Document of The World Bankdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/574301468038992076/pdf/ICR... ·...

Document of

The World Bank

Report No: ICR00001208

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

(IBRD-71700 TF-53276)

ON A

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$120 MILLION

TO THE

HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

FOR AN

EDUCATION REFORM FOR KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY I PROJECT

December 28, 2009

Human Development Sector

Middle East and North Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective December 28, 2009)

Currency Unit = Jordanian Dinar (JD)

JD 1.00 = US$ 1.41

US$ 1.00 = JD 0.70

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CAS Country Assistance Strategy KG Kindergarten

CIDA Canadian International Development Agency M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

DCU Development Coordination Unit MOE Ministry of Education

ECE Early Childhood Education MoHESR

Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific

Research

EDSS Education Decision Support System MTR Mid-term Review

ERfKE Education Reform for Knowledge Economy NCHRD National Center for Human Resources Development

FMR Financial Management Report NFCA National Council for Family Affairs

FMR Financial Management PAD Project Appraisal Document

GER Gross Enrollment Rate PDO Project Development Objective

GETT Gender Equality Technical Team PRC Public Relations Campaign

GoJ Government of Jordan PSPS Policy and Strategic Planning Secretariat

GPSC General Policy Steering Committee PSR Public Sector Reform

ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report RD Research and Development

ICT Information and Communication Technology SG Secretary General

IF Innovation Fund TA Technical Assistance

IT Information Technology TIMSS

Trends in International Mathematics and Science

Study

JBIC Japan Bank for International Cooperation UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

JEI Jordan Education Initiative USAID US Agency for International Development

JT Jordan Telecom Corp WEF World Economic Forum

Vice President: Shamshad Akhtar

Country Director: Hedi Larbi

Sector Manager: Mourad Ezzine

Project Team Leader: Peter Buckland

ICR Team Leader: Tomomi Miyajima

Jordan Education Reform for Knowledge Economy I

Implementation Completion and Results Report

Contents

Data Sheet

A. Basic Information ....................................................................................................... 1 B. Key Dates ................................................................................................................... 1 C. Ratings Summary ....................................................................................................... 1 D. Sector and Theme Codes ........................................................................................... 2 E. Bank Staff ................................................................................................................... 2 F. Results Framework Analysis ...................................................................................... 2 G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs .................................................................... 6 H. Restructuring (if any) ................................................................................................. 6 I. Disbursement Profile .................................................................................................. 6

1. Project Context, Development Objectives, and Design ....................................... 7 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ...................................... 11 3. Assessment of Outcomes ................................................................................... 16 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome .................................................. 24 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ............................................... 25 6. Lessons Learned ................................................................................................. 28 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .... 29

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 30 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 31 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................ 39 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 40 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 42 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................... 43 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 44 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and other Partners/Stakeholders ........................ 50 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 51

MAP

1

Jordan

Education Reform for Knowledge Economy I

Implementation Completion and Results Reports

A. Basic Information

Country: Jordan Project Name:

Education Reform for

Knowledge Economy I

Project

Project ID: P075829 L/C/TF Number(s): IBRD-71700,TF-53276

ICR Date: 12/28/2009 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: SIM Borrower:

THE HASHEMITE

KINGDOM OF

JORDAN

Original Total

Commitment: USD 120.0M Disbursed Amount: USD 117.2M

Environmental Category: B

Implementing Agency: Ministry of Education

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: CIDA

B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 05/22/2002 Effectiveness: 05/28/2003

Appraisal: 01/06/2003 Restructuring(s):

Approval: 05/08/2003 Mid-term Review: 01/16/2006 01/16/2006

Closing: 12/31/2008 06/30/2009

C. Ratings Summary

C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate

Bank Performance: Satisfactory

Borrower Performance: Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)

Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Highly Satisfactory Implementing

Agency/Agencies: Satisfactory

Overall Bank

Performance: Satisfactory

Overall Borrower

Performance: Satisfactory

2

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation

Performance Indicators

QAG Assessments (if

any) Rating

Potential Problem Project

at any time (Yes/No): No

Quality at Entry

(QEA): None

Problem Project at any

time (Yes/No): No

Quality of Supervision

(QSA): None

DO rating before

Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Pre-primary education 30 30

Primary education 35 35

Secondary education 35 35

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Education for all 50 50

Education for the knowledge economy 50 50

E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Shamshad Akhtar Lean-Louis Sarbib

Country Director: Hedi Larbi Joseph Saba

Sector Manager: Mourad Ezzine Regina Bendokat

Project Team Leader: Francis Peter Buckland Mae Chu Chang

ICR Team Leader: Juan Manuel Moreno

ICR Primary Author: Tomomi Miyajima

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)

Transform the education system at the early childhood, basic and secondary levels to produce

graduates with the skills necessary for the knowledge economy.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

n/a

3

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target

Values (from

approval

documents)

Formally

Revised

Target

Values

Actual Value Achieved at Completion or

Target Years

Indicator 1 : A redefined vision and integrated education strategy are developed, and policies and

regulations aligned with the new vision and strategy are revised.

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

Old Strategy New Strategy

implemented

National Strategy was developed,

disseminated and implementation is

ongoing. A strategic plan and policy

framework for 2008-2010 that reflects the

strategy was formulated. A five-year

strategic plan (2009-2013) was developed

and approved. Annual plan for 2009 was

developed and approved.

Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2009

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

100% achieved. Implementation is underway as the strategy has a multi-year perspective.

Indicator 2 : The average standardized score of Jordanian students in international assessments of

mathematics and science has improved.

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

2003 TIMSS

Scores:

475 science

424 math

A positive and

statistically

significant

improvement in

2007 TIMSS

Scores

2007 TIMSS Scores: 482 science and 427

math: Results showed positive and

marginally significant improvement in

performance. In Science score, Jordan

improved its regional and international

ranking.

Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2009

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Although the increase in TIMSS scores during 2003-2007 was not statistically significant,

Jordan's regional and international ranking improved constantly during this time period, which

was hardly achieved by most other participants worldwide.

Indicator 3 : At least 80% of primary and secondary students have access to safe and adequate basic and

secondary education school facilities.

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

70% 80% 87.4% (the number of children in safe

schools is 942,422 at project completion).

Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2009

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

100%. The project surpassed originally intended target.

Indicator 4 : At least 70% of basic and secondary students are using on-line learning portals.

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

0% 70% 84% (2,822 out of 3,350 schools) are

connected by JT (2,562) and by NBN (260).

Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2009

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

100%. The project surpassed originally intended target.

Indicator 5 : The gross enrollment rate in the second level of kindergarten has increased to 51%.

Value 41% 51% 51.8% KG II enrollment rate (public and

4

quantitative or

Qualitative)

private) was achieved.

Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 02/28/2008

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

100%

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target

Values (from

approval

documents)

Formally

Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target

Years

Indicator 1 : Mandate, structure and decision-making processes of governance and mgt. reviewed, revised

and operational.

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

Traditional top-down

decision-making,

centralized school system.

Significant level of

decentralization of

decisions to schools

in pilot directorates;

outcome-based

budgeting process

introduced in MOE.

MoE continues with

traditional budget planning

and execution. Workshops

on Planning, Budgeting,

Leadership training and

Change Management were

provided. It is unlikely that

further operationalization

beyond the pilots will be

done.

Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2009

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Partial achievement. A Policy and Strategic Planning Unit was formed and capacity was

quickly built but policy formulation process has not yet significantly changed.

Indicator 2 : Increased support for school innovations.

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

Limited scope for schools

to innovate

Schools have regular

access to funds from

govt. for innovation

and proper

utilization.

164 projects under the

Innovation Funds were

implemented; Seven out of the

planned 8 rounds were

completed

Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2009

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

90% as the project did not implement the final round and 28 projects were canceled in the

last three rounds due to implementation issues.

Indicator 3 : Education Decision Support System (EDSS) available and being used.

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

10% of decision-makers

use some kind of EDSS

EDSS implemented

and used by 50% of

decision-makers by

[2006]. EDSS

available to 90% of

decision makers by

(2008).

EDSS was put on hold in

order to focus efforts on

developing EMIS, which

made good progress towards

the end of the project and

became functional to produce

core data.

Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2009

Comments (incl. %

achievement)

Design of EDSS was completed and approved by MOE but not operational in the absence of

EMIS. Efforts were shifted towards the development of EMIS and this was completed.

5

Indicator 4 : New curriculum framework emphasizing basic skills, core competencies and essential

learning for knowledge economy, is developed and in place.

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

0% of subjects 100% of subjects

Development of curriculum

framework completed.

Learning outcomes developed

for all general education

subjects and grades. Moderate

outcomes were also produced

for several vocational streams.

Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2009

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

95%, as most of the intended targets were met. Curriculum and framework produced for all

general education streams. Framework for the pre-vocational and vocational education were

prepared and approved, except for the industrial specialization which was under review at the

time of the ICR.

Indicator 5 : Teacher training with basic ICT skills increases.

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

5,000 teachers 50,000 ICDL

certified.

85,118 teachers were trained

on ICDL and 55,000 certified.

57,738 teachers and

supervisors were trained on

INTEL and 7,702 certified.

2,583 were trained on World

Links and 1,820 certified.

Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2009

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

100%. The project surpassed the initial target.

Indicator 6 : Percentage of teachers utilizing new teaching methodology increased

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

10% 80% of teachers use

new methodology.

TIMSS 2007 study reported

74 % of teachers use new

methodology. Other studies

suggest lower utilization rates

but there is a wide recognition

that significant progress was

made.

Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2009

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Modest achievement. Continuous and robust evaluation is needed to accurately quantify the

prevalence of new pedagogy.

Indicator 7 : Teachers trained in ECE increases according to needs.

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

0%

Training of ECE

teachers/supervisors/

principals continuing.

100% of KG teachers

trained on national

curriculum & 93%

trained on "Working

with Young Children

Program”.

All KG teachers, supervisors,

and principals received the

training.

Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2009

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

100%

6

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR

Archived DO IP

Actual

Disbursements

(USD millions)

1 06/26/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.70













H. Restructuring (if any)

Not Applicable

I. Disbursement Profile

7

1. Project Context, Development Objectives, and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

Jordan’s national economy has improved significantly since the late 1990s, with an annual growth

rate of more than 4 percent during 2000–02 compared to an annual growth rate of only 1 percent

during the mid-90s. However, the fiscal deficit reached almost 5 percent of gross domestic product

(GDP) in 2002, and the economy remains fragile. More importantly, the achieved economic growth

did not translate into significant job creation or poverty reduction. Unemployment and

underemployment remained high and deep pockets of poverty persisted. As a resource-poor country,

Jordan recognized that building a competitive advantage in the global knowledge economy hinges on

a high-quality labor force. Thus, human resource development was identified as a central pillar in the

Government’s Accelerated Social and Economic Development Plan (2001), under which the Cabinet

earmarked 40 percent of the national budget to education.

In education, Jordan had made steady progress toward the achievement of the education Millennium

Development Goals (MDGs). By 2002, the gross enrollment rates (GER) were 101 percent at the

primary level, 90 percent at the secondary level, and 33 percent at the tertiary level. Moreover, Jordan

had achieved gender parity at the primary and secondary levels, with a very small gender gap at the

tertiary level. The Primary Completion Rate was 97 percent in 2000 and the adult literacy rate was 90

percent, the highest in the MENA region. In 1999, Jordan achieved above the regional average in the

Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) grade 8 examinations for both

mathematics and science.

However, despite these achievements, Jordan was still facing serious challenges. These included: (a)

a large number of students were learning in unsafe and overcrowded school environments,1 implying

that the country remained unprepared to accommodate the upcoming youth bulge2 into the school

systems; (b) inequality by region and by wealth was persistent in both school enrollment and student

learning outcomes at all levels of education; (c) a serious gap existed between the skills taught in

schools and the demands of the labor market in a fast changing global economy; (d) traditional, rote-

learning pedagogy was predominant as opposed to a learner-centered approach that fosters problem-

solving skills and higher-level thinking, required in a knowledge-based economy; and (e) proper

information and communication technology (ICT) equipment and training were not available to all

teachers and superintendents to prepare students for the evolving information age.

Enrollment in kindergarten (KG) was low and uneven (the combined GER for KG I and KG II was 35

percent).3 Early childhood education (ECE) was not compulsory and largely relied on private

1 At the time of project preparation, a study revealed that overcrowding was a problem in 39 percent of MOE-owned

schools, in over 75 percent of rented schools (schools operating in rented facilities), and in 70 percent of double-shift

schools. Over 300 schools were identified as requiring urgent rehabilitation.

2 The annual population growth rate in Jordan is 2.8 percent and the general school-age population is expected to

increase by 28 percent by 2010.

3 ECE is available to children aged 4 to 6: The first phase, KG I, covers ages 4 and 5, and the second phase, KG II,

covers ages 5 and 6. The cost-efficiency of education spending study, cost-benefit analyses for Early Childhood

Education (ECE) was also conducted during the project.

8

providers, with few formal curriculum requirements. The Ministry of Education (MOE) became

keenly aware of the importance of ECE in improving educational and social outcomes, especially

among vulnerable and at-risk populations, and in reducing school inefficiency by enhancing school

readiness among young children.

Within this framework, the Government of Jordan (GoJ), with Bank assistance, identified the main

educational sector issues and developed a “Statement of Sector Policy,” which describes the policy

framework reflecting the consensus and commitment to build on the outcome of a high-level

conference held in September 2002. During the conference, called “Vision Forum for the Future of

Education,” held under the auspices of HM King Abdullah II of Jordan, the King advanced the vision

of making Jordan the information technology (IT) hub of the region. To achieve this, he said, the

highest priority must be placed on developing human capital for the knowledge economy.4 As a result,

the GoJ prepared a comprehensive, integrated proposal for a major reform of the education system

that includes Education Reform for a Knowledge Economy (ERfKE).

The project was intended to contribute to two priority areas of the Jordan 2002 Country Assistance

Strategy (CAS): (a) human development pursued strategically to support the key development goals

of reducing poverty and enabling more Jordanians to participate in the knowledge economy; and (b)

public sector reform and governance for more equitable, efficient, and higher-quality public services.

The goal of the project was consistent with both the CAS and the government’s development

priorities.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDOs) and Key Indicators (as approved)

The PDO stated in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) is to “Transform the education system

at the early childhood, basic and secondary levels to produce graduates with the skills necessary

for the knowledge economy.” The PDO in the Loan Agreement is slightly different: “The objective

of the Project is to assist the Borrower in improving the quality, relevance and efficiency of its early

childhood, basic and secondary education systems, so as to produce graduates with the skills

necessary for the knowledge economy.” For this Implementation Completion and Results Report

(ICR), we use the PAD PDO, because this version was consistently pursued by the team and

counterparts and is stated in Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) throughout the project.

The key performance indicators as stated in the PAD are as follows:

Sector Indicators

The school-age population has equal access to education to acquire basic skills, core

competencies, and essential learning for the knowledge economy.

Project Outcome/Impact Indicators

A redefined vision and integrated education strategy will be developed, and policies and

regulations aligned with the new vision and strategy will be revised.

The average standardized score of Jordanian students in international assessments of mathematics

and science will improve.

4 The King said, “The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has the quality competitive human resource development systems

that provide all people with lifelong learning experiences relevant to their current and future needs in order to respond

to and stimulate sustained economic development through an educated population and an educated workforce.”

9

At least 80 percent of the primary and secondary students will have access to safe and adequate

basic and secondary education school facilities.

At least 70 percent of basic and secondary education students will be using online learning portals.

The gross enrollment rate in the second level of kindergarten will increase to 51 percent.

Intermediate output indicators by project component are in the Data Sheet.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and

reasons/justification

The PDO was not revised.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

The primary target population defined in the PAD was “current and future students enrolled in pre-

school, primary, and secondary education in Jordan, focusing particularly on disadvantaged groups.

About 200,000 students studying in unsafe physical facilities will be the immediate beneficiaries.”

The ECE provision and e-learning also targets rural and disadvantaged populations based on school

mapping. Although the PAD does not refer specifically to teachers and principals, it was clear that

they were also primary beneficiaries since all components entail training for teachers as part of the

activities.

The PAD states that the project will create “institutional and sector level” benefits, but it is not

explicit about the associated beneficiary groups. It was, however, evident that MOE officials, at both

the central and field offices, and the National Center for Human Resources Development (NCHRD)

were also key beneficiaries through a variety of interventions, including professional development

opportunities, equipment and capacity-building activities. Finally, as a result of the large-scale

interventions and investment, the PAD anticipated that the Jordanian society as a whole would be the

ultimate beneficiary through enhanced productivity and improvements in the skill level of the labor

force.

1.5 Original Components (as approved)

Component 1. Reorient Education Policy Objective and Strategies through Governance and

Administrative Reform (US$8.10 million). This component was designed to support the

development and implementation of policies and strategies to reorient and enable effective

management of the educational system to serve the needs of the individual learner and society at large

within a knowledge economy. This component had five subcomponents: (1.1) redefine the vision and

comprehensive integrated national strategy for education; (1.2) improve governance, management,

and decision-making processes; (1.3) integrate an Education Decision Support System (EDSS); (1.4)

conduct educational research, educational monitoring and evaluation, national and international

learning assessments, and educational policy analysis; and (1.5) develop effective management and

efficient coordination of investments in educational reform. In addition, support would be provided to

school-based innovations.

Component 2. Transform Education Programs and Practices for the Knowledge Economy (US$46.80 million). This component was designed to transform teaching and learning processes in

order to achieve learning outcomes that were relevant and consistent with the requirements of the

knowledge economy. There were three subcomponents: (2.1) development of new curriculum and

enhanced learning assessment methodologies; (2.2) the professional development of MOE personnel

10

with a particular focus on teachers, supervisors, and principals; and (2.3) the provision of the required

resources for supporting effective learning, including required information and communication

infrastructure, equipment, and learning materials.

Component 3. Support Provision of a Quality Physical Learning Environment (US$57.70

million). This component was designed to improve the quality of the learning environment in public

schools through the replacement of unsafe buildings and the alleviation of overcrowding, and through

upgrading the facilities to support learning in the knowledge economy. This component had two

subcomponents: (3.1) replace structurally unsafe and overcrowded schools; and (3.2) upgrade existing

schools to support learning in the knowledge economy through the provision of computer and science

labs.

Component 4. Promote Readiness for Learning through ECE (US$6.20 million). This component

was designed to enhance equity through public provision to KG II5 to low-income areas. The MOE

would initially develop a program to phase in KG II for children at age 5, to be followed in the future

by KG I (children at age 4) at the end of ERfKE I. This component had four subcomponents: (4.1)

institutional capacity building: (4.2) professional development of early childhood educators: (4.3)

increased access to KGs for the poor: and (4.4) parent and community participation through the

piloting of community-based centers in selected governorates.

1.6 Revised Components

The components were not revised during the project.

1.7 Other significant changes

Potential budget overrun detected early and solved properly: At the midterm review (January

2006), the mission determined that a budget overrun of US$8.8 million would occur by December

2008, mainly because of a projected significant deficit of US$19.43 million in school construction.

The Bank requested the government to clarify the financing sources for the budget overrun, either

through reprioritization within the existing World Bank loan amount or through financing from other

partners. In early April 2006, the government submitted its final version of the five-year project

implementation plan with a revised financing plan that proposed cutting construction by US$15

million and re-estimating the cost of furniture and equipment, resulting in a savings of US$1.5

million. The financing plan was accepted by the Bank and the budget overrun was averted.

The Loan Agreement was amended twice: In May 2005 and in October 2006, the loan was

amended to streamline the implementation and procurement procedures for the Innovation Fund. The

new fiduciary arrangements allowed for a specific disbursement category in the loan agreement as

well as direct contracting for acquisition of goods for the projects financed by the Innovation Fund,

thereby increasing efficiency of the Innovation Fund program’s financial management system.

Another amendment was approved in September 2006 to reallocate US$9 million for the school

construction (works category) reflecting the necessity to reprioritize the allocation of the existing

budget.

An extension of the project closing date was approved to ensure completion of all activities: In

July 2008, it was realized that efficient implementation of project activities had resulted in savings of

5 The PAD provides a detailed rationale for a phased expansion of public ECE coverage and this approach was

considered appropriate as this was the first time the MOE would provide public kindergartens.

11

US$4 million. It was agreed to use those savings to address the immediate needs of the sector,

including provision of additional access through expansion of school buildings and facilities and

replacement of outdated and obsolete equipment. Consequently, a sizable number of contracts for

goods and civil works were initiated, which required more time to complete. This resulted in project

activities going beyond the original closing date of December 2008. Based on a record of steady

progress and solid performance of the borrower, the Bank approved the government’s request to

extend the project closing date by six months. Subsequently, funds were reallocated appropriately.

The constantly evolving and high-performing project attracted more partners: Although the

project’s principal design and PDOs remained the same throughout the project life, the borrower and

the Bank managed the project in a flexible manner that encouraged new partners to join, complement,

and reinforce one another. In close consultation with the Bank and other donors, the Development

Coordination Unit (DCU) and the MOE made great efforts to adjust and fine-tune a large number of

new activities across components. As a result, towards the end of the project, 18 partners were

participating, including international donors, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private

sector. This illustrates the success of the project in transforming itself into a flagship project in the

sector and attracting more participation from various parts of Jordanian society.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry

Project design was suitable and quality at entry was satisfactory based on the following assessment:

Sufficient and timely background analyses were conducted and incorporated: During the project

identification and preparation stages (September 2001–2002), a number of studies and surveys were

conducted to ensure solid and realistic design of project components, to determine the highest priority

intervention areas and to develop the most cost-efficient scenario for school construction and

provision of equipment.

Component 1 included the preparation of the “Vision Forum for the Future of Education,” which

set the stage for strategy formulation and helped raise awareness of critical policy interventions

for human development toward a knowledge economy.

Component 2 preparations benefited from Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

technical assistance (for example, reports such as e-readiness Assessment of the MOE and

Learning Better with Broadband). Moreover, a Bank ICT review was conducted thoroughly to

shape the overall design.

Component 3 design benefitted from a number of surveys and expenditure analyses including

Cost Efficiency of Education Spending Study; A Physical Facilities Needs-assessment Survey; A

School-by-School Survey of the Physical Condition; and A Survey of the Utilization of Capacity in

all MOE Schools. The team also reviewed previous studies carried out by other donors (e.g., the

Demand for Schooling Study by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation [JBIC]).

Component 4 was based on a firm consensus reached after a series of seminars conducted jointly

with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the National Council for Family Affairs

(NCFA). The MOE conducted statistical analysis to project the ECE enrollment demand that was

reflected in the KG expansion plan. Also a background study was completed by a consultant.

Lessons learned were reflected in the design: ERfKE I was built on lessons learned from two

previous projects (Human Resource Development Sector Investment Loan Project 1 and 2). Essential

lessons incorporated include: (a) enhanced government ownership of project design and

12

implementation by the involvement of echelons lower than the managing directors in order to address

the frequent changes in the ranks of top administrators; (b) detailed and articulated contribution of

other financiers before project effectiveness to avoid delays in project implementation; (c) clarity on

implementation-related clearance and approval procedures from the Bank; (d) detailed specifications

on the construction contracts; (e) coordinated completion of school buildings synchronized with

receipt of procured furniture and other necessities, prior to the beginning of the school year; (f) ICT

training evaluations to be done quarterly by external experts, with the process to be modified based on

results. The preparation team also incorporated the concrete recommendations of the Quality

Enhancement Review (QER) conducted in October 2002, and those were reflected in the design and

implementation timetable.

Assessment of risks and identification of mitigation measures were moderately satisfactory at

entry: The team identified 19 items that were considered to pose risks to project implementation and

fulfillment of its development objectives. The overall risk rating on the PAD was Moderate, with

three High Risk items: (a) public awareness does not support the new strategy; (b) major changes in

personnel in key leadership and management positions (that is, the Minister, the DCU, and the

Directorates); and (c) resources are uncoordinated and are not provided in a timely manner to meet

requirements of key activities. For (a), the team introduced mitigation measures such as hosting

conferences for consensus building and strengthening partnerships (for example, the “Vision Forum”)

and effectively contributed to reducing the risk. For Risks (b) and (c), the mitigation identified in the

PAD was brief and implied that it depended almost entirely on the DCU to address and handle

coordination issues, despite the highly complex coordination work anticipated.6 Although issue (c)

continued to be rated High Risk during the early supervision stage, not enough mitigation measures

were proposed at the project entry stage.

Another risk that did not receive adequate attention was the DCU’s overwhelming workload. This

was noted by the government immediately after the preparation mission and was communicated to the

team with the request to provide additional technical assistance to the DCU. Similarly, the NCHRD’s

ambitious and unrealistic volume of assignments was not identified as a risk, although it had just

shifted its role from being an implementation agency to being the leading monitoring and evaluation

(M&E) and research and development (R&D) organization. In particular, education research and

M&E assigned to the NCHRD were of such a large scope that each could be another stand-alone TA

project. As a result, some 35 studies and reports produced by the institution were not always delivered

in the right sequence or with adequate quality, so the ministry could not take full advantage of the

work to reflect their results in policy development.

Preparation processes were highly participatory: Prepared jointly with another donor (CIDA) and

three ministries (MOE, the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research [MOHE], and

MOLP), the “Vision Forum” held in September 2002 is a good example of a highly participatory

approach from an early stage of project preparation. Thirty-three percent of the participants were from

the private sector and NGOs, and the conference also attracted participants from academia. The PAD

spelled out a detailed plan for a participatory implementation process (for example, the ECD

component was designed to include MOE, MSD, NCFA, UNICEF, civil society, and parents) that

guided each partner agency in actual implementation.

6 The mitigation identified for risks (b) and (c) of the PAD were, respectively, “Integrated implementation plans are

prepared annually to ensure coordination,” and “The Development Coordination Unit was established to address the

coordination issue.”

13

As an example of the substantive participation of other donors at the preparation stage, technical

assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) helped to translate the

component proposals into an integrated Five-Year Implementation Plan with specific activities and

output indicators. In early 2002, before Skype and other such communications media existed, the

Bank team made extensive use of all available ICT to connect international experts residing in

different parts of the world, including European Investment Bank (EIB) in Luxembourg, in the

program preparation process through a series of biweekly video and audio-videoconferencing

meetings with government teams and through frequent e-mail exchange.

The other shortcoming regarding project design was that several Component 1 subcomponent

activities were not closely aligned with one another, or were too ambitious to package in one

component. Due to the very different nature and large scope of activities of each subcomponent, the

team needed to deploy extra effort to ensure the right sequencing and harmonization among

subcomponents, otherwise each output would lose its impact and usefulness. For instance,

development of an EDSS required considerable engineering (which is still ongoing) before it could

become functional enough to inform policymaking and support evidence-based strategic policy

planning. The M&E and all international/national learning assessments is a large scale research

activity that can be a stand-alone TA. A school innovation fund was part of this component but the

design was silent about how this micro-focused fund contributed to the component objective to

“reorient education policy objectives and strategy through governance and administrative reform,”

which addressed a national-level, governance-related broader reform perspective.

2.2 Implementation

Serious procurement issues arose but were handled properly: At the early stage of the project

(around May–September 2004), the quality of procurement was rated “unsatisfactory” because of

significant delays in the awarding process and the unsatisfactory quality of the bid evaluation reports

issued during that period. These were largely due to the MOE evaluation committee’s lack of

familiarity with Bank procurement regulations and procedures. The DCU immediately communicated

these issues to the Bank, and a series of risk mitigation measures were introduced to support the

ministry and to quickly build DCU procurement capacity. As a result, the quality of the evaluation

reports improved significantly and the procurement rating was upgraded to satisfactory in April 2005.

Midterm Review (MTR): Most of the initial issues were resolved by the MTR (for example,

procurement, M&E, several gaps in DCU staffing, and so forth). At the time of the MTR,

implementation was not only progressing smoothly but also at a rapid pace. There were several other

risks to implementation identified during the MTR, with concrete recommendations with specific

steps to be taken for each. One of the risks noted was that the intensity and pace of implementation of

a holistic reform approach, as opposed to an incremental one, would cause fatigue on the government,

DCU and implementing agencies at all levels. Teachers were also considered vulnerable to these

intense reform pressures. To this end, focus group sessions with 50 teachers were conducted during

the MTR which revealed that some parts of training and reform outputs were not necessarily

producing a positive impact on daily work. The study was useful in improving the training program

(time and location; recognition of the training) and led to other relevant studies conducted later, such

as “The Evaluation Study of the new Curriculum and Assessment Tools for ERfKE I” by NCHRD.

Overall, the MTR was in-depth and full of important recommendations, proposing specific time

frames, setting milestones to be achieved on critical issues, and hence providing guidance on the

effective implementation of the remainder of the project.

Evolution of the scale of the project did not affect the PDOs: At the project subcomponent level,

many adjustments were made reflecting the inclusion of several new donors and partners. Various

14

new activities were added, and thus the project constantly evolved. However, while the DCU and

MOE managed the project in a flexible manner that encouraged participation of new partners, the

project consistently pursued the initially stated goal and prevented any major deviation. These

evolutions turned out to be very effective in strengthening partnerships among various development

partners.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization

The initial M&E design was unclear about the role each organization should play: With the

magnitude of investment and the complexities of the ERfKE program, M&E was extremely important.

A total of US$2.2 million was allocated for M&E, illustrating its importance. The NCHRD was

assigned to carry out external M&E for the project as well as some 30 studies and surveys, while the

DCU and respective directorates at the MOE were in charge of monitoring progress of day-to-day

implementation (internal M&E). However, at the project appraisal stage, the M&E design in the PAD

did not provide a clear role for each organization or a specific division of labor. Similarly, the PAD

did not effectively address the difficulties of recruiting and retaining staff for M&E, while there was

an apparent acute shortage of some skills. Also, the NCHRD’s readiness and capacity to conduct a

wide range of studies and surveys was not properly assessed as a risk.

Implementation of M&E was characterized by persistent delays and compromised quality:

Despite repeated and explicit recommendations by the Bank supervision team to form the M&E team

and carry out the tasks immediately, the appointment of an M&E team was delayed for two and half

years, as was the development of an M&E framework. A preliminary M&E framework was prepared

in March 2005, which required significant revisions. The final version was endorsed by the donors

several months after the MTR. Consequently, the quality of M&E was consistently rated

unsatisfactory by supervision missions during the early stages of implementation. At the MTR,

however, it was upgraded to satisfactory, reflecting the improvement made by the M&E team

(finalized M&E framework, development of an M&E action plan, progress on four studies,

development of most of the baseline indicators, and initiation of the National Assessment for

Knowledge Economy study).

It should be noted as a positive aspect that the project employed a single framework to consistently

evaluate progress and encouraged donors to use the framework to avoid duplication and reduce costs.

In this regard, the project developed an effective arrangement in promoting donor coordination in

overall M&E.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

Overall, financial management (FM) and procurement were satisfactory because proper remedial

actions were taken after the initial problems in the early stage of the project (see Section 2.2). Most

ISR ratings on FM and procurement were Satisfactory. The section below highlights some of the

difficult phases of fiduciary compliance and how the team responded.

FM was downgraded to Moderately Satisfactory as a result of the December 2005 supervision

mission. There was a major delay in receiving the audit report, which was due June 30, 2005. In

addition, a nine-month disbursement lag was noted, and it was decided this would be reviewed during

the MTR in January 2006. FM was again rated Moderately Satisfactory at the MTR. The Financial

Officer resigned in October 2005 and the post was vacant until late 2006, which affected the DCU’s

ability to monitor the project’s FM activities. There were also delays in submitting the Financial

Management Reports (FMRs) for the third quarter of 2005 and delays in submitting the audit report to

15

the Bank for FY04. Those delays were partly attributable to the MOE’s unfamiliarity of FM

procedures as the FM function was the responsibility of MOPIC in the previous projects. It required

significant time and effort for the MOE to harmonize reporting from all financiers and to provide

audit statements covering all financiers. The Bank closely supported the MOE and the DCU

throughout the period to catch up with the delay; as a result, problem was solved shortly after the

MTR.

Procurement was rated Unsatisfactory as a result of the September 2004 supervision mission due to

problems in the management of the procurement process and the quality of the evaluation reports (e.g.,

deviations from bank guidelines and procedures, lengthy evaluation periods for bids and proposals,

and a lack of required details in the Bids Evaluation reports). However, the DCU, entrusted with the

execution and supervision of the implementation of the project, was immediately responsive to the

recommendations made in Bank supervision and post-reviews and corrected the problems. Bank

training and capacity building of MOE staff successfully led to developing in-house skills, especially

in terms of technical specifications drafting, evaluation and contract management. The ministry’s

technical department has developed a database of pedagogical equipment based on regular market

research and updates on expenditures, which is rarely experienced in other ministries. The selection

of consultants for design and supervision, preparation of bidding documents for construction, signing

of contracts, supervision of work, acceptance and payments, that used to be carried out by the

Directorate of Buildings and International Projects (DBIP) at MOE, were transferred in December

2007 to the General Tenders Department (GTD) in the Ministry of Housing and Public Works

(MHPW). Despite the significant transfer of functions, the coordination between MOE and MHPW

after December 2007 did not reflect any disconnect or weaknesses. The procurement for works was

conducted using NCB procedures and the national standard bidding documents were given a no-

objection by the Bank after being reviewed and slightly modified to align with the standard bidding

document for works based on the 1999 FIDIC contract. In all supervision and ex-post reviews, no

significant shortcomings were reported. The project staff handled complaints diligently and

satisfactorily. Towards the end of the project, the borrower needed very little assistance from the

Bank in procurement.

Regarding the Safeguard issues, the Bank worked closely with the MOE to comply with the safeguard

regulations and requirements. It was well reflected within the identification of school construction

sites and other relevant plans for civil works. An Environmental Management Plan was included in

the PAD and proved to be highly effective in guiding implementation. Overall, it was well managed

and satisfactory as noted in mission aide-memories.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

ERfKE is a 10-year, multidonor sector program designed to deliver on the 2002 “Vision Forum for

the Future of Education” in Jordan. ERfKE I successfully laid a solid foundation for Phase II. To

sustain the momentum created by Phase I and further strengthen the capacity at the school and field

directorate levels, and to support the strategic leadership at senior management levels of the MOE,

ERfKE II was prepared and appraised in 2009, reflecting the lessons learned from Phase I. More

focus will be put on teachers (e.g., teacher policy, in-service training, and teachers as an agent for

change) and promotion of field-directorate-level capacity building and school-level innovation as part

of the promotion of decentralization.

A smooth transition from ERfKE I to ERfKE II is expected because the MOE and DCU are already

familiar with Bank requirements and procedures for procurement and financial management. Bank

suggestions for social and environmental safeguard compliance have been incorporated and the MOE

already has well-established systems and regulations that are largely compatible with Bank

16

requirements with respect to safeguards. The only potential challenge is the need to sustain ownership

of the project at all levels of the MOE given new leadership and turnover of several senior

management staff.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design, and Implementation

Relevance is rated as substantial based on the following facts:

The objective of the project is directly related to the 2002 “Vision Forum for the Future of

Education” that was organized by the Bank under the auspices of the King, where the

country’s core development objectives were endorsed by the government and development

partners.

The project was designed on the basis of the policy framework established by the MOE

“Statement of Sectoral Policy of the Government” and is thus considered relevant to

government priorities.

The project was also intended to contribute to two CAS priorities by addressing human

resource development and supporting public sector reform.

The project acknowledges global education trends, which emphasize higher-order thinking

and problem solving skills and underscore the imperative role of ICT in education in

nurturing globally competitive citizens.

The project aimed to help Jordan achieve the education MDGs since Component 4 is aimed at

narrowing the gaps in gender and regional inequality in primary school enrollment by

providing early childhood education to the poor and rural populations. Therefore, the project

objectives and design are highly relevant to the development priorities from the global, Bank

and government perspectives.

Implementation of the project was consistently supported by donors, NGOs, and the private

sector.

See Section 2.1 for more details on assessment of quality and relevance of design.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

Overall achievement of the PDO is rated satisfactory based on the substantive impact made at both

the institutional and individual level, as shown by international benchmarks, such as TIMSS and

PISA, as well as several surveys conducted during the project and interviews carried out for the ICR.

All proper inputs were made, almost 90 percent of all immediate output targets were fully met, and

some achievements even surpassed the original targets (e.g., Component 4). The PDO was generic

and broad, referring to an immense change in education policy and practice. Thus, more time and

continuous effort are needed to fully harvest the real fruits of such large-scale reform. In addition,

some reform areas are quite challenging, such as reforming the governance and management structure

and restructuring the decision-making mechanism, instituting results-based budgeting, changing

teachers’ pedagogical practices to promote student-centered learning while making the most of ICT,

and graduating students with knowledge-economy-oriented skills that respond to global labor market

demand. These are vast and arduous tasks for any country. It would take a decade or a generation to

scientifically measure the outcomes of all the inputs made through the ERfKE. Nonetheless, despite

such ambitious PDOs, ample outputs were produced and interviews and surveys have shown that

changes are happening at many levels of Jordanian society. It is considered that the project, as the

first phase of a 10-year reform program, successfully laid a solid foundation for helping the

17

knowledge economy permeate the country and for continuous application of evidence-based strategic

policymaking.

A brief summary of achievement of Outputs and Outcomes in each component follows.

Component 1. Substantial outputs were produced but the achievement of overarching

objectives/outcomes was modest.

Overall, achievement of component-level objectives was modest. Some of the subcomponent-level

inputs were substantially achieved (e.g., various types of professional development training; EMIS

development). However, the difficulty was that this component was overly ambitious and too many

activities were packaged in it, as discussed in Section 1.2. The overall intent of this component was to

reorient policy and planning practices at the MOE from an activity-based approach to the adoption of

a strategic and outcome-based planning approach. The phasing and levels of completion have been

uneven and further harmonization and integration of design and outcomes of each subcomponent

would have been required to fully achieve the objective. A detailed subcomponent-level analysis

compared to PDO outcome indicators and end-targets follows.

Outcome to be achieved was “A redefined vision and integrated education strategy are developed,

and policies and regulations aligned with the new vision and strategy are revised”. End-target was

“new strategy implemented.”

Subcomponent 1: A significant outcome was achieved in the definition of the vision and

comprehensive national strategy. Although initial work was significantly delayed, mostly due to

reasons beyond the control of the MOE (e.g., onset of conflict in the region, consultant changes and

changes in the supporting donors), the strategy was completed and endorsed in 2006. The

subcomponent also included a Public Relations Campaign (PRC). The design of the PRC was

completed and a number of actions were taken to publicly disseminate of the National Education

Strategy, yet not all plans were completed as initially foreseen, mostly due to procurement-related

reasons. Based on the Bank recommendation, it was agreed that the campaign will be re-launched

under ERfKE II.

Outcome to be achieved was “Mandate, structure, and decision-making processes of governance and

management reviewed, revised, and operational. Significant level of school-based-decision-making

and decentralization was promoted; outcome-based budgeting process adopted by MOE”.

Subcomponent 2: Despite several challenges, the Borrower managed to achieve sizable outputs. After

termination of DFID’s involvement, which piloted a comprehensive school-level decentralization as

part of its large-scale public sector reform program, the MOE together with CIDA proceeded with a

number of pilot initiatives (for example, Support for Jordan Education (SJE) initiatives targeting five

field directorates for school and district development; significant work done by the Directorate of

Training Qualifications and Supervisions (DTQS) supported by ERfKE Support Project (ESP) piloted

in 12 directorates during 2005-2008; several other initiatives supported by CIDA in organizational

management, gender equity, planning and budgeting). Despite initial delays caused by the difficulty

in appointing the right firms, valuable lessons were drawn from these pilot initiatives and the scale-up

of effective interventions is planned to benefit a wider population.

During the project, limited pilot outputs only were delivered thus the ultimate goal of bringing

significant changes in overall governance structure was not fully achieved and needed further work.

The MOE continues to operate under a traditional budget system, with limited application of the

MTEF budgeting (three-year) framework. Workshops on Planning, Budgeting, Leadership Training,

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and Change Management were held, but their impact on practice was limited. Borrower self-

evaluation suggests a 60 percent achievement in this subcomponent.

Outcome to be achieved was “EDSS developed, implemented and used by 50 percent of decision

makers by 2006”. End-target was that EDSS becomes available to 90 percent of decision makers by

2008.

The goal of subcomponent 3 (EDSS/EMIS development to enable the government to engage in

evidence-based, strategic policy planning) was only partially achieved since major outputs (a

functional EMIS and EduWave) were produced but not yet connected with EDSS or with other tools

to be effectively used to promote evidence-based policy development. EDSS design was complete but

put on hold pending completion of the EMIS. The Policy and Strategic Planning Secretariat (PSPS)

was established as part of the effort, which was one of the major achievements of this component.

The unit is led by the Directorate of Research and Development and staffed with highly capable in-

house experts providing support from several different MOE directorates. Although the unit does not

yet have a formal identity within the ministry, and while still officially run on a part-time basis, the

dedicated and committed staff work more than full time, and capacity is quickly being built.

Outcome to be achieved was “The average standardized score of Jordanian students in international

assessments of mathematics and science has improved”. End target was “a positive statistically

significant improvement in 2007 TIMSS scores.”

Under subcomponent 4 (Education Research, Policy Analysis, National Learning Assessment,

TIMSS participation, and M&E) about 35 studies were undertaken by the MOE and NCHRD. The

Jordanian students’ scores on the 2007 TIMSS improved (the 2003 score in science was 475 and in

math 424; scores in 2007 were: science 482 and math 427). Although the increase in this period

(comparison between 2003 and 2007 scores) was not statistically significant, the increase between

1999 and 2007 should be the point of analysis as it is far more meaningful and appropriate, according

to TIMSS experts. In this timeframe, the increase is significant; Jordan has made the largest

improvement among all participants (Patrinos, 2008). It is considered that the original outcome

indicator is not adequately designed to capture the improvement of student learning outcomes, yet

positive change (increase in TIMSS scores) was surely attained on the ground regardless of such

narrowly defined “statistical” significance.

Overall M&E work was characterized by persistent delays and quality issues as described in Section

2.3. About 30 percent of the studies were viewed as mediocre, falling short of the expectation that the

MOE would provide solid evidence on which to draw conclusions about which interventions were

proven effective and which should be scaled-up in the follow-on project.

Outcome to be achieved was “Increased support for school-based innovations”. End-target was

“Schools have regular access to funds from government for innovation and proper utilization.”

Under subcomponent 5, The Innovation Fund (IF) was designed to support school-level activities that

promote innovation in teaching and learning in four domains. Seven rounds were completed through

which schools learned to formulate a proposal and to use the fund to promote innovative learning

approaches and good practices, which are being shared. One-hundred sixty-four projects were

implemented and another 97 are under implementation, financed by the loan. The IF was

institutionalized within the MOE under the Directorate of Education Innovations, but the budget still

relies heavily on the Bank loan despite some government contributions. Thus, the end target of the

“provision of regular access to funds from the government” has not yet been achieved. Although this

activity by itself would not significantly affect the overall governance and management structure it

19

served as an important step to empower schools and raise capacity and confidence that they could be

the origin and center of reform and innovation.

Component 2: Delivery of outputs was Highly Satisfactory but achievement of component

objective was Moderately Satisfactory.

As the thrust of the ERfKE reform, this component was key to the success of the whole program. The

overall objective of this component was to transform teaching and learning processes in order to

achieve learning outcomes relevant to and consistent with the requirements of a knowledge economy.

Activities in the subcomponent included preparation of new curriculum and improved learning

assessments, professional development of MOE personnel and teachers/supervisors and the provision

of ICT infrastructure and learning materials. The achievement of immediate outputs intended by each

subcomponent was satisfactory, but the component objective was not fully met because this was

another broad undertaking, and it takes more time and effort to institute change at the classroom level.

Outcome to be achieved was “New curriculum framework emphasizing basic skills, core

competencies and essential learning for knowledge economy, are developed and in place”. End-

target was 100 percent of curriculum framework complete; general and specific learning outcomes

are developed for all subjects and grades. Textbooks are delivered to all schools.

Subcomponent 1 successfully produced new curriculums for general education for all grades plus pre-

vocational and vocational tracks (except for the industrial stream), and the final stage of rollout was

completed in 2008. Textbooks, teachers’ guides, and supplementary e-learning materials in key

subject areas were also produced and being used. Development of the new Learning Assessment

Framework and National Assessment System were also major achievements, with a concrete example

of school report cards and other comprehensive student evaluation schemes. Just completing this

massive investment by itself was remarkable, and MOE staff (e.g., Directorate of Examination and

Testing) capacity was significantly developed. Also the quality of implementation was highly

successful that key Directorates worked together, communicated closely to reach consensus and

adhered to comprehensive and inclusive planning activities. The culture of work was significantly

changed.

Outcome to be achieved was “Teacher training provided to acquire basic ICT skills”. End-target was

that 50,000 teachers became ICDL certified. Percentage of teachers utilizing new teaching

methodology increased. End target was that 80 percent of teachers use new methodology.

Achievement of the first goal in subcomponent 2 was satisfactory since it exceeded the target (85,118

teachers trained on ICDL and 55,000 certified; 57,738 teachers and supervisors trained on INTEL and

7,702 certified; 2,583 teachers trained on World Links and 1,820 certified). For the second goal,

according to the study prepared by the Directorate of Curriculum and Testing, all teachers are now

using at least one new methodology in the field. However, it is still unclear whether the methodology

refers to holistic pedagogical practice (student-centered learning) or to using computers and ICT

equipment to teach the contents in the conventional rote-memorization or lecturing style.

Classroom observational studies revealed that the impact on teacher practice was still uneven. It is

expected that such impact can only be achieved in the long run as ERfKE II continues to focus on the

issue. Undertaking such significant, system-wide changes was considered appropriate based on the

ministry’s capacity demonstrated through the implementation of ERfKE I. This component

contributed to building the capacity of and confidence in the ministry to take on a high-level, system-

wide education change.

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Outcome to be achieved was “At least 70 percent of basic and secondary students are using online

learning portals”.

Subcomponent 3 involved a massive and unprecedented investment in ICT infrastructure, software,

and training of teachers and officials throughout the system. This is a remarkable achievement that

enabled 80 percent of Jordan’s schools to be connected to the Internet, and almost all now have at

least basic ICT equipment. All schools were reported to have been provided with computers and over

75 percent now have access to online learning. In addition, the number of internet connections

increased significantly with over 2,500 schools having access to ADSL connection. Although M&E

studies show that the impact on pedagogy has not yet generated profound changes, all other areas of

intended outputs and outcomes in this component were achieved or surpassed. Notable pilot

initiatives include Discovery Schools, where supplemental, cutting-edge e-learning contents were

developed and piloted. Other activities such as Youth Technology and Careers to support school-to-

work transition were also meaningful.

This component demonstrated a strong potential for effective public-private partnerships. Many

private sector firms were involved as providers of ICT equipment and learning materials. Through

close collaboration with the ministry in developing e-content and communication strategies, and

EMIS development, valuable lessons were learned and are being incorporated into the next phase of

the reform program. This is one of the unintended positive outcomes of the project, since public-

private partnerships were not an explicit project goal in the PAD.

Component 3 exceeded its output targets and the objectives/outcomes were achieved

satisfactorily. However, the country continues to have the challenge of overcrowding and

underutilization of facilities.

The objective of this component was to improve the quality of the learning environment in public

schools through the replacement of unsafe buildings and the alleviation of overcrowding, and through

upgrading the facilities to support learning in the knowledge economy.

Outcome to be achieved was “At least 80 percent of the primary and secondary students have access

to safe and adequate basic and secondary education school facilities”.

Subcomponent 1 aimed at replacing structurally unsafe and overcrowded schools. This subcomponent

exceeded the target, and at project completion as many as 942,422 students (87.4 percent of all

students in primary and secondary education) were studying in safe schools. The loan financed 41

new school constructions (out of total 181) and 538 renovation/extensions. The procurement and

management of large scale contracts were well conducted by the MOE, demonstrating its strong

commitment and competence with a high degree of efficiency and professionalism. This massive

investment in physical infrastructure was implemented mostly on time and within budget, thus

justifying strong national commitment to education reform. Following up on this outcome, field

interviews with local donor agencies showed that adequate school infrastructure and educational

materials did create incentives for teachers to teach better and motivate them to work hard.

Despite these achievements, the problem of overcrowding and underutilization of schools persists

throughout the country. One planning survey revealed that 59 percent of the MOE schools were

underutilized, while another 39 percent of schools (101,000 students) experienced overcrowding.

Several factors seem to be at the root of this situation, including a shift of students from private

schools to public schools triggered by both enhanced quality of public schools and the financial crisis

in 2008, and the unanticipated influx of immigrant students from Iraq. This unforeseen student flow

added difficulties to the already existing problems of imbalanced demand and supply of school

21

facilities. Efficiency of school utilization still remains a challenge, even after the significant

investment through the project.

Overall, immediate outputs (school construction, extension and rehabilitation) were satisfactorily

delivered, demonstrating strong commitment and capacity of the government, yet the project was not

able to solve the core problem (overcrowding and underutilization) and there is room for

improvement in location planning and strategy with better utilization of the data such as school

mapping.

Component 4 was Highly Satisfactory, presenting an exemplary case of project implementation

building in an effective partnership among government departments, civil society organizations,

and aid partners. Outputs not only achieved all initial targets but surpassed targets in some areas. Both

design and implementation of this component have been widely recognized as being highly successful.

The objective of this component was to support the implementation of an ECE strategy to ensure that

families and communities partner with the education sector to better prepare children for learning and

to prevent school failure. This component includes four subcomponents: (i) institutional capacity

building; (ii) professional development of early childhood educators; (iii) increased access to KGs for

the poor, and (iv) parent and community participation through piloting of community-based centers in

selected governorates.

Outcome to be achieved was “The gross enrollment rate in the second level of kindergarten has

increased to 51percent” and “Teachers trained in ECE increase according to needs. End-target was

“All KG teachers trained on National Curriculum and on pedagogy appropriate for Early Childhood

Education”.

The target of 51percent enrollment in KG II was fully achieved by February 2008, well before the end

of the project. All targets related to training of teachers, development of ECD standards, indicators

and benchmarks, as well as quality assurance systems, were satisfactorily achieved. Of the

approximately 300 public KGs, 140 classrooms were rehabilitated using the Bank loan proceeds and

another 100 classrooms were rehabilitated and furnished by the USAID. All the KG teachers received

training on the National Curriculum, and 93 percent of KG teachers received training on the

Wisconsin “Working with Young Children” program.

Sub-component 1 produced exceptional national level achievement that include: (a) the development

of curriculum with digitized ECE software accompanied with user guide and teaching guide; (b) the

development of ECD standard framework, with key indicators (Early Development Indicators) that

was incorporated in the periodic household surveys to regularly inform the level of child

development; (c) development of Learning Readiness Assessment; (d) updating licensing standards;

(e) development of Quality Assurance Framework for MOE KGs; and (f) training of teachers on

Kidsmart program (IBM). Except for a few activities such as capacity building of preschool division

at MOE, all activities met the end-targets. As many as 15 organizations (donors, NGOs, Arab

organization, private sector, and various government entities) were involved in this sub-component

alone. For each activity, supervisory committees at central level were formed and functioned well to

set the direction, and field-level committees ensured the implementation on the ground. All these

were conducted in a very transparent manner and information was timely shared, according to the

program directors. These were indeed extraordinary accomplishments reflecting the strong

partnership fostered through the project, and it also validates the strong support and effective

coordination provided by DCU/MOE. The partners also reflected that the quality and timeliness of the

Bank assistance was satisfactory.

22

Sub-component 2 covered a wide range of training for trainers, teachers, principals, and supervisors.

This included provision of training to not only MOE KGs but also other NOG-managed KGs as well

as provision of curriculum and teachers to the NGO KGs. Sub-component 3 successfully completed

rehabilitation of the KG classrooms thus contributed to the increase in KG enrollment. It also

launched the Center of Excellence model in collaboration with USAID with support from NCFA,

ESP, and Arab Orphan Fund. The model is still being implemented thus there is no substantial

assessment yet of its effectiveness and sustainability. Sub-component 4 launched a public awareness

campaign, mainly through community level programs such as field educational sessions for target

groups. It provided 180 training sessions to 3,600 KG educators and supervisors as well as parents.

KG newsletter was published and distributed semi-annually. Coupled with these community reach

activities to raise awareness on ECD issues, parent involvement expansion initiative was also

undertaken to deepen parents’ understanding and commitment to KG quality improvement in

classroom (e.g., Better Parenting program). As a result, involvement of volunteer parents was

increased, and parents’ awareness about the importance of ECD was enhanced.

Overall, this component serves as a model case for reform achievement. Not only the achievement on

outputs-level was highly satisfactory but the manner it was conducted is truly noteworthy.

Component 4 demonstrated the power and synergies of strengthened partnership and collaboration

between several different departments in the government, together with other implementing partners,

NGOs and community organizations in maximizing reform outcomes.

3.3 Efficiency

No statistical analysis has been conducted on the economic rate of return of the investment due to the

nature of the reform project that involved various hard-to-quantify aspects of human development.

Assessment of Component 3, however, could offer a tangible example of cost-efficiency of project

implementation. The component entailed large-scale school construction and rehabilitation. The

largest portion of the loan (US$236.5 million, or 64 percent of total funding allocation) went to this

component. The plan was sufficiently flexible to accommodate unforeseen changes, including

increases in student enrollment in the country (e.g., immigration from Iraq). In addition, funding

adjustments within the component and efficient implementation resulted in savings of US$4 million,

which was used for wider provisions of school facilities and equipment. Overall, project

implementation was highly efficient and funding was disbursed in a stable and steady manner. As

repeatedly noted by the supervision mission, most of the project implementation progressed at a good

rate, with few hindrances. Given the complexity and magnitude of the intended reform program, the

goal of which was holistic sector improvements, all outputs and outcomes produced by ERfKE

suggest that project efficiency was very high.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Satisfactory

Combining relevance, achievement of PDOs, and efficiency, as described in detail in the above

sections, the overall outcome of the project is rated Satisfactory. Some limitations arise from the fact

that establishing a clear causal connection between the specific activities implemented under the

project and the achievement of the overarching PDO that refers to the whole education sector

improvement and national-level human resource development is difficult given that there are always

other social, political, and economic factors affecting education sector performance. It is also

generally difficult to fully attribute success to any specific reform inputs. For instance, it is widely

known in many countries that student performance (e.g., learning outcomes measured by international

assessments such as TIMSS) can be attributed more to the socioeconomic status of the students than

23

to school/teacher characteristics. Therefore, oversimplified and hasty conclusions should not be

drawn about the causal link between the project inputs and national-level human development

outcomes. Recognizing all these constraints, however, achievement in almost all components was

highly successful except for a few activities (e.g., reform of the governance/policymaking structure,

the public relations campaign, EDSS, and M&E). The project surely succeeded in laying solid

foundations for further reform and it injected the theory and practice of “knowledge economy” into

the education sector as a central part of the nation building endeavor.

3.5 Overarching Themes, other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

Gender was not explicitly mentioned in PAD nor in the original implementation plan but a major

activity was added to Component 1 around 2006 based on MOE’s decision. Supported by CIDA, a

local gender specialist was hired and worked closely with MOE and delivered the following: (i) a

Gender Equality Technical Team (GETT) was formed and provided training to MOE staff on gender

mainstreaming; (ii) the GETT reviewed curriculum, professional development materials and provided

recommendations to promote gender sensitive working environment; (iii) gender analysis was

conducted and a forum to promote female leadership was held in December 2006, with support from

SJE. Follow-up workshops were held. In 2008, an international Gender Specialist provided technical

assistance to strengthen the GETT and supported their participation in various workshops. GETT

worked both in central government and in two selected districts, in close collaboration with SJE. A

gender strategy for MOE was developed and approved. As a result of all these efforts, awareness at

MOE towards a gender-sensitive learning environment was enhanced. However, the gender strategy

has not yet been distributed nor institutionalized. GETT should be scaled up and its capacity should

be further strengthened. It was noted that the intensity and scope of activities were not even during

the project, and most of the activities were mainly led by the contracted gender specialist, not

proactively sought by MOE or other parties as illustrated in the absence of activities during 2007

where the consultant was not in the field. Therefore, even though the project succeeded in putting

gender mainstreaming on the important agenda at MOE, the concept was not yet fully or evenly

implemented and sustainability of the outcome still relies on the presence of technical specialists

contracted by donors.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

As is the case with many reform projects, the greatest progress made in ERfKE I occurred where the

centralized authority directed the hardware changes (e.g., curriculum development, teaching and

learning materials, ICT, and physical infrastructure) rather than organizational and human behavioral

changes. Progress was slower in the areas that required reform in management structure and strategic

policy planning (e.g., decentralization; results-based planning), which require a long time frame to

produce visible and sustainable results. Strong ownership was firmly built at the MOE, however, as

reasonably anticipated, leadership and capacity were not quickly or evenly developed across different

levels of the institution. Those were stronger among senior management but more fragile at other

levels.

Nonetheless, the project significantly contributed to building capacity in many areas, not only in

acquiring ICT-related skills, but also in raising awareness of critical reform concepts such as

“evidence-based policymaking,” “strategic policy planning,” and “results-based budgeting.” The

notion of a knowledge-economy-based education (higher-order thinking, critical thinking, student-

centered learning, etc.) was widely promoted among teachers, who were mostly familiar with the

24

conventional rote-memorization style of teaching. The necessity and significance of critical policy

interventions were widely recognized at both the central and field offices of the MOE, and by both

top management and other tiers of technical staff. The project successfully triggered a cultural shift

and a change in mentality, especially among staff in the MOE central office. The establishment of

PSPS and its staff’s eagerness and dedication is a good example of success in bringing genuine

institutional change.

The project also demonstrated excellent collaboration and coordination between the MOE and DCU,

both internally (among different MOE directorates) and externally with other organizations.

Examples are:

Collaboration between the MOE and universities was promoted, as seen in subcomponents 2.1 and 2.2

(curriculum development and reform of pedagogy). A MOE/Universities Joint Steering Committee

(comprising the Minister of Education and the Deans of Faculties of Education) was formed to guide

the pre-service training program.

Collaboration with other ministries and the private sector was also promoted: For Component 2

(provision of ICT infrastructure and equipment), the MOE worked with other ministries, such as

MoICT and USAID, using their grant funding to upgrade the facility of QRC while waiting for the

MoICT to work on the MOE data center, to be housed in QRC. The MOE also worked with the Jordan

Telecom Corp (JT) to connect 2,000 schools to QRC using a high-speed DSL network built in

partnership with JT.

The Jordan Education Initiative (JEI) public-private partnership was launched in 2003 under the

auspices of the World Economic Forum (WEF), and became part of the ERfKE to pilot and showcase

effective innovative interventions in selected schools (Discovery Schools).

There was excellent donor/partner coordination, as evidenced by the active participation of 17

partners; toward the end of the project, the DCU and MOE provided ceaseless support to ensure

smooth implementation of activities and to avoid duplication of effort.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

The public-private partnerships engendered by the project were one of the unintended positive

outcomes of the project. These partnerships demonstrated that the sectors can actually work together

productively to mutual benefit. The project successfully proved that collaboration can reduce

transaction costs and the burden on the MOE, and can thereby enhance the efficiency and

productivity of each organization. This positive synergy was not expressed in the initial PDOs, but it

became widely recognized as good practice in the region.

The project also succeeded in capacity development of MOE officials. The downside of success was

that consequently MOE experienced “brain drain” of these highly skilled staff as they were recruited

by private sector or other jobs outside Jordan. This shows that the project was successful in building

firm capacity and competitiveness but the loss of these competent staff was a negative unintended

outcome that may affect sustainability of the reform outcomes.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

n/a

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: Modest

25

Risk to development outcome is considered modest as a very strong foundation has been laid through

various capacity-building activities and highly motivated MOE officials became confident of carrying

the reform forward. Very promising changes are occurring, illustrated by the development of new

learning assessments (e.g., a school report card to comprehensively evaluate student learning),

development of an M&E framework, steady improvement in the TIMSS since the first participation

and creation of a PSPS unit to reinforce strategic policy planning. Although it needs more time and

continuous effort to manifest the pedagogical changes in daily practice, the concept of knowledge-

economy-oriented learning was widely promoted. Confidence and self-reliance among MOE staff has

been significantly raised to the point that they believe the reform can continue even with less formal

intervention by the Bank and donor projects. Although these progressive phenomena are seen mainly

among a limited group of people that had constant exposure to the external interventions and

technical assistance, it is evident that the government has a firm readiness and capacity to carry the

reform forward and penetrate the policy and practice of knowledge-economy-oriented education.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry


As examined in detail in Section 2.1, the preparation of ERfKE benefited from the lessons of the two

previous projects (HRDSIL 1 and 2) and various assessment outcomes. The Bank responded to the

demand from the government to continue the human resource development reform program with a

new and heavy focus on increasing competence in a knowledge-based economy. In alignment with

government priorities and the “Vision Forum for the Future of Education,” the Bank invested in

projects to ensure the continuity and relevance of the objective. The Bank provided a forum for

discussion and consultation among stakeholders, and technical seminars to deepen the understanding

of several key issues (e.g., the significance of investment in ECE). The team swiftly took measures to

provide the necessary resources for the preparation of the project and ensured its smooth launch. The

project became effective only five days after the signing date, signifying the swiftness and efficiency

of the team’s work.

(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: Highly Satisfactory

Responsiveness was high and soundness of assistance was adequate: In response to the

Borrower’s request for immediate guidance, the Bank always responded to the MOE and DCU

promptly with concrete recommendations and interventions. For instance, to address the serious

procurement problem that arose in early 2004, the Bank immediately responded to the request to

strengthen procurement capacity at the DCU and relevant ministries and to familiarize them with

Bank procedures. During May–June 2004, the Bank provided training in Amman for 20 ministry and

DCU staff on the procurement of goods and the selection of consultants. In addition, during the

September 2004 mission, a half-day workshop was conducted to address the preparation of terms of

reference and IT procurement. Similarly, for Component 1, when a problem emerged (a donor’s

termination of its participation in ERfKE, putting the continuation of subcomponent 2 at risk), the

Bank responded promptly with concrete recommendations, thus ensuring continuation of the

subcomponent. However, institutions such as NCHRD noted that it would have been more effective

26

and useful if the Bank’s feedback on their reports was received systematically and consistently, with

detailed comments and suggestions.

Risk management was also carefully done: An institutional capacity or staffing gap was usually

promptly noted based on solid analysis. The Bank guided the contracted firms in conducting situation

analysis or gap analysis before making large investments (for example, analysis of EMIS/EDSS

utilization). Other risks related to fiduciary compliance were also handled in a timely manner, as

described in previous sections. For instance, during 2004–05, the Bank provided assistance to

promote streamlined, efficient procurement procedures, as illustrated in the case of the Innovation

Fund. The Bank recommended that the DCU submit simplified procurement procedures to the Bank,

and these were promptly approved. Accordingly, the Loan Agreement was amended to include the

simplified procurement procedure to ensure rapid response and decreased processing time.

The need to provide more forums and platforms to reconfirm commitment towards higher-

order objectives: Despite the complexity and magnitude of the reform program, many donors and

partners agreed that the Bank’s assistance (both technical and administrative) was top-notch and was

highly appreciated throughout the project. One issue some partners thought the Bank could have

played a larger role in was to support the government in creating more forums to reconfirm the

overarching goals of the ERfKE. Not many people were aware of higher-order ERfKE goals, but

were rather focused on achieving their own immediate outputs in the respective component; that is

understandable given the intensity and complexity of the respective work. Similarly, as for donor

coordination, there was a growing demand to strengthen the ties among partners by facilitating

meetings such that all partners could attend and voice their concerns. It was also felt that the presence

of Bank staff based in the country would be crucial to forming a true, day-to-day working partnership.

Virtually no joint missions were held despite the strong eagerness and demand on the part of several

donors. TTLs were aware of this and made significant efforts at the individual level, mostly

informally, among like-minded project directors, but official joint missions were not formalized.

However, this also largely depended on the government’s readiness to accept joint missions to move

towards such direction. It is acknowledged that the Bank played its part in promoting deeper donor

coordination.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance


Although the previous sections highlighted a few critical issues that require improvement in the

Bank’s performance, general bank supervision and assistance was excellent and highly appreciated by

the borrower and donor community, as shown in field interviews and donor reports. Excellence of

supervision and assistance had become standard practice. This complex and enormous investment

could have easily collapsed if components were not carefully supervised, yet the project achieved its

various ambitious goals. Although there is always a ceaseless demand to do things better, and things

the Bank could or should have done better, overall, there is a satisfaction and confidence on the

ground, and among the borrowers themselves, an eagerness to continue the reform program. The

improvements in capacity of MOE senior officials and working-level staff could be attributed to the

Bank’s consistent encouragement and technical assistance, and to the results of donor coordination.

Considering these facts, Bank performance is rated Satisfactory.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance

27


It was widely recognized that strong leadership and ownership on the part of MOE executives and

senior management staff were key to moving the reform forward. This enormous investment in time

and resources by itself is a notable accomplishment attributable to the ministry’s strong commitment

to the reform. Although capacity and ownership were not fully or evenly developed across different

layers of the institution, many staff confirmed that the project successfully triggered a cultural shift

and laid a solid foundation for larger changes.

The MOE responded quickly to any problem or risk that arose during project implementation and

communicated the issue swiftly to the Bank to jointly seek solutions. The mission frequently

commended the MOE for its thorough review of consultants’ materials, formulation of options and

their analysis, and the decision-making initiated (EDSS, for example). However, it was noted that

there is a serious need to strengthen overall planning capacity within the MOE, since the planning

processes were ad hoc and disjointed, and were not strengthened sufficiently to operationalize

evidence-based, results-oriented policy development.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance


The DCU was highly effective despite several obstacles: The DCU played a strong coordination

and internal monitoring role for this very complex project and became a driving force behind

implementation of all aspects of the project. DCU staff consisted largely of public officials and their

location within the MOE resulted in stronger ownership and leadership of the project than if the

Project Implementation Unit had been located externally. From time to time during the six and half

years of project life, there was a wide gap in staffing. The DCU was inadequately staffed from March

2003 to January 2006 (e.g., original Procurement Officer, Finance Officer, and Monitoring Officer

resigned or retired during this period). The Executive director was replaced by the Minister in April

2004 and a Policy & Planning Advisor filled both positions from this date until a national director

was appointed in December 2007. The Advisor provided assistance to strengthen technical,

managerial and coordination capacity at the DCU. Reflecting the constant and rapid evolution of the

project, the DCU was expanded in January 2006 to include Component Coordinator positions to

strengthen internal monitoring. Despite the difficulty in appointing adequate staff in a timely manner,

the DCU survived and strived to achieve the project goal, with strong support from senior

management of the MOE and effective optimization of support from the Bank. It was understandable

that coordinating almost 20 partners could not result in a uniform level of satisfaction for all parties.

Given the magnitude and rapidness of reform implementation, it would be fair to say that the

contribution and performance of the DCU was substantial. It maintained high standards as it

confronted the fairly complex and heavy workload imposed on a small unit. Considering all these

factors, the performance of the DCU is rated Satisfactory.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance


The MOE and DCU invested heavily in strengthening the internal governance structure for the project.

The General Policy Steering Committee (GPSC) was formed, chaired by the Minister and included

representatives of MOPIC, NCHRD, Secretary Generals (SGs), Managing Directors, DCU and

donors. The meetings were held approximately every six weeks and provided an opportunity to

present progress reports and layout the next steps. The Component sub-committees, chaired by SGs,

28

involved all key Managing Directors, key central directorate staff, representatives of donor executing

agencies and DCU. All these meetings contributed to review the implementation status and facilitated

progress in a collaborated manner. It was highly effective to manage and implement the project in a

timely fashion and to share information. The structure was strongly supported by the Bank and was a

vehicle for some of the reporting and discussions during Bank supervision missions. Illustrated by

this example, the borrower was clear about its role with strong ownership and commitment,

proactively handling all aspects of project implementation efficiently and effectively. T-he only

reason that the rating is not Highly Satisfactory is that the level of capacity was not evenly developed

across different layers of the government and there were insufficient changes in the decision-making

mechanism and policy planning structure.

6. Lessons Learned

Strong ownership, commitment, and leadership at the highest level of the MOE, coupled with

the sound capacity of technical-level teams is the key to successful implementation. This has

been consistently identified as “a critical success factor” for successful project implementation. The

driving force of the reform came from within the Government; it was not imposed by external donor

agencies. In addition, the dedicated working-level staff played a major role in achieving major

milestones on time. This core structure is indispensable in tackling such large-scale reform and

implementing innovations, therefore, the Bank should continue supporting this good practice.

Continuous strengthening of donor coordination and active provision of forums to reconfirm

overall PDO is necessary: Despite the noteworthy successes in donor coordination and in

collaboration among numerous internal and external partners, provision of more forums for all

partners to discuss and reconfirm the commitment to overarching project goals is critical. Each team

tended to overly focus on immediate deliverables under their specific subcomponent, which is

understandable given the large number of activities and many milestones to be achieved. In order to

efficiently achieve the national level PDO, and shift the focus from micro to macro, from

subcomponent-level inputs-based to outcome-oriented, the Bank could have played a more proactive

role in providing opportunities to hear voices of all partners.

Clarity of M&E roles and linkages to policy development should be ensured: The bank should

provide a clear design and continuous technical support on the M&E practice. On the design, it must

ensure clarity in the respective roles and responsibilities for internal and external M&E and its link to

policy and strategy development, and to the need for capacity building and institutional strengthening

in technical aspects of M&E. The Bank should also monitor and advise that M&E results (policy

analyses) be systematically incorporated into policy development by suggesting the right sequencing

and the timeliness of studies and surveys.

Extra caution is needed with operational arrangements for the most challenging reform areas: Subcomponent 1 of Component 1, which aimed at changes in governance and management, decision-

making, and the budgeting system, tackled the most challenging reform areas. Notwithstanding its

own difficulties, an example of risk posed by a certain participation pattern of a donor can yield

certain lessons. Initially the MOE was a pilot case study under the broader Public Sector Reform

Program (PSR) for the Government of Jordan. This format ended up posing a risk to the continuation

of activities and funding when the donor decided to withdraw from participation. Although these

things are not always predictable, the MOE serving as a pilot to another donor’s larger inter-

ministerial project created a vulnerability, because the continuation of major activities was at the

discretion of the donor, placing it largely beyond the immediate control of the MOE/DCU and the

Bank. In the end, the team handled the risk effectively and the mission provided concrete

recommendations to secure funding and prepared back-up plans early on. But it would be worth

29

considering requiring a long-term firm commitment, not as a case study of another reform project but

as an activity directly managed by the project to ensure continuity and integrity of the activities.

Consolidating the findings of field interviews, Bank staff interviews and review of project documents,

the following were identified as issues that specifically warrant closer attention during the next phase

of the reform.

Renewed and strengthened focus on the organizational changes: The ministry should serve as a

facilitator of change as opposed to being an implementer of change.

Enhanced decentralization and empowerment of field directorates and schools are also required. In

order to fully achieve the PDO, it is crucial to make schools to serve as the locus of change.

Strong focus on teacher policy, professional development as well as enhanced awareness of their

critical role in reform is essential. Heavier investment in teachers would be necessary to make

them as key agents of change. Without creating awareness, commitment and continuous adaptation

efforts, reform outcomes would not take root at the classroom level nor automatically manifest

themselves nationwide.

Effective dissemination of reform outcomes with continuous consultation with stakeholders is

also important. The recognition of general public on the reform was still not very high due to the

suspension of Public Relations Campaign activities, thus renewed approaches and greater effort in

dissemination would be needed.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies n/a

(b) Cofinanciers n/a

(b) Other partners and stakeholders

n/a

30

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD million equivalent) supported through IBRD

Components Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest

Estimate (USD

millions)

Percentage of

Appraisal

1. Reorient Education Policy Strategies 8.10 2.503 30.9

2. Transform Education Programs and

Practices 46.80 36.974 79.0

3. Provide Quality Learning

Environments 57.70 78.626 136.27

4. Promote Learning Readiness through

Early Childhood Education 6.20 .406 6.51

Total Baseline Cost 118.80 118.509 99.78

Physical contingencies

0.00

0.00

Price contingencies

0.00

0.00

Total Project Costs 118.80 118.509 99.78

Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 00

Front-end fee IBRD 1.20 1.20 100.00

Total Financing Required 120.00 119.709 99.78

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of

Cofinancing

Appraisal

Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest

Estimate

(USD millions)

Percentage of

Appraisal

U.S.: U.S. Agency for International

Development (USAID) 14.00 25.97 186

Arab Fund for Economic and Social

Development 28.00 33.00 118

Borrower 130.00 143.9 111

CANADA: Canadian International

Development Agency (CIDA) 4.00 17.20 430

UK: British Department for International

Development (DFID) 2.00 1.79 90

EC: European Investment Bank 43.00 45.00 105

International Bank for Reconstruction and

Development 120.00 120.00 100

Islamic Development Bank 18.00 23.00 128

JAPAN: Japan International Cooperation

Agency (JICA) 1.00 1.50 150

GERMANY: Kreditanstalt fur

Wiederaufbau (KFW) 10.00 11.00 110

31

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Subcomponent/

Outcome Indicator Subcomponent Main

Activities

Baseline (Year) Expected Activity outcome Planned/ Actual

Completion Date

Status of

Completion

Notes

1.1 Governance,

Management and

Decision Making/

Redefined vision

and integrated

education strategy

formulated and

adopted/ NES

reinforced and

consensus built

through PRC

National Education Strategy No Strategy

(2003)

NES developed, approved,

produced and distributed

February 2006/

December 2006

100% complete Individual

activities are being

completed but the

challenge is in the

institutionalization

of those activities,

the policies and

overall strategy

Public Relations Campaign No PRC (2003) PRC successfully launched over 3

years

June 2006/ In

progress

Design: 100%

Implement.:

35%

Policy and Strategic Planning

Unit

No PSP Unit A fully staffed and fully

operational unit

September 2006/

April 2007

Preparation:

100%

Operation: 50%

ICT Infrastructure and

Management

Old org. structure/

No ICT policy

Newly developed, more effective

org. structure of DICT/ Clear ICT

policy

April 2008/ 70% complete

Gender Mainstreaming Limited gender

sensitivity

Higher level of mainstreaming and

sensitivity at all levels of the

system

Throughout the life

of the project

on going 75%

1.2

Organizational

Review and

Development /

Revised

governance,

management and

decision making

mechanisms are in

place that enable

the delivery of

basic skills, core

competencies and

essential learning

for knowledge

economy

Governance, Management

and Accountability

Old management

and governance

structure

Enhanced org structure and

governance; utilizing new skills,

sustainability and improvement,

accountability

Throughout the life

of the project

35% removed to

ERfKEII

Leadership, Management Limited leadership

and management

capacity of MoE

staff

Higher skills and capacity of MoE

staff at all levels

Throughout the life

of the project

20%

Field Directorate

Governance

Centralized

system/ limited

autonomy to Field

Directorates

Improved capacity of Field

Directorate staff to support

schools and gain more autonomy

Throughout the life

of the project

17%

Supervisors Professional

development

Traditional role of

supervisors

Development of the role of

supervisors to enable them

provide teachers with support

March 2007/ Covered as a

separate activity,

embedded in

32

field directorates

and management

Work plan

(SJE17%

1.3 Education

Decision Support

System

An integrated

EDSS system is

developed and in

operation

Design of EDSS No EDSS Appropriate design that fits MoE

needs

February 2006/ April

2007

100% complete

and approved by

MOE

Difficulty

proceeding with

EDSS with the

absence of a

strongly

established EMIS

Implementation of EDSS No EDSS Full implementation of EDSS and

effective usage

December 2006/ On hold

1.4 Education

Research,

Monitoring and

Evaluation

Educational

research, policy

analysis,

monitoring and

evaluation and

national learning

assessment

activities are

strengthened.

Participation in

international

assessments

Development of an M&E

Framework and Action Plan

No framework or

action plan

Effective monitoring and

evaluation of all aspects of reform

activities are conducted in a

timely and thorough manner and

are used to inform and guide

future implementation activities

June 2005/ 100% complete All M&E studies

completed, waiting

for the submission

for the last two

studies on the

baseline line follow

up, and WEI. Evaluation Studies No M&E Studies

conducted

Recommendations available based

on findings of scientific and sound

evidence

December 2008/

March 2009

May 2009

50% complete

85% complete

95% Complete

1.5

Implementation

Arrangements

Investments in

educational reform

are coordinated and

well- managed

Round I of Innovations Fund Limited support to

innovation at the

various levels

New innovative approaches to the

delivery of education are tested

and lessons learned are shared

Throughout the life

of the Project

100% complete - Due to delays in

the implementation

of the 1st Round,

the total Rounds

that will be

implemented are 7

instead of the

originally planned

8 rounds.

Round II of Innovations

Fund

100% complete

Round III of Innovations

Fund

100% complete

Round IV of Innovations

Fund

100 % complete

Round V of Innovations

Fund

100% complete

33

Round VI of Innovations

Fund

100% complete

Round VII of Innovations

Fund

100% complete

Round VIII of Innovations

Fund

Component 2: Transform Education Programs and Practices for the Knowledge Economy

2.1 Curriculum

and Learning

Assessment

Development

Development of a

new core

curriculum

to align learning

outcomes with the

knowledge

economy

Development of Curriculum

Framework and Learning

Outcomes

No framework

or Outcomes

Framework and learning

outcomes developed, approved

and implemented

September 2003/ 100% complete Prevocational and

vocational

framework &

outcomes are

prepared and

approved, except

the industrial

specialization

(under reviewing

with all concerned

parts)

Curriculum renewal process:

Development and

implementation of curriculum

Old curriculum Newly developed curricula

developed and implemented in

schools

December 2008/ 100% complete

Development and

implementation of Vocational

Education Streams

Existing

program

Policies and Strategies

developed to better align with

labor market needs, framework

and learning outcomes are

approved for

Agriculture ,hospitality and

home economics

December 2008/ 85%

Development of learning

assessment framework

No framework Framework developed, approved

and implemented

September 2003/ 100% complete

National Assessment System No National

Assessment

Assessment of student

achievements and progress will

be informed by the new practices

and will provide information

which measures and assesses

authentic, performance-based

achievement

December 2008/

100% complete

34

- Item Banking

- Portfolio

No item

banking, e-

testing or

portfolio

available

Effective item banking system,

e-testing and portfolio piloted

December 2008 Preparation:

100%

Implementation

70%

2.2 Professional

development and

Training

Development and

Implementation of Pre-service

training

Few and

disintegrated

training

programs

New pre-service training

strategy defined , ETC

legislation system has been

approved by the Cabinet which

include Induction newly

appointed teachers and in-

service training

2008

May 2009

95% completed

Draft Education

Training Center

structure prepared

for Induction

program for newly

appointed teachers

and in-service

training Development and

implementation of in-service

training

Institulization of in-service

training programs developed to

enable teachers for more

efficient teaching linked to

knowledge economy

2008 100%

Training on ICT use in teaching All teachers received training on

the new e learning materials

depending on the new strategies

and other programs like INTEL

and thinking tools , world links

2008 100%

2.3 Resources to

Support Effective

Learning

Connectivity for

all schools and

directorates with a

n e-learning

infrastructure set

up and equipment

installed

Development of new

specifications for physical

environment and equipment to

support learning

Old specs New specifications for physical

environments, learning space

allocations, and equipment and

materials required to support

learning.

2008 100%

Development and management

of e-content

No e-content Supplemental e-learning

materials in a variety of subject

areas developed, piloted and

revised for use in all Jordan’s

schools

December 2008 Math Dev: 100%

E-Science Dev:

40%

E-Arabic Dev:

100%

E-EFL Dev:

35

100%

ICT Dev : 70%

Civics : 100%

KG II : 100%

MIS: 90%

Management.:

90%

Development and deployment of

e-content (100 Discovery

Schools)

No e-content Supplemental e-learning

materials in a variety of subject

areas developed, piloted ,revised

and used in Discovery Schools

December 08

Math Dep: 68%

Arabic Dep:

50%

EFL Dep.: 55%

Science Dep:

53%

ICT Dep: 49%

Youth Technology and Careers No such project MIS program supported with

materials, software and hardware

in addition to training for

teachers and students

October 2008/ Teachers'

Training 100%

E-material 100%

Science Project No such project Better trained science teachers

on how to deliver new science

curriculum with a focus on ICT

December 2008/ 100% completed

Development of supplemental

curriculum materials

Limited

supplemental

materials

Learning materials available to

support learning

Throughout the life

of the project

On track

Connect schools to high-speed

learning network

Unavailability of

network at MoE

schools

Schools are connected to high-

speed learning network

coinciding with curriculum

implementation schedule

June 2009 Module 1: 100%

Module 8 :

100%

North Region :

60%

36

Build a communications

infrastructure network

management, technical support

and maintenance

Inefficient

infrastructure

Communications infrastructure

network management, technical

support and maintenance are

provided to ensure high quality

support to educational

programming

June 2009/ Connected

schools: 80%

Maintenance

contract is

running.

Helpdesk

postponed to

ERfKEII.

Component 3: Support Provision of Quality Physical Learning Environments

3.1 Replace

structurally

unsafe and

seriously

overcrowded

schools

Replacement of

unsafe and

overcrowded

schools mapping

World Bank Overcrowded

and unsafe

learning

environments/

Many rented

schools

41 new schools built June 2009 100% complete EIB

(2 schools

cancelled) European Investment Bank 41 new schools built Feb 2008/ 100% complete

Islamic Development Bank 25 new schools built June 2009 100% complete

Arab Fund 38 new schools built June 2007/ 100% complete

KfW Phase I:12 new schools built

Phase II:12 new schools

Phase III:12 new schools

June 2009 phase I: 100%

USAID 28 new schools built 2010 16 schools

under

construction

(20%)

12 in design

stage

(90%)(School

construction and

renovation

program moved

to ERfKE II)

3.2

Upgrade existing

schools to support

learning

Existing schools

upgraded to

support learning in

the knowledge

World Bank Extensions Phase I: 392 schools renovated

Phase II: 127 schools renovated

Phase III: 106 packages of

schools renovated

Dec.2008/

Dec. 2008

June. 2009

100% complete

100% complete

97% Complete

USAID 100 schools renovated 2010 Moved to

ERfKE II

37

economy

Component 4: Promote Readiness of Learning through Early Childhood Education

4.1 Increase

Institutional

Capacity

An enhanced

institutional

capacity

(regulation, and

standards) for KGs

developed and

programs updated.

Development and modification

of ECE Curriculum

No KG

National

Curriculum

National Curriculum and teacher

guides developed, distributed and

in use

September 2004 100% complete Develop Quality

Assurance System

in public KGs

Shift from

Accreditation to

Quality Assurance

in May 2007

Development of National ECD

Standards, Indicators, and

Benchmark Framework

No standards,

indicators or

benchmarks

National ECD Developmental

Standards developed,

implemented and used for

monitoring and evaluation

purposes

December 2005/

September 2006

100% complete

Update Licensing Standards

Old licensing

standards

Licensing Standards reviewed

and updated, used for monitoring

purposes

July 2003/ July 2005 Development:

100%

Implementation:

ERfKE II

Quality Assurance

No Quality

Assurance

System

Quality Assurance standards

developed and implemented

December 2006/ Development:

100%

Implementation:

ERfKE II

Preschool Division Capacity

Building

Limited

capacity

Improved technical and

managerial capacity of Division

staff

Throughout the life

of the project

Several training

programs for

staff capacity

building

conducted

4.2 Professional

Development of

KG teachers

A cadre of ECE

specialists trained

and developed.

Train teachers in ESP furnished

KGs on Physical Environment

and Learning Materials

Limited

capacity of

ECE teachers,

principals and

supervisors

All teachers, principals and

supervisors of kindergarten have

received training in pedagogy and

the new curriculum/ In-service

training programs are being

delivered

Throughout the life

of the project

100% complete

Provide teachers with in-service

training on different topics

Awareness Seminars for

Principals

Increased Capacity of ECE

Supervisors

38

Train teachers on Modified

Curriculum

Train Teachers on “Working

With Young Children” program

4.3 Expand KGs

for the Poor

Enhanced access

to KG by poor

197 KGs established financed by

WB Loan (part of classroom

extensions)

41 KGs established funded from

the Royal Court

Renovate and Furnish 170 KG

Classrooms

Old furniture

and at times

unsafe KG

learning

environments

Kindergartens are renovated,

furnished and fully operational/

provided with learning materials

Dec/2008

2008

June 2007/

100% complete

100% complete

ECD Center of Excellence

Model

No such center Centre is built, furnished,

equipped, staffed and conducts

teaching, training and research

functions

August 2007/ 5% complete

ERfKEII

4.4 Conduct

public awareness

and

understanding Public awareness

and understanding

increased through

Information,

Education and

Communication

(IEC) and

networks with

NGOs, local

communities and

the private sector

established.

Identify and develop Mass

Media Messages

Part of the Project’s overall PRC (1.1.3)

Disseminate Better Parenting

Materials/ Increase Parent-

Community Participation

No public

awareness

workshops

Workshops conducted for caregivers

on Better Parenting and Early

Childhood Education

Throughout the

life of the project

100% complete

Parent Involvement Initiative

Limited

involvement of

community and

parents in ECE

Involvement of parents in ECE and

their participation in children’s KG

classrooms

June 2008/ 90% complete

On going activity

ERfKEII

39

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

(including assumptions in the analysis)

n/a

40

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team Members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/

Specialty

Lending

Mae Chu Chang Lead Education Specialist EASHD Task Team Leader

Regina Maria Bendokat Sector Manager MNSHD Sector Manager

Ghassan N. Alkhoja Senior Operations Officer MNSHD Operations/ITC

Margaret M. Clarke Senior Education Spec. HDNED

Mouna Couzi Senior Program Assistant MNCLB Administration

Vincent M. Greaney Consultant MNSHD

J. Roger Pearson Consultant MNSHD

Diana C. El Masri Consultant MNAFM Financial Mgmt

Mona El-Chami Sr. Financial Management Specialist MNAFM Financial Mgmt

Nazaneen Ismail Ali Procurement Specialist MNAPR Procurement

Imad Saleh Senior Procurement Specialist EAPCO Procurement

Lina Fares Procurement Specialist MNAPR Procurement

Antonio C. Lim Operations Officer ECSSD Operations

Supervision

Juan-Manuel Moreno Sr. Education Specialist MNSED Task Team Leader

Francis Peter Buckland Lead Education Specialist HDNED Task Team Leader

Haneen Ismail Sayed Lead Operations Officer MNSHD Task Team Leader

Ghassan N. Alkhoja Senior Operations Officer MNSHD Operations/ITC

Josephine Masanque Sr. Financial Management Specialist MNAFM Financial Mgmt

Jad Raji Mazahreh Financial Management Specialist MNAFM Financial Mgmt

Imad Saleh Senior Procurement Specialist EAPCO Procurement

Lina Fares Procurement Specialist MNAPR Procurement

Celine Gavach Operations Analyst MNSHD Operations

Mouna Couzi Sr. Program Assistant MNCLB Administration

Christina Djemmal Operations Analyst MNSHD Operations

J. Roger Pearson Consultant MNSHD

Dung-Kim Pham Operations Officer MNSHD

Lianqin Wang Senior Education Specialist MNSHD

Mary Eming Young Lead Specialist WBIHD

Afifa Alia Achsien Sr. Program Assistant MNSHD Administration

41

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

Number of Staff Weeks USD Thousands (including

travel and consultant costs)

Lending

FY02 22 223.49

FY03 53 229.91

FY04 0.11

FY05 0.00

FY06 0.00

FY07 0.00

FY08 0.00

Total: 75 453.51

Supervision/ICR

FY02 0.00

FY03 1.04

FY04 28 110.85

FY05 24 153.14

FY06 23 120.23

FY07 26 144.38

FY08 22 126.92

FY09 13 0.00

Total: 136 656.56

42

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

(if any)

n/a

43

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

(if any)

n/a

44

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

The Education Reform for Knowledge Economy (ERfKE) has introduced massive inputs to the

education system in Jordan) between 2003 and 2009. ERfKE started by establishing a renewed

national education strategy that guided the K-12 education in Jordan with a new vision and enriched

the system with the required infrastructure and resources to succeed. By the end of the project,

overwhelming evidence indicates that this strategy has been successful to an acceptable degree in

fulfilling the mission of the reform.

The project overhauled the curriculum to focus on learning outcomes instead of content and produced

new textbooks, teacher guides, and supplementing materials that included electronic content. It also

introduced new assessment strategies that focused on “assessment for learning” and piloted with

authentic assessment approaches. Training programs accompanied all these efforts to prepare teachers

and administrators on these changes and to transform the teaching and learning to use modern

teaching approaches that incorporated constructivist and student-centered methods and to utilize

information and communication technologies. ERfKE also introduced kindergartens to accommodate

pre-school children at public schools in poor and remote areas in an effort to prepare students to

succeed in school. This included the creation of a new early childhood development environment with

enhanced interactive curriculum based on well-defined and selected national standards in addition to

suitable infrastructure, staffing and training.

In terms of the degree to which ERfKE has been successful at transforming the education system to

produce the graduates that are equipped with the skills needed for the knowledge economy, the

evidence from data collected in the different studies suggests that there is a positive trend in that

direction but still a long way until that is achieved. Low achievement levels at both baseline and

follow up in knowledge economy skills and still a very large percentage of students are at or below

the lowest international and national benchmarks in these areas.

Overall ERfKE has accomplished the core goals in relation to providing a set of inputs and additions

to modernize the education system. However there are serious concerns about making these changes

long lasting. Local agencies and many esteemed partners and donors have worked together, each

chipped in with some resources to support the Ministry of Education in Jordan in this important

reform but these changes still need to be institutionalized based on well studied sustainability

measures.

Brief Summary on component goals and its achievement

Component 1: Re-orient Education Policy Objectives and Strategies through Governance and

Administrative Reform. Component 1 is designed to provide a redefinition of the vision and

associated policy objectives of the educational system that will enable the required transformation to

meet the emerging needs of the knowledge economy.

1.1 National Strategy: The draft Framework for The National Education Strategy for General Education

was completed, and utilized as a resource for the development of the National Education Strategy

Framework. The initial draft NES document, based on the work done for the Framework and

involving national consultations was finalized in Feb. 2005. Further work on the Strategy has been

completed in late 2005 and refinements continued through 2006. The process of development and

production of the Strategy have been substantially supported by both CIDA and USAID.

45

1.2 Organizational Change: ERfKE activities were located within its support for the Public Sector

Reform Program in Jordan. The contractor, PricewaterhouseCoopers, submitted an Implementation

plan to MOE in May 2004 with MOE initiatives focused on three pilots: Planning and Budgeting,

Decentralization and School Management and Teacher Selection and Appraisal. The work with the

pilots was completed in June 2005 and the responsibility for technical assistance was transferred to

the incoming CIDA Executing Agency (Bearing Point/SJE). SJE has expanded the work of the pilots

to support MoE in the exploration of all key areas of organizational change through a series of seven

specific areas of work with various directorates.

1.3 Education Decision Support System The assessment and design of the Education Decision Support System has been completed.

1.4 Monitoring and Evaluation of ERfKE

As part of the first component of the project, ERfKE focused on improving the national capacity in

the area of monitoring and evaluation (M&E). The National Center for Human Resources

Development (NCHRD) was the main target for this initiative. A new M&E unit was created at

NCHRD and was charged with the project evaluation. The Center created an evaluation framework

and a baseline that established the foundation for the evaluation. Overall the evaluation of ERfKE

was faced with three challenges: (1) the project was massive and was not planned or designed in a

staged way with pilots and evaluation then expansion, nor with control and intervention groups (2)

although the resources were available, the evaluation culture and system was not institutionalized

before ERfKE (3) the evaluation framework was developed about two years after the beginning of the

project. These challenges contributed to delaying and limiting the evaluation process. However, the

Center was resilient and took over the challenge. It followed a structured and systematic evaluation

work plan. The first step was a comprehensive collection of baseline data in relation to schools,

teachers, students, curriculum and the education system as a whole. To this end, data was collected in

2005 on a set of indicators pertaining to the baseline school and student achievement from available

information sources such as prior studies and education statistics from Ministry of Education (MOE).

As part of the evaluation plan, NCHRD designed and implemented formative and summative

evaluation studies incorporating mixed method approaches to assess the quantity and quality of

implemented inputs and changes. This report uses the concurrent triangulation approach to integrate

the different studies and data collected as part of the M&E framework for ERfKE then confirms,

cross-validates, and corroborates between the findings. The following are the main conclusions:

1. On the agreed-on outcome indicators, high level of achievement has been reached:

i. A new national education strategy has been put in place and implemented.

ii. The average standardized score of Jordan students in international assessments of mathematics

and science has improved, however this improvement was not statistically significant.

iii. 80 percent of primary and secondary students have access to safe and adequate basic and

secondary education school facilities

iv. 84 percent of basic and secondary students are using on-line learning portals

v. The gross enrollment rate in the second level of kindergarten has increased to 51.8% from 41% at

baseline.

Challenges to the implementation of ERfKE were related to: unanticipated and unprecedented

escalation of student enrollments; proper timely access to the required technology; insufficient prior

experience among teachers on the use of technology in instructions and the student-centered teaching

approaches; and insufficient experience, training and understanding regarding new modalities of

assessment.

46

1.5 Implementation Arrangements

The implementation activities of the ERfKE Program have clarified the need for the Ministry of

Education to be inclusive of, and responsive to, its’ various stakeholders during current and future

educational reform efforts. In response to this identified need, and to provide policy guidance and

support for the coordination of implementation to educational reform efforts, the ERfKE General

Policy Steering Committee was established and has operated throughout the duration of the Program.

This Committee is comprised of senior level; served as the governance mechanism for the

management of the reform program and oversees the work of the Development Coordination Unit

which is charged with all aspects of program coordination. The GPSC, chaired by H.E. the Minister,

provides guidance through actions and decisions on educational policy development and educational

reform priorities, the status of and directions for the ERfKE implementation process, and the effective

integration of all reform efforts under the umbrella of the National Reform Agenda and through the

National Education Strategy.

Component 2: Transform Education Programs and Practices for the Knowledge Economy.

Component 2 aims to transform teaching and learning processes to achieve learning outcomes

consistent with the requirements of the knowledge economy.

i. Developing new curriculum framework: Overall, there is solid evidence that changes in the

textbooks and assessment tools have moved the national curriculum to a new level that is focused on

skills and outcomes as indicated by experts and researchers who were involved in the different studies

that tackled this dimension. This message was also confirmed in the perception of teachers, school

principals, parents and students. On the other hand implementing the new curriculum was very

challenging and lots still need to be done to change the old attitudes and approaches and many

improvements are still needed in areas related to enriching the textbooks and instructions to focus on

skill development, applying content and on activities that promote critical thinking and problem

solving skills. While new methods of assessments have been introduced and were observed to be used

by some teachers (small percentage) more professional development activities are needed (and

requested by teachers) to help teachers understand proper implementation of authentic assessment

methods. Classroom environment: Overall, students seemed to have managed to some noticeable

degree the transition to the changes mandated by the ERfKE initiative more readily and easily,

especially students who formerly lagged behind or struggled with the course content, than the

teachers and school administrators. For example, among the public schools visited, an example of a

school that exemplified the ERfKE’s vision of a student-centered learning institution that infused

technological applications into its teaching and learning activities was a girls Discovery school

located in a comparatively impoverished district of Amman.

ii. Enhanced student Learning:

All metrics used to assess students’ participation in early childhood programs and students’ readiness

to school as they enter the first grade show that ERfKE has been instrumental in affecting the

development of young children. Enrollment and participation in kindergartens have increased

significantly due to the establishments of these programs especially in rural areas. Children’s

readiness to school has improved especially in social and cognitive domains. Specifically, by the end

of ERfKE,

a. Jordanian children have significantly better early childhood indicators at the end of ERfKE relative to

baseline: gross enrollment rate in kindergartens increased by about 3% and percentage of new

students in first grade who attended a kindergarten increased by 30%.

b. Percentage of qualified kindergarten teachers with bachelor degree and certification (at MoE schools)

increased by 37%,

47

c. Child to Teacher ratio at the kindergarten was reduced by 9%, and percentage of fully equipped KGs

(MOE) increased by 46%.

d. In addition quality was enhanced as school readiness improved over what was before the introduction

of public kindergartens.

Results are suggesting improvement at the public schools and the achievement gap between schools is

getting smaller. The between schools variability in performance is getting smaller. This was reflected

from school walkthroughs, classroom observations, and student performance on national and

international assessments. In fact public schools are becoming more competitive to private schools

than ever before. This has been evident in public schools’ achievement (relative to private school) in

NAfKE and TIMSS end of project studies relative to baseline. Public schools, especially Discovery

schools appeared more likely to embrace and realize the ERfKE mission and vision than private

schools which have traditionally served as models of academic excellence. Although the instruction

provided by private school’s teachers was excellent, teachers were reluctant to relinquish their

traditional role as lecturer or supervisor responsible for orchestrating the delivery of instruction. Thus,

teachers would actively engage students in a teacher directed Q&A session. In contrast, teachers in

public Discovery schools were more inclined to take a backseat to their students who assumed

responsibility for their own learning. In a student centered context, teachers were resources available

to support students who were active agents in self-directed learning activities that naturally

incorporated team-building and technology.

iii. Teacher Training: Both the quantitative and qualitative data indicated significant gains in what

the teachers learned, as well as an increase in knowledge. They affirmed behavioral changes in their

pedagogical style caused by expanding their awareness levels and development in relation to

ERfKE’s needs. Evidence from the studies also showed that among a group of teachers training was

definitely making a difference in the classroom. Significant evidence that trained teachers (relative to

a comparison group) have started in implementing the changes brought by ERfKE: frequent use of

modern instructional practices, integrating a variety of ICT applications, search engines, and the

Internet into their teaching, and collaboration among students, teachers and schools. However there is

still a long path toward a significant change to classroom practices especially in implementing a

constructivist approach and in utilizing different techniques to accomplish learning. Many teachers

and administrators confessed to a lack of knowledge of the pedagogical aspects and expressed a

desire for more training in this area. Also teachers indicated that there is a need to accommodate them

better to obtain the training, (a) depending on experience, (b) time, and (c) personal preference (d) a

follow up system in place to follow up with teachers.

iv. ICT connectivity & utilization:

a. School connectivity with ICTs (Intranet, Internet, Eduwave): Around 86% of schools are connected

to Intranet. Of these, 77% were connected between the years 2003 and 2006. As for Internet, around

72% of schools are completely connected to the Internet. 90% of schools are connected to Eduwave,

the learning management system.

b. Availability of computer labs: Results indicated that 79% of schools have one to two computer labs.

Only 18% of schools reported that they have three to four computer labs. It is worth to mention that

1.4% of schools (4 out of 278 schools) reported that they do not have computer labs.

c. Student-computer ratio: Results show that around 23% have a ratio of 5 to 10 students per PC.

Around 25% of schools have a ratio of 25 to 30 students per PC. A small percentage (10%) of schools

reported a ratio of 35 to 40 students per PC. However, around 42% reported a ratio of 15 to 20

students per PC. This last ratio seems to be the dominant among most schools.

d. Percentage of classrooms equipped with PCs and ICT equipment (data shows, and/or projectors) a

large percentage of respondents (around 88%) reported that classrooms at their schools are not

48

equipped with any of such equipments. Only around 4% of schools reported that some classrooms

(about one-fifth of their classrooms) are equipped with such equipments.

e. A representative national sample of school principals indicated a partial utilization of ICT at schools.

f. Occupancy rate of computer labs: When asked about the occupancy rate of computer labs at their

schools, around 58% of respondents reported an occupancy rate of 4 classes and above a day. Around

25% reported an occupancy rate of 2 to 3 classes a day. Only around 7% of respondents reported an

occupancy rate of one class a day.

g. ICT teachers’ perception of usability & reliability of connectivity & equipment: Around 67% of

respondents reported the availability of maintenance and technical support plans at the school level. A

close percentage (61%) reported that at the MoE level, plans regarding hardware/software

maintenance are available, but 14% of respondents were not sure whether such plans exist at the MoE

level.

h. Maintenance and technical support arrangements: a representative sample of ICT teachers (as the

frequent users of ICT) were surveyed and the results indicated that there was a negative perception

toward usability and reliability of connectivity and equipment.

i. Percentages of Teachers Who Use Internet (Web and email): percentages of teachers who don’t use

email/Web in teaching at MoE schools have dropped from 37% in the year 2004 and to 14% in the

year 2008. This huge decrease in percentage has been matched by a big increase for those who use it

very frequently which was 15% in the year 2004 has been almost doubled (29%) in the year 2008.

j. Moreover, the percentages of the monthly and weekly uses of PC in financial administration have

increased over the last four years. In particular, the highest increase in percentage has occurred in the

"weekly use" category (9%). A decrease of 11% in the "Never" category can be noticed as we move

from the year 2004 to the year 2008. This decrease indicates more use of PC in financial

administration.

Component 3: Support Provision of Quality Physical Learning Environments. Component 3 aims to

ensure adequate provision of structurally safe school buildings and improved learning environment.

A construction component included extending schools to accommodate new kindergarten classes,

additional classrooms, computer labs, and science laboratories. It also included building a significant

number of new schools with designs and architecture that are suitable for modern instructions with

the use of new technology. Major investment was also made to build the information and

communication technology infrastructure to reach all public schools around the Kingdom. That

included networking, computers, servers, management information system, and a learning

management platform

Component 4: Promote Readiness for Learning through ECE, envisages enhancing equity through

public provision of KG II in the low-income areas of the Kingdom.

All metrics used to assess students’ participation in early childhood programs and students’ readiness

to school as they enter the first grade show that ERfKE has been instrumental in affecting the

development of young children. Enrollment and participation in kindergartens have increased

significantly due to the establishments of these programs especially in rural areas. Children’s

readiness to school has improved especially in social and cognitive domains. Specifically, by the end

of ERfKE,

e. Jordanian children have significantly better early childhood indicators at the end of ERfKE

relative to baseline: gross enrollment rate in kindergartens increased by about 3% and percentage of

new students in first grade who attended a kindergarten increased by 30%.

f. Percentage of qualified kindergarten teachers with bachelor degree and certification (at MoE

schools) increased by 37%,

g. Child to Teacher ratio at the kindergarten was reduced by 9%, and percentage of fully equipped

KGs (MOE) increased by 46%.

49

h. In addition quality was enhanced as school readiness improved over what was before the

introduction of public kindergartens.

Quality and effectiveness of WB Supervision

Supervision missions were conducted regularly with adequately staffed teams, their performance

assuring quality at entry in a satisfactory rate. The Bank encouraged qualitative performance

throughout the life of the project and sought to draw lessons about alternative mechanisms for the

program that were implemented in partnership between the MOE, donors and NGOs.

Recommendations & lesson learned

1. It has been observed that attention needs to be given to the needs of teachers as they are the

knowledge economy professionals. They need continuous development to advance their skills in

relation to the pedagogy and technology.

2. A national strategy needs to be highlighted and emphasized to zoom on the expectations from

teachers. This national strategy needs to build on national best practices in using modern learning and

teaching methods utilizing student-centered and teaching for learning approaches. All within an

environment that uses technological supporting means to help teacher better communicate and teach

the skills such as problems solving.

3. While training seems to accommodate the basic professional development needs of teachers it is

still not sufficient to accommodate a modern education reform such as ERfKE. In one hand, it is not

sufficient to make the change and does not seem to be implemented in scalable means. A session on

operating the computer and using the Internet and another on using the textbook and assessment tools

are not sufficient to change teacher’s attitude, behavior and help them gain and transfer the skills

learned. At least the overwhelming majority of teachers have reached a reasonable comfort level in

understanding the ideas and starting to use technology and new methods of teaching but there is a

need to move beyond that.

4. Evaluation of ERfKE was a very challenging task because of timing and the magnitude of

implementation of the project. ERfKE has initiated processes to build a systematic, accountable, and

independent system in evaluation and more still needs to be done. It would have been more efficient

to have designed the reform/project with evaluation in mind and not after the fact or after the start of

initiatives. Delays in implementing research studies were due to lengthy process to get funding and

approvals. While ERfKE introduced significant improvements in relation to the evaluation processes,

more concrete steps are needed to give evaluation more independence and sustainability in terms of

moving from one step to another without delays.

5. Establish a financial process to simplify the funding of research studies based on a strategy and a

funding formula to be determined from the beginning of the project.

6. There were several success stories observed of teacher’s work in utilizing ERfKE’s main goals, to

this end, learning profiles and best practices documentation activities need to be initiated by MoE to

host, share, and use in training of teachers.

7. Several initiatives were introduced and added during the project that distracted the evaluation

plans. A clear vision that is evidence based would be a better approach to expand and scale up new

programs.

8. There is a need to establish follow-up systems/mechanisms (with programs and teachers) in order

to enforce and ensure that teachers and administrators apply what they learned, trained on, or

expected from them in relation to new interventions.

50

Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and other Partners/Stakeholders

n/a

51

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents Project Document

Initial Project Information Document, May 17, 2002

Initial Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet, May 13, 2002

Project Concept Document, May 16, 2002

Project Appraisal Document, April 10, 2003 (Report No. 25309-JO)

Loan Agreement, May 23, 2003 (Loan No. 7170-JO)

Aide Memoires/Back to Office Reports

- 2002 June, September

- 2003 March, October

- 2004 February, September

- 2005 March, September

- 2006 January (mid-term-review), November

- 2007 May, December

- 2008 February, July

- 2009 June

Implementation Status Results (ISR) # 1 - 11

- 2003 --- 06/26; 12/23

- 2004 --- 02/16

- 2005 --- 12/01

- 2006 --- 06/15; 12/28

- 2007 --- 06/28; 12/21

- 2008 --- 04/30; 09/03

- 2009 --- 06/29

World Bank

Country Assistance Strategy for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2002)

Cost Efficiency of Education Spending Study (2002)

Ready to Learn? An Assessment of Needs and Programs for Children ages 4-6 in Jordan (2002)

ICT, social inclusion, and the transfer to e-based learning (2002)

Quality Enhancement Review (2002)

Independent Auditors’ Report

Ex-post review reports

Patrinos, H. (2008) “Assessment test can be used to inform policy making”

Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research

Jordan Vision 2020 (2000)

Physical Facility Needs Assessment Survey (2002)

The building capacity of schools at the Ministry of Education (2002)

Statement of Sector Policy (2003)

National Strategy for Education (2006)

National Center for Human Resources Development

Dropout ratios and factors in Jordan schools for the year 1999-2001

Formative Evaluation study of the innovation fund program

A Survey Study of Teachers', School Principals' and Parents' Perceptions of New Curricula and

Textbooks

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Evaluation Study for Education Diploma program in communication and information

technologies (CADER).

Evaluation study of discovery school.

National assessment for knowledge economy skills (NAfKE 2006;2008).

National report on the program for international student assessment (PISA2006).

Early Development Instrument (EDI)

National report on the trend in international mathematics and science study (TIMSS 2007).

Evaluation study of the interactive curriculum

Evaluation of ICT Resources Provision, Access and Utilization

Evaluation Study of the Early Childhood Development Program under ERfKE Project.

Baseline Data Report

Monitoring and Evaluation Framework

World Education Indicators (WEI)

Baseline follow-up Study

Qualitative Summative Evaluation Study of the ERfKE

Development Coordination Unit

Operations Manual

Project Progress Reports

Action Plans

Financial Monitoring Reports

Borrower’s Completion Report

Consultants and other Donor’s Report

Supporting e-learning in Jordan: An assessment of the e-readiness of the Ministry of Education

(New Brunswick Department of Education for the Ministry of Education) 2002

Learning Better with Broad Band (Canarie Inc) 2003

Introducing computer on wheels to Jordanian Schools (Education Support Project) 2005

Maintenance System Standards and Procedures

Evaluate the technical capacity, applicability, scalability, and robustness of the e-learning

platform used by the Ministry of Education

School and District Development Program

Jordan ERfKE Support Project Quarterly Progress Report (USAID)

End of Project Evaluation of CIDA’s contribution to ERfKE

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