Fremont - Opening Brief
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Nos. 12-1702, 12-1705, 12-1708
________________________
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
________________________
FREDH.KELLER,JR., ET AL.,Plaintiffs-Appellants
v.CITYOFFREMONT, ET AL.
Defendants-Appellees
_______________________
MARIOMARTINEZ,JR., ET AL.,Plaintiffs-Appellants
v.CITYOFFREMONT, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees
Caption continued on inside cover
________________________
On Appeal from the United States District CourtFor the District of Nebraska
________________________
PRINCIPAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
THE CITY OF FREMONT
_______________________
Kris W. Kobach Garrett R. RoeKobach Law, LLC Immigration Reform Law Institute4701 N. 130th St. 25 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.Kansas City, KS 66109 Suite 330-B(913)638-5567 Washington, DC 20001
(202)742-1830
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Caption continued from front cover_______________________
FREDH.KELLER,JR., ET AL.,Plaintiffs-Appellees
v.CITYOFFREMONT, ET AL.
Defendants-Appellants
_______________________
MARIOMARTINEZ,JR., ET AL.,Plaintiffs-Appellees
v.CITYOFFREMONT, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellants
_______________________
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities ................................................................................... vii
Statement of the Issues .................................................................................. 1
Statement of the Facts ................................................................................... 2
Summary of the Argument ............................................................................ 8
Argument .................................................................................................... 11
I. Keller Appellants Juana Doe 2 and Juan Doe Lack Standing ............ 11
A. Appellant Juana Doe 2 is Not a Tenant in a Dwelling Unitand Therefore Lacks Standing ................................................. 12
B. Appellant Juan Doe Will Never Be Required to Comply withthe Ordinance .......................................................................... 14
II. The Salerno Rule Disfavoring Facial Challenges Renders AppellantsArguments Unsustainable ................................................................. 18
III. The Harboring Provisions of the Ordinance are Not Preempted ........ 20
A. The District Court Correctly Applied the Presumption AgainstPreemption .............................................................................. 22
B. Appellants Rest their Preemption Claims on One VacatedOpinion and One Split Decision .............................................. 25
C. The District Court Correctly Held that the Ordinance is not aRegulation of Immigration .................................................. 28
D. The District Court Correctly Held that the Ordinance is notField Preempted ...................................................................... 33
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1. There is no Field Preemption on the General Field of
Immigration or the Sub-Field of Harboring IllegalAliens ........................................................................... 33
2. The Ordinance Has Nothing to Do with AlienRegistration................................................................... 36
E. The District Court Correctly Held that Requesting ImmigrationStatus Information from an Alien and Verifying an Aliens Statuswith the Federal Government are not Conflict Preempted ....... 41
1. Whiting andArizona Have Raised the Bar for ConflictPreemption Claims ........................................................ 44
2. Congress Has Encouraged Local Efforts to ReduceIllegal Immigration ....................................................... 47
3. Appellants Inquisitorial Practices Argument isNonsensical................................................................... 52
F. The District Court Erred in Holding that Revocation ofIllegal Aliens Occupancy Licenses Would be Conflict-Preempted ............................................................................... 56
1. Under the Doctrine of Concurrent Enforcement, theAnti-Harboring and License-Revocation Provisions ofthe Ordinance Are Not Conflict-Preempted .................. 56
2. The District Courts Erred in Distinguishing the Anti-Harboring and License-Revocation Provisions from theRemainder of the Ordinance ......................................... 62
IV. The Ordinance Does not Violate the Fair Housing Act ..................... 65
A. The District Court Properly Denied Martinez AppellantsRule 60(a) Motion Because Martinez Appellants did notPlead Disparate Impact ........................................................... 67
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B. Unlawful Immigration Status is Not Protected by the FHA
and therefore a Disparate Treatment Analysis Based on thisClass is Erroneous ................................................................... 74
C. Keller Appellants Have Not Established a Prima Facie Case ofDisparate Impact Because they Have Not Presented a RelevantSubset that is Adversely Affected by the Ordinance ............... 77
D. The City has Legitimate, Non-Discriminator Reasons forEnforcing the Ordinance and No Less BurdensomeAlternatives Exist .................................................................... 82
V. The Ordinance Does Not Conflict with Section 1981........................ 86
A. No Appellant Possesses Standing to Raise this Claim ............. 86
B. Keller Appellants Alleged That the Ordinance Discriminatedagainst Latinos Because of their National Origin andCannot Change their Allegations Through Briefing ................ 87
C. Keller Appellants Failed to Make the Required Showing ofDiscriminatory Intent Below and Waived Their Right toAppeal the District Courts Holding ........................................ 89
D. Keller Appellants Cannot Show Discriminatory IntentAgainst Latinos ....................................................................... 90
E. Keller Appellants Cannot succeed on a Theory ofDiscrimination against Illegal Aliens ...................................... 91
1. Section 1981 Does Not Protect Illegal Aliens as aClass ............................................................................. 92
2. If Section 1981 Once Did Protect Illegal Aliens as aClass, Then 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A) PartiallyRepealed It .................................................................... 94
VI. The Ordinance Does Not Exceed the Citys Municipal AuthorityUnder Nebraska State Law................................................................ 97
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A. The Ordinance is an Exercise of the Police Powers Authorized
by Neb. Rev. Stat. 16-246 .................................................... 98
B. The Ordinance is Not Inconsistent With the General Lawsof the State ............................................................................ 102
1. Nebraskas E-Verify Law ........................................... 102
2. Nebraskas Fair Housing Act ...................................... 107
C. Appellants Two-Mile Limit Argument Falls Short ........... 108
D. The Ordinance is Specifically Authorized by Two StateStatutes ................................................................................. 110
1. The Ordinance is Authorized by Nebraskas MunicipalLicensing Statute ........................................................ 110
2. The Ordinance is Authorized by Nebraskas StatuteRequiring Municipalities to Deny Benefits to Illegal
Aliens ......................................................................... 113
E. Appellants Manufactured Test Regarding Issues of NotPurely Local Concern is Irrelevant ...................................... 114
VII. The Provisions of the Ordinance are Severable ................................. 119
A. The Ordinance is Clearly Severable Under Sarpy ................. 120
B. The Ordinance is Severable underDuggan ........................... 121
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 124
Certificate of Compliance ......................................................................... 126
Certificate of Service ................................................................................ 127
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) ....................................... 56, 60
Alpern v. UitliCorp United, 84 F.3d 1525 (8th Cir. 1996) ........................... 67
Altria Group, Inc., v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008).......................... 22, 24, 25
Anderson v. Conboy, 156 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 1998) ................................ 93, 94
Ariz. Contractors Assn v. Candelaria, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96194(D. Ariz. 2007), affd sub nom. Chicanos Por La Causa v. Napolitano,544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008), affd sub nom. Chamber of Commercev. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) .................................................... 48
Arizona v. United States, Sup. Ct. No. 11-182 (2012) ..........................passim
Atkinson v. Inter-American Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ... 106
Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55 (1946) .......................................... 117
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat. Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979) ............. 16
Barron v. S.D. Bd. of Regents, 655 F.3d 787 (8th Cir. 2011) ....................... 11
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2008) ........................................ 71
Bennett v. Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 2010) ................................. 91
Busch v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 261 Neb. 484,
623 N.W.2d 672 (2001) .................................................................. 100
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) ..................passim
Charleston Hous. Auth. v. USDA, 419 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 2005) ............. 1, 78
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Chicanos Por la Causa v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 867(9th Cir. 2009), affd sub nom.
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 ........................ 103
City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425 (2000) ................................... 84
City of Omaha Human Relations Dept. v. City Wide Rock &
Excavating Co., 201 Neb. 405 (Neb. 1978) ..................................... 118
City of Omaha v. Cutchall, 173 Neb. 452, 114 N.W.2d 6 (1962) .............. 100
Clifton Terrace Assocs. V. United Techs. Corp.,929 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1991) .......................................................... 87
Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1292 (9th Cir. 2000) ........ 1, 72
Davis v. Federal Election Commn, 128 S.Ct. 2759 (2008) ......................... 12
Dahl v. Rice County, 621 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2010) ..................................... 90
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) ................................ 12
Darst-Webbe Tenant Assn Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth.,417 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2005) ................................................. 78, 82, 86
De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) ...............................................passim
Duggan v. Beerman, 249 Neb. 411 (1996) ......................................... 120-123
Elizabeth M. v. Montenez, 458 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 2006) ......................... 1, 15
English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990) ................................... 24
Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., Inc.,414 U.S. 86 (1973) ............................................................. 74, 107-108
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul,373 U.S. 132 (1963) ............................................................... 24, 56-57
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Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn,
505 U.S. 88 (1992) ................................................................. 23-24, 44
Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010) .............................passim
Gambill v. Duke Energy Corp., 456 Fed.Appx. 578 (6th Cir. 2012) ............ 69
Gamma-10 Plastics v. American President Lines, Ltd.,32 F.3d 1244 (8th Cir. 1994) ............................................................. 73
Geier v. Amer. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) ...................... 47
Gen. Bldg. Contractors Assn v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982) .......... 91
Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920) ................................................. 57
Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969) .................................................... 15
Gonzales v. Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983) ................................. 56, 58
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) .............................................. 93
Gray v. City of Valley Park, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7238(E.D. Mo. 2008) affd Gray v. City of Valley Park,567 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2009) ................................................. 23, 58, 62
Green v. Dillards, Inc., 483 F.3d 533 (8th Cir. 2007) ................................ 91
Gregory v. Dillards, Inc., 565 F.3d 464 (8th Cir. 2009) ........ 1, 67, 69, 90-91
Guimaraes v. SuperValu, Inc., 674 F.3d 962 (8th Cir. 2012) ........................ 74
Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton County,466 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2006) ............................................. 79, 80, 81
Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907) ...................................................... 57
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) ......................................... 36-37, 43
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Hispanic Interest Coalition of Ala. v. Bentley, 2011 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 137846 (D. Ala. 2011) .......................................................... 93
Hodak v. City of St. Peters, 535 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2008) ........................... 87
In re Jose C., 45 Cal. 4th 534 (2009) .................................................... 35, 61
Jacobberger v. Terry, 211 Neb. 878 (Neb. 1982) ...................................... 118
Jacobson v. Solid Waste Agency of Northwest Neb. (SWANN),
264 Neb. 961 (2003) ...................................................... 2, 99-100, 105
Jaksha v. State, 241 Neb. 106 (1992) ........................................................ 122
James v. City of Dallas, 254 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2001) ................................. 15
Jenkins v. Winter, 540 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2008) ............................... 82-83, 90
John Doe No. 1 v. Ga. Dep't of Pub.Safety,
147 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (D. Ga. 2001) ................................................. 85
Johnson v. Missouri, 142 F.3d 142 F.3d 1087
(8th Cir. 1998) ................................................................... 1, 13, 15-16
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) ......................................... 24
Jones v. Hydro Conduit Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44768(D.S.C. Jan. 10, 2012) ..................................................................... 107
Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1993) ........... 72
Keller v. City of Fremont, 280 Neb. 788 (2010) .................................... 98-99
Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1978) ...................................... 26
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) .......................................................... 11
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Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3rd Cir. 2010),
vacated and remandedat 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011) ........................ 26-27
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ............................. 11, 16
Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1987) ............................. 57, 64
L.Z. v. Parrish, 733 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1984) .............................................. 67
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) ........................................... 15
Martinez v. Partch, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4162 (D. Colo. 2008) .............. 76
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) ................................. 22, 23, 47
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973) ........ 62
Midwest Employers Council, Inc. v. City of Omaha,
177 Neb 877 (1964) ................................................................. 115-118
Mosby v. Williams, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105536 (D. Ark. 2010) ............ 87
Niklaus v. Miller, 159 Neb. 301 (Neb. 1954) ............................................ 118
OShea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) .................................................... 15
Oti Kaga, Inc. v. South Dakota Housing Dev. Auth.,342 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2003) ......................................................... 1, 78
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) ........................................... 33, 43, 75, 83
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) .......................................................... 85
Presidio Enterprises, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Distributing Corp.,
784 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1986) ........................................................... 106
Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 1995) ........................ 1, 71, 73
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Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) .......................... 22, 24
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) ................................................... 94
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987)......................... 94
Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004) ................................................ 19
Salitros v. Chrysler Corp., 306 F.3d 562 (8th Cir. 2002) ............................ 26
Sarpy v. City of Papillion, 277 Neb. 829 (2009)................................. 119-121
Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2008) ........... 80
School Dist. v. McCook, 163 Neb. 817 (1957) ............................................ 99
Scottsbluff v. Winters Creek Canal Co., 155 Neb. 723 (1952) ................... 100
S.D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583 (8th Cir. 2003) ............. 73
Stalley v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517 (8th Cir. 2007) ............ 67
State ex rel. Andruss v. North Platte, 120 Neb. 413 (1930) ......................... 99
State v. Belitz, 203 Neb. 375 (1975) .......................................................... 105
State v. Flores, 218 Ariz. 407 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) ........................ 57, 60-61
St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987) ............................. 2, 93
Storino v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach,322 F.3d 293 (3rd Cir. 2003) ............................................................ 12
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009) ................................ 14
Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) ................. 92
Thomas v. Henry, 260 P.3d 1251 (Ok. 2011) .............................................. 84
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Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2012) ............passim
Triad Elec. & Controls, Inc. v. Power Sys. Engg, Inc.,117 F.3d 180 (5th Cir. 1997) ............................................................. 73
Tsombanidis West Haven Fire Dept., 352 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2003) ............. 80
United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989) ................................ 60
United States v. Asalati, 615 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 2010) .............................. 75
United States v. Balderas, 91 Fed. Appx. 354 (5th Cir. 2004) ..................... 60
United States v. Gomez-Moreno, 479 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 2007) ................... 60
United States v. Estate of Romani, 118 S. Ct. 1478 (1998) ........................ 106
United States v. Fort, 248 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2001) .................................... 85
United States v. Lemons, 697 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1983) ............................... 19
United States v. Loaiza-Sanchez, 622 F.3d 939 (8th Cir. 2010) ................... 75
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) ................................................. 24
United States v. Lopez-Salas, 266 F.3d 842 (8th Cir. 2001) ........................ 75
United States v. Ovellaner, 405 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2005) ............................ 16
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960) ........................................ 19, 110
United States v. Rubio-Gonzalez, 674 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1982) ................ 64
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) ............................................ 18
United States v. Sanchez, 963 F.2d 152 (8th Cir. 1992) .............. 59, 84, 95, 96
United States v. Stephens, 594 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2010) ..................... 19-20
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United States v. Tipton, 518 F.3d 591 (8th Cir. 2008) ................ 59, 84, 95-96
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) ........................................... 77
United States v. Varkonyi, 645 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1981) .............................. 60
United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 1999) ............. 47
United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992) ............................................. 77
United States v. Zheng, 306 F.3d 1080 (11th Cir. 2002) .............................. 50
Village of Winside v. Jackson, 250 Neb. 851,
553 N.W.2d 476 (1996) .................................................................. 100
Villas at Parkside Partners v. Farmers Branch,675 F.3d 802 (5th Cir. 2012)petition for rehg pending ........ 26-28, 64
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party,128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008) ................................................... 18-19, 56, 110
Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 245 Neb. 660,
515 N.W.2d 390 (1994) .................................................................. 110
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) ............................................... 15
Wolf v. City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 545 (1964) ........................................ 98-99
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) .......................................... 22, 24-25
Zar v. S.D. Bd. of Examrs of Psychologists,976 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1992) ............................................................. 89
Federal Statutes and Rules
8 U.S.C. 1101 ................................................................................. 5, 29-30
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8 U.S.C. 1324a ............................................................................. 45, 58, 96
8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) ................................................................. 60-61
8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) ...............................................................passim
8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(B)(1992) .................................................................. 96
8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(C)(1992) .................................................................. 96
8 U.S.C. 1357(g) ............................................................................ 1, 46, 51
8 U.S.C. 1373 ...................................................................................passim
8 U.S.C. 1373(b) ................................................................................ 39, 48
8 U.S.C. 1373(c) ...............................................................................passim
8 U.S.C. 1621 ...................................................................................... 1, 77
8 U.S.C. 1621(a) ...................................................................... 1, 40, 49, 55
8 U.S.C. 1621(b) ...................................................................................... 55
8 U.S.C. 1621(c) ................................................................................ 40, 55
8 U.S.C. 1160(b)(7)(A)(i) ........................................................................ 96
8 U.S.C. 1160(b)(7)(A)(ii) ....................................................................... 96
18 U.S.C. 371 .......................................................................................... 96
42 U.S.C. 1981..................................................................................passim
42 U.S.C. 3601......................................................................................... 68
42 U.S.C. 3604..................................................................................... 1, 74
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) ................................................................................... 67
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Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act(PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996)........... 39, 49
State Statutes
Comp. St. 1922, secs. 3986-4030precursor to current Neb. Rev. Stat. 16-246 ................................... 99
Neb. Rev. Stat. 4-108 ....................................................................... 40, 113
Neb. Rev. Stat. 4-109 ......................................................................... 2, 114
Neb. Rev. Stat. 4-111 ......................................................................... 2, 114
Neb. Rev. Stat. 4-112 ............................................................................. 114
Neb. Rev. Stat. 4-114 ......................................................................... 2, 103
Neb. Rev. Stat. 16-101 ............................................................................. 98
Neb. Rev. Stat. 16-205 ......................................................................passim
Neb. Rev. Stat. 16-229 ............................................................................. 98
Neb. Rev. Stat. 16-246 ......................................................................passim
Neb. Rev. Stat. 20-301 .......................................................................... 107
Neb. Rev. Stat. 20-318(5) ...................................................................... 107
City Ordinances
Fremont Municipal Code Ch. 4, Art. 3 ...................................................... 101
Fremont Municipal Code Ch. 7, Art. 2 ...................................................... 101
Fremont Municipal Code Ch. 9, Art. 4 ...................................................... 101
Fremont Municipal Code Ch. 9, Art. 6 ...................................................... 101
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Fremont Municipal Code Ch 10 ................................................................ 101
Fremont Municipal Code 2-209 ............................................................. 101
Fremont Municipal Code 2-210 ............................................................. 112
Fremont Municipal Code 9-602 ............................................................. 112
Fremont Municipal Code 4-309 through 4-311 .................................... 112
Fremont Municipal Code 7-302 ............................................................. 112
Fremont Municipal Code 7-303 ............................................................. 112
Fremont Municipal Code 8-301 through 8-307 .................................... 112
Fremont Municipal Code 8-403 ............................................................. 112
Fremont Municipal Code 9-603 ............................................................. 112
Fremont Municipal Code 9-605 ............................................................. 112
Fremont Municipal Code 10-102 through 10-129 ................................ 112
Fremont Municipal Code 10-130 ........................................................... 112
Fremont Municipal Code 10-202 through 10-208 ................................ 112
Fremont Municipal Code 10-315 through 10-321 ................................ 112
Fremont Municipal Code 10-322 ........................................................... 112
Fremont Municipal Code 10-401 through 10-409 ................................ 101
Fremont Municipal Code 10-501 through 10-505 ................................ 112
Fremont Municipal Code 10-601 through 10-609 ................................ 112
Fremont Municipal Code 10-804 through 10-811 ................................ 112
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Fremont Municipal Code 10-904 ........................................................... 112
Fremont Ordinance 3139, section 1, paragraph K ..................................... 112
Legislative History
S. Rep. No. 104-249, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) .................................... 39
Other Materials
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=dc4f2363d8928310VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=dc4f2363d8928310VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD (Last visited July 3, 2012) ................................................... 20
ICE Fact Sheet, available athttp://www.ice.gov/doclib/sevis/pdf/dmv_factsheet.pdf
(last visited July 4, 2012) .................................................................. 54
Dodge County Clerk Verifies Immigration Petition Signatures,Fremont Tribune (Mar. 25, 2009), available athttp://fremonttribune.com/news/local/article_32276c70-7c0e-5073-994b-de92bdc3821f.html ....................................................... 124
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether Keller Appellants Juana Doe 2 and Juan Doe possess
standing. Johnson v. Missouri, 142 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1998);Elizabeth M. v.
Montenez, 458 F.3d 779, 784 (8th Cir. 2006).
2. Whether any part of the harboring sections of Ordinance 5165,
1(2)-(4), is preempted by federal law, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, U.S.
Const. art. VI, cl. 2. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976); Chamber of
Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011);Arizona v. United States, Sup. Ct.
No. 11-182 (2012). 8 U.S.C 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), 1324(c), 1357(g)(10), 1373,
1621, 1644.
3. Whether Martinez Appellants included a Fair Housing Act disparate
impact claim in their Third Amended Complaint. Gregory v. Dillards, Inc., 565
F.3d 464 (8th Cir. 2009); Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648, 658 (8th Cir.
1995); Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2000).
4. Whether any part of the harboring sections of Ordinance 5165 violates
the federal Fair Housing Act under a disparate impact theory. Oti Kaga, Inc. v.
South Dakota Housing Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 871, 883 (8th Cir. 2003); Gallagher v.
Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010); Charleston Hous. Auth. v. USDA, 419 F.3d
729, (8th Cir. 2005). 42 U.S.C. 3604.
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5. Whether any part of the harboring sections of Ordinance 5165 violates
42 U.S.C. 1981. St. Francis Coll. V. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987);
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2012).
6. Whether Ordinance 5165 is a valid exercise of the municipal powers
of a Nebraska city of the first class. Jacobson v. Solid Waste Agency of Northwest
Neb., 264 Neb. 961 (2003). Neb. Rev. Stat. 4-109; 4-114; 16-205; 16-246.
7. Whether any parts of the harboring sections of Ordinance 5165 are
severable. Sarpy v. City of Papillion, 277 Neb. 829 (2009).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The City accepts the preponderance of Appellants statement of facts, but
disagrees on two points: the description of how Ordinance 5161 (the Ordinance)
operates, and the description of Fremont voters intentions in enacting the
Ordinance. A more accurate statement on those points follows.
Ordinance 5165 was carefully drafted to comply with controlling federal
precedents defining the authority of state and local governments to discourage
illegal immigration and otherwise reinforce federal immigration law. The
Ordinance requires each prospective adult tenant of a rented dwelling unit in the
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City to obtain a residential occupancy license. 1(3.A-3.B).1 The Ordinance
applies only to future tenancies, commencing after the Ordinance goes into effect.
1(2.A(3)). To obtain a license, the prospective tenant must submit a one-page
form to the City and pay a $5 fee. 1(3.B). On this form, the applicant must
provide basic information such as name, address, date of birth, and country of
citizenship, along with the address of the proposed rental premises, the date of
lease or rental commencement, and the name and business address of the landlord.
1(3.E(1)-(9)). An applicant who is a United States citizen or national must so
declare. 1(3.E(9)(a)). An applicant who is not a United States citizen or national
must either provide an identification number that the applicant believes establishes
his or her lawful presence in the United States or declare that the applicant does not
know of any such number. 1(3.E(9)(b)).
Upon receipt of a completed application and fee, the Fremont Police
Department (hereinafter Department) immediately issues the license, without
scrutiny of the information provided. 1(3.B). In the case of an applicant who has
declared himself or herself a United States citizen or national, no further action is
taken. In the case of other applicants, the Department exercises the Citys
authority under 8 U.S.C. 1373(c) to verify the immigration status of the applicant
with the federal government. 1(4.A). If the federal governments response is
1 The Ordinance is at JA 133-40. All references will be to specific Ordinancesections, rather than to JA page numbers.
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that the applicant is lawfully present, no further action is taken. If the response is
inconclusive or tentative, no further action is taken unless and until a final
verification is received. 1(4.C). The Department may use any process that the
federal government directs it to use, including the Systematic Alien Verification
for Entitlements (SAVE) program, direct telephonic inquiries to Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), or any other method of submitting inquiries to the
federal government. 1(4.A). Under no circumstances may the City attempt to
independently verify any aliens immigration status. 1(4.C).
If the federal government notifies the City that the applicant is not lawfully
present in the United States, the Department issues a deficiency notice. 1(4.B).
The notice affords the applicant a 60-day window in which to obtain a correction
of the federal governments records and to submit additional information to the
federal government. Id. After the 60 days, the Department again queries the
federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1373(c). 1(4.D). Only if the federal
government reports for a second time that the applicant is not lawfully present does
the Department send a notice of revocation of the residential occupancy license to
the applicant and to the landlord. Id. The Ordinance provides for pre-deprivation
and post-deprivation judicial review. 4(F).
Under Ordinance 5165, it is unlawful to, among other things, (1) lease or
rent a rental unit as a lessor without obtaining and retaining a copy of the license of
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each known occupant; or (2) as a landlord, knowingly permit an occupant to
occupy a rental unit without a valid license. The Ordinance does not impose any
penalties upon occupants. 1(3).
Ordinance 5165 relies entirely upon the definitions of immigration status
provided by federal immigration law, 8 U.S.C. 1101, et seq. 1(1.A-1.B, 1.F).
The City must accept the federal governments determination of each aliens
status, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1373(c). 1(1.A-1.B). Federal immigration law
governs suits for judicial review of actions taken under the ordinance. 1(4.F(4)).
The employment provisions of the Ordinance require employers in Fremont
to utilize the E-Verify Program to verify the employment authorization of newly-
hired employees. Ord. 5165 5(E-F). City agencies are required to enroll in the
E-Verify Program, as are businesses that contract with the City. Id., 5(C-D).
The City Attorney may enforce the employment provisions by seeking cancellation
of any City contract or revocation of any City permit possessed by an employer
who violates the Ordinance in an adjudicative proceeding before the City Council,
with the protections of due process and the right of appeal to the District Court of
Dodge County. Id., 5(E). The City Attorney may also seek injunctive relief in
any court of competent jurisdiction in Dodge County. Id., 5(F).
The Ordinance contains a robust severability clause. 2. A flowchart
illustrating the operation of the Ordinance appears on the following page.
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Yes
No
Yes
No
Yesor inconclusive
No
Yesor inconclusive
No
No
Application
rejected
License
issued
No further
action
No further
action
Application
complete &fee paid?
UScitizen or
national?
Query 2:Lawfully
present?
Query 1:Lawfully
present?
No further
action
License
revoked
Judicial
review
Notice + 60-
day deferral
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On June 21, 2010, the voters of the City enacted the Ordinance by popular
initiative. The popular vote total was 3,906 in favor (57%) to 2,908 (43%)
opposed. With respect to the intentions of the Fremont voters who adopted the
Ordinance, Appellants make a variety of assertions that are inaccurate or attempt to
impute discriminatory motivations to the 3,906 Fremonters who voted for the
Ordinance, suggesting that they sought a reduction in the number of Hispanics
living in Fremont. Keller Br. 4. For example, Keller Appellants claim that Jerry
Hart, one of the co-petitioners, was concerned about the number of Hispanics who
received benefits and services. Keller Br. 5 n.3 (Appellants words). They
grossly mischaracterize Mr. Harts deposition testimony. Mr. Hart was emphatic
that he was concerned about illegal aliens who impose costs on Fremont
taxpayers, regardless of their ethnicity. JA 115-19.
Martinez Appellants are equally misleading. They claim that Bob Warner,
the sponsor of a virtually-identical ordinance when it was before the City Council,
intended to reduce the growing number of Latinos in Fremont. Martinez Br. 7
(Appellants words). On the contrary, Mr. Warner emphatically explained that
when he introduced his ordinance, it was not because of any animus toward
Latinos or Hispanics. JA 1036-37 (Warner Dep. 127:1-128:22)(I was referring to
illegals, because if I wouldnt have opposed Hispanics, why in the hell would I
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oppose the Latinos? [Plaintiffs counsel] just said theyre the same.); see also JA
1180-82.
The district court forcefully rejected Appellants attempts to impute racist
motivations to Fremonters. The Plaintiffs have directed the Court to no case in
which such scant evidence and conjecture has been found sufficient to support a
conclusion that unlawful discrimination was a motivating factor in the enactment
of a statute, ordinance, or initiative. JA 112-13. Appellants do not appeal this
finding of the court. Nor do they appeal the courts rejection of their intentional
discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause, the FHA, and Section
1981. Thus, it is unclear why Appellants include these misleading accusations in
their statement of facts at all.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
As a threshold matter, two Keller AppellantsJuana Doe 2 and Juan Doe
lack standing in this matter. Juana Doe 2 no longer lives in a rented apartment, as
she did when this case began; she lives in a trailer home that she owns. The
Ordinance does not affect her in any way. Juan Doe is also unaffected by the
Ordinance, because of his stated intention to remain at his current residence and his
stated intention to return to his home country if his lawful immigration status
expires. Because these two Appellants lack standing, no Appellant in this
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litigation may raise the FHA and Section 1981 claims presented. This Court may
dismiss both claims for lack of jurisdiction.
The district court properly held that the vast majority of the Ordinance was
not preempted by federal law. The district court erred, however, in concluding that
the license-revocation and anti-harboring provisions were preempted under a
theory of implied conflict preemption. Neither the court, nor the Appellants, can
identify any federal statute that conflicts with these provisiona necessary part of
any conflict preemption claim. On the contrary, the Ordinance perfectly conforms
to federal statutes that specifically invite state and local efforts to discourage illegal
immigration. The district court correctly rejected Appellants regulation-of-
immigration and field preemption theories.
If any Appellant has standing to raise an FHA disparate impact claim, it
must nevertheless be rejected because the district court improperly extended the
protections of the FHA to illegal aliens. The court also erred by failing to compare
relevant groups to calculate any disparate impact. However, the court was correct
in rejecting Martinez Appellants effort to re-characterize their disparate treatment
claim in their Third Amended Complaint as a disparate impact claim.
If any Appellant has standing to raise a Section 1981 claim, it must be
rejected. The district court correctly denied Keller Appellants Section 1981 claim.
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Section 1981 does not apply to illegal aliens. And if it were to be construed that
way, it would be implicitly repealed by relevant federal immigration laws.
With respect to the Citys authority under state law to enact the Ordinance,
the district court correctly held that the broad police powers afforded to Nebraska
cities of the first class encompass the Ordinance. In addition, the City possesses
separate and independent authority pursuant to the Nebraska municipal licensing
statute and the Nebraska statute requiring that public benefits and licenses be
denied to illegal aliens.
Finally, the District Court correctly held that the provisions of the Ordinance
are severable.
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ARGUMENT
I. Keller Appellants Juana Doe 2 and Juan Doe Lack Standing.
The City concedes that Appellant Fred Keller, Jr., as a landlord, has standing
to raise most of the preemption claims asserted by Keller Appellants. However,
the two remaining Keller AppellantsJuana Doe 2 and Juan Doelack standing
to raise any claims in this case.
The case or controversy requirement of Article III, which is the irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing, contains three elements:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in factan invasionof a legally protected interest[,] which is (a) concrete andparticularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical[.] Second, there must be a causal connection betweenthe injury and the conduct complained ofthe injury has to be fairly... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ...th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not beforethe court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merelyspeculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorabledecision.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (internal citations
omitted);Barron v. S.D. Bd. of Regents, 655 F.3d 787, 794 (8th Cir. 2011).
The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing standing.
Lujan, 504 U.S.at 561.
Importantly in the case at bar, [s]tanding is not dispensed in gross.Lewis
v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 n.6 (1996). A plaintiff must demonstrate standing
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for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought.
Davis v. Federal Election Commn, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 2768-69 (2008) (quoting
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006)). Plaintiffs must
establish proper jurisdictional bases for each and every claim particularly when
courts are called upon to review a state or local legislative enactment. Storino v.
Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 300 (3rd Cir. 2003).
As is explained below, there is no Keller Appellant who possesses standing
to bring the FHA disparate impact claim or the Section 1981 claim. The only
remaining Keller Appellanta United States citizen landlordobviously lacks
standing to bring either claim. There is no other party in this case who raised
either claim in his or her Complaint and who possesses standing to do so.2
Consequently, there is no jurisdiction to address those two claims.
A. Appellant Juana Doe 2 is Not a Tenant in a Dwelling Unit andTherefore Lacks Standing.
At the time Keller Appellants initially filed their First Amended Complaint,
Appellant Juana Doe 2 rented an apartment on a month-to-month basis in the City
of Fremont. JA 155. However, her living situation changed significantly while
this case was pending in the district court. During that time, she vacated her
2 The District Court correctly held that Martinez Appellants did not plead adisparate impact claim under the FHA in their Third Amended Complaint. JA148-50.
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apartment, purchased a trailer home, and moved into that trailer home.
Consequently, Appellant Juana Doe 2 does not have standing to challenge
Ordinance 5165 because she owns her own trailer home. JSA 29 (Juana Doe 2
dep. 26:11-26:12). Moreover, she plans to continue living in her trailer home
[i]ndefinitely. Sealed Supplemental Appendix (Sealed SA) 2 (28:4-28:6). Keller
Appellants conceded in briefing below that she now owns her own trailer home.
JA 263. Although she rents the space in the trailer home park on which her trailer
home is located, that space is not a dwelling unit within the meaning of the
Ordinance. A dwelling unit is a single residential unit with living facilities for
one or more person, including space for living, sleeping, eating, cooking, bathing
and sanitation. 1(1.C). Therefore, it is abundantly clear that Juana Doe 2
lacks standing to raise any claims in this matter because she is not subject to
Ordinance 5165 and cannot demonstrate that she will ever be subject to Ordinance
5165. See Johnson v. Missouri, 142 F.3d 1087, 1089-90 (8th Cir. 1998).
Although the City raised this deficiency in the standing of Juana Doe 2
below, see Supplemental Appendix (SA) 5, the district court erroneously repeated
the description of Juana Doe 2 found in the Complaint, stating that she was
renting an apartment unit month-to-month. JA 96. This was evidently an
oversight on the part of the district court. It is, however, beyond dispute that Juana
Doe 2 now resides in a trailer home that she ownsnot in a rented dwelling
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unitand is therefore not covered by the Ordinance. She stated in her deposition
that she has no plans to move out of her trailer home and rent an apartment again.
Sealed SA 2 (Juana Doe #2 Dep. 28:4-28:6)(Q. How long do you intend to
continue living in your trailer...? A. Indefinitely). She will never have to comply
with the Ordinance in any respect, is not currently covered by it in any respect, and
thus no longer has standing.
B. Appellant Juan Doe Will Never Be Required to Comply with the
Ordinance.
The standing of Appellant Juan Doe is equally deficient. Juan Doe has no
intention of leaving his current residence. Sealed SA 8 (Juan Doe dep. 38:12-
38:15). Specifically, when asked how long he intended to continue living at his
current apartment he responded, For a long time. I feel comfortable there. Id.
Consequently, the Ordinance will never affect him, since it only applies to new
tenancies that commence after it takes effect. 1(2.A(3)). Thus, Juan Doe has no
intention of taking steps that would bring him within the scope of Ordinance 5165.
It is unclear when, if ever, Juan Doe would even be required to apply for a
residential occupancy license. He did not allege, either in the Keller Amended
Complaint, or in his deposition, that he has any specific plans to move. Juan Does
lack of specific intention to commence a new tenancy after the Ordinance takes
effect falls far short of the firm intention that the Supreme Court demands.
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1150 (2009). To have Article III
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standing, Plaintiffs must show they are likely to suffer future injury that will be
remedied by the relief sought. Elizabeth M. v. Montenez, 458 F.3d 779, 784 (8th
Cir. 2006)(citing James v. City of Dallas, 254 F.3d 551, 563 (5th Cir.
2001))(emphasis added). Abstract injury is not enough. It must be alleged that
the plaintiff has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of the challenged [Ordinance]. OShea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488, 494 (1974)(quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)).
The injury or threat of injury must be both real and immediate, not conjectural
or hypothetical. OShea, 414 U.S. at 494 (quoting Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S.
103, 109-110 (1969)).
InJohnson, the plaintiffs wanted to challenge a statute which had never been
imposed on them. It was unclear when, if ever, the statute would affect them. This
court explained the numerous speculative steps that would be required to take
place before the statute could conceivably be applied against them. [A]bstract
injury was not enough to confer standing, 142 F.3d at 1089, because the injuries
were too speculative to invoke the jurisdiction of an Art. III court. Id. at 1090
(citations omitted). As this Court explained:
We reject appellants argument that they have standing becauseimposition of a statutory sanction is imminent. It is well-settled thatallegations ofpossible future injury do not satisfy the requirementsof Art. III. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990).Instead, [a] threatened injury must be certainly impending to
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constitute injury in fact. Id. (quotingBabbitt v. United FarmWorkers Nat. Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)).
Id. at 1089.
As this Court noted, the Supreme Court cautioned against accepting standing
in these circumstances so as to reduce the possibility of deciding a case in which
no injury would have occurred at all.Id. at 1090 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565
n.2)(internal punctuation omitted). Like theJohnson case, it is unclear when, if
ever, Juan Doe will be required to obtain an occupancy license under Ordinance
5165. He has not even expressed a remote intention (much less an immediate plan)
to commence a new tenancy. The Ordinance will therefore never affect him, since
it only affects tenancies commencing after it takes effect. 1(2.A(3)).
Consequently, there is no injury in fact with a high degree of immediacy.Id.
Indeed, there is no injury in fact at all.
Even if Juan Does standing could be based on a hypothetical possibility that
he himself does not expressthat he may someday move despite his current
statement to the contraryhe still would not have standing because he is an alien
under Temporary Protected Status (TPS). Sealed SA 4-5 (Juan Doe dep. 31:14-
32:7). This status means that Juan Doe is an alien who is lawfully present in the
United States. United States v. Ovellaner, 405 F.3d 360, 364-65 n.21 (5th Cir.
2005)(person granted TPS is in a lawful status). TPS is extended to all aliens from
a particular country, due to natural disasters or other factors that make a return to
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the aliens country of origin dangerous. As an alien lawfully present in the United
States, Juan Doe is entitled to possess an occupancy license under Ordinance 5165.
When the federal government notifies the City that Juan Doe is an alien lawfully
present in the United States, no revocation of his occupancy license can occur.
1(4)(B)-(C)). Thus, he cannot possibly suffer any injury in fact sufficient to confer
standing upon him.
Finally, even if Juan Doe were to assert standing based on the speculation
that at some point his TPS might be terminated, he would nonetheless lack
standing because he stated in his deposition that, in that event, he would not remain
unlawfully in the United States. Rather, he would at that point leave the United
States. Sealed SA 6-7 (Juan Doe dep. 35:14- 36:6). He therefore cannot possess
standing to challenge Ordinance 5165 if he has no intention of being subject to its
terms. Thus, for multiple reasons Juan Doe lacks standing.
As with the standing of Juana Doe 2, it appears that the district court
mistakenly recited the description of Juan Doe in the Keller First Amended
Complaint, without considering the deposition testimony presented in the Citys
Summary Judgment Memorandum. JA 95 (describing Juan Doe as a City resident
who is presently pending immigration proceedings (paraphrasing Complaint at
JA154)). The court did not acknowledge either that he is a lawfully present alien
with TPS status who intends to leave the United States when his TPS status
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expires, or that he has no present plans to move to a different apartment. Nor did
the court conduct any analysis as to why Juan Doe would still possess standing in
spite of those facts. JA 95-96. For all of these reasons, Juan Doe lacks standing.
II. The Salerno Rule Disfavoring Facial Challenges Renders Appellants
Arguments Unsustainable.
Appellants brought a highly-speculativefacial challenge to the validity of
the Ordinance before it had been implemented. Consequently, Appellants must
establish that the Ordinance would conflict with federal law under every
conceivable set of circumstances: A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of
course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances exist under which the Act would be
valid. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)(emphasis added).
In 2008, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Salerno standard and made clear
that its high hurdle applies in facial challenges. Washington State Grange v.
Washington State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1190 (2008). The Court also
reiterated that to prevail in a facial challenge, a plaintiff must establish that the
law is unconstitutional in all of its applications. Id. (emphasis added). This is
because [t]he State has had no opportunity to implement [the law], and its courts
have had no occasion to construe the law in the context of actual disputes or to
accord the law a limiting construction to avoid constitutional questions. Id. The
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Supreme Court cautioned: In determining whether a law is facially invalid, we
must be careful not to go beyond the statutes facial requirements and speculate
about hypothetical or imaginary cases. Id. (quoting United States v. Raines,
362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960)).
On June 25, 2012, the Supreme Court reiterated that facial challenges are
disfavored, this time in the specific context of a conflict preemption challenge to a
state law discouraging illegal immigration. There is basic uncertainty about what
the law means and how it will be enforced. At this stage, without the benefit of a
definitive interpretation from the state courts, it would be inappropriate to assume
[the law] will be construed in a way that creates a conflict with federal law.
Arizona v. United States, Sup. Ct. No. 11-182, slip op. at 24 (2012).
This Court has adhered to this high standard for facial challenges. The
Supreme Courts disdain for facial challenges is an expression of judicial self-
restraint. United States v. Stephens, 594 F.3d 1033, 1037 (8th Cir.
2010)(quotingUnited States v. Lemons, 697 F.2d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 1983)).
Facial challenges are especially to be discouraged when application of the
challenged statute to the case at hand would be constitutional when the facts are
eventually developed. Stephens, 594 F.3d at 1037 (quoting Sabri v. United States,
541 U.S. 600, 608-609 (2004)).
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As this Court has explained, the defendant need only offer a fact pattern in
which the statute in question could be administered constitutionally, for the statute
to survive a facial challenge. Stephens, 594 F.3d at 1038. This the City does
easily (in addition to demonstrating that the Ordinance would be constitutional
under all applications). For example, it is probable that a United States citizen will
apply for an occupancy license, declare that he is a United States citizen as
required by the application, receive his license, and commence his tenancy without
event. Similarly, an alien who is a lawful permanent resident (green card holder)
applies for an occupancy license, records her green card number on the application,
and the City subsequently verifies her lawful immigration status with the federal
government, and her tenancy proceeds without event. Such cases demonstrate
sets of circumstances exist when the mandates of [the law] are constitutionally
valid. Id. Because Appellants rushed to the courthouse to file their Complaints
before the Ordinance was implemented, they now face the high hurdle for
disfavored facial challenges. They cannot clear that hurdle.
III. The Harboring Provisions of the Ordinance are Not Impliedly
Preempted.
Implied preemption in the immigration context is guided by the landmark
Supreme Court precedent ofDe Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). In that case,
the Court laid out a three-part test for determining whether a state or local
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regulation affecting immigration is displaced through implied preemption. A state
regulation is only preempted (1) if it falls into the narrow category of a regulation
of immigration preempted by the Constitution itself, id. at 355, (2) if Congress
expressed the clear and manifest purpose of completely occupying the field and
displacing all state activity, id. at 357, or (3) if the state regulation conflicts with
federal laws, such that it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress. Id. at 363. Otherwise, a state or local
government is free to enact a law that discourages illegal immigration or deals
with aliens, without being preempted. Id. at 355.
Appellants asserted before the district court that the Ordinance fails all three
De Canas tests. The district court rejected virtually all of Appellants preemption
arguments, holding that the Ordinance is not a regulation of immigration, is not
field preempted, and that the vast majority of the Ordinances provisions do not
conflict with federal law. JA 101-109.3 Appellants now raise the same preemption
challenges again, but only with respect to the harboring provisions of the
Ordinance. Before addressing Appellants specific preemption challenges, we turn
first to the presumption against preemption.
3 The District Court found only that Sections 1(2), 1(3.L), and 1(4.D) of theOrdinance were conflict preempted, insofar as they provided for the revocation ofoccupancy licenses and prohibited the harboring of illegal aliens. JA 109.
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A. The District Court Correctly Applied the Presumption AgainstPreemption.
The district court below correctly applied the presumption against
preemption. Courts begin with a presumption againstpreemption. JA 101
(emphasis in original). As the Supreme Court held in 2009, the presumption
against preemption applies in every preemption case. In all pre-emption cases,
and particularly in those in which Congress has legislated... in a field which the
States have traditionally occupied, ...we start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct.
1187, 1194-95 (2009) (emphasis added)(quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S.
470, 485 (1996) andRice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
InAltria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008) as well, the Court
emphasized that the presumption against preemption applies in all preemption
cases. The Court then noted that in some cases the assumption is especially strong.
That assumption applies with particular force in cases that concern a field
traditionally occupied by the states. Id. at 543. Because the regulation of rental
accommodation remains within the states historic police powers, the assumption
of non-preemption must apply with particular force in the case at bar. Moreover,
Appellants must not only demonstrate congressional intent to preempt, they must
show that such congressional intent is unambiguous. [T]he historic police powers
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of the States [a]re not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that [is] the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress. Id. (internal citations omitted).
In 2008, the Eastern District of Missouri sustained a local ordinance dealing
with illegal immigration against a nearly-identical preemption challenge. That
court applied the presumption against preemption and concluded that the
presumption could only be set aside if the local ordinance actually attempted to
regulate who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the
conditions under which a legal entrant may remain. Gray v. City of Valley Park,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7238 (E.D. Mo. 2008), at *24-*25, affd Gray v. City of
Valley Park, 567 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2009)(quoting De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355).
Because the ordinance did not do so, the court concluded, the Ordinance is a
regulation on business licenses, an area historically occupied by the states. The
rule articulated by the Supreme Court inMedtronic, Inc., is applicable, and the
Court will apply a presumption against preemption. Id. at *25. The same
analysis applies here. The regulation of business licenses and the regulation of
residential rental units are in areas historically occupied by the states, and the
Ordinance does not regulate who should or should not be admitted into the
country.
[W]e will not infer pre-emption of the States historic police powers absent
a clear statement of intent by Congress. Gade v. National Solid Wastes
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Management Assn, 505 U.S. 88, 111-12 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)(citing
Rice, 331 U.S. at 230;Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); and
English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)). InDe Canas, the
Supreme Court applied this high standard:
[F]ederal regulation should not be deemed pre-emptive of stateregulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons either that thenature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, orthat Congress has unmistakably so ordained.
424 U.S. at 356 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142 (1963))(emphasis added). Appellants have not offered any evidence of
congressional intent to preempt ordinances like Ordinance 5165, much less
unmistakable evidence thereof.
Appellants incorrectly claim that the presumption against preemption should
not apply. Martinez Br. 45; Keller Br. 11. Appellants error in this regard stems
from their reliance on a 2000 case that has now been superceded with respect to the
presumption against preemption: United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000)
([A]n assumption of nonpre-emption is not triggered when the State regulates in
an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence.). The
relevant passage inLocke gave rise to considerable confusion on the issue
confusion that was finally resolved in 2008 and 2009 in the cases ofAltria,129 S.
Ct. at 543, and Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194-95, respectively.
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InAltria and Wyeth, the Supreme Court removed any uncertainty about
when to apply the presumption against preemption, confirming that it applies [i]n
all pre-emption cases.Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194-95 (emphasis added)(internal
citations omitted). It applies with particular force in cases in which the
challenged law is in a field traditionally occupied by the states. Id.
Martinez Appellants also attempt to redefine the applicable field in order to
reduce the strength of the presumption against preemption, by calling the
applicable field the regulation of residence of noncitizens, Martinez Br. 45, or
the regulation of immigration. Keller Br. 11. However, underDe Canas, their
attempt at reframing is wrong: [T]he fact that aliens are the subject of a state
statute does not render it a regulation of immigration, which is essentially a
determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the
conditions under which a legal entrant may remain. Id. at 355. Thus, it is clear
that the presumption against preemption applies in all cases; and in this case it
applies strongly.
B. Appellants Rest their Preemption Claims on One Vacated
Opinion and One Split Decision.
Appellants rest their preemption case almost entirely upon two flawed
decisions from other circuits. When Martinez Appellants declare that every other
federal court to consider preemption of [similar ordinances] has struck it down in
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its entirety, Martinez Br. 23, they are actually referring to just two circuit cases:
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3rd Cir. 2010), vacated and remandedat
131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011); and Villas at Parkside Partners v. Farmers Branch, 675
F.3d 802 (5th Cir. 2012),petition for rehg pending. Martinez Appellants rely
particularly heavily on the Third Circuits decision inHazleton, citing it (or the
district court decision that it affirmed) a dozen times as the basis for their
preemption theories.4 However,Hazleton is a deeply flawed decision that has
already drawn an implicit rebuke from the Supreme Court. Shortly after handing
down Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011), in which the
Supreme Court rejected implied preemption arguments similar to those adopted by
the Third Circuit, the high court vacated the Third Circuits decision inHazleton,
remanding the case for further consideration in light ofWhiting. 131 S.Ct. at 2958.
The Supreme Courts decision to vacateHazleton is immensely important
for two reasons. First, theHazleton preemption analysis, upon which Appellants
have built their argument, is unreliable and has been implicitly rejected by the
Supreme Court. Second, in this Court [a] vacated decision is deprived of its
precedential effect. Salitros v. Chrysler Corp., 306 F.3d 562, 575 (8th Cir. 2002)
(citing Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320, 1324 (8th Cir. 1978)).
4Martinez Br. 3, 23-24, 26-27, 29, 33, 35, 38, 43, 45.
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Aware that they are treading on thin ice, Martinez Appellants urge this Court
to rely on the vacatedHazleton opinion nonetheless, because the Hazleton
ordinance involved both the employment and harboring of illegal aliens, whereas
the Arizona law in Whiting involved only the employment of illegal aliens.
Martinez Br. 29. However, the Supreme Courts decision to vacateHazleton
cannot be avoided by arguing that Whiting rendered the employment portion of the
Hazleton decision invalid, but not the harboring portion. The Supreme Court
vacated and remanded the entire decision in light ofWhitingnot just the
employment portion. 131 S. Ct. at 2958. The implied preemption challenges to
the harboring provisions of the Hazleton ordinance were based on the same faulty
premises as were the implied preemption challenges to the employment provisions
of that ordinance. See Hazleton, 620 F. 3d at 202-225.
The other decision upon which Appellants rely, Farmers Branch, is equally
problematic.5 Farmers Branch is a split decision authored by Judge Thomas
Reavley that prompted a vigorous dissent by Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod. It is
Elrods opinion, not Reavleys, that is consistent with Supreme Court and Fifth
Circuit precedents. In crafting its conclusion, the majority conflates the distinct
doctrines of regulation of immigration and conflict preemption. [A]
straightforward application of Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent yields a
5 Keller Appellants base their five-and-a-half pages of preemption argument almostentirely on Farmers Branch. See Keller Br. 13-17.
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different result. Farmers Branch, 675 F.3d at 826-27 (Elrod, J., dissenting).
The majority opinion also supplanted the controlling Supreme Court definition of a
regulation of immigration with its own invented definition. [T]he majority
concedes that the Ordinance does not determine the entry or exit of anyone into or
out of the United States. This should be the end of the regulation of immigration
inquiry. Id. at 827. After a petition for rehearing en banc was filed, the Fifth
Circuit requested additional briefing. Case No. 10-10751, Doc. No. 00511841335
(May 1, 2012). The petition for rehearing en banc is still pending.
C. The District Court Correctly Held that the Ordinance is not a
Regulation of Immigration.
Appellants claim that the Ordinance is an attempt to regulate immigration.
Keller Br. 15; Martinez Br. 30. However, Appellants ignore the Supreme Courts
long-standing definition of what constitutes a forbidden state or local regulation
of immigration, which is preempted by the Constitution itself. A preempted
regulation of immigration is defined narrowly: [T]he fact that aliens are the
subject of a state statute does not render it a regulation of immigration, which is
essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the
country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain. De Canas,
424 U.S. at 355.
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Recognizing that the Ordinance cannot be accurately construed as a
regulation of immigration, the district court rejected Appellants claim:
Because the Fremont Ordinance is not essentially a determination of who should
or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal
entrant may remain, it is not preempted by the United States Constitution. JA
105.
The correctness of the district courts conclusion is clear. The Ordinance in
no way determines who should or should not be admitted into the country. On the
contrary, the Ordinance defers to federal categories of immigration status and the
federal governments determination of any particular aliens immigration status.
Like the Arizona law at issue in Whiting, the Ordinance applies federal
immigration categories, classifications and definitions: Unlawfully present in the
United States means unlawfully present in the United States according to the terms
of United States Code Title 8, Section 1101 et seq. 1(1.B); see Whiting, 131 S.
Ct. at 1981 (The Arizona law begins by adopting the federal definitions.). All
determinations of an aliens immigration status are made by the federal
government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1373(c), which Congress enacted to ensure that
such local inquiries always receive a federal response. The City shall not
conclude that an alien is unlawfully present in the United States unless and until an
authorized representative of the City has verified with the federal government,
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pursuant to Title 8, United States Code, Section 1373(c), such aliens immigration
status. 1(1.B)). The Department shall not attempt to make an independent
determination of any occupants immigration status. 1(4.C). The Whiting Court
spoke approvingly of the same language in the Arizona law: Not only that, the
Arizona law expressly provides that state investigators must verify the work
authorization of allegedly unauthorized aliens with the Federal Government, and
shall not attempt to independently make a final determination on whether an alien
is authorized to work in the United States. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981 (quoting
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 23-212(B)).
Nor does the Ordinance determine the conditions under which a legal
entrant may remain in the United States. The Ordinance does not establish any
new condition that an alien must satisfy to remain lawfully present in the United
States. That is entirely a question of federal law, defined under 8 U.S.C. 1101,
et seq. The Ordinance does establish conditions for any person (citizen or alien)
occupying a rental unit in the City of Fremont. As the Supreme Court has made
clear, a state or municipality is free to enact legislation discouraging illegal
immigration within its jurisdiction without being preempted:
In this case, California has sought to strengthen its economy byadopting federal standards in imposing criminal sanctions against stateemployers who knowingly employ aliens who have no federal right toemployment within the country; even if such local regulation hassome purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration, it does
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not thereby become a constitutionally proscribed regulation of
immigration.
De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355-56 (emphasis added). Appellants assertion that the
Ordinance constitutes a preempted regulation of immigration cannot be squared
with the Supreme CourtsDe Canas holding.
Martinez Appellants nevertheless attempt to obfuscate the issue. They
assert, By imposing conditions on aliens presence in the United States, 1(3)
and 1(4) constitute an impermissible regulation of immigration. Martinez Br. 30.
The premise of this assertion is misleading in four respects. First, the Ordinance
does not impose a condition on aliens presence in the United States. Rather, it
imposes a condition on any personcitizen or alienoccupying a rental unit in
Fremont. Second, the Ordinance does not impose a condition uponpresence.
Rather, it imposes a condition upon retention of an occupancy license issued by the
City. Third, it does not impose a condition upon presence in the United States;
rather, it imposes a condition upon occupying a rental unit in the City of Fremont.
Fourth, Martinez Appellants misstate theDe Canas definition by omitting the
crucial phrase legal entrant and replacing it with aliens. Again, the correct
definition of a regulation of immigration is: a determination of who should or
should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal
entrant may remain. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355. In short, Appellants must resort
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to misstating theDe Canas definition and misconstruing the Ordinance in order to
claim that it constitutes a regulation of immigration.
Keller Appellants offer an even weaker argument. They assert that because
eight of the ten whereas clauses in the Ordinance make statements that touch on
illegal immigration, the Ordinance is therefore an attempt to regulate immigration
in Fremont. Keller Br. 13. However, the concerns mentioned in the whereas
clauses are irrelevant to the determination of whether a law constitutes a forbidden
regulation of immigration. The Ordinance does not determine who should be
admitted into the country; nor does it impose conditions upon legal entrants
remaining in the country. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355. The analysis need go no
further. Keller Appellants are also mistaken in suggesting (without any support)
that a city is forbidden to exercise its traditional police powers in a manner that
serves to deter illegal immigration. See Keller Br. 13-14. As the Supreme Court
has explained:
[U]nchecked unlawful migration might impair the States economygenerally, or the States ability to provide some important service.Despite the exclusive federal control of this Nations borders, wecannot conclude that the States are without any power to deter theinflux of persons entering the United States against federal law, andwhose numbers might have a discernible impact on traditional stateconcerns.
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Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 n.23 (1982). Accordingly, this Court should
affirm the holding of the district court below that the Ordinance is not a regulation
of immigration.
D. The District Court Correctly Held that the Ordinance is not Field
Preempted.
The district court also rejected Appellants claim that the Ordinance is field
preempted. While it may be inferred that Congress has preempted the field of
immigrationi.e. what, where, and how aliens or immigrants may enter and must
leave the countryit cannot be inferred that states and municipalities have no
authority to enact laws and ordinances that are in harmony with federal
objectives. JA 107. That holding is correct, as explained below.
1. There is no Field Preemption on the General Field of
Immigration or the Sub-Field of Harboring Illegal Aliens.
Appellants claim that the Ordinance is field preempted, asserting that certain
sections intrude in fields fully occupied by federal immigration law.
Martinez Br. 36. In making this claim, Appellants once again ignore the
controlling precedent ofDe Canas. InDe Canas, the Supreme Court emphatically
rejected the argument that the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act
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(INA) constituted general field preemption and thereby displaced state and local
laws relating to aliens.
InDe Canas, the Supreme Court sustainedagainst a preemption challenge a
California law that imposed penalties on any employer who knowingly
employ[ed] an alien who is not entitled to lawful residence in the United States if
such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers. 424
U.S. at 352. TheDe Canas Court held that states and localities possessed wide
leeway to deal with aliens without being preempted. Id. at 355. Importantly, the
De Canas Court considered and expressly rejectedthe possibility that the
regulation of immigration by the federal government might be so comprehensive
that it leaves no room for state action on the field:
Only a demonstration that complete ouster of state power includingstate power to promulgate laws not in conflict with federal laws wasthe clear and manifest purpose of Congress would justify thatconclusion . Respondents have not made that demonstration. Theyfail to point out, and an independent review does not reveal, anyspecific indication in either the wording or the legislative history ofthe INA that Congress intended to preclude even harmonious stateregulation touching on aliens in general, or the employment of illegalaliens in particular.
De Canas, 424 U.S. at 357-58 (internal citations omitted)(emphasis added). The
Supreme Courts holding that field preemption has not occurred was unequivocal.
Thus, it is plain that there is no field preemption on the general field of regulations
relating to aliens.