourct grve priras orhers such as Lusrria ""i ;;;J.;, ;;;::, truropean counrries, asGiven the fr.r tirr-.r"i.nrari^^ -^_-,- , - e considering Turkey.i ven the facr rha r orien ra ri on ;;;^;;;;::ffi':?:ff1;I;.*r*in it were rhe underpinii:g: :f fr;k;{;;l;arisr foreign policy, rhc rahanges inevirably ,"rr.lf:l: .o'rir,,,.i ";li;;ry. Ir- is in recogniiion of tl3ijl,,li,*ri*":ji::"1: *l ni*ia."i.ozar ro rhe rurkish f,,,]:':_j:t.. have been saying rt ", r.-lli#;;: Y:l ,:o .h. rurkjsh f,r...t';,:":l1,1?lr:, il e"ia. i,,l;;#oJi.i,:ne rrs parr and that TuThus, rebuff bv lu. rvr LIE'rr POIlcy''Jliffi .",f,::r:{i:::r,fi ' j:ilT"'.1::,J$::Tfi :*:H:I:::::n d rh e'v'es re rn e rs ; ;; ;; #; :''',1_'f ;,il]x ::$:i :[::i:*: lffi.t:JL1i?**l*;\:ffi ';:,',fl :.ii:'g.,":-"r"J",1r..,i,,Turkic" ar. i.l,-..;-^r-. Lr. Les berween "Turkish" rrTu rk i c " a re i nlrea, i nrri- fl, l.:.i' #" ;.l:n, "r..XT:., ; T: 'h: n;;,prorector' and spokesman. for,arr ru.t i. p"e,opre.rr Turkey arso scer:il::i y ::i::",::., :, ::,^ :l ln,l* ;j;;. ;.1.,.,. p o p u r a,ion s a s D ro,,,,il:p riff ,?x nx *i:* : j:* r:'jti, r:t'.1i,H:i';Azerbaijan. A sisn oru rk i sh i n n uen ce i. ^ i-,-l'^'., F;i.+; J:,:l: T"X;J':l*il1fllt1kt'h. influence in a**"ii". *.r'ri."r1i.t"1:ltt_: policv of impl*R:j"i:i#';:;1,',il'ff :l*J,*[iT:yj:.:!:f"':.T':i:i",','':-'l;# r._il;.i;,iii?To.trtron wirh Iran was anotherfacron iurf..r,.f ,,t" ": : *':,*::|1! J'". ::::il :;,1' ::?: ?: : i :: ra v o red, ;, ;. ; ".fJ,?lill.l,'l;:*taiio.nremai;;;*ild;i:-"'il:1.?l'S,,Y:firural role in Soviet ",:lr]:l:1r-o.^1sie,nifi31r economic, politicat, ,rrrd Jurar rore in Soviet A,erbaiian *i;:iJ Mllillililiii,il,Tii,.ill,ior Turkey and for these republr* iriirr',1,i, go"r shourd be purstrerlX,"lnllli.l?#j li::*_t{ .ii, "r. " "a.*.L.," n di visions in thcse r;:'f,7 [:i:il' iH: i n teres ts " ;J';;""'#;Lil :?:1i:.'::::

    4zerbaiian,: search for ieentity Z4.l

    differenr anrlEvenrs in Soviec Azcrbaijan -presented Iran with acure ser of dilemmas. Burdened'by i""i*

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    244 Shireen Hunterwould have a more difficult time managing the Azerbaiiani issue. When cheAzerbaif an crisis erupted in January 1990, Iran was in a delicate posirion interms of its domesric politics and in its international relarions.Domestically, the factional power struggle and positioning for the post-Khomeini period was at irs peak as the Ayatollah Khomeini's healthwaned. The war with Iraq had ended in a ceasefire, leaving chunks ofIranian territory under Iraqi occupation. And the country waseconomically devastated, militarily weak, and in the grips of an intensepolitical debate about the misrakes of its revolutionary decade.lnternationally, the controversy over the Ayatollah Khomeini's edict in1989 that the Indian-born British author Salman Rushdie should be killedon charges of apostasy against Islam in his book Satanic Verses, hadcreated the worst crisis in lran's relations with the West since the time ofthe American hostage crisis. The effects of this crisis were still affectingIran-'West relations tn 1991.The only positive elemenr in Iran's foreign relations at the time was theimprovement of relations with the Soviet Union, which had culminated inthe rhen-speaker of the lranian Parliament Ayatollah Al-Akber HashcrniRafsaniani's trip to Moscow in June 1989.Thus the eruption of the Azerbaiian crisis presented Iran wirh a difficultdilemma: if it were to take a high profile in defense of the Azerbaijanis itwould risk scuttling all recent improvemenrs in ries with the Sovier Union;and if it responded too coolly, it would jeopardize future ties with the Azer-baiianis.In addition, understandably, Iran was concerned about rhe ramifi-cations of events in the Soviet Azerbaijan for its own securiry and terri-torial integriry. Iran was also concerned abour possible Soviet miliraryaction against itself. The ofEcial attitude of the lranian government wascautious and based on the principle of respect for every country's indepen-dence and territorial integrity and support for the legitimate aspirations ofAzerbaiiani Muslims.3eUnofficially, however, opinion on how to respond was divided, withsome segments ddvocating a more activist policy in support of AzerbaijaniMuslims.ao However, the lranian government did nor succumb to thesepressures and continued irs low-key policy. This attitude of rhe lraniangovernment was manipulared by the ultra pan-Turkists in Sovier Azerbai-jan and projected as the modern-day version of historic Russo-lraniancollusion to thwart Azerbaiian's aspirations for unity and independence.After the relative stabilization of the situation in Azerbailan, the Iraniangovernment tried to expand and consolidate relations wirh the republic.Apart from economic agreements between the two countries, the lraniangovernment and unofficial bodies were using cultural and religious affini-ties to cement ties and to prevent a Turkish monopoly of the republic'scultural scene. Cultural societies in Iran and in Baku have been set up,

    Azerbaijan: searcb for identity 245entitled "Nezami Associarions" after rhe great Persian-Azerbaijani poer''Nezanri Gandiavi. A conference commemorating Nezami's 850th a.nivcr-sary was held in Tabriz, the capital of rhe lranian province of EasrernAzerbaijan in June 1991, artended by experts on Persian literarure from theregion and the world. Religious leaders from Iran also visited the republicand there are Soviet Azerbaijani srudenrs in rhe theological schools inGhom. Howe'ver, the Iranians are still cautious in completely opening upthe borders.

    lfhat is cle'ar is that Iran will be keenly interested in the evolution ofevents in the r,:public and their implicarions for its securicy. Iran, ar least atthis point, does not have any irredentist aspiration toward rhe region and ismore concernr:d abour the Sovier Azerbaiian's irredentist claims toward irsown territory, Irs principal objecrive is ro have a presence there and toprevent the enrergence of ulrra pan-Turkic tendencies which could expandto Iran and its Turkic minorities.However, g;rowing Turkish activism has raised concerns in lran. TheIranian press lras been saying rhat by failing to take a more activist arritudetoward Azerbaijan, rhe governmenr is allowing Turkey ro implant itspower rhere arid ro turn it into a NATO base which could be used againstIran.4l Thus, in the immediate future, Iran may try to raise its profile there.In December 1991, the Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati visitedBaku and reached new agreements with Az_erbaijan. He denied the chargesmade in an lzuestia arricle that Iran was againsr Azerbaijani indepen-dence.42Let us briefly consider the issue of Armenia and how it would play inTurkish-Azerbaijani relations. The Armenian leaders, largely because ofpressure by the'Wesr, are seeking to improve ries wirh Turkey.as Bur, as arthe popular level, anri-Turkish sentiments are strong. Too close Turkish-Azerbaijani relarions would affect Armenia's efforrs ro improve ties withTurkey. Iran, by conrrasr, has been a safe haven for Armenians fleeingOttoman repression since the nineteenth century.44 Iran, therefore, canplay the Armenian card in its comperition with Turk'ey. In fact, the Arme-nians, although circugnspecr in their rapprochemenr with lran, have beenkeen on creating airlinks with lran, as well as a land bridge over rhe ArasRiver.a5Also Russia's interest and stake in Azerbaijan would acr as a balanceagainsr Turkish or Iranian dominarion of rhe republic's economic and cul-tural life. A cooperative relationship with both Turkey and Iran would besrserve Turkey's inrerests economically, culrurally, and politically, andwould enhance its independence in these domains.A promising note in rhis regard is the request of Soviet Azerbaijan roioin the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) which groups lran,Turkey, and Pakistan. It may lead to expansion of this organizarion andeventually perhaps include other Soviet Muslim republics.a6

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    A.zerbaijan: search for ideitity 2l245 Sbiyeen HunterAzerbaiiani-Armenian relations: is reconciliation possible?Irr rernrs of f'urdame'tar issr:es of national ide'tity anci cultLrre, theevolurion of rhe nature of Azerbaiian's rerations with irs two Musrimneighbors, Turkey and lran, "r. ..,or. imporrant than any other rerarionsthat the republic may develop with orher counrnes.But in terms of immediat. prorp..t, for Azerbaijan's securiry, poriticarstabiliry' and economic growth and prosperity, rerations with Armenra arethe mosr significanr. The narure of ar.rblil"n,s relarions with Armenia * asmall, land-locked, and isorated christian communrry - would arso have aconsiderable impacr on che characrer of its relario.,, *irt ,t. iVlur,Thus' a repear of rhe kiring of Armenians in Baku inlaniary t990would adversely affecr_'wesrerriopinion "na ir, *rrr-*".rr',1' t.tp ar..-aijan economically. Continued :".f';.; or even worse, ourright war,would prohibit foreign invesrors fromd im m in g i * i ro r pr..r, 7o r ra p i d ;.; " ;;;; Jrffiil:::.: :nt;:,i :;. rl::irh Armenia would also undermine Azerbaijr.,, ;;;;l;i,ij por,ri.,nuis-d-uis irs rwo Iarge neighbors. In rerms of Azerbaiian's a"o.n"rrl poliricalevolutio', continued confricr with Arrnenia would i,.the. urJ"r-i". ""yhances, which are already slim, for tt.r. a.u.topment of democraric rnsfrrll-tions in the near future.The currenr Azerbaijani^readership, which has strong authorirarran re'_dencies, would use the conflict *irh n.m.nia and rhe exrernar rhreat ro tl.rerepublic's rerriroriar integriry in order ro jusrify undemocraric rure. Moredangerous wourd be tharihe A.-.r,i"n-A#bairani .."ni.i1"., fr"ro.no_Karabagh could Iead to rheir ou.r--irii".izarion, much as rhe Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir led to tt,. *irit".irarion and nuclearizarionof the Indian subcontinent. If this were ro h"pp.n, rhe imprications wouldgofar beyond the rwo repubrics and wourd destabilize neighboring areas as

    Nagorno-Karabagh and the roots of the Armenian-Azerbaijani disputeThe focus of the recent Azerbaijani-Armenian dispure has been confricr_ing territorial craims in regard to the mounrarnous region of Nagorno-Karabagh, a small autonomous area, parr of Azerbaijan, bur wirh an over-whelmingly Armenian popuration.-D.rpii. a reducrion in ,r,. -..g,on,,Amenian popularion, the Armenianr h"u. a 70 percenf "r"i".i, in rhisBur other factors beyond. rerritoriar grievances have conrributed tomutual animosity- The ge'resis of the Karlbagh dispure J"* ,o'ir,. .".r,eriod of the esrabrishmenr.of conrror by th* new Bolshevik regime overthe Tsar's possessions in the T."nr."u."rur, ond ,1," U"gin"iii of rh.rocess of carving rerritorial srates out of ther.r.

    o. i ;':,ili ; i.: * f i+i i : Jffi r,[T: ! j:,-":ff ::ff:5 ;ff ::j,,:; Il:H ,:'1i;;J:,1t :he bu'e'u';;;;;; rhis earrier decision and *ou. ,,g ro u n ;1 s, r, ", a,. liii iLll ": :i,ilT.: ::;ff a: *,,i,:.ffi lf:i:i ffhe Armenians of .Karab"kh;;;i;;"in " b.rr., dil;;;nomic:rryowever' Azerbaijani p'o,.r,, "-nlltli .on...n for Turkey', pr.f...,,.. ,ave common borders *i,t nr..ulti"""*... o,i,.. i*po.r]'n,-r1.,o., i,, ,t,hange of hearr' But the il;-il;; i"1 yn9r. signi'cant in the srvreecision ro give rhe area "r N"r.i.i.""n, -irh il r*i" e.il.ni"n -,n,rr,,r,nd which is physicalty ,.p",;;;;'i;oi-, ir..u",;^; ;; ;;;il, t..,it.,, y;:j::':J?:.I;,j $: 'o,"' "i ",'iu,o,,o-o,,, repubric. rhis change ,,

    I A:"*.xr,:, trHi'{,,l. ;*1* :::'ff**i;:i Hfffi:communar rensions. b.t*..n ,r,.'ar..u"iianis and rhe Armenians rr,rvee,n,an endemic o::ll:l r,' ,f.,;, *ri"" since the ";;;;;;, of .r,rrffi, :r;Jil:,'J:,-{:1.":4 : &i':.d : :., :T ;:, r j*#i::r::il :t; ; jjnT::1ff'lJ;it"J :t-'l:, rvincil ,.r'*...a ur.,i. ;iG; iirri"e "i' .,,tailure.to charge n'n-, i,l,f'llJio*1.tto"""ni teacher "ta",r'.--"ri?;;':.In the 1970s' Arnrenian activism with strong nadonalisr ,rd...ur..,,,,,H,,l.LlT?:T in Armenia, i,,...n,.a. lr'.r" 1.,;"i;;; ffi:ffi;il1,,.,i:lli..T?:,?i$*i#[,i:'l,Jfi rf"*i]rf:j:ii jj'" .l;Tl' :,: jl"J i;.T:n: :!?, y:T: trr;"i l.,H11# lh ;::;;:i:::,,J;l'H'JJ:,g,.: lilll,' " " na ti on a I ism u'-"l "ui'd * o i a r,

    -i I I ;;;:#fi -1IIncreased Armenian nationalism, coupled with the opporruniries offcrc,ry glasnosr' resurted in rurn in rn o,rrpouring of Azerbaijani narionarisrrrndeed, it has been ,.cy!d ,r,", i"rJ,irinll']qr_.nir. nationalism, .r;r;;;iized in rhe claim to Karabagh, ilii;;rercame official "r,a ooori,"pathy in Azerbaijan 1nd r.a ,"" ,r-'l'J.J.tJo-..,, of popurar and nari.,,,list groups's' Through^ rlss, p.o,"lrJ,"al;i""r,racions, urr6,sr;L.-"1.,.',ll:J;:il1Tft?-T1"i; Armenia, "rr "i-.i'", gaining ,r,. ",in.",i,; TiJ;l. A particularly importanr watershed in rhe worsening of Azerbaiiarrrf,'.f i',il fi:ffi ',,Ti,ilxff#*l.":.'#*;:**:nff:t*'ji,uarv 28-29' r9gg, bv rhe Azerblij""r y"rii. These .i",r..r"I*)-i"":j:,i Azerbaijan: search for identity 249

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    248 Shireen Huntersive property damage and large numbers of dead and wounded, with esti--ut.i urtyi.tg according to Soviet or dissident sources'Similar "ti".ks *... ,.rrd. by Armenians on Azerbaiiani communitiesand villages. Rising rension between Azerbaiianis and Armenians alsoresulred in large migration of peoples from each republic. These r.efugees,especially the Arerb"ilani refugees in Baku, became a maior contributor tothe worsening relations betwien the two peoples' increased nationalistpassions, 6n"lly leading to the large-scale massacre of Armenians in Bakuin the winter of 199o, "id ,h" introduction of Soviet military forces to Bakuin January.3in.. ,h^, time, while there has not been anything resembling what hap-pened in Baku, Azerbaiiani-Armenian clashes have continued and all.ffo.r. at reconciliation, including those engineered by Boris Yeltsin, Presi-dent of the Russian Federation, and Nursultan Nazarbayev, President ofKazakhstan on September 21, 1991, failed to resolve the problem. Thecrash of a helicopter on a peace mission in November 1991 carryingofficials from Azertaiian, Kazakhsran, the KGB, the Defense Ministry, andthe Russian Republic's parliamenr, was blamed by Azerbaiian on the Arm-enians.S1 The outlook for a quick resolurion of this problem is notpromising. Rather, with the Sovier Union's disintegration and the rush bytoth Ar.r,enia and Azerbaiian to form national armies, the risk of outrightwar between the two republics has increased'

    The principal culprit: religion, ethnicity, or the legacy of Sovietimperialism and mismanagement?while rhe dispure over the territory of Nagorno-Karabagh is theimmediate and most tangible cause of Armenian-Azerbaiiani conflict,other factors have also conqributed to this problem' During the crisis ofJanuary 1990 and the massacre of Armenians in Baku, many wesrernLbr.ru"rr, especially journalisrs, referred to religious and ethnic differencesberween the^Azerbailanis and the Armenians as the underlying causes ofconflict between the two PeoPles.No doubt these factors are important, but nevertheless, undue emphasis

    on rhem, especially religion, should be avoided. In fact, the case of theArmenian communities in neighboring Iran, including the Iranian Azerbai-jan, proves that religious differences have never been an insurmountableobstacle to peaceful and even friendly coexistence'since rhe safavid times in lran, Armenian communities have lived insafety in that country. Admittedly, non-Muslims do not enioy equal rightswirh Muslims in Islamic societies run by Islamic law. But they enioy pro-rection and freedom to Practise their faith. In secularized Muslim societies,they enjoy equal sratus with other citizens. This was increasingly the casein lran under the secularizing influence of the Pahlavis"

    The situation worsened after the Islamic revolution as Islamic law andmorality was enforced with greater rigor. But there was no gross violationof the Armenian cornmtrnity's rights, at least not more than those of otherIranians whc, did not fit the Islamic mold promoted by rhe newgovernment,In shorr, rhe main problem has never been religion but rhe lack ofdemocracy. 1'hus, religious abuses thar the Armenian community inNKAO suffen:d, such as the destrucrion of churches, especially during theoeriod rhar Gaider Aliev was the KGB boss of Azerbaijan, were the con-i.q.r.n." of anti-religious dimensions of Communism and not the anti-Christianism f Islam.52The erhnic factor is more important, given the identification of Azerbai-janis as "Turks," and in view of the unhappy experience of the Armeniancommuniry in Otroman Turkey even before the tragic events of 1915,which is imprinted on their collective consciousness as wilful genocide.But again, rhis facror should not be exaggerated, Certainly rhe linguisri-cally Turkified Iranian Azerbaijanis have lived peacefully with the Arme-nians. Even in Kemalist Turkey inter-communal relations have improved.Nevertheless, the Armenians' historic memory of suffering at the hands ofrhe "Turks" colors their present attitudes. Thus every Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict acquires dimensions which go beyond what is justifiedby the specific incident as they merge with rhis collective consciousness ofArmenian suffering.Erhnic anirnosity steadily increased following the introduction ofRussian power and the relative favoring of the Armenians as fellow Chris-tiarrs. Thus even in earlier times, envy and disparity in social and economtcconditions have been more important than mere ethnic differences.s-rRepressive policies adopred by Communist regimes only exacerbatedrhese rensions. These policies, plus the manipulation of inier-ethnic conflictboth by the local Communist leadership and central power in Moscow rnrhe battle between reformers and hard-liners' as well as the center's vacilla-rion and confusion during the early part of the crisis in 1988 and Gorba-chev's desper^te ^nd inept efforts to keep a crumbling union together, havebeen principal culprits in exacerbating Azerbaijani-Armenian animosity.5aIndeed, some observers have gone so far as to accuse the communistesrablishment in Azerbaijan of complicity with hard-liners in Moscow inprovoking the worst of Azerbaiiani-Armenian clashes, namely those inSumgait in 1988 and in Baku in 1989*1990. These riots were supposed roshow the dangers of perestroika and glasnost, and thus discourage thecentral government in Moscow from pursuing them. In January 1990,arracks against the Armenians were allegedly provoked in order to pave theway for the introduction of the Russian army to Baku in order to crush theAzerbaijani independence movemenr, This move at the time was viewed aspro-Armenian by rhe Azerbaijanis. They maintained that undue influence

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    250 Sbireen Hu.nterof rhe Armenians within the Moscow establishmenr was the reason for rhismove. lr is very dif6cult ro ascerrain rhe veraciry cif rhese.r,r.g.r. Buc rhereseems to be enough circumstanrial evidence ro support the rhesis that somedegree of. manipularion by locar and cenrral authorities was indeedinvolved, both in the Sumgaic and Baku evenrs.Certainly the attitude.of rhe_centrar governmenr roward rhe issue ofNasor19:K-ara bagh, and the. confl icti ng .r"i-, of Azerba,irjan "nd A.-.r,i"since i.987 largely depended on the rwo repubricr' pori,ion, on the issueof independence or remaining wirhin the union. Tirr, *h.r, Ly A,.,g,..rr1990 Armenia seemed to be moving toward indep.nde.,c" *nir" Azerbai_jan indicated thar ir was wiiling ro remain in rhe u"i";;-';h. centralgovernment began ro shift toward a more pro-Azerbail".,i poriiro.,. Thusduring the Azerbaijani-Armenian clashes *hi.h rook pr"..'i.'rrr"y rssr,soviet rroops and Azerbaijani forces cooperated "g"ir,r, the Armenianmiliria.The immediate cause for rhese crashes was sovier efforrs ro disarm Arm-enian militia which the-repubrican governmenr rr"a p.o-ir.Jr;;; but hadnot been able to comprete. But the Armenians accused the cenrrar govern-menr-of using this prerext to punish Armenia for having i"ir.d;; sign rhenew Union Treary, and thus sided with Azerbaiian.ssorhers relared rhis ro -the intra-leadership .or,fli., in Azerbaijan becweenMutalibov and Hasan Hasanov, the Azerbail"ni .q"i*-r"*'lf o p.i*.Minisrer. The Karabagh issue has been manipurarei by uoriou, facrionsand groups in Azerbaiian in efforts to gain power and influence.r6Bur perhaps more rhan any factor orhei rhan p"riri."i."pi.rrion "ndconomrc stagnarion, rhe inherenr inconsistencies of the notio'n-ol .,ro.i"l_ist inrernationalism" and irs contradicrion with th. .,.tion-i.rrtdi.,g poti_cies of sovier leadership which began under Starin t,"r. .".,riuured tocurrenr difficulties nor only in-Azerbaijan, but "fr" i"1rn.;;;;;r*;;;;soviet empire. The essence of sociarisr inrernarionalism was that crassInteresrs and lovalries rather rhan erhnic and rerigiou; ;;;;i";sms andallegiances would consriture principar u""at rrninf;il;;:'sociaristsociety' But a socialisr society cannor be created oi.rnigi.,t- t,lot o.,ty th.old socioeconomic and poriticar strucrures have ro u"" air-u",red, butpeoqle.must be cured of iheir religior* u'i narionarist and ethno-cenr.cprocfivtrles.

    ... This goal .was supposed to be achieved by what the soviets called"inrernarionalist education." Even as lare as r9g7_'9gg, Gorbachevblamed rhe _ourpouring of nationarist senrimenrs and ethnic viorencethroughout th-e empire on the governmenr's laxness in inrernarionalist edu_cation' The fact, however, is rhar erhnicity and religion rr"u. prou"nstronger forces of group identificarion than class.Moreover, in a paradoxical way, the soviet poriry of carving our separ-ate terrirorial and culrurar entities of ethnicary, .utiu."rty, "ni..ilgiourty

    Azerbaijan: searcb for identity Zinterpenetrated Asian possessions of the Tsar herve conrributedheighrened sense of erhnic and cu"rttrrar p:rrticur:rrism. This increasedof separareness has sown rhe seeds of furure conflicrs.In cenrral Asia, fo.r_ example, because of the communisrs, nabuilding srraregies, suddenly rhe mixed Turko-Iraniun-rrtumic'.urturhe region has become divided into Tajik, Uzbek, ;;; n;;;..iog",wirh hisroric falsi'cation practised by ih.'r,ew sysrem, the legacy opolicy has been ethnic and cultuiar conflicr and unrearistic irredeclaims by these new entiries toward rheir neighbors. The u.r, .*"*prhis is the fabrication of rhe notion of Norrhern and Sourher' nr"ruoi1In addition ro this process of state- and nation-building, *t i.r, oruared erhnic and religious parricurarism rarhe*rrr.-r"ii..i.g socinrernationalism, Sovier policies, s.uch as playrng one erhnic group ag11o1h.er' forced displacement of ethnic groupr, such as rhe rransfer ofMeshketian Turks ro predomi'a.,trf sun'i uzbekisran. Drawinborders without adequare concern abour ethni. una ti.,g;irr-J-f".r.:":! ."t.leaving the persian-speaking Tajiks of samarkand and Bukin Uzbekisran - also conrribured to "rhni. und .,.lru.ui .ir"rry'"ii"r,,,siry' In the case of NKAO, the fare o[ rhe region was nor decided o'basis of its ethnic composirion nor on the principre of narionardetermination.As long as the central governmenrrhese feelings were kept benearh rhelifted under glasnost, ro Gorbachev'pouring our.

    pursued a total policy of represssurtace. But as soon as the lids urter surprise these feelings ci. Economic sragnation, environmentar damage, and other socioecon,rshorrcomings of rhe sovier sysrem furrher exacerbated ethno-culturarmositv' In fact, rhe Azerbaijani-Armenian conflicr "; L;;;;;;i, in ",ion to irs obvious territorial dimensions, has been affected by all thfacrors. probably under a.rruly open -rl;i.rl;;;i;;;;;lu,y prpetng system the Karabagh Armenians' desire f". "ni6;;;Lr, *Armenia would have becomi much ress inrense, if not tora[y-"ii*innt"Moreover, if inter-repubric curturar and other ;"";;;;;'.lop..^,i.,,,had been kept at a high rever, rhe Armenians would nor have f"rt ,.pu."tfrom rheir kin and rhus wourd nor have seen any need for rerriroriar rerr6carion.57In rhe more recenr pasr, the same lack of understanding of the forcesethnicity by the soviet.leadership, especiaily Gorbachev, .In,.rL,rr.a ,,,misha.ndling of the Armenian-Azerbaiyani conflicr. tnde.d, -" -consrcomplaint in rhe Soviet Union and abioad was rhat Gorbachev hadundersranding of the nationariries probrem nor any rear interest in ir, rany clear plans to deal with it.s8It seems rhat the Soviet readership was srunned ro 6nd our rhar rsovier Union was nothing but a coioniar empire, and rhar as soon

    Azerbaiian: search for identity 253r!ffii,',,,,,ffit.',i.i

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    252 Sbireen Hunteropportunity was offered. the non-Russrln l::r'le would exPress rheir anti-colonial sentlments ln an tlpsurge oI narionelist feelings'Thus,Gorbachev's,r"ttmt"t-thatbyexpressingnationalistfeeiingsandtheir desire fo. ind.ptndtnlt, tht Armenians were stabbing at the heart of;;;r;;iL; *^, th.^ait"tt "'ult of rhis lack of awareness' ln addition' asnoted before, ,t,. ..tt""i gou"'n-tnt's efforts to hold the union togetherwithout at the same ti-.."o-pt"tely.reverting ro rhe repre.ssive methods ofthe past, despite ".t;;i;i ""t

    of milirary Power' led to a policy ofinconsistency ".,a u"itt"'iot o" the NKAO issue' as indeed on rhe entirenationality problem. r .---.:-- ^-.--in" ..rui, *", the exacerbation of rhe conflict and growing anlmosltyby both the Armenta";-;;J rhe Azerbaijanis toward the Russians and thecentral government in Moscow'What the "Uou" i*fii* for the future of Armenian-Azerbaiiani rela-tions is thar the ."..""ir.".", or r^r^u"t h is untenable. lt is very unlikelythat an overwhelmingly Armenian area could remain under Azerbaiianijurisdiction' no*.u.iJh;;; ;tt no easy alternatives to the current situationeither. For instance, n"i't't' the return of NKAO to Armenia' nor a repatri-ationoftheArmeniatp"p"f"'i"t'areplausiblealternatives'Theso-calledBaku plan mediated Uy!lf rrit and Nazarbayev envisaged keeping the areaas part of Azerbaiia,,'Ut" "L'o holding free elections and granting NKAOcomplete self-rule. S,'t,-'o far rhese !lat'' h"t" not been

    implemented'Indeed, it seems in..*'i"gly unlikely that either Moscow or other AsianRepublics could find " p"i."rrr solution to rhis problem. Thus, some kindof internation"t - ir,.l,.tiitg ptth"p' United Nations .- mediation and inter-vention appear necessary'However, once the ilfaO t1ispute is .settled' and after a period ofhealing, there ls.,o ui"Utt-'""'on *'hy Azerbaiian and Armenia cannot livein peace, if not in ,",;l;;it' To achieve this goal' however' in addition toresolving th. fr.uU"gft ptoUttrn, care should be taken not to exacerbatethe Armeniarrr' r".tiigr'of being encircled. An irredentist, pan-Turkic""f fit .t the part of A?erbaijan iould do iust thar' exacerbl': 'ft Arme-il""j i".fl"LJ"f .".ittfement and being alone' Viewed in this light'.thepJl.y

    "fou".rly p.omoting Turkey- as ihe main influence in Azerbaiian

    could backfir", .u..,--*i.h"r"."nt efforrs of the Armenian leadership toimprove ties with TurkeY'Post.AugustlgglcoupdevelopmentsandoutlookforthecharacterofAzerbaii ani governmentThecommuntstestablishmentinAzerbaijanwasnevercomfortablewith perestroika and glasnost' However'. they manipulated^these'issues'and even more so ,fr. fi"r"U"gh problem, in their internal in-fighting' Thisin-hghring "nd -".,ip.tl"tiot'i'st led to the dismissal of Kamran Bagirov

    and his replacement by Abdul Rakhman Vezirov, and then the dismissal ofVazirov and the comrng to Power of Ayaz Mutalibov' Moreover' followingMoscow,s military int?ru.rtion in Baku, the Azerbaijanis, including thei.rl.*r,lp, de,veloped a srrong dislike o-f and resenrmenr toward Gorba-.iJ, p.rr"n, although for a variety of reasons, including concern over["r^b"gh, thc:y maintained reasonable ties with Moscow'Thus, wher.r the coup attempt took place in August Lggl' the Azerbai-iani leadershilr was pl.ased' It'deed, Azerbaijan's president Ayaz Mutali-fi;,';;;; ii,. it-"'** visiting Iran, expressed his satiifacrion ar Gorba-chev's dismissal.fe l-t. i*tt denitd that he had done so' But these denialsalJ no, satisfy' opposition forces' On September 5' Moscow Radio broad-caStareportthatMutalibovhadsurvivedanassassinationattemptandblamed tire A:zerbaif an Popular Front for ir. But this was denied by Azer-baijani sources.5oIndeed, Ayaz Mutalibov managed to consolidate his power and beelected as prer;ident in the election on September 8 in which he ran unop-;;;. il! ",.,fy other candidare, a Social Democrat once af6liated wirhipp, Zurau.ht Ali Zade, withdrew his candidacy at the lasr minute''--er.ru"ii"n moved quickly to declare irs independence as ir became clearby';;;i;-tigz rh^, rhe Soviet Ur.rion was no more and rhat the so-called;'co*_o.*ealth of lndependent stares" did not have much chance of;i;;;;g it. "l-he disintegiation of the Soviet Union inrensified the po*'er,ii"ggr""*i,i,in th" er".6aijani leadership. Ir also led to the flaring up

    ofthe conflict wirh Armenia over Nagorno-Karabagh. ln fact, the problem ofiJ;;t; K^rabagh and rhe Azerbaiiani power struggle became inextric-ably linked rogether.conscious of the facr rhat with the end of the soviet Union they were leftto themselves to settle the Karabagh issue' the two sides took measures'Jni.i i.J to fierce fighting in the winrer and spring of 1992' In January'A,ler'aiian decided 'o uring Karabagh under irs direct iurisdiction, an acrwhich contributed ,o ,h. fr"ri.rg uf of conflict. During the fighting thenr.rt-"ii""i, suffered serious ,.u-..r.t and a large number of Azerbaiianiswere killed by the Armenian forces, particularly in the Kholali and Agdarnvillages. These reverses convinced the Azerbaijan Popular Front and theofpJn.rlr, of President Ayaz Mutalibov.to force him out of office' In viewol in. r.rg_enred narure of the ApF and the divisions within the old com-munist esiablishment after Mutalibov's removal, the future of Azerbaiian'sleadership became very clouded. Elections were scheduled for Jtne 1992"ij i, surprised many rhar they were held. vhile various faffions pro-...a.awithdevelopingtheirseparatemiliria'adevelopmentwhichdidnot,"g", *.ff for Azerba]ian's stabiliry, elections provided citizen particrpa-tion through , .,o.,-uiol.tt outlet' The man elected to the presidency' APFi."a., RbJ Fez llcibey, promised to regain Nagorno-Karabagh for Azer-baiian'

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    254 Shireen HunrerThe .Azerbaijani readership crisis made resolurion of rhre Karabaghproblenr r'or-e dif6curr-by making ir exrremery t".d ro. "ny"Azerbaiianieader to be flexible. In facr, o.,. oith..h"rgu, againsrpresident Muralib.vwas rhat he u'ras roo flexible on this rnarrer. A^s a_resurt, throughout sp.ng1992, various mediation efforts by lran, the GSCE, and the United Nationsro solve_rhis pnoolem did nor yield any resulrs.. Another consequence of the heighrened Karabagh crisis and Azerbai_jan's leadership probrems was " --or. intervenrionisc rurkrsh policyuis-d-uis Azerbaijan, partry in view of ApF's pro-Tu.kish "nJ p"n-ru.tirttendencies, whereas Mutaribov was ftlore even-handed i" .L'rra ro rera_tions wirh Azerbaijan's rwo big neighbors. Turkish leaders;;:;'", Turgurozal and Mesut Yilonaz op"nly Jdrrocut.d a more active and inrrusiveTu_rkish policy on the issue of Nagorno_Karabagh.In sum' as was noted earrier_in ihis .rr"y, ,n.?"pid disintegration of rheTri:r union broughr ro rhe fore Azerbarran's many conrradictrons anddivisions' consequently, on the eve of irs independenc.,-;;;;;r.public,s[uture seemed very uncerrain.

    ConclusionsSoviet Azerbaijan

    l"di,:.p.".ple are going rhrough-a process thar manyof rhe new narions of rhe Third^worrd"experienced during rhe 1960s andI970s knorvn as rhe process o[ narion-buirding. In doing so, rhey are rryingro rediscover rheir o11r. In chis exercise, rh.y are U.,.i..,.a Uy cie So,rietlegacy of h istoric faisi fi ca rion, r"r."a-i"ri.,izarion, a nd R ussi fi carion.what rhey discover about rheir own history and curtural roors is ofrenincomparible wirh rheir currenr and future vision of th.-r.ru.r. Thur,some of rhe Azerbaijani inte'ectuars are engaging in historic revisionism ofheir own and are reinterpreting hisrory inirder to 6r their presenr goars.'Historic revisionism, romanticism, and even mythification of one,shistory- is a pracrice rhar ail nacionr .ng"g. in ro varying degrees. Bur in thecase of soviet Azerbaijan, if pushed tlo"fur, it couid J..rL ,.rio.rs prob_lems for them in their external ties.This search for identiry and efforts ar narion-buirding are happening ina highly conrrolled atmoiphere within o n"r.o* erire. popurar debate onthese issues and the range of.parricipants are rimited. Thus, wharever irsourcome' it may not be very lasting. In rhis process, Azerbaijan is feeringthe impact of several "rp..ti of irs Jhnic, ting,rlrti., .uf r,rr"l "na ,.tigiou,composirion. The people are divided as difFerenr ;r;r;;;.;',i. o,rrr ofone facror (religion) or anorher (language) ro, ar times, vasrry differenrdegrees.Moreover, there are extremisr rendencies within different groups whichf:*: complicate problems "f n"rion_Uuil,ting ".,d increase the risk oftragmentation along sectarian and other lines. Azerbaijan,s p.obl._, of

    fii!,. i;,;; 1:l;:O"rr,oo are exacerl,. ,,ed by rF,e presence of tw,,i"narge" neigt;*'i.ilil*?{rE:i::"[iT'i:i:,r.#ilil*tru*";m::1,il';ri";'J.-'i..#r!'Jr1]:iT.":y:li'il*#'#i[.H+*lhf*zarion. ciu.n ,n.l1lll^tl o:ttbaijan were to go roo far in self-TurkeyidistincrA;;;"""'"1'.:iii:l:'r"+il:i;-'"?*iJ;?,:iti::*11,H;i;' 'Bi;l:"fi:::'_Tn::Um.:* i:l l. coultvr ruture prospe*or srabirirv and e1o13mi. er"*iil-r, i'.r...tnrio.,, with Armenia. wirh'u:illi:i::ffi l:l;"ir:l:;:;;i*1.-;:l$;;;bi"nmayc,,,o"ver-m i I i ra ri za ri o n, " r, a a.t-" y ; ; ;:;::?j :;:::#TT1iliCiven where it is locared, Azerbaiian w"na ini..n",rr"i'o",,,,.s. oursiders *,,i,,11:.jtTe_be drawn in""'"" #i:l'lJ: drflti,jtjti*::+,;;;-_:,' ":an's furure would be "ffecred-L;;h*';;ooens ro rhe Commorndependenr srates. r","r .i,*ii,",i"" ii'in. Russian presence w,ii,',':'.""".1i*"::,fi:i?:?:::r."*,i:,:=q.;d;;;;:f i rs fra g m en ta t i o n . o r a r., i " r, "' i, i gt'fi :,.ffi....T fl .:l,:ilT jff::-*:iT:n}1if" Iran whicir "I^o1,...,uinry wourd increas

    #,.i'".ji# #:l'::**i :' f.*",' ffi l*: * ri:lt frif #ft |fis rrufu i', in.:; rH i r1j*r,h;il,T:.}ili#Fil flt', Ir would also allow-A.*.bi,i;';;i:; more consrructive an

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    260 Shireen Huntercaucasus," Souiet Nationalities Suruey, united states Department of srare,Bureau of Intelligence and Research, no. 15, August 22' 1988' p. 10'52 See Ronald Suny, "The Revenge of the Past: socialism and Ethnic conflict inTranscaucasia ," Neut Left Reuiew, no. 184, November/December 1990' Seealso Saroyan, "The Karabakh Syndrome."53 On Gorbachev's vacillarion, see Mark saroyan, "Trouble in the Transcauca-sus," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 45, no. 2, March 1989' p' 18'

    .54 On the pro-Azerbaiian tilr, see "Armenians and Azerbailanis clash in TwoSoviet Villages," Christian Science Monitor, May 7, 1991' p. 5.5J On Mutalibov-Hasanof rivalry, see ibid.55 On the Armenians' cultural grievance, see Saroyan "The KarabakhSyndrome."57 On Gorbachev's lack of understanding of nationality problems, see LudmillaAlexeyeva "Unrest in the Soviet Union," Wasbington Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 1,Winter 1990, pp. 63-77. Also, Quentin Pecl, "Dagger at Heart of Perestroika,"Financial Times, January 18, 1.99O, p. 17 .58 See Elizabeth Fuller, "The Azerbailani Presidential Election: A one HorseRace," Report on the LSSR,vol. 3, no, 37, September 13, 1991, p' 14-

    11 Armenia: the nation awakensNORA DUDWICK

    In a speech ro rhe Armenian parliament in ocrober, 1990, Levon Ter-Perrosian observed thar the "Armenian people finally woke up from irsdelightful slumber" ro realize rhe realiries of its situation.l In his commenr,Ter-Petrosian,, now president of Armenia, was using one of the mostpopular tropes of nationalism.2 Ninereenrh-cenrury nationalist discoursede6ned -the dr:velopmenr of vernaculars and the exploration of folklorewhich formed the first phase of European nationarism as rhe...redis-covering' of something deep-down always known."3 Metaphors ofawakening, rediscovery, and regeneration, all of which appear wirh fre-quency in Arnrenian public discourse, are apr for conceptu alizing nationalsentiment in Armenia, for which, despite an unbroken presencc of nearly3,000 years on rhe Armenian plateau in Asia Minor, ..hisrory has been abroken trail."4The formation of the Armenian PeopleIt has yet to be ascertained whether Armenians originated in wesrernAsia Minor or wherher rhey were among the narive inhabitanrs of rhe hieh-lands of easrern Anarolia. Nor is it known where rhe term "Armenia,""orthe indigenous rerm, "Hayastan" originates,s although Greek and persiansources refer ro "Armina" and "Armenians', as early as 500 B.C.6 TheArmenian tribes were 6rsr recognized around 500 B.c., with the collapse ofthe wealthy kingdom of urartu, centered in van (in present-day Turley).7'lwhether Uramu was pri.marily Armenian, wirh a small ruling elite from adifferent ethnic stock, is today a conrentious issue for Armenian hisrorianseager to prove that Armenians were indigenous to easrern Anatolia.Articles on Armenia's relation to the kingdom of Urarru periodicallyappear in the local press.s Polirically, early Armenia was made up offeuding dynastic principaliries, a partern which conrinued throughoui rh.medieval period, making Armenia a prey to larger neighboring empires. Atthe same time, this pattern probably ensured the survival of a^ distinctethnic identity since part of Armenian territory continually maintainedsome autonomy and thereby resisted assimilationist pressures.eThe adoprion of chrisrianity as the state religion ar the beginning of rhe

    261

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    262 Nora Dudwickfourth ce*tury', and the crearion of a phoneric, thirry'-six character alphabe .ra century lacer under Church sponsorship, played a major role in mai,rraiir,ing a distinctive Armenian identity, for "in a real sense, Armenians did noaeven fully becorne 'Arrneniar.rs' until rhey acquired their own distinctivelyArmenian religion . ."lo In A.D. 4sl, at rhe Battle of Avarayr, st. VardanMamikonian and his 696 men died resisring rhe persian Empire's arrernprto impose Zoroastrianism on the Armenians. Today, Armenians commem-orate this date as a reminder of their willingness ro martyr themselves fortheir christian faith. what is signiGcant, however, is that for the earlychronicler of this evenr, ir was nor just a religious conflicr. According toElishe, Vardan and his men foughr the persians to defend rheir craditionalcustoms and way of life, evidence thar a sense of distincriveness alreadyexisted among Armenians some 1,500 years ago.ll After the sixth cenruryschism between rhe Armenian and Byzanrine churches, Armenia formed adistinct cultural unit between rhe classical wesr and the persian east.l2Split between the Persian and Roman (and larer, Byzantine) empires by theend of rhe fifrh cenrury, Armenians conrinued to enioy relative auronomydespire rendering nominal fealry ro rheir imperial rulers.lrwaves of invasions by Turkic tribes from cenrral Asia in rhe eleventhcenrury, followed by the Mongol invasions of rhe rhirreenth and fourteenrhcenturies, stimulated Armenian migration to cities rhroughour Europe,Russia, and rhe Middle Easr. By rhe end of rhe Gfreenrh ..nr.,.y, ih.ottoman Turks had esrablished themselves in consrantinople, and rvereextending rheir power inro Anarolia. The orroman Empire iuled religiousminorities through rheir religious leaders; rhus, the patriarch of rhe Arme-nian Aposrolic church became rhe functional head of rhe Armenian com-munity, or millet. The church became rhe single mosr imporranr insciru-tion of Armenian life within the ottoman Empire,la and "from rhe fiftee'thto the late ninereenth cenrury, whoever led rhe church spoke for whatthere was of the nation."15A sixteenth-cencury rreaty with rhe persian Empire divided Armenia inroa western portion under ottoman hegemony and an eastern portion underPersian hegemony. The new boundary rransformed Armenia into a perpe-tual rhearer of war, as military campaigns, pillage, deportations andfamine during rhe following cenruries accelerared the depopulation of rheArmenian hinterland, ultimately turning Armenians into a minoriry intheir homeland.16 In contrast to rhe impoverishmenr of rhe Armenianheartland, a prosperous commercial bourgeoisie developed in rhe urbandiaspora. It was among these communities that a nationaiist consciousness6rst developed. Now permanent "outsiders," Armenians turned rheirattention to rhe plight of the distanr but longed-for homeland. In rhesecities, they were also exposed ro the revolutionary and nationalist currentswhich began to sweep Europe in rhe eighreenrh and nineteenrh cenruries.As in Europe, nationalism among Armenians developed unevcnry among

    soc.:, i." ",s and.egtons, beginr,,,rg wirhphasi. r.r'h,,::r iecl to a militanr camnaign forArmenia: the nation at*,ak-es 16.l

    a purely culrural and lirer.uvthe "national idea_"17The first awakeninga[e "prehisrory"' of Armenian narionalism can be dated to rhe sixteerrrlrcenrury, when an Armenian currural renaissance b.g"" l;-,h; diasp'rr,The use of rhe printing press by Armenian commerciar entrepreneurs lctrro a srream of publications in Armenian,^incruding ri.-Hrri'p.i"ted Ar-menian Bible (Amsrerdam, 1.666), and the 6rsr iournal of Armenian affairr(Madras, L7 94). Afi rhese pu blicarions disseminated E"."p;;; R.naissancelearning amons Armenians.rs A. very signi6cant f";;;:;..;i-'; Armeni*rculru.ral awakening was rhe ..dir.o.,..y"and repubric"ri"" -"i Armenii,lclassical religious, riterary and hisroric"i ,.*,, by rhe rra"r.r,ir".i* monks,an Armenian Benedictine order founded in Venice in the eighreenrh cen"rurv're The Mekhirarists' efforts were aimed ";;i;;;d.";;i, f.ii*"ro or_menian communities of the ortoman Empire, "u", ,rt./*.J.".li.rut ,,o, ,,,transform cultural views into poridcar trends."2o Hirro.i."i "Jmychologi_al Armenian heroes who had resisted foreign dominarion were offered r,Armenians primarily as sources of pride anJ spiriruar u"tu.r.-ir," conceptof the "narion," however, remained .urtrrr"i rarher i-t,"" 'p"iiri.al antrwirhin rhe ottoman Empire, where the bulk of ,h; A;;;l"lloput"tionsrill formed an impoverished, semi-lirerare, often Turkish-speaking mass,rhe "nation" as a self-consc^ious enriry consisted pri-"rily ;;,h. miilet,ttclerical and wealthy classes,2tFollowing the Mekhitarisrs modificarion of the ancient literary ran-guage, grabar, Khatchatour Abovian popurarized " ,"ai."ily ,,,oJifi.d u..-nacular with the pubricarion of his ,,tuer, wounds of Armenia. This ver-nacular subsequently became the medium "f "r, ir,.