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2021 IL App (5th) 210170-U

NO. 5-21-0170

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ In re JAYLA H., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Madison County. ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 17-JA-234 ) Kristina S., ) Honorable ) Amy Maher, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Boie and Justice Moore concurred in the judgment. ORDER ¶ 1 Held: We affirm the trial court’s judgment where the court’s findings that the

minor’s mother was an unfit parent and that termination of her parental rights was in the minor’s best interest were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 2 Respondent, Kristina S. (Mother), appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of

Madison County finding her unfit and terminating her parental rights to her daughter, Jayla H.

For the following reasons, we affirm.

NOTICE

This order was filed under

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is

not precedent except in the

limited circumstances allowed

under Rule 23(e)(1).

NOTICE Decision filed 11/09/21. The text of this decision may be changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of the same.

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¶ 3 I. Background

¶ 4 Mother has four children, J.C. Jr. (age 17), whose father, J.C. Sr., resides in Michigan;

Jayla H. (age 12), whose father, James H., is deceased; and K.C. (age 6) and M.C. (age 5), whose

father is T.C. Sr. T.C. Sr. also has two other children, T.C. Jr. (age 9) and T.C. (age 8).1

¶ 5 On October 8, 2017, when Jayla H. was eight years old and T.C. was four years old, the

Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) was contacted after Mother was

charged with two counts of aggravated battery involving T.C. and one count of aggravated

battery involving Jayla H. According to DCFS service plan narratives, Alton police reported that

Mother and T.C. Sr. had been drinking and were very intoxicated while caring for all six

children. Mother reportedly became angry at T.C. for not being quiet, punched T.C. in the face

multiple times, and stomped on his face with her bare feet. Mother also struck Jayla H., causing

her to suffer bruising. T.C.’s injuries were so severe that he was first transported to Alton

Memorial Hospital and then to Cardinal Glennon Children’s Hospital in St. Louis, Missouri.

After releasing M.C. and K.C. to their paternal grandmother and T.C. Jr. to his mother, DCFS

took protective custody of J.C. Jr. and Jayla H.

¶ 6 On October 12, 2017, the State filed juvenile petitions with respect to Mother’s children.2

The petition, alleging two counts of abuse and neglect pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987

(Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2016)), requested the trial court adjudicate Jayla H. a

ward of the court; specifically, the State alleged that Jayla H. was abused as defined in section 2-

3(2)(ii) of the Act (id. § 2-3(2)(ii)) in that Mother created a substantial risk of physical injury to

1Illinois Supreme Court Rule 663(b) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001) requires only that the minor’s last name be replaced with an initial for privacy reasons. However, to ensure the protection of privacy, we are also using an initial in place of Mother’s last name. Additionally, although not parties to this appeal, two of the identified children share a common first and last name with their respective father. To help protect the identities of these children, we have used their initials only.

2Although this appeal is limited to Jayla H., we have included in the factual recitation certain details involving Mother’s other children only as needed for a clear understanding of the issues presented.

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Jayla H. due to the October 8, 2017, incident and other specified incidents of domestic violence.

The State also alleged that Jayla H. was neglected, as defined in section 2-3(1)(b) of the Act (id.

§ 2-3(1)(b)), in that her environment was injurious to her welfare due to Mother’s alcohol abuse,

there was ongoing domestic violence between Mother and T.C. Sr., and T.C. Sr.’s prior indicated

finding3 for “Cuts, Bruises, Welts, Abrasions and oral injuries.”

¶ 7 Prior to the shelter care hearing on October 12, 2017, the trial court entered an order

appointing a guardian ad litem (GAL) for Jayla H. During the shelter care hearing, Mother, who

appeared while in the custody of the Madison County Sheriff’s Department, agreed that probable

cause existed for the filing of the petition. She also agreed to a temporary custody order placing

Jayla H. in the temporary custody of DCFS and prohibiting Mother from having contact or

visitation with Jayla H. until further order.

¶ 8 Following the hearing, Jonetta Clark, a foster care supervisor employed by Hoyleton

Youth and Family Services (Hoyleton), a private agency under contract with DCFS, prepared a

service plan for Mother. The service plan outlined certain tasks Mother needed to complete to

correct the conditions that led to Jayla H.’s removal from the home, including the completion of

substance abuse, mental health, and domestic violence assessments and any recommended

treatment. Clark also recommended that Mother agree to random drug testing and that she

participate in a therapeutic parenting program. The targeted date for completion of all services

was April 10, 2018. The service plan included Hoyleton’s established permanency goal for Jayla

H. of return home within five months.4

3A prior indicated finding means that a child protection investigator for DCFS investigated a

report of abuse or neglect and determined that there was credible evidence of the alleged abuse or neglect. 89 Ill. Adm. Code 336.20 (2017).

4For a complete list of the possible permanency goals, see 89 Ill. Adm. Code 315.200 (2011).

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¶ 9 On May 1, 2018, Montina Marshall, a Hoyleton foster care case manager, filed an

adjudication/dispositional report, which included a narrative of the underlying details supporting

the petition. The report also included a summarized version of Mother’s “Assessment of the

Problem.” According to the report, Mother also claimed that she suffered from anxiety and

depression and that “she was self-medicating due to her depressed state regarding her being a

witness to a criminal case.” Mother also claimed that she “blacked out” prior to the October 8,

2017, incident, and that she and T.C. Sr. had been physically abusive to each other during their

relationship. The report indicated that Mother was granted a pretrial release from the Madison

County jail on April 6, 2018, and was residing with her sister in East Alton, Illinois. However,

the October 12, 2017, temporary order prevented Mother from visiting with Jayla H. Lastly, the

report included Hoyleton’s recommendations that Mother complete all service plan tasks, that

DCFS maintain guardianship of Jayla H., and that the permanency goal be return home within 12

months.

¶ 10 On July 3, 2018, Mother filed a motion to lift the no contact provision of the October 12,

2017, order. In support, Mother asserted that she was not prohibited from having visitation with

Jayla H. as a condition of her bond and that there had been no problems during her weekly visits

with her other children. She also asserted that Clark would likely recommend that she have

visitation with Jayla H. because she had made satisfactory progress on her service plan.

¶ 11 On August 23, 2018, Clark filed an adjudication/dispositional report, which described

Mother’s progress on her service plan tasks since her release from jail on April 6, 2018.

According to the report, Mother was visiting K.C. and M.C. on a weekly basis and had

completed her parenting classes on June 4, 2018. She also completed a substance abuse

assessment, with no recommendations, and a mental health assessment on May 8, 2018. She was

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attending weekly therapy sessions and undergoing random drug screenings, all of which had

been negative. Mother’s last drug screen was on July 10, 2018. Additionally, she had completed

victimization classes at Oasis but still needed to complete domestic violence for perpetrators at

Group Interventions. The report noted Mother’s belief that the agency was adding more services

for no reason and that the additional domestic violence classes were unneeded. The report further

indicated that Jayla H. was attending counseling sessions through the child advocacy center and

had expressed to the counselor that she would like to visit with Mother. Lastly, the report

included Hoyleton’s recommendations that Mother be granted supervised visitation with Jayla H.

at Hoyleton, DCFS maintain guardianship of Jayla H., and the permanency goal be return home

within 12 months.

¶ 12 Later that same day, on August 23, 2018, the trial court held a hearing5 on Mother’s

motion to lift the no contact order. The State called Kasey Standal, a Hoyleton case manager,

who testified to the following. Standal clarified that she was testifying in place of the assigned

caseworker because that caseworker was new to Hoyleton and unfamiliar with the particulars of

the case. Regarding Mother’s progress in completing service plan tasks, Standal testified

consistent with Clark’s August 23, 2018, adjudicatory/dispositional report. Standal further

testified that Jayla H.’s counselor was recommending that Mother be granted supervised

visitation with Jayla H. and that Hoyleton agreed with the counselor’s recommendation.

¶ 13 Following Standal’s testimony, the trial court asked the GAL for his recommendation.

The GAL responded that he also recommended that Mother be granted supervised visitation.

Based on the evidence presented, the court entered an order lifting the no contact provision and

allowing Mother supervised visitation with Jayla H. at Hoyleton’s discretion.

5The transcript of the report of proceedings erroneously states that the matter was called for a

dispositional hearing.

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¶ 14 On October 11, 2018, the GAL filed an emergency motion to suspend visitation. In

support, the GAL asserted that Mother had been physically abusive and threatening to Jayla H.

during recent visits and that Jayla H.’s therapist had recommended stopping the visits between

Jayla H. and Mother. Later that same day, the trial court entered an order, over Mother’s

objection, suspending Mother’s vitiation with Jayla H. “pending hearing.” The court

subsequently entered an order on October 18, 2018, requiring that supervised visitation take

place at Hoyleton and prohibiting Mother from contacting Jayla H. by phone until further order.6

¶ 15 On December 4, 2018, Sharon McDevitt, Hoyleton’s child welfare director, filed an

adjudication/dispositional report, which described Mother’s progress on her service plan tasks

since the previous report. According to the report, Mother began having four-hour visits with all

of her children on Saturdays. Mother also had attended domestic violence for perpetrators at

Group Interventions, completing 7 of 26 sessions with only one unexcused absence. Unchanged

from the previous report, the report again noted that Mother’s last random drug screening was

negative. The report also indicated that Mother’s therapist was communicating with Jayla H.’s

therapist to determine when it would be therapeutically beneficial for family counseling to begin.

Lastly, the report repeated Hoyleton’s recommendation that guardianship be granted to DCFS,

visitation remain supervised, and the permanency goal be return home within 12 months.

¶ 16 On January 8, 2019, Rebekah Woolever, a Hoyleton child welfare manager, filed an

adjudication/dispositional report, which described Mother’s progress on her service plan tasks

since the previous report. According to the report, a drug test was requested on December 4,

6The record reflects that the State filed supplemental discovery containing a progress report on

October 16, 2018. The October 18, 2018, order reflects that “DCFS appears and reports safety concerns with [Mother] during visits.” Neither the purported progress report nor the transcript of the hearing is contained in the record on appeal.

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2018, “but service was denied,”7 and Hoyleton did not receive a confirmation from Group

Interventions related to Mother’s recent attendance. Lastly, the report, again, repeated

Hoyleton’s recommendation that guardianship be granted to DCFS, visitation remain supervised,

and the permanency goal be return home within 12 months.

¶ 17 On February 27, 2019, the GAL filed a motion to suspend visitation for a second time. In

support, the GAL asserted that Mother was physically abusive and threatening to Jayla H. at

recent visits. The GAL also asserted that the visits were traumatic for Jayla H. and Jayla H.’s

therapist again recommended stopping the visits.

¶ 18 On April 16, 2019, Nathaniel Cokley, a Hoyleton case manager, filed an

adjudication/dispositional report, which described Mother’s progress on her service plan tasks

since the previous report. According to the report, Mother had completed 15 of 26 domestic

violence for perpetrators counseling sessions, but Hoyleton had not yet received an updated

attendance report from Group Interventions. Jayla H.’s therapist indicated that “considering the

likelihood that the children will be called as witnesses in [Mother’s] criminal conviction hearing,

then unsupervised visits and family therapy are not appropriate at this time.” Jayla H.’s therapist

also informed Cokley that Jayla H. had “issues with visitation” and did not want to participate in

family therapy. The report also indicated that Mother’s visits with her children had gone well.

Lastly, the report repeated Hoyleton’s continuing recommendation that guardianship be granted

to DCFS, visitation remain supervised, and the permanency goal be return home within 12

months.

7The adjudication/dispositional report does not clarify the meaning of the phrase “but service was

denied.” The State asserted in its brief that Mother refused to submit to the drug test. Mother, however, does not respond in her reply brief to the State’s assertion.

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¶ 19 On April 16, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the GAL’s February 27, 2019, motion

to suspend visitation.8 The court entered an order limiting Mother’s supervised visitation with

J.C. Jr. and Jayla H. to once a week for three hours.

¶ 20 On May 16, 2019, the trial court held an adjudicatory hearing pursuant to section 2-21 of

the Act (id. § 2-21).9 The court entered an adjudicatory order finding that Jayla H. was neglected

as defined in section 2-3(1)(b) of the Act (injurious environment) (id. § 2-3(1)(b)), due to

Mother’s alcohol abuse, there was ongoing domestic violence between Mother and T.C. Sr., and

T.C. Sr.’s prior indicated finding for “Cuts, Bruises, Welts, Abrasions and oral injuries.” The

court also found that Jayla H. was abused as defined in section 2-3(2)(ii) of the Act (substantial

risk of physical abuse) (id. § 2-3(2)(ii)) based on the October 8, 2017, incident and other

specified incidents of domestic violence as alleged in the juvenile petition.

¶ 21 A dispositional hearing was initially set for June 27, 2019, but was subsequently

continued to July 18, 2019.

¶ 22 On July 18, 2019, in anticipation of the dispositional hearing, Susan Hosman, a Hoyleton

case manager, filed a dispositional report, which described Mother’s progress on her service plan

tasks since the previous adjudication/dispositional report. According to the report, Mother was

recently approved for a psychological evaluation, which was in the process of being scheduled.

Unchanged from the previous report, Mother had completed 15 of 26 domestic violence for

perpetrators counseling sessions. However, Hoyleton still had not received an updated

attendance report from Group Interventions. The report included a statement that:

“The children were not moved from the foster home and their visits were scaled

back to once per week as the children have many activities and felt that it would be more

8A transcript of the hearing is not contained in the record. 9A transcript of the hearing is not contained in the record.

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beneficial if they were able to only visit once per week to allow them time to relax and

feel like ‘normal’ kids.”

Lastly, the dispositional report repeated, once again, Hoyleton’s continuing recommendations

that guardianship be granted to DCFS, visitation remain supervised, and the permanency goal be

return home within 12 months.

¶ 23 On August 27, 2019, following an agreed continuance, the trial court held a dispositional

hearing.10 However, Mother failed to appear for the hearing. The court entered a dispositional

order finding that, for reasons other than financial circumstances alone, Mother was unable to

care for, protect, train, educate, supervise, or discipline Jayla H. and that placement with Mother

was contrary to Jayla H.’s health, safety, and best interest. The court’s findings were based on

Mother’s failure to successfully complete all service plan tasks and correct the conditions that

brought Jayla H. into care, despite having been provided appropriate services. Accordingly, the

court granted the State’s request for adjudication of court wardship and ordered that custody of

Jayla H. continue with DCFS. The court further found that the service plan and the permanency

goal of return home within 12 months were appropriate. The court ordered Mother’s visitation

with Jayla H. to remain supervised at DCFS’s discretion. Mother’s attorney signed the order

“over objection.”

¶ 24 On November 12, 2019, Kelsey Smith, Hoyleton’s assigned caseworker, filed the first

permanency report. The report included Mother’s progress toward completing four service plan

tasks. Regarding the first task, “Parenting,” Mother completed classes on June 4, 2018, and

displayed appropriate parenting skills during visits. Regarding the second task, “Substance

Abuse Assessment,” Mother completed the assessment with no recommendations. It was also

10A transcript of the dispositional hearing in not included in the record.

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noted that Mother had undergone random drug screenings, all of which had negative results.

Regarding the third task, “Mental Health Assessment,” Mother completed the assessment

through Hoyleton on May 5, 2018. It was also noted that Mother had attended weekly sessions

since the assessment, and that she was successfully discharged on March 26, 2019. Regarding

the fourth task, “Domestic Violence Assessment and Treatment,” Mother had completed the

victimization counseling and attended the final perpetrators domestic violence class on May 14,

2019. Additionally, the permanency report indicated that Mother’s last visit with J.C. Jr. and

Jayla H. was on August 21, 2019. Mother’s last contact with Hoyleton was in October 2019.

¶ 25 The permanency report also indicated that the permanency goal was “Agency Set at

Return Home.” However, the report included Hoyleton’s new recommendation that the trial

court change Jayla H.’s permanency goal from return home within 12 months to “continuing

foster care.” The report included the following information in support of the proposed change.

Mother pled guilty to the aggravated battery charges and was sentenced to 30 months’

imprisonment11 and to a consecutive 30 months’ probation. According to the Illinois Department

of Corrections (IDOC) website, her projected parole date was January 1, 2021. Prior to the

imposition of sentence, Jayla H. was not interested in continuing visitation with Mother. Jayla

H.’s primary care physician was recommending that Jayla H. not visit with Mother until Jayla H.

was able to be seen by a psychiatrist. The report provided that Jayla H. was diagnosed with

posttraumatic stress syndrome and anxiety related to her visits with Mother. As further rationale,

the report included that:

“Due to the length of the incarceration and the engagement of services that [Mother] was

engaging in on her service plan prior to sentencing, [Hoyleton] will be conducting a legal

11The record reflects that Mother served her prison sentence from October 2019 through June

2020.

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screening *** because we are unsure if there are grounds for termination of parental

rights. [Hoyleton] is exploring other options with the relative foster parents such as

subsidized guardianship and private guardianship as well. In the meantime, [Hoyleton]

has reviewed the criteria for selection of permanency goals and *** Return Home is not

an option for Jayla due to her father being deceased and [Mother’s] current incarceration

***. This permanency goal does not Rule out Guardianship, but rather will allow

[Hoyleton] more time to fully explore options that will be in the foster parents and

minor’s best Interest.”

¶ 26 On November 26, 2019, Smith filed the second permanency report, which remained

largely unchanged from the previous report. The trial court also held the initial permanency

hearing12 that same day. Mother attended the hearing while in IDOC custody. The court entered

the initial permanency order based on the permanency report and stipulation of the parties.

Contrary to Hoyleton’s recommendation, the court found that the appropriate permanency goal

was return home within 12 months, noting Jayla H.’s age and in light of the service plan tasks.

The court also found that Mother failed to make “reasonable efforts” and “reasonable and

substantial progress” toward returning Jayla H. home. The court found that Mother had not

completed all of the service plan tasks. Lastly, the court ruled that custody of Jayla H. was to

continue with DCFS.

¶ 27 On August 5, 2020, Smith filed the third permanency report. According to the report,

Mother was released from prison in June 2020, but she had not visited with J.C. Jr. and Jayla H.

since August 21, 2019, although Jayla H. was still refusing to visit with Mother. The report

provided no other updated information. Even though the trial court set the permanency goal at

12A transcript of the hearing is not contained in the record.

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the November 26, 2019, dispositional hearing, the report indicated that the permanency goal was

“Agency set at Return Home.” The court entered an order directing the clerk to set/reset the

“PPR-TPR” on October 6, 2020.

¶ 28 On September 30, 2020, Smith filed the fourth permanency report. The report indicated

that Smith had submitted the case for a legal screen to DCFS, but DCFS was holding the legal

screen pending compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act. Again, the report repeated the

permanency goal as “Agency set at Return Home.”

¶ 29 On October 6, 2020, the State filed a petition for termination of parental rights. The State

alleged that Mother was unfit under section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West

2020)). In support, the State alleged that Mother had failed to make reasonable progress toward

the return of the minor within the nine-month period after the adjudication, and to maintain a

reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minor’s welfare. The State

further alleged that Mother was depraved based on her criminal convictions for aggravated

battery of Jayla H. and T.C. and that Mother had abandoned the minor and deserted the minor for

more than three months “next preceding the commencement of these proceedings.” Lastly, the

State alleged that it was in the best interest and welfare of the minor for Mother’s parental rights

to be permanently terminated.

¶ 30 On November 19, 2020, Smith filed a best interest report regarding Jayla H. The report

indicated that the permanency goal set by the trial court was “Substitute Care Pending

Termination” and that the last permanency hearing was on August 6, 2020. The report also

indicated that Mother was notified to reengage with mental health services upon release from

prison. In addition, consistent with the previous permanency reports, the report indicated that

Mother had not visited with J.C. Jr. and Jayla H. since August 21, 2019, and that Mother was

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prohibited from visiting Jayla H. “[d]ue to a court document from her criminal case.” Moreover,

the report indicated that Mother had been in contact with Hoyleton and attended an in-person

meeting in early October 2020. Smith also spoke to Mother on November 17, 2020.

¶ 31 Additionally, in specifically addressing Jayla H.’s best interest, the report included the

following:

“Jayla [H.] has been observed in the foster home to have a bond with foster parents.

Foster parents can meet [Jayla H.’s] physical, mental, and emotional needs. Her current

placement is willing to adopt her. Jayla [H.] has many family supports, including her

aunt, who are willing to provide her with a home for life. Jayla [H.] has a bond with her

aunt. Her aunt can also meet her needs and is willing to adopt her as well.”

However, the report included information that Jayla H. had refused to return to the foster home

after a weekend visit on November 8, 2020. Since that incident, Jayla H. was living with her

paternal aunt and continued to express a desire to stay with her aunt.

¶ 32 On December 18, 2020, Julie McKay, a Hoyleton caseworker, filed the second best

interest report. The report included the same information as the previous report but further

indicated that Jayla H.’s aunt could also meet Jayla H.’s needs and was willing to adopt her.

¶ 33 On February 12, 2021, Sherico Hayes, a Hoyleton caseworker, filed the third best interest

report. Since the last report, Hoyleton had officially notified Jayla H. of its decision to remove

Jayla H. and place her with her aunt. According to the report, Jayla H.’s foster parents had stated

their intention to appeal the decision, but Hoyleton had yet to receive a formal notification of

appeal. The report indicated that Mother was released from prison on June 10, 2020, but had not

been involved in parenting classes since her release.

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¶ 34 On February 25, 2021, bifurcated hearings were held regarding the issues of parental

fitness and the best interest of the children. At the start of the fitness hearing, on the State’s

motion and without objection, the trial court took judicial notice of Mother’s criminal

convictions. Specifically, that on May 15, 2019, Mother was convicted of aggravated battery to

T.C. Jr. and sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment, and she was also convicted of aggravated

battery to Jayla H. and sentenced to 30 months’ probation. The court also took judicial notice

that Mother’s probation order included the conditions that she successfully complete drug and

alcohol treatment, along with anger management classes.

¶ 35 The State called Rebecca Woolever, the Hoyleton case manager, as its only witness.

Woolever had been the case manager overseeing the cases involving Mother’s children, J.C. Jr.

and Jayla H., since the inception of the case in October 2017. Her role included helping the

caseworkers and supervisors with “reaching out to parents” and engaging them in services.

Woolever would sometimes visit with the children and ensure that the children’s needs were

being met. She also provided supervision and guidance over the case.

¶ 36 Woolever testified that Jayla H. came into DCFS’s care in October 2017 after Mother,

while severely intoxicated with her paramour, T.C. Sr., stomped on T.C.’s head and punched

Jayla H. After the children came into DCFS’s care, a service plan containing recommended tasks

was created for Mother. It included parenting classes, a substance abuse assessment, a mental

health assessment, and a domestic violence assessment and treatment.

¶ 37 Woolever testified that the most recent service plan was prepared in September 2020,

which included the same tasks as the initial 2017 service plan. Woolever testified that Mother

completed the parenting classes in June 2018. Woolever further testified, however, that the task

remained on the service plan over concerns that Mother was not retaining some of the

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information and had failed to make progress on some of the “parenting stuff.” Woolever

explained that during a visit, in October 2018, Mother was trimming Jayla H.’s nails and was

cutting them too close, causing Jayla H. to whine in pain. When Jayla H. asked Mother to stop,

Mother stated, “shut up before I swing on you.”

¶ 38 Woolever also testified to four other incidents in which Mother displayed inappropriate

parenting. During a visit with one of her other children, Mother was unhappy about a situation

and pulled her arm back as though she was going to “like slap or swing on” the child. The second

incident occurred on July 2, 2019, where it was reported that Mother appeared intoxicated. The

third incident involved Mother telling Jayla H. the details of a girl’s murder that had occurred in

the community, which afterward caused Jayla H. to have nightmares. Woolever pointed out that

Jayla H.’s father was murdered only a couple of years earlier. The last incident occurred when

J.C. Jr. attempted to leave a visit and Mother yelled for him not to come back, which caused J.C.

Jr. to spend the evening crying in his foster home. Woolever testified that Mother did not

participate in a parenting class recommended to her by Hoyleton.

¶ 39 Woolever testified that a DCFS consulting psychologist approved a referral for Mother to

undergo a psychological evaluation due to her inappropriate parenting behaviors. Woolever

further testified that the consulting psychologist had several questions he wanted answered by

the evaluation, including the following: (1) whether Mother had the ability to parent a child with

emotional disturbances and the knowledge of acceptable and effective methods of discipline with

sufficient self-restraint to use them; (2) what risks would be present if children were placed in

Mother’s care; and (3) if Mother understood the impact of domestic violence and her history of

substance abuse on the children’s sense of security and well-being. Woolever testified that the

psychological evaluation was not completed. Woolever explained that the referral was only valid

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for six months and could not be completed while Mother was incarcerated. Mother was first

provided the referral when she was released from the Madison County jail. However, before the

assessment could be performed, Mother was sent to prison.

¶ 40 Next, Woolever testified that Mother received a substance abuse assessment, but no

services were recommended. Woolever testified that the task remained on the service plan

because Mother was required to complete alcohol and substance abuse treatment as a condition

of her probation, and Hoyleton was concerned that Mother was still using substances. Woolever

explained that one of Mother’s children reported that she came to a visit under the influence. The

child reported that he believed Mother was under the influence during the July 2, 2019, visit

because she was talking with her eyes closed and was not “acting right.” Woolever testified that

Hoyleton believed that Mother had not “fully engaged in treatment” and, thus, had failed “to gain

the benefits of the substance abuse treatment program.”

¶ 41 Additionally, Woolever testified that Mother had completed a substance abuse class in

prison, but that Hoyleton does not accept the class as satisfying the task. Woolever explained that

due to Mother being in a locked facility at the time she completed the class, rather than ‘in the

real world,” Hoyleton could not determine its lasting effect and would “like to see a bit more.”

¶ 42 Woolever also testified that Mother had completed her mental health assessment and was

referred for treatment at Hoyleton. Although Mother completed the weekly treatments, the task

remained on her service plan because Hoyleton wanted her to “reengage,” after she was released

from prison, to “make sure that nothing happened in prison.” Woolever also explained that

Hoyleton believed it was important for Mother to continue with individual therapy due to the

significant traumas in her life and then to progress to family therapy. Woolever also testified that

Hoyleton believes that Mother’s past inappropriate behavior at the visits demonstrated that she

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had not learned anything from the mental health treatment. Woolever testified that Mother had

not engaged in mental health treatment since being released from prison.

¶ 43 Woolever next testified regarding Mother’s progress on the domestic violence task. Even

though Mother completed both victim and perpetrator courses, the task remained on the service

plan due to issues at the visits. Woolever explained that J.C. Jr. had stated that he was only going

to the visits to protect Jayla H. and that they only felt safe when the visits were directly

supervised in the office, compared to the visits occurring at the local library. Woolever again

pointed to the incidents of inappropriate parenting that occurred during the previous visits as

demonstrating that Mother had not made progress or “learned anything” from the domestic

violence classes.

¶ 44 Woolever further detailed the events surrounding the two previous suspensions of

Mother’s visits with Jayla H. Woolever testified that Mother stayed in monthly contact with

Hoyleton after she was granted visitation following her release from the Madison County jail in

March 2018. Mother also continued to cooperate and maintain contact with Hoyleton even after

her visits were initially suspended. However, Woolever recounted that when the visits were

suspended for a second time in September 2019, Mother became inactive “almost like she gave

up.” Woolever explained that the children were being prepped for possible testimony at Mother’s

trial, and they “were having a lot of behaviors and just concerns around the visits *** so it was

bringing up a lot of anxiety with the children.”

¶ 45 Next, Woolever testified that Mother’s compliance since her release from prison had

been minimal. Woolever testified that Mother failed to respond to the caseworker’s phone calls

or text messages and that Mother also had a petition to revoke her parole currently pending based

on her missing her parole appointments. Woolever also testified that when the caseworker was

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eventually able to visit Mother’s home, Mother questioned the need to reengage in therapy and

asserted that she was only willing to do family therapy.

¶ 46 Woolever next explained that there was no visitation plan in place for either J.C. Jr. or

Jayla H. because Mother was prohibited by the IDOC from having contact with Jayla H., as “a

known victim that pertains to her,” and that J.C. Jr. expressed no desire to visit “ever since the

visits stopped.” In addition, the children had disclosed to their caseworkers, therapists, and foster

parents that they did not feel safe during visits.

¶ 47 Near the end of its direct examination, the State solicited Woolever’s thoughts regarding

whether Mother had made reasonable progress toward the return of her children. Woolever,

opining that Mother had not made reasonable progress, explained her reasoning as follows:

“It looks good on paper, so she seems like she has checked off the boxes, but it doesn’t

seem that she has made progress on some of the areas of concerns. So she is clearly still

struggling with behavior during visits. She hasn’t truly addressed some of the reasons for

DCFS involvement. The fact that visits were suspended prior to her going to prison

because the kids weren’t feeling safe, and this is after she had already completed all of

the tasks on her service plan, I think that that really shows that she hasn’t made any

progress.”

The State then solicited Woolever’s opinion regarding Mother’s fitness to parent, to which

Woolever responded that the trial court should find Mother an unfit parent. Woolever explained,

among other things, that the children do not feel safe around Mother and that there were still

“gaps” in what Mother needed to do, but she had not shown an ability to have the children feel

safe around her.

19

¶ 48 On cross-examination, Woolever acknowledged that Mother had completed all of the

service plan tasks and that she was unable to complete the psychological assessment because of

her incarceration. Woolever further acknowledged that Mother had shown a willingness to

participate in family counseling, but the children had refused. Additionally, Woolever

acknowledged that Mother had attended visits with Jayla H. except when incarcerated or

prohibited by court order.

¶ 49 On redirect examination, Woolever clarified that Mother would engage in services and

complete the tasks but then fail to demonstrate that she had learned from the services. As a

result, although Mother “checked the boxes” in her service plan, the overall goal had remained

unsatisfactory. Mother had not progressed toward the return home goal and her visits remained

supervised, rather than progressing to unsupervised and overnight visits.

¶ 50 After Woolever’s testimony ended, Mother provided unsworn, narrative comments

concerning her efforts to complete the service plan tasks and to achieve the goal of return home.

The trial court, however, struck these comments and then gave Mother an opportunity to testify,

subject to cross-examination, which Mother declined.

¶ 51 Following arguments of counsel, the trial court determined that the State proved by clear

and convincing evidence that Mother was an unfit person within the meaning of the Adoption

Act (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)). The unfitness determination was based solely on Mother’s failure to

make reasonable progress in correcting the conditions that brought the children into care. The

court found the State failed to prove the other grounds alleged against Mother in the petition to

terminate parental rights—reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the

minor’s welfare, desertion of the child for more than three months preceding the commencement

of the adoption proceeding, and depravity. After acknowledging that Mother “had done all of the

20

services that were asked of her,” the court stated that the children’s visits continued to be unsafe,

and that Mother was no closer to achieving the return home goal than when the case was

originally initiated. The court further stated that the children have been in foster care for almost

four years, yet the visits have not progressed to even unsupervised.

¶ 52 Immediately after the fitness hearing, the trial court proceeded to the best interest

hearing. During the best interest hearing, Woolever first testified as to the children’s placements.

Both J.C. Jr. and Jayla H. were originally placed with J.C. Jr.’s paternal grandparents, but Jayla

H. later refused to return to their home following a weekend visit with her paternal step-aunt,

Jayva, in November 2020. Since that time, Jayla H. had been placed with Jayva and was residing

with Jayva, Jayva’s husband, Sean, and their two sons, ages 13 and 9. Woolever testified that

Jayla H. was doing better in her placement, “really coming out of her shell,” and she “definitely

made great strides in her grades.” Woolever also testified that Jayva’s residence was in the same

neighborhood as the previous foster parents, so Jayla H. was able to keep the same friends,

attend the same church, and was not required to change schools. Additionally, Woolever testified

that Jayva and Sean have shown interest in adopting Jayla H., but the placement was too recent

for Hoyleton to consider allowing them to sign permanency commitments. Woolever believed

that both sets of foster parents will be supportive of sibling visits in the future.

¶ 53 Woolever next testified that Jayla H. recently expressed that she wanted to have contact

with Mother but does not want to live with her. Jayla H. also wanted to have continuing contact

with other family relatives, such as her grandmother in Missouri and her aunt in Florida.

Woolever clarified that Jayva would be supportive of Jayla H.’s desire to have contact with her

family members, including with Mother, but Jayla H. had not spoken to Mother since August

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2019. Lastly, Woolever testified that it was in the children’s best interest for Mother’s parental

rights be terminated so that the children could be freed for adoption.

¶ 54 On cross-examination, Woolever explained that Jayla H. had recently voiced a desire to

have some contact with Mother. However, Mother is still under a court order not to have contact

with any of her victims, including Jayla H. Woolever acknowledged that there was no guarantee

that Jayva would allow Jayla H. to visit with Mother. Following an adoption, Woolever testified

that Jayva would decide whether visits were in Jayla H.’s best interest and that Jayva would

certainly stop the visits if she thought they were detrimental to Jayla H.

¶ 55 At the close of the evidence, the parties waived argument, and the GAL requested

additional time to speak with Jayla H. and to submit a written recommendation. The trial court

then granted the GAL’s request and took the matter under advisement.

¶ 56 On April 1, 2021, the GAL submitted the written best interest recommendation, asserting

that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Jayla H.’s best interest. In support, the GAL

first noted that he had recently spoken to the minor and the minor’s current caregiver. Based on

these conversations and the evidence presented at the termination hearing, the GAL asserted that

the minor was safe, loved, and well cared for in her current foster home, and she desired to be

adopted by her current caregiver and needed permanency. The GAL also asserted that the current

caregiver was committed to adopting Jayla H. and open to allowing her to have continued

contact with her family after the adoption.

¶ 57 On June 1, 2021, the trial court entered a written order terminating Mother’s parental

rights. The court found that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother was

unfit within the meaning of the Adoption Act, in that “she failed to make reasonable progress

toward the return of the child to the parent during any nine month period following the

22

adjudication of abuse or neglect, specifically from May 16, 2019, through the date of the filing of

the termination petition.” The court also found that it was in the best interest of the minor that

Mother’s parental rights be terminated and that DCFS be appointed as the minor’s guardian with

the power to consent to the minor’s adoption. In doing so, the court observed that the minor was

strongly bonded to her foster family and that her emotional, psychological, and financial needs

were being met in the foster home. In addition, the court entered a subsequent permanency order

changing the permanency goal to adoption. Mother timely appealed.

¶ 58 II. Analysis

¶ 59 On appeal, Mother argues that the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights must

be reversed because (1) the State failed to prove that she was an unfit parent by clear and

convincing evidence and (2) the court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in

Jayla H.’s best interest was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Before addressing the

specific issues raised in this appeal, we find it prudent to direct the court to the obvious

deficiencies in complying with procedural mandates of the Act as revealed by the record.

¶ 60 First, section 2-28(2) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 2020)), in pertinent part,

provides: “In selecting any permanency goal, the court shall indicate in writing the reasons the

goal was selected and why the preceding goals were ruled out.” The record before us is devoid of

any written orders identifying a change in permanency goal and stating the reasons for the

change. Contrary to the November 19, 2020, best interest report, the record does not show that a

permanency hearing occurred on August 6, 2020. In fact, the August 6, 2020, order only directed

the clerk to set/reset the “PPR-TPR,” and the subsequent permanency report filed on September

30, 2020, which immediately preceded the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights,

reflected a return home goal. Section 2-28(2) also requires that the first permanency hearing be

23

conducted by the judge and, in pertinent part, that “[t]he initial hearing shall be held (a) within

12 months from the date temporary custody was taken, regardless of whether an adjudication or

dispositional hearing has been completed within that time frame.” Id. In the present case, the

initial permanency hearing was held on November 26, 2019, which was more than two years

after DCFS took temporary custody of Jayla H.

¶ 61 Second, section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act provides, in pertinent part, the

following: “[W]hen a petition or motion seeks to terminate parental rights on the basis of item

(ii) of this subsection (m), the petitioner shall file with the court and serve on the parties a

pleading that specifies the 9-month period or periods relied on.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West

2020). The State did not file with the trial court a pleading that specified the relevant nine-month

period or periods. The State, instead, specified in the petition a period in excess of two years,

from “June 7, 2018, through the date of filing this petition” (October 6, 2020), and it did not

provide in the petition, or in the hearing, the significance it attributed to the June 7, 2018, start

date. Similarly, the court’s order finding Mother an unfit person specified a period where Mother

failed to make reasonable progress, from May 16, 2019 (the date of adjudication), through

October 6, 2020 (the filing date of the petition to terminate), which is in excess of 16 months.

¶ 62 We note, however, that Mother did not raise any of these obvious procedural deficiencies

before the trial court or on appeal. The State, observing only the second deficiency, asserted that

the time period specified by the State and the time period specified by the court, “is not, in and of

itself, grounds for reversal,” and that Mother had forfeited the issue. Citing to the Illinois

Supreme Court’s decision in In re S.L., 2014 IL 115424, ¶¶ 20-27, the State argues that

“the State’s failure to file a separate notice pleading identifying the nine-month period or

periods at issue constitutes a pleading defect, not a failure to state a cause of action,

24

which under section 2-612(c) of the Code [of Civil Procedure] was forfeited by [Mother]

because she failed to raise the issue in the trial court when it still could be remedied.”

However, in her reply brief, Mother does not respond to the State’s assertion. Because Mother

did not raise these issues, we conclude that she has forfeited review of these issues. Id. ¶ 27; see

also Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued are forfeited and shall not be

raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.”); see also In re H.D., 343

Ill. App. 3d 483, 489 (2003) (“The principles of forfeiture apply to proceedings conducted

pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act [of 1987].”).

¶ 63 Forfeiture aside, we also agree with the State that the trial court’s order specifying a

period exceeding the statutory period is not necessarily grounds for reversal. As the State

correctly points out, the time period the court considered was within the time period alleged in

the petition to terminate parental rights. Additionally, the court identified a specific time period

that was within the statutorily prescribed time period for the particular ground of parental

unfitness. See In re R.L., 352 Ill. App. 3d 985, 997-98 (2004) (ruling that the circuit court did not

err in finding that the respondent mother failed to make reasonable progress where the court

expressly stated that it had considered the respondent’s “unsatisfactory” ratings during three

consecutive six-month periods).

¶ 64 A better practice, here, would have been for the trial court to make explicit findings as to

the relevant nine-month time period or periods it had relied upon and to state the factual basis for

its ultimate determination, which would have enabled this court to easily ascertain where the

manifest weight of evidence lies. However, given that the court orally pronounced that Mother

“was no closer to achieving the return home goal than when the case was originally initiated,”

and specified the relevant time period in which Mother failed to make reasonable progress in its

25

written order, we find sufficient factual findings to allow meaningful appellate review. Thus, we

find a remand is unwarranted and will review the court’s ruling. See In re Tr. A., 2020 IL App

(2d) 200225, ¶¶ 47-48 (rejecting a respondent mother’s argument for remand where the trial

court’s oral findings as to parental unfitness combined with its handwritten order were sufficient

to allow meaningful appellate review).

¶ 65 A. Parental Unfitness

¶ 66 On appeal, Mother first argues that the State failed to prove that she was an unfit parent

by clear and convincing evidence, because the evidence demonstrates that she completed her

service plan tasks. In support, Mother asserts that she completed all of her service plan tasks,

including parenting classes, substance abuse treatment (both before she went to prison and one

while in prison), mental health assessment and treatment, and two different types of treatment for

domestic violence. In response, the State argues that Mother failed to apply the knowledge and

skills that she should have learned from completing these tasks and continued to be “prone to

acting violently” in situation where she was unhappy. Thus, the State argues that Mother failed

to eliminate any of the underlying causes that brought Jayla H. into care and, therefore, the

evidence supports the trial court’s finding of unfitness. We agree with the State.

¶ 67 “[T]ermination of parental rights is an extraordinarily serious matter.” In re M.F., 304 Ill.

App. 3d 236, 238 (1999). “The termination of parental rights constitutes a permanent and

complete severance of the parent-child relationship.” In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001).

Termination of parental rights proceedings are governed by the Act (705 ILCS 405/1-

1 et seq. (West 2020)) and the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/0.01 et seq. (West 2020)). In re J.L.,

236 Ill. 2d 329, 337 (2010). A petition to terminate parental rights is filed under section 2-29 of

the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29 (West 2020)). In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d at 337. Section 2-29 of the Act

26

establishes a two-step process for the involuntary termination of parental rights. 705 ILCS 405/2-

29(2) (West 2020).

¶ 68 In the first step, the State must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is

unfit as defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)). 705 ILCS

405/2-29(2), (4) (West 2020); In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d at 337. A finding of parental unfitness will

not be disturbed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re R.L., 352 Ill. App.

3d 985, 998 (2004). A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite

conclusion is clearly apparent or the determination is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the

evidence presented. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498 (2002).

¶ 69 We note, in the present case, the trial court concluded that the State had successfully

proven one ground of unfitness against Mother. Specifically, the court found that Mother failed

to make reasonable progress toward the return of Jayla H. in any nine-month period following

the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020)).

¶ 70 “Reasonable progress is an objective standard, focusing on the amount of progress

toward the goal of reunification one can reasonably expect under the circumstances.” (Emphasis

omitted.) In re C.M., 305 Ill. App. 3d 154, 164 (1999). Reasonable progress requires, at a

minimum, measurable or demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification. In re Jacorey

S., 2012 IL App (1st) 113427, ¶ 21. “Reasonable progress exists when the trial court can

conclude that it will be able to order the child returned to parental custody in the near future.”

In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1067 (2006).

¶ 71 Although DCFS service plans are an integral part of the statutory scheme, our supreme

court has rejected the view that the sole measurement of parental progress is the parent’s

27

compliance with service plans. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 214-15. Instead, the supreme court ruled

that

“the benchmark for measuring a parent’s ‘progress toward the return of the child’ under

section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act encompasses the parent’s compliance with the

service plans and the court’s directives, in light of the condition which gave rise to the

removal of the child, and in light of other conditions which later become known and

which would prevent the court from returning custody of the child to the parent.” Id. at

216-17.

Moreover, the Fourth District has repeatedly stated that “a court is duty bound to ensure that

serious parental deficiencies of whatever nature have been corrected before the court permits one

of its wards to be returned to that parent’s custody.” In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 464

(1991); In re C.M., 305 Ill. App. 3d 154, 164 (1999); In re C.S., 294 Ill. App. 3d 780, 790

(1998).

¶ 72 With these principles in mind, we begin our analysis by examining the bases for the trial

court’s finding that Mother “had done all of the services that were asked of her,” and yet she

“was no closer to achieving the return home goal than when the case was originally initiated.” In

this context, we will review the evidence prior to the date of adjudication. We will, however,

limit our review of the propriety of the court’s ultimate determination to the period—from May

16, 2019, to October 6, 2020—for which the court determined that Mother failed to make

reasonable progress. Again, any nine-month period during this time period would fall under

subsection (m)(ii). 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020).

¶ 73 The record shows that Mother was incarcerated when the initial service plan was filed on

October 31, 2017, which included a targeted completion date of April 10, 2018. Mother missed

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the targeted completion date due to her incarceration in the Madison County jail. Following her

pretrial release from the Madison County jail on April 6, 2018, Mother began working on her

service plan. She first completed the parenting task. By June 2018, she had completed the three

recommended assessments—substance abuse, mental health, and domestic violence. Based on

the mental health assessment’s treatment recommendation, she began attending weekly sessions.

In addition, during this same time period, she had no positive drug tests.

¶ 74 By July 3, 2018, after nearly seven months of no visits and believing that she had made

sufficient progress on her service plan, Mother requested that the trial court lift the October 12,

2017, no contact order so that she could visit with Jayla H. The court subsequently entered an

order granting supervised visitation on August 23, 2018. Mother then started having four-hour

supervised visits on Saturdays.

¶ 75 However, from October 11, 2018, to October 18, 2018, Mother’s visits with Jayla H.

were suspended due to “safety concerns.” During her testimony in the parental fitness hearing,

Woolever recounted the event that gave rise to the safety concerns. Woolever testified that

during an October 18, 2018, visit, after Jayla H. asked Mother to stop trimming Jayla H.’s nails,

Mother told Jayla H. to “shut up before I swing on you.” As a result, the trial court entered an

order requiring the visits to be supervised by Hoyleton at its facility and further prohibited

Mother from contacting Jayla H. by phone.

¶ 76 Mother’s visits were subsequently reduced to once a week for three hours on April 16,

2019. Woolever again recount the triggering event. Woolever testified that during a visit with

one of Mother’s other children, Mother was unhappy about a situation and pulled her arm back

as though she was going to “like slap or swing on” the child.

29

¶ 77 Thus, as described above, the record reveals that Mother had actively worked on

completing her service plan tasks from October 2017 to May 16, 2019, yet continued to pose a

threat to the physical safety of her children. While Mother made sufficient progress to be granted

supervised visitation with her children, during this same period her visits were subsequently

suspended and reduced because of her continued abusive behavior. As such, during this

approximate 18-month period, Mother made little progress toward the return home goal.

¶ 78 Turning our attention to the nine-month period following adjudication (May 16, 2019, to

February 16, 2020), the record establishes that Mother continued to display serious deficiencies

in her ability to parent her children. In particular, Woolever testified that Mother appeared

intoxicated during a visit on July 2, 2019. Woolever also testified to two other incidents where

Mother was inappropriate during visits. Woolever testified that Mother told Jayla H. the details

of a girl’s murder that had occurred in the community, which afterward caused Jayla H. to have

nightmares. Woolever believed that Mother’s behavior was particularly damaging to Jayla H.

because Jayla H.’s father was murdered only a couple of years earlier. Woolever testified that the

next incident occurred when J.C. Jr. was attempting to leave a visit. Mother yelled for him not to

come back, which caused J.C. Jr. to spend the evening crying in his foster home.

¶ 79 Following these incidents, Mother’s visitation was stopped in September 2019. In the

period that followed, Woolever recounted that Mother became inactive “almost like she gave

up.” Mother was requested to participate in a parenting class at Hoyleton, but she never attended

it. Mother was also approved for a psychological evaluation but began serving a prison sentence

in October 2019. Thus, Mother was unable complete the evaluation.

¶ 80 By the time the initial permanency order was entered, November 26, 2019, Jayla H. had

been in care for more than two years. Mother stipulated to the permanency order, which included

30

findings that Mother had not completed the service plan tasks and that she had made neither

“reasonable and substantial progress” nor “reasonable efforts” toward returning Jayla H. home.

Thus, the record establishes that Mother made virtually no postadjudication progress toward

achieving the return home permanency goal.

¶ 81 Woolever next testified that Mother was released from prison in June 2020, but she had

minimal contact with Woolever. In addition, according to the next permanency report, filed on

August 5, 2020, Mother had not visited with J.C. Jr. and Jayla H. since August 21, 2019.

¶ 82 Accordingly, we cannot say the court’s finding that Mother failed to make reasonable

progress toward the return of the minor during any nine-month period following the adjudication

of neglect was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Based on the foregoing, there is clear

and convincing evidence that Mother failed to make reasonable progress during the initial nine-

month period following the adjudication.

¶ 83 Having concluded that the trial court’s finding that Mother was an unfit person, as

defined in section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (id.), was not against the manifest weight of

the evidence, we now turn our attention to the court’s best interest determination.

¶ 84 B. Best Interest Determination

¶ 85 Mother asserts that the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in

Jayla H.’s best interest was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.

¶ 86 If the trial court finds the parent unfit, the matter proceeds to a second hearing, where the

State must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it is in the child’s “best interests” that

parental rights be terminated. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2020); In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 366

(2004). During the second step of the process, the focus of the court’s scrutiny shifts from the

rights of the parents to the best interests of the child. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 365. Section 1-3 of

31

the Juvenile Court Act lists the “best interests” factors that should be considered by the trial court

when making a “best interests” determination. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2020).

¶ 87 In making a best interest determination, the trial court must consider the following factors

in the context of the child’s age and developmental needs: (1) the physical safety and welfare of

the child, (2) the development of the child’s identity, (3) the child’s background and ties, (4) the

child’s sense of attachments, (5) the child’s wishes, (6) the child’s community ties, (7) the child’s

need for permanence, (8) the uniqueness of every family and child, (9) the risks attendant to

entering and being in substitute care, and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for

the child. Id. The court’s best interest determination will be reversed only if it is against the

manifest weight of the evidence. In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953, 961 (2005).

¶ 88 Here, the trial court’s conclusion that it was in Jayla H.’s best interest to have Mother’s

parental rights terminated and to appoint a guardian with the right to consent to her adoption was

not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record also shows that the court reviewed

the evidence and the best interest report before reaching its decision and that the statutory best

interest factors supported its decision.

¶ 89 The evidence shows that Jayla H. had been in foster care for more than 3½ years since

October 2017. At the time of the best interest hearing, Jayla H., a few months shy of 12 years

old, had been in foster care for more than three years. She had not spoken to Mother since

August 2019. While living in foster care, Jayla H. received mental health treatment for PTSD

and anxiety. Jayla H.’s emotional health improved, and she was better able to express her

feelings. Her grades also improved. Although Jayla H. was no longer residing in the same foster

home as her older sibling, J.C. Jr., both foster homes were located in the same neighborhood.

32

While residing with Jayva, Jayla H. was able to maintain her ties to her friends and attend the

same school and church.

¶ 90 Although Jayla H. expressed that she had no desire to be returned to Mother’s care, Jayla

H. had recently shown some interest in visiting with Mother. Jayla H. also expressed a desire to

be adopted by Jayva, who would allow her to maintain contact with extended family. In regard to

future visitation between Jayla H. and Mother, Woolever testified that Jayva would decide

whether visits were in Jayla H.’s best interest and that Jayva would certainly stop the visits if she

thought they were detrimental to Jayla H.

¶ 91 The trial court observed that Jayla H. was strongly bonded to the foster family and that

Jayla H.’s needs were being met in the foster home. The court also noted that Jayva had signed

permanency commitments. Again, as discussed above, Mother was unable to offer Jayla H. a

sense of permanence and stability for more than 3½ years of being involved in services.

¶ 92 The GAL also submitted a written best interest recommendation, in which he

recommended that the trial court terminate Mother’s parental rights. In his submission, the GAL

reported that he had recently visited with Jayva and Jayla H. The GAL observed that Jayla H.

was safe, loved, and well cared for in her current foster placement and that Jayva was willing to

sustain Jayla H.’s ties to her other siblings and extended family members. In recommending that

Mother’s parental rights be terminated, the GAL stressed the importance of Jayla H.’s need for

permanency and, thus, opined that it was in Jayla H.’s best interest to be freed for adoption.

¶ 93 In light of this record, we find that the best interest factors sufficiently support the trial

court’s best interest finding. Accordingly, the court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental

rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

33

¶ 94 III. Conclusion

¶ 95 For the preceding reasons, the trial court’s determination that Mother was an unfit parent

and that it was in Jayla H.’s best interest and welfare to terminate Mother’s parental rights was

not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We therefore affirm the judgment.

¶ 96 Affirmed.