Document of
The World Bank
Report No: ICR00001208
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IBRD-71700 TF-53276)
ON A
LOAN
IN THE AMOUNT OF US$120 MILLION
TO THE
HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN
FOR AN
EDUCATION REFORM FOR KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY I PROJECT
December 28, 2009
Human Development Sector
Middle East and North Africa Region
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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective December 28, 2009)
Currency Unit = Jordanian Dinar (JD)
JD 1.00 = US$ 1.41
US$ 1.00 = JD 0.70
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 – December 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
CAS Country Assistance Strategy KG Kindergarten
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
DCU Development Coordination Unit MOE Ministry of Education
ECE Early Childhood Education MoHESR
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific
Research
EDSS Education Decision Support System MTR Mid-term Review
ERfKE Education Reform for Knowledge Economy NCHRD National Center for Human Resources Development
FMR Financial Management Report NFCA National Council for Family Affairs
FMR Financial Management PAD Project Appraisal Document
GER Gross Enrollment Rate PDO Project Development Objective
GETT Gender Equality Technical Team PRC Public Relations Campaign
GoJ Government of Jordan PSPS Policy and Strategic Planning Secretariat
GPSC General Policy Steering Committee PSR Public Sector Reform
ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report RD Research and Development
ICT Information and Communication Technology SG Secretary General
IF Innovation Fund TA Technical Assistance
IT Information Technology TIMSS
Trends in International Mathematics and Science
Study
JBIC Japan Bank for International Cooperation UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
JEI Jordan Education Initiative USAID US Agency for International Development
JT Jordan Telecom Corp WEF World Economic Forum
Vice President: Shamshad Akhtar
Country Director: Hedi Larbi
Sector Manager: Mourad Ezzine
Project Team Leader: Peter Buckland
ICR Team Leader: Tomomi Miyajima
Jordan Education Reform for Knowledge Economy I
Implementation Completion and Results Report
Contents
Data Sheet
A. Basic Information ....................................................................................................... 1 B. Key Dates ................................................................................................................... 1 C. Ratings Summary ....................................................................................................... 1 D. Sector and Theme Codes ........................................................................................... 2 E. Bank Staff ................................................................................................................... 2 F. Results Framework Analysis ...................................................................................... 2 G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs .................................................................... 6 H. Restructuring (if any) ................................................................................................. 6 I. Disbursement Profile .................................................................................................. 6
1. Project Context, Development Objectives, and Design ....................................... 7 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ...................................... 11 3. Assessment of Outcomes ................................................................................... 16 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome .................................................. 24 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ............................................... 25 6. Lessons Learned ................................................................................................. 28 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .... 29
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 30 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 31 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................ 39 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 40 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 42 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................... 43 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 44 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and other Partners/Stakeholders ........................ 50 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 51
MAP
1
Jordan
Education Reform for Knowledge Economy I
Implementation Completion and Results Reports
A. Basic Information
Country: Jordan Project Name:
Education Reform for
Knowledge Economy I
Project
Project ID: P075829 L/C/TF Number(s): IBRD-71700,TF-53276
ICR Date: 12/28/2009 ICR Type: Core ICR
Lending Instrument: SIM Borrower:
THE HASHEMITE
KINGDOM OF
JORDAN
Original Total
Commitment: USD 120.0M Disbursed Amount: USD 117.2M
Environmental Category: B
Implementing Agency: Ministry of Education
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: CIDA
B. Key Dates
Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual
Date(s)
Concept Review: 05/22/2002 Effectiveness: 05/28/2003
Appraisal: 01/06/2003 Restructuring(s):
Approval: 05/08/2003 Mid-term Review: 01/16/2006 01/16/2006
Closing: 12/31/2008 06/30/2009
C. Ratings Summary
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR
Outcomes: Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate
Bank Performance: Satisfactory
Borrower Performance: Satisfactory
C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)
Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings
Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory
Quality of Supervision: Highly Satisfactory Implementing
Agency/Agencies: Satisfactory
Overall Bank
Performance: Satisfactory
Overall Borrower
Performance: Satisfactory
2
C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators
Implementation
Performance Indicators
QAG Assessments (if
any) Rating
Potential Problem Project
at any time (Yes/No): No
Quality at Entry
(QEA): None
Problem Project at any
time (Yes/No): No
Quality of Supervision
(QSA): None
DO rating before
Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory
D. Sector and Theme Codes
Original Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Pre-primary education 30 30
Primary education 35 35
Secondary education 35 35
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Education for all 50 50
Education for the knowledge economy 50 50
E. Bank Staff
Positions At ICR At Approval
Vice President: Shamshad Akhtar Lean-Louis Sarbib
Country Director: Hedi Larbi Joseph Saba
Sector Manager: Mourad Ezzine Regina Bendokat
Project Team Leader: Francis Peter Buckland Mae Chu Chang
ICR Team Leader: Juan Manuel Moreno
ICR Primary Author: Tomomi Miyajima
F. Results Framework Analysis
Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)
Transform the education system at the early childhood, basic and secondary levels to produce
graduates with the skills necessary for the knowledge economy.
Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)
n/a
3
(a) PDO Indicator(s)
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target
Values
Actual Value Achieved at Completion or
Target Years
Indicator 1 : A redefined vision and integrated education strategy are developed, and policies and
regulations aligned with the new vision and strategy are revised.
Value
quantitative or
Qualitative)
Old Strategy New Strategy
implemented
National Strategy was developed,
disseminated and implementation is
ongoing. A strategic plan and policy
framework for 2008-2010 that reflects the
strategy was formulated. A five-year
strategic plan (2009-2013) was developed
and approved. Annual plan for 2009 was
developed and approved.
Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2009
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
100% achieved. Implementation is underway as the strategy has a multi-year perspective.
Indicator 2 : The average standardized score of Jordanian students in international assessments of
mathematics and science has improved.
Value
quantitative or
Qualitative)
2003 TIMSS
Scores:
475 science
424 math
A positive and
statistically
significant
improvement in
2007 TIMSS
Scores
2007 TIMSS Scores: 482 science and 427
math: Results showed positive and
marginally significant improvement in
performance. In Science score, Jordan
improved its regional and international
ranking.
Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2009
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Although the increase in TIMSS scores during 2003-2007 was not statistically significant,
Jordan's regional and international ranking improved constantly during this time period, which
was hardly achieved by most other participants worldwide.
Indicator 3 : At least 80% of primary and secondary students have access to safe and adequate basic and
secondary education school facilities.
Value
quantitative or
Qualitative)
70% 80% 87.4% (the number of children in safe
schools is 942,422 at project completion).
Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2009
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
100%. The project surpassed originally intended target.
Indicator 4 : At least 70% of basic and secondary students are using on-line learning portals.
Value
quantitative or
Qualitative)
0% 70% 84% (2,822 out of 3,350 schools) are
connected by JT (2,562) and by NBN (260).
Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2009
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
100%. The project surpassed originally intended target.
Indicator 5 : The gross enrollment rate in the second level of kindergarten has increased to 51%.
Value 41% 51% 51.8% KG II enrollment rate (public and
4
quantitative or
Qualitative)
private) was achieved.
Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 02/28/2008
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
100%
(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target Values
Actual Value Achieved at
Completion or Target
Years
Indicator 1 : Mandate, structure and decision-making processes of governance and mgt. reviewed, revised
and operational.
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
Traditional top-down
decision-making,
centralized school system.
Significant level of
decentralization of
decisions to schools
in pilot directorates;
outcome-based
budgeting process
introduced in MOE.
MoE continues with
traditional budget planning
and execution. Workshops
on Planning, Budgeting,
Leadership training and
Change Management were
provided. It is unlikely that
further operationalization
beyond the pilots will be
done.
Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2009
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Partial achievement. A Policy and Strategic Planning Unit was formed and capacity was
quickly built but policy formulation process has not yet significantly changed.
Indicator 2 : Increased support for school innovations.
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
Limited scope for schools
to innovate
Schools have regular
access to funds from
govt. for innovation
and proper
utilization.
164 projects under the
Innovation Funds were
implemented; Seven out of the
planned 8 rounds were
completed
Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2009
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
90% as the project did not implement the final round and 28 projects were canceled in the
last three rounds due to implementation issues.
Indicator 3 : Education Decision Support System (EDSS) available and being used.
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
10% of decision-makers
use some kind of EDSS
EDSS implemented
and used by 50% of
decision-makers by
[2006]. EDSS
available to 90% of
decision makers by
(2008).
EDSS was put on hold in
order to focus efforts on
developing EMIS, which
made good progress towards
the end of the project and
became functional to produce
core data.
Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2009
Comments (incl. %
achievement)
Design of EDSS was completed and approved by MOE but not operational in the absence of
EMIS. Efforts were shifted towards the development of EMIS and this was completed.
5
Indicator 4 : New curriculum framework emphasizing basic skills, core competencies and essential
learning for knowledge economy, is developed and in place.
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
0% of subjects 100% of subjects
Development of curriculum
framework completed.
Learning outcomes developed
for all general education
subjects and grades. Moderate
outcomes were also produced
for several vocational streams.
Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2009
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
95%, as most of the intended targets were met. Curriculum and framework produced for all
general education streams. Framework for the pre-vocational and vocational education were
prepared and approved, except for the industrial specialization which was under review at the
time of the ICR.
Indicator 5 : Teacher training with basic ICT skills increases.
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
5,000 teachers 50,000 ICDL
certified.
85,118 teachers were trained
on ICDL and 55,000 certified.
57,738 teachers and
supervisors were trained on
INTEL and 7,702 certified.
2,583 were trained on World
Links and 1,820 certified.
Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2009
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
100%. The project surpassed the initial target.
Indicator 6 : Percentage of teachers utilizing new teaching methodology increased
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
10% 80% of teachers use
new methodology.
TIMSS 2007 study reported
74 % of teachers use new
methodology. Other studies
suggest lower utilization rates
but there is a wide recognition
that significant progress was
made.
Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2009
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Modest achievement. Continuous and robust evaluation is needed to accurately quantify the
prevalence of new pedagogy.
Indicator 7 : Teachers trained in ECE increases according to needs.
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
0%
Training of ECE
teachers/supervisors/
principals continuing.
100% of KG teachers
trained on national
curriculum & 93%
trained on "Working
with Young Children
Program”.
All KG teachers, supervisors,
and principals received the
training.
Date achieved 05/28/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2009
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
100%
6
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
No. Date ISR
Archived DO IP
Actual
Disbursements
(USD millions)
1 06/26/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.70
2 12/23/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.70
3 05/17/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.26
4 11/12/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.96
5 04/29/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 26.28
6 12/01/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 31.82
7 06/15/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 40.75
8 12/28/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 64.12
9 06/28/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 73.77
10 12/21/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 80.29
11 04/30/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 88.25
12 09/03/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 97.73
13 06/29/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 116.06
H. Restructuring (if any)
Not Applicable
I. Disbursement Profile
7
1. Project Context, Development Objectives, and Design
1.1 Context at Appraisal
Jordan’s national economy has improved significantly since the late 1990s, with an annual growth
rate of more than 4 percent during 2000–02 compared to an annual growth rate of only 1 percent
during the mid-90s. However, the fiscal deficit reached almost 5 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP) in 2002, and the economy remains fragile. More importantly, the achieved economic growth
did not translate into significant job creation or poverty reduction. Unemployment and
underemployment remained high and deep pockets of poverty persisted. As a resource-poor country,
Jordan recognized that building a competitive advantage in the global knowledge economy hinges on
a high-quality labor force. Thus, human resource development was identified as a central pillar in the
Government’s Accelerated Social and Economic Development Plan (2001), under which the Cabinet
earmarked 40 percent of the national budget to education.
In education, Jordan had made steady progress toward the achievement of the education Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). By 2002, the gross enrollment rates (GER) were 101 percent at the
primary level, 90 percent at the secondary level, and 33 percent at the tertiary level. Moreover, Jordan
had achieved gender parity at the primary and secondary levels, with a very small gender gap at the
tertiary level. The Primary Completion Rate was 97 percent in 2000 and the adult literacy rate was 90
percent, the highest in the MENA region. In 1999, Jordan achieved above the regional average in the
Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) grade 8 examinations for both
mathematics and science.
However, despite these achievements, Jordan was still facing serious challenges. These included: (a)
a large number of students were learning in unsafe and overcrowded school environments,1 implying
that the country remained unprepared to accommodate the upcoming youth bulge2 into the school
systems; (b) inequality by region and by wealth was persistent in both school enrollment and student
learning outcomes at all levels of education; (c) a serious gap existed between the skills taught in
schools and the demands of the labor market in a fast changing global economy; (d) traditional, rote-
learning pedagogy was predominant as opposed to a learner-centered approach that fosters problem-
solving skills and higher-level thinking, required in a knowledge-based economy; and (e) proper
information and communication technology (ICT) equipment and training were not available to all
teachers and superintendents to prepare students for the evolving information age.
Enrollment in kindergarten (KG) was low and uneven (the combined GER for KG I and KG II was 35
percent).3 Early childhood education (ECE) was not compulsory and largely relied on private
1 At the time of project preparation, a study revealed that overcrowding was a problem in 39 percent of MOE-owned
schools, in over 75 percent of rented schools (schools operating in rented facilities), and in 70 percent of double-shift
schools. Over 300 schools were identified as requiring urgent rehabilitation.
2 The annual population growth rate in Jordan is 2.8 percent and the general school-age population is expected to
increase by 28 percent by 2010.
3 ECE is available to children aged 4 to 6: The first phase, KG I, covers ages 4 and 5, and the second phase, KG II,
covers ages 5 and 6. The cost-efficiency of education spending study, cost-benefit analyses for Early Childhood
Education (ECE) was also conducted during the project.
8
providers, with few formal curriculum requirements. The Ministry of Education (MOE) became
keenly aware of the importance of ECE in improving educational and social outcomes, especially
among vulnerable and at-risk populations, and in reducing school inefficiency by enhancing school
readiness among young children.
Within this framework, the Government of Jordan (GoJ), with Bank assistance, identified the main
educational sector issues and developed a “Statement of Sector Policy,” which describes the policy
framework reflecting the consensus and commitment to build on the outcome of a high-level
conference held in September 2002. During the conference, called “Vision Forum for the Future of
Education,” held under the auspices of HM King Abdullah II of Jordan, the King advanced the vision
of making Jordan the information technology (IT) hub of the region. To achieve this, he said, the
highest priority must be placed on developing human capital for the knowledge economy.4 As a result,
the GoJ prepared a comprehensive, integrated proposal for a major reform of the education system
that includes Education Reform for a Knowledge Economy (ERfKE).
The project was intended to contribute to two priority areas of the Jordan 2002 Country Assistance
Strategy (CAS): (a) human development pursued strategically to support the key development goals
of reducing poverty and enabling more Jordanians to participate in the knowledge economy; and (b)
public sector reform and governance for more equitable, efficient, and higher-quality public services.
The goal of the project was consistent with both the CAS and the government’s development
priorities.
1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDOs) and Key Indicators (as approved)
The PDO stated in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) is to “Transform the education system
at the early childhood, basic and secondary levels to produce graduates with the skills necessary
for the knowledge economy.” The PDO in the Loan Agreement is slightly different: “The objective
of the Project is to assist the Borrower in improving the quality, relevance and efficiency of its early
childhood, basic and secondary education systems, so as to produce graduates with the skills
necessary for the knowledge economy.” For this Implementation Completion and Results Report
(ICR), we use the PAD PDO, because this version was consistently pursued by the team and
counterparts and is stated in Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) throughout the project.
The key performance indicators as stated in the PAD are as follows:
Sector Indicators
The school-age population has equal access to education to acquire basic skills, core
competencies, and essential learning for the knowledge economy.
Project Outcome/Impact Indicators
A redefined vision and integrated education strategy will be developed, and policies and
regulations aligned with the new vision and strategy will be revised.
The average standardized score of Jordanian students in international assessments of mathematics
and science will improve.
4 The King said, “The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has the quality competitive human resource development systems
that provide all people with lifelong learning experiences relevant to their current and future needs in order to respond
to and stimulate sustained economic development through an educated population and an educated workforce.”
9
At least 80 percent of the primary and secondary students will have access to safe and adequate
basic and secondary education school facilities.
At least 70 percent of basic and secondary education students will be using online learning portals.
The gross enrollment rate in the second level of kindergarten will increase to 51 percent.
Intermediate output indicators by project component are in the Data Sheet.
1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and
reasons/justification
The PDO was not revised.
1.4 Main Beneficiaries
The primary target population defined in the PAD was “current and future students enrolled in pre-
school, primary, and secondary education in Jordan, focusing particularly on disadvantaged groups.
About 200,000 students studying in unsafe physical facilities will be the immediate beneficiaries.”
The ECE provision and e-learning also targets rural and disadvantaged populations based on school
mapping. Although the PAD does not refer specifically to teachers and principals, it was clear that
they were also primary beneficiaries since all components entail training for teachers as part of the
activities.
The PAD states that the project will create “institutional and sector level” benefits, but it is not
explicit about the associated beneficiary groups. It was, however, evident that MOE officials, at both
the central and field offices, and the National Center for Human Resources Development (NCHRD)
were also key beneficiaries through a variety of interventions, including professional development
opportunities, equipment and capacity-building activities. Finally, as a result of the large-scale
interventions and investment, the PAD anticipated that the Jordanian society as a whole would be the
ultimate beneficiary through enhanced productivity and improvements in the skill level of the labor
force.
1.5 Original Components (as approved)
Component 1. Reorient Education Policy Objective and Strategies through Governance and
Administrative Reform (US$8.10 million). This component was designed to support the
development and implementation of policies and strategies to reorient and enable effective
management of the educational system to serve the needs of the individual learner and society at large
within a knowledge economy. This component had five subcomponents: (1.1) redefine the vision and
comprehensive integrated national strategy for education; (1.2) improve governance, management,
and decision-making processes; (1.3) integrate an Education Decision Support System (EDSS); (1.4)
conduct educational research, educational monitoring and evaluation, national and international
learning assessments, and educational policy analysis; and (1.5) develop effective management and
efficient coordination of investments in educational reform. In addition, support would be provided to
school-based innovations.
Component 2. Transform Education Programs and Practices for the Knowledge Economy (US$46.80 million). This component was designed to transform teaching and learning processes in
order to achieve learning outcomes that were relevant and consistent with the requirements of the
knowledge economy. There were three subcomponents: (2.1) development of new curriculum and
enhanced learning assessment methodologies; (2.2) the professional development of MOE personnel
10
with a particular focus on teachers, supervisors, and principals; and (2.3) the provision of the required
resources for supporting effective learning, including required information and communication
infrastructure, equipment, and learning materials.
Component 3. Support Provision of a Quality Physical Learning Environment (US$57.70
million). This component was designed to improve the quality of the learning environment in public
schools through the replacement of unsafe buildings and the alleviation of overcrowding, and through
upgrading the facilities to support learning in the knowledge economy. This component had two
subcomponents: (3.1) replace structurally unsafe and overcrowded schools; and (3.2) upgrade existing
schools to support learning in the knowledge economy through the provision of computer and science
labs.
Component 4. Promote Readiness for Learning through ECE (US$6.20 million). This component
was designed to enhance equity through public provision to KG II5 to low-income areas. The MOE
would initially develop a program to phase in KG II for children at age 5, to be followed in the future
by KG I (children at age 4) at the end of ERfKE I. This component had four subcomponents: (4.1)
institutional capacity building: (4.2) professional development of early childhood educators: (4.3)
increased access to KGs for the poor: and (4.4) parent and community participation through the
piloting of community-based centers in selected governorates.
1.6 Revised Components
The components were not revised during the project.
1.7 Other significant changes
Potential budget overrun detected early and solved properly: At the midterm review (January
2006), the mission determined that a budget overrun of US$8.8 million would occur by December
2008, mainly because of a projected significant deficit of US$19.43 million in school construction.
The Bank requested the government to clarify the financing sources for the budget overrun, either
through reprioritization within the existing World Bank loan amount or through financing from other
partners. In early April 2006, the government submitted its final version of the five-year project
implementation plan with a revised financing plan that proposed cutting construction by US$15
million and re-estimating the cost of furniture and equipment, resulting in a savings of US$1.5
million. The financing plan was accepted by the Bank and the budget overrun was averted.
The Loan Agreement was amended twice: In May 2005 and in October 2006, the loan was
amended to streamline the implementation and procurement procedures for the Innovation Fund. The
new fiduciary arrangements allowed for a specific disbursement category in the loan agreement as
well as direct contracting for acquisition of goods for the projects financed by the Innovation Fund,
thereby increasing efficiency of the Innovation Fund program’s financial management system.
Another amendment was approved in September 2006 to reallocate US$9 million for the school
construction (works category) reflecting the necessity to reprioritize the allocation of the existing
budget.
An extension of the project closing date was approved to ensure completion of all activities: In
July 2008, it was realized that efficient implementation of project activities had resulted in savings of
5 The PAD provides a detailed rationale for a phased expansion of public ECE coverage and this approach was
considered appropriate as this was the first time the MOE would provide public kindergartens.
11
US$4 million. It was agreed to use those savings to address the immediate needs of the sector,
including provision of additional access through expansion of school buildings and facilities and
replacement of outdated and obsolete equipment. Consequently, a sizable number of contracts for
goods and civil works were initiated, which required more time to complete. This resulted in project
activities going beyond the original closing date of December 2008. Based on a record of steady
progress and solid performance of the borrower, the Bank approved the government’s request to
extend the project closing date by six months. Subsequently, funds were reallocated appropriately.
The constantly evolving and high-performing project attracted more partners: Although the
project’s principal design and PDOs remained the same throughout the project life, the borrower and
the Bank managed the project in a flexible manner that encouraged new partners to join, complement,
and reinforce one another. In close consultation with the Bank and other donors, the Development
Coordination Unit (DCU) and the MOE made great efforts to adjust and fine-tune a large number of
new activities across components. As a result, towards the end of the project, 18 partners were
participating, including international donors, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private
sector. This illustrates the success of the project in transforming itself into a flagship project in the
sector and attracting more participation from various parts of Jordanian society.
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry
Project design was suitable and quality at entry was satisfactory based on the following assessment:
Sufficient and timely background analyses were conducted and incorporated: During the project
identification and preparation stages (September 2001–2002), a number of studies and surveys were
conducted to ensure solid and realistic design of project components, to determine the highest priority
intervention areas and to develop the most cost-efficient scenario for school construction and
provision of equipment.
Component 1 included the preparation of the “Vision Forum for the Future of Education,” which
set the stage for strategy formulation and helped raise awareness of critical policy interventions
for human development toward a knowledge economy.
Component 2 preparations benefited from Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
technical assistance (for example, reports such as e-readiness Assessment of the MOE and
Learning Better with Broadband). Moreover, a Bank ICT review was conducted thoroughly to
shape the overall design.
Component 3 design benefitted from a number of surveys and expenditure analyses including
Cost Efficiency of Education Spending Study; A Physical Facilities Needs-assessment Survey; A
School-by-School Survey of the Physical Condition; and A Survey of the Utilization of Capacity in
all MOE Schools. The team also reviewed previous studies carried out by other donors (e.g., the
Demand for Schooling Study by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation [JBIC]).
Component 4 was based on a firm consensus reached after a series of seminars conducted jointly
with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the National Council for Family Affairs
(NCFA). The MOE conducted statistical analysis to project the ECE enrollment demand that was
reflected in the KG expansion plan. Also a background study was completed by a consultant.
Lessons learned were reflected in the design: ERfKE I was built on lessons learned from two
previous projects (Human Resource Development Sector Investment Loan Project 1 and 2). Essential
lessons incorporated include: (a) enhanced government ownership of project design and
12
implementation by the involvement of echelons lower than the managing directors in order to address
the frequent changes in the ranks of top administrators; (b) detailed and articulated contribution of
other financiers before project effectiveness to avoid delays in project implementation; (c) clarity on
implementation-related clearance and approval procedures from the Bank; (d) detailed specifications
on the construction contracts; (e) coordinated completion of school buildings synchronized with
receipt of procured furniture and other necessities, prior to the beginning of the school year; (f) ICT
training evaluations to be done quarterly by external experts, with the process to be modified based on
results. The preparation team also incorporated the concrete recommendations of the Quality
Enhancement Review (QER) conducted in October 2002, and those were reflected in the design and
implementation timetable.
Assessment of risks and identification of mitigation measures were moderately satisfactory at
entry: The team identified 19 items that were considered to pose risks to project implementation and
fulfillment of its development objectives. The overall risk rating on the PAD was Moderate, with
three High Risk items: (a) public awareness does not support the new strategy; (b) major changes in
personnel in key leadership and management positions (that is, the Minister, the DCU, and the
Directorates); and (c) resources are uncoordinated and are not provided in a timely manner to meet
requirements of key activities. For (a), the team introduced mitigation measures such as hosting
conferences for consensus building and strengthening partnerships (for example, the “Vision Forum”)
and effectively contributed to reducing the risk. For Risks (b) and (c), the mitigation identified in the
PAD was brief and implied that it depended almost entirely on the DCU to address and handle
coordination issues, despite the highly complex coordination work anticipated.6 Although issue (c)
continued to be rated High Risk during the early supervision stage, not enough mitigation measures
were proposed at the project entry stage.
Another risk that did not receive adequate attention was the DCU’s overwhelming workload. This
was noted by the government immediately after the preparation mission and was communicated to the
team with the request to provide additional technical assistance to the DCU. Similarly, the NCHRD’s
ambitious and unrealistic volume of assignments was not identified as a risk, although it had just
shifted its role from being an implementation agency to being the leading monitoring and evaluation
(M&E) and research and development (R&D) organization. In particular, education research and
M&E assigned to the NCHRD were of such a large scope that each could be another stand-alone TA
project. As a result, some 35 studies and reports produced by the institution were not always delivered
in the right sequence or with adequate quality, so the ministry could not take full advantage of the
work to reflect their results in policy development.
Preparation processes were highly participatory: Prepared jointly with another donor (CIDA) and
three ministries (MOE, the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research [MOHE], and
MOLP), the “Vision Forum” held in September 2002 is a good example of a highly participatory
approach from an early stage of project preparation. Thirty-three percent of the participants were from
the private sector and NGOs, and the conference also attracted participants from academia. The PAD
spelled out a detailed plan for a participatory implementation process (for example, the ECD
component was designed to include MOE, MSD, NCFA, UNICEF, civil society, and parents) that
guided each partner agency in actual implementation.
6 The mitigation identified for risks (b) and (c) of the PAD were, respectively, “Integrated implementation plans are
prepared annually to ensure coordination,” and “The Development Coordination Unit was established to address the
coordination issue.”
13
As an example of the substantive participation of other donors at the preparation stage, technical
assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) helped to translate the
component proposals into an integrated Five-Year Implementation Plan with specific activities and
output indicators. In early 2002, before Skype and other such communications media existed, the
Bank team made extensive use of all available ICT to connect international experts residing in
different parts of the world, including European Investment Bank (EIB) in Luxembourg, in the
program preparation process through a series of biweekly video and audio-videoconferencing
meetings with government teams and through frequent e-mail exchange.
The other shortcoming regarding project design was that several Component 1 subcomponent
activities were not closely aligned with one another, or were too ambitious to package in one
component. Due to the very different nature and large scope of activities of each subcomponent, the
team needed to deploy extra effort to ensure the right sequencing and harmonization among
subcomponents, otherwise each output would lose its impact and usefulness. For instance,
development of an EDSS required considerable engineering (which is still ongoing) before it could
become functional enough to inform policymaking and support evidence-based strategic policy
planning. The M&E and all international/national learning assessments is a large scale research
activity that can be a stand-alone TA. A school innovation fund was part of this component but the
design was silent about how this micro-focused fund contributed to the component objective to
“reorient education policy objectives and strategy through governance and administrative reform,”
which addressed a national-level, governance-related broader reform perspective.
2.2 Implementation
Serious procurement issues arose but were handled properly: At the early stage of the project
(around May–September 2004), the quality of procurement was rated “unsatisfactory” because of
significant delays in the awarding process and the unsatisfactory quality of the bid evaluation reports
issued during that period. These were largely due to the MOE evaluation committee’s lack of
familiarity with Bank procurement regulations and procedures. The DCU immediately communicated
these issues to the Bank, and a series of risk mitigation measures were introduced to support the
ministry and to quickly build DCU procurement capacity. As a result, the quality of the evaluation
reports improved significantly and the procurement rating was upgraded to satisfactory in April 2005.
Midterm Review (MTR): Most of the initial issues were resolved by the MTR (for example,
procurement, M&E, several gaps in DCU staffing, and so forth). At the time of the MTR,
implementation was not only progressing smoothly but also at a rapid pace. There were several other
risks to implementation identified during the MTR, with concrete recommendations with specific
steps to be taken for each. One of the risks noted was that the intensity and pace of implementation of
a holistic reform approach, as opposed to an incremental one, would cause fatigue on the government,
DCU and implementing agencies at all levels. Teachers were also considered vulnerable to these
intense reform pressures. To this end, focus group sessions with 50 teachers were conducted during
the MTR which revealed that some parts of training and reform outputs were not necessarily
producing a positive impact on daily work. The study was useful in improving the training program
(time and location; recognition of the training) and led to other relevant studies conducted later, such
as “The Evaluation Study of the new Curriculum and Assessment Tools for ERfKE I” by NCHRD.
Overall, the MTR was in-depth and full of important recommendations, proposing specific time
frames, setting milestones to be achieved on critical issues, and hence providing guidance on the
effective implementation of the remainder of the project.
Evolution of the scale of the project did not affect the PDOs: At the project subcomponent level,
many adjustments were made reflecting the inclusion of several new donors and partners. Various
14
new activities were added, and thus the project constantly evolved. However, while the DCU and
MOE managed the project in a flexible manner that encouraged participation of new partners, the
project consistently pursued the initially stated goal and prevented any major deviation. These
evolutions turned out to be very effective in strengthening partnerships among various development
partners.
2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization
The initial M&E design was unclear about the role each organization should play: With the
magnitude of investment and the complexities of the ERfKE program, M&E was extremely important.
A total of US$2.2 million was allocated for M&E, illustrating its importance. The NCHRD was
assigned to carry out external M&E for the project as well as some 30 studies and surveys, while the
DCU and respective directorates at the MOE were in charge of monitoring progress of day-to-day
implementation (internal M&E). However, at the project appraisal stage, the M&E design in the PAD
did not provide a clear role for each organization or a specific division of labor. Similarly, the PAD
did not effectively address the difficulties of recruiting and retaining staff for M&E, while there was
an apparent acute shortage of some skills. Also, the NCHRD’s readiness and capacity to conduct a
wide range of studies and surveys was not properly assessed as a risk.
Implementation of M&E was characterized by persistent delays and compromised quality:
Despite repeated and explicit recommendations by the Bank supervision team to form the M&E team
and carry out the tasks immediately, the appointment of an M&E team was delayed for two and half
years, as was the development of an M&E framework. A preliminary M&E framework was prepared
in March 2005, which required significant revisions. The final version was endorsed by the donors
several months after the MTR. Consequently, the quality of M&E was consistently rated
unsatisfactory by supervision missions during the early stages of implementation. At the MTR,
however, it was upgraded to satisfactory, reflecting the improvement made by the M&E team
(finalized M&E framework, development of an M&E action plan, progress on four studies,
development of most of the baseline indicators, and initiation of the National Assessment for
Knowledge Economy study).
It should be noted as a positive aspect that the project employed a single framework to consistently
evaluate progress and encouraged donors to use the framework to avoid duplication and reduce costs.
In this regard, the project developed an effective arrangement in promoting donor coordination in
overall M&E.
2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance
Overall, financial management (FM) and procurement were satisfactory because proper remedial
actions were taken after the initial problems in the early stage of the project (see Section 2.2). Most
ISR ratings on FM and procurement were Satisfactory. The section below highlights some of the
difficult phases of fiduciary compliance and how the team responded.
FM was downgraded to Moderately Satisfactory as a result of the December 2005 supervision
mission. There was a major delay in receiving the audit report, which was due June 30, 2005. In
addition, a nine-month disbursement lag was noted, and it was decided this would be reviewed during
the MTR in January 2006. FM was again rated Moderately Satisfactory at the MTR. The Financial
Officer resigned in October 2005 and the post was vacant until late 2006, which affected the DCU’s
ability to monitor the project’s FM activities. There were also delays in submitting the Financial
Management Reports (FMRs) for the third quarter of 2005 and delays in submitting the audit report to
15
the Bank for FY04. Those delays were partly attributable to the MOE’s unfamiliarity of FM
procedures as the FM function was the responsibility of MOPIC in the previous projects. It required
significant time and effort for the MOE to harmonize reporting from all financiers and to provide
audit statements covering all financiers. The Bank closely supported the MOE and the DCU
throughout the period to catch up with the delay; as a result, problem was solved shortly after the
MTR.
Procurement was rated Unsatisfactory as a result of the September 2004 supervision mission due to
problems in the management of the procurement process and the quality of the evaluation reports (e.g.,
deviations from bank guidelines and procedures, lengthy evaluation periods for bids and proposals,
and a lack of required details in the Bids Evaluation reports). However, the DCU, entrusted with the
execution and supervision of the implementation of the project, was immediately responsive to the
recommendations made in Bank supervision and post-reviews and corrected the problems. Bank
training and capacity building of MOE staff successfully led to developing in-house skills, especially
in terms of technical specifications drafting, evaluation and contract management. The ministry’s
technical department has developed a database of pedagogical equipment based on regular market
research and updates on expenditures, which is rarely experienced in other ministries. The selection
of consultants for design and supervision, preparation of bidding documents for construction, signing
of contracts, supervision of work, acceptance and payments, that used to be carried out by the
Directorate of Buildings and International Projects (DBIP) at MOE, were transferred in December
2007 to the General Tenders Department (GTD) in the Ministry of Housing and Public Works
(MHPW). Despite the significant transfer of functions, the coordination between MOE and MHPW
after December 2007 did not reflect any disconnect or weaknesses. The procurement for works was
conducted using NCB procedures and the national standard bidding documents were given a no-
objection by the Bank after being reviewed and slightly modified to align with the standard bidding
document for works based on the 1999 FIDIC contract. In all supervision and ex-post reviews, no
significant shortcomings were reported. The project staff handled complaints diligently and
satisfactorily. Towards the end of the project, the borrower needed very little assistance from the
Bank in procurement.
Regarding the Safeguard issues, the Bank worked closely with the MOE to comply with the safeguard
regulations and requirements. It was well reflected within the identification of school construction
sites and other relevant plans for civil works. An Environmental Management Plan was included in
the PAD and proved to be highly effective in guiding implementation. Overall, it was well managed
and satisfactory as noted in mission aide-memories.
2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
ERfKE is a 10-year, multidonor sector program designed to deliver on the 2002 “Vision Forum for
the Future of Education” in Jordan. ERfKE I successfully laid a solid foundation for Phase II. To
sustain the momentum created by Phase I and further strengthen the capacity at the school and field
directorate levels, and to support the strategic leadership at senior management levels of the MOE,
ERfKE II was prepared and appraised in 2009, reflecting the lessons learned from Phase I. More
focus will be put on teachers (e.g., teacher policy, in-service training, and teachers as an agent for
change) and promotion of field-directorate-level capacity building and school-level innovation as part
of the promotion of decentralization.
A smooth transition from ERfKE I to ERfKE II is expected because the MOE and DCU are already
familiar with Bank requirements and procedures for procurement and financial management. Bank
suggestions for social and environmental safeguard compliance have been incorporated and the MOE
already has well-established systems and regulations that are largely compatible with Bank
16
requirements with respect to safeguards. The only potential challenge is the need to sustain ownership
of the project at all levels of the MOE given new leadership and turnover of several senior
management staff.
3. Assessment of Outcomes
3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design, and Implementation
Relevance is rated as substantial based on the following facts:
The objective of the project is directly related to the 2002 “Vision Forum for the Future of
Education” that was organized by the Bank under the auspices of the King, where the
country’s core development objectives were endorsed by the government and development
partners.
The project was designed on the basis of the policy framework established by the MOE
“Statement of Sectoral Policy of the Government” and is thus considered relevant to
government priorities.
The project was also intended to contribute to two CAS priorities by addressing human
resource development and supporting public sector reform.
The project acknowledges global education trends, which emphasize higher-order thinking
and problem solving skills and underscore the imperative role of ICT in education in
nurturing globally competitive citizens.
The project aimed to help Jordan achieve the education MDGs since Component 4 is aimed at
narrowing the gaps in gender and regional inequality in primary school enrollment by
providing early childhood education to the poor and rural populations. Therefore, the project
objectives and design are highly relevant to the development priorities from the global, Bank
and government perspectives.
Implementation of the project was consistently supported by donors, NGOs, and the private
sector.
See Section 2.1 for more details on assessment of quality and relevance of design.
3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives
Overall achievement of the PDO is rated satisfactory based on the substantive impact made at both
the institutional and individual level, as shown by international benchmarks, such as TIMSS and
PISA, as well as several surveys conducted during the project and interviews carried out for the ICR.
All proper inputs were made, almost 90 percent of all immediate output targets were fully met, and
some achievements even surpassed the original targets (e.g., Component 4). The PDO was generic
and broad, referring to an immense change in education policy and practice. Thus, more time and
continuous effort are needed to fully harvest the real fruits of such large-scale reform. In addition,
some reform areas are quite challenging, such as reforming the governance and management structure
and restructuring the decision-making mechanism, instituting results-based budgeting, changing
teachers’ pedagogical practices to promote student-centered learning while making the most of ICT,
and graduating students with knowledge-economy-oriented skills that respond to global labor market
demand. These are vast and arduous tasks for any country. It would take a decade or a generation to
scientifically measure the outcomes of all the inputs made through the ERfKE. Nonetheless, despite
such ambitious PDOs, ample outputs were produced and interviews and surveys have shown that
changes are happening at many levels of Jordanian society. It is considered that the project, as the
first phase of a 10-year reform program, successfully laid a solid foundation for helping the
17
knowledge economy permeate the country and for continuous application of evidence-based strategic
policymaking.
A brief summary of achievement of Outputs and Outcomes in each component follows.
Component 1. Substantial outputs were produced but the achievement of overarching
objectives/outcomes was modest.
Overall, achievement of component-level objectives was modest. Some of the subcomponent-level
inputs were substantially achieved (e.g., various types of professional development training; EMIS
development). However, the difficulty was that this component was overly ambitious and too many
activities were packaged in it, as discussed in Section 1.2. The overall intent of this component was to
reorient policy and planning practices at the MOE from an activity-based approach to the adoption of
a strategic and outcome-based planning approach. The phasing and levels of completion have been
uneven and further harmonization and integration of design and outcomes of each subcomponent
would have been required to fully achieve the objective. A detailed subcomponent-level analysis
compared to PDO outcome indicators and end-targets follows.
Outcome to be achieved was “A redefined vision and integrated education strategy are developed,
and policies and regulations aligned with the new vision and strategy are revised”. End-target was
“new strategy implemented.”
Subcomponent 1: A significant outcome was achieved in the definition of the vision and
comprehensive national strategy. Although initial work was significantly delayed, mostly due to
reasons beyond the control of the MOE (e.g., onset of conflict in the region, consultant changes and
changes in the supporting donors), the strategy was completed and endorsed in 2006. The
subcomponent also included a Public Relations Campaign (PRC). The design of the PRC was
completed and a number of actions were taken to publicly disseminate of the National Education
Strategy, yet not all plans were completed as initially foreseen, mostly due to procurement-related
reasons. Based on the Bank recommendation, it was agreed that the campaign will be re-launched
under ERfKE II.
Outcome to be achieved was “Mandate, structure, and decision-making processes of governance and
management reviewed, revised, and operational. Significant level of school-based-decision-making
and decentralization was promoted; outcome-based budgeting process adopted by MOE”.
Subcomponent 2: Despite several challenges, the Borrower managed to achieve sizable outputs. After
termination of DFID’s involvement, which piloted a comprehensive school-level decentralization as
part of its large-scale public sector reform program, the MOE together with CIDA proceeded with a
number of pilot initiatives (for example, Support for Jordan Education (SJE) initiatives targeting five
field directorates for school and district development; significant work done by the Directorate of
Training Qualifications and Supervisions (DTQS) supported by ERfKE Support Project (ESP) piloted
in 12 directorates during 2005-2008; several other initiatives supported by CIDA in organizational
management, gender equity, planning and budgeting). Despite initial delays caused by the difficulty
in appointing the right firms, valuable lessons were drawn from these pilot initiatives and the scale-up
of effective interventions is planned to benefit a wider population.
During the project, limited pilot outputs only were delivered thus the ultimate goal of bringing
significant changes in overall governance structure was not fully achieved and needed further work.
The MOE continues to operate under a traditional budget system, with limited application of the
MTEF budgeting (three-year) framework. Workshops on Planning, Budgeting, Leadership Training,
18
and Change Management were held, but their impact on practice was limited. Borrower self-
evaluation suggests a 60 percent achievement in this subcomponent.
Outcome to be achieved was “EDSS developed, implemented and used by 50 percent of decision
makers by 2006”. End-target was that EDSS becomes available to 90 percent of decision makers by
2008.
The goal of subcomponent 3 (EDSS/EMIS development to enable the government to engage in
evidence-based, strategic policy planning) was only partially achieved since major outputs (a
functional EMIS and EduWave) were produced but not yet connected with EDSS or with other tools
to be effectively used to promote evidence-based policy development. EDSS design was complete but
put on hold pending completion of the EMIS. The Policy and Strategic Planning Secretariat (PSPS)
was established as part of the effort, which was one of the major achievements of this component.
The unit is led by the Directorate of Research and Development and staffed with highly capable in-
house experts providing support from several different MOE directorates. Although the unit does not
yet have a formal identity within the ministry, and while still officially run on a part-time basis, the
dedicated and committed staff work more than full time, and capacity is quickly being built.
Outcome to be achieved was “The average standardized score of Jordanian students in international
assessments of mathematics and science has improved”. End target was “a positive statistically
significant improvement in 2007 TIMSS scores.”
Under subcomponent 4 (Education Research, Policy Analysis, National Learning Assessment,
TIMSS participation, and M&E) about 35 studies were undertaken by the MOE and NCHRD. The
Jordanian students’ scores on the 2007 TIMSS improved (the 2003 score in science was 475 and in
math 424; scores in 2007 were: science 482 and math 427). Although the increase in this period
(comparison between 2003 and 2007 scores) was not statistically significant, the increase between
1999 and 2007 should be the point of analysis as it is far more meaningful and appropriate, according
to TIMSS experts. In this timeframe, the increase is significant; Jordan has made the largest
improvement among all participants (Patrinos, 2008). It is considered that the original outcome
indicator is not adequately designed to capture the improvement of student learning outcomes, yet
positive change (increase in TIMSS scores) was surely attained on the ground regardless of such
narrowly defined “statistical” significance.
Overall M&E work was characterized by persistent delays and quality issues as described in Section
2.3. About 30 percent of the studies were viewed as mediocre, falling short of the expectation that the
MOE would provide solid evidence on which to draw conclusions about which interventions were
proven effective and which should be scaled-up in the follow-on project.
Outcome to be achieved was “Increased support for school-based innovations”. End-target was
“Schools have regular access to funds from government for innovation and proper utilization.”
Under subcomponent 5, The Innovation Fund (IF) was designed to support school-level activities that
promote innovation in teaching and learning in four domains. Seven rounds were completed through
which schools learned to formulate a proposal and to use the fund to promote innovative learning
approaches and good practices, which are being shared. One-hundred sixty-four projects were
implemented and another 97 are under implementation, financed by the loan. The IF was
institutionalized within the MOE under the Directorate of Education Innovations, but the budget still
relies heavily on the Bank loan despite some government contributions. Thus, the end target of the
“provision of regular access to funds from the government” has not yet been achieved. Although this
activity by itself would not significantly affect the overall governance and management structure it
19
served as an important step to empower schools and raise capacity and confidence that they could be
the origin and center of reform and innovation.
Component 2: Delivery of outputs was Highly Satisfactory but achievement of component
objective was Moderately Satisfactory.
As the thrust of the ERfKE reform, this component was key to the success of the whole program. The
overall objective of this component was to transform teaching and learning processes in order to
achieve learning outcomes relevant to and consistent with the requirements of a knowledge economy.
Activities in the subcomponent included preparation of new curriculum and improved learning
assessments, professional development of MOE personnel and teachers/supervisors and the provision
of ICT infrastructure and learning materials. The achievement of immediate outputs intended by each
subcomponent was satisfactory, but the component objective was not fully met because this was
another broad undertaking, and it takes more time and effort to institute change at the classroom level.
Outcome to be achieved was “New curriculum framework emphasizing basic skills, core
competencies and essential learning for knowledge economy, are developed and in place”. End-
target was 100 percent of curriculum framework complete; general and specific learning outcomes
are developed for all subjects and grades. Textbooks are delivered to all schools.
Subcomponent 1 successfully produced new curriculums for general education for all grades plus pre-
vocational and vocational tracks (except for the industrial stream), and the final stage of rollout was
completed in 2008. Textbooks, teachers’ guides, and supplementary e-learning materials in key
subject areas were also produced and being used. Development of the new Learning Assessment
Framework and National Assessment System were also major achievements, with a concrete example
of school report cards and other comprehensive student evaluation schemes. Just completing this
massive investment by itself was remarkable, and MOE staff (e.g., Directorate of Examination and
Testing) capacity was significantly developed. Also the quality of implementation was highly
successful that key Directorates worked together, communicated closely to reach consensus and
adhered to comprehensive and inclusive planning activities. The culture of work was significantly
changed.
Outcome to be achieved was “Teacher training provided to acquire basic ICT skills”. End-target was
that 50,000 teachers became ICDL certified. Percentage of teachers utilizing new teaching
methodology increased. End target was that 80 percent of teachers use new methodology.
Achievement of the first goal in subcomponent 2 was satisfactory since it exceeded the target (85,118
teachers trained on ICDL and 55,000 certified; 57,738 teachers and supervisors trained on INTEL and
7,702 certified; 2,583 teachers trained on World Links and 1,820 certified). For the second goal,
according to the study prepared by the Directorate of Curriculum and Testing, all teachers are now
using at least one new methodology in the field. However, it is still unclear whether the methodology
refers to holistic pedagogical practice (student-centered learning) or to using computers and ICT
equipment to teach the contents in the conventional rote-memorization or lecturing style.
Classroom observational studies revealed that the impact on teacher practice was still uneven. It is
expected that such impact can only be achieved in the long run as ERfKE II continues to focus on the
issue. Undertaking such significant, system-wide changes was considered appropriate based on the
ministry’s capacity demonstrated through the implementation of ERfKE I. This component
contributed to building the capacity of and confidence in the ministry to take on a high-level, system-
wide education change.
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Outcome to be achieved was “At least 70 percent of basic and secondary students are using online
learning portals”.
Subcomponent 3 involved a massive and unprecedented investment in ICT infrastructure, software,
and training of teachers and officials throughout the system. This is a remarkable achievement that
enabled 80 percent of Jordan’s schools to be connected to the Internet, and almost all now have at
least basic ICT equipment. All schools were reported to have been provided with computers and over
75 percent now have access to online learning. In addition, the number of internet connections
increased significantly with over 2,500 schools having access to ADSL connection. Although M&E
studies show that the impact on pedagogy has not yet generated profound changes, all other areas of
intended outputs and outcomes in this component were achieved or surpassed. Notable pilot
initiatives include Discovery Schools, where supplemental, cutting-edge e-learning contents were
developed and piloted. Other activities such as Youth Technology and Careers to support school-to-
work transition were also meaningful.
This component demonstrated a strong potential for effective public-private partnerships. Many
private sector firms were involved as providers of ICT equipment and learning materials. Through
close collaboration with the ministry in developing e-content and communication strategies, and
EMIS development, valuable lessons were learned and are being incorporated into the next phase of
the reform program. This is one of the unintended positive outcomes of the project, since public-
private partnerships were not an explicit project goal in the PAD.
Component 3 exceeded its output targets and the objectives/outcomes were achieved
satisfactorily. However, the country continues to have the challenge of overcrowding and
underutilization of facilities.
The objective of this component was to improve the quality of the learning environment in public
schools through the replacement of unsafe buildings and the alleviation of overcrowding, and through
upgrading the facilities to support learning in the knowledge economy.
Outcome to be achieved was “At least 80 percent of the primary and secondary students have access
to safe and adequate basic and secondary education school facilities”.
Subcomponent 1 aimed at replacing structurally unsafe and overcrowded schools. This subcomponent
exceeded the target, and at project completion as many as 942,422 students (87.4 percent of all
students in primary and secondary education) were studying in safe schools. The loan financed 41
new school constructions (out of total 181) and 538 renovation/extensions. The procurement and
management of large scale contracts were well conducted by the MOE, demonstrating its strong
commitment and competence with a high degree of efficiency and professionalism. This massive
investment in physical infrastructure was implemented mostly on time and within budget, thus
justifying strong national commitment to education reform. Following up on this outcome, field
interviews with local donor agencies showed that adequate school infrastructure and educational
materials did create incentives for teachers to teach better and motivate them to work hard.
Despite these achievements, the problem of overcrowding and underutilization of schools persists
throughout the country. One planning survey revealed that 59 percent of the MOE schools were
underutilized, while another 39 percent of schools (101,000 students) experienced overcrowding.
Several factors seem to be at the root of this situation, including a shift of students from private
schools to public schools triggered by both enhanced quality of public schools and the financial crisis
in 2008, and the unanticipated influx of immigrant students from Iraq. This unforeseen student flow
added difficulties to the already existing problems of imbalanced demand and supply of school
21
facilities. Efficiency of school utilization still remains a challenge, even after the significant
investment through the project.
Overall, immediate outputs (school construction, extension and rehabilitation) were satisfactorily
delivered, demonstrating strong commitment and capacity of the government, yet the project was not
able to solve the core problem (overcrowding and underutilization) and there is room for
improvement in location planning and strategy with better utilization of the data such as school
mapping.
Component 4 was Highly Satisfactory, presenting an exemplary case of project implementation
building in an effective partnership among government departments, civil society organizations,
and aid partners. Outputs not only achieved all initial targets but surpassed targets in some areas. Both
design and implementation of this component have been widely recognized as being highly successful.
The objective of this component was to support the implementation of an ECE strategy to ensure that
families and communities partner with the education sector to better prepare children for learning and
to prevent school failure. This component includes four subcomponents: (i) institutional capacity
building; (ii) professional development of early childhood educators; (iii) increased access to KGs for
the poor, and (iv) parent and community participation through piloting of community-based centers in
selected governorates.
Outcome to be achieved was “The gross enrollment rate in the second level of kindergarten has
increased to 51percent” and “Teachers trained in ECE increase according to needs. End-target was
“All KG teachers trained on National Curriculum and on pedagogy appropriate for Early Childhood
Education”.
The target of 51percent enrollment in KG II was fully achieved by February 2008, well before the end
of the project. All targets related to training of teachers, development of ECD standards, indicators
and benchmarks, as well as quality assurance systems, were satisfactorily achieved. Of the
approximately 300 public KGs, 140 classrooms were rehabilitated using the Bank loan proceeds and
another 100 classrooms were rehabilitated and furnished by the USAID. All the KG teachers received
training on the National Curriculum, and 93 percent of KG teachers received training on the
Wisconsin “Working with Young Children” program.
Sub-component 1 produced exceptional national level achievement that include: (a) the development
of curriculum with digitized ECE software accompanied with user guide and teaching guide; (b) the
development of ECD standard framework, with key indicators (Early Development Indicators) that
was incorporated in the periodic household surveys to regularly inform the level of child
development; (c) development of Learning Readiness Assessment; (d) updating licensing standards;
(e) development of Quality Assurance Framework for MOE KGs; and (f) training of teachers on
Kidsmart program (IBM). Except for a few activities such as capacity building of preschool division
at MOE, all activities met the end-targets. As many as 15 organizations (donors, NGOs, Arab
organization, private sector, and various government entities) were involved in this sub-component
alone. For each activity, supervisory committees at central level were formed and functioned well to
set the direction, and field-level committees ensured the implementation on the ground. All these
were conducted in a very transparent manner and information was timely shared, according to the
program directors. These were indeed extraordinary accomplishments reflecting the strong
partnership fostered through the project, and it also validates the strong support and effective
coordination provided by DCU/MOE. The partners also reflected that the quality and timeliness of the
Bank assistance was satisfactory.
22
Sub-component 2 covered a wide range of training for trainers, teachers, principals, and supervisors.
This included provision of training to not only MOE KGs but also other NOG-managed KGs as well
as provision of curriculum and teachers to the NGO KGs. Sub-component 3 successfully completed
rehabilitation of the KG classrooms thus contributed to the increase in KG enrollment. It also
launched the Center of Excellence model in collaboration with USAID with support from NCFA,
ESP, and Arab Orphan Fund. The model is still being implemented thus there is no substantial
assessment yet of its effectiveness and sustainability. Sub-component 4 launched a public awareness
campaign, mainly through community level programs such as field educational sessions for target
groups. It provided 180 training sessions to 3,600 KG educators and supervisors as well as parents.
KG newsletter was published and distributed semi-annually. Coupled with these community reach
activities to raise awareness on ECD issues, parent involvement expansion initiative was also
undertaken to deepen parents’ understanding and commitment to KG quality improvement in
classroom (e.g., Better Parenting program). As a result, involvement of volunteer parents was
increased, and parents’ awareness about the importance of ECD was enhanced.
Overall, this component serves as a model case for reform achievement. Not only the achievement on
outputs-level was highly satisfactory but the manner it was conducted is truly noteworthy.
Component 4 demonstrated the power and synergies of strengthened partnership and collaboration
between several different departments in the government, together with other implementing partners,
NGOs and community organizations in maximizing reform outcomes.
3.3 Efficiency
No statistical analysis has been conducted on the economic rate of return of the investment due to the
nature of the reform project that involved various hard-to-quantify aspects of human development.
Assessment of Component 3, however, could offer a tangible example of cost-efficiency of project
implementation. The component entailed large-scale school construction and rehabilitation. The
largest portion of the loan (US$236.5 million, or 64 percent of total funding allocation) went to this
component. The plan was sufficiently flexible to accommodate unforeseen changes, including
increases in student enrollment in the country (e.g., immigration from Iraq). In addition, funding
adjustments within the component and efficient implementation resulted in savings of US$4 million,
which was used for wider provisions of school facilities and equipment. Overall, project
implementation was highly efficient and funding was disbursed in a stable and steady manner. As
repeatedly noted by the supervision mission, most of the project implementation progressed at a good
rate, with few hindrances. Given the complexity and magnitude of the intended reform program, the
goal of which was holistic sector improvements, all outputs and outcomes produced by ERfKE
suggest that project efficiency was very high.
3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating
Rating: Satisfactory
Combining relevance, achievement of PDOs, and efficiency, as described in detail in the above
sections, the overall outcome of the project is rated Satisfactory. Some limitations arise from the fact
that establishing a clear causal connection between the specific activities implemented under the
project and the achievement of the overarching PDO that refers to the whole education sector
improvement and national-level human resource development is difficult given that there are always
other social, political, and economic factors affecting education sector performance. It is also
generally difficult to fully attribute success to any specific reform inputs. For instance, it is widely
known in many countries that student performance (e.g., learning outcomes measured by international
assessments such as TIMSS) can be attributed more to the socioeconomic status of the students than
23
to school/teacher characteristics. Therefore, oversimplified and hasty conclusions should not be
drawn about the causal link between the project inputs and national-level human development
outcomes. Recognizing all these constraints, however, achievement in almost all components was
highly successful except for a few activities (e.g., reform of the governance/policymaking structure,
the public relations campaign, EDSS, and M&E). The project surely succeeded in laying solid
foundations for further reform and it injected the theory and practice of “knowledge economy” into
the education sector as a central part of the nation building endeavor.
3.5 Overarching Themes, other Outcomes and Impacts
(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development
Gender was not explicitly mentioned in PAD nor in the original implementation plan but a major
activity was added to Component 1 around 2006 based on MOE’s decision. Supported by CIDA, a
local gender specialist was hired and worked closely with MOE and delivered the following: (i) a
Gender Equality Technical Team (GETT) was formed and provided training to MOE staff on gender
mainstreaming; (ii) the GETT reviewed curriculum, professional development materials and provided
recommendations to promote gender sensitive working environment; (iii) gender analysis was
conducted and a forum to promote female leadership was held in December 2006, with support from
SJE. Follow-up workshops were held. In 2008, an international Gender Specialist provided technical
assistance to strengthen the GETT and supported their participation in various workshops. GETT
worked both in central government and in two selected districts, in close collaboration with SJE. A
gender strategy for MOE was developed and approved. As a result of all these efforts, awareness at
MOE towards a gender-sensitive learning environment was enhanced. However, the gender strategy
has not yet been distributed nor institutionalized. GETT should be scaled up and its capacity should
be further strengthened. It was noted that the intensity and scope of activities were not even during
the project, and most of the activities were mainly led by the contracted gender specialist, not
proactively sought by MOE or other parties as illustrated in the absence of activities during 2007
where the consultant was not in the field. Therefore, even though the project succeeded in putting
gender mainstreaming on the important agenda at MOE, the concept was not yet fully or evenly
implemented and sustainability of the outcome still relies on the presence of technical specialists
contracted by donors.
(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening
As is the case with many reform projects, the greatest progress made in ERfKE I occurred where the
centralized authority directed the hardware changes (e.g., curriculum development, teaching and
learning materials, ICT, and physical infrastructure) rather than organizational and human behavioral
changes. Progress was slower in the areas that required reform in management structure and strategic
policy planning (e.g., decentralization; results-based planning), which require a long time frame to
produce visible and sustainable results. Strong ownership was firmly built at the MOE, however, as
reasonably anticipated, leadership and capacity were not quickly or evenly developed across different
levels of the institution. Those were stronger among senior management but more fragile at other
levels.
Nonetheless, the project significantly contributed to building capacity in many areas, not only in
acquiring ICT-related skills, but also in raising awareness of critical reform concepts such as
“evidence-based policymaking,” “strategic policy planning,” and “results-based budgeting.” The
notion of a knowledge-economy-based education (higher-order thinking, critical thinking, student-
centered learning, etc.) was widely promoted among teachers, who were mostly familiar with the
24
conventional rote-memorization style of teaching. The necessity and significance of critical policy
interventions were widely recognized at both the central and field offices of the MOE, and by both
top management and other tiers of technical staff. The project successfully triggered a cultural shift
and a change in mentality, especially among staff in the MOE central office. The establishment of
PSPS and its staff’s eagerness and dedication is a good example of success in bringing genuine
institutional change.
The project also demonstrated excellent collaboration and coordination between the MOE and DCU,
both internally (among different MOE directorates) and externally with other organizations.
Examples are:
Collaboration between the MOE and universities was promoted, as seen in subcomponents 2.1 and 2.2
(curriculum development and reform of pedagogy). A MOE/Universities Joint Steering Committee
(comprising the Minister of Education and the Deans of Faculties of Education) was formed to guide
the pre-service training program.
Collaboration with other ministries and the private sector was also promoted: For Component 2
(provision of ICT infrastructure and equipment), the MOE worked with other ministries, such as
MoICT and USAID, using their grant funding to upgrade the facility of QRC while waiting for the
MoICT to work on the MOE data center, to be housed in QRC. The MOE also worked with the Jordan
Telecom Corp (JT) to connect 2,000 schools to QRC using a high-speed DSL network built in
partnership with JT.
The Jordan Education Initiative (JEI) public-private partnership was launched in 2003 under the
auspices of the World Economic Forum (WEF), and became part of the ERfKE to pilot and showcase
effective innovative interventions in selected schools (Discovery Schools).
There was excellent donor/partner coordination, as evidenced by the active participation of 17
partners; toward the end of the project, the DCU and MOE provided ceaseless support to ensure
smooth implementation of activities and to avoid duplication of effort.
(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)
The public-private partnerships engendered by the project were one of the unintended positive
outcomes of the project. These partnerships demonstrated that the sectors can actually work together
productively to mutual benefit. The project successfully proved that collaboration can reduce
transaction costs and the burden on the MOE, and can thereby enhance the efficiency and
productivity of each organization. This positive synergy was not expressed in the initial PDOs, but it
became widely recognized as good practice in the region.
The project also succeeded in capacity development of MOE officials. The downside of success was
that consequently MOE experienced “brain drain” of these highly skilled staff as they were recruited
by private sector or other jobs outside Jordan. This shows that the project was successful in building
firm capacity and competitiveness but the loss of these competent staff was a negative unintended
outcome that may affect sustainability of the reform outcomes.
3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops
n/a
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome
Rating: Modest
25
Risk to development outcome is considered modest as a very strong foundation has been laid through
various capacity-building activities and highly motivated MOE officials became confident of carrying
the reform forward. Very promising changes are occurring, illustrated by the development of new
learning assessments (e.g., a school report card to comprehensively evaluate student learning),
development of an M&E framework, steady improvement in the TIMSS since the first participation
and creation of a PSPS unit to reinforce strategic policy planning. Although it needs more time and
continuous effort to manifest the pedagogical changes in daily practice, the concept of knowledge-
economy-oriented learning was widely promoted. Confidence and self-reliance among MOE staff has
been significantly raised to the point that they believe the reform can continue even with less formal
intervention by the Bank and donor projects. Although these progressive phenomena are seen mainly
among a limited group of people that had constant exposure to the external interventions and
technical assistance, it is evident that the government has a firm readiness and capacity to carry the
reform forward and penetrate the policy and practice of knowledge-economy-oriented education.
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5.1 Bank Performance
(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry
Rating: Satisfactory
As examined in detail in Section 2.1, the preparation of ERfKE benefited from the lessons of the two
previous projects (HRDSIL 1 and 2) and various assessment outcomes. The Bank responded to the
demand from the government to continue the human resource development reform program with a
new and heavy focus on increasing competence in a knowledge-based economy. In alignment with
government priorities and the “Vision Forum for the Future of Education,” the Bank invested in
projects to ensure the continuity and relevance of the objective. The Bank provided a forum for
discussion and consultation among stakeholders, and technical seminars to deepen the understanding
of several key issues (e.g., the significance of investment in ECE). The team swiftly took measures to
provide the necessary resources for the preparation of the project and ensured its smooth launch. The
project became effective only five days after the signing date, signifying the swiftness and efficiency
of the team’s work.
(b) Quality of Supervision
Rating: Highly Satisfactory
Responsiveness was high and soundness of assistance was adequate: In response to the
Borrower’s request for immediate guidance, the Bank always responded to the MOE and DCU
promptly with concrete recommendations and interventions. For instance, to address the serious
procurement problem that arose in early 2004, the Bank immediately responded to the request to
strengthen procurement capacity at the DCU and relevant ministries and to familiarize them with
Bank procedures. During May–June 2004, the Bank provided training in Amman for 20 ministry and
DCU staff on the procurement of goods and the selection of consultants. In addition, during the
September 2004 mission, a half-day workshop was conducted to address the preparation of terms of
reference and IT procurement. Similarly, for Component 1, when a problem emerged (a donor’s
termination of its participation in ERfKE, putting the continuation of subcomponent 2 at risk), the
Bank responded promptly with concrete recommendations, thus ensuring continuation of the
subcomponent. However, institutions such as NCHRD noted that it would have been more effective
26
and useful if the Bank’s feedback on their reports was received systematically and consistently, with
detailed comments and suggestions.
Risk management was also carefully done: An institutional capacity or staffing gap was usually
promptly noted based on solid analysis. The Bank guided the contracted firms in conducting situation
analysis or gap analysis before making large investments (for example, analysis of EMIS/EDSS
utilization). Other risks related to fiduciary compliance were also handled in a timely manner, as
described in previous sections. For instance, during 2004–05, the Bank provided assistance to
promote streamlined, efficient procurement procedures, as illustrated in the case of the Innovation
Fund. The Bank recommended that the DCU submit simplified procurement procedures to the Bank,
and these were promptly approved. Accordingly, the Loan Agreement was amended to include the
simplified procurement procedure to ensure rapid response and decreased processing time.
The need to provide more forums and platforms to reconfirm commitment towards higher-
order objectives: Despite the complexity and magnitude of the reform program, many donors and
partners agreed that the Bank’s assistance (both technical and administrative) was top-notch and was
highly appreciated throughout the project. One issue some partners thought the Bank could have
played a larger role in was to support the government in creating more forums to reconfirm the
overarching goals of the ERfKE. Not many people were aware of higher-order ERfKE goals, but
were rather focused on achieving their own immediate outputs in the respective component; that is
understandable given the intensity and complexity of the respective work. Similarly, as for donor
coordination, there was a growing demand to strengthen the ties among partners by facilitating
meetings such that all partners could attend and voice their concerns. It was also felt that the presence
of Bank staff based in the country would be crucial to forming a true, day-to-day working partnership.
Virtually no joint missions were held despite the strong eagerness and demand on the part of several
donors. TTLs were aware of this and made significant efforts at the individual level, mostly
informally, among like-minded project directors, but official joint missions were not formalized.
However, this also largely depended on the government’s readiness to accept joint missions to move
towards such direction. It is acknowledged that the Bank played its part in promoting deeper donor
coordination.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance
Rating: Satisfactory
Although the previous sections highlighted a few critical issues that require improvement in the
Bank’s performance, general bank supervision and assistance was excellent and highly appreciated by
the borrower and donor community, as shown in field interviews and donor reports. Excellence of
supervision and assistance had become standard practice. This complex and enormous investment
could have easily collapsed if components were not carefully supervised, yet the project achieved its
various ambitious goals. Although there is always a ceaseless demand to do things better, and things
the Bank could or should have done better, overall, there is a satisfaction and confidence on the
ground, and among the borrowers themselves, an eagerness to continue the reform program. The
improvements in capacity of MOE senior officials and working-level staff could be attributed to the
Bank’s consistent encouragement and technical assistance, and to the results of donor coordination.
Considering these facts, Bank performance is rated Satisfactory.
5.2 Borrower Performance
(a) Government Performance
27
Rating: Satisfactory
It was widely recognized that strong leadership and ownership on the part of MOE executives and
senior management staff were key to moving the reform forward. This enormous investment in time
and resources by itself is a notable accomplishment attributable to the ministry’s strong commitment
to the reform. Although capacity and ownership were not fully or evenly developed across different
layers of the institution, many staff confirmed that the project successfully triggered a cultural shift
and laid a solid foundation for larger changes.
The MOE responded quickly to any problem or risk that arose during project implementation and
communicated the issue swiftly to the Bank to jointly seek solutions. The mission frequently
commended the MOE for its thorough review of consultants’ materials, formulation of options and
their analysis, and the decision-making initiated (EDSS, for example). However, it was noted that
there is a serious need to strengthen overall planning capacity within the MOE, since the planning
processes were ad hoc and disjointed, and were not strengthened sufficiently to operationalize
evidence-based, results-oriented policy development.
(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance
Rating: Satisfactory
The DCU was highly effective despite several obstacles: The DCU played a strong coordination
and internal monitoring role for this very complex project and became a driving force behind
implementation of all aspects of the project. DCU staff consisted largely of public officials and their
location within the MOE resulted in stronger ownership and leadership of the project than if the
Project Implementation Unit had been located externally. From time to time during the six and half
years of project life, there was a wide gap in staffing. The DCU was inadequately staffed from March
2003 to January 2006 (e.g., original Procurement Officer, Finance Officer, and Monitoring Officer
resigned or retired during this period). The Executive director was replaced by the Minister in April
2004 and a Policy & Planning Advisor filled both positions from this date until a national director
was appointed in December 2007. The Advisor provided assistance to strengthen technical,
managerial and coordination capacity at the DCU. Reflecting the constant and rapid evolution of the
project, the DCU was expanded in January 2006 to include Component Coordinator positions to
strengthen internal monitoring. Despite the difficulty in appointing adequate staff in a timely manner,
the DCU survived and strived to achieve the project goal, with strong support from senior
management of the MOE and effective optimization of support from the Bank. It was understandable
that coordinating almost 20 partners could not result in a uniform level of satisfaction for all parties.
Given the magnitude and rapidness of reform implementation, it would be fair to say that the
contribution and performance of the DCU was substantial. It maintained high standards as it
confronted the fairly complex and heavy workload imposed on a small unit. Considering all these
factors, the performance of the DCU is rated Satisfactory.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance
Rating: Satisfactory
The MOE and DCU invested heavily in strengthening the internal governance structure for the project.
The General Policy Steering Committee (GPSC) was formed, chaired by the Minister and included
representatives of MOPIC, NCHRD, Secretary Generals (SGs), Managing Directors, DCU and
donors. The meetings were held approximately every six weeks and provided an opportunity to
present progress reports and layout the next steps. The Component sub-committees, chaired by SGs,
28
involved all key Managing Directors, key central directorate staff, representatives of donor executing
agencies and DCU. All these meetings contributed to review the implementation status and facilitated
progress in a collaborated manner. It was highly effective to manage and implement the project in a
timely fashion and to share information. The structure was strongly supported by the Bank and was a
vehicle for some of the reporting and discussions during Bank supervision missions. Illustrated by
this example, the borrower was clear about its role with strong ownership and commitment,
proactively handling all aspects of project implementation efficiently and effectively. T-he only
reason that the rating is not Highly Satisfactory is that the level of capacity was not evenly developed
across different layers of the government and there were insufficient changes in the decision-making
mechanism and policy planning structure.
6. Lessons Learned
Strong ownership, commitment, and leadership at the highest level of the MOE, coupled with
the sound capacity of technical-level teams is the key to successful implementation. This has
been consistently identified as “a critical success factor” for successful project implementation. The
driving force of the reform came from within the Government; it was not imposed by external donor
agencies. In addition, the dedicated working-level staff played a major role in achieving major
milestones on time. This core structure is indispensable in tackling such large-scale reform and
implementing innovations, therefore, the Bank should continue supporting this good practice.
Continuous strengthening of donor coordination and active provision of forums to reconfirm
overall PDO is necessary: Despite the noteworthy successes in donor coordination and in
collaboration among numerous internal and external partners, provision of more forums for all
partners to discuss and reconfirm the commitment to overarching project goals is critical. Each team
tended to overly focus on immediate deliverables under their specific subcomponent, which is
understandable given the large number of activities and many milestones to be achieved. In order to
efficiently achieve the national level PDO, and shift the focus from micro to macro, from
subcomponent-level inputs-based to outcome-oriented, the Bank could have played a more proactive
role in providing opportunities to hear voices of all partners.
Clarity of M&E roles and linkages to policy development should be ensured: The bank should
provide a clear design and continuous technical support on the M&E practice. On the design, it must
ensure clarity in the respective roles and responsibilities for internal and external M&E and its link to
policy and strategy development, and to the need for capacity building and institutional strengthening
in technical aspects of M&E. The Bank should also monitor and advise that M&E results (policy
analyses) be systematically incorporated into policy development by suggesting the right sequencing
and the timeliness of studies and surveys.
Extra caution is needed with operational arrangements for the most challenging reform areas: Subcomponent 1 of Component 1, which aimed at changes in governance and management, decision-
making, and the budgeting system, tackled the most challenging reform areas. Notwithstanding its
own difficulties, an example of risk posed by a certain participation pattern of a donor can yield
certain lessons. Initially the MOE was a pilot case study under the broader Public Sector Reform
Program (PSR) for the Government of Jordan. This format ended up posing a risk to the continuation
of activities and funding when the donor decided to withdraw from participation. Although these
things are not always predictable, the MOE serving as a pilot to another donor’s larger inter-
ministerial project created a vulnerability, because the continuation of major activities was at the
discretion of the donor, placing it largely beyond the immediate control of the MOE/DCU and the
Bank. In the end, the team handled the risk effectively and the mission provided concrete
recommendations to secure funding and prepared back-up plans early on. But it would be worth
29
considering requiring a long-term firm commitment, not as a case study of another reform project but
as an activity directly managed by the project to ensure continuity and integrity of the activities.
Consolidating the findings of field interviews, Bank staff interviews and review of project documents,
the following were identified as issues that specifically warrant closer attention during the next phase
of the reform.
Renewed and strengthened focus on the organizational changes: The ministry should serve as a
facilitator of change as opposed to being an implementer of change.
Enhanced decentralization and empowerment of field directorates and schools are also required. In
order to fully achieve the PDO, it is crucial to make schools to serve as the locus of change.
Strong focus on teacher policy, professional development as well as enhanced awareness of their
critical role in reform is essential. Heavier investment in teachers would be necessary to make
them as key agents of change. Without creating awareness, commitment and continuous adaptation
efforts, reform outcomes would not take root at the classroom level nor automatically manifest
themselves nationwide.
Effective dissemination of reform outcomes with continuous consultation with stakeholders is
also important. The recognition of general public on the reform was still not very high due to the
suspension of Public Relations Campaign activities, thus renewed approaches and greater effort in
dissemination would be needed.
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners
(a) Borrower/implementing agencies n/a
(b) Cofinanciers n/a
(b) Other partners and stakeholders
n/a
30
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing
(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD million equivalent) supported through IBRD
Components Appraisal Estimate
(USD millions)
Actual/Latest
Estimate (USD
millions)
Percentage of
Appraisal
1. Reorient Education Policy Strategies 8.10 2.503 30.9
2. Transform Education Programs and
Practices 46.80 36.974 79.0
3. Provide Quality Learning
Environments 57.70 78.626 136.27
4. Promote Learning Readiness through
Early Childhood Education 6.20 .406 6.51
Total Baseline Cost 118.80 118.509 99.78
Physical contingencies
0.00
0.00
Price contingencies
0.00
0.00
Total Project Costs 118.80 118.509 99.78
Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 00
Front-end fee IBRD 1.20 1.20 100.00
Total Financing Required 120.00 119.709 99.78
(b) Financing
Source of Funds Type of
Cofinancing
Appraisal
Estimate
(USD millions)
Actual/Latest
Estimate
(USD millions)
Percentage of
Appraisal
U.S.: U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) 14.00 25.97 186
Arab Fund for Economic and Social
Development 28.00 33.00 118
Borrower 130.00 143.9 111
CANADA: Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) 4.00 17.20 430
UK: British Department for International
Development (DFID) 2.00 1.79 90
EC: European Investment Bank 43.00 45.00 105
International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development 120.00 120.00 100
Islamic Development Bank 18.00 23.00 128
JAPAN: Japan International Cooperation
Agency (JICA) 1.00 1.50 150
GERMANY: Kreditanstalt fur
Wiederaufbau (KFW) 10.00 11.00 110
31
Annex 2. Outputs by Component
Subcomponent/
Outcome Indicator Subcomponent Main
Activities
Baseline (Year) Expected Activity outcome Planned/ Actual
Completion Date
Status of
Completion
Notes
1.1 Governance,
Management and
Decision Making/
Redefined vision
and integrated
education strategy
formulated and
adopted/ NES
reinforced and
consensus built
through PRC
National Education Strategy No Strategy
(2003)
NES developed, approved,
produced and distributed
February 2006/
December 2006
100% complete Individual
activities are being
completed but the
challenge is in the
institutionalization
of those activities,
the policies and
overall strategy
Public Relations Campaign No PRC (2003) PRC successfully launched over 3
years
June 2006/ In
progress
Design: 100%
Implement.:
35%
Policy and Strategic Planning
Unit
No PSP Unit A fully staffed and fully
operational unit
September 2006/
April 2007
Preparation:
100%
Operation: 50%
ICT Infrastructure and
Management
Old org. structure/
No ICT policy
Newly developed, more effective
org. structure of DICT/ Clear ICT
policy
April 2008/ 70% complete
Gender Mainstreaming Limited gender
sensitivity
Higher level of mainstreaming and
sensitivity at all levels of the
system
Throughout the life
of the project
on going 75%
1.2
Organizational
Review and
Development /
Revised
governance,
management and
decision making
mechanisms are in
place that enable
the delivery of
basic skills, core
competencies and
essential learning
for knowledge
economy
Governance, Management
and Accountability
Old management
and governance
structure
Enhanced org structure and
governance; utilizing new skills,
sustainability and improvement,
accountability
Throughout the life
of the project
35% removed to
ERfKEII
Leadership, Management Limited leadership
and management
capacity of MoE
staff
Higher skills and capacity of MoE
staff at all levels
Throughout the life
of the project
20%
Field Directorate
Governance
Centralized
system/ limited
autonomy to Field
Directorates
Improved capacity of Field
Directorate staff to support
schools and gain more autonomy
Throughout the life
of the project
17%
Supervisors Professional
development
Traditional role of
supervisors
Development of the role of
supervisors to enable them
provide teachers with support
March 2007/ Covered as a
separate activity,
embedded in
32
field directorates
and management
Work plan
(SJE17%
1.3 Education
Decision Support
System
An integrated
EDSS system is
developed and in
operation
Design of EDSS No EDSS Appropriate design that fits MoE
needs
February 2006/ April
2007
100% complete
and approved by
MOE
Difficulty
proceeding with
EDSS with the
absence of a
strongly
established EMIS
Implementation of EDSS No EDSS Full implementation of EDSS and
effective usage
December 2006/ On hold
1.4 Education
Research,
Monitoring and
Evaluation
Educational
research, policy
analysis,
monitoring and
evaluation and
national learning
assessment
activities are
strengthened.
Participation in
international
assessments
Development of an M&E
Framework and Action Plan
No framework or
action plan
Effective monitoring and
evaluation of all aspects of reform
activities are conducted in a
timely and thorough manner and
are used to inform and guide
future implementation activities
June 2005/ 100% complete All M&E studies
completed, waiting
for the submission
for the last two
studies on the
baseline line follow
up, and WEI. Evaluation Studies No M&E Studies
conducted
Recommendations available based
on findings of scientific and sound
evidence
December 2008/
March 2009
May 2009
50% complete
85% complete
95% Complete
1.5
Implementation
Arrangements
Investments in
educational reform
are coordinated and
well- managed
Round I of Innovations Fund Limited support to
innovation at the
various levels
New innovative approaches to the
delivery of education are tested
and lessons learned are shared
Throughout the life
of the Project
100% complete - Due to delays in
the implementation
of the 1st Round,
the total Rounds
that will be
implemented are 7
instead of the
originally planned
8 rounds.
Round II of Innovations
Fund
100% complete
Round III of Innovations
Fund
100% complete
Round IV of Innovations
Fund
100 % complete
Round V of Innovations
Fund
100% complete
33
Round VI of Innovations
Fund
100% complete
Round VII of Innovations
Fund
100% complete
Round VIII of Innovations
Fund
Component 2: Transform Education Programs and Practices for the Knowledge Economy
2.1 Curriculum
and Learning
Assessment
Development
Development of a
new core
curriculum
to align learning
outcomes with the
knowledge
economy
Development of Curriculum
Framework and Learning
Outcomes
No framework
or Outcomes
Framework and learning
outcomes developed, approved
and implemented
September 2003/ 100% complete Prevocational and
vocational
framework &
outcomes are
prepared and
approved, except
the industrial
specialization
(under reviewing
with all concerned
parts)
Curriculum renewal process:
Development and
implementation of curriculum
Old curriculum Newly developed curricula
developed and implemented in
schools
December 2008/ 100% complete
Development and
implementation of Vocational
Education Streams
Existing
program
Policies and Strategies
developed to better align with
labor market needs, framework
and learning outcomes are
approved for
Agriculture ,hospitality and
home economics
December 2008/ 85%
Development of learning
assessment framework
No framework Framework developed, approved
and implemented
September 2003/ 100% complete
National Assessment System No National
Assessment
Assessment of student
achievements and progress will
be informed by the new practices
and will provide information
which measures and assesses
authentic, performance-based
achievement
December 2008/
100% complete
34
- Item Banking
- Portfolio
No item
banking, e-
testing or
portfolio
available
Effective item banking system,
e-testing and portfolio piloted
December 2008 Preparation:
100%
Implementation
70%
2.2 Professional
development and
Training
Development and
Implementation of Pre-service
training
Few and
disintegrated
training
programs
New pre-service training
strategy defined , ETC
legislation system has been
approved by the Cabinet which
include Induction newly
appointed teachers and in-
service training
2008
May 2009
95% completed
Draft Education
Training Center
structure prepared
for Induction
program for newly
appointed teachers
and in-service
training Development and
implementation of in-service
training
Institulization of in-service
training programs developed to
enable teachers for more
efficient teaching linked to
knowledge economy
2008 100%
Training on ICT use in teaching All teachers received training on
the new e learning materials
depending on the new strategies
and other programs like INTEL
and thinking tools , world links
2008 100%
2.3 Resources to
Support Effective
Learning
Connectivity for
all schools and
directorates with a
n e-learning
infrastructure set
up and equipment
installed
Development of new
specifications for physical
environment and equipment to
support learning
Old specs New specifications for physical
environments, learning space
allocations, and equipment and
materials required to support
learning.
2008 100%
Development and management
of e-content
No e-content Supplemental e-learning
materials in a variety of subject
areas developed, piloted and
revised for use in all Jordan’s
schools
December 2008 Math Dev: 100%
E-Science Dev:
40%
E-Arabic Dev:
100%
E-EFL Dev:
35
100%
ICT Dev : 70%
Civics : 100%
KG II : 100%
MIS: 90%
Management.:
90%
Development and deployment of
e-content (100 Discovery
Schools)
No e-content Supplemental e-learning
materials in a variety of subject
areas developed, piloted ,revised
and used in Discovery Schools
December 08
Math Dep: 68%
Arabic Dep:
50%
EFL Dep.: 55%
Science Dep:
53%
ICT Dep: 49%
Youth Technology and Careers No such project MIS program supported with
materials, software and hardware
in addition to training for
teachers and students
October 2008/ Teachers'
Training 100%
E-material 100%
Science Project No such project Better trained science teachers
on how to deliver new science
curriculum with a focus on ICT
December 2008/ 100% completed
Development of supplemental
curriculum materials
Limited
supplemental
materials
Learning materials available to
support learning
Throughout the life
of the project
On track
Connect schools to high-speed
learning network
Unavailability of
network at MoE
schools
Schools are connected to high-
speed learning network
coinciding with curriculum
implementation schedule
June 2009 Module 1: 100%
Module 8 :
100%
North Region :
60%
36
Build a communications
infrastructure network
management, technical support
and maintenance
Inefficient
infrastructure
Communications infrastructure
network management, technical
support and maintenance are
provided to ensure high quality
support to educational
programming
June 2009/ Connected
schools: 80%
Maintenance
contract is
running.
Helpdesk
postponed to
ERfKEII.
Component 3: Support Provision of Quality Physical Learning Environments
3.1 Replace
structurally
unsafe and
seriously
overcrowded
schools
Replacement of
unsafe and
overcrowded
schools mapping
World Bank Overcrowded
and unsafe
learning
environments/
Many rented
schools
41 new schools built June 2009 100% complete EIB
(2 schools
cancelled) European Investment Bank 41 new schools built Feb 2008/ 100% complete
Islamic Development Bank 25 new schools built June 2009 100% complete
Arab Fund 38 new schools built June 2007/ 100% complete
KfW Phase I:12 new schools built
Phase II:12 new schools
Phase III:12 new schools
June 2009 phase I: 100%
USAID 28 new schools built 2010 16 schools
under
construction
(20%)
12 in design
stage
(90%)(School
construction and
renovation
program moved
to ERfKE II)
3.2
Upgrade existing
schools to support
learning
Existing schools
upgraded to
support learning in
the knowledge
World Bank Extensions Phase I: 392 schools renovated
Phase II: 127 schools renovated
Phase III: 106 packages of
schools renovated
Dec.2008/
Dec. 2008
June. 2009
100% complete
100% complete
97% Complete
USAID 100 schools renovated 2010 Moved to
ERfKE II
37
economy
Component 4: Promote Readiness of Learning through Early Childhood Education
4.1 Increase
Institutional
Capacity
An enhanced
institutional
capacity
(regulation, and
standards) for KGs
developed and
programs updated.
Development and modification
of ECE Curriculum
No KG
National
Curriculum
National Curriculum and teacher
guides developed, distributed and
in use
September 2004 100% complete Develop Quality
Assurance System
in public KGs
Shift from
Accreditation to
Quality Assurance
in May 2007
Development of National ECD
Standards, Indicators, and
Benchmark Framework
No standards,
indicators or
benchmarks
National ECD Developmental
Standards developed,
implemented and used for
monitoring and evaluation
purposes
December 2005/
September 2006
100% complete
Update Licensing Standards
Old licensing
standards
Licensing Standards reviewed
and updated, used for monitoring
purposes
July 2003/ July 2005 Development:
100%
Implementation:
ERfKE II
Quality Assurance
No Quality
Assurance
System
Quality Assurance standards
developed and implemented
December 2006/ Development:
100%
Implementation:
ERfKE II
Preschool Division Capacity
Building
Limited
capacity
Improved technical and
managerial capacity of Division
staff
Throughout the life
of the project
Several training
programs for
staff capacity
building
conducted
4.2 Professional
Development of
KG teachers
A cadre of ECE
specialists trained
and developed.
Train teachers in ESP furnished
KGs on Physical Environment
and Learning Materials
Limited
capacity of
ECE teachers,
principals and
supervisors
All teachers, principals and
supervisors of kindergarten have
received training in pedagogy and
the new curriculum/ In-service
training programs are being
delivered
Throughout the life
of the project
100% complete
Provide teachers with in-service
training on different topics
Awareness Seminars for
Principals
Increased Capacity of ECE
Supervisors
38
Train teachers on Modified
Curriculum
Train Teachers on “Working
With Young Children” program
4.3 Expand KGs
for the Poor
Enhanced access
to KG by poor
197 KGs established financed by
WB Loan (part of classroom
extensions)
41 KGs established funded from
the Royal Court
Renovate and Furnish 170 KG
Classrooms
Old furniture
and at times
unsafe KG
learning
environments
Kindergartens are renovated,
furnished and fully operational/
provided with learning materials
Dec/2008
2008
June 2007/
100% complete
100% complete
ECD Center of Excellence
Model
No such center Centre is built, furnished,
equipped, staffed and conducts
teaching, training and research
functions
August 2007/ 5% complete
ERfKEII
4.4 Conduct
public awareness
and
understanding Public awareness
and understanding
increased through
Information,
Education and
Communication
(IEC) and
networks with
NGOs, local
communities and
the private sector
established.
Identify and develop Mass
Media Messages
Part of the Project’s overall PRC (1.1.3)
Disseminate Better Parenting
Materials/ Increase Parent-
Community Participation
No public
awareness
workshops
Workshops conducted for caregivers
on Better Parenting and Early
Childhood Education
Throughout the
life of the project
100% complete
Parent Involvement Initiative
Limited
involvement of
community and
parents in ECE
Involvement of parents in ECE and
their participation in children’s KG
classrooms
June 2008/ 90% complete
On going activity
ERfKEII
40
Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes
(a) Task Team Members
Names Title Unit Responsibility/
Specialty
Lending
Mae Chu Chang Lead Education Specialist EASHD Task Team Leader
Regina Maria Bendokat Sector Manager MNSHD Sector Manager
Ghassan N. Alkhoja Senior Operations Officer MNSHD Operations/ITC
Margaret M. Clarke Senior Education Spec. HDNED
Mouna Couzi Senior Program Assistant MNCLB Administration
Vincent M. Greaney Consultant MNSHD
J. Roger Pearson Consultant MNSHD
Diana C. El Masri Consultant MNAFM Financial Mgmt
Mona El-Chami Sr. Financial Management Specialist MNAFM Financial Mgmt
Nazaneen Ismail Ali Procurement Specialist MNAPR Procurement
Imad Saleh Senior Procurement Specialist EAPCO Procurement
Lina Fares Procurement Specialist MNAPR Procurement
Antonio C. Lim Operations Officer ECSSD Operations
Supervision
Juan-Manuel Moreno Sr. Education Specialist MNSED Task Team Leader
Francis Peter Buckland Lead Education Specialist HDNED Task Team Leader
Haneen Ismail Sayed Lead Operations Officer MNSHD Task Team Leader
Ghassan N. Alkhoja Senior Operations Officer MNSHD Operations/ITC
Josephine Masanque Sr. Financial Management Specialist MNAFM Financial Mgmt
Jad Raji Mazahreh Financial Management Specialist MNAFM Financial Mgmt
Imad Saleh Senior Procurement Specialist EAPCO Procurement
Lina Fares Procurement Specialist MNAPR Procurement
Celine Gavach Operations Analyst MNSHD Operations
Mouna Couzi Sr. Program Assistant MNCLB Administration
Christina Djemmal Operations Analyst MNSHD Operations
J. Roger Pearson Consultant MNSHD
Dung-Kim Pham Operations Officer MNSHD
Lianqin Wang Senior Education Specialist MNSHD
Mary Eming Young Lead Specialist WBIHD
Afifa Alia Achsien Sr. Program Assistant MNSHD Administration
41
(b) Staff Time and Cost
Stage of Project Cycle
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
Number of Staff Weeks USD Thousands (including
travel and consultant costs)
Lending
FY02 22 223.49
FY03 53 229.91
FY04 0.11
FY05 0.00
FY06 0.00
FY07 0.00
FY08 0.00
Total: 75 453.51
Supervision/ICR
FY02 0.00
FY03 1.04
FY04 28 110.85
FY05 24 153.14
FY06 23 120.23
FY07 26 144.38
FY08 22 126.92
FY09 13 0.00
Total: 136 656.56
44
Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR
The Education Reform for Knowledge Economy (ERfKE) has introduced massive inputs to the
education system in Jordan) between 2003 and 2009. ERfKE started by establishing a renewed
national education strategy that guided the K-12 education in Jordan with a new vision and enriched
the system with the required infrastructure and resources to succeed. By the end of the project,
overwhelming evidence indicates that this strategy has been successful to an acceptable degree in
fulfilling the mission of the reform.
The project overhauled the curriculum to focus on learning outcomes instead of content and produced
new textbooks, teacher guides, and supplementing materials that included electronic content. It also
introduced new assessment strategies that focused on “assessment for learning” and piloted with
authentic assessment approaches. Training programs accompanied all these efforts to prepare teachers
and administrators on these changes and to transform the teaching and learning to use modern
teaching approaches that incorporated constructivist and student-centered methods and to utilize
information and communication technologies. ERfKE also introduced kindergartens to accommodate
pre-school children at public schools in poor and remote areas in an effort to prepare students to
succeed in school. This included the creation of a new early childhood development environment with
enhanced interactive curriculum based on well-defined and selected national standards in addition to
suitable infrastructure, staffing and training.
In terms of the degree to which ERfKE has been successful at transforming the education system to
produce the graduates that are equipped with the skills needed for the knowledge economy, the
evidence from data collected in the different studies suggests that there is a positive trend in that
direction but still a long way until that is achieved. Low achievement levels at both baseline and
follow up in knowledge economy skills and still a very large percentage of students are at or below
the lowest international and national benchmarks in these areas.
Overall ERfKE has accomplished the core goals in relation to providing a set of inputs and additions
to modernize the education system. However there are serious concerns about making these changes
long lasting. Local agencies and many esteemed partners and donors have worked together, each
chipped in with some resources to support the Ministry of Education in Jordan in this important
reform but these changes still need to be institutionalized based on well studied sustainability
measures.
Brief Summary on component goals and its achievement
Component 1: Re-orient Education Policy Objectives and Strategies through Governance and
Administrative Reform. Component 1 is designed to provide a redefinition of the vision and
associated policy objectives of the educational system that will enable the required transformation to
meet the emerging needs of the knowledge economy.
1.1 National Strategy: The draft Framework for The National Education Strategy for General Education
was completed, and utilized as a resource for the development of the National Education Strategy
Framework. The initial draft NES document, based on the work done for the Framework and
involving national consultations was finalized in Feb. 2005. Further work on the Strategy has been
completed in late 2005 and refinements continued through 2006. The process of development and
production of the Strategy have been substantially supported by both CIDA and USAID.
45
1.2 Organizational Change: ERfKE activities were located within its support for the Public Sector
Reform Program in Jordan. The contractor, PricewaterhouseCoopers, submitted an Implementation
plan to MOE in May 2004 with MOE initiatives focused on three pilots: Planning and Budgeting,
Decentralization and School Management and Teacher Selection and Appraisal. The work with the
pilots was completed in June 2005 and the responsibility for technical assistance was transferred to
the incoming CIDA Executing Agency (Bearing Point/SJE). SJE has expanded the work of the pilots
to support MoE in the exploration of all key areas of organizational change through a series of seven
specific areas of work with various directorates.
1.3 Education Decision Support System The assessment and design of the Education Decision Support System has been completed.
1.4 Monitoring and Evaluation of ERfKE
As part of the first component of the project, ERfKE focused on improving the national capacity in
the area of monitoring and evaluation (M&E). The National Center for Human Resources
Development (NCHRD) was the main target for this initiative. A new M&E unit was created at
NCHRD and was charged with the project evaluation. The Center created an evaluation framework
and a baseline that established the foundation for the evaluation. Overall the evaluation of ERfKE
was faced with three challenges: (1) the project was massive and was not planned or designed in a
staged way with pilots and evaluation then expansion, nor with control and intervention groups (2)
although the resources were available, the evaluation culture and system was not institutionalized
before ERfKE (3) the evaluation framework was developed about two years after the beginning of the
project. These challenges contributed to delaying and limiting the evaluation process. However, the
Center was resilient and took over the challenge. It followed a structured and systematic evaluation
work plan. The first step was a comprehensive collection of baseline data in relation to schools,
teachers, students, curriculum and the education system as a whole. To this end, data was collected in
2005 on a set of indicators pertaining to the baseline school and student achievement from available
information sources such as prior studies and education statistics from Ministry of Education (MOE).
As part of the evaluation plan, NCHRD designed and implemented formative and summative
evaluation studies incorporating mixed method approaches to assess the quantity and quality of
implemented inputs and changes. This report uses the concurrent triangulation approach to integrate
the different studies and data collected as part of the M&E framework for ERfKE then confirms,
cross-validates, and corroborates between the findings. The following are the main conclusions:
1. On the agreed-on outcome indicators, high level of achievement has been reached:
i. A new national education strategy has been put in place and implemented.
ii. The average standardized score of Jordan students in international assessments of mathematics
and science has improved, however this improvement was not statistically significant.
iii. 80 percent of primary and secondary students have access to safe and adequate basic and
secondary education school facilities
iv. 84 percent of basic and secondary students are using on-line learning portals
v. The gross enrollment rate in the second level of kindergarten has increased to 51.8% from 41% at
baseline.
Challenges to the implementation of ERfKE were related to: unanticipated and unprecedented
escalation of student enrollments; proper timely access to the required technology; insufficient prior
experience among teachers on the use of technology in instructions and the student-centered teaching
approaches; and insufficient experience, training and understanding regarding new modalities of
assessment.
46
1.5 Implementation Arrangements
The implementation activities of the ERfKE Program have clarified the need for the Ministry of
Education to be inclusive of, and responsive to, its’ various stakeholders during current and future
educational reform efforts. In response to this identified need, and to provide policy guidance and
support for the coordination of implementation to educational reform efforts, the ERfKE General
Policy Steering Committee was established and has operated throughout the duration of the Program.
This Committee is comprised of senior level; served as the governance mechanism for the
management of the reform program and oversees the work of the Development Coordination Unit
which is charged with all aspects of program coordination. The GPSC, chaired by H.E. the Minister,
provides guidance through actions and decisions on educational policy development and educational
reform priorities, the status of and directions for the ERfKE implementation process, and the effective
integration of all reform efforts under the umbrella of the National Reform Agenda and through the
National Education Strategy.
Component 2: Transform Education Programs and Practices for the Knowledge Economy.
Component 2 aims to transform teaching and learning processes to achieve learning outcomes
consistent with the requirements of the knowledge economy.
i. Developing new curriculum framework: Overall, there is solid evidence that changes in the
textbooks and assessment tools have moved the national curriculum to a new level that is focused on
skills and outcomes as indicated by experts and researchers who were involved in the different studies
that tackled this dimension. This message was also confirmed in the perception of teachers, school
principals, parents and students. On the other hand implementing the new curriculum was very
challenging and lots still need to be done to change the old attitudes and approaches and many
improvements are still needed in areas related to enriching the textbooks and instructions to focus on
skill development, applying content and on activities that promote critical thinking and problem
solving skills. While new methods of assessments have been introduced and were observed to be used
by some teachers (small percentage) more professional development activities are needed (and
requested by teachers) to help teachers understand proper implementation of authentic assessment
methods. Classroom environment: Overall, students seemed to have managed to some noticeable
degree the transition to the changes mandated by the ERfKE initiative more readily and easily,
especially students who formerly lagged behind or struggled with the course content, than the
teachers and school administrators. For example, among the public schools visited, an example of a
school that exemplified the ERfKE’s vision of a student-centered learning institution that infused
technological applications into its teaching and learning activities was a girls Discovery school
located in a comparatively impoverished district of Amman.
ii. Enhanced student Learning:
All metrics used to assess students’ participation in early childhood programs and students’ readiness
to school as they enter the first grade show that ERfKE has been instrumental in affecting the
development of young children. Enrollment and participation in kindergartens have increased
significantly due to the establishments of these programs especially in rural areas. Children’s
readiness to school has improved especially in social and cognitive domains. Specifically, by the end
of ERfKE,
a. Jordanian children have significantly better early childhood indicators at the end of ERfKE relative to
baseline: gross enrollment rate in kindergartens increased by about 3% and percentage of new
students in first grade who attended a kindergarten increased by 30%.
b. Percentage of qualified kindergarten teachers with bachelor degree and certification (at MoE schools)
increased by 37%,
47
c. Child to Teacher ratio at the kindergarten was reduced by 9%, and percentage of fully equipped KGs
(MOE) increased by 46%.
d. In addition quality was enhanced as school readiness improved over what was before the introduction
of public kindergartens.
Results are suggesting improvement at the public schools and the achievement gap between schools is
getting smaller. The between schools variability in performance is getting smaller. This was reflected
from school walkthroughs, classroom observations, and student performance on national and
international assessments. In fact public schools are becoming more competitive to private schools
than ever before. This has been evident in public schools’ achievement (relative to private school) in
NAfKE and TIMSS end of project studies relative to baseline. Public schools, especially Discovery
schools appeared more likely to embrace and realize the ERfKE mission and vision than private
schools which have traditionally served as models of academic excellence. Although the instruction
provided by private school’s teachers was excellent, teachers were reluctant to relinquish their
traditional role as lecturer or supervisor responsible for orchestrating the delivery of instruction. Thus,
teachers would actively engage students in a teacher directed Q&A session. In contrast, teachers in
public Discovery schools were more inclined to take a backseat to their students who assumed
responsibility for their own learning. In a student centered context, teachers were resources available
to support students who were active agents in self-directed learning activities that naturally
incorporated team-building and technology.
iii. Teacher Training: Both the quantitative and qualitative data indicated significant gains in what
the teachers learned, as well as an increase in knowledge. They affirmed behavioral changes in their
pedagogical style caused by expanding their awareness levels and development in relation to
ERfKE’s needs. Evidence from the studies also showed that among a group of teachers training was
definitely making a difference in the classroom. Significant evidence that trained teachers (relative to
a comparison group) have started in implementing the changes brought by ERfKE: frequent use of
modern instructional practices, integrating a variety of ICT applications, search engines, and the
Internet into their teaching, and collaboration among students, teachers and schools. However there is
still a long path toward a significant change to classroom practices especially in implementing a
constructivist approach and in utilizing different techniques to accomplish learning. Many teachers
and administrators confessed to a lack of knowledge of the pedagogical aspects and expressed a
desire for more training in this area. Also teachers indicated that there is a need to accommodate them
better to obtain the training, (a) depending on experience, (b) time, and (c) personal preference (d) a
follow up system in place to follow up with teachers.
iv. ICT connectivity & utilization:
a. School connectivity with ICTs (Intranet, Internet, Eduwave): Around 86% of schools are connected
to Intranet. Of these, 77% were connected between the years 2003 and 2006. As for Internet, around
72% of schools are completely connected to the Internet. 90% of schools are connected to Eduwave,
the learning management system.
b. Availability of computer labs: Results indicated that 79% of schools have one to two computer labs.
Only 18% of schools reported that they have three to four computer labs. It is worth to mention that
1.4% of schools (4 out of 278 schools) reported that they do not have computer labs.
c. Student-computer ratio: Results show that around 23% have a ratio of 5 to 10 students per PC.
Around 25% of schools have a ratio of 25 to 30 students per PC. A small percentage (10%) of schools
reported a ratio of 35 to 40 students per PC. However, around 42% reported a ratio of 15 to 20
students per PC. This last ratio seems to be the dominant among most schools.
d. Percentage of classrooms equipped with PCs and ICT equipment (data shows, and/or projectors) a
large percentage of respondents (around 88%) reported that classrooms at their schools are not
48
equipped with any of such equipments. Only around 4% of schools reported that some classrooms
(about one-fifth of their classrooms) are equipped with such equipments.
e. A representative national sample of school principals indicated a partial utilization of ICT at schools.
f. Occupancy rate of computer labs: When asked about the occupancy rate of computer labs at their
schools, around 58% of respondents reported an occupancy rate of 4 classes and above a day. Around
25% reported an occupancy rate of 2 to 3 classes a day. Only around 7% of respondents reported an
occupancy rate of one class a day.
g. ICT teachers’ perception of usability & reliability of connectivity & equipment: Around 67% of
respondents reported the availability of maintenance and technical support plans at the school level. A
close percentage (61%) reported that at the MoE level, plans regarding hardware/software
maintenance are available, but 14% of respondents were not sure whether such plans exist at the MoE
level.
h. Maintenance and technical support arrangements: a representative sample of ICT teachers (as the
frequent users of ICT) were surveyed and the results indicated that there was a negative perception
toward usability and reliability of connectivity and equipment.
i. Percentages of Teachers Who Use Internet (Web and email): percentages of teachers who don’t use
email/Web in teaching at MoE schools have dropped from 37% in the year 2004 and to 14% in the
year 2008. This huge decrease in percentage has been matched by a big increase for those who use it
very frequently which was 15% in the year 2004 has been almost doubled (29%) in the year 2008.
j. Moreover, the percentages of the monthly and weekly uses of PC in financial administration have
increased over the last four years. In particular, the highest increase in percentage has occurred in the
"weekly use" category (9%). A decrease of 11% in the "Never" category can be noticed as we move
from the year 2004 to the year 2008. This decrease indicates more use of PC in financial
administration.
Component 3: Support Provision of Quality Physical Learning Environments. Component 3 aims to
ensure adequate provision of structurally safe school buildings and improved learning environment.
A construction component included extending schools to accommodate new kindergarten classes,
additional classrooms, computer labs, and science laboratories. It also included building a significant
number of new schools with designs and architecture that are suitable for modern instructions with
the use of new technology. Major investment was also made to build the information and
communication technology infrastructure to reach all public schools around the Kingdom. That
included networking, computers, servers, management information system, and a learning
management platform
Component 4: Promote Readiness for Learning through ECE, envisages enhancing equity through
public provision of KG II in the low-income areas of the Kingdom.
All metrics used to assess students’ participation in early childhood programs and students’ readiness
to school as they enter the first grade show that ERfKE has been instrumental in affecting the
development of young children. Enrollment and participation in kindergartens have increased
significantly due to the establishments of these programs especially in rural areas. Children’s
readiness to school has improved especially in social and cognitive domains. Specifically, by the end
of ERfKE,
e. Jordanian children have significantly better early childhood indicators at the end of ERfKE
relative to baseline: gross enrollment rate in kindergartens increased by about 3% and percentage of
new students in first grade who attended a kindergarten increased by 30%.
f. Percentage of qualified kindergarten teachers with bachelor degree and certification (at MoE
schools) increased by 37%,
g. Child to Teacher ratio at the kindergarten was reduced by 9%, and percentage of fully equipped
KGs (MOE) increased by 46%.
49
h. In addition quality was enhanced as school readiness improved over what was before the
introduction of public kindergartens.
Quality and effectiveness of WB Supervision
Supervision missions were conducted regularly with adequately staffed teams, their performance
assuring quality at entry in a satisfactory rate. The Bank encouraged qualitative performance
throughout the life of the project and sought to draw lessons about alternative mechanisms for the
program that were implemented in partnership between the MOE, donors and NGOs.
Recommendations & lesson learned
1. It has been observed that attention needs to be given to the needs of teachers as they are the
knowledge economy professionals. They need continuous development to advance their skills in
relation to the pedagogy and technology.
2. A national strategy needs to be highlighted and emphasized to zoom on the expectations from
teachers. This national strategy needs to build on national best practices in using modern learning and
teaching methods utilizing student-centered and teaching for learning approaches. All within an
environment that uses technological supporting means to help teacher better communicate and teach
the skills such as problems solving.
3. While training seems to accommodate the basic professional development needs of teachers it is
still not sufficient to accommodate a modern education reform such as ERfKE. In one hand, it is not
sufficient to make the change and does not seem to be implemented in scalable means. A session on
operating the computer and using the Internet and another on using the textbook and assessment tools
are not sufficient to change teacher’s attitude, behavior and help them gain and transfer the skills
learned. At least the overwhelming majority of teachers have reached a reasonable comfort level in
understanding the ideas and starting to use technology and new methods of teaching but there is a
need to move beyond that.
4. Evaluation of ERfKE was a very challenging task because of timing and the magnitude of
implementation of the project. ERfKE has initiated processes to build a systematic, accountable, and
independent system in evaluation and more still needs to be done. It would have been more efficient
to have designed the reform/project with evaluation in mind and not after the fact or after the start of
initiatives. Delays in implementing research studies were due to lengthy process to get funding and
approvals. While ERfKE introduced significant improvements in relation to the evaluation processes,
more concrete steps are needed to give evaluation more independence and sustainability in terms of
moving from one step to another without delays.
5. Establish a financial process to simplify the funding of research studies based on a strategy and a
funding formula to be determined from the beginning of the project.
6. There were several success stories observed of teacher’s work in utilizing ERfKE’s main goals, to
this end, learning profiles and best practices documentation activities need to be initiated by MoE to
host, share, and use in training of teachers.
7. Several initiatives were introduced and added during the project that distracted the evaluation
plans. A clear vision that is evidence based would be a better approach to expand and scale up new
programs.
8. There is a need to establish follow-up systems/mechanisms (with programs and teachers) in order
to enforce and ensure that teachers and administrators apply what they learned, trained on, or
expected from them in relation to new interventions.
51
Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents Project Document
Initial Project Information Document, May 17, 2002
Initial Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet, May 13, 2002
Project Concept Document, May 16, 2002
Project Appraisal Document, April 10, 2003 (Report No. 25309-JO)
Loan Agreement, May 23, 2003 (Loan No. 7170-JO)
Aide Memoires/Back to Office Reports
- 2002 June, September
- 2003 March, October
- 2004 February, September
- 2005 March, September
- 2006 January (mid-term-review), November
- 2007 May, December
- 2008 February, July
- 2009 June
Implementation Status Results (ISR) # 1 - 11
- 2003 --- 06/26; 12/23
- 2004 --- 02/16
- 2005 --- 12/01
- 2006 --- 06/15; 12/28
- 2007 --- 06/28; 12/21
- 2008 --- 04/30; 09/03
- 2009 --- 06/29
World Bank
Country Assistance Strategy for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2002)
Cost Efficiency of Education Spending Study (2002)
Ready to Learn? An Assessment of Needs and Programs for Children ages 4-6 in Jordan (2002)
ICT, social inclusion, and the transfer to e-based learning (2002)
Quality Enhancement Review (2002)
Independent Auditors’ Report
Ex-post review reports
Patrinos, H. (2008) “Assessment test can be used to inform policy making”
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research
Jordan Vision 2020 (2000)
Physical Facility Needs Assessment Survey (2002)
The building capacity of schools at the Ministry of Education (2002)
Statement of Sector Policy (2003)
National Strategy for Education (2006)
National Center for Human Resources Development
Dropout ratios and factors in Jordan schools for the year 1999-2001
Formative Evaluation study of the innovation fund program
A Survey Study of Teachers', School Principals' and Parents' Perceptions of New Curricula and
Textbooks
52
Evaluation Study for Education Diploma program in communication and information
technologies (CADER).
Evaluation study of discovery school.
National assessment for knowledge economy skills (NAfKE 2006;2008).
National report on the program for international student assessment (PISA2006).
Early Development Instrument (EDI)
National report on the trend in international mathematics and science study (TIMSS 2007).
Evaluation study of the interactive curriculum
Evaluation of ICT Resources Provision, Access and Utilization
Evaluation Study of the Early Childhood Development Program under ERfKE Project.
Baseline Data Report
Monitoring and Evaluation Framework
World Education Indicators (WEI)
Baseline follow-up Study
Qualitative Summative Evaluation Study of the ERfKE
Development Coordination Unit
Operations Manual
Project Progress Reports
Action Plans
Financial Monitoring Reports
Borrower’s Completion Report
Consultants and other Donor’s Report
Supporting e-learning in Jordan: An assessment of the e-readiness of the Ministry of Education
(New Brunswick Department of Education for the Ministry of Education) 2002
Learning Better with Broad Band (Canarie Inc) 2003
Introducing computer on wheels to Jordanian Schools (Education Support Project) 2005
Maintenance System Standards and Procedures
Evaluate the technical capacity, applicability, scalability, and robustness of the e-learning
platform used by the Ministry of Education
School and District Development Program
Jordan ERfKE Support Project Quarterly Progress Report (USAID)
End of Project Evaluation of CIDA’s contribution to ERfKE
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