for PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA...

QRA STUDY REPORT for

PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL

AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA

Submitted by

MAY 2014

Prepared by

DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS PVT. LTD. An ISO 9001 : 2008 COMPANY &

NABET / QCI ACCREDITED EIA CONSULTANT ORGANIZATION CONSULTING ENGINEERS

KOLKATA MUMBAI DELHI CHENNAI

BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LIMITED

CONTENTS

i

SECTION DESCRIPTION PAGE NO/ REMARKS

GLOSSARY OF TERMS I to IV

SECTION - 1 INTRODUCTION 1-1 to 1-2

1.1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION 1-1

1.2 SUMMARY OF PROPOSED PROJECT 1-1

SECTION - 2 RISK ASSESSMENT 2-1 to 2-30

2.1 HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION 2-1

2.2 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 2-6

2.3 RISK ANALYSIS 2-12

ENCLOSURES

PLATE 1 PLOT PLAN (4 SHEETS) IN DRAWING JACKET

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

I

Emergency A situation created by an accidental release or

spill of hazardous chemicals, which poses a

threat to the safety of workers, residents, the

environment or property.

Flash Point The Flash Point of a chemical is the lowest

temperature at which a flame will propagate

through the vapour of a combustible material to

the liquid surface. Put more simply, it is the

minimum temperature at which the liquid

produces a sufficient concentration of vapour

above that it forms an ignitable mixture with air.

It can be mentioned that the source of ignition

need not be an open flame, but could equally be,

for example, the surface of a hot plate, or a

steam pipe.

Hazard Any situation that has the potential for doing

damage to life, property and/or the environment.

Hazardous Chemical A chemical, which is explosive, flammable,

poisonous, corrosive, reactive or radio-active and

requires special care in handling because of the

hazards it poses to public health and

environment.

Hazards Identification Provides information on available extremely

hazardous substances (EHSs) on site, their

nature, quantities and also on storages and

conditions of storage.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

II

IDLH Immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH)

level means the maximum level to which a

healthy worker can be exposed for 30 minutes

without suffering irreversible health effects or

escape impairing symptoms.

LC50

(Lethal Concentration 50)

LC50 is the concentration of a chemical, which

kills 50% of a sample population. This measure is

generally used when exposure to a chemical is

through the animal breathing it in.

LD50

(Lethal Dose 50)

LD50 is the measure generally used when

exposure is by swallowing, through skin contact,

or by injection.

LCLO Where acute exposure data are available (30

minutes to 4 hours exposure), the lowest

exposure concentration causing death or

irreversible health effects in any species is used

as the IDLH concentration. These data are often

reported as lethal concentration, low (LCLO).

Level of Concern (LOC) The concentration of an extremely hazardous

susbstances (EHS) in the air above which there

may be serious irreversible health effects or

death as a result of a single exposure for a

relatively short period of time.

On Site Emergency An accident, which takes place in a chemical

industry and its effects, are confined to the

factory premises involving only the people

working in the factory.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

III

Off Site Emergency If an accident takes place in a chemical industry

and its effects are felt outside the factory

premises, the situation thus generated is called

an off-site emergency.

Occupier “Occupier” in relation to any factory or premises,

means a person who has control over the affairs

of the factory or the premises and includes, in

relation to any substance, the person in

possession of the substance.

Risk The predicted or actual frequency of occurrence

of an adverse effect of a chemical or other

hazard.

Risk Analysis It is a relative measure of the likelihood of various

possible hazardous events and enable the

emergency plan to focus on the greatest potential

risk.

STEL (Short Term Exposure

Limit)

STEL is the maximum permissible concentration

of a material, generally expressed in ppm in air,

for a defined short period of time (typically 5 or

15 minutes, depending upon the country). This

"concentration" is generally a time-weighted

average over the period of exposure. These

values, which may differ from country to country,

are often backed up by regulation and therefore

may be legally enforceable.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

IV

Threshold Planning Quantity A quantity designated for each chemical which

requires the occupier to take various steps in

preparation of emergency planning like

preparation of on-site plans, submission of

information for preparation of off-site plan or

making a safety report as per Manufacture,

Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals

Rules, 1989.

TLV (Threshold Limit Value) TLV is the maximum permissible concentration of

a material, generally expressed in parts per

million in air for some defined period of time

(often 8 hours, but sometimes for 40 hours per

week over an assumed working lifetime). These

values, which may differ from country to country,

are often backed up by regulation and therefore

may be legally enforceable.

Toxic End Point The threshold for serious injury from exposure to

a toxic substance in the air.

Vulnerable Zone It is an estimated geographical area that may be

affected by the release of hazardous substance

that could cause irreversible acute health effects

or death to human population within the area

following an accidental release.

QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA

SECTION-1 BPCL 1-1

DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS

SECTION – 1 I N T R O D U C T I O N

1.1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL) is a fortune 500 oil refining,

exploration and marketing PSU with Navratna status. BPCL has multiple refinery

units in Mumbai, Kochi, Numaligarh and Bina.

Bharat Petroleum’s Mumbai Refinery is one of the most versatile Refineries in

India. With successful implementation of various projects and de-bottlenecking,

our Refineries currently process about 12 Million Metric Tons of crude oil per

annum.

BPCL has also many common user POL Terminals spread across the country.

BPCL now wants to expand the capacity of the existing POL Terminal at Piyala,

near Faridabad, Haryana by adding additional tankage.

The proposed project is an expansion project of the existing POL terminal with

existing storage capacity 1,62,790 kL. After expansion, the capacity of the POL

Terminal will be 2,27,360 kL.

1.2 SUMMARY OF PROPOSED PROJECT

Location

The Project Site is located at Piyala which is in the south side of Faridabad town

in the state of Haryana. The distance between Piyala and Faridabad is around

20 km. The nearest railway station is Ballabgarh on the Delhi-Mathura triple

track broad-gauge line. Nearest domestic and international airport is at New

Delhi.


SECTION-1 BPCL 1-2


Hazardous Chemicals

After proposed expansion, the terminal will cater to receipt and storage of

petroleum products as follows:

(i) Diesel (HSD),

(ii) Kerosene (SKO)

(iii) Petrol (MS)

(iv) Aviation Turbine Fuel(ATF)

The Product is received through pipeline from BPCL Mumbai & Bina Refineries.

The storage terminal will have a gross storage capacity of approx. 2, 27,360 kL

for product storage. There will be routing of different products in their designated

tanks. The existing as well as proposed expansion capacity of the POL Terminal

is furnished below:

Name of Product

Existing Capacity (kL)

Proposed Capacity

Expansion (kL)

Total Capacity after Expansion (kL)

HSD 63,520 890 64,410

MS 82,670 27,640 1,10,310

SKO 16,600 0 16,600

ATF 0 36,040 36,040

TOTAL 1,62,790 64,570 2,27,360

The dispatch of products will be done through a) Tank Lorries to Retail outlets,

b) Railway Wagons to Northern India Depots/installations, c) pipeline to BPCL

Bijwasan Installation.

----------- o -----------


SECTION-2 2-1 BPCL


SECTION - 2

RISK ASSESSMENT

2.1 RISK ASSESSMENT

2.1.1 Hazards Identification

Hazard identification is the first step in Risk Analysis / Hazard Analysis which

involves the following:

- Types and quantities of hazardous chemicals

- Location of the facilities

- Potential hazards associated with spills or release

a) Types and Quantities of Hazardous Chemicals

The following hazardous chemicals are proposed to be stored in the proposed project:

(i) Motor Spirit (MS)

(ii) High Speed Diesel (HSD),

(iii) Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO)

(iv) Aviation Turbine Fuel(ATF)

Types of Hazards

As per the Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical (Amendment) Rules, 2000, HSD, SKO and ATF are highly flammable chemicals and MS is very highly flammable chemical. The following scenario of

emergency may arise due to the accidental release of chemicals:


SECTION-2 2-2 BPCL


Name of Chemical Consequence

MS Fire

HSD Fire

SKO Fire

ATF Fire

Inventory of Hazardous Chemicals

Name of Product

Existing Capacity (kL)

Proposed Capacity

Expansion (KL)

Total Capacity after Expansion (kL)

HSD 63,520 890 64,410

MS 82,670 27,640 1,10,310

SKO 16,600 0 16,600

ATF 0 36,040 36,040

TOTAL 1,62,790 64,570 2,27,360

b) Location of Facilities

The location of MS, HSD, SKO and ATF storage tank is marked in Plate 1: Plot Plan.

Storage Tanks

The storage terminal will have tanks for the storage of petroleum products of the

classes A, B and C.

The tanks for class A shall be built as internal floating roof tanks, while fixed roof

tanks shall be considered for class B and C. The followings tanks have been

envisaged for the project.


SECTION-2 2-3 BPCL


The classification of the products is summarized below for ready reference:

Name of Product Full Name Class*

MS Motor Spirit A

HSD High Speed Diesel B

SKO Superior Kerosene Oil B

ATF Aviation Turbine Fuel B

* Petroleum Class ‘A’ - means petroleum having a flash point below 230 C Petroleum Class ‘B’ - means petroleum having a flash point of 230C and above

but below 650C Petroleum Class ‘C’ - means petroleum having a flash point of 650C and above

but below 930C

The design of the installation is in accordance with Indian standards OISD

117,118,141 and as contained in Petroleum Rules and approved by The Chief

Controller of Explosives, Nagpur (CCOE). The details of product storage / tank

firm are as follows:

Details of Existing Tanks

Tank No. Product

Tank Roof Type

Tank Diameter

(m)

Tank Height

(m)

Gross Capacity

(kL)

Pumpable Capacity

(kL) Above Ground Tanks

TK-2 MS FR 43.0 20.0 26750 25400 TK-3 MS FR 43.0 20.0 26750 25400 TK-4 MS FR 43.0 20.0 26750 25400 TK-5 HSD FR 33.0 20.0 15600 14950 TK-6 HSD FR 33.0 20.0 15600 14950 TK-7 HSD FR 33.0 20.0 15600 14950 TK-8 HSD FR 33.0 20.0 15600 14950 TK-9 SKO FR 26.0 17.0 8200 7700

TK-10 SKO FR 26.0 17.0 8200 7700 TK-11 SLOP CR 9.0 13.5 890 858 TK-12 SLOP CR 9.0 13.5 890 858 TK-13 HSD CR 9.0 13.5 890 858

Under Ground Tanks UT-1 MS U.G 4.0 16.2 200 200


SECTION-2 2-4 BPCL


Details of Existing Tanks

Tank No. Product

Tank Roof Type

Tank Diameter

(m)

Tank Height

(m)

Gross Capacity

(kL)

Pumpable Capacity

(kL) UT-2 MS U.G 4.0 16.2 200 200 UT-3 HSD U.G 4.0 16.2 200 200 UT-4 SKO U.G 4.0 16.2 200 200 UT-5 MS /

ETHANOL

U.G 4.0 16.2 200 200

UT-6 HSD U.G 2.012 5.0 15 15 UT-7 HSD U.G 2.012 5.0 15 15 UT-8 SLOP U.G 2.012 6.75 20 20 UT-9 SLOP U.G 2.012 6.75 20 20

Details of Proposed Tanks

Tank No. Product

Tank Roof Type

Tank Diameter

(m)

Tank Height

(m)

Gross Capacity

(kL)

Pumpable Capacity

(kL) Above Ground Tanks

TK-1 MS FR 43.0 20.0 26750 25400 TK-14 ATF CR 24.0 20.0 9000 9000 TK-15 ATF CR 24.0 20.0 9000 9000 TK-16 ATF CR 24.0 20.0 9000 9000 TK-17 ATF CR 24.0 20.0 9000 9000 TK-18 HSD CR 9.0 13.5 890 858 TK-19 MS CR 9.0 13.5 890 858

Under Ground Tanks UT-10 SLOP

ATF U.G 2.012 6.75 20 20

UT-11 SLOP ATF

U.G 2.012 6.75 20 20

All the tanks are installed in separate dyked enclosures as per OISD standards.

c) Potential Hazards Associated with Spills or Release

There are mainly Fire/Explosion Hazards associated with the spillage or leakage

of hazardous chemicals.


SECTION-2 2-5 BPCL


Flammable Chemicals are categorized into five categories in the Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical (Amendment) Rules, 2000 as defined below:

Flammable Gases : Gases which at 200C and at standard pressure of

101.3 kPa are:-

i) ignitable when in a mixture of 13 percent or less by

volume with air, or

ii) have a flammable range with air of at least 12

percentage points regardless of the lower

flammable* limits.

Extremely Flammable Liquids

: Chemicals which have flash point lower than or

equal to 230C and boiling point less than 350C.

Highly Flammable Liquids

: Chemicals, which have a flash point, lower than or

equal to 600C but higher than 230C.

Flammable Liquids

: Chemicals which have a flash point higher than 60oC

but lower than 900 C.

(*) The flammability shall be determined by tests or by calculation in

accordance with methods adopted by International Standards

Organisation ISO Number 10156 of 1990 or by Bureau of Indian

Standards ISI Number 1446 of 1985.

As per the Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical (Amendment) Rules, 2000, Toxic chemicals are the chemicals having the

following values of acute toxicity due to its physical and chemical properties and

capable of producing major accident hazards:


SECTION-2 2-6 BPCL


Sl. No

Toxicity Oral toxicity LD50

(mg/kg)

Dermal toxicity LD50

(mg/kg)

Inhalation toxicity LC50

(mg/l)

1. Extremely toxic

> 5 <40 < 0.5

2. Highly toxic >5-50 >40-200 < 0.5 - 2.0

3. Toxic >50-200 > 200-1000 >2-10

2.2 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

The vulnerability analysis is the second step of Risk Assessment and it includes

estimation of the vulnerable zone or zone of influence which requires use of

some computer models.

2.2.1 Vulnerable Zone (Zone of Influence)

As per the “Manual on Emergency Preparedness for Chemical Hazards”,

(MEPCH) published by MoEF, the vulnerable zone or zone of influence should

be estimated considering the maximum loss of containment or catastrophic

vessel rupture which leads to spillage / leakage of maximum single storage for

each hazardous chemical. It is always advisable that the vulnerable zone should

be restricted within factory premises. In order to achieve this, the following are

generally recommended:

i) Reduction of the quantity of hazardous substances stored ii) Increase of the number of storages iii) Isolation of storages that might lead to cascading effect iv) Substitution of extremely hazardous substances with less hazardous

substance.


SECTION-2 2-7 BPCL


The methodology as proposed in MEPCH for estimation of vulnerable zone or

zone of influence is identical to Worst Case Scenario as defined by USEPA. The Worst Case Scenario is defined by USEPA as follows:

The release of the entire contents of the largest vessel in the process, with

essentially none of the safety systems and devices that are in place to prevent

such an occurrence functioning as designed. The release under Worst Case Scenario is assumed to occur under the following conditions:

- Over a 10 minute time period,

- Under the most stable atmospheric and weather conditions (Atmospheric

Stability Class F, Wind Speed of 1.5 m/s, and Ambient Temperature of

250C), which minimizes the dispersion and dilution of the release and

presents the absolute worst case that could possibly occur.

- All releases to take place at ground level.

The Worst Case Release may never occur at a facility. For this reason, EPA

also recommends reporting of an Alternative Release Scenario and is generally

accepted to be more likely, or more credible than the Worst Case Scenario.

When selecting an Alternative Release Scenario, EPA suggests a facility to

consider scenarios such as transfer hose releases, pipe / valve / flange leaks,

pump seal leaks etc.

It is also recommended in “Manual on Emergency Preparedness for Chemical

Hazards”, (MEPCH) for toxic gas releases that 1/10th of the value of Immediately

Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) concentration, or lethal concentration low

(LCLO) or level of concern (LOC) value of the chemical concerned should be

taken as the effective concentration. This concentration also matches with

EPA-specified toxic endpoint and this is also the STEL (Short Term Exposure

Limit) value for 15 minutes exposure as recommended in The Factories Act,


SECTION-2 2-8 BPCL


1948 (Act No. 63 of 1948), as amended by the Factories (Amendment) Act, 1987

(Act 20 of 1987)

Level of Concern (LOC) for a Thermal Radiation is a threshold level of thermal

radiation, usually the level above that a hazard may exist. As per EPA, the

flammable endpoints represent vapor cloud explosion distances based on

overpressure of 1 psi (0.07 kg / cm2) or radiant heat distances based on exposure to 5 kW/m2 for 40 seconds.

2.2.2 Computer Models

Computer Simulation

The effects of characterized hazards were generated by computer simulations.

The software used is BREEZE HAZ developed by Trinity Consultants, USA. The

package is extensively used by leading Government and private sector

organizations in India and abroad, and its use is accepted by the statutory

authorities.

The effects when superimposed on physical layouts of sources of loss of

containment and of their neighboring environment provided the essential

elements of Risk Analysis.

Loss of Containment Models

Quantitative Risk Assessment requires quantification of the possible rates of

escape of a given chemical, the duration of release and hence the mass

available either for combustion or explosion or to produce toxic effect depending

on the nature of the chemical involved.


SECTION-2 2-9 BPCL


The behavior of release is influenced by physico - chemical properties of the

specific chemical(s), pressure and temperature of either storage, pipe line or

where the leakage occurs, ambient conditions and possible geographical location

at which the release might take place. The post-release phenomena are

influenced by prevailing weather conditions.

A few models of catastrophic failure of storage vessels have been considered to

generate the worst-case scenarios. Historically pressure vessels designed, built

and maintained according to Codes such as ASME do not fail on their own.

Failures are invariably associated with influence of external force or mal -

operation.

Conditions of Occurrence and Behavior of Characterized Generic Hazards

Various outflow models have been used to calculate the rate of release of chemicals.. The models are as follows:

a) Pool Spread and Vaporization Liquid spilt on the ground from the piping/equipment under study form a circular

pool of the liquid which may spread up to the bund (dyke) wall. Mass and heat

transfer occurs resulting in evaporation or boiling of liquid. The extent of spillage,

vaporization rate and mass vaporized of flammable/explosive/toxic liquid is

calculated by this model. This model can be linked to "Pool Fire Model" and/or

"Dense Cloud Dispersion, as necessary.

b) Pool Fire

Following an accidental spill of volatile and flammable liquid, a confined pool in

a bunded area or an unconfined pool in unbunded area will form. The liquid will

burn as POOL FIRE under influence of an external flame.


SECTION-2 2-10 BPCL


Thermal radiation generated by such pool fires can have damaging local impacts

on cables, signal lines, pipe work, valves, equipment & structures etc. and

also on people (typically plant personnel) in the immediate neighborhood. Other

people in the surrounding area may also be affected.

c) Dense Cloud Dispersion

If a flammable vapor / gas cloud does not ignite immediately after

release/formation, it undergoes atmospheric dispersion in accordance with

prevalent wind direction, relative humidity, wind speed and stability category

type, etc. As the cloud disperses, it dilutes and traverses longer distance and

envelopes larger area till such time its concentration in air falls below its Lower

Flammable Limit (LFL). Beyond this, the diluted cloud becomes harmless for

flammable hazard. But within this region any source of ignition may lead to Vapor

Cloud Explosion.

For toxic gases, however, the concentration pertaining to and below the

Immediate Danger to Life & Health ( IDLH ) value is generally considered to be

harmless.

d) Flammable Jet

The jet flame radiation model predicts the visible length, approximate diameter

and the lift-off distance of vertical gaseous jet flame resulting from high pressure

pipeline accidents in which the escaping flammable gas is ignited. It also predicts

the thermal radiation flask levels.

2.2.3 Thermal Damage Criteria

The following properties measure how readily and easily, a chemical will catch

fire :


SECTION-2 2-11 BPCL


▪ Volatility ▪ Flash Point ▪ Flammability Limits

Volatility is a measure of how easily a chemical evaporates. A flammable liquid

must begin to evaporate forming a vapor above the liquid before it can burn. The

more volatile a chemical, the faster it evaporates and quicker a flammable vapor

cloud is formed.

Flash point is the lowest temperature where a flammable liquid will evaporate

enough to catch on fire if an ignition source is present. The lower the flash point

of a chemical, the easier it is for a fire to start.

Flammability limits, called the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) and the Upper Expose

Limit (UEL), are boundaries of flammable region of a vapor cloud,. These limits

are percentages that represent a concentration of the chemical (vapour form) in

the air. If the chemical vapour comes into contact with an ignition source, it will

burn only if its fuel – air concentration is between the LEL and UEL.

Thermal Radiation arising out from a fire may cause injuries and even death to

people exposed to it. A large fire may cause ignition to buildings and equipment

steel structures melt due to exposure to fires at light watt doses. Skin exposed to

thermal radiation will absorb heat so that its temperature is raised, its structure

destroyed and burning occurs. The "degree of burning" is related to the degree

to which the skin is destroyed, namely:

1st degree => inner layer of skin is not destroyed - any damage to the skin is recoverable.

2nd degree => all outer skin is destroyed and some inner - damage

may or may not be recoverable.


SECTION-2 2-12 BPCL


3rd degree => all the skin is destroyed in the irradiated zone - there will be permanent damage unless new skin is grafted on.

The degree of burning that results from a fire hazard will be function of the level

of thermal radiation that occurs and the time of exposure to that radiation. These

thermal radiation hazards emanate from exposure to Flash Fires and Pool Fire.

The following table lists some physiological effects at specific thermal radiation

levels and durations (on bare screen) :

Radiation Intensity (kw/m2)

Time for Severe Pain (seconds)

Time for 2nd Degree Burns (seconds)

1 115 663 2 45 187 3 27 92 4 18 57 5 13 40 6 11 30 8 7 20 10 5 14 12 4 11

Note : The durations that correspond to effect like pain or second-degree burns can vary considerably depending on circumstances. The effects as mentioned above were observed on bare skin that was exposed directly to thermal radiation.

2.3 RISK ANALYSIS

Risk Analysis is the third part of the Risk Assessment process. Risk analysis serves the following purposes: ▪ provide a relative measure of the likelihood and severity of various

possible hazardous events ▪ enable the emergency plan to focus on the greatest potential risks


SECTION-2 2-13 BPCL


2.3.1 Probable Hazard Scenarios

As recommended in the RMP document of USEPA, both Worst Case Scenario and Alternative Scenario are considered while reporting the probable hazard scenarios. The following table summarizes the probable hazard scenarios which are considered for computer simulation study:

Case Type

Hazardous Chemical (Tank No.)

Description Simulation Model

Worst Case

MS (TK-2/3/4)

Maximum loss of containment due to catastrophic vessel rupture of the largest storage tank of MS

Confined pool fire

HSD (TK-5/6/7/8)

Maximum loss of containment due to catastrophic vessel rupture of the largest storage tank of HSD.

Confined pool fire

SKO

(TK-9/10)

Maximum loss of containment due to catastrophic vessel rupture of the largest storage tank of SKO.

Confined pool fire

ATF

(TK-14/15)

Maximum loss of containment due to catastrophic vessel rupture of the largest storage tank of ATF.

Confined pool fire

ATF

(TK-16/17)

Maximum loss of containment due to catastrophic vessel rupture of the largest storage tank of ATF.

Confined pool fire


SECTION-2 2-14 BPCL


Case Type



Alternate Case I

MS

Leak due to pipe failure in dyke area [Diameter 250 mm, Hole diameter 20 mm, pressure 2 atm] in storage tank inlet line.

Jet fire

HSD


Jet fire

SKO


Jet fire

ATF


Jet fire

Alternate Case II

MS

Rupture of 200 mm downstream pipe line resulting in spillage of MS in TLF Gantry area.

Unconfined pool fire.

HSD

Rupture of 200 mm downstream pipe line resulting in spillage of HSD in TLF Gantry area.


SKO

Rupture of 200 mm downstream pipe line resulting in spillage of SKO in TLF Gantry area.



SECTION-2 2-15 BPCL


Case Type



ATF

Rupture of 200 mm downstream pipe line resulting in spillage of ATF in TLF Gantry area.


a) Worst Case Scenario

As recommended in US EPA, the release under Worst Case Scenario is

assumed to occur under the following conditions:

- Over a 10 minute time period,

- Under the most stable atmospheric and weather conditions (Atmospheric

Stability Class F, Wind Speed of 1.5 m/s, and Ambient Temperature of

250C), which minimizes the dispersion and dilution of the release and

presents the absolute worst case that could possibly occur.

- All releases to take place at ground level.

Maximum loss of containment due to catastrophic vessel rupture of the

largest storage tank of MS/HSD/SKO/ATF resulting in spillage of

MS/HSD/SKO from the tank inside the respective dyke area, which will

ultimately produce a confined pool fire.

The volume of MS/HSD/SKO/ATF released under Worst Case Scenario

will be equal to the volume of the liquid in the largest tank as mentioned

as follows:


SECTION-2 2-16 BPCL


Hazardous Chemical

Maximum volume released under Worst Case Scenario (m3)

MS : 26750

HSD : 15600

SKO : 8200

ATF : 9000

b) Alternative Case Scenario

Alternate case scenarios are releases that are more likely to occur than worst-

case releases and these consider both active and passive mitigation systems.

During this release, a realistic release profile, coupled with typical meteorological

conditions and wind speed are considered. It is also assumed that administrative

procedures and engineered controls are in place and as a result, a much more

realistic model of a likely outcome is expected.

Alternate Case I

Pipeline leakage in dyke area which will ultimately produce a Jet fire for

MS/HSD/SKO/ATF

Alternate Case II

Rupture of Truck loading pipeline in TLF Gantry area which will ultimately

produce an unconfined pool fire for MS/HSD/SKO/ATF

2.3.2 Results of Computer Simulation

Computer simulation for fire hazards was done considering MS/HSD/SKO/ATF as equivalent to n-heptane. As the Flash Point of n-heptane is far below than that


SECTION-2 2-17 BPCL


of the Hazardous chemicals under consideration, the results obtained during computer simulation follow a conservative approach. The results of computer simulation for the probable hazardous scenarios as identified above are listed below:

a) Worst Case Scenario Worst Case for Tank Farm-1 (Tank No. TK-2/3/4)

i) Considerations:

Scenario : Worst Case Scenario Meteorological

Conditions

: Atmospheric Stability Class F,

Wind Speed of 1.5 m/s, and

Ambient Temperature of 250C

Release type : Finite duration (600 seconds)

Pool Type : Confined pool within a rectangular dyke

Pool Dimension

: Length : 144m, width : 138m, pool liquid

height : 1.65m

Model Used : Confined Pool Fire

Hazardous Chemical : MS

ii) Result: The highlights of simulations are furnished in the following table:

Thermal Flux (kw /m2)

Distance from center of pool (m) Front View

(View along dike width) Side View

(View along dike 31.5 146.74 147.68

12.6 238.25 237.29 5.1 361.47 358.16


SECTION-2 2-18 BPCL


The "thermal flux impact zones" for such an event is shown in Plate 1: Plot Plan (Sheet 1 of 4).

Worst Case for Tank Farm-2 (Tank No. TK-5/6/7/8)

i) Considerations:


Conditions






Pool Dimension : Length : 117m, width : 106.18m, pool

liquid height : 1.65m


Hazardous Chemical : HSD

ii) Result:

The highlights of simulations are furnished in the following table:




(View along dike 31.5 118.55 119.98

12.6 193.93 191.93 5.1 295.82 289.40

The "thermal flux impact zones" for Worst case scenario is shown in Plate 1: Plot Plan (Sheet 1 of 4)


SECTION-2 2-19 BPCL


Worst Case for Tank Farm-3 (Tank No. TK-9/10/14/15and TK-16/17)

i) Considerations:


Conditions






Pool Dimension : Length : 84m, width : 84m, pool liquid

height : 1.65m


Hazardous Chemical : SKO/ATF

ii) Result:





(View along dike 31.5 93.07 93.07

12.6 152.20 152.20 5.1 232.70 232.70

The "thermal flux impact zones" for Worst case scenario is shown in Plate 1: Plot Plan (Sheet 1 of 4)


SECTION-2 2-20 BPCL


b) Alternate Case Scenario-I MS/HSD/SKO/ATF

i) Considerations :

Scenario : Alternate Case Scenario-I

Meteorological

Conditions

: Atmospheric Stability Class D,

Wind Speed of 3 m/s, and



Source Type Gas outflow due to pipeline leak from

MS/HSD/SKO/ATF Pipeline inside the

dyke area.

Pipe dia : 250 mm

Hole diameter : 20 mm

Model Used : Jet Fire Model

ii) Result:


Radiation (kw /m2) Distance from center of Jet (m)

31.5

NO RESULT OBTAINED 12.6 5.1


SECTION-2 2-21 BPCL


c) Alternate Case Scenario-II

Motor Spirit(MS) at TLF Gantry

i) Considerations:

Scenario : Alternate Case Scenario-II Meteorological Conditions

: Ambient Pressure 1.01 bar, Wind Speed of 3.0 m/s, Relative Humidity 50 % and Ambient Temperature of 250C

Type of spill : Continuous Duration of spill : 180 seconds Surface type : Concrete Release rate : 2.5 m3 /min

Considering 50% of the flow rate(300 m3/hr) of Truck Loading Pump.

Model Used : Unconfined Pool Fire Model

ii) Result:



Distance from center of pool (m)

31.5 27.46 12.6 37.73 5.1 50.32

The “Thermal flux impact zones” of Alternate case scenario-II for MS is shown in Plate 1: Plot Plan (Sheet 2 of 4)


SECTION-2 2-22 BPCL


High Speed Diesel(HSD) at TLF Gantry

i) Considerations:




Considering 50% of the flow rate (150 m3/hr) of Truck Loading Pump.

Model Used : Unconfined Pool Fire Model ii) Result:




31.5 21.72 12.6 29.16 5.1 38.44

The “Thermal flux impact zones” of Alternate case scenario-II for HSD is shown in Plate 1: Plot Plan (Sheet 3 of 4)


SECTION-2 2-23 BPCL


SKO/ATF at TLF Gantry

i) Considerations:




Considering 50% of the flow rate (75 m3/hr) of Truck Loading Pump.

Model Used : Unconfined Pool Fire Model

ii) Result :




31.5 16.67 12.6 22.24 5.1 29.92

The “Thermal flux impact zones” of Alternate case scenario-II for SKO/ATF is shown in Plate 1: Plot Plan (Sheet 4 of 4)

2.3.3 Recommendations & conclusions The recommendations & conclusions as revealed from Risk Analysis study

are as follows:


SECTION-2 2-24 BPCL


i) The distances of the vulnerable zones mostly fall within the plant

periphery.

Moreover, outside the plant boundary there is no habitation within 200 meter

of plant periphery and the same acts as the Safety Buffer Zone.

ii) Recommendations made by M.B. Lal Committee should be implemented.

iii) Regular maintenance of the equipment including storage tanks and

pipelines should be done to avoid any major failure. Design and

fabrication data of all the equipment should be maintained.

iv) Leak Detection System has to be provided at various places inside the

licensed area.

v) All Instruments and trip interlocks should be checked and calibrated at

regular intervals to prevent any wrong signaling and consequent failures.

vi) Fire Protection facilities should be made as per the OISD 117 guidelines.

vii) Fire fighting system as well as portable fire-fighting appliances should be

always kept in good working condition. Safety appliances should be

checked and kept in good working condition.

viii) Mock Drills should be conducted at regular intervals.

ix) Non -sparking tools should be used for maintenance to avoid any

spark.

x) The storage tanks, pipelines and facilities in Tank Truck loading area

should be properly earthed to avoid accumulation of static charges.


SECTION-2 2-25 BPCL


xi) Entry of personnel should be restricted inside the licensed area.

xii) Two High Velocity Long Range (HVLR) monitors are to be positioned for

each tank farm area.

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