HAAS, Ernst. Regionalism, Functionalism and Universal International Organization

8/11/2019 HAAS, Ernst. Regionalism, Functionalism and Universal International Organization

1/27

Trustees of Princeton University

Regionalism, Functionalism, and Universal International OrganizationAuthor(s): Ernst B. HaasSource: World Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Jan., 1956), pp. 238-263Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2008973.

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2/27

REGIONALISM,

FUNCTIONALISM,

AND

UNIVERSAL

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION*

By

ERNST

B.

HAAS

N

THING

compels

he reexamination

f basic onstitutional

postulates

o much s the

possibility

f their eaceful

evision.

Hence hemuch-advertisednitedNations eview onferencender-

scores

heneedfor

ontrasting

he heoretical

tructuref

theCharter

with

he

realityf

thepractices

hich

ave

volved ithin

tsframe-

work.

uch

n effort,

hile t

might

ive upporto

those

whostrive

for evere

lterationsf

the tructure,

ay lso

ead

to the onclusion

that ven hough

he perational

ractices

f nternational

rganization

fail

to meet hespecifications

f theCharter,

eace

might e

more

securen theColdWarera f t s permittedo depend noperational

vagaries

ather

han on

legal precision.

What, then,

s the

basic

theory

f

theCharter

nd

what he ctual

ractice?

It

is

a commonplace

hat he

preservation

f peace

andsecurity

s

the

fundamental

im

of the United

Nations.

Collective

ecurity-

rather

han hemyriad

ffunctional

asks lso

entrusted

o

contempo-

rary

nternational

rganizations,

ncludingn

particular

he

dvance-

mentof economic evelopment

nd the

emancipation

f colonial

peoples-was

he

basic

urpose.conomic

ell-being

nd

the

chieve-

ment

f

national

elf-determination

ere onsidered

n 1945

as

means

toward

he end of security,

ot as basic

aims

n their

wn

right.

Further,

ecurity

as conceived

s the

resultantf

a

firm

oncert f

power

f

the

Big

Five, s institutionalized

n the

ecurity

ouncil

nd

its

voting

ules.

inally,

n the heory

f he

Charter,egional

rganiza-

tions

were

o

be

firmlyinked

o the

UnitedNations

nd

subordinate

to thedirectionf the Securityouncil.As SenatorVandenberg

argued,

We

have

found sound nd

practical

ormula or

putting

regional

rganizations

nto ffective

ear

with

global

nstitutions..

We

do notthus

ubtract

rom

lobal

unity

f the

world's

eace

nd

security;

n the

contrary,

e

weld these

egional ing-links

nto

a

*

I

am

greatly

ndebted

oPaul

Seabury

or

ritical

omments

nd dvice

nd

to

Fred

vonderMehden

or

much

esearch

ssistance.


3/27

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

239

global

chain. '

Only Article

1

foreshadowedhe

possibility

f the

regionalails

wagging

heglobaldog,

ather

han

cknowledging

he

directinguperiorityf

the

universalrgan.

Eachof these ostulatesasin factbeenupset y thepatternsf

behavior

manifestedn

international

rganizations

ince

947.

If

the

term

regional

rganization

s understoods

connoting

ny

kind

of

basic olitical

ie,

ilateralr

multilateral,

ased n a treatyr

merely

on

traditional

nderstandings,

ith he ole

proviso

hat articipation

is

by

definitionimited

o

certain tates

elected

ccording

o

some

principlef

mutual

olitical-military

eed, he

non-universal

attern

would eem o

be

growingy eaps nd

bounds.

four ighty

overeign

states,nly ifteenackmembershipnsuch ystems;f the ixty ur-

rentUnited

Nationsmembers,

nly even

emain

naffiliated,

nd

if

we

count

he

Afro-Asianloc as a

system,

he

number hrinks

o

four.

rue, n terms f

their

ualitative

ohesion,

hese ystemsary

from

he

oosenessf

the

Commonwealtho

the

military

nd

political

rigor f

NATO; but n almost

ll, the

cope f

cooperation

nd

even

of

centralized

ecision-making

oes

onsiderably

eyond

he

olegiven

to theUnitedNations.

The

advent f

regionalism

eflectshe

disintegration

f the oncert

of

power s

the

guarantorf

security.

ollective

ecurity ithin

he

universal

rganization

as become he

function,otof a

concert,ut

of

a

pair of new

operational

axims:

ermissive

nforcementnd

balancing.2ermissive

nforcementmplies he

delegationfenforcing

power o

a

membertate r a

group f

such tates,r

even o

regional

systems.

s

manifested

n the

Uniting or eace

Resolutionnd n the

Korean ituation,heprinciple akes ossiblehe nlistingfUnited

Nations

ymbols

nd values n

behalf f

anypolicy

which

ucceedsn

obtaininghe upportf

two-thirdsfthe

membership.

ut n regional

terms-as,

ndeed, as

been

clearly one by

American, ritish, a-

nadian,

nd

Australian

tatesmen-permissive

nforcement

mplies he

delegation

f

enforcing

ower o

a NATO or

a

SEATO as theonly

focus f

trength

hich

ould e

expectedo

undertake

arge-scale

ili-

tary perations.

alancing, y

contrast,

omes

bout s the

result

f

the ffortsf neutralrmediatingloc's eekingopreventermissive

enforcement

perations.

hrough

ffers

f

ompromisend

conciliatory

formulas-as

n

the Indian

scheme or

the

repatriationf

Korean

1

Ascited

n

NormanJ.

Padelford,Regional

rganizationsnd

the

United

Nations,

International

rganization,

iii,

No.

2

(May

1954),p.

216.

2

For

elaborationf

these

oncepts,ee

my Types

f

Collective

ecurity:

nExamina-

tion

of

Operational

oncepts,

merican

olitical cience

Review,

LIX,

No.

i

(March

'955).


4/27

240 WORLD POLITICS

prisoners-such

bloc seeksto

prevent

he utilizationf

regional

strengthnderUnitedNations ymbols. ollectiveecurity

hen

be-

comes functionf a delicate egotiatingrocess,

ith

the

world

organizationhe orum,ot f communityonsciencera concertf

power, utof counterbalancingorces nwillingo seek showdown,

fearfulfalienatingriendsr neutrals,ndthereforeillingo make

concessions.

Finally, he theory f the Charter as in factbeen upsetby the

intrusionffunctionalnterestslamoringor ecognition

n their wn

right atherhan s adjunctso thepreservationfpeace.

No longers

the ecurityssue hedominatingne n all relationsetween egional

blocs. here s an evidentracticefbarteringoncessionsn economic,

social, nd colonial uestionsor upportn securityssues.ndeed, t

has

been uggestedhat here re woCold Wars: he onflictetween

theWest nd

he

oviets,nd he trugglef heAfro-Asianloc gainst

theWest n

the fforto eradicatecolonialism. 3hus,

hefunctional

and

security

laims

fregionalystemsave merged

s the ource

f

the

ctual unctioningf universalnternationalrganizations.4

It is the effortf this rticle o suggest number f propositions

permitting

he

elaborationf a limited Cold War

theory f the

relationships

etween

nternational

rganization

nd

world

politics,

restrictedn validity

o

the raof an active ripolarization

f

regional

cohesion,

fnot

f

power.

he

first

ask f

uch

n effort

s to

go beyond

the

theory

f the

Charters

expounded

n

I945

and

to

explain

he

advent

f

regionalism,

he

displacement

fthe

oncert

fpower

s

the

instrumentfsecurity,ndthe ntrusionffunctionalspirationsnto

the

political

ntercoursef

the

United

Nations. urthermore,

uch

an interpretivettempt ust utconduct

n

the

United

Nations nd

regional rganizations

nto heover-allontext

f

foreign

olicy ims

and

clashes. he

interpretation,herefore,

ssumes

asicallyhat ar-

3

Coral Bell, The United

Nations nd the

West, nternational

flairs,

XIX,

No. 4

(October

953). This

point

s

worked

out

in

the

formof

an equilibrium heory f

internationalrganization,

abeled

multiple quilibrium

ecauseof

its extensionnto

a non-power imension,yJiri iska, n TheMultiple quilibriumnd the American

National

Interest

n International

rganization,

arvard Studies n

International

Affairs,

v,

No. I

(February954).

4Critics

f

the advent

f

regionalism

nd

related actors

n

the

UnitedNations re

legion.Neutralists,espite

heir

spousal

f third

orces,

umber

ignificantlymong

them,

ut

so

do firm

upporters

f Western

olicy. ee, e.g.,

ByronDexter,

Locarno

Again, ForeignAffairs, xxii,

No.

i

(October

953);

Paul H.

Douglas, Unitedto

Enforce

eace, bid.,xxx,

No.

I

(October

951);

Commission

o

Study

he

Organiza-

tion

of

Peace,RegionalArrangementsor ecurity

nd the United

Nations,

New

York,

I953.


5/27


241

ticipationn

internationalrganizations

s

regarded

y policy-makers

as a means

or he chievementf

national

olicy

ims.

While he

national olicy

ims

provide

he nitial

oint

f

departure

inthe ffort,heprimaryoncernntheseuggestionssto abstracthe

patternf nterlockingolicies hich esult

romhese imswhen

hey

are actively

ursued

within he

organizational

rameworkf the

United

Nations, ATO,

or

theCommonwealth.ur

argument

olds

that general

rocess

f

balancing revails

t

the evel

f

regional

s

well as

global nternational

rganizations,

f which

ecurityssues,

colonial

spirations,ndeconomic emands orm

he

prime onstitu-

ents. ach of

these oncernsigures ithin he

ontext

f

regionalys-

tems;relationsetweenegionalystems-expresseds voting locs

in

the

General

ssembly-define

he

nature

f

United

ations

ctivity.

So

long s the

conditionsow

determining

he

policies

f states on-

tinue

o

dominate,

t

is

contended

hat

herange

f

alternativeoals

open n the

UnitedNations

s

roughlyimited

y he

perationf the

balancing

attern.

Balancing ere mplies

o more han he

tendencyf one setof

national rregionalims o be metbya counteringetofaspirations,

with measure

f

compromise

ikely

o be worked

ut o

long

s

the

participants

rove

unwilling

o

ignore

r

override

ompletelyhe

countervailingressuresreatedy their

olicies. o

notion fequal

countervailingorcess

being ntertained;et he

cheme ere

uggested

is

sufficiently

eminiscent

f the

classical alance

f

power atterno

requiren

examinationf

whether

he

balance

f

power,

onsidered

as

a

tool

of

political

nalysis,

s

applicable

o the

discussionf

inter-

national rganization.'

II

The first

tep

n the

development

f

such

scheme,

herefore,ust

be an

analysis

fthe

major egionalystems.

ttention

illbe

focused

on

thenature fthe

ommunity

f

nterests

hich ies

hememberso

one

another,

n

thefactors

f

cohesionnd

conflicthich

haracterize

eachsystemnternally,nd on theprocess f adjustment-orbal-

ancing -through

hich

achretains

hatever

iabilityt possesses.

Without

oubt,

he

Soviet

egional ystem

s the

most olidof

the

5This definitionf

balancing iffersrom

dward H.

Buehrig's

indred

uggestion.

His

conceptioneemsto me

to

be

synonymousith

what

s

generallyalled

power

politics.

ee

his The United

States,

he

United

Nations nd

Bi-polar

olitics,

nter-

national

Organization,

v, No.

4 (November

950).

For

a

treatmentf the

balanceof

power s a tool

of

political

nalysis,

ee

my

The

Balanceof

Power:

Concept, rescrip-

tion

or

Propaganda?

World

Politics, ,

No.

4 (July953).


6/27

242

WORLD POLITICS

entire

rray.

high

degree

f

ideological,

nstitutional,

nd

policy

congruence,

fnot

dentity,

s evidentn

the elationsetween

astern

Europe

nd

Moscow.

combination

f

concessionsnd

purges

uffices

to reestablishnitywhen tension oes develop.Whetherhrough

coercion

r

voluntary

greement,

hen,

n

the

ntergovernmental

nd

interparty

evels

he

oviet

loc

cts

s

one.

Whetherhe

ame

weeping eneralizations

an be

made bout he

Soviet-Chinese

elationship

s

another

matter.

While

the

diplomatic

record hows

hat

ull

greement

etween oscow

nd

Peiping

s

al-

ways

displayed

o theWest

n

the

ast

nalysis,

ertain

vidence

lso

suggestshat

he

wo

have

not

lways

marched

n

step

efore

he

ast

stagesf joint hrust.hus, uringheKorean risoneregotiations,

Peiping

eemed

repared

o

accept

he

ndian-sponsored

ompromise

resolutioneforeMoscow

was

ready

o

do so.'

Again,

during

he

Indo-Clinesealks

t

Geneva, ifferences

f

degreeeemed

ndicated

y

the

ess

ntransigentosition

aken

y

Molotov

ith

espect

oLaos

and

Cambodia, s

compared

iththe

nitial

rgument

f

Chou.

Other

negotiations

uggest

hat

he

mount nd

kind

f

economic

id

given

to China

and

the

security

ssue

n

the

Far

East

generally akeforfrictionetweenheCommunistartners.f therere

differences

n

outlook nd aim

between he

two,

t

follows

hat

ome

degree

f

adjustment

s

called

for

f

they

xpect

o

maintain

common

ront

toward

heir

nemies.

The

Western

amp,

composed

f

NATO, the

SEATO-ANZUS

combination,

nd

the

Organization

f

American

tates

OAS), ex-

hibits o such

unity.

onflicts

etweenhe

partners

rise

onstantly,

calling or djustmentnd redefinitionfcollectiveims,within ach

system

s

well

as

among

hem.

efore

xamining

he

combined

e-

havior

f thethree

ystems,

s

reflected

n

the

policy f

the

United

States

s

the

eading

memberf

each,

he

bases

f

nternal

greement

and divisionmust

e

outlined.

NATO exhibits

high

degree

f

consensus

ith

espect

o

theneed

for

ntegrated

ilitary

nd

political

ctivity

or

he

defensef

Europe.

Every

risis-including

hat

verGerman

earmament,

he

most

di-

visivessue ofar onfrontingATO-has been esolvednthebasis

of

a

larger

elegation

f

power

o

the

system's

entral

nstitutions.

It

is

because

f this

edrock

f

agreement

hat

pervasive

ommunity

of

interests

ouldtake

hape,

iving

ise

to

international

nstitutions

6

See

Indian

Proposals

or

Korean

Truce,

ndian

Press

Digest,

i,

No.

3

(March

1954),

for

a

study

of

diplomatic

xchanges

between

New

Delhi

and

Peiping,

as

revealed

rom

ndian

government

nd

press

ources.


7/27


8/27

244

WORLD

POLITICS

notes

hat

the fficial

ritish

oint fview

bout heUnitedNations

is

that t

s

now really

forum,

hat t should e universalnd

con-

tinue hespecial

osition f thegreat

owers

hroughhe veto,

ut

that t should

ot

beregardeds aneffectivenstrumentf collective

security.

egional acts

erve his

urpose

nstead. ut, n

contrasto

American redilections,

ritons

often avor

ringing

heso-called

neutral

tatesnto he

picture,

ince recisely

ecause f

their eutrality

they

ring ackthe

dea of

detachedudgment

n placeof

theclash

of

world

orces. 8

These

differencesre

ymbolizedy

the

positionakenn

European

independenteutralist

ircles.

While

upporting

ATO in Europe

(althoughsuallypposingermanearmament),raisingheUnited

States or

ts

eadership

gainst

ommunism,

ndappreciativef

eco-

nomic s

well

s

militaryid

programs,

hese neutralists

evertheless

demand

that

he ree

ationsfEurope

hould

otbe ed nto

laying

the

ole f

satelliteso

any

Power; hat hey

hould e

free o conduct

their

omestic

ffairsccording

o their

wn design;

nd that n the

foreignield

hey

hould

se

their

nfluencenwhatever

ay hey

on-

sidermost onduciveothepreservationndorganizationfpeace. 9

In

terms fglobal

ollective

ecurity,his

mplies he

ntercessionf

a

neutralthird

orce

o

facilitate

egotiationsnd

compromise,ven

though

his

orce

might eallied

o the

United tates

n

NATO.

Such

neutralistemandsmay

be

expected o grow

n

popularitynd ef-

fectiveness

hen

nstitutionalized

hroughheWestern

uropeannion

structure.n

terms

f

NATO

solidarity

n UnitedNations

ouncils,

these entiments

arry

ith

hem

he

need

or

onstantnternal

djust-

ment norderopreservearmony,n issue fparticularelevanceo

the

olidarityf

theWest

with espectoAsian

ecurity.

SEATO, despite

rench

nd

British

embership,

hus

y

no

means

represents

he

xtension

fAtlantic

egional

olidarity

o the

Far East.

Even

ANZUS,

ts

modest

redecessor,

as

kept

rom

eing ully

f-

fective y

disagreementverwhether

apan

r

China

was

the main

target

f

theAlliance.

ustraliand New Zealand

rgued

heformer

position,heUnited tateshe atter.hesedifficultiesre ompounded

by

the

heterogeneous

embership

f

SEATO.

As

made

plain

t

the

Bangkok

onference,

he United

tates

egards

ormosan,

orean,

Japanese,

nd Southeast sian

security

s mere

ocal

aspects

f

a

8Hugh Gaitskell,

The Search

for

Anglo-American

olicy, oreignAffairs,

XXII,

No.

4 (July I954),

p.

566.

I

Guy Mollet,

France

nd

the

Defense

f

Europe, bid.,xxxii,No. 3 (April I954),

pp.

365,

372-73.


9/27


245

regional

front.

he

Philippines

ndThailand re

oncerned

rimarily

with

Formosa

nd

Indo-China.

ew

Zealand nd

Australiadvocate

immediate

ntegrated

ilitary

lanning

or

he

treaty

rea

proper-

which heUnited tates pposes-while ritainnd France re con-

cerned

with

Malaya nd

Indo-China,

nd Pakistan

with

ndia. The

community

f

ecurity

nterests

s

at

best tenuous

ne.

The

picture

s

made

more

omplex

ith he

ntroductionf

conomic

and

colonialssues.

arge-scale

conomic

evelopment

s

demanded

y

theAsian

membersnd

supportedy

Britain,

ith he

American

ole

and

contribution

eft

n doubt. akistan

nd

the

Philippinestand

or

the

emancipation

f

the

remaining

oloniesn

Asia;

France,

ritain,

andAustraliahow oparticularastendeparting.

It

is

therefore

ardly

urprising

hat

he

nstitutional

tructuref

SEATO

so far

s

unimpressive.he

supra-nationalATO

Secretariat

has

ts

ounterpart

n

Bangkok

nly

n

the orm

f

permanent

oun-

cil of

the

diplomatic

epresentatives

f

the

member

tates.

ontinuous

balancing

f

contradictory

ecurity

ims

will

be

required

o

maintain

a

harmony

f

interests.

nd

pronouncedntra-SEATO

djustments

on economicnd colonial uestions ill become ecessaryocement

the

greementn

security.

his

taskwill

not

be

made

easier

y the

conflicting

ommitmentsndforces

hich

revail

ithin

ATO. The

Atlantic eluctanceor

extensive

acific

ecurity

rrangements

an

hardly

e

overcome

y

conomicnd

colonial

oncessions,

ince

NATO

opposes

sian EATO

opinion

n

these

pheres

s

well.

On

balance,

he

impact

f Afro-Asian

eutralism

ay

well be

strengthened

ecause f

the

curious

mediating

ole

exercised

y the

Commonwealth.ith wo f tsmembersommittedotheneutralist

bloc-and

sharply

ritical f

SEATO-and

four

thers

articipating

in

the

Southeast

sian

ystem,

ommonwealth

tatesmen

nxious o

preserve

heir

wn

community

f

nterests

ust

teer

course

etween

fullWesternommitmentnd

encouragement

f

neutral

ntercession

betweenheSoviets

nd

theWest.

nstead f

unifying

he

wo

major

anti-Communist

egional

ystems,

hen,

he

Commonwealth

s

likely

to

enhance

he

necessity

or onstant

nterregional

djustmentsmply-

ing dilutionfcommitments.

Balancing

ithin he

OAS

hinges

n

the

ame

basic

ssues:

ecurity,

economics,

nd

colonial

mancipation.

s

in

NATO

and

SEATO,

Americanims

n

theWestern

emisphere

egional

ystemre

domi-

nated

y

ecurity

onsiderations.he

Rio

Pact

nd

the

Bogota

harter

have

ashioned

hemispheric

ystem

hich

ot

nly

tabilizesolitical

relations

mong

he

members

utwhich

lso

s

ntended

o

create

solid


10/27

246

WORLD POLITICS

frontmong hem

gainst xtra-hemisphereangers.

enceAmerican

policy

as

emphasized

he arming

nd standardizationf forces

n

South

America,

he

collective

iscouragement

f

Communist-tinged

movements,nd theundertakingfcooperativerogramsor nternal

security.

nd to the extent hatLatinAmerican

overnments

hare

Washington'setermination

o

keep

the

hemisphere

ree romOld

World nfluences

f

nykind,

heres

certainly

n

the

OAS a minimum.

communityf nterests

ith

espect

o

security.

More than

this,

however, ardly

xists. or

years,

atin Amer-

ican insistence

n

OAS-sponsored

conomic

evelopmentrograms

has fallen

on

unsympathetic

ars n

Washington.

ore American

investment,oretechnicalssistance,nd especially AS-adminis-

teredhemispheric

ommoditygreements

re

demanded

y

Latin

American overnments.

he essence f

Pan-Americanism,aysEze-

quiel Padilla,

s economic

olidarity:

The

objective

ould

be

to

treat

he

whole

hemisphere

s

one

economic

nit,

nd thus o

rescue

Latin

American

conomy

rom he

grip

f

blind

conomic orces. '0

The

desire or

ndustrialization

nd

the

fear

f

retainingingle-crop

economiesreconstanthemesnthese emandsndthey dd up to a

muchmore

lamorous

horus

han

Washington's

oncern

or rmed

strength.

n

equally

marked

ivergence

f

interestsxists n the

colonial phere.

n UnitedNations s well

as

in

OAS

meetings,he

termination

f colonialism

n

theWestern

emisphere

as been

de-

manded,

ith

n

invitation

o

Britain,rance,

nd

Holland

o

leave

their

emaining

merican

ossessions,

n aim to

which

heUnited

States

s

at

best ndifferent.

Cohesionn theOAS, therefore,s farfromtriking. judicious

process

f

balancing eeps

he

organization

ffective,s demonstrated

at theCaracas nd Rio Conferences

f

1954:

the

United tates cceded

to theLatindemand

or

ommodityegulation

o the

xtent f spon-

soring

conference

o

that

nd,

while he

South

Americansndorsed

Washington'sreoccupation

ith

emisphere

ecurityypassing eso-

lutionsgainst

ommunism

n

membertates

nd

bytacitlypproving

intervention

n Guatemala.

urther,

nited

tates

olicy ad to give

way nthe ealm f conomicevelopmentndcolonialmancipation,

as set

forth

elow,

n

the

ontinuing

ffort

o

retain

he

lmost olid

OAS-bloc

ote

n

favor

f American

nterpretations

nd

conceptions

of

global

ollective

ecurity,.e.,permissive

nforcement.

The

Afro-Asian

loc

differs

rom he

regionalystems

o

far

ex-

10

Ezequiel

Padilla,

The

Meaning

f

Pan-Americanism,

oreign

Affairs,

xxii,

No.

2

(January954), p.

274.


11/27

INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATION

247

amined

n

that

t

doesnotpossess

ne organization

f

tsown.Apart

from

he almost

efunct

rab

League,

rregular

slamic

nd Asian

conferences

ave

been

he

nlymodes

forganization,

ith he

Afro-

Asian Conferencef

1955

the most mbitiousf suchefforts.wo

themesre

ommono

the

tates f

the

egion nd

make

p their

om-

munity

f nterests:

vital

oncern

ith

conomicevelopment,

nd

the

determination

o end

colonialism

verywhere.

The

economic

ssuemanifests

tself

n

demands

or arge-scale

nited

Nations

nvestment

utlays

nd

technicalssistance,

oupled

with he

assertion

f

the

ighto nationalize

nd

regulate

oreign

roperty.

et

these

ountries

eject

conomic

id as a substitute

or

freedom,

s

theyee t. TheArabworld,wrote Lebanese iplomat,antago-

nized

nd

isolated

nd

thrown

nto

despair,

an

no more e

restored

into

'situationf

strength'y

such

hort-cutss PointFour

than t

canbe

ntimidated

nto

ove fand

oyalty

o

theAmerican

ause

ya

show

fforce.'

Consensus

n the

Afro-Asianloc,

however,

s demonstrated

ni-

formly

n

the

ttack

n

all

colonial

estiges.

We

are

here

o challenge

the asic ssumptionsfnineteenth-centurymperialism,heEgyptian

delegate

eclared

o the

Security

ouncil

uring

heSuez

Canal dis-

pute.

If the

whole

f

Asia and

Africa

ombined

annot

et subject

discussed

ecause

f

two

or three

reat

owers

bjecting,

hen

he

time

may

ome

when heAsian

nd African ountries

ill feel hat

they

re happier

n their

wn countries

nd

not n the

UN,

Prime

Minister

ehru

oldthe ndianParliament.'2unis,

Morocco,

ew

Guinea, yprus,

ranian

il,

Palestine

efugees,

nd

theformer

talian

coloniesreall issueswhich,o theAfro-Asians,ymbolizeheirtrug-

gle against

llvestiges

f

Western

omination.

Agreement

isappears,

owever,

s soon

as the ssue

of

collective

security

s

raised.

o

doubt,

most

f the

tatesn the

region

re

neu-

tralist

n

the ense

f

preferring

onciliation

o

enforcement,

egotia-

tion

etween

he

uper-powers

o

ndefiniteipolarization

fmight

nd

influence.

et

three

f

them

ave

oined

EATO

and two

re

moving

toward ATO. Neutralismn the ense frigorouson-alignment

with

any

regional

lliance

ystem

haracterizes

nly

the

Colombo

Powers

excluding

akistan)

nd

thosemembers

f theArab

League

whichdisapprove

f

Iraq's

Western

rientation:

gypt,

yria,

nd

Saudi

Arabia.

t is

their octrine

fneutralism

hich alls

for

urther

11

Fayez

A.

Sayegh,

The

Arab

Reaction

o

American

olicy,

ocial

Science,

xvii,

No.

4 (October

952),

pp.

I90-93.

12Bell,

op.cit.,

pp.

466-67.


12/27

248

WORLD POLITICS

examinationn terms

f the

dynamicsfregionalnd

universalnter-

national

rganization.

Rigorous

eutralismmplies

istrustor ll

Westerndeologies,ut

a tolerationor heir issidenttrains,speciallyn the imultaneousc-

ceptance

fbothMarxismnd

iberal

emocracyythe ame

groups.

This

detachment,n

turn, acilitatesn

indifferenceo

themeritsf

the

deologicalssuebetween he

super-powers.niversal

ollective

securitys thekey o

peace, nd

not

he

ivalryetween

power locs,

which

Nehrunever ires

f

castigating

nd with

whichhe

identifies

regional

rganizations.ohammed atta

described

bstentionrom

these locs s designedto

work

nergeticallyor he

preservation

f

peace ndthe elaxationf ensioneneratedy he woblocs, hrough

endeavors

upported

f

possible

y

he

majorityfthemembersfthe

United

ations.

s an llustrationf

his

olicymay

e cited

he fforts

made

by

ndonesian concert

ith

he

Arab nd Asian

ountries,

o

put

n

end

to thewar

n

Korea. '3

onciliation

nd mediation

n

the

Cold

War are

the obvious

olicy

erivativesrom

he

principle f

neutralism,s

consistentlyreachedy

Nehru

nd

endorsedvenby

Israel,ran, ndYugoslavia.

The

maximum

f

agreement

chieved

y

the

nner

oreof

neu-

tralist sian states

was revealed

n

the

1954

Colombo

Conference:

United

Nations

upervision

ver he

establishment

f

peace

n

Indo-

china,

ontinued

isarmamentalks

nd

a

cessation

f

hydrogen-bomb

tests

n

the

Pacific,

dmission

f

Peiping

o

theUnited

Nations,

e-

nunciation

f

colonialism,specially

n

North

Africa,

nd

the

desira-

bilityf alling

he

955

Afro-Asianonferenceo

considerhesessues

further.

alancingmong

he

five, owever,

as

manifestedn

this

declaration

f

solidarity

irected

qually gainst

ast

nd

West:

The

Prime

Ministers

ffirmed

heir

aith

n

democracy

.

.

and

.

.

de-

clared

heir

nshakable

eterminationo

resist

nterferencen

the

affairs

f their

ountries

y

external

ommunist,

nti-Communist

nd

other

gencies. '4

t

is

surmised

hat his

ruly

neutral

tatement

represents

ndia's

oncessiono Burma's

ndPakistan's

oncern

ver

Sino-Sovietxpansion.

13

MohammedHatta,

Indonesia's

Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, xxi, No. 3

(April 953), pp. 444-45.

Contrast

his

osition

ith

he

venmore

elativisticonception

of neutralismfferedy P. Middle

GroundBetween

America nd

Russia:

An

Indian

View, bid.,

XXXII,

No. 2

(January

954).

See also Robert

A.

Scalapino, 'Neutralism'

in Asia,

American

olitical cience

Review,

LVIII,

No.

i

(March

954).

14

Article

of the

Final

Communique

f the Conferencef

South-East sian Prime

Ministers;ndian

Council

of World

Affairs,oreign

Affairs

eports,

II,

No.

7 (July

I954) a


13/27

INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATION

249

Such

are the

nternal

armonies

nd

disharmonies

f regional

ys-

tems.

Regional

ohesions

maintained,

r at

least ought,

y

mutual

adjustments

nd concessions

n

therealm f

security.ut, n

addi-

tion, id nthe ealms f conomicevelopmentndcolonialmancipa-

tion

s bartered

or

upportn

security

ssues. ven

so,

ntra-regional

balancing

requently

ails o

establish

solidfront

n all

issues nd

unity f

performance

n theUnited

ationss

mperfect.ence t

s at

the

lobal

nstitutional

evel hat

dditionaloncessions

remade

within

and

among egional

ystems

norder o

enable

keyblocs

o

marshal

that

wo-thirds

ajority

hich s

essentialo

gaining

nited

Nations

endorsement

or ny setof

national olicies.

he

continuing

mpact

offunctionalismn security ustnowbe demonstrateds itmani-

fests

tselfhrough

egional

ensionsn

the

UnitedNations.

III

Aspirations

or

conomic

ell-being

nddemands or olonial ree-

dom are

certainly

actors hich

would

play n ever

more

mportant

role

n

internationalelations

ven

f therewereno

Cold

War.

Still,

intermsf nover-allatternfforeignelations,uestionsf ecurity

-collective

r

otherwise-are

ominant.While t

is no

doubt

rue

that

o

India

the

matter

f

economicevelopment

nd

to

Egypt

he

expulsion f

the

British

rom uez are

of far

greater

oncern han

the

rivalry etween

he

democratic

est nd

the Communist

oviet

bloc,

he

fact

emainshat

hese

ndian nd

Egyptian

spirationsain

most

f their

nternationalogency

rom

eing

ied omehow

o

Cold

War

strategy.

ence the

crucial

actorn a

theory

f

international

organizationemainshequestionfcollectiveecurity,incettends

to condition

he

mount

f

mpactnjoyed

y the

functional

ealms.

How does

balancing

n

the collective

ecurity

ieldmanifesttself

in the

closely

elated

reas of economic

evelopment

nd

colonial

emancipation?

Balancing

mplies he

preservationf

security

hrough process f

negotiation,

onciliation,

nd

mediation.

he

conciliators an

uncom-

mitted

arty,

r

member

f

major

ower loc

not

ully

n

agreement

with he eader fthegroup-in hort,heAfro-Asiannddissident

NATO or

SEATO

powers.

ecause f

his

crucial

mportance

o

both

super-powers

nd

their

llies, he

positionf the

conciliatorust

e

respected

o

some

xtent,

eading

o

concessions,

asing f

tensions,nd

even

dctentes.

cumulative

attern

f

compromises,

n

turn, ets

p

expectations

f

peace,

tability,

nd

coexistence

hich

he

uper-powers

can

violate

nly

t

great eril

o their

eputation

nd

eadership

n

the


14/27

250

WORLD

POLITICS

world.

oth

conomic

evelopment

nd the

ry

or

olonial

reedom

can

nd

do contribute

urther

mpetus

othe

alancing

attern,

ecause

they

reate

more

nd

more xpectations

etracting

rom

he

over-

whelminglyecurity-orientedpproach hich heWest eeks ogive

tothe

United

Nations,

hereby

trengthening

he

otal argaining

osi-

tion

f

he onciliating

loc

orblocs.

t must e stressed,

owever,

hat

only ssues

which

rouse

ontroversy

ulfillhisparticular

ole;

for

such

matters

s

the

tatus

f

women

r

the tandardization

fstatistics,

although

functional

n

the

usual

sense

f

that

erm,

o

not

give

rise o

a

pattern

f

compromise

nd

adjustment.

How, then,

oes

economic

evelopment

ffect

he

functioning

nd

impact ftheUnitedNations s a totality?egional nd national

aspirations

n

the

realm

f

international

nvestment

re singled

ut

as the

key

ndex

n

the nalysis,

specially

s

they

evolveround

ro-

posals

o create

n International

inance

Corporation

IFC)

and

a

Special

nited

ations

und

for

conomic

evelopment

SUNFED).

For the

underdeveloped

ember

tates,

he

proposition

s

fairly

simple.

he Afro-Asian

nd

most

f

the

Latin

American

ountries

feel hat

he

dearth

fprivate

nternational

enture

apital

nd

the

conservative

ending

olicy

f

the

nternationalankcallformore

UnitedNationsfforts.

hey

prefer

n

international

nstitution

nder

collective

ontrol

obilateral

ssistance

r

global

gencies

ominated

y

the

industrialized

ations.

hey

stress

he importance

f

non-self-

liquidating

rojects

nd

the

need

for

grants;

hey

bject

o the

high

interestates

nd

stringent

mortization

erms

ttached

o

the

nter-

national

ank

for

Reconstruction

nd

Development

oans.

A barteringfeconomicor ecurityonsiderationssfranklydvo-

cated y

one

ofthe

eaders

n

the

fight

or

FC

and

SUNFED,

Chile's

Hernan

antaCruz:

The

United

Nations

as

taken

p arms

o

repel

aggression

nd to

vindicate

ollective

ecurity.

he

main

burden

was

being

arried

y

Western

ountries.. .

If they

id

not receive

aw

materials

rom he

underdeveloped]

ountries,

hey

ould

not

physi-

cally

resist,

nd

without

heir

moral

upport

he

collective

truggle

againstggressionn thename fpeacewould egeneratento mere

fight

n

defense

fpolitical

nd

economic

nterests....

And

the om-

monman

n

the

underdeveloped

reas

would nly

upport

heUnited

Nations

nd ts

great

work

f

collective

ecurity

fhe

were

onvinced

that

ts ctionwas

part

fa

universal

ndertaking,

he bject

f

which

was to

secure

eace,

ndividual

reedom

nd

the

elf-determination

f

peoples,

nd

alsoto

provide

im

with

decent

tandard

f iving

nd


15/27


251

materialnd social

rogress. '5

hether

r not

he

NATO

and

Soviet

blocs ake eriously

heringing

harter hrasesdvocating

he

aims

setforth y Santa

Cruz, concern

or mobilizing

r

hamstringing

UnitedNations ecurityperationsompels ttentiono this uxta-

positionf ssues.

Initiallyt least,

heWest

pposed oth FC and SUNFED.

With

the exceptionf

Holland, he NATO and ANZUS

countries

ave

pointed

o theneed for making

verseasnvestments

ttractiveo

private nterprise

nd have tressed

he carcityfpublic ndprivate

capital or arge-scalenternational

nvestment.

omestic eeds, he

burden

f

rearmament,nd the

measuresf regional rganizations

have all figuredn the argumentf the oppositiono IFC and

SUNFED.

A

bartering

f

securityor conomic

oncessions,

owever,

as

been

featuredy the

West s well.Apparentlyoping o

outmaneuverhe

argument

f

theSUNFED

supporters,merican

elegatesxplicitly

in

952

and

953 made articipationn the

evelopmentchemeson-

tingentn savings

btainedrom

successfulrogramfglobalmulti-

lateral isarmament.espite heoutcry fopposition,hisproposal

was

to

lay the

groundworkor he

extensivealancing perationn

the

Eighth eneral ssembly.

The

position

fthe

Soviet loc, inally, as the

most

lear-cut.ike

theirWestern

ntagonists,he

Soviets aveopposed heprojects.

ut

they rgue hat FC and SUNFED

must ertainly

eadtoever-growing

dominationver

heworld conomy yAmerican

mperialists.ith-

out

any ualification,he

Communistelegates

ssert hat ll interna-

tional inancingust eadto a growthfWestern onopolies.

These

being

he

positionsaken, ow rewe

to

account

or

hefact

that esolutionspprovingoth

rojects ere assed

n

953

byunani-

mous

votes,

ith

he

Soviet

loc

abstaining? he balancing

attern

is

implicit

n

the

compromise

esolutionassed:disarmamentas

to

make

possible

conomic

evelopment,

ntensive

tudy

or

he

FC

and

SUNFED

was

to

go forward,nd

Belgium's aymond

cheyven

15As citedin RobertE. Elder and ForrestD. Murden, EconomicCooperation:

Special

United Nations Fund

for Economic

Development

SUNFED), Woodrow

Wilson

Foundation,

ew

York, September

954,

pp.

7-8.

16-See

nited

Nations,

epartment

f

Economic

Affairs,

eport

n a

Special United

NationsFund

for

Economic

Development, ew

York,

1953; United

Nations,

Official

Records f

theGeneral

Assembly,th

Session, econd

Committee,

ummary

ecordof

Meetings,

nd the same

document or

the 8th

Session.

Also

Economic

evelopment f

Underdeveloped

Countries,

U.N.

Doc

A/2430

and

A/2447;

and

Elder

and Murden,

op.cit., or

details n

the aborious

egotiations

f the

Working arty nd

the

mediating

role

played

by these

our

mavericks:

olland,Haiti,

Greece,

nd

Pakistan.


16/27

252

WORLD POLITICS

was to

explore

rivatelyhe

willingnessf member overnments

o

contributehe

necessaryunds.

While Western

tatesmen ade it

quite lear

hat heir ote or he

projects

id not mply eadinesso

contributeo the nstitutionsroposed,heAmericanelegate'state-

ment

n the ssuewas

sufficiently

mbiguouso encourage

xpectations

among he

underdeveloped

ountries.he true mplicationsf

the

compromise,

owever, aybe seenwithin

hecontext

f theglobal

balancing

rocess.

Thus,

heWest

learly ielded he

principleo the

Afro-Asiannd

Latin

American

locs. ymerely

ndorsingheprojects

nd-verbally

-wishing themwell,

heWestern

overnmentslso

weakened heir

oppositionothe dea.Refusaloparticipatetsome utureimewillbe

that

muchmore

difficulto

ustifyo a worldwhich

lready ccuses

the

West

f sacrificingiving

tandardso

armaments.t maybe sug-

gested,

urthermore,

hat heWest's ielding

as n turn

motivatedy

the

desire o retain

or ecurity

ssues hevotes fthe

regionalystems

standing

or economic

evelopment.s

Jonathan ingham

oted:

The

temptationo

use the

[technicalssistance] unds

or

more

spectacular

urposes,r to use

them o win

some mmediateolitical

pointfrom wavering overnmentsuchas a favorableoteon a

crucialssue n the

United

ations) reconstantndvery

reat. hose

who

are

responsible

or he

day-to-dayonduct f our

foreign olicy

are

constantly

ooking or lue

chips o playwith, nd

an appropria-

tion

f

several

million ollars or

n aid

programn an area ooks ike

a

very

ice

bluechip

ndeed. '7 fro-Asian

nd Latin

Americanco-

nomic spirations

eetWestern

ecurity

ims

and the

result s a

compromiseytheWest n thehopeofretaininghe oyaltyf some

present

r

futurealancer. ne

recent

onsequenceasbeen heAmer-

ican

decision o

contributeo

IFC,

made, ignificantly,

t the OAS

Conferencet

Rio.

Another as been

lesseningf

European pposi-

tion

o

SUNFED, as

illustratedn the

Scheyven eport o

ECOSOC.

But he

oviets

ieldedheir rincipless

well.By

abstainingnstead

of

voting

gainst he

proposals,hey oo eemed o underwrite

hede-

mands f

the

underdeveloped

ountries

n

non-Soviet

erms.

ecent

Soviet ontributionsotheUnitedNations echnical ssistancero-

grammay

be

interpreted

imilarly.

hese

tepsmply

recognition

f

and

a

yielding

o

regional

emandswhich

may

render

future

retreat

f

the

Soviet loc

quite

hazardous

n

terms

f

propaganda.

The

second

major

unctional

rea

n

which

alancingmight

e

ex-

17

Jonathan . Bingham, Partisan olitics nd Point

Four, Bulletin f the Atomic

Scientists,,

No.

3 (March

954), p. 85.


17/27

INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATION

253

pected

o operates the

realm

f

nternationalolicy oward

olonial

emancipation.he crucial

ndex f

clashing egionalnd

national s-

pirationss

providedy he ual ssue f

whether

list ffactorshould

beadopted ywhich o udge hedegreefadvancementowardelf-

government

r independence

chieved

y

a

given

dependency,

nd

the

resultant

uestion

f whether

uerto

Rico,

s of

I953,

was

self-

governingrnot.

The

decision-makingrocess

isplayed

n

the

Gen-

eral

Assembly

n

this ccasion

s

likely

o

yield ome

ruitful

nsights.

A

list

f

factors as

considered

ecessaryy

majority

f

the

mem-

ber

tates

n

order

o

be able to udge

the

claims

f colonial

owers

whoceased

o

transmitnnual

eports

o theGeneral

ssembly

nder

Article3e.Byclaiminghat hepossessionsnquestion ad achieved

self-governingtatus,

he olonial

owers

ad

withdrawn

ifteen

uch

areas

rom he

cope

f

the

Charter's

hapter

I

since

947,ncluding

Puerto

ico.While

he

factors ereformulatednd

proposed

o

the

General

ssemblynly

or

urposes

f

guidance, strong

ovement

developed y I953 to vest

xclusive

ompetence

n

the

General

As-

sembly ortheapplication

f these

actors

o

any

one

territory.

t

followed,f course,hat n the futureolonial owersmust eek

United

Nations onsent

o

no

longer

eporting

n

their

ossessions;

specifically,his mplied

American

ack

of

competence

o

remove

Puerto

Rico

unilaterally

rom

United

Nations

xamination

nd dis-

cussion.

The

inter-nd

intra-regional

alancing rocess

as

defined

y

the

initial

ositions

aken

y

the

member

overnments

n

thedual

ssue

of

factors

nd

ofcompetence. 8

t one

extreme

f the

pectrum,he

West

ook

very

imview

f

thewhole

ttempt.

he

European

nd

Australasian

ations,

orvarious

easons,ejected

heprinciplef the

UnitedNations

ormulating

nd

applyingny

et

of

factors

ver

he

possible

issent

f

the

administering

tate.While

objecting itterly

to

the

vesting

f

competence

n

theGeneral

ssembly,

s

forcinghe

pace

and

timing

f

establishingelf-government

r

independence

y

an

anti-colonial

gency,

he

West

nevertheless

ished

or

majority

whichwouldrelease heUnited tates romheobligationoreport

on

Puerto

Rico, and

thus

give

a

colonial

power

clean

bill of

health.

18

These

generalizationsre basedon:

United

Nations,

fficial

ecords

f

the

General

Assembly,th

Session,

ourth

Committee,

ummary

ecord

f

Meetings,

nd the

same

document

or

the 8th Session.

Also

see Sherman

.

Hayden

and

Benjamin

Rivlin,

Non-Self-Governingerritories:

tatus

f

Puerto

Rico,

Woodrow

Wilson

Foundation,

NewYork,

eptember954.


18/27

254

WORLD

POLITICS

The Soviet loc ccupiedhe ppositeole.

ull and mmediate

nde-

pendence or all

colonies

was

demanded.

o

transitional

tage

of

partial elf-governmentr lingeringssociations

ith the colonial

power fter hegrantf utonomyere dmitted,lthoughheywere

recognized

n

theGeneral

ssembly'sist

f

factors.ndeed,

he oviets

rejected hevery

dea of stating

hefactors

s

misleading

nd

prone

to introduce

emporizing

nd evasion.

While

arguing

or he

com-

petence f the GeneralAssemblyo examine

laims or

non-submis-

sionof reports

nderArticle

3e,

heCommunistlocalso

sought

o

condemn heWesterntand n Puerto

ico and obstruct

herelease

oftheUnited tates

romts bligations.

The listof factorsnd the ssue f competence,f course, ad re-

ceived heir nitial

upport rom he

combined fro-AsianndLatin

American locs.

However,herewas by

no means nanimitymong

these

nti-colonial

ations.

he

overwhelmingajority

n

bothblocs

favoredhe ist ffactors,

ut

even atinAmericanelegationsished

to

avoidthe

ssue

of

competencend

release he United tates n-

conditionallyrom

urthernternational

esponsibilitiesithrespect

to Puerto ico.To

this ourse, ost fthe

Colombo owers ndthree

Latin Americanountriesbjected, roposingnstead UnitedNa-

tions nvestigation

fPuerto ican onditionsn order o verifymer-

ican claims. he

compromiseesolution

orked ut in the Fourth

Committeeesulted

n giving heUnited tatests leanbillof

health,

but

also

asserted

he exclusive

ompetence

f the GeneralAssembly

to

decide imilarases n the uture.19

The voting

n

I953

on both

ssues

llustrates

he tensions

ithin

andamong locs. he list ffactors,or guidance nly, as adopted

by

vote

f

7

to

23,

withChina nd

Thailand

bstaining.henega-

tive oteswere ast y lmost he ntire

ATO-ANZUS ombination,

four

atinAmerican

elegations,nd thefullCommunistloc.

The

debatewas capped y declarationrom

he olonial owers hat

hey

had

no

intentionf mplementing

heresolution.ut t

was

the ssue

of Puerto ico which

aised hecompetence

uestionn full. n the

Fourth

Committee,

he

resolution

bsolving

heUnited tates rom

furtheresponsibilityut also assertingnitedNations ompetence

was

passed

2

to

i8,.

with

9

abstentions.

ost

Western

tates

oted

negativelyr abstained

ecause f the

competencessue.The Soviet

bloc

plus Burma, ndia, ndonesia,

raq, Guatemala,

Mexico, nd

Yugoslavia

oted

negatively

ecause

hey

isputed

he

attainment

f

self-governmenty

Puerto ico.

19

Proposals nd

votes re analyzed

n

Haydenand

Rivlin, p.cit., p.

i6-i9.


19/27

INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATION

255

In

theplenary

eeting

he ame

general

ally

f votes

was

obtained,

falling hort

f

the

necessary

wo-thirds

ajority.

owever,

arlier

n

the

meeting,he

Assemblyad

approved

y vote

f

0

to26

a Mexi-

canproposaloapplyhe ule f implemajorityoallquestionsnder

Chapter I.

Hence he

West, he

oviets,ndthedissident

fro-Asians

and

Latin

Americans

ere

utmaneuverednd

theresolution

as

de-

clared

dopted.he

United

tates,

hich ad

abstained

n

the

Fourth

Committeeote

because

f the

competence

ssue,was

compelled o

vote

or he

resolution

nthe

plenary

meetingn

order

ot o ose

ts

cleanbill

of health n

Puerto

ico.

In

colonial

matters,hen,

he

patternf

balancing

s

far

ess

marked

thannthe ealm feconomicevelopment.he votesnalyzedhow

veryittle

djustmentnd

compromisen

the

part fthe

two

polar

camps n

thedirection

f

thebalancing

fro-Asiannd

OAS

systems.

Thesame

onclusion

merges

rom he

ositions

akenn the

955

vote

on

Algeria.No

general

ompromise

ormula,

ompellinghe

chief

antagonistso

endorsehe

balancers'

osition,as

yet

een

developed,

as

evidenced

y

thecombined

Western

nd Soviet

ppositiono the

principleffactors. nd so long s nosuch ommitmentsobtained,

the

balancing

locs ack an

additionalever

with

which o

condition

the

West ndthe

ovietso

restraintnd

concession.

owever,t

may

well

be

that he ntroduction

f he

principlef

simple

majority

oting

will

change his

picture. o

longer

will the

polar

blocsbe

able to

count n

the

defeat f

balancing

esolutions

or

ackof a

two-thirds

majority

n

plenary

essions.f

the

principle

fbartering

ecurity

otes

for

upportn

colonial nd

economic

matters

ontinues

o be

opera-

tive, herefore,tmaywellbe surmisedhatbalancing illemerge

even n the

olonial ealm s

a

processf

considerablemportance.

l-

ready

hepolicy f

the

United

tates n

this ssue

ives

ome

upport

to

such

conjecture.

The actual

mpact

f

balancing

n

thefield f economic

evelop-

ment

nd

thepotential

f

a similar

ourse

f events

n the

colonial

realm,

hen, re

the

constituents

f a larger

nterregional

rocess

f

balancingt theUnitedNations. hepracticefcollectiveecuritys

advocated

y he

West r

the

denunciations

f t

utteredy

he

oviets

depend or

heir

nstitutional

ffectivenessn

the

ttention

iven o

the

functional

spirationsf

underdevelopednd

anti-colonial

egions.

he

Cold

War maywell

be

expected

o

deepen his

nterlockingelation-

ship

and

thereby

ncrease

he

bargainingosition f the

balancers,

especially

n

the

ealm

f

collective

ecurity.

ence

he

mobilization

f


20/27

256 WORLD POLITICS

the

United

Nations

y

one

state

r

regional ystem

ill become

ess

and

ess

ikely.

IV

It is evidenthat he

process

f

exchanging

oncessions

ithin

ach

regional ystem

s

by

no

means

uniformly

uccessful.

onsequently,

issues f

security,

conomics,

r colonial

mancipation

ay

continue

to

form he

ubstance

f

disagreement

nd

rival

spirations

ven

mong

membersf the ame

egional

ystem,

nce he

ssue

eaches

he

evel

ofUnited

Nations

iscussion. henever

uch

olidarity

s not

chieved

at the

regional

evel,

he

pportunity

or

alancing

t the

global

evel

increases,ince heregionalartnersreunder ressureoburyheir

differencesnd since

heir

pponentsersist

n

seeking

o

prevent

uch

agreement.

pportunity

or

egotiation,

aneuvering,

nd

compromise

therefore

mproves

t

theuniversalevel

s the ase

of

reachinggree-

ment

egionally

eclines.

The

net

result f

ntra-regional

nd

United

Nations

alancing ro-

cedures

ith

espect

o

the

wo

uper-powers

s

a

loss

of

the

unilateral

ability o implementational imsor dictate egional olicy. n

principle,he

United tates eeks o

mobilize

he

United

Nations

n

behalf

f thecontainment

olicy,

ttempts

o

preserve

he

unilateral

and bilateral

ature f

aid to

economic

evelopment,

nd

prefers

o

subject he

remaining

olonial

mpires

o

no

immediate

rocessfdis-

integration.

n

practice,

he

balancing rocessorces

merican

olicy-

makers

o sacrificelementsn all

these

ealms.

n

principle,

he

SovietUnion

s

eager

o

prevent

he

use of

the

United

Nations

or

containmenturposes, inder rganized chemes oreconomic e-

velopment,

nd

advance

apidly

he

dissolution

f

empires.

n

practice,

however,

he

Soviet nionnot

nly

inds

tself

nable o

achieve

hese

aims but

must

requentlyhange

ts

position

o

accommodate

tself

to

the

pressures

f

balancing.

ational

olicies,

ubjected

o

regional

balancing,

ubjected

urtheroUnited ations

ressures

nterregionally,

are

thus

n

effect

eflected

hrough

he

operations

f

nternationaln-

stitutions.he

degree

f deflection

ow

remains

o

be

demonstrated.

Clearly,he oviet loc s far ess ubjectosuchnfluenceshan re

the

American-led

ystems.

he

Soviet

ystem

s

united

n all

issues

arising

ithin

he ramework

f

nternational

rganizations.

urther,

Soviet

eadership

hich

or

actical r

strategiceasonss

uninterested

in

catering

o

any

xternal

ody

f

opinion as

nothing

o

gainby on-

cessionsnd

will

herefore

e

mpervious

o

the

orcesf

balancing.

he

fact

hatno

single

egional

ystem

ccepts

n

full he

Soviet

ositions


21/27

INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATION

257

on security,

conomic

evelopment,

nd colonial mancipation

ay

therefore

e quite

rrelevant

o

balancing

perations.

n

that

vent,

negotiation

nd

compromise

annot

e

expected.

If,however,heSovieteadershiphould ollow hetacticaload

of plitting

he

Western

lliance,

he

egional

nd

functional

ynamics

of United

Nations

rocessesffer

mple

opportunity

ormaneuver.

Further,

f theKremlin

eredetermined

o

bring

bout

long-range

relaxation

n the

Cold

War, mmersion

n

the

balancing

rocess

ould

hardlye

avoided

nless

he

oviets

re

willing

orelax

ensions

urely

on

American

erms.

upport

or he

Communist

osition

must

hen

be garnered;

xternal

pinion

ecomes

ital.

Hence,

concessions

o

theAfro-Asianeutralistsecome ecessary,speciallyn therealms

of economics

nd

colonies.

imilarly,

oncessions

n security

rounds

become ital

f the

European

eutralists

re to be

wooed

way

from

too close tie

with

Washington.

fforts

osplit

he

already

enuous

SEATO community

f nterests

ight

ring

with

hem

conomic

nd

colonial oncessions

n the

Far

East

and

even he

trongly

nti-Com-

munist AS membership

ight

e

attracted

y

harping

n these

ssues.

But uccessnsuch enturestill resupposes

epartures

rom

he

basic

arguments

sed

n theUnitedNations.Whatevidences there hat

such roadhas

been

ollowed

y

Moscow?

In

the

ield

f ecurity,

t

hould

e

notedhat

he

oviet

nion

with-

drew rom

ran n 1946

partlys

a result

f

very

mild

dverse ub-

licityn

the

Security

ouncil,

ven

though

o

overwhelming

orce

was

brought

obear

on

Moscow.

he

Soviets,

urther,

onsented

o

theKorean

ruce,

espite

considerable

how

f

reluctance,

fter

he

Afro-Asianlochad taken strong and n thenegotiations-even

though

ussia tood

o

oseheavily

nprestige

n theprisoner

epatria-

tion

process.

nd

n

Indo-China,

heGeneva

ettlement

y

no

means

represents

he

est

ermshe

Communist

owers

ould

have btained-

withNATO

as

well

as Afro-Asian

ressure

gain

n

evidence.

oviet

contribution

o

the

formerly

aligned

echnical

ssistance

rogram,

participation

n

two much-denounced

pecialized

gencies,

nd the

initiation

f

bilateralconomicid

schemes

ll represent

odifications

in Soviet acticsroughtbout ythepressuresfbalancing.

The

likelihood

hat hese hanges

re expedientially

otivated

nd

imply

o basic hange

npolicy

oes

notdetract

romheir

mportance

in

terms

f

a

possible

iminution

f tensions.

n making

he

ommit-

ment,

owever ircumscribed,

opes

nd

expectations

ill be

created

in

thecolonial,

conomic,

ndsecurity

ealms

which

an

be

violated

only

t therisk

f ncurring

heenmity

f neutral

egional

locs

n


22/27

258

WORLD

POLITICS

some uture

ecurityssue.

hus,

alancing

ay

make

t farmore

if-

ficult or

he

Soviet

Union

to

obtainAfro-Asian

upport

or

global

propaganda

esolutions

esignedo

embarrass

heWest. or a

Soviet

Union ommittedven otheverbiagef peacefuloexistence,al-

ancing

esults

n

an

ever

more

omplex

attern

f

nterdependencies

which

asthe

umulative

ffect

f

reducing

he

urity

f

ll

national-

and

regional-policy

ositions.

Evidence hat

alancing

as

resulted

n a

deflectionfactualAmer-

ican

policys

far

more

mpressive.

f

course,

t

remains

rue

hat

commitmento a

course f

going t

alone, f

ignoring

egional

solidaritynd

United

Nations

ndorsement,

ould

render

alancing

pressurerrelevantoAmericanolicy.As in thecaseoftheSoviet

refusalo

make

ny

oncessions,o

possibility

f

negotiation

nd com-

promise

ould

hen

emain.

Yet

American

olicy as

been

oncerned

ith

chievingnd

main-

taining

he

olidarity

f

NATO,

SEATO,

and

OAS

on all

issues nd

on

all

evels.

he

heterogeneityf

he

lliance

ystems

as

not acilitated

this

ask

nd t

s

ikely

hat

he

ommunityf

nterestsn

NATO

will

sufferilutionnEuropewith he dmissionfGermany,hile he n-directssociation

f a

rearmed

apan

with

EATO is

almost

ertain

to

have

the

ame

ffectn

Asia.

Thus a

Soviet

eadership

ent

ither

on

dividing

he

West

or on

placating

issident

arts

fit

can

take

comfort

rom

he

egional

ynamicsf

global

rganizationy

catering

to

the

ounsels

f

moderation

hich

may e

addressedo

Washington

from

ondon,

aris,

nd

Tokyo.

Atthe

ame

ime,

merican

olicy-

makers

refer

o

obtain

nited

ations

ndorsementn

the

vent

hat

regional ystemsre mobilizedgainstCommunism.egional r-

rangements

will

be

employedn

the

ervice

f

Charter

rinciples

nd

will

not

degeneratento

mere

military

lliances,

mploying

orce

r

the

hreatf

force

or he

chievementf

narrow

urposes

nconsistent

with

he

Charter,

enjamin

.

Cohen

old he

General

Assembly.20

The

attainment

f

olidarity

ithin

ach

regional

ystem,he

oordina-

tion

f

these

iverse

nterests

lobally,

nd

their

ubordination

o

the

elusive

wo-thirds

ajorityf

the

General

Assemblyombine o

im-

posebalancingn theUnited tates,mplyingeparturesrom oc-

trinal

uritynd

concessions

oall

who

require

eassurance.

Within

ATO,

American

oncessions

avebeen

patent

n

the

field

of

German

earmament,

he

militarystretch-out

n

NATO,

but

most

trikingly

n

the

modification

f

America's ar

Eastern

olicy

20

Benjamin

.

Cohen,

Collective

ecurity

nder

Law,

Department

f

State

Bulletin,

XXVI,

No. 656

(January

i,

I952),

p.

Ioo.


23/27

INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATION

259

in

the Korean nd Indo-Chinese

rises. ATO's restraining

ole

n

Asia

is manifested

urther

n the

relatively

odest ole accorded

o

SEATO,

despite

arlier

merican emands

o the

contrary.

ithin

OAS, theconcessionatterns evidentargelyn therealms f eco-

nomics

nd

colonial

aution,

hile oncessionso theAfro-Asianeu-

tralists akethemselves

elt

n

a

reductionf

securitylaims

n

the

UnitedNations

nd

n

the

ole

ccruing

o SEATO.

Recent

oncessions

esulting

rom he

pressures

f

balancing ere

made ven

n

thecase

of Puerto ico.

The

American

nnouncement

during he

GeneralAssembly

ebate hat he sland

ommonwealth

maybe grantedndependence

fPuerto ico

requests

t

would

hardly

havebeenmadewithouthepressureftheAsian ndOAS criticsf

colonialism.

n fact, he tightrope-walking

f Americanolicy n

United

Nations

iscussions

f

colonialism

s

in itself

vidence

f the

impact f

balancing,

s demonstrated

n

the

United

tates ote or he

finalresolution

n

Puerto

Rico, despite

he obnoxious

ompetence

clause.

he

colonial

ssue

will

thus ecomemore rucial

o balancing

processes

s the

United

tates eels

ompelled

o

depart

rom

ts

NATO-

ANZUS allies.2'

The

most

triking

xample

f the

continuingmpact

f

balancing

lies

n the ield

f

he

tom.

ecent

majorhanges

n

American

trategic

planning

ertainly

re not

due

solely

o the

nfluence

f

nternational

organizations.

et

the

oincidence

f ntra-nd

nter-regional

ensions

on

the

role

of

nuclear

warfarend the

revision

f

American

olicy

statements

s most

triking.

hus massive

etaliation

as

givenway

to

a

system

n which

ocaldefensive

trength

s

reenforced

y

more

mobile eterrentower, .e., egional ilitarytrength.22nd limited

atomic

trategy

ithreliance

n tactical

uclear

weapons

as

since

emerged

s a muchmoremodest

tatement

fAmerican

ilitarylan-

ning.

The

continued

eed

felt or

he

pursuance

f

disarmament

e-

gotiations,

espite

he ack

ffaithn their

uccessndthe ontradiction

they epresent

o muchbasicAmerican

trategiclanning,

mplies

further

oncession

o the United

States'nervous

llies and

critical

neutralistntagonists.t is likely hat he UnitedNations-endorsed

scheme

or

he ndustrial

tilization

f atomic

nergy

as

nspiredy

similar

onsiderations.

ith

this ncidence

f

proposals,

teps,

nd

measures

etracting

romhedominance

fthe

purelymilitaryspects

Z1

For an

official

tatement

f

thispoint,

ee

Vernon

McKay,

The

United

States,

he

United

Nations

nd Africa,

bid., xviII,

No. 7I2 (February

6,

1953).

22

John

oster

Dulles,

Policy

orSecurity

nd

Peace,

Foreign

Affairs,

xxii,

No. 3

(April

954),

pp.

358-59.


24/27

260

WORLD

POLITICS

of United

Nations

trategy,

merican

olicy

s more

nd more om-

mittedo

restraint

nd

patient egotiation.

V

If the

precedingropositions

nd demonstrations

ossess

he

validity

claimed

or

hem,

herewouldno

longer

e

any

reason

or

rguing

that egional

nd

universalnternational

rganization

re

ncompati-

ble.Clearly,he

wonot

only

oexist

ut

depend

n one another.he

balancing attern

stablishes

he

descriptive

nd

conceptua

HAAS, Ernst. Regionalism, Functionalism and Universal International Organization

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