Directed Energy Solutions - Gulf · PDF fileDirected Energy Solutions ... • DE denies...
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I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Headquarters U.S. Air Force
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Directed Energy Solutions
Col Mike “Montana” EdwardsOctober 2006
UNCLASSIFIED BRIEFING
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• Problem• Task Forces & Priorities• DETF• EPTF• Passive Defense• Active Defense• Advantages• Roadmap—FP & ATL• Barriers
OVERVIEW
Protection
Offensive
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• DE denies full kill chain-even at low power levels• Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage & Assess• Space or Air
• Proliferation of DE devices• Threatening devices available today
• Use: Non-State actors or US civilians• Future: more power, smaller and agile
PROBLEM
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TASK FORCESDETF established Sep 2004
• 2-Star GOSG
• 75 DOTMLPF Action Items
EPTF established Oct 2004• DOD, DHS, DOT & DOJ
JIAG established Oct 2005• OSD, JOINT, Services & DHS
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PRIORITIES1. People 3. Capabilities2. Systems
Policy & CONOPS
Education & TrainingSpace
LegalTest & Evaluation
MedicalAcquisition
Modeling & Simulation
DOTMLPF
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Eye Protection Task Force (EPTF)
• Established Tech Transfer Policy• Created common Threat Document• Created civilian solution• Driving to common military solution• Commercial & First Response LEP design• Efforts expanding—ID DOD technologies• DOD LEP Roadmap • Developing Acquisition Mechanism
EPTF
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Eye Protection Task Force (EPTF)
• Established Tech Transfer Policy• Created common Threat Document• Created civilian solution• Driving to common military solution• Commercial & First Response LEP design• Efforts expanding—ID DOD technologies• DOD LEP Roadmap • Developing Acquisition Mechanism
EPTF
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SYSTEMS19 Tasks--Protection• Risk Assessments• Funding• Evaluation of Programs• Standardization
JSF & F-22Policy
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SYSTEM PRIORITIES
ACC StudyFundingTradesRed/Blue Study
PolicyJSFF-22SpaceSDB
Near Mid Far
LASERSLASERSHEL HEL
UltraUltra--Short Short Adv HPMAdv HPMRFRF??
Agile LASERSAgile LASERSHPM HPM
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CAPABILITIES
36 assigned Tasks• DE Roadmap• CRRA Process• Develop Strategic & Tactical Policies• Develop Offensive/Defensive Capabilities• Validate CONOPS• Moving to Offensive use
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PASSIVE/ACTIVE DEFENSE
Near Mid Far
Stand alone—integrated—networked Warning Devices
Sensor/Guidance/LASINT Devices
LASERSLASERSHEL HEL
UltraUltra--Short Short Adv HPMAdv HPM
Agile LASERSAgile LASERSHPM HPM
RFRF??
Who shoots first wins—OALAIRCM / DIRCM
LIDAR
Countermeasures
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• Precision– Can Target specific component– may require better aim point selection & maintenance
• Deep magazine—”Load Out” determined by power supply and duty cycle
• Limited Collateral Damage– Unintended effects must be understood and quantified
• Graduated Effects– Impact on Battle Damage Assessment, Target Regeneration/Repair
• “Instantaneous” Attack—WAR• Reduces predictive ISR requirement
• Long time of fall and flight munitions—Collateral damage issues
• NEED SPEED OF LIGHT TO FIGHT SPEED OF LIGHT• Requirement to find them first
LASER ADVANTAGES
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• All Weather—WAR • Non-lethal• Covert action is possible• Low targeting, tracking, and
pointing accuracies are required• Protective measures are not readily
available• Reconstitution is easier
RF ADVANTAGES
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• Passive/Active Defense development—sensors
• Support Non-Lethal• HPM Munitions & Platform • Force Protection• Advanced Tactical Laser
• ATL—DE Cornerstone
OFFENSIVE ROADMAP
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Develop cost effective, multi-use, integrated and interoperable solutions and generate residual benefits across DOD and external agencies
Act RecoverAssessDetect Decide
USA
USAF
USN
USMC
DHS
COMMON OPERATIONS, COMMON THREATS, COMMON SOLUTIONS…
Common threats:Insurgents/Terrorist direct attacks
IEDs and MinesIn Direct Fire Rockets, Arty, Mortars
UAVs, RCAs and Cruise MissilesCBRNE
MANPADsUnknown/Emerging
Joint Integration Advisory Group (JIAG)
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• Create Joint Force Protection capabilities • Decrease consumer costs & duplication• Increase interoperability• Expand customer base
• JCB Approved effort 29 Sep• Lead is now Army 3-Star TRADOC• Effort now called Integrated Unit, Base and
Installation Protection (IUBIP)• AAC will lead capabilities assessment team
Joint Integration Advisory Group (JIAG)
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• Fills QDR force requirements & CRRA gaps• Potential to greatly lower:
• Collateral Damage • Reconstitution Costs
• Provides new capabilities against targets• New effects & new targets can be engaged
• Path for rapid HEL employment--only mature program• Lowers cost for future DE weapons• Captures knowledge for Electric Lasers
• Numerous components remain
ADVANCED TACTICAL LASER
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ATL ANSWERSIntegration
1. Weapon integration2. System power and thermal control3. Aircraft4. Avionics and BMC4I
Laser device (COIL)5. Resonator optics6. Beam management7. Power distribution and
management8. Cooling
Optical systems9. Acquisition Tracking and Pointing
(ATP)10. Sensors11. Beam Director12. Beam director aero-optical effects
Beam Propagation Effects13. Precision Engagement14. Target / material interactions15. Collateral damage effects16. Weapon command and control
Operational concept17. System capabilities / trades18. CONOPS Modeling & Simulation19. Mission planning20. Master Test Plan / System Test &
Evaluation
Logistics and support21. Training22. Infrastructure and logistic support23. Reliability, Availability and Maintainability
(RAM)24. GSE & STE25. Software
Knowledge & Components for
Electric-based WeaponSubstantial– 16 Elements
Some– 9 ElementsLittle or none– 0 Elements
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Supports Development of Future HEL CapabilitiesEffects analysis (target vulnerability)Counter IED & UAVsISR (LIDAR)Bomber defenseTactical defenseGround attackCollateral damage assessmentsExploitation of non-lethal to lethal capability
AAC will lead ATL post ACTD effort
ATL is High Energy Laser (HEL) Cornerstone
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Policy • Principal USECDEF for Policy
• Approved Dep SECDEF support memo• Approved insertion of DE into DSPS• Support DE insertion into JCOFA
• DE Threats will be in STARS• AF Hardening Policy within 6 Months
BARRIERS
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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCEAIR FORCE POLICY DIRECTIVE 62-2
(DATE)Developmental Engineering
SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY
2. The Air Force will ensure its mission critical systems are capable of surviving against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, laser, and other forms of electronic threats. The Air Force must also apply counter-optical augmentation as an essential consideration.The purpose of system susceptibility characterization is to accurately and objectively measure and document the response of the device under test to survivability threats.
POLICY
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• Modeling & Simulation—Engineer to Aircrew• AFAMS established as POC for M&S action items• 159 Codes identified (2-3 are V, V & A)—share codes• ID gaps in capabilities• Develop proposal for funding & fixing shortfalls• Insert DE into models—Space & JCOFA
• Education & Training• ACC AFI will make it annual requirement• AFIT developing curriculum for Senior leaders and AOs• Syllabus changes within Weapons Schools etc• AF/SG & ACC developed classified training CD• MCM 3-1 Tactics/Threat Manual—insertion of DE• JMEMS—insertion of DE
BARRIERS
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• Medical & Bio-effects• AF will be executive agent (EA) for post event treatment• Prioritizing Bio-effects studies • Increasing funding for Bio-effects and treatment work
• Intelligence• Developed tie between NORTHCOM & Civilian Intel• Selection of DE center of Intelligence—J2 engaged• Standardizing reporting and tracking of events-J2• Creating strategic DE intelligence capabilities• Sponsoring development of DE sensors• Threat Study by HQ A-8 & ACC
BARRIERS
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BARRIERS
Additional Efforts• Test & Evaluation Infrastructure– ACC & DETEC• Legal, Public Affairs, Strategic CommunicationsInstitutionalization of DE• HQ AF DE Requirements Division
• A5RE & A5RW• ACC & AAC established DE Branches • AFMC established DE IPT—Expand
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• Working Broad front across DOTMLPF• Barriers to DE are being removed
• Working requirements & funding• Offensive and Defensive efforts should be
worked together• CONOPS Exist
Getting the truth and cost effective solutions and options to our senior
leaders
SUMMARY