Diminution and Development by Peter Torbay

Diminution and Development - pg 2 ___________________________________________________________________________

Diminution and Development Why America Lost in Afghanistan

By Peter Torbay

___________________________________________________________________________

Registered Writers Guild of America 10 February 2010 after acceptance for publication by Algora Publishing, NY on 4 January 2010.

Diminution and Development - pg 3

Dedication

“How dreadful knowledge of the truth can be when there’s no help in the truth.” — Sophocles


Table of Contents

Foreword

Abstract

Acknowledgement

1 – Governance in Afghanistan Today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pg 8

2 – Bridging the Gap to Effective Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pg 36

3 – Our Vision for the Future of Afghan Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pg 78

4 – The Anglo-American Vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pg 115

5 – Relations With Afghanistan’s Neighbours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pg 155

6 – The 2009 National Afghan Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pg 183

7 – Consequences and Implications for Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pg 205

Afterword

Appendix 1 – Maps of Afghanistan

Appendix 2 - Afghan Ministries & Departments; National Budget; USAID efforts

Appendix 3 – The Pashtunwali Code

Abbreviations and Terms

Bibliography


Foreword

I began this narrative in 2004, after seeing an image of the fabled Bactrian Gold artifacts of

Afghanistan in a news article. I studied the history of their creation, their lose, and then their

recovery, so much like Afghanistan’s own story, then prepared a proposal to create an online

docent-tour e-museum, and mailed it off blind to the Afghanistan Ministry of Antiquities.

I never heard back from them. Then in 2006, I received a formal request from then Governor

of Kandahar, Asadullah Kahlid, through unknown intermediaries, to conduct a mission to

Afghanistan, for the purpose of creating a similar proposal, this one a traffic master planning

proposal for Kandahar, to be presented to US Command and US AID, as part of the large

grants in aid promise the US and European leaders had made for humanitarian reconstruction.

I met my guide and interpreter, Mr. Popal, at the airport in Seattle, and together we began a

trip halfway around the world, pausing briefly in Amsterdam, then halting in Dubai, and after

a night’s rest, flying on into Kabul. There, we met another Afghan, I can only identify as Mr.

Mohammed, as all Afghans use one name for security purposes.

Mr. Mohammed and Mr. Popal would be my hosts for the next two weeks, as we caravanned

down to Kandahar on the ‘Highway of Death’, met with the Governor, then stayed at his

Guest Compound, since destroyed in a bombing, while I worked, incognito in Afghan garb,

doing the traffic geometry surveys and traffic counts necessary to put a proposal together for

the master traffic plan. Finally we drove out to the US Command base at Kandahar airfield,

and met with Command and USAID leadership. This book is the outcome of that meeting.

Peter Torbay Richmond, BC

Diminution and Development - pg 6 Abstract: This book is a political history of the empire and modern wars of Afghanistan, drawn from a review of unclassified sources. In this thesis, it is proposed that non-unique solutions to the current disintegration of the ‘Global War on Terror’ effort in Afghanistan-Pakistan are attainable, in plain view, provided US:ISAF allies self-appraise their individual motives dispassionately and objectively, by examining their national political, social, economic and religious precepts and prejudices for involvement in the occupation, pacification and exploitation of Afghanistan. Beginning with a recitation of past Afghan political history, the 30 years of industrial war, then moving to a proposal for a new ‘Afghan Vision’, as well as a deconstruction of the ‘Anglo-American Vision’ using a ‘Khrushchev’s Shoe’ approach, and along with discussion of the role of Afghanistan’s neighbours and significance of the 2009 national elections, the author presents well-tested solutions for state-building and country-rehabilitation. This book was reviewed by a native Afghan involved in political policy-making, and includes extensive country data, anecdotes and citations, making it a more useful general reference tool for policy-makers engaged in the Central Asia region.


Acknowledgement

I must acknowledge Mr. Popal, without whom this book would have remained just a memory

in my head of our visit to Kandahar. In February of 2009, he asked me to be his researcher,

writer and editor for an advanced degree thesis in political science, then with little in the way

of guidance beyond finding an ‘escape from the current Afghan pathology’, turned me loose.

I began where I left off in 2006, focused solely on development, in fact, I drafted the last

chapter, first, then worked back and forth, the first chapter as history, the second as vision,

weaving in the threads of the US:ISAF vision, Afghanistan’s neighbours, the vision of the

Afghan electorate in the failed August, 2009, elections, and finished with a series of rewrites

that lasted for months, trying to satisfy Mr. Popal’s conservative UK professors.

This effort grew, and grew, as I continued to refine, cut and paste, research and follow the

latest breaking news from the ‘Afghan Front’. This finally grew to book length, much to

everyone’s surprise. Then having satisfied my promise to Mr. Popal to ghost-write his thesis,

I kept the book manuscript and expanded on those sections which I felt were of more interest.

In this, I would like to thank one more Afghan. As we were leaving Kabul on the last day of

our failed mission, driving on the last roundabout before the airport, there was a young man

there beside the roadway, with thick jet black beard, and curly oiled hair. He was dressed in

clean white muslin, white as snow. The sun shone on his upturned face and palms as he

prayed in silence. He had been propped there, beside the curb, set on pillows, as his legs had

been amputated at the hips. Every time I thought of giving up this book, I thought of him.

We must do better in Afghanistan.


Chapter 1 - Governance in Afghanistan Today

‘Afghanistan’ is the perfect neo-liberal tar baby, and the perfect neo-conservative lab rat.

The country is falling apart. The increase in violence being mounted by militants, bandits and

Taliban, the lack of substantial redevelopment progress—as committed by the US and its

allies—and widespread mismanagement and corruption by the Afghan authorities, all expose

the general ineffectiveness of the current political and military policies of the international

community in Afghanistan. The “Good War” which united the world behind the Bush plan to

eradicate Al-Qa'idah from Afghanistan was put into abeyance by US abandonment after the

Tora Bora retreat, and its shift of focus and resources to the ill-conceived invasion of Iraq.1, 2

That damage can’t be undone. The aim of this book is to identify those poorly planned and

ineffectively executed Afghan policies—supporting criminal warlords and for far too long

ignoring corrupt officials, for example—and to present realistic solutions going forward to

the multifaceted challenges to peace and stability that remain for Afghanistan, insofar as

these can be crystallized from the daily maelstrom.

"Fragile states are not a new problem: most countries classed as poor or developing fall into the category of fragile states, and they have long been the target of international development and humanitarian assistance. In today's world of distant proximities, however, fragile states are no longer solely the concern of international assistance actors. There is a new and growing intersection among the policy, research, and programmatic agendas of the international development and humanitarian, security, and diplomatic communities that is focusing on fragile and failed states.... Particularly with the current concern over transnational terrorism,

1 - http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4860080.ece 2 - http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB214/index.htm


such states have been referred to as a 'sleeping giant' threat that requires concerted and integrated attention...."3

Since the US invasion and subsequent collapse of the Taliban regime in October 2001, there

has been a gradual increase in the number of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops in Afghanistan. Hundreds of Non-

Governmental Organizations (NGOs) from across the world have been funded by the United

Nations and the World Bank, with fiscal changes put in place by the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) and their respective governments to help rebuild the Afghan national and social

infrastructures. Yet in spite of all these international constraints and incentives, Afghanistan

continues to experience growing internecine violence and a national government which is

increasingly unable to take charge of its own affairs. Sadly, the US:ISAF Coalition seems

bent on pursuing an autonomous course of its own.4

In order to critically examine some of the successes and failures in Afghanistan, post 9/11, it

is essential to understand the aims and objectives of the campaign there. First I will delineate

and briefly explore the history of Afghanistan as an empire, including over the entire 30-year

period of war, along with its attempts at nation building with their successes and failures.

Ludovico di Varthema of Bologna only skirted Afghanistan in his travels of Arabia and India

in the early 1500’s. Western historical records date back to, ‘The Journey of Benedict Goës

from Agra to Cathay’, a Benedictine monk travelling the Silk Road to Cathay in 1584,5 then

after that, an English encounter with Afghans in Coverte’s perhaps phantasmagorical travels

3 - Lister, S. and A. Wilder. Subnational Administration and State-Building: Lessons from Afghanistan in (ed) D. Brinkerhoff. Governance in Post-conflict Societies: Rebuilding Fragile States. (London: Routledge). 2006. 4 - “Afghanistan: Economic activity and policy challenges.” (London:Library of Parliament) InfoSeries PRB 07-29E http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0729-e.pdf 5 - "The Journey of Benedict Goës from Agra to Cathay," in Henry Yule and Henri Cordier, tr. and ed., Cathay and the Way Thither, Being a Collection of Medieval Notices of China, Vol. IV (London: Hakluyt Society, 1916): 169-259;

Diminution and Development - pg 10 in 1614, as referenced by Thomas Coriate, in his ‘Traveller for the English Wits’.6 Borrowing

from the later official travel account by Lord Mountstuart Elphinstone, made during his epic

diplomatic mission to the Afghan court of Shah Shuja in 1808–1809, Hopkins argues

Afghanistan ‘never really existed’, except as an ‘Elphinstonian episteme’, in paraphrasing

M.G. Aune’s own premisefor the English episteme in India:7

“In inception, 'Afghanistan' is largely a product of the colonial conceptualization given form through imperialism. The area we now know as Afghanistan had no previous existence as a united, independent political unit. Indeed, it did not convincingly achieve this status until the reign of Abdur Rahman Khan in the late nineteenth century. The conceptual framework the British constructed during the early nineteenth century, what I term the "Elphinstonian episteme', in subtle ways went on to shape Afghan society into a reality fitting British understanding of it. This was not achieved through conquest, but rather through the slow penetration of the imperial global order personified by the British Indian Empire into the lives of the (Afghan) tribesman.” 8

Of course, that passage echoes Anglo-America’s obdurate triumphant exceptionalist weltzeit,

which I develop in more detail in Chapter 4. The Anglo-American ‘episteme’ for Afghanistan

derives from the English colonial preoccupation, dating back to the AD 1600’s, which Aune

refers to in the works of Indian political historian Jyotsna Singh:

“In her book, ‘Colonial Narratives/Cultural Dialogues’, Jyotsna G. Singh introduces and develops a post-colonial model to describe the early modern English encounter with Mogul India (28-29). Singh begins her study with an invocation of the trope of discovery deployed by European writers to depict distant lands and cultures as open and receptive to constructions of the cultural other. She quickly acknowledges that the trope acquired “shifting, multiple meanings” during the age of exploration. What is important for Singh is how the trope of discovery allowed the British to “gain … a privileged epistemological position, whereby … they could claim new knowledge” which could then be constituted as the colonial binaries of civilized/barbarous, tradition/modernity and Christianity/heathendom. These binaries, as they appear in English travel writing of India, constitute a “colonizing

6 - Coverte, Robert, A True and Almost Incredible Report of an Englishman,... 1614 (see bibliography) 7 - Elphinstone, Hon. Mountstuart. An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary and India Comprising a View of the Afghaun Nation and the History of the Dooraunee Empire. (London:Richard Bentley).1839. 8 - Hopkins Ben, The Makings of Modern Afghanistan, (London, Palgrave MacMillan), 2008, p148


imagination [her italics] which ‘discovers’ new lands via demarcations of identity and difference …” developed from binaries such as civilized and barbarous.”9

Civilized and barbarous? Afghanistan was every bit as civilized as England at inception!

“Afghanistan fell to the Turks of Turkistan in A.D. 962. The Samanid Emirate, extending east from Persia, was partially crushed and Transoxiana lost to the Karakhanid Turks in 990 but it remained for another Turk, General Mahmud, one of the greatest figures in Central Asian history, to completely overthrow the Samanids in 999, initiating the Ghaznawid Emirate in that area of southern, central Asia. Early in the 11th century Mahmud the Turk, ruler of Afghanistan, moved out of his base at Ghazni to conquer most of Persia and the Punjab of India, along with most of central Asia, establishing the greatest empire of this period.

Ghazni [in eastern Afghanistan] equaled Baghdad as a cultural center of Islam.”10

Life for the English in the 11th Century under William the Conqueror was much like that of

Afghans’ under Mahmud. The upper tiers of the baronial aristocracy held half of England’s

land, and the rest was held by tenants-in-chief and rentier-class landlords, with its isolated

tenant-farming hamlets following the ancient pattern of village settlement interspersed by

agrarian fields, exactly as in Afghanistan. What separated Afghan and English empire from

that point was English foreign colonialism, the vast wealth obtained by plundering India,

ploughing America and an African slave trade, with added convenience of shuffling off urban

outcasts to Australia, itself colonized away from the aboriginals.

By about 1747, the stable Durrani Empire in Afghanistan was firmly established, well before

American independence, so that the British East Indian Company and its trade activities on

the sub-continent in the 1800’s clearly post-dates the formation of ‘Afghanistan’ as a nation-

state, above the myriad tribes, legions and kinships that it encompassed, when, by an annual

stipend to Emir Ahmad Shah Durrani, the British Raj first assigned the named region that

Ahmad Shah administered and governed. With the end of British Empire in South Asia, the

9 - Aune, M. G. "Elephants, Englishmen and India: Early Modern travel Writing and the Pre-Colonial Movement". Early Modern Literary Studies 11.1 (May, 2005) 4.1-35 10 - Maxfield, Jack, Central and Northern Asia: A.D. 801 to 900 http://cnx.org/content/m17833/latest/

Diminution and Development - pg 12 annual stipend for the Afghan Emirate ceased and struggles began in the region as a loya

jirga (council of elders) rejected the Durand Line left undefined by the British India Office:

“The Durand Line, the meandering border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, was delineated in 1893 as the boundary between British India and Afghanistan. The international community recognizes the Durand line as the Pak-Afghan border since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, but successive Afghan rulers have repudiated its legitimacy. Afghanistan has occasionally repudiated the Durand Line and demanded the right of self-determination for the Pashtu’s because it does not consider them part of Pakistan. Pashtunistan has long been a flash point for the two countries, and brought them to the brink of war on three occasions.”11

Meanwhile, in its crawl towards being a free republic, Iraq, the real main focus on crude oil

of US:ISAF (OIF outspent OEF by 2:1) the British-backed Hashemite kingdom was installed

in 1921, and became an independent constitutional monarchy only in 1932, one hundred

eighty years after Afghanistan. That monarchy fell in 1958, in a military coup led by General

Abdul Karim Qassim, having existed only 26 years, versus the 206 year Afghan monarchy.

Qassim attempted to combine nationalism with social reform, playing off powerful populist

movements: Nasserite Arab nationalists, the secularist Arab Baath party and Iraqi Communist

Party (ICP). Saddam Hussein, a young Baath member, was involved in an assassination plot

on Qassim in 1959, and Qassim was finally removed in a February 1963 coup, engineered by

Saddam’s Baath party, in conjunction with other Arab nationalist elements. 12

Iraq went from a British installed monarchy to Baathist dictatorship in only 42 years, and it

took another 42 years, a world war and $600 billion wasted to finally achieve ‘democracy’.

From its own rise as a sovereign monarchy in 1747, Afghanistan transitioned from absolute

to constitutional monarchy in 1953, when, following disintegration of the British Indian

Empire and declaration of the free republics of India and Pakistan in 1947, King Mohammed

11 - Mahmood, Tariq, The Durand Line:South Asia's New Trouble Spot, (Monterey:Naval Postgraduate School), 2005. 12 - http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=51

Diminution and Development - pg 13 Zahir Shah made the appointment of his cousin Mohammed Daoud Khan as Afghanistan’s

first Prime Minister. Our country then languished within a period of factionalism and political

infighting until 1964, when Zahir Shah introduced his form of ‘democracy’ with the new

Afghan Constitution, granting free elections, a parliament and universal voting rights, in

parallel with the American Civil Rights Act of 1964.

But only nine years later, Daoud Khan staged a coup d’état while King Zahir Shah was out of

the country, and declared Afghanistan a ‘free republic’, with himself as President. Zahir Shah

soon abdicated, and the Afghan monarchy came to an end, after more than two centuries of

existence, and perhaps coincidentally, just as the US occupation was ending in Viet Nam.13

The 1970’s were pivotal for Afghanistan’s future. US President Nixon took the US$ currency

off the gold standard in 1971, with monumental impact on the global currency exchange. In

October of 1973, OPEC announced an oil embargo on nations supporting Israel during the

Yom Kippur War. Nixon signed the Paris Peace Accords in January, 1973, ending the decade

long Viet Nam War, before he was impeached and forced to resign the following year. The

fiat US$ currency, post-Viet Nam War, Nixon’s impeachment and the OPEC oil embargo

economic slowdown led to a severe US economic recession.

Meanwhile, in 1975, Leonid Brezhnev, Soviet General Secretary, signed the Helsinki Final

Act, legitimizing the Soviet authority over its satellite states, and in 1977 Brezhnev forced his

way onto the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet as Chairman, making him the most powerful

Russian leader since Stalin. Soviet espionage succeeded in stealing US Defense and National

Aerospace Administration (NASA) aerospace documents on secret US surveillance satellites,

the Space Shuttle, Saturn rocket, the Apollo Program, Poseidon missile, Boeing 747 and vital

US computer technology. In 1977, two agents for the Soviet Union were arrested, tried and

sentenced in a highly publicized trial which deeply humiliated US Department of State, as the 13 - http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB59/

Diminution and Development - pg 14 Cold War reached its apex, and the decades-long US:USSR Cold War played out its final act

in of all places, the Garden of Central Asia, Afghanistan.14

On the 27th of April, 1978, the Saur (April) Revolution marked the ascension to political

power of populist communalism in Afghanistan, establishing the People’s Democratic Party

of Afghanistan (PDPA). The PDPA was not united in its aims, however. It was bitterly split

into two factions: Parcham (‘Flag’, considered intelligentsia) and Khalq (‘Masses’). That rift

wedged an opening for the Soviets, who had been developing Afghan natural gas fields since

December 18, 1955, when Moscow announced a major development loan of $100 million.

The Saur coup was triggered by the murder of Mir Akbar Khyber, a member of the Parcham

faction of the PDPA on the 17th of April, 1978. The murder was never solved, and two days

after Khyber’s burial, there were massive protests in the capital city of Kabul – an estimated

15,000 demonstrators, the largest crowd ever seen.

The protestors marched on the US embassy, “shouting Marxist slogans against the CIA and

imperialism”. Not surprisingly, these events drew a response from President Daoud, when he

opted to arrest the PDPA leadership. However, Daoud’s decision was poorly executed. Those

arrests were attempted only after a full week had passed and were also unsynchronized. This

allowed a second-in-command of the Khalq faction, Hafizullah Amin, to carry out a series of

counter-plans and to pass messages on to sympathetic military commanders. The PDPA drew

large support from the armed forces, and by evening of the 27th of April, the Saur coup was

over. President Daoud and 17 members of his immediate family had barricaded themselves in

the presidential palace, and all were shot dead after Daoud refused to surrender.15

14 - Andrew, Christopher and Mitrokhin, Vasili, The Sword and the Shield, (New York:Perseus Books), 1999 15 - Andrew, ibid

Diminution and Development - pg 15 [NOTE: In neighboring Iran, almost in parallel, a populist movement began in January 1978,

and the Shah of Iran was deposed in fleeing to exile in January, 1979, before future Iranian

liberties were abrogated by the hard-rightist Ayatollah, and Iran became a theocratic state.]

A maelstrom of civil war was unleashed, born in the epi-center of the super-power cold war!

And let me emphasize that at this moment in time, Afghanistan had been a civilized empire

for nine centuries and a stable monarchy for two of those, had a natural gas resources trade

with the Soviet Union, a rich agricultural trade of its world-famous nuts and fruits, Afghan

carpets and semi-precious gems, their own military & state, and ‘modern’ cities beginning to

sprout trendy shops and clubs as a tourist mecca for young Europeans. The Afghan Treasury

was unable to keep up with the booming economy, and as a result, our currency (Afghani)

was rapidly appreciating, drawing in more foreign investment. Good times! Afghanistan’s

later ‘right out of the Old Testament’ status derived entirely from Western wars of empire.

Nur Mohammed Taraki seized power as Afghan President, then PDPA was free to pursue

Marxist ideology. However, his administration failed at the first hurdle. Land reforms, which

were the top priority of Daoud’s administration, were also pursued by the PDPA, but without

Daoud’s diplomatic finesse. What Daoud understood, the PDPA did not – the power of Islam

as its faith affects the minds of the Afghan peoples. PDPA land reforms ran counter to beliefs

of conservative Muslims, and roused critical offence when Islamic scholars (‘mullahs’) were

ordered to surrender their properties. Likewise, the PDPA decreed new “educational” drives,

described as a religious struggle (‘jihad’) - on illiteracy. In a departure from Afghan cultural

practice, women were expected to attend these jihad classes and elderly men were coerced as

well, but Marxist indoctrination programs were anathema to the religious mullahs. Marriage

laws were also changed and freedom of choice was promoted. Womens’ rights were another

Diminution and Development - pg 16 serious divergence from cultural norms. These pogroms generated strong cultural resistance

from the various Afghan regions, sects and tribes, as I will detail and cite in later chapters.

The abrupt introduction of such inflammatory legislation most likely struck both moderates

as well as conservatives as unmeasured, unrepresentative and running contrary to the beliefs

of the majority of Afghans. Uprisings occurred in various parts of the country which were

then suppressed with overwhelming aggression, and often with the assistance of local Soviet

military resources. A most notable example is that of the uprising of Herat, a province in the

west of Afghanistan. Villagers gathered in the town, soldiers from the garrison mutinied;

communist teachers, officials, Soviet advisors and their families were murdered; and the

prison attacked. Ismail Khan, a former professional officer became the leader of resistance in

Herat province. The uprising was crushed by a column of armoured vehicles with support of

the air force, a portion of which is suspected to have come from the USSR. This dependence

on the Soviets also became a source of great discontent among the Afghan peoples, I feel.

Taraki’s government addressed the Soviet Union as the ‘Great North Neighbour’ and Soviet

advisors and arms flowed readily into the country. This led to the popular suspicion that the

PDPA had become a puppet government of the Soviets. Thus, in the classic metaphor of the

‘vicious circle’ that we see playing again today: more uprisings occurred and the government

sent for more aid from the Soviets. It is within this ‘death spiral’ that Afghanistan had locked

itself – the country was now on a sure course toward political suicide and social disorder.

In February, 1979, US ambassador Adolph Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul. President Carter’s

national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski immediately painted it as a Khalqi-Communist

plot and pushed to destroy US-Soviet détente. However recently declassified cables show

Ambassador Dubs kidnappers may not have been affiliated with the Khalq at all, but with a

known pro-Chinese Maoist terrorist organization, known as ‘Setam-i Milli’. Other accounts

Diminution and Development - pg 17 say Dubs was killed seven months later on orders of Syed Daud Taroon, Security Chief of the

KHAD intelligence agency, then Taroon was himself killed in a shootout between Taraki

security and Amin security.16 There is even evidence the Americans were planning a putsch

as well, using their CIA-installed Shah of Iran, to mount an Iranian invasion in order to

remove Communist government in Kabul!17 In any case, Dubs’ kidnap became pivotal.

With the advantage of hindsight it now seems clear that at this point an invasion by the

Soviet Army was inevitable. It was imperative to them that they maintain a Marxist state in

Afghanistan under the Brezhnev Doctrine, as a ‘buffer’ within the Soviet sphere of influence

against neighbouring free republics of Pakistan and India. The Soviets had built a covert

special forces unit (spetsnaz) on Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB) Chairman

Yuri Andropov’s instructions, specifically for the purpose of maintaining communist

dominance within the rebellious satellite states.18 Afghanistan could not be allowed to fall to

the rebel uprising; this would invite American interference and provide a wedge driving apart

the Soviet satellites. The Soviets must have also suspected American covert funding.

In March, 1979, Taraki went to Moscow to press the Soviets to send ground troops to help

the Afghan army put down the mujahideen. By September, Taraki forces were actively

gunning after forces allied with West-leaning Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin. Then Amin

appointed himself Commander of the Armed Forces and dismissed key Taraki supporters

from his Cabinet. On the 16th of September, President Taraki was assassinated and Amin

succeeded him as President. But Amin’s loyalties were unknown to the Soviets. Rumours

spread that he was educated in the US and colluding with the CIA, that they had coaxed him

to power and that he was about to shift to the West. This was the trigger for Andropov’s

16 - http://www.anusha.com/escape.htm 17 - Gould, Elizabeth and Fitzgerald, Paul. Invisible History - Afghanistan's Untold Story. (San Francisco:City Lights Publishers). 2008 18 - Andrew, ibid

Diminution and Development - pg 18 Special Forces to act. The Soviet General Staff moved their operations to the Afghan border

within Uzbekistan, then Special Forces commanders secretly flew into the Soviet base at

Bagram to supervise the overthrow. Afghan expatriate and KGB protoge Babrak Karmal and

three former ministers declared Amin an enemy of the State, and on the 24th of December

1979, KGB Special Forces dressed as Afghan soldiers assaulting the palace, assassinated

Amin, and installed Karmal as President.19

"The Limited Contingent of Armed Forces of the Soviet Union entered the [sovereign national] territory of Afghanistan in the last days of December 1979, "with the mission of rendering international aid to the friendly Afghan people and establishing advantageous conditions to prevent possible actions by the governments of neighbouring countries against Afghanistan." Thus, with these extremely vague goals and limited military planning time, the Soviet peoples were cast into a bloody war that would last for nine years, one month and eighteen days."20

The gears were set in motion for Afghanistan to become the ultimate Cold War battleground

that Cuba had once threatened to become, as US had already decided to confront the Soviets

there, six months before the KGB Special Forces operation. On July 3, 1979, President Carter

signed a presidential finding, authorizing funding for ‘anticommunist guerrilla resistance’ in

Afghanistan.21 As a part of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) program ‘Operation

Cyclone’, the massive arming of Afghanistan's mujahideen (muǧāhidīn “strugglers” for

freedom) was deliberately initiated, knowing it would push the Central Asia region into a

destabilizing geopolitical conflict.22 It’s exactly this type of global brinksmanship we still see

playing out in the theatre today.

19 - Andrew, Christopher and Mitrokhin, Vasili, The World Was Going Our Way, (New York:Perseus Books), 2005, P 398 20 - Russia Generalnyi Shtab Federation, Lester W. Grau (Translator), Michael A. Gress (Editor),The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost (Modern War Studies), (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas), 2002. 21 - Bergen, Peter, Holy War Inc, ( New York:Free Press), 2000, p.68 22 - The CIA's Intervention in Afghanistan, Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Le Nouvel Observateur, Paris, 15-21 January 1998 http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BRZ110A.html

Diminution and Development - pg 19 The Soviets faced a protracted and bitter campaign in Afghanistan. If the senior military

commanders and politicians believed an overwhelming show of force – ‘shock and awe’ –

would quell the rebellion that Afghanistan had fallen into, they were wrong. Soviet troops

began an occupation that was to ultimately last for almost ten years. Unable to consolidate his

power, Karmal was recalled to Moscow by Gorbechev. After a humiliating call on the carpet

and grovelling for his job, Karmal was replaced by Dr. Mohammad Najibullah as President in

1986. The Soviet troops took over the cities, including the capital, and fortified bases and

outposts. This left the countryside and mountains of the country to the mujahideen rebels,

who were being supplied by the CIA, through the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)

secret service, along the porous eastern border south of the Hindu Kush. The mujahideen

received arms, radios and medical supplies, and accessed Pakistan for rest and recuperation.

By the end of the Soviet invasion in 1989, aid being channelled into mujahideen resistance

was “something in excess of two billion dollars.”23 This war budget was matched by Saudi

Arabia, in an alliance with the US. The Saudis were also enemies of the Soviets, and they

feared Soviet superpower was advancing to dominate all the oilfields in the Middle East.

Others were repelled by Marxist anti-religion secularism as an intrusion into Islamic faith.

The CIA was covertly arming the mujahideen resistance in Afghanistan, but leaving the

issuing of arms and equipment to Pakistan, so as to disguise American involvement. We

know little about to whom Pakistanis gave the weapons. Did President Zia-ul-Haq have his

own agenda? What was Pakistan’s ultimate goal in supplying Afghanistan with aid then? 24

The attitude to Afghanistan could be described in the same way as one of the more advanced

weapons the US sent to Afghanistan: ‘Fire-and-forget’, is a term used to describe the Stinger

23 - Crile, George, Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History, (New York:Atlantic Monthly Press), 2003 24 - The Taliban File Part III, “Pakistan Provided Millions of Dollars, Arms, and Buses Full of Adolescent Mujahid to the Taliban in the 1990's”, Edited by Sajit Gandhi, March 19, 2004 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/index4.htm

Diminution and Development - pg 20 missile; a man-portable weapon for attacking aircraft. (After the Soviets left Afghanistan the

CIA attempted to purchase back these weapons for $100,000,25 and there were reportedly

CIA estimates of 600 stinger missiles still at large in 1996.) 26 It was American and Pakistani

military support actions and a popular uprising of the Afghan people against new communist

laws, along with collapse of the Soviet economy engineered by international capital during

Gorbechev’s administration, which caused the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan to fail.

"The outcome of the war in Afghanistan was sealed at a dramatic meeting of the Politburo on 13 November 1986. A year earlier, Gorbachev had given the army a last chance to defeat the mujahideen or at least to create the illusion of victory.

Gorbechev set a target of two years for withdrawing all Soviet troops, but was anxious to ensure that 'the 'American's don't get into Afghanistan' as a result. The reason for the delay was essentially to avoid losing face after the long struggle for influence with the United States in the Third World: 'The Afghan problem, as in the beginning of this adventure, was still seen primarily in terms of 'global confrontation' and only secondarily in light of the 'new thinking'.

As Gorbechev acknowledged, 'They panicked in Kabul when they found out we intended to leave.' In implementing the decision to withdraw, he also had to cope with a rearguard action mounted by some sections of the Centre and the military. He retaliated with a series of public disclosures which revealed that Soviet military intervention had been decided by a small clique within the Politburo that had put pressure on Breshnev."27

By the 15th of February, 1989, all Soviet troops had left the country, but Soviet arms,

equipment and food aid continued to flow in support, reaching three billion dollars a year.

President Najibullah reorganized his government, purged all the non-Party members, and

with a strong Soviet-trained national army, beat back the mujahideen at Jalalabad, Herat and

Kandahar. However, defectors and coup-plotters within his government eventually brought

25 - Moore, Molly, The Taliban’s deadly rise to power. (WA DC:The Washington Post), 16 Sep 2001 26 - Coll, Steve, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, (New York:Penguin Press), 2005 27 - Andrew, 2005, ibid

Diminution and Development - pg 21 Najibullah down, after General Abdul Rashid Dostam defected and Defense Minister

Shahnawaz Tanai fled the country following an unsuccessful coup attempt.28

Osama bin Laden may have been a figure in Afghanistan during that final struggle against the

communists, so he claimed in an interview, ”I was enraged and went there at once. I arrived

within days, before the end of 1979.”29 Some sources dispute this, and it does seem unlikely,

considering bin Laden graduated from King Abdul Aziz University, Saudi Arabia, in 1981.

The bin Laden family are business entrepreneurs and aristocrats in Saudi Arabia—his father

came from Yemen—business associates of the Bush oil and banking family in America, and

they made their vast wealth from a booming oil facilities- and US military base-construction

business. Unsurprisingly, bin Laden attracted a following in Afghanistan, but it is unknown at

that time what his legitimate role there was, and whether he actually fought the Soviets.

Figure - Hanging of President Najibullah

By 1992, the mujahideen had overrun the capital Kabul and ousted Najibullah’s communist

government, hanging the President and his brother, Shalpur Ahmadzi, in the central square, 28 - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_war_in_Afghanistan 29 - Fisk, Robert, Anti-Soviet Warrior Puts His Army On the Road to Peace, (London:The Independent), 6 December 1993

Diminution and Development - pg 22 and installing new Afghan President Sibghatullah Mujadidi. Then after only a two months

term, Burhanuddin Rabbani replaced him as interim leader. It was in this unsettled and

murderous environment that future Afghan President Hamid Karzai found himself, acting as

a deputy foreign minister, and following upon his former service to the Northern Alliance in

Peshawar, Pakistan, where he provided sanctuary and a conduit for CIA arms and funds.

They “emerged from the mountains…firing their guns in the air in celebration,” US Colonel

John Johnson reported later.30 The mujahideen, however, were no government-in-waiting.

They were loose bands of rebels in autonomous factions under various warlords, deriving

from tribal loyalties reaching back beyond the Durand Line and even the Durrani Empire.

Devoid of any central leadership, they had been aligned only in their hatred of the Soviet

occupation. In Kabul looting took place, government offices and police training centres were

gutted. Factions within the mujahideen briefly allied, then split apart and fought internecine

skirmishes. The sole extent of ‘organised rule’ was in the form of checkpoints, manned by

armed extortionists, demanding tolls and bahkshish every few miles along major roads.31

Yet with the Berlin Wall’s fall and end to the Cold War, former ally United States had turned

its back on Afghanistan. The rise to power of Democrats under President Clinton derailed any

plans that earlier CIA Director and later President George HW Bush Sr. may have had for the

Afghanistan region, especially since CIA Director William J. Casey, architect of the Soviet

resistance, had died in 1987 and taken those secrets to his grave. Americans were demanding

their Cold War dividend, and turning inwards. “Bush's perceived greatest strength, foreign

30 - Johnson, Col. John. Currahee Memorial Dinner. 506th Infantry. 16 August 2008 31 - Rubin, Michael. “Afghanistan: As Bad as It’s Reputation?”. (Philadephia:The Middle East Quarterly), September. 2000. Vol. 7 Number 3 http://www.meforum.org/72/afghanistan-as-bad-as-its-reputation

Diminution and Development - pg 23 policy, was regarded as much less important following the collapse of the Soviet Union and

the relatively peaceful climate in the Middle East after the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War.”32

The Coming of Wahhabi Islam to Afghanistan

It was a religious man from the southern city of Kandahar, who offered the Afghan people a

‘better future’. Mullah Mohammed Omar cited the chaos in Afghanistan as a result of the

abandonment of Islamic principles. Omar and bin Laden were close associates as resistance

fighters against former Soviet occupation, Omar may have been mentored by his Saudi friend

on the application of Islamic Sharia law [ ʃə’ri’ə - literally ‘laws’(of Islam)], as Osama

certainly continued to do afterward.33 Omar gathered together religious students, particularly

those that were ready to take on the warlords, and here the die was cast: the Mullah started a

revival with devout students of Islam and those desperate to be rid of the chaos-wreaking

mujahideen rebels, by fusing them into one faith: Any enemy of the mujahideen was a devout

follower of Islam; then any follower of Islam was obligated to fight the mujahideen. Mullah

Omar had transplanted an extreme form of Wahhabi Islam into the Afghan psyche, as a

student religious movement called ‘Taliban’ [ṭālibān - literally, ‘student’ (of Islam)], which

derives from the Salafi jihadi ethos.

The Taliban pledged to rid Afghanistan of the remnants of warlord mujahideen bands. Law

and order in Afghanistan had become nonexistent, and the terrified population welcomed the

Taliban as “angels of peace”. The mujahideen, factionally ethnic, and with no uniting cause

beyond general looting and territorial squabbles, put up little resistance. The Taliban’s claim

as religious jihadists may also have served as a deterrent to the mujahideen to resist further.

32 - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_election,_1992 33 - http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Bin_Laden%27s_letter_to_Mullah_Mohammed_Omar

Diminution and Development - pg 24 Once Taliban had established themselves in Kabul, the life-long royalist, former mujahideen

supporter and future Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who had been purged from the interim

government by Rabbini’s Intelligence Chief Fahim, became a Taliban supporter himself! But

finding no position of power offered him beyond being named as the Taliban Ambassador to

the UN, (which the UN did not accept), he broke away and lived in exile in Quetta, Pakistan,

where he worked to reinstate former King Zahir Shah. After his father, Abdul Ahad Karzai,

was assassinated in 1999, allegedly by agents of, or for, the Taliban, Karzai actively allied

with former mujahideen and one-time royalist himself, Panjshir Ahmad Shah Massoud.

Together they worked to garner support to defeat the Taliban, but with little known success.

In November of 2000, former Texas Governor and Houston oil man George Walker Bush Jr.

was elected President of the United States. His UN Ambassador, an Afghan and ‘neo-con’

Project for a New American Century (PNAC) co-founder, Zalmay Khalilizad, had already

met with the Taliban in Houston before, as I’ll discuss in more detail in Chapter 4. Bush’s

Vice President Cheney held several secret meetings with top Enron officials, including its

Chairman Ken Lay.34 Cheney and Bush allegedly pre-planned the pre-emptive invasion of

Afghanistan in the spring of 2001, as a result of that earlier meeting, and had informed India

and Pakistan of their planned October, 2001, action.35 Only months later the 9/11 attack on

New York City and Washington DC occur, ... and everything changed after that, to where we

hardly remember life before Year 2000 (Y2K), much as Afghans can’t remember ever having

the prosperous society that was stolen from us by Western geo-political intrigues.

The Taliban rule in Afghanistan lasted only a few short but devastating years after the fall of

Kabul in 1996, and came to an abrupt end after they were overthrown by US invasion forces

in October, 2001, as Bush and Cheney had allegedly planned. However, because the Taliban 34 - http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/pen-l/2002m03.1/msg00347.htm 35 - Chin, Larry, “Players on a Rigged Chessboard: Bridas, Unocal, and the Afghanistan Pipeline,” Online Journal, March 6, 2002.

Diminution and Development - pg 25 are more a Pakistani ISI phenomenon, and not so much an Afghan movement, Taliban today

still retain de facto power and dominance primarily in southern provinces and border regions,

supported in their secretive alliances by ‘unknown’ foreign entities. With former Pakistan

President Musharraf now deposed, and pro-Western billionaire President Zardari installed,

United States and International Security Assistance Force (US:ISAF) military forces firmly

occupy most of Afghanistan under a pre-elections ‘surge’—now a second ‘surge’, projected

to reach a US force of 110,000 in early 2010—, while former intelligence agents, mercenaries

and international arms merchants continue to plague the geo-political strategic planning for

Central Asia by augmenting this ‘Af/Pak’ conflict to $138B!

Pakistan and the US:ISAF alliance have come to sharp verbal blows over US Secretary of

State Clinton’s characterization of ‘Afghanistan-Pakistan’ as the new “Central Front in the

War of Terror.” 36 This ignores 25 years of benign relationship between the Taliban and the

Pakistani military. Pakistan and Iran have also announced a major gas pipeline deal through

Baluchistan, which likely involves swapping gas for Pakistan’s nuclear technology. 37

King Zahir Shah is dead. Our monarchy has lost its way, and Afghanistan is once again

reduced to the role of pawn, in what British East India once dubbed, ‘The Great Game’.

The Afghan Character

A striking and apparent feature of the history of Afghanistan is its inconsistency. Disunity is a

major factor in every chapter of recent Afghan politics – the Daoud Coup, Saur Revolution;

PDPA infighting; the disintegration of the mujahideen, the rise and fall of the Taliban. The

country has suffered thirty years of unremitting violent war and unrest after the collapse of a

36 - Hassan, Ahmed, “Parliamentarians call for change in security strategy”, (Islamabad:Dawn Media), 07 April 2009. 37 - Hassan, Ahmed and Ali, Kalbe, “Government approves Iran gas pipeline”, (Islamabad:Dawn Media), 08 April 2009.

Diminution and Development - pg 26 stable Afghan empire reaching back as far as Britain’s own, and largely from the consistent

interference by neighbouring countries and outside foreign interlopers. Then the obvious

quandary occurs: what makes Afghanistan so attractive to the Western ’industrialized’

world? Is it our famous pistachios and apricots, our melons and grapes, our wool carpets?!

What is the West doing here in our country, rather then in Libya, or Somalia, or Yemen?!

Our nation is traditionally tribal, and the loyalties of people often lie with the clan, the local

elder, scholar, or warlord, a theme that I will develop in Chapter 3. However, the return of

Taliban religious extremism, despite the US and NATO presence, along with the increased

cultivation of opium poppy bringing power and influence to drug cartels, largely diminished

the influence of local elders, as it increases the dominance of mullahs and warlords. This

plays into the hands of foreign adventurers, their goal exploitation of our natural resources.

These 30 years of conflict have ensured Afghans are neither adverse to, or unfamiliar with,

violently demonstrating, protesting and fighting to promote their interest, beliefs, and causes.

Compared to Pakistan, Afghanistan’s social fabric is far stronger and the text of history has

proven this time and time again. Afghan unity was increased by the invaders’ aggressions

hoping to make us their “buffer” state, and for the most part Afghan pride is the product of

these desperate acts of self defence. While the Afghans have their internal struggles and

ethnic divisions, they are inclined to hold a kind of common unity between these factions.


Figure 1 – Government guards (2006). (not Taliban!) © R. Marmaduke

What united Afghans during the Soviet occupation? The single most unifying event was

common hatred of PDPA pogroms and dogmas, which led to the successful mujahideen

resistance against the Soviets, aided and abetted by the Americans and Pakistanis, that

brought all Afghans together in a common war of insurrection and solidarity. The communist

regime in Afghanistan was unpopular, predominantly because of its neglect of traditional

Afghan values, although it did enjoy some support in the military and among privileged elites.

The same, however, could not be said of the Soviet occupation that followed. Various sources

estimate that between one and two million Afghans were killed fighting the Soviet army, and

factoring in the surviving veterans give us a picture of massive national resistance by the

entire male population. In the rise of the Taliban that followed, ousting the mujahideen was

seen as a hoped-for spiritual rebirth, and before their determined and inspired opposition,

mujahideen offered no resistance. Many were readily absorbed into the ranks of the Taliban.

I believe nothing unites Afghans more than a common foreign enemy. All Afghans share a

common faith in Islam. It was the guiding factor in uniting Afghans against the ‘godless

communists’, and now the ‘infidel Crusaders’, the mantra under which the Taliban recruit

Diminution and Development - pg 28 members to its ranks. Islam represents a powerful force in current Afghan political affairs,

but unlike the case in Pakistan or Iran, here in Afghanistan it is not the state that promotes

extremism within the country, or as an element of its foreign policy used against other states.

Rather, there are external forces at play, consistently trying to bring extreme ideologies and

extremists into Afghanistan, in order to keep US-lead NATO forces tied down with logistics

and greater funding for essential supplies and troop deployment to our country.

The “Global War on Terrorism”

The US campaign in Afghanistan was triggered by ‘terrorist’ attacks in America on the 11th

of September, 2001 (‘9/11’), at least that’s the official committee report after the undamaged

passport of Satam Al Suqami, one of the alleged 19 hijackers, was found at the World Trade

Center (WTC) site. It was confirmed, in telephone exchange between George Bush and Tony

Blair on 12 September 2001, that there was likely to be ‘an immediate military response’ to

these attacks. On that same day, for the first time in its history, NATO invoked Article 5 of

its North Atlantic Treaty, stating that an attack on one of its members constituted an attack on

all member states. NATO pledged to fight in defence of the US, in doing so, they legitimised

the use of military force against Afghanistan. It was apparent from early on that military

action against the Pakistani-inspired Taliban who were hosting ‘Al-Qa’idah’, would proceed

instead against Pakistan’s neighbour, Afghanistan, since Pakistan and the US were officially

‘allies’; the world was shocked and supportive of retaliation, and NATO provided political

cover to the US imperative for military action.38 It was clear to Afghans from the beginning,

however, that the US:ISAF Occupation response to ‘9/11’ would metastasize into a perpetual

US Defense Establishment beachhead in Kabul, as a Global Crusade against ‘Islamic Jihad’.

38 - Kampfner, John, Blair's Wars, (London:Free Press), 2004

Diminution and Development - pg 29 The study of political science and of history, of course, is essential in understanding any war.

It sheds light in this case on the origins of the enemy that the multinational military forces in

Afghanistan face, the aims and motivation of that enemy, and the lack of stability and great

political disunity that is a prominent feature of all recent Afghan history. Most significant,

Afghanistan’s past has seen a repetition of invasion and occupation by opposing super-

powers, comparable to the current military campaign being waged by the US:ISAF in

‘Afghanistan-Pakistan’(AF-PAK) today.

The United States had experienced the deadliest attack on its territory since the Pearl Harbor

attack in World War Two. World sympathy towards the US was unanimously supportive, as

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mobilized its military might in support of the

US operations in Afghanistan. Their aim was to topple the Taliban regime and replace it with

a moderate political establishment in the form of a ‘legitimate’ national government in Kabul.

Before long, the Northern Alliance, an Afghan opposition force to the Taliban that was

funded and guided by CIA-operatives, reappeared back on the streets of Kabul. These were

the forces which had fought the Russian Red Army, ousted Dr. Najibullah’s regime, and

ignited the deadliest ethnically-motivated civil war over power-sharing with Gulbadin

Hekmatyar in the history of Afghanistan.

It is generally accepted that the Taliban government of Afghanistan supported the aims of Al-

Qa’idah, by harbouring them, and allowing the establishment of terrorist training camps. It is

questionable, however, whether the Taliban can be held directly responsible for, or even had

prior knowledge of, the attacks of 9/11. It seems unlikely that the large, open organisation of

a rebel insurrection would be privy to secret plans of Al-Qa'idah. This was clearly understood

and reflected in the ultimatum issued to the Taliban by Bush, in an Address to a Joint Session

Diminution and Development - pg 30 of Congress and the American People, on the 20th of September, 2001; in which he ordered:

“Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of Al-Qa’idah who hide in your land”.39

A clear distinction was made between Al-Qa’idah and Taliban then, but it wasn’t long before

this distinction was blurred, and now we will never know, because the Bush Administration

pipelined all their e-mails through a private network service, so there is no public archive,

and hence no ‘Bush Papers’ equivalent to Nixon Papers, to unmask one day in the future. In

that cover-up, Bush also ordered all Presidential Papers sealed from 1980 forward [e.g. the

Reagan Era] on December 10, 2001, concealing Executive records forever from the People!

Americans are now permanently disenfranchised from their national government and hyper-

consolidated State-fed news media, exactly as Afghans have become under US occupation!

The Clinton Administration had earlier met directly with the Taliban, at the same time as they

were attacking Afghan training camps with cruise missiles, seeking some kind of trade to

have the Taliban expel bin Laden for the Sudan bombings. The Taliban envoy demurred: “By

the end of the November 28 (1998) meeting, pressed on why the Taliban refused to turn over

bin Laden, Ahmed said that the Afghan people, "would not understand why the Taliban had

expelled a man who was regarded as a 'great mujahid,' or Islamic fighter, during the war

against the Soviets. They would reject the Taliban if the Taliban took this action”."40

So the US ultimatum went unanswered, and in the eyes of the Bush Administration served as

a sign of complicit support for Al-Qa’idah by the Taliban. America’s leadership were aware

that this was an oppressive, opium trade suppression – and now, terrorist-supporting regime,

that had (either rightly, or wrongly) come to power via Pakistan with support from ISI and

other foreign Arab entities. If Taliban were removed as collateral to the US campaign to

39 - Bush, George, Address to a Joint Session of Congress Following 9/11 Attacks, 20 September 2001, 40 - U.S., Taliban bargained over bin Laden, documents show. CNN 19 August, 2005. http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/08/19/taliban.documents/index.html

Diminution and Development - pg 31 destroy Al-Qa’idah, well, then so be it. War was declared on Afghanistan as a nation! Yet, it

is this blurring, or widening, of the objectives that has caused widespread disagreement over

the success or failure of those operations. The Taliban were routed! Mission Accomplished?

The leaders of the UK and US, those primary instigators of military action, Bush and Blair,

were very particular in stating their aims. Bush’s war branding was carefully crafted, as I

illustrate in Chapter 4. That slogan itself insinuates without another word, ‘if you oppose this

program, you will be left in ashes’. In his address to the Joint Session of Congress, Bush

coined the phrase “War on Terror” and soon after Blair, at the Labour conference 2001 spoke

generally of a time to “re-order this world around us”.41 Bush and Blair were capitalising on

the global outrage and shock of the 9/11 attacks, and on the political capital thrown behind

military action by NATO, in order to keep their ulterior aims and objectives and options as

wide as possible. There was no intention to go to war in the ‘traditional’ sense – war had been

declared, not only on the Taliban and Al-Qa’idah, but on every supporter, sympathiser, and

every affiliate of Islam, and on every popular insurrection, even the anti-globalisationists,

worldwide. Bush’s ‘Global War on Terror’ morphed into an international war on nationalist

freedom to resist the global lockstep of a super-corporate supra-financial ‘New America’, by

painting them as the ‘terrorists’, but those ‘code words’ are clear, if you know how to read:

"We will not apologize for our way of life nor will we waver in its defense. And for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that, ... Our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken. You cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you. To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist"42

Of course, Taliban were no match for the pre-planned US invasion, and were quickly routed.

The Bonn Conference was convened to unite the Northern Alliance with moderate Afghan

41 - Michael White, Wednesday October 3, 2001 The Guardian http://www.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=006ZYf 42 - US President Barack Obama Inauguration Address, 2008

Diminution and Development - pg 32 factions from all across Afghanistan. The alleged aim was to forge a moderate democratic

system and to ‘rebuild Afghanistan’s institutions and infrastructures’. That the Western

powers installed Hamid Karzai in office as interim Afghan leader, then later the légerdermain

of a ‘secret ballot’ held for selecting their contender in a loya jira council, later still through

the charade of ‘democratic elections’ by flying Karzai around the countryside ahead of his

rivals while lavishing his administration with aid, is a convincing proof that Karzai was hand-

picked by the West in hopes of establishing a ‘legitimate’ Central Asian colonial bureaucracy

[or a ‘foreign trade friendly business profit centre’, ... whichever terminology you prefer].

President Karzai’s popularity sprang from his willingness to cater to all ethnic groups, or as

US President Obama might say, “To bring everyone inside the tent”. But most importantly,

President Karzai's selection was due to his ability in 2002 to bring needed international relief,

military and diplomatic support, and to secure promises from the Bush Administration that

Afghanistan would not be abandoned for a second time. (Which, sadly, those last promises

were immediately junked by President Bush in March, 2003, with the invasion for OIF-Iraq.)

By avoiding the former Soviet-era error of Khalq intelligentsia issuing edicts for land reform

and pogroms for women’s rights, which would have been at odds with the views of Afghan

peoples, of the deposed Taliban, and frankly, of the US Right itself, Karzai’s Administration

has successfully endured for five long years. Now with the countryside substantially pacified

instead of in open revolt, and with his competing opposition effectively marginalized or

silenced, Karzai rules the business and administrative affairs of Afghanistan, leaving ‘crowd

control’ to the US:ISAF alliance, and the fourth estate to kidnappers and Taliban assassins,

(viz. journalists Abdul Samad Rohani and Javed Yazamy, recently murdered in 2009).43

43 - http://frontlineclub.com/blogs/frontline/2009/03/javed-yazamy-killed-in-kandahar.html

Diminution and Development - pg 33 Indeed, by confidential memo, I’ve heard complaints that the ‘Karzai Administration’ had

notified US:ISAF command there is only ‘one State-approved media’ (e.g. monopoly) in

Afghanistan, managed by 'Qazi Omar', aka Omar Karzai, a Karzai cousin, but it’s known the

company itself is owned by Abdul Qayoom Karzai, a Karzai brother now living in the USA,

and the monopoly is being aided and abetted by an influence racket run by another Karzai

brother in Kandahar, Ahmad Wali, ... or so they claim. Still, I have also seen the US and

Canadian Command memos, acquiescing to the State media monopoly demands, cancelling

their media contracts with private independent Afghan firms, in favour of ‘Qazi’.

We know that President Karzai released all the drug lords that US:ISAF had rounded up and

imprisoned, ahead of the August elections, which has caused great consternation in NATO.44

And we know US Congressmen Tierney, Chairman of the Committee on Fraud, Waste and

Abuse, grilled the Inspector General in September, 2009, about the lack of audits for US

$10B’s in missing aid-funding for Iraq, Afghanistan and Katrina, after the Commission on

Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC) issued a scathing report in February,

2009, 45 and Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction issued a

Strategic Plan for Inspections in April, 2009, eight years after Afghan occupation began! 46

As Bush put it, “You are either with US, or you are with the terrorists.” This is the exigent

and divisive tactic of ideologues, reaching broadly left and right to achieve goals by overt

coercion. The question raised: is fundamentalism a useful political tool for achieving our

democratic aims? If not, then can Afghanistan be a winnable ‘victory’? History says no.

Afghans will always unite against a common enemy. If the US:ISAF forces in Afghanistan

allow themselves to be painted as the unwanted invader/occupier, endlessly expanding their

44 - Farmer, Ben, Afghanistan: senior female judge accuses Hamid Karzai over release of drug lords, (London:Telegraph) 06 Sep 2009 45 - http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Press.MinorityNews&ContentRecord_id=667fcf4d-7e9c-9af9-7a96-fe90922e918f 46 - http://www.sigar.mil/inspections/pdf/Strategic_Inspections_Plan.pdf

Diminution and Development - pg 34 military and business intrigues in the region, and supporting a national government in Kabul

that is being portrayed as being corrupt and nepotist, all signs point to a doomed campaign.

“Once funding for Coalition military operations is factored in, the cost of maintaining relative peace and stability in Afghanistan could exceed the $16-18 billion per year currently being spent — a prohibitively high figure in light of creeping donor fatigue. With the security situation in the country still volatile, regional posturing intensifying, and the United States signalling that troop withdrawals are imminent, Afghanistan's transition remains fragile and uncertain. Senior Washington officials already quietly acknowledge that the reform process has failed to maintain the critical momentum that the Afghan government's landmark report, Securing Afghanistan's Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward, appeared to generate.”47

Yet just released figures show the burn-rate in Afghanistan has already soared past US $43

billion per year, and that’s before General McChrystal’s 30,000 troop ‘Surge 2’ budget is

approved!48 Highlighting the runaway cost-growth in US Defense, others even vociferously

claim the troop levels and $43 billion per year spending are not nearly enough for ‘victory’:

"....the United States not only failed to adequately fund the [Afghan National Army], it only reacted after the Taliban-HiG-Haqqani scored major gains in the power vacuum left by inadequate forces and resources. It then reacted erratically and as if a surge in one year could somehow solve the problem. The US was strong on concept and rhetoric and dismally incompetent in planning, management and execution. The cost of failing to provide the proper resources for the Afghan Army, which has been seen as the key alternative to more US troops, is that an effective force has not been created as quickly as possible, and US and NATO/ISAF goals remain unmet.49

This clearly highlights an invisible insurrection going on in the US, between Congress, State

and Pentagon, its think-tanks and war contractors, which I’ll address in depth in Chapter 4.

There is an, as yet, unmasked insurrection in Afghanistan as well. The US-installed national

government of some 107 ministries and departments has a ‘burn-rate’ of $2.7B, more than

47 - Sedra, Mark and Middlebrook, Peter, “Revisioning the International Compact for Afghanistan”, (Washington DC:Foreign Policy in Focus), 2 November 2005. 48 - Tiron, Roxana, U.S. spends $3.6 billion a month in Afghanistan, (WA DC:The Hill) 14 October 2009 49 - Ambinder, Marc, Cordesman's Verdict: Afghanistan Needs New Strategy, Lots of Money, (NY:The Atlantic) 6 August 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 35 300% of the total Afghan GDP. President Karzai recently announced that Afghanistan would

not be able to afford the cost of its own government and military until 2024, at the soonest!50

In the following chapter, I will examine whether Afghanistan can possibly be governed at all,

by briefly reviewing the progression of Afghanistan’s historical past, then expanding, and in

some instances detailing, those specific issues which plague Afghan governance at present.

50 - Oppel, Richard, Bumiller, Elisabeth, Karzai Says Afghan Army Will Need Help Until 2024, (NY:NY Times) 8 December 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 36 Chapter 2 – Bridging the Gap to Effective Government

In the first chapter, I introduced Afghanistan as a long established sovereign state, co-opted

and caught in the US:ISAF ‘Second Front in the Global War on Terror’™, having suffered in

living memory now three successive decades of modern warfare, from Soviet occupation, to

mujahideen- versus-Taliban civil war, and now what appears to be further occupation without

end. No other country in the world, or in human history, for that matter, has suffered and

survived through 30 successive years of modern high-tech warfare. There are no precedents,

nor is there any ‘cook book’ or Army Technical Manual for how to ‘secure the blessings of

liberty and prosperity,’ the fundamentals found in that Anglo-American belief in ‘Freedom

and Democracy for All’™. We had liberty and prosperity until it was stolen from us!

Instead, as in the past, US:ISAF went into this without an exit plan, and without a strategy for

pacification, resettlement and redevelopment with a minimum of collateral damage. As a

result, their initial neo-liberal ‘Hearts and Minds’ has been rudely supplanted by the more

traditional Judeo-Christian ‘Clear and Hold’, and the question goes begging: then what?

Can Afghanistan ever be governed? Remember the ‘Elphinstone episteme’? In his grand epic

adventure, trekking from India to Kabul, Lord Elphinstone describes ever more remote and

isolated Afghan tribes, each more friendly or fearsome than the last, and each region more

desolate or verdant, until at last he arrived in ‘Caubul’ at the base of the fabled Hindu Kush,

and strategically located along the trade routes of the Silk Road, a city said to be 3,000 years

old, where he was the guest of the Afghan King, with all Elphinstone’s retinue of men,

animals and equipment, for two years:

“In Afghanistan … the internal government of the tribes answers its end so well, that the utmost disorders of the royal government never derange its operations, nor disturb the lives of the people. A number of organized and high-spirited republics are ready to defend their rugged country against a tyrant, and able to defy the feeble


efforts of a party in a civil war. …but if a King, of sufficient genius to form the design of cordially uniting his subjects, should spring up among the Afghauns, he would necessarily fall on a beautiful form of government, as the only one by which he could possibly accomplish his design. ”51

So there’s Elphinstone’s clue, the secret herb to spice this Afghan stew: ‘internal government

of the tribes’ by ‘national cordial unity’. Yet when we see the level of nepotism, corruption

and administrative overhead within the Afghan national government’s crippled institutions,

under the general shortage of trained Afghan technocrats, it leads to one dire quandary; how

can Afghanistan continue to survive as a sovereign nation in such disorderly governance?

Figure 2 - Extent of the former Afghan Empire of Ahmad Shah Durrani 52

Since its creation as a formalized state in 1747, Afghanistan has enjoyed both glories and

hardship. Ahmad Khan—Shah (King)—the founder and Father of modern Afghanistan,

conquered the largest territory since the Persian Empire.. The Afghan Empire stretched from

Mashhad, in mountainous Iran, to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean, covering all of

51 - Elphinstone,1839, ibid 52 - http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Afgempdur.jpg

Diminution and Development - pg 38 future Pakistan and the west within future India to the Indus River, seat of Pakistan’s claim to

being a pre-Islam, pre-Hindu ‘Indus Valley Civilization’, even older than that of Caubul’s.

75 years later, the British East Indian Company would further imperial political interest in the

Afghan region with the Battle of Plassey against Siraj Ud Daulah, the last Nawab of Bengal.

Afghanistan was soon to be the buffer state in the 19th Century “Great Game” and a century

later host the final armageddon between two Super Power rivals of the “Cold War”. While

the influence of British and Russian oligarchies was waxing at this time, the effectiveness of

Afghan authority was waning. The pressure of their rivals in the region disrupted effective

governance and forced the leaders of Afghanistan to fight. Their fight for freedom turned into

fight for survival, and this forced Afghan leaders to choose sides. Each time they changed

sides, the cost to the Afghan people was enormous.

All along, Afghans managed to have a functioning or semi-functioning government that

maintained its authority sufficiently to lead it through the test of the times. However, external

events beyond the control of Afghans, and those pressures and effects on trade and commerce

created a culture of rivalries and distrust among the people. Emir Abdur Rahman Khan was

forced to concede temporary secession of Afghan territory to both British India and Tsarist

Russia with their Joint Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission Agreement. In spite of this, the

Afghanistan state that remained has proved to be unbreakable. Afghanistan’s social structure

remains the strongest among any of the world’s multiethnic and multilingual states. Political

disunity among Afghans, external interference—Taliban’s regime—and severe economic

hardship of the most recent decades have not been able to break the Afghan spirit or faith.

National governance in Afghanistan was always less relevant to the individual, but it remains

at least a banner and a symbol of Afghan identity and unifying source of debate.

Diminution and Development - pg 39 The Causes of Malaise

Online streaming video (digitized film) found at University of Pennsylvania’s archive on

Afghanistan, and taken before the Soviet Invasion, clearly shows a pastoral land with an

untroubled, untrammelled village life.53 Western travellers during the ‘hippie era’ in the

1960s reported a ‘Shangrai lai’ of easy living in the ‘Land of the Happy Hunzas’, and TV

pitchmen regaled US viewers with tales of ‘living for a century, like they do in Hunza Land’.

Every youth in Europe wanted to visit the streets of Kabul, which like many Muslim capitals,

had begun to westernize their society.

During the 30 year siege since those carefree days, Afghans have endured terrible political

divisions: through the Soviet occupation, three brief presidency’s, a presidential hanging and

several high-level assassinations, the defeat of a disjointed mujahideen coalition by a unified

fundamentalist Taliban regime, and finally takeover by US:ISAF invasion with its successful

installation of a Western-style Presidential Executive, a passive ‘House of the People’ and

‘House of the Elders’ bicameral Legislative arm, and a largely corrupted Supreme Court.

Afghans continue to express their displeasure with the way national government is actually

functioning: “Many Afghans are still sceptical about the central government and perceive it

to be a client of the international community. In the country’s eastern provinces, for example,

many local leaders balked at seeing Kabul appointees distributing community land to their

cronies. Situations like these, create opportunities for unrest and, ultimately, for violence.”54

Politically, Afghans are as divided as they were during PDPA-Soviet rule, during the civil

war over power sharing among mujahideen and again during the Taliban regime. The result

53 - http://www.archive.org/details/upenn-f16-0286_1965_35_Afghanistan 54 - http://www.usip.org/resources/afghans-international-community-chart-joint-path-forward

Diminution and Development - pg 40 of such chronic divisiveness has left the current governing bodies weak and preoccupied with

themselves, rather than fulfilling their responsibilities to the Afghan people, in my view.

More than half the Afghan population lacks suitable drinking water and sanitation facilities.55

Seventy percent of Afghanistan's urban population lives in informal settlements without basic

services.56 More than two-thirds of Afghans remain functionally illiterate, and barely half of

school-aged children receive any formal education. Under-5 mortality rate is the third highest

in the world, and half of the under-5 survivors show moderate or severe nutritional stunting.

There are over 1,600,000 war orphans, and more than 2,100,000 internally displaced persons

(IDP), the largest internal refugee population in the world.57 Pakistan has just announced it

will deport another 800,000 expat Afghans by the end of 2009, and who can say how many of

the FATA/NWFP Federally Administered Tribal Areas / North West Frontier Provinces (of

Pakistan) crisis in the Swat Valley will add to that? Other than a few literate technocrats in

the large Afghan cities benefitting from national government posts and perks, the majority of

Afghans remained estranged from and disenfranchised by their national government, as

millions of Afghan refugees remain landless and homeless.

The Poppy

As a result of persistent droughts that limited agricultural production of food crops and a lack

of adequate law enforcement under international oversight, poppy cultivation has become an

easy source of income for Afghan farmers. Afghanistan is now the largest opium producer in

the world. Farmers are protected from and taxed by the drug traffickers and militants who are

opposing the current Afghan government. “We must destroy poppy, or poppy will destroy

55 - http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/afghanistan_statistics.html 56 - http://www.undp.org.af/News/2008/08-10-22-UNDP_PRESS_RELEASE%20UDG_eventEngfinal.pdf 57 - http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/country?iso=afg

Diminution and Development - pg 41 us,”58 President Karzai warned in 2006. Well it may, since poppy cultivation has increased!

From its huge profits, trafficking and Taliban insurgent activities are equally on the rise. An

unidentified top Afghan government official reported, during his official trip to London,

President Karzai told him British authorities pressuring him to replace Rahmatullah Raufi —

now the ousted governor of Kandahar and former chief of the Afghan National Army in five

provinces, including Kandahar — because he had several tons of heroin in his house.59

Figure 3 – Afghan poppy farmer, [Daily Mail, UK]

One Afghan who has been accused in the global media as well as private conversations of

drug trafficking is Ahmad Wali Karzai, younger brother of President Karzai, and head of the

Kandahar Provincial Council.60 President Karzai has been defending his brother since 2006

when these drug allegations first came to light. Ahmad is one of several well known Afghan

officials with alleged connections with the drug trade, and neither NATO forces nor Afghan

authorities have undertaken any serious investigation in order to reach a decisive conclusion.

58 - President Hamid Karzai, 2006 59 - Unnamed Afghan Official, London, February 2009 60 - Risen, James. Reports Link Karzai’s Brother to Afghanistan Heroin Trade. New York Times. 4 October, 2008


Figure 4 – Ahmad Wali Karzai © NYTimes 2008

Hamid Karzai’s older brother Mahmoud,— nick-named “Mr. Twenty-Five Percent” in any

deal involving him—, has amassed “major interests in the country’s only cement factory, its

dominant bank, its most ambitious real estate development, its only Toyota distributorship

and four coal mines. Mahmoud’s swift rise to wealth stirred resentment and suspicion among

many Afghans, disaffected with the Karzai government and its seeming tolerance for insider

dealing, favor trading, … and other unsavory activities. Rampant corruption fuels the Taliban

insurgency, experts warn, and threatens American support for President Karzai.”61

As a result, President Karzai’s reputation is being unfairly destroyed by public innuendo.

Beside the Afghan National Army, there are over 8,000 British armed forces in Helmand

province of Afghanistan, yet poppy farmers have been able to systematically increase

cultivation of poppy even under the watchful eyes of both Afghan armed forces and its

British counterparts, while the US Command dithers. While the Afghan government is failing

to resolve this problem, the credibility international community is no higher and does not

permit it to point a finger at the Afghan authorities. US:ISAF shares the commitment to

eradicating poppy cultivation and providing ‘alternative livelihoods’, but so far has done little 61 - http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/05/world/asia/05karzai.html?_r=1&ref=world

Diminution and Development - pg 43 beyond building military ring roads, military bases and irrigation projects. As US Special

Ambassador to Afghanistan-Pakistan Holbrooke recently announced, ‘US is out of the poppy

eradication business”, largely because its piecemeal effort resulted in US:ISAF troop deaths

at the hands of disgruntled farmers. It also provided Taliban a recruiting tool to join the jihad.

Instead, USAID subsequently issued a Personal Service Contract (PSC) for an individual

private contractor to, ‘train the Afghan government in Kabul how to eradicate poppy

cultivation across all Afghanistan,’ in late September, 2009.62 Holbrooke was dissembling!

‘Legitimate’ Government

These lapses derive from the US Command, which blazed a trail into Afghanistan in October

of 2001, drove the Taliban out, ‘propped up’ a ‘democratic popularly elected’ president

whom they flew around the country to campaign, lavishly distributed aid money for studies

and mapping, then disappeared from the scene in May, 2003. The ensuing five years were a

lesson in administrative bloat and bureaucratic lack of discipline, a savage ‘Lord of the Flies’

which continues to propagate, even after US:ISAF has refocused its efforts:

“This historical reality poses a major problem for the US. Democracy is not a coat of paint. A feudal society in which women are still largely treated as property and literacy hovers below 10 percent in rural areas does not magically shortcut 400 years of political development and morph into a democracy in a decade. The current government of Afghanistan's claim to legitimacy is based entirely on a legal source – winning an election. Yet this has no historical basis for legitimizing Afghan rule. The winner of today's election will largely be seen as illegitimate because he had been selected.

The tragic mistake was in eliminating the Afghan monarchy from a ceremonial role in the new Afghan Constitution. Nearly two thirds of the delegates to the loya jirga in 2002 signed a petition to make the aging King Zaher Shah the interim head of state, and only massive US interference behind the scenes in the form of bribes, secret deals, and arm twisting got the US-backed candidate for the job, Hamid Karzai, installed instead.

62 - personal file copy … USAID does not leave RFPs online, and uses scans to defeat Google archiving


The US and UN policymakers then rode shotgun over a constitutional process that eliminated the monarchy entirely. This was the Afghan equivalent of the 1964 Diem Coup in Vietnam: afterward, there was no possibility of creating a stable secular government. While an Afghan king could have conferred legitimacy on an elected leader in Afghanistan, without one, an elected president is on a one-legged stool.”63

The Afghan government today continues to face tremendous problems, and has a long way to

go before becoming a fully functioning bureaucracy. Yet, at a CIA estimated $2.7 billion a

year burn rate64, it is one of the most expensive on earth, in terms of national income. The

IMF suggests an Afghanistan's GDP of only $3.4 billion (2008)65, a 50% net administrative

cost burn-rate ratio that is twice as high as the already deficit US Federal government’s, or

that of the technically bankrupt United Kingdom.66

“The lack of a viable exit strategy for the U.S. is tied directly to the real reason for its invasion and its continued occupation: the need for a pro-U.S. regime in Kabul to back its goal of controlling oil and gas supplies in the Middle East. Exiting without such a regime is seen as unacceptable. Hamid Karzai was supposed to play that role, and ... was imposed on the Bonn conference held in November 2001. Even the U.S.'s hand-picked delegates refused to give a single vote for Karzai as chairman of the Interim Administration. The large majority voted for Abdul Satar Sirat, "who represented the Afghans who wanted a constitutional monarchy as they had under the 1964 Constitution," Warnock has written. The threats from the U.S. to withdraw all funding for the future government led the conference to reluctantly reverse itself and agree to choose Karzai.

It was the end of any genuine commitment to democracy from the U.S. By manipulating the constitutional process and the rules of democratic elections, the U.S. and its NATO allies aimed at ensuring that no nationalist, secular government would ever take power. Why? Because such a government would be virtually certain to oppose U.S. imperial designs for Afghanistan. But the price the U.S. paid was the virtual certainty that any government that did hold power under U.S. rules would be beholden to the war lords and drug lords who fill the vacuum left by non-existent civil society. It would also, of course, be a government characterized by rampant

63 - Johnson, Thomas, Mason, M. Chris, "The tragic mistake was eliminating the Afghan monarchy in the new Afghan Constitution", (Boston:The Christian Science Monitor) 20 August 2009 64 - https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html 65 - http://www.indexmundi.com/afghanistan/gdp_real_growth_rate.html 66 - http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article7475.html


corruption and total incompetence, incapable of providing services to the people and equally incapable of inspiring troops and police to fight the Taliban."67

To that end, the re-elected Karzai regime must re-establish its credibility as a legitimate

bureaucracy, and not another narco-state kleptocracy, as it appears to Afghans and outsiders.

Poppy cultivation is fueling the insurgency and is linked to corruption. Eradication of the

drug trade will give the government the legitimacy it desperately needs, but staggering

problems still persist that can only be solved by channelling, and auditing, donor aid:

“In the winter of 2009, extreme cold has devastated the Afghan livestock sector, killing over 300,000 animals since late December and seriously affecting livelihoods. High prices for fuel, vegetable oil and cereals are compounding the vulnerability of poor households, reducing their access to food. The harshest winter weather conditions in nearly 30 years have killed over 800 people, and many others, notably shepherds and their families, have suffered severe frostbite, requiring disabling amputation, according to a recent FAO report.”

“Food and medical supplies have been running short as roads in remote areas remain blocked by record heavy snowfall. Winter crops in the hardest-hit areas have been severely damaged, in particular vegetables, which are the main source of nutrition during the lean winter months. High world wheat prices, and the low purchasing power of the bulk of the population, mean that the country’s commercial import requirement this year of 550,000 tonnes of wheat, the main staple, is unlikely to be met.”68

Yet just one year ago, Afghanistan was approaching agricultural self-sufficiency!69

The Spread of Corruption

Change comes slowly. For the tens of billions of US dollars already unaccounted for, only

one hundred and fourteen senior civil servants from twenty-three ministries and agencies in

67 - Dobbin, Murray, Afghan Election's Outcome Doesn't Matter, (Vancouver:The Tyee) 27 Aug 2009 68 - http://www.agrifeeds.org/en/node/21904 69 - http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/EGUA-7RQP9U?OpenDocument

Diminution and Development - pg 46 Kabul and provinces were recently awarded certificates for successful completion of the first

phase of training on Senior Leadership Competency Development Programme (SLCDP).70

Mr. Popal wrote, “I myself was most fortunate to immigrate before the PDPA government fell. In 1990, I travelled to the US via Karachi, Pakistan. I got out shortly before the mujahedeen take-over. The universal corruption I encountered in Karachi was hard to accept. Although my own country was exactly blame less. I was not to encounter corruption on such a massive scale until I returned to Kabul in May 2004, after 14 years of self imposed exile.

I found my country transformed by corruption. It existed at every social and bureaucratic level. Afghanistan and its people are governed by corrupt leaders at every level now! It is appalling to me to hear international political missions and their armed forces and NGOs idly chatting about corruption in their formal meetings, when they enable it! Since the collapse of the Taliban in October 2001 and even after Barak ‘Change’ Obama was elected President of the United States, no meaningful international laws or commitments have been made to prevent corruption.

If there is any positive thing that ordinary Afghans remember about Taliban rule, it was their harsh and inhumane deeds in dealing with thieves and wrongdoers which curbed widespread corruption, just as they succeeded in greatly reducing poppy cultivation, almost to zero, as far as the UN was able to estimate. What an incredible accomplishment!

Many of the current Afghan officials are corrupted and/or on the payrolls of various covert entities. This leaves them with little or no incentive to serve the Afghan people they are supposed to represent. Mid or low level posts receive very low salaries and in order to buy what they cannot afford — fruits, clothes, a cab ride — they ask for ‘bakhshish’ [Farsi/Dari word for ‘gift’]. Their superiors pocket large sums of money or receive high priced gifts, such as the latest models of mobile phones and gold pens from the ‘duty free shops’ of Dubai, and I have heard of officials receiving new 4x4 Toyota Land Cruisers as ‘sheereny’ [Dari/Pashto word for ‘sweets’] on their appointment to office.

From junior state employees right up to the President, everyone knows and talks about the details of who gave what gift, how much it was worth, what brand it was. There are competitions in coming up with innovative ways of giving bakhshish for ‘aashnah sakton’ [Dari/Farsi word for ‘friends making’]. While this has always been a part of international business culture: the ‘private gift’ from business to political leaders, this culture of graft and corruption has to be sharply curbed, before Kabul government loses its legitimacy for representing the interests of the Afghan people.”

70 - http://www.undp.org.af/News/2009/09-01-29-PR-SLCDP-CSLD-v03Eng.pdf

Diminution and Development - pg 47 Lapses in Security

The decline of security has a negative impact for both the Afghan government and the NATO

led ISAF. To add to the chaos, Afghanistan’s neighbours have been duplicitous with both the

militants and NATO forces operating in Afghanistan, by undermining their efforts. Having

said that, I must stress that it is important for Afghans to maintain a degree of hope and

confidence that their various government leaders will provide for national security, and

safeguard their hard earned accomplishments. However, it must be admitted that the Taliban

attacks against Kabul have been on the rise:

“Jun 17, 2007 ... A bomb attack on a bus full of police instructors in Kabul left 35 people dead, the fifth major attack in three days. The Taliban attacks are becoming bolder;”71

“Aug 1, 2008 ... American intelligence agencies have concluded that members of Pakistan’s powerful spy service helped plan the deadly July 7 bombing of India’s embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan;”72

“Nov 27, 2008 ... At least four civilians have been killed in a suicide bomb attack near the US embassy in the Afghan capital Kabul;”73

“Feb 11, 2009 ... Time calls it the Taliban's mini-Mumbai -- coordinated suicide bombing and small-arms attacks on three sites in Kabul the worst attack since July in the Afghan capital;”74

Security is especially bad across the border into Pakistan, where Taliban and Al-Qa’idah have

repeatedly destroyed US supply convoys on their way to Kabul through Peshawar and Quetta.

These attacks have been so devastating to US logistics that Russia and Iran have both been

tapped to provide non-weapon supplies, and the rest has been flown in at great cost in US

military air transports:

71 - http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=2940709n 72 - http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/01/world/asia/01pstan.html 73 - news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7751720.stm 74 - blog.wired.com/defense/2009/02/mumbai-style-at.html


“Nov 11, 2008 ...Some 60 masked militants hijacked about 13 trucks carrying Humvees and other supplies for American-led troops in Afghanistan on Monday in a brazen attack near the Khyber Pass, authorities said Tuesday;”75

“Dec 1, 2008 ... Two killed, NATO Supplies Destroyed in Peshawar. Taliban militants Monday destroyed a dozen trucks in the Pakistani city of Peshawar containing supplies for NATO troops in Afghanistan, killing two people in the process, police said;”76

“Dec 07, 2008 ... The death toll in the Peshawar bomb blast went up to 34 while the number of under-treatment patients was reported to be over 100 on Saturday, hospital sources said;”77

Financial Governance

The World Bank describes good governance as “the exercise of political authority and the use

of institutional resources to manage society's problems and affairs”.78

But Afghanistan’s financial balance sheet [FEB 2009] with IMF is discouraging:79.

I. Membership Status: Joined: July 14, 1955; Article XIV

II. General Resources Account: SDR Million %Quota

Quota 161.90 100.00

Fund holdings of currency 161.92 100.01

Reserve Position 0.00 0.00

Holdings Exchange Rate

III. SDR Department: SDR Million %Allocation

Net cumulative allocation 26.70 100.00

75 - http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/12/world/asia/12pstan.html?_r=1 76 - http://www.apakistannews.com/two-killed-dozen-trucks-for-nato-supplies-destroyed-in-peshawar-92982 77 - http://www.dawn.com/2008/12/07/top5.htm 78 - World Bank, Managing Development - The Governance Dimension, 1991, Washington D.C. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/03/07/000090341_20060307104630/Rendered/PDF/34899.pdf

79 - IMF Members' Financial Data by Country http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/exfin2.aspx?memberKey1=10&date1key=2009-03-08

Diminution and Development - pg 49 Holdings 0.03 0.11

IV. Outstanding Purchases and Loans: SDR Million %Quota

PRGF Arrangements 58.40 36.07

V. Latest Financial Arrangements:

Date of Expiration Amount Approved Amount Drawn

Type Arrangement Date (SDR Million) (SDR Million)

PRGF Jun 26, 2006 Jun 25, 2009 81.00 58.40

VI. Projected Payments to Fund 1/

(SDR Million; based on existing use of resources and present holdings of SDRs):

Forthcoming

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Principal

2.45 8.29

Charges/Interest

0.41 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.41

Total

0.41 0.45 0.45 2.89 8.70

Clearly, given the extent of corruption within national government and the lack of functional

law enforcement entities, political authority is severely limited for the Afghan population.

Simultaneously, Afghanistan is faced by problems imposed externally by both their friends

and enemies. How can the Afghan national government exercise a legitimate authority under

the current security situation and political circumstances? In the eyes of ordinary Afghans, an

incompetent national government led by corrupt officials has failed to deliver on their

promises of re-development. Afghans no longer give the benefit of a doubt to US:ISAF to

protect their daily life. By concentrating their international forces near major Afghan cities

and towns US:ISAF has left the borders open for the militants and terrorists to cross into

Afghanistan and freely conduct their operations across most of the country.

Diminution and Development - pg 50 There are many reasons to sympathize with the Afghan government’s plight. Granted, that

the government has corrupt officials and lacks enough trained technocrats to deliver results.

However, the weakness of the Kabul government has direct links with the presence of a

strong multinational NATO force and their distinct political and NGO missions. The United

Nations too has a strong multi-functioning role on the ground. Each country and organization

has its own mandates and deadline to meet and report back to their headquarters outside of

Afghanistan. Until very recently, most of these organizations operated with no (or limited)

operating restrictions.

Finally, and perhaps most perversely, are unfulfilled US:NATO promises of aid made by

President Bush [$10 billions in 2006]80 and the EU [$10 billions in 2008]81, and aid which

comes in dribs and drabs, estimated by former Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani as no more

than $500 million for the villages. This false promise had caused Afghan businessmen to plan

for, set-aside and expend precious development funds, which could have been better used in

stabilizing the retail economy, instead of commercial “build it and they will come” failures.

Such promises might be forgiven if they were innocently made, but an (undisclosed) USAID

party chief told our (my friends) Kandahar development mission field-party in April, 2006,

“The Afghan people don’t decide what gets rebuilt (with these aid monies), the (US) Defense

Department does, … and nothing’s getting rebuilt around here anytime soon.”

It may prove to have been a godsend that promised aid monies never materialized. Afghan

commercial pre-development dried up and failed, as the huge catastrophe made by foreign

real estate speculation, which swept and blighted the economies of the affluent Cooperation

Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) countries, and the world at large, was avoided.

But perhaps it’s only for a time, until Western corporations makes their demands for nearly

80 - “Afghans Lack $10 Billion in Aid, Report Says,” (NY:The New York Times), March 26, 2008 81 - “G20 leaders tout consensus, $1 trillion in aid “ (Scarborough:CTV Canada), 2 April 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 51 royalty-free concessions for resource extraction leases, while the International Monetary

Fund (IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction & Development (IBRD) and the

International Development Association (IDA) demands repayment of loan principals from

those inconsequential lease payments? Isn’t that how the game is played out?

Such actions might make it appear that IMF:IBRD:IDA planned the failure of Afghanistan as

a sovereign nation from the beginning of their ‘anti-Taliban’ occupation campaign, as a slow-

motion but inexorable resources war, which I will discuss in greater detail in Chapters 3 & 4.

Legal System

Initially, the Afghan government had no laws to set a norm and provide conditions for the

international groups to conduct their security and development operations in Afghanistan.

When the laws were established, the lack of trained and empowered law enforcement entities

left the Afghan authorities without a voice. Afghan “human capital” was limited and because

the government was not able to pay as much as the international organizations, local literate

Afghan and trained technocrats were recruited by foreigners and their organizations instead.

International organizations had mandates and reasons to hire Afghan nationals, while Afghan

institutions were suffering for the lack of literate and trained Afghans. This lose-win cycle

against the Afghan government is still in full swing even at this late date in the occupation.

Unless and until Afghanistan has an ethnically balanced and fully trained, well-equipped

military, intelligence agency and police to protect its territory and population from external

threats, and a corruption-free justice system, the country will remain at a tipping point of

failure. There are no guarantees that American led security and development operations in

Afghanistan will enjoy a sustained EU and NATO support. Predicting a worst case scenario,

Israel:Iran nuclear antagonisms and Pakistan:India tit-for-tat extremism may soon generate

more attention for US and NATO. Afghanistan will become instead a US:ISAF training

Diminution and Development - pg 52 camp, weapons test range and incursion launching pad, while any hope of good governance

for Afghans will progress retrograde at best.

“The result of these decades of destruction is that everything in the country has suffered — its physical infrastructure, its human resources, and its legal system. There are 1,400 judges, more than 3,000 prosecutors, and thousands of court personnel throughout the country. However, these statistics belie a legal system that is barely functioning. Court management is archaic, to say the least. Most judicial decisions are made by judges with insufficient education and training. Written law is not applied, or even widely known, including by judges and lawyers. Although there is a constitutional right to counsel in all criminal cases, there are very few defence lawyers, and corruption is so rampant that Afghans routinely forgo using the formal court setting in favour of an informal justice system. It is within this background that the task of building a rule of law in Afghanistan has begun.”82

EU, Germany, Italy and Norway have provided grants for small judicial training programs to

bring justice to the frontier beyond the major cities of Kabul, Kandahar and Herat, under the

Afghanistan Rule of Law Project.

Police adviser Henning Høgseth at the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute (NUPI) cautions:

“We can’t just blame the Afghans for lack of progress with the reforms, as they were handed

a system that had been decided almost before it hit the ground, to put it like that. What is

needed is local institutional capacity building — the handing over of responsibility to

Afghans themselves — we’re not the ones that are going to run the country after all,” he said.

“If you pump too much money into a post-conflict area without having an administration and

a bureaucracy capable of handling the funds, you just get more corruption and waste.”

Norway’s foreign affairs department acknowledges that corruption is a problem.

82 - Wallitsch, Thomas A, “Afghanistan works to create court system out of chaos”, (Allentown:Allentown Morning Call), 16 June 2006

Diminution and Development - pg 53 “A precondition for the efforts at justice reform made by Norway and the international

community is that the Afghan authorities actively combat the corruption that exists within the

justice sector both centrally and out in the provinces.” 83

Managing Protocols

In order to support its population, the government of Afghanistan has to respect traditional

norms. Afghanistan is a multiethnic society and interests are widely varied. The Afghan

government’s job is to engage with the tribal leaders, mullahs (religious leader), and political

figures to satisfy their demands and to gain support from them.

No Afghan government, throughout history has ever had any illusions about the importance

of connecting with the Afghan tribal and religious leaders and affluent people. Such is the

case today. Moreover, the current democratic form of government allows much broader

opportunities for these individuals to self-aggrandize, and they have become far more

powerful and difficult for the government authorities to ignore. President Karzai has admitted

in an interview that “for the unity of the country, I have made and will compromise”84 by

appointing certain individuals, if that can help him gain the support of influential persons.

Today, cabinet and other prominent government posts and other mid-level technocratic

appointment could not be finalized without Karzai’s consent. 85

Admittedly, at the start of this new democratic government there were no adequate military,

security, or legal systems in place. The International military did not have a strong presence

on the ground, other than pockets of CIA operatives who bribed local warlords to win their

support. In 2004, President Karzai won the support of Afghans, a legislature was established

and over the past eight years, the Afghan National Army (ANA) numbers reaches over eighty

83 - Olsen, Tarjei. “Afghanistan: Justice is Hard to Import.” (Online:Afghan Development News) 11 August 2008 84 - Arian Television, 2006 85 - Unnamed senior level Afghan Foreign Ministry official

Diminution and Development - pg 54 thousand soldiers, by benefitting from its close cooperation with NATO. It is past time for

President Karzai to stop incessant deal-making, and plan the long-term stability of the Afghan

national government. He must also seek to ethnically balance the ANA and ANP (Afghan

National Police) by recruiting more among the Pashto population, reflecting their majority.

The Afghan government has to maintain a delicate balance between the customs, traditions,

and religious values, and democratic norms and expectations of the various ethnic groups.

Certainly, this is not an easy task for the young government administration of Afghanistan.

The lead goes to US, NATO, UN and EU and ordinary Afghans hold them accountable for

any progress or lack of it. That does not mean the Afghans have forgiven President Karzai for

his own missed opportunities and misjudgements, early on. For example, for the past few

years, the US led NATO forces have been conducting raids on Afghan homes and arresting

people without legal warrant. Only now has President Karzai started to complain publically

against this, after aerial bombings killed large numbers of innocent Afghan civilians. Afghans

interpret this as another of Karzai’s desperate last-ditch measures, as he faces the loss of

support among Afghans and his foreign supporters outside of Afghanistan.

For years (since 2005), the Afghan government has claimed that US:ISAF needs to train and

arm double the number of ANA troops, to a force of 145,000, and increase the size of the

ANP. The new Obama ‘Afghanistan-Pakistan’ ‘Surge 2’ has approved this increase as part of

their war marketing plan, which I have discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. Balancing that

fortune in aid for the Karzai clan, Pakistan will receive up to $5 billion dollars in military aid

annually, and the Pakistani military and ISI intelligence will have a direct share of funding!

these are the very same people who created the first generation of Taliban movement under

President Zia, by sending young recruits to the new madrassas that ISI had built along the

NWFP-FATA frontier! Even today, ISI's ‘S’ wing is still accused of being largely responsible

Diminution and Development - pg 55 for organizing attacks in Afghanistan and for aiding militants in terms of training and

equipment for insurgent operations within Afghanistan.

Lofty Rhetoric, Brutal Realities

In the past seven years, the US has poured some $230 billion into military equipment, troop

logistics, government contractors, mercenaries and supposedly redevelopment missions in my

country. Why? We need to look beyond the current headlines, and to explore what it is that is

attracting so much international attention. Immediately after the Soviet occupation in 1979,

Figure 5 - Mineralized Areas [USGS] 86 their geologists spread across the countryside to map Afghanistan’s natural resources. What

they found was astounding. Highly-mineralized, high-yield strategic metals: iron, copper,

bauxite, in fact, the largest such reserves in all Asia, and clear evidence of oil & gas deposits.

86 - USGS, ‘Preliminary Assessment of Non-Fuel Mineral Resources of Afghanistan,2007 ‘ available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2007/3063/fs2007-3063.pdf

Diminution and Development - pg 56 This was the strategic resources information developed by the Soviets, which the Taliban

emissary had attempted to barter for wealth and tribute at the Houston UNOCAL meeting in

1997, and again afterwards, while George W. Bush was Governor of the State of Texas.

Figure 6 - Mineral Estimates in Tons [USGS]

“The Taliban visits to Washington continued up to a few months prior to the September 11 attacks. The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research’s South Asian Division maintained constant satellite telephone contact with the Taliban in Kandahar and Kabul. Washington permitted the Taliban to maintain a diplomatic office in Queens, New York headed by Taliban diplomat Abdul Hakim Mojahed. In addition, U.S. officials, including Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Christina Rocca, who is also a former CIA officer, visited Taliban diplomatic officials in Islamabad.

In the meantime, the Bush administration took a hostile attitude towards the Islamic State of Afghanistan, otherwise known as the Northern Alliance. Even though the


United Nations recognized the alliance as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, the Bush administration, with oil at the forefront of its goals, decided to follow the lead of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and curry favor with the Taliban mullahs of Afghanistan. The visits of Islamist radicals did not end with the Taliban. In July 2001, the head of Pakistan’s pro-bin Laden Jamiaat-i-Islami Party, Qazi Hussein Ahmed, also reportedly was received at the George Bush Center for Intelligence (aka, CIA headquarters) in Langley, Virginia.”87

"A former Pakistani diplomat has told the BBC that the US was planning military action against Osama Bin Laden and the Taleban even before last week's (9/11) attacks. Niaz Naik, a former Pakistani Foreign Secretary, was told by senior American officials in mid-July that military action against Afghanistan would go ahead by the middle of October. 88

Immediately after the US invasion and occupation, US Geological Survey (USGS) geologists

analyzed the Soviet records, and later estimated even higher reserves. Each of these massive

iron and copper reserves alone placed Afghanistan at the top tier of all Asian nations! But

USGSs announcement wasn’t made until 2007, two years after the Karzai Administration had

approved in 2005 the Minerals Law, laws written by the West immediately after Tora Bora,

likely at the Cheney Energy Policy Committee member’s request to State, and that proposed

egregious production sharing agreements (PSAs) and likely sub-standard royalties which had

not been published or debated, or analyzed in view of the later reported reserves.

Not one word in the US media about Afghanistan’s natural resources ... ever!

A discussion of PSAs is beyond the scope of this premise(see footnote 89). PSAs do not

provide all the benefits one might expect, and were rejected by Iraq’s parliament after they

consolidated their civil authority.90 Running to hundreds of pages of complex legal and

financial language and subject to commercial confidentiality provisions, PSAs are immune

87 - Madsen, Wayne, “Afghanistan, the Taliban and the Bush Oil Team”, (Montreal:Centre for Research on Globalisation), globalresearch.ca, 23 January 2002 88 - http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1550366.stm 89 - Bindemann, Kirsten, Production-Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis. (Oxford:Oxford Institute for Energy Studies), 1999 90 - Muttitt, Greg, Crude Designs: The RipOff of Iraq’s Oil Wealth, (Global Policy Forum:Institute for Policy Studies) November 2005

Diminution and Development - pg 58 from public scrutiny, and lock governments into economic terms that can’t be altered by

future administrations, they are a formalized treaty for permanent territorial legal status.


Figure 7 – Central Asian Pipelines 91

Figure 8 - Central Asia Gas Pipelines – Heritage.org

91 - Foster, John, A Pipeline Through A Troubled Land: Afghanistan, Canada, And The New Great Energy Game, (Ottawa: CCPA, Foreign Policy Series) Volume 3, No. 1, June 19, 2008

Diminution and Development - pg 60 In Afghanistan’s case, these contracts were signed while the government was new and wholly

foreign-sponsored, when the security situation was dire, and the leadership under duress:

“Since the first oil field was discovered in Afghanistan in 1959, more than 150 million barrels of oil (mmbo) reserves and more than 4,500 billion cubic feet of gas (bcfg) reserves have been identified, using Soviet methodologies and technologies, in 29 fields in the Afghan portion of the Amu Darya and Afghan-Tajik basins.There is enormous opportunity for further discoveries to add to Afghanistan's energy resource base. That resource base is essential to the economic development of the country.”92

Again, as with Afghanistan’s mineral wealth, in 2004, the Karzai executive branch approved

production sharing agreements in a ‘Hydrocarbon Law’93, which was drafted by the West

three years earlier under US State Department directive, in the aftermath of Tora Bora!

“Petroleum Law. The writing and discussion of a modern Afghanistan Petroleum Law have been ongoing for more than two years. This law, when enacted, will serve to level the playing field for all interested foreign investors in the oil and gas sector and will provide for transparency in the management of this critical energy sector of the country. Basically, it will lay out the Afghanistan Government's leasing process for foreign investors. The World Bank is funding this activity; government approval of the new law is expected by the end of calendar year 2004. “94

“More than two years...” there was no Afghan government or Ministry of Mining in 2001!

“A March announcement that the U.S. Geological Survey had identified undiscovered oil reserves 18 times the amount originally thought and three times the amount of natural gas likely caused many a Pavlovian response. The World Bank helped draft the [Hydrocarbon Law] regulation that gives the Afghan government full ownership of oil and gas wells, but allows foreign investment in exploration through shared-production agreements [PSAs].“95

Yet the currently published version of the Hydrocarbon Law and Regulations only allows

Afghanistan to purchase its own oil and/or natural gas back at the international market price,

and there is still no published discussion of royalties, taxes or environmental protections!

92 - USGS Projects in Afghanistan Oil and Natural Gas http://afghanistan.cr.usgs.gov/oil.php 93 - http://www.mom.gov.af/uploads/files/English/The%20Hydrocarbon%20Law.pdf 94 - USGS, ibid 95 - http://www.aisa.org.af/Downloads/archive/AfghanStudy.pdf

Diminution and Development - pg 61 This lends credence to those who suggest both Iraq and Afghanistan are really resource wars,

rather than ‘wars against terrorism,’ as pre-emptive acts of deliberate conquest, since the US

was willing to let millions of Afghan people suffer horribly torture in a decades of civil war

between the mujahideen and Taliban, without taking overt actions, until the moment Taliban

revealed the richness of Afghan natural resources to Houston in 1997 and after, when the

Bush-Cheney Administration began planning to invade, as my citations earlier demonstrate.

Only after Tora Bora, as US forces accessed ministerial archives of Soviet research reports on

minerals and hydrocarbons, only then did US and its allies show an interest in establishing a

presidential form of government for Afghanistan, instead of our traditional constitutional

monarchy or our interim parliamentary form; one where the president has executive power to

appoint cabinet ministers to approve, without publicity or debate, resources lease agreements

written by foreign entities. Then, upon being assured of those concessions, USGS reported in

March of 2006, through Afghan Ministry of Mines, greatly increased estimates of oil and

gas reserves, far greater than those described under the 2004 and earlier Hydrocarbon Law.

“Estimates are 1,596 million barrels of crude oil, 15,687 billion cubic feet of natural gas, and 562 million barrels of natural gas liquids. Most of the undiscovered crude oil is in the Afghan-Tajik Basin, and most of the undiscovered natural gas is in the Amu Darya Basin.” 96

Under the likely terms of the PSA contracts, US and UK oil companies rates of return from

investing in Afghanistan oil development would range from 42% to 162%, far in excess of

industry profit target of ~12% return on investment.97 At 2009 prices, $70 a barrel for oil and

$4 a TCF for gas, Afghan oil and gas reserves exceed $200 billion in value, and the loss to

the Afghan Treasury from these PSAs is in the $10 billions, ten times the value of $1.28

billion in loans or grants made to Afghanistan by the World Bank, those with long-term

96 - http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2006/3031/ 97 - ibid Crude Designs

Diminution and Development - pg 62 interest penalty, not to mention the loss of 100 years of Afghan energy independence, as I

will describe.

Nevertheless, if the foreign nations keep their commitments to the development of Afghan

infrastructure and irrigation, if they build all-weather roads, railroads and pipelines, if they

secure the country’s borders against foreign influence and promote multi-lateral global trade

without turning Afghanistan into a perpetual gulag dependency, then what do PSAs matter?

As Afghanistan continues its stabilization and rebuilding efforts, challenges to extraction of

these rich minerals and hydrocarbon resources will need immediate and long-term solutions.

From those solutions we can judge the real intent of US:NATO toward the Afghan peoples.

In the previous year (2008), the Afghan Ministry of Mines and Heavy Industries awarded the

magnificent Aynak copper deposit through a tender process to China's top integrated copper

producer, Jiangxi Copper Co. Jiangxi and China Metallurgical Group Corp, (MCC) who are

going ahead with exploration of the vast reserve, in an area near Kabul, after they bid for the

contract to develop it in 2007. Terms of the agreement were a reported as a $3.4 billion lump

sum payment and $400 million per year in royalties during the life of the mining operation, a

small fraction of the $100 billions copper deposit. MCC will have to build a huge gas-fired

power plant to upgrade the extracted copper ore, and build a railroad to the Indian Ocean

within four years, or the lease reverts back to the Ministry. Fuel for the power plant would be

supplied by gas pipeline from Turkmenistan, or Afghanistan’s own huge gas deposits.98

Gustavson Associates, an American transaction advisor and mining consultant, has assisted

the Ministry in preparing a request for bids on the lease award for Afghanistan's massive

Hajigak iron ore deposit, estimated at 2 billion tonnes of exceptionally high grade ore, and

98 - http://www.mom.gov.af

Diminution and Development - pg 63 worth hundreds of billions of dollars as a world-class deposit. No terms for the Mineral Law

and the mining and extraction royalty agreements (“Regulations”) were made available.

The Ministry, again represented by US firm Gustavson Associates as transaction advisor, also

announced a Bidding Round for the award of Exploration and Production Sharing Contracts

for Hydrocarbon Operations in 3 blocks in Northern Afghanistan. The deadline to apply for

pre-qualification was June 15, 2009. No terms of the Hydrocarbon Law and the drilling and

extraction royalty agreements (“Regulations”) were released at that time. It was expected that

US and UK oil cartels would dominate the bidding, and that President Karzai would make the

award official before his term of office expires in August.99 Instead, the elections dragged out

for months, and The Orient Petroleum Company, owned by a Pakistan corporation, won the

oil auction, but there were no bidders for the gas reserves. A website purporting to follow the

development of these oil leases, operated by law firm Gaffney, Kline & Associates, is at:

http://afghanistanpetroleum.com/ and posts the allegedly 2009-dated versions of the Laws.

This raises an interesting observation, beyond the bald fact that not one world leader has ever

mentioned these huge natural resource projects in their presentations on ‘AF-PAK’ GWOT2!

USGS say there are 1.6 billion barrels of crude oil in Afghanistan. How much does that really

mean to our citizens? Here EIA estimates Pakistan consumes 354,000 barrels per day, and the

Afghan population is roughly 1/10th of Pakistan’s and is more under-developed, so it’s fair to

suggest Afghan oil consumption would be about 40,000 barrels per day. An oil refinery could

be built for roughly $800 million or so, about the same as the annual royalties from the MCC

Aynak copper concessions over two years. Then Afghanistan could build their own refinery

without IMF:World Bank aid, and its oil reserves would be sufficient to provide fuel energy

for Afghans for more than a century! Then why is US-based deal advisor Gustavson and a

99 - http://gustavson.com/afgan_alert.htm

Diminution and Development - pg 64 closed-door Afghan Ministry auctioning off Afghanistan’s 100-year energy supply for

roughly one cent (1¢) on the dollar ($1)?!

With Friends Like These, Who Needs Irredentism?

.

Figure 9 - Popular Karzai cartoon, © e-Ariana.com

“Afghanistan’s problem is not only because it had bad enemies, but because it had strong

friends”100. The British are leading a strong lobbying complaint for the support of Pakistan.

Rory Stewart, a former British Diplomat, argues that the world does not have the resources,

nor will they be able to stay in Afghanistan for long. “We need to prioritize what we need and

not what we should.” 101 He argues that Pakistan is more important in terms of British foreign

100 Wakel Ahmad Mutawakil, Taliban Foreign Minister 101 Rory Stewart, Chatham House, November 2008

Diminution and Development - pg 65 policy. He is right. Pakistan has a large population, nuclear weapons, has strong political and

historical ties with the British and a large Pakistani diaspora in the United Kingdom But

Pakistan has no natural resources! It can only serve as a conduit, a corridor from Central Asia

to the Indian Ocean and the vast India energy market. This and other reasons force British

policy makers to make sure Pakistan remains as their sphere of regional influence, and that

policy choice may come at a great cost to Afghanistan. “Afghanistan has always been a tribal

country. Major projects are not going to work in Afghanistan and it will take resources and

time. Small and quick impact projects over the long run are better for Afghans.”102

In other words, the current UK political and economic commitment is not going to work, and

it is better to leave Afghanistan with all its problems, until Pakistan’s political and economic

stability is ensured. We see the US doing exactly that, with Secretary of State Clinton’s

conflation of “AF-PAK”. This is a perfect formula to creating a new ‘Shock and Awe’ attack,

only this time, precious resources will be shifted east across the Durand Line into Pakistan.

There are only four ways out of Central Asia for natural resources extraction, three of which

the US:NATO forces have no control over: Iran, Russia (via the ‘Stans), China. and Pakistan.

With $100 billions in private profits at stake, any amount of war spending can be justified.

Pakistan’s problems are real and could be problematic for both the region and the world.

Pakistan’s stability will not resolve Afghanistan’s problems, because during the Pakistani

sponsored regime of Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan had enjoyed much better stability.

Solving Pakistan’s problems at the expense of Afghanistan is a tragedy, just as Pakistan’s

Taliban solution for Afghanistan with the defeat of mujahideen turned into another tragedy.

As I will show in the next chapter, first, Soviet incursions into Afghanistan brought General

Zia-al-Haq to power in Pakistan, as Zia responded to the “godless communists” by creating

madrassas and deeni madaris, where illiterate unemployed young males could be radicalized 102 Rory Stewart, CNN Interview 2008

Diminution and Development - pg 66 by religious fanatic maulvis under the tutelage of local mullahs. While the United States was

busy training and funding illiterate mujahideen to fight the Soviets in the north, instilling in

them the myths of invincible jihad warrior, on the other side of the Durand Line, Pakistan

was doing exactly the same thing! The inevitable clash and civil war between the mujahideen

and the Taliban was a proxy war, made to drive the Soviets out of the region, then left to fight

for regional power by the US and its ally, Pakistan, against the influence of the Iranians, the

Chinese and the Indians, proof of the Universal Law of Unintended (we hope) Consequences.

For thirty years Pakistan has had a strong military executive that acted in concert with Inter-

Service Intelligence (ISI) and is responsible for training and promoting extremists as a tool of

its foreign policy against both India and Afghanistan. They did this while the United States

was its ally. President Musharraf has resigned under relentless CIA pressure, and the

Pakistani government has collapsed into neo-liberal dithering. Its economy is on the brink of

total collapse held afloat on life-supporting international loans, and its military is fractured as

it alternatively fights against, and issues cease-fire agreements with NWFP:FATA that it was

formerly responsible for radicalizing.

“In Peshawar, there is sympathy and support for the Afghan Taliban among both the

Pashtoon’s and Pakistani military”.103 This means, the support mechanism and safe heavens

remain in Pakistan and the insurgents are free to cross back and forth across the Durand Line

into Afghanistan. Pakistan must be pressured through political channels to secure its borders,

and international economic assistance must come with strict conditions and demand for

results, even as the Mumbai bombings further complicate the regional issues. However, the

current US:ISAF stated goal of Afghanistan’s reconstruction, infrastructure and irrigation

development and internal security must not be shifted to Pakistan, as just another front.

103 - Professor Anthony, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2008

Diminution and Development - pg 67 Lessons Learned at Self-Governance

Why would Afghans insist on a national identity, but oppose a national government entity?

You want to know whether I am first a Pashtun, a Muslim, or a Pakistani.

I have been a Pashtun for 2,000 years, a Muslim for 1,400 years, and a

Pakistani for 30 years. Therefore, I will always be a Pashtun first.

Wali Khan

“Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory supports the idea that normative factors can impede the establishment of state authority. Prospect theory suggests that, “the pain of loss exceeds the pleasure from gains.” People are less willing to get involved in situations where some form of loss is possible, despite an equal opportunity for some form of gain.”104

“The acceptance of a rule of law by its people gives the state authority. Therefore, a state usually seeks to create and enforce all forms of law within its territory to clearly define its authority. The presence of a competing rule of law challenges that authority. States are especially concerned with the case of criminal law due to its close connection to the use of violence; to remain viable, the state must maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. It is also important for a state to maintain order within its borders to appear strong and prevent the likelihood of intervention by other states.” 105

Students of post-Taliban Afghan governance claim, rightly or wrongly:

1) The mistake made at the beginning during the first loya jirga, was that no attention

was given to the royalists or to Taliban opposition, at all, and the US ran rough-shod;

2) Taliban were disarmed with the promise that they would be safe, but they were sent to

various jails and prisons instead, and ultimately to Guantanamo by US forces. Taliban

houses were bombed, and their properties destroyed. Bush and Karzai lied. Thousands

104 - Levy, Jack S, Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict: Perspectives from Prospect Theory, Handbook of War Studies II, ed.Manus I. Midlarsky, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), 2000, Pg.194

105 - Weber, Max, Politics as a Vocation, excerpt from Patrick O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski, Essential Readings in Comparative Politics, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company), 2004. pg. 34


died. Bagram remains as their secret internment facility, now that Abu Ghraib is closed

and Guantanamo is set to be closed;

3) Contradiction in policies between the Kabul government vis-à-vis the opposition.

Karzai continues to waffle with regard to conducting talks with the Taliban towards a

coalition government with them in a minority role. (I will share an interesting political

anecdote on Taliban supporter Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in a later chapter);

4) The government was formed on the basis of deals and compromises with international

political and military groups (e.g. World Bank written Hydrocarbon Laws and the

Mineral Laws giving up Afghan resource royalties) demonstrating the corrupting

influence of US:NATO, and willingness of the Executive to become corrupted;

5) International and national drug mafia leaders, connected to various countries of the

world became the high ranking authority of the country, or enjoy strong support of the

Afghan Government. Someone, somewhere is looking the other way. There is more

opium produced in Afghanistan now than three times the world’s annual consumption;

6) The UK, EU and US must work on reducing their own street demand for illicit drugs

and not just focus on and blame Afghans for poppy production;

7) Afghanistan needs a pure, mandated government made up of honest, country-loving,

educated, experienced people who are dedicated and committed. Our people need action

for the improvement of their government system and in their own daily lives.

The Form of Good Governance

Larry Goodson with US Army War College, observed at close hand, the first Loya Jirga and

pre-election of the later democratically-elected President Hamid Karzai.


“Despite the many problems that marred the Phase I and II indirect elections, the hunger to have a voice was palpable and impressive. That this nascent experimentation with accountable government would be nipped in the bud at the Loya Jirga, the very institution meant to give democracy a chance to flower, was sad if predictable, but it brought home the reality that Afghanistan’s transition even to stability (much less democracy) is highly unlikely.

What is worse, after a largely successful military campaign, the United States and the rest of the world may have only a limited window of opportunity within which to aid Afghanistan’s transition. Moreover, they may be losing interest in doing so, which would almost certainly doom any chance that the country might have to break out of the cycle of state failure and violence in which it has been caught for the last quarter-century,”106

What would characterize a successful democratic ideal for a small nation like Afghanistan?

Let’s suggest the following ideal litmus test, using Sun Yat Sen’s Three Principles of the

People 107 as a proven formula for successful nation-building (witness tiny Taiwan’s peaceful

and unprecedented prosperity, under the enormous shadow of Communist China),

representing a true, and proven metric of good governance.

These three principles can be used as a measure of whether Afghanistan is well governed:

· ‘The Principle of Mínzú – Government of the People, “developed as a "civic-nationalism", as opposed to an "ethnic-nationalism", so as to unite all of the different ethnicities:” 108

Mínzú’s ideal sense of national government of all the people is far different from the Afghan

vision, with rule by an Executive intelligentsia, (despite early failure of the similarly cleric-

minded Khalq Party, with support of a foreign Soviet occupier, that later led to more brief,

unhappy failures under the leadership of inept Babrak Karmal and doomed Dr. Najibullah).

As a result, large areas in the six northernmost provinces geographically-divided from the rest

of the country by the Hindu Kush mountains remain under the control of warlords, and will

106 - Goodson, Larry, "Afghanistan's Long Road to Reconstruction", (The Johns Hopkins University Press:Journal of Democracy), Volume 14, Number 1, January, 2003 107 - Yatsen, Sun, The Three Principles of the People, (Taiwan:China Publishing Co.), 1925 108 - Yatsen, ibid

Diminution and Development - pg 70 likely always be vulnerable to foreign interference. There are currently so many foreign

governments, militaries and NGO’s operating in Afghanistan at cross purposes, and directly

interfering with national governance, that Afghanistan has become the antipodal opposite of

Yat Sen’s (and traditional Afghan) ‘government of the people’.109

· ‘The Principle of Mínquán - Government by the People, “The power of politics, expressed as election, recall, initiative, and referendum" and “The power of governance, a government of five branches : The Legislative Yuan, the Executive Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Control Yuan and the Examination Yuan:” 110

While the population of Afghanistan was granted a once every five-year plebiscite among a

pre-selected, pre-vetted roster of ruling elite candidates in the 2004 election, Afghan national

government could hardly be called ‘government by the people’, and there is little in the

historical record that would indicate Afghans have any interest, at all, in having a national

government, preferring to hold their ‘government by the people’ at the provincial and district

grass roots levels. The evidence is clear that Afghan’s only attention to national government,

is when it interferes with their local political arrangements, as Lord Elphinstone observed.

· ‘The Principle of Mínshēng - Government for the People, “The concept may be understood as social welfare or as populist ("for the people", "to pleasure the people") governmental measures. Sun understood it as an industrial economy and equality of land holdings for the Chinese peasant farmers. He divided livelihood into four areas: food, clothing, housing, and transportation; and planned out how an ideal (Taiwanese) government can take care of these for its people:”111

President Karzai has referred to a more basic measure, he describes as, “bread, tea and a job.”

The National government established by the US:ISAF has gradually shown an administrative

munificence, but one with both a humanitarian as well as an alternative face, riddled with

corruption, bribes and wholesale diversion of aid and grant monies. Still, as I will point out 109 - http://www.interaction.org/files.cgi/6138_AfghanistanMAR.pdf 110 - Yatsen, ibid 111 - Yatsen, ibid

Diminution and Development - pg 71 later in Chapter 4 on Anglo-American Vision, if duplicitous corruption nevertheless benefits

the Afghan people in bridging their transit from destitution to some form of self-reliance,

then even duplicity is a problem that can be put off for future generations to resolve. Afghans

need metrics, in the form of audits, inspections and accounting, not loose rhetoric; and some

immediate local-level funding, in preference to the confabulation of grand promises for tens

of billions of American dollars in reconstruction aid that never came.

“The Government of Afghanistan’s model of governance and development today derives

from an ancient Central Asian concept called the “Circle of Justice” (daira-yi’ idalat). As the

ninth century Islamic scholar Ibn Qutayba, wrote:

There can be no government without an army,

No army without money,

No money without prosperity,

And no prosperity without justice and good administration.

A century later, in Afghanistan itself, Sultan Sebuktegin of Ghazni put it this way:

The first thing you should do is to keep the private and public treasuries in a

prosperous condition; for a kingdom can only be retained by wealth. Wealth

cannot be acquired except by good government and wise statesmanship, and good government cannot be achieved except through justice and righteousness.”112

Clearly, despite a $2.7 billion annual expenditure maintaining a national administration113,

neither the Kabul intelligentsia nor their US:NATO and IMF:IBRD:IDA directors have found

a way to close that “Circle of Justice”, not for lack of bureaucratic and committee oversight

112 - AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY - An Interim Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth & Poverty Reduction, available at: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2006.nsf/FilesByRWDocUNIDFileName/KHII-6LK3R2-unama-afg-30jan2.pdf/$File/unama-afg-30jan2.pdf 113 - CIA World Factbook, ibid

Diminution and Development - pg 72 by more than two dozen national ministries114, and all their provincial minions, nor repeated

US Congressional calls for accountability that go unheeded.

“Threats by Outside Forces”

In addition to his Three Principles of the People, Sun Yat Sen also cautioned against three

outsider forces which he felt could destroy a national government and a nation in short order:

1) Foreign banks siphoning capital reserves and debt interest payments out of the country -

Without a stable security situation attracting big foreign banks, with the current global

economic malaise, a largely cash economy and with the majority of (non drug-related) capital

coming from outside anyway, the potential negative impact of foreign retail banking on the

Afghan economy is debatable, for now. Clearly the International Monetary Fund,

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and International Development

Association [IMF:IBRD:IDA] is a danger signal of the “mark-to-debt” endless loan

entanglements that Afghanistan could easily fall fatally into, as many other third-world

nations have already.

2) Foreign shipping transporting raw materials - Current estimates for air-freight into

Afghanistan run US$14,000 per ton, or US$7 per pound, (160Afghanis per kilo), putting air-

freight commodities imports entirely out of the hands of ordinary Afghans, and keeping

bountiful Afghan fresh produce entirely out of the hands of the EU or GCC markets,115 a

crucial point to future economic redevelopment. Transport by rail through Russia, or by road

through Iran or Pakistan can cost up to US$500 per ton and take many days, making safe

transportation of fragile or perishable commodities cargo non-viable. Transport of valuable

commodities is fraught with tariffs, and theft. Afghanistan has no relationship with its

114 - (see Appendix 2) 115 - http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav050508a.shtml

Diminution and Development - pg 73 neighbors that protects priceless agricultural root stock, and astoundingly beautiful Afghan

carpets from foreign patents and IPR theft. Faux label “Made in Afghanistan” is often applied

to vastly inferior foreign copies. Clearly, until Afghanistan gets their own railroad, reaching

through Pakistan to the Indian Ocean port at Gwadar, (and enforce Afghan patent and IPR

protection against imitation goods) foreign carriers will continue to extract an exorbitant

penalty from national income growth The economic figures on consumer prices prove this:

Projected % Change 2008 2009 Real GDP 7.482 8.316 Consumer Prices 24.000 9.463

Figure 10 – Afghan Cost of Living [World Economic Outlook (October 2008)]

3) Speculative investment – Yat Sen’s third “curse” of foreign exploitation, and clearly at the

core of Afghanistan’s current problems. The former Soviet, now US:ISAF occupation funds

and grants are a perverse form of speculative investment, sharply inflating commodities and

skilled labor costs against subsistence survival of the agrarian population, as is the equally

speculative labor wages investment by the Taliban in terrorism and guerrilla actions:

“A 25-year-old man we will call Shakir has told IRIN he rues rejecting an offer of “work” from a Taliban agent whereby he would get 500 Afghanis (about US$10) a day for carrying out attacks on government offices in Farah Province, southwestern Afghanistan. The Taliban pay 500-1,000 Afghanis [$10-20] for a day of action against government and American forces,” said Lutfullah, 23, from Helmand Province. By contrast, Afghan national government employees make $2 a day.” 116

At the macro level the problem is worse, as ActionAid points out:

“The financial crisis will affect factors such as bank lending, equities and foreign direct investment, and changes in interest rates will impact on countries and companies that raise money by issuing bonds. While the recession will have the biggest impact on trade flows, it is also likely to affect aid levels and money sent home by relatives working in rich countries. Of all the money that flows into developing countries, it is bank lending that has been hit the hardest. The Institute of International Finance (IIF), the international association of financial institutions, estimates that foreign bank lending to developing countries in 2008 was just 40% of

116 - http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=83310


the 2007 level, and by 2009 the IIF forecasts that bank lending will have dropped by more than 100% from its 2007 level. In other words, net flows to developing countries will actually be negative as more money is transferred to banks overseas than is lent to developing countries.”117

Sometimes the pressure of international corporate governance is subtle, but it is as deliberate

and as inexorable as being pressed to death under stones for the poor aid recipients. Nothing

illustrates this more clearly than in agriculture, almost wholly unreported in Western media,

but the very essence of life for the 80% of Afghans who are subsistence farmers:

“The support between the military and agricultural work runs both ways. While agricultural reconstruction facilitates US/NATO military operations, the military operations push forward the agenda of US and other foreign-based agribusiness corporations by creating a context where they can easily put pressure on the government to adopt neoliberal policies. The war provides these corporations with both a lucrative short-term market in the blossoming “reconstruction” industry and an opportunity to integrate Afghanistan into their global production networks and markets in the long term.

Seeds are at the centre of these processes. The Consortium and other CGIAR-led initiatives have completely bypassed the rich heritage of farmers’ (seed) varieties in Afghanistan, which would have provided the basis for genuine agricultural reconstruction. According to an ICARDA survey conducted in 2002, neither rain-fed rice varieties nor rain-fed and irrigated wheat varieties that have been supplied by the aid organisations have included any Afghan genetic materials. The authors of the survey concluded that Afghan wheat farmers are “on their own when it comes to replicating and reselecting local variety seed”.

Afghanistan has instead been deluged with all manner of foreign seed varieties, some of which have come through projects with foreign seed companies seeking to test their varieties in a potential future market. Concerns were raised early on about the indiscriminate importing of seeds and the disregard of local seeds, prompting the FAO, ICARDA and the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture to propose a Code of Conduct for seed aid in 2002. But any concern for farmers’ seeds has been overrun by the insistence of the US and EU on crafting a seed industry in Afghanistan allied to their larger political agendas. Essentially this means building up a few local seed companies that can initially serve as a conduit for seed aid, and later, if the US wins the war, open the door to foreign (patented) seed companies and (monopoly) agribusiness.

117 - Where does it hurt? The impact of the financial crisis on developing countries. ActionAid Hamlyn House Macdonald Road London N19 5PG, UK http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/where_does_it_hurt_final.pdf


It brings death, poverty and illness, as well as the destruction of the natural resources that help us live.”118

Why that is important? As was explained to me regarding the “Golden Rice miracle”, so-

called ‘Golden Rice’ was American bioscience’s patent search for higher rice crop yields, but

it was marketed to the third world with a ‘shiney object’. Never mind that the golden rice

achieved it’s higher yields only with synthetic fertilizers, and heavy herbicide and pesticide

use that third world farmers could not afford. No, what really made ‘golden rice’ a ‘miracle’

of biotechnology was it contained (...drum roll...) (minute) amounts of pro-vitamin A!

But hidden behind this ‘golden miracle’, (or ‘hook’ as marketeers say), Indian populations

which have no cash, would have to somehow buy and choke down 227 dry kilos of golden

rice a year to achieve that minimum vitamin A requirement! And the prolonged boiling

required to the cook rice breaks down that pro-vitamin A, when third-world peoples have

numerous other freely-grown vegetable sources for the vitamin A already!119

So where is the miracle? IMF loans restructuring were linked to adoption of this so-called

‘golden’ variety! Within one or two growing seasons, unique local rice seed varietals in their

1,000s and 10,000s were lost, as the foreign patented ‘Golden Rice’ came into popular use.

Going from sharing set-aside seeds for the next harvest, to being forced to buy ‘Golden Rice’

at Western-set prices, plus synthetic fertilizer, plus synthetic pesticides and herbicides, soon

bankrupted many Indian farmers. As a result, more than 17,500 of them committed suicide

every year between 2002 and 2006, according to experts who analyzed government statistics,

from the debilitating and no-returns costs of being forced to adopt Western bio-engineering.

Too Much of a ‘Good Thing’

118 - Robin, Marie-Monique. The World According to Monsanto. http://www3.nfb.ca/webextension/monsanto/ and http://stuffedandstarved.org/drupal/node/478 119 - http://ngin.tripod.com/forcefeed.htm

Diminution and Development - pg 76 The latest AF-PAK war policy, as US State:Defense have branded it, shows how rapidly the

theatre battle space is changing in Afghanistan, now that the Central Asia region is closely

involved in the logistical struggle of keeping a modern Western army supplied with arms,

food and fuel. I’ll discuss AF-PAK policy in a later chapter. For now I want to close without

situational analysis from the ground, by just viewing Afghan governance as a model space.

I have asked in this chapter if Afghanistan can be governed. Clearly it already is, under

overlapping layers of Kabul national bureaucracy, US:ISAF and USAID advisors and by

obsequious IMF:World Bank financial obligations, overlain by relentless pressures from

foreign mercenary corporate interests in resource exploitation, all under the overweening

presence of US:ISAF military forces and unsubtle impacts of Afghanistan’s neighbours in

Iran and Pakistan, and looming unknown impact of our new trading partners in China.

For the indigenous local farmers, add the Afghan National Army and corrupt Afghan

National Police, economic intrigues of international capital and their NGOs, plus the farm-to-

market middlemen, seed patenters, rentiers, watermen, mayors, mullahs, drug traffickers,

road toll bandits to those other lurking jackals, the Taliban and Al-Qa’idah.

As over-governed and over-taxed as we think we are here in UK, citizens would rise up—like

Jack Straw in the Peasant’s Revolt—with torches and pitchfork to throw off the scourge of an

Afghan national government holding a burn-rate of 80% of GDP. 120 And all this is under the

constant danger of an US:ISAF blitz, year passing year, no schools, no utilities, no roads, just

wattles, mud, rainwater, seed, soil and livestock, in a meagre existence of basmati rice, flat

bread and green tea, basmati rice, flat bread and green tea.

120 - (see Appendix 2)

Diminution and Development - pg 77 Welcome to Afghanistan, my friend! In the following chapter I will share the Afghan Vision

for their country with you, and one which might surprise you, since it is rarely reported upon,

other than the occasional addled Western reporter on assignment, asking some poor farmer,

‘tell me all the things that are wrong with your country’.

Diminution and Development - pg 78 Chapter 3 - A Vision for the Future of Afghan Society

“Blood will have blood; that's certain. But blood will not end it. For murder is fertile: it breeds more death, like a spider laden with a thousand eggs. And who now can break this cycle, which has been going on for generations?”121

Currently, 43 countries and over 3,000 small and large NGOs are involved in the effort to

‘reconstruct’ and help ‘develop’ Afghanistan. Each country and NGO has its respective

vision of what Afghans need and they back their assessments by their own range of surveys

and data sampling of all those Afghans they have managed to access. This means those

Afghans who live in the insecure provinces and inaccessible villages, as well as in the

Pashtoon south—Sangin and Musa Qala districts of Helmand province—are represented by

ethnically different or, at best, by a distinct minority of educated Afghans living in large and

relatively secure cities. The point is that the vision of Afghans is defined through a set of

questions put by non-Afghans to ensure securing funds for whatever a given NGO wants to

do in Afghanistan. The efforts of NGOs in providing services such as polio vaccinations,

emergency food supplies…etc must be duly acknowledged. However, in this chapter, I will

attempt to represent a true Afghan vision. To that end, let us start with what the Karzai

government’s ‘Vision for Afghanistan’.

By the solar year 1400 (2020), Afghanistan will be:

· A stable Islamic constitutional democracy at peace with itself and its neighbours, standing with full dignity in the international family.

· A tolerant, united, and pluralist nation that honors its Islamic heritage with deep aspirations toward participation, justice, and equal rights for all.

· A society of hope and prosperity based on an unusual (sic), private sector-led market economy, social, equity, and environmental sustainability.122

· A healthy, poverty free and opium free Afghanistan, based on independence, democratic governance, self-reliability and equitable development.123

121 - Kewe http://www.thewe.cc/ 122 - http://www.moph.gov.af/strategy-and-policy/strategy-2007-2008-2012-2013/


· (A nation) which is not a threat to regional stability, but achieves its own security and is strong enough to deter interference.

· (A nation) which is not a burden on the international community, but stands on its own feet, determines its own destiny and repays its debts to those who have given lives and resources to help us.

· (A nation) which is a respected member of the community of nations, and an example of an Islamic state which exports tolerance, moderation and stability.124

· (A nation with) broad access and improved quality without discrimination in student admission.

· (A nation which is) honoring culture, religion and tradition, incorporating modern scientific knowledge and methods.

· (A nation with) educational quality and institutional management meeting international standards.

· (A nation which will) restore its former excellent institutions of higher education, as well as create new and diverse institutions.125

· “Afghans today stand with full dignity and declare to the world that we are rising from the ashes of invasion and will live forever……”126

History proves that Afghans are not unfamiliar with “rising from the ashes of invasion”, but

that has never guaranteed peaceful and prosperous “living forever”. Here is what President

Karzai said to his own people in his State of the Nation radio address on April, 2003, just

before the Bush Administration abandoned him for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

“The conflicts ended generally across the country in solar year 1381 (2002-2003), and it was because the establishment of a new regime put an end to the reasons for the conflicts. Fighting was eliminated across the country. … the rule and influence of the terrorists of Al-Qa'idah … are diminishing day by day. It is because the public at large in Afghanistan and the vast sections of the people hate war. They want to live in peace, in security, within their country. They want their fields and gardens to flourish and to shape their lives that have been shattered for 23 years. They are seeking to settle in their houses, villages and cities honourably and respectably.

Afghanistan needs general reconstruction in the economic, social, political, administrative and cultural fields. Businessmen, investors, governmental and non-

123 - http://www.mrrd.gov.af/English/Vision,%20Goal%20&%20Objectivs.htm 124 - "His Excellency General Abdul Rahim Wardak," The International Institute for Strategic Studies. 5 April 2005, http://www.iiss.org/recent-key-addresses/general-abdul-rahim-wardak/ 125 - http://www.mohe.gov.af/?lang=en&p=plan 126 - President Hamid Karzai in his inaugural speech to the National Assembly 28 Qaws 1384 (19 December 2005)


governmental organizations NGOs , the United Nations and other international organizations commenced this reconstruction work on a different level last year. But it is impossible to rehabilitate all of the devastation in Afghanistan in one or two years. Thus we should be patient, as we do not have the resources and the opportunities. Every project we undertake is dependent on assistance.

Our most important work in the reconstruction process was that we activated the deadlocked administration in Afghanistan. However it still has many flaws and shortcomings. The good point is that the doors of the government departments opened to people across the country. The participation of the government increased in the reconstruction programmes during the later days of the year. Government, American and other donor countries, in coordination with the United Nations and other non-governmental organizations have rendered the following work in the different fields of Afghans' political, economic, social and cultural lives:

Paving the way for the dominance of the governance of rule of law … Economic performance … Banking and monetary reforms … Commerce … Attention to investment and the development of the private sector … Mines and industries … Boosting farming and rural services … Agriculture, livestock, irrigation and city development … Transport links and power supplies … Preservation of the rights of masses and the rights of women … Telecommunications … Help to invalids and the needy … Looking after the nation's health … Education, Higher education, culture and science … Culture and the media … Afghan embassies abroad….

Government Shortcomings

The government has not managed to do anything to reform the civil administration! Bribery has continued in all government departments, municipalities and security agencies and several customs institutions with full effect, and the law-enforcement and public rights agencies have failed to stop bribery.

There has not been any significant progress made within the government when it comes to cadres either. Personal relations still count for more than rules and regulation when selecting cadres, appointing and transferring them. And the assessment of performance at government institutions has been critically weak with respect to government cadres and it still is. Still some of the persecutors have illegally snatched the shops, flats, residences, and land of a number of our compatriots. Departments (established for) preserving the rights of the masses could not return the properties to their original owners.” 127

Notice that President Karzai clearly is aware of corruption and the need to reform in 2003.

But when Karzai was asked by the Western press for his dream for Afghanistan in mid-2009,

he was more demure: "Peace, good relations with the West and Saudi, education, roads, water

127 - http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/Current%20Affairs/karzai-state-of-the-nation-speech.htm

Diminution and Development - pg 81 and agriculture." He doesn’t mention those US $100 billions of Afghan natural resources

being auctioned off in the US by Gustavson Associates, and unreported by the world’s media.

External Political Forces

To understand this impact, I’ll recite in ranging narrative the political history of my country.

‘Afghanistan’ coalesced over millennia as a loose collective of farmers, merchants, warlords

and traders into the Durrani Empire of the 18th Century. Afghan stability since that era has

pivoted on both a regional clash of empires, and the provincial republic clash of warlords.

Now today, insurgents fight to resist any national government authority on behalf of outside

financiers, colonialists and resource extractors, occupiers who view indigent populations

outside the central state’s authority as dangerous to both the formation of a national corporate

state, and the moneyed interests of the international community. At the same time, many

government loyalists and technocrats are struggling against corruption and the abuse of

power, to once again achieve an independent Afghanistan with a strong, recognizable

national identity.

A quick background-er illuminates the history of a Central Asian empire ever falling to yet

another conquest. Afghanistan’s unstable existence as a collective society reaches into

antiquity to the march of Alexander the Great in 330 BC followed by the Silk Road, when a

southern route running beside the Indus River route found merchants from the Middle East

pushing north from the Persian Gulf with their caravans, into the land of the Baluchis and

Pashtuns, the Uzbeks and Tajiks on their way through Kabul, Bagram and Bactria to

Bamiyan, there rejoining the main Silk Road, and on over the mountains into Kashgar. Thus,

Afghanistan became the corridor for ethnic movements from Central Asia to India undertaken

by Aryans, Hephthalites, Ghaznavids, and other groups, and its role became that of a conduit

Diminution and Development - pg 82 between India and Central Asia: a moveable and fluid buffer between the Seleucids and

Mauryans, the Safavids and Mughals.

Following on the brief discussion of Afghan history in the previous chapters, Ahmad Shah

Durrani (18th century) conquered as far as Mashhad, Kashmir and Baluchistan. The outlying

territories of Kashmir and Mashhad were lost after his death in 1772. The early 19th century

saw the rise of a Sikh empire of the Punjab under Runjit Singh. By 1834 the Sikhs had

conquered much of the present-day North West Frontier Province (NWFP), including

Peshawar (the former Afghan winter capital). By the middle 19th century---with the

enormous profits generated by the British East India Company---there developed the “Great

Game” between Britain and Russia. The British Empire in India expanded west from the

Ganges Plain towards the Indus River, as the Russian Empire encroached across the Central

Asian steppe, meeting in the Hindu Kush mountains dividing Afghanistan.

The British expressed a general desire to settle the Indian/Afghan frontier question. In 1893,

the Durand Conference in Kabul, a month-long negotiation, settled the frontier. The British

desired to possess the higher ground of the Hindu Kush territory to control the passes, and be

able to control mountain Pashtun tribes, should they attack the settled areas to the southeast.

The Demarcation of the Durand Line on the ground by the Anglo-Afghan commission

proceeded from 1893-1896. Some areas were left un-demarcated on account of the difficulty

terrain and tribal attacks. The Durand Agreement states that neither state should exercise

influence on the other side of the Line. However, the Amir of Afghanistan continues to send

subsidies to Pashtun tribes on the British side of the Line, and invite their chiefs to Kabul.

From the Durand Agreement, 1893: “Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the Side of India, and whereas both His Highness the Amir [Abdul Rahman] and the Government of India are desirous of


settling these questions by a friendly understanding, and of fixing the limit of their respective spheres of influence, so that for the future there may be no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied Governments, it is hereby agreed:

The eastern and southern frontier of His Highness’s dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian Border, shall follow the line shown in the map attached to this agreement. The British Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise in the territories lying beyond this side on the side of India.”

With the end of the WWII, Indian independence (first mooted in 1926) become inevitable.

Afghanistan began to lobby for the return of the Pashtun areas of NWFP, with access to the

Indian Ocean through Balochistan. In 1947, Britain granted Indian independence. In

referenda and jirgas, the NWFP and tribal areas voted to join Pakistan. However, Afghanistan

protested that the former Afghan territories were never given the choice of independence, or

of re-joining Afghanistan! Afghanistan had now been permanently cut off from its southern

trade routes, and the Indian Ocean, then voted against Pakistan being admitted to the UN.

Afghanistan and Pakistan continued their skirmishes until 1965, when the negotiation of

Trade Transit Agreement with Pakistan brought a quieter period of history. The Soviets

began developing Afghan oil and gas reserves in 1955. Natural gas production reached 275

million cubic feet per day (Mmcf/d) by the mid-1970s. The Djarquduk field was brought into

production and boosted Afghanistan’s natural gas output to a peak of 385 Mmcf/d by 1978-

79, supplying the Soviet gas grid through Uzbekistan.128 (By comparison, the $3.4B Blue

Stream Natural Gas Pipeline, between Russia and Turkey, handles 1,545 Mmcf/d, about four

times the volume). The Brezhnev Doctrine was used to justify Soviet invasion and preserve

this important source of energy, and the Durand Line issue was almost forgotten for a time.

128 - http://afghanistanenergy.com/

Diminution and Development - pg 84 The Durand Line and the dependant territories it created out of the former Durrani Empire

have split the Pashtun people. Both Waziristan and Balochistan rightfully belong to a re-

united Afghanistan, and are the basis for Pakistani intrigues since General Zia-ul-Haq’s reign.

The line was an agreement of convenience left in place without rescission, by two world

monarchies, and after further secession following the British departure, the pre-biased 1947

Pakistani referendum withheld any right to Pashtun self-determination. What a century ago

was just a line in the sand for territorial control has, with the subsequent creation of Pakistan

and absorption of those territories into that new sovereign nation, created a permanent source

of dissent and discord, with the deep cultural and religious implications we face today.

So, ‘Balkanization’ may be the preferred choice. By restoring the Pashtun lands in West

Pakistan into a ‘Pashtunistan’, and carving away Southern Afghanistan from the Turkmen,

Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras who traditionally held the lands north of the Hindu Kush, three

stable nations could potentially be created: (N) Afghanistan, ‘Pashtunistan’ and (E) Pakistan,

with traditional and historic national capitals in Kabul, Kandahar and Islamabad.

Instead, however, international capital’s incessant putsch toward Global Free Trade will force

the amalgamation of three distinct cultures and disparate territories into a polyglot “AF-PAK”

colony, with a unified energy and natural resources extraction corridor lease contract. Then

$100’s of billions a year in ‘aid’ will be squandered to keep up that artifice, and millions of

internally displaced refugees will be forced to remain in detention tent camps.

Internal Political Forces

The efforts of different Afghan ethnic groups and tribal clans to establish their authority over

the majority, either as warlords over provincial areas, or as a form of central government, left

Turkmen, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and Panjshiri at the heart of the ongoing conflicts with the

Taliban. This reaches across into Pakistan, across the British Durand Line that arbitrarily

Diminution and Development - pg 85 divided the original Pashtun ethnic territory. Other Afghan ethnic groups and tribal clans, the

Gojer, Pashaee, Qazalbash, Nuristanis and Baloochi, have played a lesser role.

Beyond the tribal and ethnic differences, Afghanistan is united in Islam, but the mullahs have

been unable to sustain influence over the national government or the people, even in remote

areas. The effect of religion is more a unifying aspect of daily life—except where and when

Taliban interfere. Afghanistan was always a largely agrarian village tribal culture under a

‘head-man’ or ‘council of elders’ jirga system of local authority for distribution of land, seed

and irrigation, until the Communist era, and up until the Soviet occupation, local tribal

leaders had good relations with the Afghan royalty and their centralist authority.

Following the abdication of the monarchy, and throughout the intervening thirty years of war,

frequent attempts were made to ‘nationalize’ the loosely provincial Afghan society into one

central state, first by the Soviet Communists, then by the Taliban Islamists and now by

Karzai’s national government. During that period, four Afghan presidents were sacked,

assassinated or hanged. The political cultural split that arose between Parcham and Khaq

parties during the Soviet occupation, led to outright civil wars between rival factions of the

mujahideen after the rout of the Soviets, and again between the mujahideen and the Taliban.

This unparalleled calamity of civil war left deep tribal and ethnic divisions which continue to

affect national politics today, and threatens to degenerate into a test-lab for ‘state-building’, a

sort of Katrina-esque doll of voodoo economists, corporate warlords and polemicists alike.

Social dislocation following the Soviet occupation would normally have taken decades to

resettle and re-integrate, and might have without further interference, but with Afghanistan’s

prolonged drought, its population growth, a decline in the export economy, an abolition of the

government structure of monarchy, the flight of the educated class to the West, destruction of

Diminution and Development - pg 86 all infrastructure by war and the disruption of the rural administrative and security structures,

Afghan society had become permanently penurious and radicalized.

Following the US invasion and rout of the Taliban, Afghans political figures were invited to

meet at a conference in Bonn to devise a ‘way forward’ for self-governance. This became

known as the Bonn Agreement of 2001:

“In December 2001, a number of prominent Afghans met under UN auspices in Bonn,

Germany, to decide on a plan for governing the country; as a result, the Afghan Interim

Authority (AIA) - made up of 30 members, headed by a chairman - was inaugurated on 22

December 2001 with a six-month mandate, to be followed by a two-year Transitional

Authority (TA), after which elections are to be held.”129

Not a single former Taliban leader was invited. The newly-selected Karzai interim

government focused on general Afghanistan Development Framework [ADF] ‘themes’:

ADF 2005 - Theme 1 - Accelerating Infrastructure Development

ADF 2005 - Theme 2 - A pro-poor approach to economic growth

ADF 2005 - Theme 3 - Creating an enabling environment

ADF 2005 - Theme 4 - Fiscal sustainability and public administration reform

ADF 2005 - Theme 6 - Strengthening Regional Cooperation

ADF 2005 - Theme 7 - Fighting Drugs and Creating Alternative Livelihoods

ADF 2005 - Theme 8 - Security, Justice and equitable political

This emphasis on redevelopment, for stable national governance, for more international

redevelopment funds, ‘enabling’ one other in turn, led to the Afghanistan Compact of 2006:

“The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the international community: 129 - Wikipedia- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonn_Agreement_(Afghanistan)


Determined to strengthen their partnership to improve the lives of Afghan people, and to contribute to national, regional, and global peace and security;

Affirming their shared commitment to continue, in the spirit of the Bonn, Tokyo and Berlin conferences, to work toward a stable and prosperous Afghanistan, with good governance and human rights protection for all under the rule of law, and to maintain and strengthen that commitment over the term of this Compact and beyond;

Recognising the courage and determination of Afghans who, by defying violent extremism and hardship, have laid the foundations for a democratic, peaceful, pluralistic and prosperous state based on the principles of Islam;

Noting the full implementation of the Bonn Agreement through the adoption of a new constitution in January 2004, and the holding of presidential elections in October 2004 and National Assembly and Provincial Council elections in September 2005, which have enabled Afghanistan to regain its rightful place in the international community;

Mindful that Afghanistan's transition to peace and stability is not yet assured, and that strong international engagement will continue to be required to address remaining challenges;

Resolved to overcome the legacy of conflict in Afghanistan by setting conditions for sustainable economic growth and development; strengthening state institutions and civil society; removing remaining terrorist threats; meeting the challenge of counter-narcotics; rebuilding capacity and infrastructure; reducing poverty; and meeting basic human needs;”130

Despite bold themes and long-winded planning narratives, very little was accomplished.

President Karzai once said, “… if I have 50 thousand educated Afghans, I will not ask

Washington for money, I will bring money to Washington.”131 He revised his assessment

recently, saying Afghanistan would not be able to pay for its own government or security

until at least 2024. Karzai’s earlier statement excited many educated and professional

Afghans, and motivated them to pack up and return home. But once there, they found

themselves pitted against the bureaucracy and those powerful individuals who control it. 130 - Building On Success - The London Conference On Afghanistan - The Afghanistan Compact London 31 January – 1 February 2006 http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/afghanistan_compact.pdf 131 - National Press Club, Washington DC, President Hamid Karzai, 2003

Diminution and Development - pg 88 Karzai clearly made an historic appeal to the Afghan Diaspora, but had no mechanism in

place to utilize them when they returned. Afghan leaders must learn that they have to do their

homework and get funded first, before trying to imitate the leadership of the ‘modern world’.

The resulting ‘democratic’ form of governance in Afghanistan allows almost any faction to

enter the Afghan political arena. So far, these factions have created more problems than

solutions for the Afghans and public bureaucracy. Every faction wants prominent posts both

inside the country and at the Afghan missions abroad. Powerful personalities and factions are

responsible for a lack of opportunity for trained Afghan technocrats to enter the governmental

bureaucracy, let alone playing a constructive role. As healthy societies enable the practice of

hiring the best qualified for the best pay, Afghanistan’s government must ensure that

qualified individuals are allowed to join the system.

An Orphaned State

Figure 11 - © AP Newslink

For a century or more, Afghanistan has been deliberately maintained as a no man’s land by

the world superpowers for the sake of their strategic geo-political aims. Afghanistan has

Diminution and Development - pg 89 suffered from chronic international isolation in the fields of international relations, economic

development and modernization. Despite Afghanistan’s location within the heart of the Old

World, traversed since antiquity by the Silk Road, having international borders in common

with strategically important neighbours, the country is now less a central hub and more of a

‘regional conflict complex’, a landlocked controlled wasteland where all the highways and

railways originating from neighbouring countries disappear abruptly at the Afghan border.132

Thus Afghanistan’s strategic orphan-state position has given birth to one great irony: no

great power has ever been fully a friend or a development partner, nor ever had any positive

relationship with us. Just look around at the utter devastation. Please remember Kabul was all

set to become a modern city prior to Soviet invasion. The super powers blocked any Afghan

attempt to develop relationships with other nations, for example, with Russia or Iran. The

aspirations and ideals of Afghans towards achieving economic modernization have always

been crushed by the colonialists in favour of maintaining Afghanistan’s vegetal puppet status.

From the birth of contemporary Afghanistan as a far-flung empire in the eighteenth century,

with its reach from today’s Eastern Iran to Western India, Afghanistan remained a regional

power until the era of the British Raj on the Indian sub-continent. As the British withdrew,

the Soviets advanced. Ironically, this was Afghanistan’s modern era. Then over a period of

30 years Afghanistan suffered one war and occupation after another, with only brief intervals

of peace. Breaking its stasis as a buffer state, being forced out of its isolation as a border land

lost in time, various nationalist and reformist movements resurfaced on the Afghan scene.

These movements and personalities proved to be violent and tumultuous, resulting in frequent

132 - Cramer, Christopher and Goodhand, Jonathan, Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better? War, the State and the 'Post-Conflict' Challenge in Afghanistan, in State Failure, collapse and reconstruction ed. Jennifer Milliken, pp 131-155, (New York:Wiley-Blackwell), 2003

Diminution and Development - pg 90 internal implosions, civil wars, and coup d’etats, until by the end of the twentieth century,

much of Afghanistan was a moonscape, ruled by the Pakistani-sponsored Taliban.

Today, following the traditional pattern set by the English imperialists when they first formed

native rifle battalions, (Eastern Frontier Rifles after the 'Sepoy Mutiny' in 1895), the Afghan

National Army officers are elites. There is no upward mobility for common militiaman, and

little or no sense of loyalty. They would drop their weapons, or even assassinate Western

military observers or Afghan politicians they were assigned to guard. They will look the other

way during Taliban prison breaks and attacks on government compounds, as in Kandahar,

rather than die defending an uncertain government.

“The performance of elite Afghan units impressed analysts, but the rest of the army was made

up of illiterate and backward conscripts who were largely unwilling to serve, poorly trained,

and suffering from low morale. An ethnic imbalance was evident. The professional officers

were "largely from prosperous Pashtun farming families, and also educated Tajiks," while the

enlisted personnel were conscripts from poor (landless or peasant) classes of all ethnic

groups, but frequently Hazaras and Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmen.”133

The ANA is the most respected institution in the country now. However, according to one

high ranking representative of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan

(UNAMA), “roughly 70 percent of the enlisted ANA are non-Pashtun” 134. In their military

activities within the Pashtun heartland to the South, operations are being conducted by non-

Pashtuns along with foreign US:ISAF forces, most of whom are unfamiliar with local

customs and traditions. Worse, they speak and understand local Pashto dialectics only poorly,

133 - Chan,Samuel, “Sentinels of Afghan Democracy: The Afghan National Army.” (US Army:Professional Writing Collection), Vol. 7, February, 2009. 134 - Unnamed friend at UNAMA, November 2008, Bydgoszcz, Poland.

Diminution and Development - pg 91 if at all. Then other than being Afghan nationals and Muslims, the bulk of the ANA are just as

foreign to Pashtun farmers, as any other NATO troops on the ground!

It is this administrative elitism and privileged ‘management culture’, with no sense of loyalty

to the forces that they command, which breeds the endemic corruption within the Karzai

government. These change-of-loyalty factors existed during the unsuccessful occupations

attempts by the British and Soviet Union, which involved a modern government’s efforts to

establish authority over the rural agrarian Afghan people. The state failed when it either

misunderstood the importance of tribal factors and their disdain for the elite, or wilfully

ignored them to pursue their own interests, and as a result, each army in succession drove the

previous one out of power, much as the British Raj defeated the Mughal Empire before it.

“The research in this premisesuggests that policies focused purely on suppression, isolation,

or accommodation are destined to fail in establishing state authority. The common failing of

these three policies occurs when the state fails to understand the difference between

establishing order and establishing authority. Most often, a policy focused on a give and take

relationship with a tribe, leaning slightly towards more giving than taking, appeared to work

best. Finally, the state must seriously consider its capacity to expand its authority—the lower

the capacity, the longer it will take and the more accommodating (but not purely

accommodating) the state must act.” 135

It is important to note that Afghans are supremely loyal, but decades of broken promises and

mucking about with their pride have made them maestros of guerrilla warfare and need-based

diplomacy. Ever since the Soviet occupation, and even before, Afghan loyalties depended on

135 - Groh, Ty L, Ungoverned Spaces: The Challenges of Governing Tribal Societies, (Monterey:Naval Postgraduate School), June 2006, Report Number: A373154

Diminution and Development - pg 92 their sense of which path showed the most promise. As soon as someone is willing to pay

better, they often switch allegiance and fight against a different enemy.

An elder Afghan statesman recently confided in me, “The allies and the Karzai government

are attempting to rebuild allegiances with the Taliban and the former mujahideen Gulbuddin

Hekmatyar. When Saudi Arabia hosted exploratory talks between Taliban and the Karzai

government in July 2008, a representative of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was there, apparently as

a free agent unaffiliated with either delegation.” 136

Redevelopment of Afghan Natural Resources

Back in 1989, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan had collapsed under the withering fire of

the Afghan mujahideen supported by the US CIA, and with Pakistan ISI support for Taliban

resistance groups. The Soviet Union itself collapsed later, after Gorbechev’s reforms were

implemented, then the long Cold War was over! George Bush Sr was voted out of office and

the neo-liberal ‘New Democrats’ under Clinton swept in. The Clinton centrists immediately

reduced defense spending in a frenzy of domestic welfare-state onanism, turning their backs

on their international responsibilities.

Figure 12 – Afghan refugees © National Geographic

136 Unnamed top Afghan government official, March 2009, London, UK

Diminution and Development - pg 93 During that period of internal conflict, when thousands of Afghans were killed or were

internally displaced refugees, and hundreds of thousands of children orphaned, their former

patron in Washington, DC ignored them, obsessed with a destructive ‘Dot.com’ investment

bubble, masquerading as a ‘decade of economic growth’.

What followed for Afghanistan was a brutal decade of civil war destruction between the

northern mujahideen warlords and southern Taliban clerics, vying for power over the Afghan

people as the entire country was destroyed by violence for a second time. The old Soviet

natural gas pipeline stations and the urea fertilizer plant were abandoned. The Taliban ousted

the mujahideen, seized national power, and discovered in Kabul the old Soviet geological

surveys left behind in the retreat. They found to their surprise and delight that Afghanistan

was one of the richest countries in Central Asia, in terms of truly vast natural resource wealth

in strategic metals, copper & chromium, iron & coal, oil & gas, diamonds and rare gems.

Once the Bush Administration was elected in 2000, they took the hard line, demanding

Afghan oil and gas development concessions for the US alone, when they sent Assistant

Secretary of State Christina Rocca to Kabul in August of 2001 to threaten Taliban leaders,

"Either you accept our carpet of gold, or we will bury you under a carpet of bombs." 137

The shocking events of 9/11 in 2001 took place, and from that point on, Afghans faced both

hope for a free and brighter future from the oppressive Taliban regime and a future that was

equally uncertain with the new foreign occupiers, as world media reported the US assault at

Tora Bora on Al-Qui’da ‘mastermind’ Osama bin Laden. Eight years later, that ‘mastermind’

is still permeating the headlines of the western media, but not a word about those old Soviet

geological reports, showing the untold wealth they represented for the war torn Afghanistan!

137 - Brisard, Jean-Charles and Dasquie, Guillaume, 'Bin Laden, la verite interdite' ['Bin Laden, the forbidden truth']. (Paris:Denoël), 2001 at http://www.amazon.fr/Ben-Laden-interdite-Jean-Charles-Brisard/dp/2207253201

Diminution and Development - pg 94 Long before wholly pre-emptive Second Gulf War on Iraq was a twinkle in Vice President

Cheney's eye, in furtherance of the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) Doctrine of

a Supreme New World Order under a sole Super Power, “supporting greater American

militarization, challenging hostile governments, advancing democratic and economic

‘freedoms’”138, his Energy Policy Committee was working directly with the World Bank to

craft Hydrocarbon Law and Minerals Law concessions in language fit for Afghans. The rich

natural resources belonging to the Afghan people would simply be expropriated by the

US:UK as part of the Bush-Cheney-Blair ‘Global War on Terror’.

And I say again, not one word in the Western media!

As I explained before, first though, in order to perfect these resource laws, to enact and

enable their expropriation, the Bush Administration needed Republican Executer. They

suggested a Presidential Executive form of government for Afghanistan, rather than a

monarchist or parliamentary system, and they choose Hamid Karzai amongst their contacts

from UNOCAL. Cheney nominated Karzai as interim leader of Afghanistan to establish their

Executive, then after a duly publicized and carefully choreographed "democratic" elections in

2002, barely a year after Tora Bora, Karzai was selected by a secret ballot of a Loya Jirga

assembly to be the first President of Afghanistan.

One of Karzai's first official acts under the presidential system, was to sign the Western

drafted Hydrocarbon Law and Minerals Law, without any debate, without fanfare, and

certainly, without publicity. World class reserves of natural resources that belonged to the

Afghan people had been expropriated. All that was left to do was to auction them off in

138 - Afsah, Ebrahim, Creed, Cabal, or Conspiracy - The Origins of the current Neo-Conservative Revolution in US Strategic Thinking, (Munich:German Law Journal), 4, No. 9, 2003

Diminution and Development - pg 95 private to the highest bidder. Then the Bush Administration turned their attention to the rich

oil resources in Iraq, and deserted President Karzai to grow his technocratic bureaucracy.

“In October 2006, the British Agencies Afghanistan Group announced that privatization of the Jawzjan gas field was beginning and that deals had already been signed to privatize the Karkar-e Dodkash coal mine in Baghlan, a fluoride mine in Uruzagan, a gold mine in Herat, a precious stones mine in Nuristan, and cement factories in Ghori and Parwan.”139

Then late in 2007, four years after Bush's 'Mission Accomplished' had siphoned off half a

trillion dollars from the US Treasury, cleverly inaugurating the first of many defence requests

for future ‘emergency funding’ for Iraq, Afghanistan and other undisclosed national security

interests’,140 the Afghan Ministry of Mines and Heavy Industries issued a tender offer, then

awarded the fabled ~$300 billion resource-value copper mine concessions at Aynak to the

China Metallurgical Group Corporation (China MCC) for a $3.4 billion signing payment, and

$400 million a year in royalties over the expected twenty to thirty year period of mining

development until exhaustion.

That set the lease terms royalty precedent of some $300 billion in resource value, traded away

for about $15 billion, all told, a meagre royalty rate of return of about 5¢ on the $1. This

compare unfavourably with established royalties in the West, requiring 12.5 percent of net

profits in Texas, 25 percent in Alaska, 33 percent in Canada and the EU and even higher in

the so-called 'leftist' countries, such as Pakistan, our technically bankrupt neighbour, which

also requires the establishment of a Workers Welfare Fund of all foreign entities.141

139 - http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=12486 140 - http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/rewrite/budget/fy2007/defense.html 141 - Qadar, Dr. Sohaib. Outline of Fiscal Tax Structure Applicable to Upstream Petroleum Companies Operating in Pakistan. Advisor - Association of International Petroleum Negotiators (personal file)

Diminution and Development - pg 96 But the ink was barely dry on China MCC’s encroachment into US sphere of influence before

Cheney began banging the drum for a new 'surge' in Afghanistan: a strategy which President

Obama has adopted whole-heartedly after the 2008 elections. But we are told precisely

nothing by the White House, or Downing Street, or the US: UK command in Afghanistan

about the current security situation at the China MCC mine development, or even the fact that

there is a China MCC mining operation, the site of the largest future exploitation play of

copper in all of Asia, a copper mine whose fame is heralded in the annals of antiquity!

"The big question is whether they (China) will deliver on all that or not," said a second Western official, who requested anonymity to speak freely. "The transparency going forward will be all important. We don't want this great resource potential to become a great resource curse, as has happened in other countries."

There may be some cause for concern.

A January 2008 report by Integrity Watch Afghanistan, a European research group, said that MCC extracted more copper than expected from a mine in Sandaik, Pakistan, but that the project has "had virtually no spillover effect on the local economy to date."

The report also warned of the potential for an "environmental and social disaster" if Aynak isn't properly managed, noting that the area is home to some 90,000 people and a source of Kabul's water supply.

China may hope that the Aynak deal will help it position it to compete for more projects in Afghanistan, where three tectonic plates converge. The region is thought to hold some of the world's last major untapped deposits of iron, copper, gold, uranium, precious gems and other raw materials.

"It's the last frontier," said the second Western official.”142

With a quick flip of the ‘surge’ switch, the careful deliberate strategy of counterintelligence,

reconstruction and ‘Hearts and Minds’ crafted by Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan

before the China lease, has now been thrown out for one of "Clear and Hold" under a US

surge of Marine Expeditionary Forces redeployed from Anbar Province. Was this surge just

for the Afghan elections? Hardly. Obama has already approved an additional 35,000 troops!

142 - Landay, Jonathan, China's thirst for copper could hold key to Afghanistan's future, (Sacramento:McClatchy), 8 MAR 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 97 As I will show in Chapter 4, in strategic attacks exploiting growing unrest, the Anglo-

American Global War on Terror was rebranded into 'Afghanistan-Pakistan', as the ‘Second

Front in the Global War on Terror’. CIA sponsorship of Benazir Bhutto put strong pressure

on long-term Pakistani military ruler Pervez Musharaf to resign before the 2008 elections,

and brought billionaire Western-style businessman President Zardari to power.

Immediately ‘emergency funding’ jumped from $50 billion a year in 2007, to $138 billion a

year today, after Obama and Brown offered Zardari $6.5 billion in military aid to stir up the

Taliban homeland in the Swat Valley, Pakistan, which is directly across the border from the

Logar Province copper holdings. Obama's first official act in GWOT was to create over two

million refugees in Swat and heat up the Afghanistan war to where China may no longer hope

to make good on their copper development, not before the 2012 contract deadline to start

mine development or lose it, not without a quid pro quo for supporting the US economy.143

The war in Afghanistan, now in its eighth year, is clearly a resource war. As Karzai's first

term in office came to an end in May, the Afghan Supreme Court extended his term to

August in an unprecedented move, allegedly because national elections campaigns security

weren’t ready to get underway! Yet at the same time, Ministry of Mines hired the US

resource management advisor Gustavson Associates to issue a private short-list call for

interest, ahead of privately negotiations for auction of the world-class iron ore and coking

coal reserves, and the oil and gas deposits, in the billions of barrels and trillions of cubic feet.

Then, as the world media was dominated with the humanitarian crisis in Swat and upcoming

Afghan presidential elections, while the US military news was dominated by 'clear and hold,'

under Surge 3, lease bids were being taken, and President Karzai was preparing sign away

$100 billions worth of Afghan natural resources, for mere cents in the dollar.

143 - Boone, Jon, Chinese group’s $3bn bet on Afghan mine, (London:Financial Times) 28 November 2007

Diminution and Development - pg 98 That’s what made the deputy special representative of the United Nations Peter Galbraith’s

proofs of August election fraud so provocative, and mocks SecState Clinton’s and other US

leaders claims the election results are ‘still legitimate,’ and are ‘certified and legitimate’.144

You say corruption? Galbraith got sacked for it, and Clinton received the Freedom Award!

Here how it works. The national government’s bureaucracy (2008) in Kabul has swollen to a

net $1.7 billion a year, according to foreign observers.145 But judging from the China MCC

lease, royalties from the iron ore & coking coal concessions, copper concession and oil &

gas leases will amount to little more than a billion and a half dollars per year, so just enough

to support the national government, its National Army and National Police, and to repay

interest-only debt on the loans made to Afghanistan by the IMF and the World Bank.

Horrifyingly tidy and efficient, when you think about it, everything neatly signed into law,

protected by the US occupation force’s ‘surge’, extracted at just those royalties necessary to

keep the national government, army and militia in power, and leave the Afghan people in

thirty years time just another destitute, resource-stripped, smoking moonscape.

But isn’t that what the permanent Anglo-American military occupation meant to prevent?!

Afghan Dream of Energy and Agricultural Independence

Instead of resource appropriation by the occupying forces, the Afghan people can take a

different path, one with a renewable future, and I will describe how using published cost data.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, IEA estimates Pakistan uses 345,000 barrels of oil per day.146

Afghanistan has about 1/10th the population of Pakistan, so it's reasonable to expect that

144 - http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/peter-galbraith-afghanistan-elections-interview 145 - CIA World Factbook, ibid 146 - http://www.iea.org/Textbase/stats/oildata.asp?COUNTRY_CODE=PK

Diminution and Development - pg 99 Afghanistan would consume only 40,000 barrels of oil per day. The US consumes 21 million

tons of anhydrous ammonia fertilizer per year,147 and has about 400 million acres of arable

land in farm production. Afghanistan has about 1/20th the arable irrigated land as the US,148

so it’s reasonable to expect that Afghanistan would consume only 1 million tons of ammonia

per year. The latest USGS estimates say there are 1.6 billion barrels of crude oil underneath

Afghanistan's sands and 15 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, 149 enough oil for Afghan people

to achieve total energy independence for the next 100 years, and enough natural gas to

produce their demand for ammonia fertilizer for the next 300 years, using the Haber-Bosch

Process.150 Records show the Soviets ran a successful 100,000 ton per year urea fertilizer

conversion plant in Mazar-i-Sharif using 1970’s technology.151 Think what could be

accomplished now, if Afghans didn’t have to buy their own gas back at market price!

With energy and agricultural independence, supplemented by the minerals royalties and

humanitarian reconstruction aid for the war damage foisted on them by world super-powers,

the Afghan people could rebuild their Garden of Eden themselves, and become an exporting

powerhouse! All it would take is design, planning and construction of a 50,000 barrel per day

oil refinery in Afghanistan, and a 1 million ton per year anhydrous ammonia fertilizer plant,

by taking the oil and gas sale off the table now, before any extraction leases are signed.

What would a new 50,000 barrel per day refinery cost? Make Oil Company of Lebanon was

to start building a $3 billion, 250,000 b/d refinery in Kurdistan in 2006.152 Make Oil also bid

for a $2.2 billion, 150,000 b/d refinery in Iraq.153 Then a 50,000 b/d refinery in Afghanistan

would cost about $1 billion, over three years of construction, easily paid for by $3.2 billion 147 - http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031148.pdf 148 - http://www.cfr.org/publication/19478/ 149 - http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1473 150 - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haber_process 151 - ibid http://afghanistanenergy.com 152 - http://www.allbusiness.com/manufacturing/petroleum-coal-products-manufacturing/12336150-1.html 153 - http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/163434473.html

Diminution and Development - pg 100 China MCC signing payment, or using only a portion of the $800 million a year in royalties

expected from Afghan minerals mining concessions.

The costs for two 500,000 t/yr anhydrous ammonia plants? In Algeria, ASMIDAL Group, its

trading partner Transammonia Inc., and the German engineering firm Ferrostaal AG signed a

memorandum of understanding (MOU) to build a 600,000-t/yr joint-venture ammonia plant.

The new facility has a combined capacity of about 550,000 t/yr. Estimated project cost was

$370 million. In Indonesia, PT Kaltim Parna Industri, a joint venture between Japanese firms

Mitsubishi Corp. (55%) and Asahi Chemical Industry Co. Ltd. (10%) and the Indonesian

companies PT Parna Raja (25%) and PT Pupuk Kalimantan Timur (Kaltim) (10%), started

construction of a $240 million ammonia plant in Bontang, East Kalimantan. Capacity at the

plant was projected to be 495,000 t/yr. And in Oman, Suhail Bahwan Group announced that it

would construct an ammonia-urea complex in the Sohar industrial area. The new plant would

have a design capacity of 2,000 t/d of ammonia [750,000 metric tons per year] and 2,600 t/d

of granular urea. The estimated cost of the plant was between $450 and $500 million. 154

So let’s tally up the costs. Afghanistan’s energy and agricultural independence can be secured

for about $1.5 billion! This is a mere fraction of current US:ISAF spending on their military

occupation in a single month. Did global policy planners at IMF / World Bank even consider

this option? Of course not! Western 'humanitarian' policy requires dependent clients. They

need 'failed states' in order to grow their ‘emergency funding’, which can only be ‘fixed’ with

more US:UK taxpayer dollars in an endlessly increasing +8% per year budget death spiral.

Afghanistan has within its own lands total energy and agricultural security for more than a

century! Why are World Bank and IMF auctioning off these resources for 1¢’s on the $1!?

Certainly, the lease contracts allow the Afghan government the option of buying oil and gas

154 - http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/nitrogen/480400.pdf

Diminution and Development - pg 101 but at market prices! How could that then translate into motor fuels and nitrogen fertilizers

that the Afghan people could afford?! The answer, it can’t and it won’t. ‘It doesn’t add up’.

$100 billions in Afghan oil and gas resources are meant as export to US:UK trading partners.

The oil leases will become effective “not later than February 10, 2010” to Orient Petroleum

International Inc (OPII), a Pakistani resource company. There were no bids for gas leases!155

Where will China MCC find power needed to smelt the copper ore within the four-year mine

development time-frame? Are they planning to use hydropower instead?

Then what about hydropower? With Decree 4 of the Presidential Office, the Ministry of

Energy and Water [MEW] was established from two existing ministries: Ministries of Energy

and Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources and Environment [MIWRE]. Energy is our

economy's only hope for growth, and sustainable availability of electricity at affordable

prices is the best way to improve Afghan living standards. Historically, most power

generation in Afghanistan has been based on hydropower, our most promising resource

[generating over 54% of the total]. The rest is provided by thermal sources, primarily coal

and natural gas. Power generation facilities suffered extensive war damage and neglect, and

require significant restoration and upgrading. There has been good success with US

reconstruction of the Kajaki Dam, and installation of the third generator. Similarly water

treatment and irrigation improve Afghan livelihoods by providing access to safe drinking

water, household food security, and sources of income while protecting them from the

negative effects of droughts and floods, by developing and managing water resources in a

sustainable way with user participation, and by contributing to the growth of the national

economy by providing effective services for efficient water use in all sectors.

But it may not happen this way:

155 - First Round Bid Qualifiers http://afghanistanpetroleum.com


“...there is concern that the good progress made in selecting an investor (MCC, OPII) is not being matched by progress in building institutions and a regulatory environment, raising alarms that the institutional process may not be adequately completed. In many instances, developing countries’ state apparatus have experienced difficulties in resisting pressure and lobbying from powerful industry majors, once they have been awarded contracts.” 156 “An extraordinary 40 per cent of the billions of dollars in aid destined for Afghanistan never reaches the country, a top international specialist on the region has warned. Anthony Cordesman, from the US Centre for Strategic and International Studies, said in Canberra yesterday that the massive waste of international aid was one of the great failures of the campaign to win the war in Afghanistan.”157

The World Bank estimates that demand for food will rise by 50 percent by 2030, as a result

of growing world population, rising affluence, and the shift to Western dietary preferences by

a larger middle class. World prices for that food will soar, as will the world market prices for

Afghan oil & gas resources so blithely squandered, and in an ultimate irony, our ‘Garden of

Central Asia’ from centuries in antiquity, will be reduced to some sub-Saharan kill zone.

The Taliban Vision

The Taliban view of “conflict” between believer and infidel is at variance with an ancient

one, pre-Crusades, and reveals the complicated nature of conflicting religious ideologies,

hardening from their core beliefs, as have the other ‘goat herder’ religions: Judaism and

Christianity. In addition to restrictions placed upon the behavior of the Mu’min (believer),

that is, purity of love towards all Muslims and purity of hate against all infidels (but here not

to the point of injustice, it’s important to point out), are the corruptions of Koranic law by the

Taliban in all their many factions, as splintered and divisive as the mujahideen themselves.

We know them well. Women must be clothed head to toe and veiled. Girls may not receive

secular education after age 9. Flogging for real or imagined adulterous transgressions, and in

156 - http://iwaweb.org/aynakcoppermine.pdf 157 - Nicholson, Brendan, 40% of Afghan aid 'never arrives', (Melbourne:The Age) 14 October, 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 103 many cases, women are not allowed to leave their compounds at all. Acid has been sprayed in

the face of school girls. Hands are chopped off for thievery. Collaborators and apostates are

hanged. No quarter is given to captured infidels in summary executions. Sharia rule of law.

Wahhabism promotes these views too, recently ruling that an aged grandmother be whipped

with 40 lashes, for being alone in the same room with two men not of her immediate family.

US:ISAF intelligence sources report that segments of the Taliban have shifted dramatically in

their theology from Deobandism toward the Salafi-jihadi outlook since Tora Bora, under the

influence of such Saudi ideologues as Sheik Isa al-Masri. This may further rupture Taliban

relationships with the Afghan people, as it did in 1998 when the Taliban slaughtered between

5,000 and 6,000 Hazara Shi’ia followers in Mazar i-Sharif, 158 to avenge the killing of

thousands of Taliban foot soldiers and in 2001, when the Taliban destroyed the world famous

Bamiyan Buddhist statues and sent a shiver down the spine of Western civilization. This

“Dark Ages” effect of the Taliban Sharia on Afghan society could be employed as a divisive

propaganda wedge, as Canadian Psyops Division in Kabul is attempting now.159

The re-emergence of the Taliban can be attributed to four major factors: first, the continued

patronage and training of Taliban by some faction of the Pakistani ISI; second, lack of state-

building and the inability of the Afghan government to establish a significant and sustained

military presence throughout the country; third, the failure to secure and stabilize the rural

areas of the country so that development and reconstruction can proceed, and; lastly, the lack

of any significant material improvement in the lives of most Pashtuns, especially in the

southwest and east of the country, since the demise of the former Taliban regime.

“A former Taliban fighter provided a gripping first-hand account of being secretly trained by members of the Pakistani military, paid $500 a month and

158 - Sheridan, Michael. ‘How the Taliban slaughtered thousands of people’. The Sunday Times. 1 Nov 1998. 159 - (personal communication)


ordered to kill foreigners in Afghanistan. Mullah Mohammed Zaher offered a description of a bomb-making apprenticeship at a Pakistani army compound where he says he learned to blow up NATO convoys. He’s one of three former Taliban fighters introduced to The Canadian Press by an Afghan government agency that works at getting rebels to renounce the insurgency. A report produced for the Pentagon and released this month by the Rand Corp., claims individuals in the Pakistani government are involved in helping the insurgents.

An illiterate, career warrior, Zaher has not seen the 177-page report. But he made a series of claims in a 90-minute interview that supported its broad conclusions - and offered a deluge of new details. He described how men in khaki army fatigues housed, fed, paid and finally threatened insurgents into carrying out attacks on foreign troops.

Perhaps most startling of all was his description of the repeated warning from Pakistani soldiers about where trainees would be sent if they refused to fight: Guantanamo Bay. He said there was an inside joke among insurgents whenever the Pakistanis turned over a high-profile rebel to the Americans for detention at the U.S.-run prison camp in Cuba.

"Whenever we heard on the news that Pakistan caught a Taliban commander, we used to say: ’He stopped obeying them’," Zaher said through an interpreter.”160

‘Zaher’ (zahir ) means ‘visible’ in Arabic. Like the meaning of zahir, there are hundreds

of ‘visible’ examples of direct Pakistani ISI interference in Afghan peoples’ lives, both

by their agents and their foreign allianced in Al-Qa’idah’.161 What lies beneath and

remains invisible is most likely far worse than what is visible. A common Afghan hope

and example of an Afghan Vision would be to stop Pakistani interference in Afghan

affairs entirely, whatever national and international effort that may require.

"Night letters (shabnamah ) have been a traditional and common instrument of Afghan

religious figures, jihadists and rebels to encourage people, especially (but not exclusively)

rural populations to oppose both state authority and regulations. Louis Dupree, in his seminal

work on Afghanistan, suggests that such ‘framing instruments’, often in the form of folklore,

performed a variety of significant functions to include ‘social control’ where individuals are 160 - Ex-Taliban fighter tells of training, cash, orders from Pakistani military, Kabulpress.org. June 30, 2008. 161 - http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KJ15Df04.html

Diminution and Development - pg 105 told by illustration what they should or should not do and what rewards or penalties they will

incur for those not following these directives. Taliban shabnamah serve the same purpose.”162

In addition to the lyrical shabnamah, of course, are the continuous death threats issued to

every political figure and businessperson in Afghanistan, rumours gravely whispered to them

or written on scraps of paper that the person is ‘third on the assassination list’ or that their

family ‘is targeted’ for reprisals. Since the toppling of the Taliban regime at the end of 2002,

criminal activities have been on the rise. Child abductions for ransom are now a common

concern in Afghan society. Businessmen, who can afford protection, do not take risks. Forced

marriages and beatings appear on local news outlets more and more often, as some female

victims have even chosen to immolate themselves. Until the ANP and other law enforcement

agencies are capable of preventing or at the least, capturing and prosecuting the perpetrators,

the Afghan vision remains a long way off from spotting, ‘the light at the end of the tunnel.’

Worse than the lack of good governance is to allow a government official to see himself as

heir apparent of Afghan Law and use it as a tool that bends in any direction that suits him.

This is why ordinary people, especially in the Pashoon southwest are more likely to take their

case to a powerful individual or someone with connection before stepping into government

offices. This is widely known among the NATO circles.163 The reality of life in Afghanistan

is as described above and that simply means, Afghan commoners are voiceless and invisible.

We know the US military is deploying ‘high-accuracy’ cluster munitions HIMAR artillery164

intent on saturation-shelling areas of Taliban territory just across the Durand Line as a

“surgical” (sic) operation, under the night-vision gaze of hovering Blackhawks and UAV’s.

We know the Taliban lost no love over ‘infidels’, and moreover, when the allies are unjust, 162 - Johnson, Thomas, “An Analysis of Taliban ‘Night Letters’, Small Wars & Insurgencies”, (Vancouver: Afghanistan Conflict Monitor) Vol 18, Issue 3 September 2007, pages 317-344. 163 Unnamed Foreign Advisor to the current NATO Command in Afghanistan, 2009. 164 - http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2009/03/marine_himars_030709w/

Diminution and Development - pg 106 when allies kill women and children with their “pinpoint” bombing, thirty at a time, just to

attempt to assassinate a single Taliban field commander, but with only a 1 in 6 success ratio,

that incremental growth to the opposing insurgency is a chain reaction. Every single innocent

death must be avenged, by suicide bombing if necessary, as these allied counterinsurgency

collateral deaths activate and energize the obtuse Code of Pashtunwali (pəsh'tünwâlî ):165

“Pashtunwali is the Pashtun code of life. The Pashtun, speaking an east Iranian dialect called Pashto, live on both sides of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Although predominantly Muslim, the Pashtun live according to a cultural code, Pashtunwali, which demands courage, hospitality, and revenge—unless the aggressor seeks public pardon. Pashtunwali, however, never forgives shame-causing crimes, especially those involving a woman's honor. Pashtun society is well known for its generations-long cycles of revenge murder. Conflict resolution in the case of murder involves public pardon, forgiveness, the ceding of land, or the giving in marriage of a woman from the aggressor's family to a member of the aggrieved family. Pashtunwali is driven by nang (honor) and tor (shame)."166

As Hopkins explains, it’s even more complicated than that, for those who wish to study this:

“Colonial and anthropological understandings of genealogy as the primary modus operendi of Pashtun tribal society meant that it not only creates the bounds of tribal society, but also shapes the channels and limits of socially acceptable competition and violence. The tarbûrwâlî, the rivalry between paternal cousins or agnates, acted as a restraint and regularized violence in Pashtun society. The tarbûrwâlî is encapsulated by the Pashtünwâlî, and is thus one of the ideal norms regulating Pashtun society. This structuring of violence profoundly affected the evolution of state power, especially in the succession struggles for the Afghan throne. While in the main European observers failed to grasp the structure of violence, instead understanding the apparently chaotic levels of violence as endemic in Pashtun society, some of the more attuned observers clearly discerned it. Yet the tarbûrwâlî offers a glimpse onto another understanding of tribal identity, one not simply genealogically defined, but rather performed.”167

165 - see also Appendix 3 166 - Ahmed, Akbar S, Pashtun Economy and Society: Traditional Structure and Economic Development in a Tribal Society. (London: Routledge), 1980 167 - Hopkins, Ben, The Makings of Modern Afghanistan,(London:Palgrave MacMillan), 2008.

Diminution and Development - pg 107 The continuation of civilian deaths as a result of the on going NATO air strikes on the one

hand, and the growing role of the criminal warlords in the Afghan political and social affairs

on the other hand, forces us to a sarcastic conclusion; Ta wa Amrica zamoosz the para delta

zanoona waszni!? (You say Americans are dying for us here!?) This is a profound change in

the view of ordinary Afghans since early 2002. As far as Afghan civilian collateral death are

concerned, what needs to be clearly understood first is that Obama’s GWOT has been much

more deadly for Afghan civilians than was Bush’s in the comparable months of 2008.

Silence of the Innocents

Finally, there is the vision of the Afghan innocents, often overlooked in Afghan society:

“The High Commissioner noted that there has been a dramatic increase in threats and intimidation against women in public life or who work outside the home. Women working with government agencies, national and international organisations, journalists, police, and lawyers have all reported death-threat letters and phone calls. As a result, many women in public life have been forced to curtail their activities or abandon their jobs. The report calls for the protection of women and girls in both the private and public sphere and this must be translated into policies and concrete programmes.” 168

Even today, under US:ISAF security, Afghanistan may well be moving retrogressively:

“The Taliban may not be returning anytime soon, but if some Afghan lawmakers have their way, Taliban-era laws will once again reign over the country. Last week, a group of members of parliament (MPs) put forth draft legislation that would ban T-shirts, loud music, women and men mingling in public, billiards, video games, playing with pigeons, and more – all regulations from the notorious Taliban era. The move is the most recent attempt by religious conservatives to restrict "un-Islamic influences." Many observers say it's the latest sign of growing Talibanization in Afghanistan." 169

Shi’ite Personal Status Law, signed by President Karzai in April, 2009.

168 - http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2009/03/05/un-high-commissioner-alarmed-at-worsening-human-rights-situation-in-afghanistan.html 169 - http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0421/p01s03-wosc.html

Diminution and Development - pg 108 Although financial commodities speculation and global meltdown made simple existence

unsustainable, (retail food prices soared by 28% in 2008) it is unlikely that the Afghan people

will conform to the foreign dream and trot off quietly to find a spot to curl up and die. For the

same reason, the ill-equipped and poorly paid ANA/ANP are unlikely to bring an

independent Afghan stability, however many hundred thousands of unemployed are poorly

trained and poorly armed, and left illiterate and ill-advised to guard some far-off district

traffic intersection, and however $10 billions are poured into Kabul’s aid coffers for the

foreseeable future, up to 2024.

Human rights groups say hundreds of women are killed by male relatives every year in

Afghanistan and Pakistan for alleged infidelity or other perceived slights to the family name.

Violence against women such as rape, "honour killings", teenage forced marriage and sexual

abuse remain widespread. In response to physical beatings and brutal disfigurement by

cutting or acid committed by their husbands, with essentially total seclusion brought on by

Islamic fundamentalism, more and more Afghan women are resorting to self-immolation:

“Every day in Afghanistan, women are committing suicide by setting themselves on fire. In a country where women are often oppressed, self immolation has become a common practice to escape family problems. And the cases of self immolation are growing at an alarming rate. "They burn themselves because they see no other option,"170. Sixty percent of Afghan girls are married before the legal age of 16. And between 70 and 80 percent must endure forced marriages. Often, the marriage is to an older man who has another wife and children.” 171

Here is the healthcare challenge that Afghan women face every day:

· Only 14 percent of Afghan women have access to skilled medical childbirth care · Second-highest maternal mortality ratio in the world: 1,900 deaths per 100,000 births · 70 pregnant women die each day in Afghanistan, often during childbirth

170 Dr. Zakia Fazel, an Afghan human rights advocate 171 - http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2009/02/03/afghanistan-the-smell-of-death.html


· 1 in 4 Afghan children will not live to see their fifth birthday172

Public officials beg Afghan women not to commit suicide. What do Afghan women believe?

What do they see? Of the 1,600,000 Afghan

orphans [UNICEF], almost nothing is known.

“60% of children have lost at least one member of

their family or close relatives; 35% of children

have lost one of their parents, over 600,000

children sleep on the streets, for every 50,000 there

is one physician or doctor and of 200,000 disabled

people 50% are children.”173

There are many anecdotes of the Kabul orphan

‘smoke sellers’, their discarded tin cans filled with

charred herbs (spand), selling the scented smoke to

passing drivers trapped in traffic snarls for a few

Afghanis. Spand is herb gathered and sold in the markets. The smoke is believed to ward off

any misfortune174. You only have take a look at their faces to see the cruel psychological

stress they endure, the poorest of the poor, Afghanistan’s ‘slumdogs’, in their millions, living

on the streets and in IDP detention camps for the last 20 years.

“Timely information have reported the presence of children under 18 years serving in the armed forces. The use of children as human bombs by anti-government elements, including Taliban, was reported as well as cases of recruitment of children as well as voluntary forced by the Taliban in southern provinces and in regions of Pakistan.

The number of suicide attacks has increased significantly in 2006 and 2007. Reports indicate that these attacks were carried out by anti-government elements, including Al Qa’idah, the Taliban and the Hizb-e Islami. A study by UNAMA found that perpetrators of bomb attacks 172 - Improving Maternal and Child Health in Afghanistan, The Abbott Fund 173 - http://www.rawa.org/orphanages.htm 174 - UNHCR

Figure 13 - Kabul Smoke Sellers [public domain]

Diminution and Development - pg 110 "appeared to be young (sometimes children), poor, uneducated, easily influenced by recruiters and from a large number of madrassas (Islamic religious schools states) of the "other side of the border with Pakistan." The number of attacks against teachers, students and schools has also increased significantly during the first half of 2006. In 2006, more than 200 schools were burned, attacked or partially destroyed, at least 15 teachers were killed and some 200 000 students were affected by the closure of schools.175

Figure 14 - John Moore, Getty Images

While some 4.8 million war-displaced Afghans have gone home, tens of thousands more

remain unaccounted for in Pakistan, Iran and the surrounding former Soviet socialist

republics. The Bush Administration’s pledge of $10 billion in aid remains an unfulfilled

promise, so has EU’s pledge, and their claim that $10 billions were spent on reconstruction,

but remain unaudited. In spite of these broken promises, lack of security and development,

poor but proud Afghans still follow their code of hospitality when interacting with US:ISAF

175 - http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/files/french_translations/AFGHANISTAN_FR.pdf

Diminution and Development - pg 111 forces in the field. US and NATO must do all that they can not to casually slaughter and so

alienate the Afghan common peoples, because in that case, the tea tray of Afghan hospitality

will be replaced with an AK47 of ghach (‘revenge’).

‘The way-Forward’ for US:ISAF

I must remind readers that Afghanistan was an empire and caliphate (larger than India today)

for one thousand years, and was considered the “Garden of Central Asia” and “Crossroads of

the Continents” when Alexander the Great settled in the Bamiyan Valley for four years prior

to his onward push to India. The Afghan people are descended culturally from both the West

and the East as can be seen in their faces today, and notwithstanding British (East) Indian

Empire creation of their Durand Line which divided our land in the 19th Century (a partition

that should have been redrawn in 1947), Afghanistan as recently as the 1970’s was a

“modern” society with Western-style clothes, lifestyles, automobiles, stores and markets, and

with social habits imported from the West, styles no different from any rich oil emirate today.

Countless British and European tourists traveled to Afghanistan as our well-served guests in

the 1960’s and 1970’s visiting the “Rooftop of the World” and the “Land of the Happy

Hunzas”,. That all changed when the US took umbrage with Soviet expansionism before

1980, after the US CIA’s involvement in creating both the mujahideen and Taliban as a proxy

counter-force to the “Communist Domino Theory”. Afghanistan, like Viet Nam, was

destroyed in the cause of the Cold War, and just as in Viet Nam, US turned its back and

walked away for a full decade, while Afghan military forces which it had resolutely trained

and armed reduced Afghan life to rubble.

Diminution and Development - pg 112 With all of the collective military might of the alliance, dominant currencies, extended media,

global legal mechanisms, regional influence, international relations and moral obligations, the

US:ISAF must atone for this past liability, and assist in delivering security for Afghanistan:

1. Suppress foreign interference which has negative repercussions on internal security in

Afghanistan and promotes disunity among Afghan tribes. US must secure Pakistan’s

commitment to stop its support of fundamentalist and international jihadi groups. Iran

must be prevented from playing a divisive role, using cultural and language pretexts.

2. Interdict, arrest and eliminate local and international mercenary agents — individuals

and organizations — who disrupt life in order to prevent Afghanistan from becoming

a secure, peaceful and prosperous country. There are elements within the Arab world

funding militants who promote fundamentalist religious ideology in Afghanistan and

across the region, just as there are similar mercenary elements within the West.

3. Establish national security throughout Afghanistan. This could be accomplished by

funding, training and equipping the Afghan National Army and National Police

militia forces and law enforcement agencies, and increasing their role in society.

4. Arrest criminal warlords, drug traffickers and corrupt political officials and their

families, while recognizing not all Afghan warlords are criminals, and that they are

also our national war heroes. Stockpiles of arms, currency and drugs must be seized

and destroyed, and those arrested must be tried and sentenced, not simply released.

Instead, it seems that the Obama Administration’s State:Defense is continuing Cheney’s

psyops program to gyn up an expanding front in the globar war of terror on every continent,

now with ‘Underpants Bomber’, whose father is coincidentally one of the richest men in

Africa, and whose wealth was in Yemen banks threatened by domestic insurgents. Suddenly

‘Yemen’ is on the GWOT radar, using that same logic programming ‘WMD’ made famous:


“Either P, or Q, is true.

P is terrifying and awful!

Therefore, Q is true.” 176

This was the repeat pattern of the Bush Administration through every stage of Iraq invasion,

through the ’08 economic collapse US taxpayer bailout of the world’s major banks, even the

hysteria over H1N1 flu, which lead to mandatory taxpayer bailout of BioPharmacy, even as

nothing is done about food safety, medical malpractice or pharmaceutical drug interactions.

In the following chapter, I’ll examine the development of the ‘Anglo-American Vision’ of

Afghanistan, how they once championed Afghan freedom fighters when it was convenient to

their Cold War culture of triumphant exceptionalism, then immediately abandoned any real

effort at Afghanistan nation building after the Soviet Union fell and the Cold War ended. It is

important for Western readers to remind themselves that non-Western nations don’t see the

Anglo-American through the sloganeered branding by which they foist themselves upon the

world, and that as long as Anglo-America remains blinded by their dominion status, and self-

deluded by 24x7x365 commercially-corporatized media bombardment, that the $100 billions

expense for domination of Afghanistan, as proxy for Central Asia, will never come to an end.

In Chapter 5, I will discuss the overriding effect of Afghanistan’s neighbours on Afghan

domestic policies, and lead from there to Chapter 6, discussing the recent Afghan presidential

elections. In Chapter 7, I will conclude with my views of a ‘way-forward’ for redevelopment

projects that will have major long-term positive impact on the lives and future of Afghans,

creating a strategic economic centre within the global market. Afghanistan is positioned to

develop energy and agricultural independence with its own natural resources, if given the

176 - Stearns, Denis, Freedom Means Never Having to Be Logical..., (Seattle:Food Safety News), 15 october, 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 114 opportunity. Investing an equitable and fair share of Afghan natural resource royalties in oil

refineries, fertilizer factories, medical and education services, in hydroelectric dams and

irrigation canals will create jobs, reduce poverty and protect youth from indoctrination by

Wahhabi extremism, while allowing us to rebuild our Garden of Eden without debt service.

With renewed strength, security and independence, Afghanistan will be ready to solve the

social and political problems created for the estimated 50 million Pashtuns living on both

sides of the Durand Line, which remains the source of conflict between Afghanistan and

Pakistan, with on-going global consequences.

Provided the Punjabi- majority controlling Pakistani government can be brought to the table

and the Afghan Leadership is convinced as well, an alternative solution to the historic source

of mistrust between the two Islamic States could be one of abrogation of that line, in which

Pakistan gives up a ten-mile wide railway, highway and pipeline Super-Corridor, stretching

from Kandahar through Baluchistan to the warm-water Indian Ocean port at Gwadar.

In return, Afghanistan would agree to the social and political compromise of recognizing the

(technically already rescinded) Durand Line, and let it become their permanent legal border.

Such a solution provides the geopolitical security that Pakistan needs for it to survive as a

State. At the same time, a Super-Corridor will free Afghanistan from economic isolation, to

become an equal trading partner in a highly competitive and strategically important region.

The West owes Afghanistan at least that much for their continued militant interference in our

lives. But before they do this, they must first confront their own epistemological reality.


Chapter 4 – The Anglo-American Vision

Figure 15 - © Sgt. Anthony Boocock

While the US builds forts, the Chinese build ports.

I’ve fully described our Afghan Vision, but in the 30 years since Soviet invasion, that vision,

such as it is, or was, or hopes to be, has been subsumed beneath the oppressive hegemony of

the major global empires. Let’s now look at the Anglo-American vision, as outsiders see it.

Since the “Bonn Agreement” in December 2001, which established the mechanism for

provisional arrangements pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions

in Afghanistan, the Anglo-American vision has been challenged by the security, social and

development circumstances of Afghanistan.

Diminution and Development - pg 116 While there is a broad agreement on continued international engagement, the security

circumstances have been tipping toward the militants and Taliban. Taliban continue to bank

on the failure and the inability of President Karzai to tackle corruption and build strong

government institutions that can effectively take charge of Afghanistan’s internal affairs. At

the same time, the Taliban find the Anglo-American vision for Afghanistan conflicting and

their internal schism over the ‘way-forward’ in Afghanistan confusing.

In response, the Obama Administration has appointed a new US commander, General

McChrystal, and “took time” to reflect on his recommendations for an additional surge of

40,000 troops and $100 billion more in emergency funding. Therefore, a clearly different

Anglo-American Vision was in the “pipeline”. Finally on first of December 2009, President

Obama announced the deployment of 35,000 more troops to Afghanistan, with a new set of

priorities which I will discuss in this and following chapters.

‘I Love Your Jesus, But I Hate Your Christ’

First I want to emphasize I’m not in any way disparaging the brave actions of American and

NATO military forces, whose exploits in battle are brilliant and extraordinary. Over 897 US

soldiers, 223 UK soldiers and 361 coalition soldiers have lost their lives to buy us precious

moments of time here for laissez faire political science theories, while private mercenaries

and war profiteers push the Global War against Islam across the trillion-dollar goal. Military

engagement itself is only a ‘small’ part of a vast ‘Global War On Terror Program’, and the

military doesn’t run this, bureaucrats on the sidelines do.

My premiseis on international studies, not military science, and as any military person would

be the first to admit, it is the international politicians who determine how war campaigns are

engaged, and ultimately what are the costs of, and the war profits from, those campaigns. We

are political scientists, and as such, we are obliged to observe the war objectively and without

Diminution and Development - pg 117 the blinkers of flag waving, elitist exceptionalism or misplaced patriotism, and we must

engage that branding in dialogue, whether in the end it proves to be patriotic, or puerile.

I’ll present a counter-insurgency speech by a real warrior, then go on from there:

“We are fighting a counterinsurgency battle here in Afghanistan and the focus for all of our efforts is the Afghan people. We intend to separate the population from the enemy physically, but more importantly psychologically. The enemy is very complex, ranging from criminals, narco traffickers, Taliban, Haqqini network insurgents, HIG (Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin) fighters, all the way to Al Qa’idah.

As we separate the population from the enemy we then endeavour to connect them with their government and their Afghan national security forces, which include their Army, their police and their border police. Our aim is to influence an Afghan population that has already suffered terribly through decades of fighting and austerity, to embrace the Afghan government as a legitimate way to achieve a better future for their children and to reject an alternate vision of death and destruction. We do all this by leading from behind to build the capacity of our Afghan brothers so we may one day return home. We invest a considerable amount of effort improving roads, schools, clinics and fostering good governance at the provincial and district level.

There are many brave Afghans stepping up to the plate and I'm optimistic for the future.”177

Popular US football hero-turned-soldier Pat Tillman was more circumspect, “We will not

question the reasons for our being here or allow any personal beliefs to interfere with our job.

My hope is that decisions are being made with the same good faith that Kevin and I aim to

display. … I hope [this war is about] more than oil, money & power. … I doubt that it is.”178

Anglo-Americans especially were in the grip of a Straussian sub-culture which “believed that

the liberal idea of individual freedom led people to question everything—all values, all moral

truths. And this threatened to tear apart the ‘shared values’ which held society together. But

there was a way to stop this, Straussians believed. It was for politicians to assert [to implant]

177 - Johnson, Col. John. Currahee Memorial Dinner. 506th Infantry. 16 August 2008 178 - Pat Tillman in his journal, March 13, 2003

Diminution and Development - pg 118 powerful and inspiring myths that everyone could believe in. They might not be true, but they

were ‘necessary’ illusions. One of these was Religion; the other was the myth of the Nation.

And in America, that became the belief that the country had a [pre-emptive] destiny to battle

the ‘Forces of Evil’ throughout the world.”179 Will we ever awaken from that death culture?

A Taliban look-alike told our Kabul field-party, “I love your Jesus, but I hate your Christ.”

And why shouldn’t they? Not once in Western media has it ever been mentioned that Jesus is

considered as a prophet within Islam, worshipped along with Mohammed. In our own past,

waves of Christian faith swept across Afghanistan during the Silk Road era, and became the

basis for Pastunwali’s code of hospitality. The Pashtuns may even be the lost tribes of Israel,

their tribal names in Pashto the tribes of Reuben, Shimeon, Levi, Naftali, Gad, Asher, Josef

and Ephraim! “The former monarchy in Afghanistan has a widely-spread tradition according

to which their origin was from the tribe of Benjamin and the family of King Saul.” 180

179 - Curtis, Adam, The Power of Nightmares Episode 1 - Baby It’s Cold Outside, 2004 180 - http://www.dangoor.com/74069.html


Figure 16 - © David Axe

But the West needs a bogey man, an Anti-Christ Daemon to replace ‘Godless Communism.’

Speaking of Islamic faith and honour is counter-productive to building up ‘war confidence’!

‘Deep Throat’ advised on Watergate, ‘Follow the money’. Here, let’s ‘Follow the branding’:

1. ‘Freedom and Democracy’™ - More of a slogan than a real theme, and a carryover from

the whitewash of Iraq, the ‘purple thumb’ of Afghanistan democracy is to δημοκρατια, as a

red pyjama’s Santa Claus is to Druidic communal solstice feasts to welcome back the sun.

It’s a gimmick, a ‘gew-gaw’. Freedom and Democracy™ will become an irritatingly ironic

and sarcastic reference used by both Western and Afghan journalists alike, as the years pass

and Afghanistan remains further destabilized and unreconstructed, even less free and clearly

non-democratic, while the US Congress quibbles and US military dithers between careful

counter-insurgency, or maintaining a clear and holding action, or simply automating the war

into daily Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)‘pin-point’ bombing;

Diminution and Development - pg 120 2. ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’™ (OEF-A) - A military ‘boots and saddles’ campaign with

reference from America’s Wild West Frontier. Taliban insurgents from frontier provinces

(NWFP/FATA) bordering Afghanistan-Pakistan are “renegades”, “hostiles”, or “Tango”.

Ground and air forces issue out from Bagram Air Base, Parvan, Charikar (we might refer to

as “Fort Kabul”), from Kandahar Air Base (“Fort Kandahar”), from Khost Airbase, Paktia,

Khost (“Fort Khost”) and from Mazar-e-Sharif Airbase, (“Fort Mazar”), conducting routine

patrols sweeps without adequate cover, scouting for and drawing fire, suffering Improvised

Explosive Device (IED) traps and engaging in fire-fight skirmishes, until they are forced to

call in heavy artillery or air cavalry suppression to ‘mop up’;

Another tactic from ‘Taming the Frontier Wild West’ is the use of informants to identify the

movements of “bad guys”. They then engage in massacres using helicopters, fighter-bombers

or UAV drones, (and as with their own Frontier Wild West, the US military in Afghanistan

has shown no reluctance against killing civilian women and children).181 “The 'kinetic' side:

60 drone hits have killed 14 Al-Qa’idah ‘terrorists’ but also [killed] 687 civilians.”182 That’s a

pathetic 25% operational effectiveness, and a grotesque 50:1 ‘collateral damage’ ratio!

Operation Enduring Freedom™ is the unifying marketing theme for domestic consumption.

Every Sunday the news shows have a brief tally of those US soldiers killed in combat, and

the latest lurid stories from whatever flashpoint the military had suppressed that week, in time

to make the TV tabloids. As the patrols are increased and the troops surged, so will massacres

increase in their collateral damage and extreme brutality, with more US:ISAF soldier deaths

and more new insurgent recruits, until it descends into a vicious ‘death spiral’, so-called

because it is a change so gradual, the pilots are unaware their plane is about to crash.

181 - Afghanistan Says 140 Civilians Killed in US Airstrikes. VOA News. 16 May 2009 182 - Mir, Amir, 60 drone hits kill 14 Al-Qa’idah men, 687 civilians, (Islamabad:The News). 10 April 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 121 That spiral must be paid for, and will be: “Emergency funding for Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan

and other undisclosed national security purposes”, taxing $100 billions a year above the

regular Department Of Defense (DOD)-Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA)-National Security Agency (NSA) budget, with Obama’s request

in his first 100 days for $109 billion more, as though US citizens’ precious taxed life savings

are just water poured onto salt, making a brine of tears. That constant US media propaganda

effort to portray counter-insurgency war in Afghanistan in a ‘Cowboys and Indians’-style

shoot out so dear to Americans, is a key element in selling the Global War on Terror, one

which no citizen or politician would dare to dispute, for fear of appearing unpatriotic, and one

that the Defense Department relies on to keep active duty forces well above the Title 10 cap

mandated 203,000 permanent military, except in ‘times of war’. War hasn’t been declared!

“A bifurcated, externally driven, spatially segregated economic system, managed by a foreign 'trained' and foreign-backed elite is the image of tomorrow's 'successful' Afghanistan, representing the limit of development possibilities [and imagination] under the Intercontinental model of Karzai & Associates. The Kabul Intercontinental Hotel serves as a powerful metaphor of this 'vision.' The 'vision' must be driven by certain hard facts: a 'demand profile' determined by social class and income realties; a particular 'insertion' of the Karzai regime in the international politico-economic order; and a specific emerging post-Taliban class and power structure. Very descriptive attributes of this 'vision' include spatial segregation [Kabul and the 'Rest']; utter irrelevance to the masses of impoverished Afghans; the co-existence of the Intercontinental Hotel 'model' alongside and separate from a huge traditional, subsistence, nomadic and vibrant marketplace economy in the informal sector; and a dependence upon outside 'dollars' as the necessary fuel for economic prosperity in the Intercontinental. Should such international funds be disbursed in cash form, history strongly suggests the kleptocracy in place will first line its pockets.


The Karzai vision is, thus, consumptionist, Western, and international trade-oriented [including heavy import dependence and earning foreign exchange from services whether oil pipeline fees or traditional Afghan exports like carpets and fruits].”183

Operation Enduring Freedom™ will enable egregious Defence deficit-spending for decades.

That perpetual surge in troop forces will bring Defense $118 billion in 2009 for active duty

salaries and benefits alone, generating revenues of literally a million dollars per soldier, this

before $138 billion in emergency funding requests are added in! Where is all the tax money

going!? GWOT also serves as a ‘Made in USA’ illegal trade subsidy to protect US arms &

equipment manufacturers. The US defence employees and civilian contractors are immune

from foreign outsourcing competition, even ordinary domestic hiring, a trade barrier which

none may cross, other than the ‘Above Top Secret’ Future-Warrior Establishment.184

3. ‘Sovereignty and Empire’™ – Beyond the catchy slogan as a deliberate war game is a

dichotomy in American doctrine, a deliberate crusade which Barber cleverly referred to as

‘Jihad vs McWorld’, a war of ideologies between truly ex-state global corporate capitalism

against clearly fundamentalist tribal theocracy. Western hegemony embraces international

resource exploitation and ‘push marketing’, building ‘sales adrenaline’: ‘How To Maximize

Profit On Every Transaction And Go From Commodity To Monopoly In 2 Easy Steps!’, and

pitched in taut phrases like ‘command and control’, ‘clear and hold’ and ‘market dominance’.

For the West, everyone and everything is just a commodity to be exploited, from top to toe,

Shinola to Brylcreem. Any resistance to that overt exploitation and commoditization is a

challenge to Western sovereignty, and becomes an ideological emergency. 185

183 - Herold, Marc. "Karzai & Associates' Trickle Down Reconstruction" 12 May, 2002. at http://cursor.org/stories/karzai.htm 184 - O'Hanlon, Michael, Restraining the Growth of the U.S. Defense Budget. (WA DC:Senate Committee on the Budget), 2002 185 - Barber, Benjamin, Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World, (New York:Ballantine Books), 1996


This broad rift did not just evolve. It represents an often violent behind the scenes struggle between the Chicago School of Leo Strauss embodied by Reagan-era Neo-Cons, and the post-Soviet economic reality: “As President George H.W. Bush noted in his 1992 State of the Union address, “communism died this year,” and, he promised, “we can stop making the sacrifices we had to make when we had an avowed enemy that was a superpower. Now we can look homeward even more and set right what needs to be set right.” Toward that end, he ordered his Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, to initiate a 30% cut in defence spending. Gloom and doom in the military-industrial complex was palpable.” 186

Instead of following orders, Cheney turned rogue, and co-founded the Project for the New

American Century (PNAC). PNACs solution was a purely ideological one: deconstruct

‘Creeping Communism™’ and rebrand it as ‘Islamic Jihad™’. But rather than digress into

the development of Neo-Con political organizing tactics used to gain a majority in Congress

and eventually the Executive with the selection of George W. Bush Jr in 2000, followed with

huge increases in defence expenditures (the 1990 Defense budget was only $90 billion) and

acts of overt pre-emptive war, I prefer to look at process and outcome. As I’ve said in earlier

chapters, if the NeoCon ideology is ‘useful for Afghanistan’, that is, if there’s a discernable

structure that serves any useable function for the Afghan people, then the American empire is

‘good’, and for the interim, any marketing slogan will suffice to promote Afghanistan, always

provided the Afghan people gain full control over their own sovereignty, and our nation

doesn’t become just a puppet state, a moonscape resource extraction and profit-centre depot,

in a repeat of the Soviet occupation.

Here there are stronger concerns. ‘Afghanistan’ may be an ideological proxy, as conservative

NeoCon political dialogue in the US and UK increasingly amalgamates Afghanistan and

Pakistan into a racial and cultural slur, ‘Afghanistan-Pakistan’, blurring the lines of Durand

and the cultural divide of the Hindu Kush for the same benefit that Weapons of Mass

186 - Sheer, Robert, Indefensible Spending, (Los Angeles:LA Times), 1 June, 2008

Diminution and Development - pg 124 Destruction (WMD) provided for their war in Iraq: a ‘shiny object’, a social distraction,

branded, ‘The Good War of Afghanistan’™.

4. ‘Hearts and Minds’™ – “This notion of hearts and minds becomes difficult in Afghanistan,

where the population has a ‘me, me, me’ personality.”187

The principal goal for counterinsurgency by both national government and foreign occupier

(as well as insurgency by the opposition) is control of the population, first and foremost. The

population can be sequestered in controlled urban centres, then relentlessly inoculated with

counter-propaganda, rehabilitated with promises of reconstruction aid and ‘hoped up’ by the

government’s corrupting influences, trappings of office and ‘election’ illusion of democracy.

A hydropower project here, an irrigation project there, it is a basic ‘softening up’ operation,

as I have shown in earlier chapters. The Clinton neoliberals labelled this ‘Hearts and Minds’.

“"Hearts" means persuading people that their best interests are served by COIN success. "Minds" means convincing them that the force can protect them and that resisting it is pointless. Note that neither concerns whether people like Soldiers and Marines. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. Over time, successful trusted networks grow like roots into the populace. They displace enemy networks, which forces enemies into the open, letting military forces seize the initiative and destroy the insurgents.” [Note that ‘being nice’ to the population won’t suffice:] “Hearts: The population must be convinced that our success is in their long-term interests. Minds: The population must be convinced that we actually are going to win, and we (or a transition force) will permanently protect their interests.”188

Occupation blueprints were issued just in time. We are left wondering if the US:ISAF forces

will follow a (popular press issue) of the The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency

187 - Smith, Chris; Tatnell, Scott, JFTC Counterinsurgency Overview Briefing. (LTC Troy J. Anhalt Counterinsurgency Training Center – Afghanistan), 2004 188 - Dilegge, Dave. Hearts and Minds. Small Wars Journal. 21 October 2007

Diminution and Development - pg 125 Field Manual189 or now the newly available, (but limited edition) Field Manual 3-07 Stability

Operations190, with its borrowed acknowledgements to Fukuyama.191

Does a popular edition of one, and a limited edition of the other, speak to the occupation’s

true intentions? Is one for war funding, and the other reconstruction propaganda? As a

(confidential) USAID spokesperson related to our Kandahar field-party (April, 2006):

“’Afghanistan’ is just a money pot for Congress to throw funding into. Most of it has already

been diverted to Iraq and Katrina.”

FM3-07 states that stability operations are no longer secondary to the combat operations:

“[Stability operations encompass] various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations [ed. emphasis added] and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.”192

The war process then, apart from its camouflaged fundraising face, appears to have changed

in Afghanistan’s favour. The situational analysis has changed recently too. After an abortive

Neo-Con coup attempt in Pakistan, with the CIA driving Benazir Bhutto to her death by

assassination in December, 2007, in an attempt to stir popular unrest against Musharraf’s on-

going term in office, there was such a substantial fundamentalist jihad blowback that the

coalition supply route through Pakistan may likely be replaced with Russian supply routes

which would be more than twice as expensive to operate. 189 - The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 2007 190 - Field Manual No. 3-07 – Stability Operations, (Washington DC:Department of the Army), 2008 191 - Fukuyama, Francis, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, (Ithaca:Cornell University Press), 2004 192 - ibid Field Manual No. 3-07

Diminution and Development - pg 126 Reshaping The Afghan Economic Landscape

So what did US:ISAFs $500 million reconstruction program in Afghanistan villages intend?

· Stabilization: partnering with ISAF/OEF(SOF) to provide projects for

immediate impact

· Community Development: promote community ownership of development

projects—via PDCs, DDAs, & CDCs with focus in districts where little

development assistance now exists

· Research & Development (R&D): deliver concrete development assistance;

focus on employment by rebuilding infrastructure (power & roads)

ADP/agricultural development, & economic growth (microfinance & Small

and Medium Enterprises (SME) development)

· Governance: partnering with Independent Directorate of Local Governance

(IDLG), Civil Service Commission, Ministries on sub-national governance

capacity building training & mentoring for provincial and district officials;

establishing Rule of Law (ROL) programs, and supporting elections; 193

And what did President Karzai recently say were his development goals? “If I win I will have

three specific programs: first to enhance peace, second to keep good relations and friendship

with the world, the U.S. and Islamic world, and third to continue development, including

education and building roads,” he said. He also promised to focus on agriculture and water.

“With agriculture we can stand on our own feet and feed not only ourselves but other

countries. And with water we can make dams and produce electricity,” he said.”194

193 - RC(S) – the US Embassy View USAID/STATE DEPARTMENT, January 2009 194 - http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/world/asia/02afghan.html

Diminution and Development - pg 127 Karzai spoke not a single word about US $100 billions in Afghan natural resources, strategic

minerals, oil & gas, gold and precious gems, and not a single word about tackling corruption

and replacing his Kabul insiders and family favourites with competent professionals!

Given the $20 billions in US:UN funding grants that were publicly promised to Afghanistan,

and the $100 billions in defence operations which include reconstruction, there’s not been

much actual progress. The USAID mission is $5.9 billion, combined. The Katari Project

(Helmand River Valley irrigation and energy grid) is ongoing; the ring road is completed but

far substandard as an insecure and heavily-travelled all-season highway; the Southern

Strategy Road linking Kandahar to Pakistan’s border at Spin Boldak is “ongoing”, and may

be abandoned; a few supplementary provincial roads have been surveyed but not drawn up; a

few diesel generators have been installed but have not been fueled; battle damage has been

repaired in Panjwayi, Sangin, Garmseer; Alternative Development Programmes (ADP) to

repair damage to agricultural infrastructure, have been underway in Kandahar, Uruzgan,

Garmseer; a $375 million Alternative Livelihoods program in six provinces in the South has

been promised for Kandahar in 2009; and a number of programs are in discussion, designed

to complement ADP to achieve a ‘multiplier effect’.

US $100 millions on-the-ground in aid, maybe, not a tenth of $20 billion in reconstruction

aid that was promised by the US and EU. I fear the majority of those redevelopment funds are

going towards foreign advisor perks and maintenance of their Kabul Embassy, as they craft

the Afghan national government into a pro-Western intelligentsia. Some of my friends in

southwest Afghanistan have been led to suspect, what if US:ISAF strategy is deliberately one

of “Operation Enduring Turmoil”?


Figure 17 - http://img122.imageshack.us/img122/712/enduringturmoilzv4.jpg

“Col. David Lamm, who was chief of staff of the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan from

2003 to 2005, Lt. Gen. David Barno, is doubtful about the willingness of the Army leadership

to shift to a counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan. "The institutional army doesn’t want

to do this," he told InterPress Service (IPS) in an interview last September. "There isn’t a lot

of money in counter-insurgency. It isn’t a high-tech war - it’s a low-tech humint [human

intelligence] operation."

Lamm recalled that the army’s role in Afghanistan before Barno took command in 2003 had

been "counter-terrorism" rather than “counter-insurgency”. The army "wanted to roll in,

round up terrorists, drive them out of the country, kill them," he said.”195

“Congressional Democrats are voicing increased concern about the Obama administration’s

plans to escalate military involvement in Afghanistan and to try to stabilize the rapid

195 - Porter, Gareth, “U.S. Lacks Capacity to Win Over Afghans.” (Rome:IPS International), 23 April, 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 129 deterioration in Pakistan, complicating the push by the White House for $83.4 billion in war

spending and other aid. “I’ve got the sinking feeling we are getting sucked into something we

will never get out of,” said Representative Jim McGovern, Democrat of Massachusetts.196

The new Obama Administration seems bent on privatizing the War in Afghanistan onto a

plebeian Afghan National Army corps, and there has been some progress achieving that goal:

“A decade later, in an attempt to rebuild a war-ravaged Afghanistan, the United States led the international effort to "establish a nationally respected, professional, ethnically balanced, Afghan National Army that is democratically accountable, organized, trained, and equipped to meet the security needs of the country." Although constant conflict, harsh terrain, and hardihood have cultivated the Afghans' abilities to soldier, building the Afghan army was not an easy task for the U.S. and coalition partners. A large pool of combat veterans existed, but almost all were guerrilla fighters and most had never served in an organized, professional army loyal to the state. They had only fought for strongmen, religious parties, and ethnic or tribal groups. The Afghan civil war of the 1990s also meant that institutions that once provided regimentation, professional training, and education to the military were now defunct. Low literacy rates, the limited influence of the central government, ethnic rivalries, and provincial strongmen also made the task of building the army quite arduous.

A former Afghan minister of interior with an intimate understanding of Afghanistan believes that "the major challenge is to create a military loyal to the state, a nationally oriented, ethnically balanced, morally disciplined, professionally skilled, and operationally coherent Afghan army." Recognizing this, Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the headquarters "responsible for manning, equipping and training the Afghan National Army," defined the army's end state as "a respected, multi-ethnic, affordable, sustainable, loyal, and competent ministry of defense, general staff, and sustaining institutions capable of directing, commanding, controlling, training and supporting operational forces that have the capability to conduct internal counterinsurgency operations with limited international assistance."

As of July 2008, the Afghan army had "63,000 troops in the field and another 9,000 in training," halfway towards the recently revised goal of a 134,000-strong force, which would allow the Afghan government to assume the lead for security operations in the country. The ‘ethnically balanced’ force of 15 brigades is geographically distributed with the 201st Afghan National Army

196 - Hulse, Carl, "Democrats Have Qualms Over War in Afghanistan", (NYC:NYTimes), 23 April, 2009


Corps headquartered in Kabul, the 203d in Gardez, the 205th in Kandahar, the 207th in Herat, and the 209th in Mazar-e-Sharif, with the balance assigned to the ANA Air Corps (ANAAC), the Afghan Ministry of Defense, and associated institutions. Even with these advances, the Afghan military apparatus ... are still very much a "work in progress.”197

Then should Afghans just be glad for anything they can get? The occupation will always be

able to out-spend and out-tech and out-gun any insurgent opposition. Will that win Afghan

hearts and minds? If US:ISAF interdiction clears and holds, if USAID builds and repairs in

dribs and drabs, if the US Secretary of State/Justice/Treasury completely reform the Kabul

Administration, but then the Taliban filter back and burn it down or blow it up again, before

ANA:ANP troops are sent in to rout the Taliban redoubts out, etcetera, then ‘Afghanistan

Reconstruction’ becomes a spin cycle of endless branding and budgeting, hope and suffering,

and those hearts and minds of the Afghan people will be lost to jihad and anarchy.

I am calling for re-energizing the underlying dire need to act urgently on reconstruction, and

asking that we worry less about the ‘strategy front’ pessimism fashioning political branding,

war campaigning, and flavouring seemingly endless formalities in London and Washington.

The United Kingdom’s View

As I mentioned earlier, the United Kingdom’s vision for Afghanistan is interlocked with the

American one. The major difference is that the UK has a vast Pakistani Diaspora and the

terrorist’s attacks—to date—here at home have links to Pakistan. For this reason, Britain has

no choice but to make sure that for internal political advantages, they keep the Pakistani

diasporas satisfied and on the other hand, shoulder the American commitment to defeating

terrorists in Pakistan, yet this risks the continued threat of terrorist attacks here in the UK.

197 - Chan, Samuel, ibid

Diminution and Development - pg 131 We might hope that the UKs vision of Afghanistan is somehow different from that of the US,

despite the Britain’s repeated defeats in Afghanistan in the 19th Century. But it’s precisely

those long ago defeats to the British Empire which remains burned into the UK psyche:

“In the past, politicians promised to create a better world. They had different ways of achieving this. But their power and authority came from the optimistic visions they offered to their people. Those dreams failed. And today, people have lost faith in ideologies. Increasingly, politicians are seen simply as managers of public life. But now, they have discovered a new role that restores their power and authority. Instead of delivering dreams, politicians now promise to protect us from nightmares. They say that they will rescue us from dreadful dangers that we cannot see and do not understand. And the greatest danger of all is international terrorism. A powerful and sinister network, with sleeper cells in countries across the world. A threat that needs to be fought by a war on terror. But much of this threat is a fantasy, which has been exaggerated and distorted by politicians. It’s a dark illusion that has spread unquestioned through governments around the world, the security services, and the international media.” 198

Didier Bigo, Professor of International Relations, Institut d'Etudes Politiques observes,

“The myth of the impunity of the United States and the centers of international capitalism [in UK] fell with the twin towers, and we must adjust to that. Everyone is equally vulnerable to determined attackers, and though technical measures can always be employed to counter this type of attack (strengthened air security, presence of lethal weapons on civilian aircraft, etc.), contemporary societies simply cannot be protected by impenetrable physical and electronic barriers. We must abandon the delusion of maximum security that always follows a murderous terrorist attack. Antiterrorist measures that aspire to form an impenetrable "technological" shield imply a Northern Irelandization of Western societies, which runs counter to the real goal of security. Reassuring consists of demonstrating the political impotence of such attacks and their counterproductive impact on those who initiate them.”199

That assumes Blair’s goal was really to reassure British citizens, rather than to resecure them,

and to direct Britains to a new-found prosperity, rather than to redirect them to privatization. 198 - Curtis, Adam, 2004 ibid 199 - Bigo, Didier, Reassuring and Protecting: Internal Security Implications of French Participation in the Coalition against Terrorism, in Critical Views of September 11: Analyses from around the World, ed. Eric Hershberg and Kevin W. Moore, (New York: New Press), 2002

Diminution and Development - pg 132 Every little breach of security is touted. Are we to have a Global War of Underpants now?

Labour Member of Parliament Jeremy Corbyn writes (2008) ,

“It is over six years since NATO forces were deployed to Afghanistan in order to [allegedly] root out the Taliban. Last year alone, the US undertook 3,572 air attacks and the Taliban is a permanent presence in 54 per cent of the entire country. Last year, 6,500 people died and the British troops are now suffering almost as many casualties as a much larger contingent suffered in Iraq. The strategy seems to be a mix of unconditional support for President Karzai, despite the authoritarian tendencies of his government and the presence of warlords at the highest table, and a commitment to the 30-year struggle which some MoD folk frequently talk about.”200

Foreign Secretary David Miliband, speaking at Chatham House (2009), states,

“The international system was not set up to take care of weak states. There is not an absence of multilateral engagement in Afghanistan. Some say there is too much, but whether these multilateral institutions could co-ordinate better – is a very profound issue. It’s not just the UN, it’s not just NATO, it’s not just the EU. We’ve got a wide range of institutions seeking to support good governance by the Afghan government. No-one wants to be in Afghanistan to create a new colony – rather the international community is there to bolster a sovereign government. After regularising strong states and their behaviour, and supporting weak ones, the third great insecurity is the absence of a mechanism to deliver public goods.”201

200 - Corbyn, Jeremy, Tragic Legacy of Imperialism, (London: Epolitix), 2008 http://www.epolitix.com/mpwebsites/mppressreleases/mpsite/jeremy-corbyn/ 201 - Miliband, David, The Limits of the State, (London:The House Magazine), Issue 1291, 2009


Figure 18 - © Sgt. Anthony Boocock

To that end, Britain has become the second most important contributing nation in terms of

troops and money and they are focusing on the following programs:

· improve governance, both nationally and locally, making sure that it works in the

interests of all the Afghan people

· tackle corruption and the drugs trade

· build up the rule of law

· promote economic development - investing in infrastructure, legal alternatives to

opium poppies, and jobs

· improve access to education and healthcare.202

Global Vulture Capital

202 http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/conflict-prevention/uk-effort-in-afghanistan/

Diminution and Development - pg 134 Vulture capital itself may have become so global and stateless, that it is able to subsume all

states, both ‘allied’ or ‘axis of evil’, into one big scrum sharing out the spoils of war in

Afghanistan, just as Zbigniew’s ‘kleptocrats’ carved up the former Soviet Union, in broad

daylight. The March 2009 UN-organized Central Asia Forum brought together struggling

(gas-oil wealthy) Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, together

with observers from Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Germany, Iran, Turkey, Russia, France,

Slovakia and the United States, to address regional issues of water, energy, labor, drugs,

crime and environment, while praising the concept that “regional cooperation was vital in

order to find viable solutions” in Afghanistan.

‘We are spending ourselves into oblivion’ is a common joke in the US military, of the $138

billion additional in ‘emergency funding’, which now underlies the Anglo-American Vision.

Where are those billions going? Not all to the military effort! What are they trying to hide?

Figure 19 - US GAAP Deficits Will Exceed US Real Property Value by 2011 © shadowstats.com

This is the real ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’: $65.5 trillion in US Generally Accepted Accounting

Principles (GAAP) deficits, and a Wall Street financial sector which many around the globe

Diminution and Development - pg 135 feel is dangerously out of control. Politicians and corporate pundits alike continue to cling

earnestly to the misapplied 18th century theories of Alexander Hamilton, believing in “using

government to enhance market dynamism by fostering more equitable competition ... and to

promote social revolutions”203, the original ‘small government’ mandate sloganeered by

Reagan’s ‘trickle down’ theory, when what we have in the West today, as with UK’s BAE

Systems, for example, or with America’s Boeing Aerospace, is run-away production cost-

growth, exacerbated by parasitizing production labour and materials suppliers, as well as

poaching revenues from set-aside sole-source defence contracts, which is the very opposite of

‘dynamism’ and ‘free competition’.

The stealth corporate subsidies and war-for-resource profit bleed-off to international capital is

what really drives the so-called ‘Second Front in the Global War on Terrorism’. Afghanistan-

Pakistan (AF-PAK) is the perfect vehicle to drive their ambitions globally: a vast ‘Failed

State’, enjoining a state-less ‘Islamic Jihad’, together embodying an unimpeachable war cry

for endless and uncontested occupation, allowing for ‘emergency funding’ without audit.

So, their ‘way forward’ demand for a US:UK occupation strategy, can be expected to:

1) Employ the Obama ‘surge’ to bolster (and to box in) the Karzai regime, both because the

Allies demand a ‘legitimate’ point-of-contact, somebody they can deal with and a reliable

conduit for aid and security, but also, as history shows, the Soviet’s attempt to meddle in

national government affairs and land reform led to a bitter civil war between rival factions

that brought the fall of Taraki, rise of Amin and shortly afterward, Soviet forced-replacement

with their puppet Karmal. Gerard Chaliand’s report is an excellent narrative of the period

surrounding that Soviet invasion.204 US:ISAF/NATO were therefore prepared to make every

effort to stabilize the countryside ahead of the runoff elections, rather than allow Karzai’s

203 - Bogle, Jack, "The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism" (New Haven:Yale University Press), 2005 204 - Chaliand, Gerard, Report from Afghanistan, (New York:Penguin), 1980

Diminution and Development - pg 136 term of office to expire and the country once again explode into ‘Chaosistan’, so putting at

risk $100 billions of exploitable Afghan natural resources.

2) Make small, concentrated efforts to restore power, develop roads to market, improve

market bazaars, rebuild the most obvious war damaged buildings, and provide enough small

works bids to engage the local population in high profile reconstruction jobs. Part and parcel

of this effort will be a wide security network mounted by the surge and the National Army,

armed militias, increased intel, with more informers and greater use of pin-point

assassinations in Pakistan conducted by invisible hovering Unmanned Aerial Vehicle drones,

to move the war front eastward as perceived by the Afghan people bullshitting the civilians

that US:ISAF/NATO forces bring ‘peace’, and obscuring the fact they are protecting the

natural resources.

3) Media serves as the disinformation that convinces the American people the US is ‘losing’

the war in Afghanistan, which will release the genie of bin Laden to hijack the Pakistani

nuclear warheads, and transport them on his magic carpet to New York City! This will free

up another $100 billions in ‘emergency funding for other undisclosed national security

purposes, and push 35,000 more troops in-country to ensure that the ‘Global War On Terror

Program’ cann’t be jettisoned. In for a penny, in for a pound. Time and again they reiterate

the Gig Nuke lie, used with such repetitive abandon by the Bush Administration as the sine

qua non for GWOT. Overnight, the ‘good’ Karzai has turned ‘bad’ and is now being blamed

for all the mistakes and corruption of the post-Taliban years, the very same mistakes and

corruption the West overlooks within its own ranks.

Patrick Cockburn bluntly pierces through the ‘end-as-means’ propaganda veil:

“In other words, as always in our bipartisan Terror War, the actual policies pursued by our leaders will, of necessity, produce the opposite result of their stated aims: quelling terrorism, dampening extremism, bringing stability, and, in the words of


Obama's escalation speech at West Point, building "a better future for our children and grandchildren" by ensuring that "other peoples' children and grandchildren can live in freedom and access opportunity." Let's state it again: you cannot achieve such goals, even in the slightest degree, with the foreign policies and military actions of the Bush and Obama administrations. You cannot invade countries, kills thousands upon thousands of innocent people, destroy societies, unleash and foment civil war, impose corrupt, violent, repressive regimes on shattered, suffering people and expect that this will somehow build "a better future" for your children and grandchildren -- much less for the children and grandchildren that you are murdering, brutalizing and traumatizing.” 205

Canada and ISAF’s Strategy

“While in Clausewitz’s time imperial nation-states would often ally with each other militarily as a means of addressing the balance of power, today, in Afghanistan, ISAF is a 41 nation alliance – a staggering number by any standard, which creates a complex political and military picture. In addition, beside the nations involved in the mission there are innumerable other sub-state partners, mostly NGOs, and these partners bring their own politically influenced view of the mission and therefore their own strategies and caveats for operations within Afghanistan. The result is a dizzying array of political agendas and military strategies operating within ISAF.”206

Canada and NATO appear willing to follow the US lead, which itself derived from

McKiernan’s careful counterinsurgency to McChrystal’s already failed ‘clear and hold’

strategy, which saw troop casualties soar whilst promoting yet another strategy again re-

labelled as ‘hearts and minds’!

“That means looking at the engagement not as a military mission to eradicate the Taliban, but as an effort to gain the support and assistance of the local population in suppressing the insurgency. It means providing a spectrum of security, good governance and development – and giving the Afghans a reason to prefer what is offered by the government in Kabul to what is being held out by the Taliban. “The fact that we did not [do that] allowed for corruption to get embedded in different areas of the government. It allowed for the Taliban to provide governance

205 - Floyd, Chris, When Blood is Their Argument: An Empire on Fire, http://www.chris-floyd.com referencing, Patrick Cockburn, US Surge will only prolong Afghan war, (London:The Independent) 6 December, 2009 206 - McCoy, John. Two Strategies in Afghanistan: Canadian and Dutch Approaches to Counter-Insurgency Paper ISA's 50th ANNUAL CONVENTION "EXPLORING THE PAST, ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE". NYC. 15 February 2009


where the government could not. That resulted in increased insecurity because the population now sees the government as the problem, not as the solution – and the Taliban as the solution, not the problem,” he said. In effect, the coalition has said that the game of whack-a-mole that has been played by all NATO armies, including the Canadians in Kandahar, must end. In its place, the coalition will adopt the kind of approach Canadian soldiers are using in the model villages they have established south of Kandahar city and hope to spread to the broader, and more dangerous, Panjwai region in the coming months.”207

High sounding rhetoric, but at what price? A counterinsurgency demands huge numbers of

troops to secure an area the size of France, and stay until the population can fend for itself.

And there it is. A state of ‘Perpetual War’. Clearly, the allied occupation in ‘Afghanistan-

Pakistan’ is not just about ‘killing Tango’. It quickly devolves into ‘trench warfare’, and tit-

for-tat, while perfecting the destruction of local infrastructure and agrarian sustenance:

“LASHKARGAH: Artillery and mortar shelling by the NATO-led international troops killed nine civilians in southern Afghanistan, locals said. However, Afghan and NATO officials claimed only militants were killed in the mortar shelling on the outskirts of Lashkargah, capital of the Helmand province, on Wednesday evening. People who brought bodies of their slain relatives to Lashkargah, said the dead included three children and six men. They died as a mortar shell landed in the fields covered with maize crop, said the locals. Haji Shah Muhammad, a tribal elder from Babaji area on the outskirts of the provincial capital, told Pajhwok Afghan News the victims were busy collecting the harvest. "I lost four members of my family. They included my three sons and a son-in-law working in the fields" said another elder Syed Gul. Press office of the NATO-led ISAF in Lashkargah confirmed the attack, but said only militants, planting bombs to target the local and Afghan troops, were killed. Officials at the press office rejected locals' claim regarding civilian casualties. Daud Ahmadi, spokesman for the provincial governor, also said only militants were killed in the overnight attack.

207 - Galloway, Gloria, How Canada does counterinsurgency, (Toronto:The Globe and Mail) 6 November, 2009


The civilian casualties in Helmand occurred just a day after the killing of five British soldiers by an Afghan policeman in the province.”208

That Worn-Out Theme: ‘The Hunt for bin Laden’

Figure 20 - © David Axe

In the face of overwhelmingly grim economic news, the Obama Administration rushed a New

Vision for ‘Afghanistan-Pakistan’ to the presses, ahead of the last G20 Summit in London:

“Today, I'm announcing a comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan Pakistan. And this marks the conclusion of careful policy review led by Bruce [ed. Bruce Riedel is a Senior Fellow in foreign policy at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy of the Brookings Institution, who writes in Council on Foreign Relations on a ‘dire need for US to actively engage Al Qa’idah in Pakistan’] that I ordered as soon as I took office. My administration has heard from our military commanders as well as our diplomats.

So let me be clear. Al Qaida and its allies, the terrorists who planned and supported the 9/11 attacks are in Pakistan and Afghanistan. And if the Afghan government

208 - Stanikzai, Zainullah and Hashmi, NATO strike kills nine civilians in Helmand, Afghanistan, (Kabul:RAWA News), 5 November 2009


falls to the Taliban or allows Al Qaida to go unchallenged, that country will again be a base for terrorists. Afghanistan’s future is inextricably linked to the future of its neighbour Pakistan.“ 209

Obama then nominated General Karl Eikenberry at the new US Ambassador to Afghanistan.

Eikenberry toes to the AF-PAK line, while ignoring strong evidence that Osama bin Laden

and Ayman al-Zawahiri, may already be inconveniently dead: "The Search for (Osama) bin

Laden will continue because this man (sic) has committed mass crimes and atrocities against

the American people. And we will not rest as a government, our military will not rest until

that man is found, captured or killed."210

What if Osama’s corpse is never found?! Is Bin Laden then the PNAC’s perpetual-prophet?

President Obama apparently now intends for USA to stay in Afghansitan indefinitely, picking

up on the Bush Plan and extending it:

“The hard promises in Obama's speech yesterday were threefold: another 4,000 U.S. military trainers are to deploy to Afghanistan, on top of a surge of 17,000 [now 35,000] combat troops previously announced; that military footprint will be augmented by a much stronger emphasis on diplomatic and civilian capacity-building with the goal of demonstrating to Afghans that their corruption-plagued government is an entity worth supporting.

Finally, the U.S. will view the region as a single challenge straddling two (or more) countries, starting with a pledge of $1.5 [surely now $10] billion a year for Pakistan to reassert sovereignty over its lawless and restive frontier with Afghanistan through a system of carrot-and-stick incentives.”211

Highlights of the Obama 25-point plan include:

“Sending 40,000 new troops, who would train Afghan soldiers and police. The plan includes a goal of having 134,000 soldiers in the Afghan army, up from about 65,000 soldiers now. That is how we will prepare Afghans to take responsibility for their security, and how we will ultimately be able to bring our troops home,” Obama said.

209 - Obama Announces New Afghanistan, Pakistan Strategies, (WA DC: Washington Post), Transcript, March 27, 2009. 210 - Burns, Robert, Envoy choice cites urgency of boosting war effort, (NY:Associated Press), 26 March, 2009 211 - Potter, Mitch, Obama Retools Afghan War Strategy, (Toronto:Toronto Star), 28 March, 2009


“Creating a standing network for talks between the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan. “Our nations will meet regularly,” Obama said, with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates leading the talks.

“Pushing for passage of two bipartisan congressional plans to provide more economic aid to Pakistan. One, sponsored by Senators. John Kerry, D-Mass., and Richard Lugar, R-Ind., would increase non-military aid by $1.5 billion a year for five years. The second, sponsored by Sen. Maria Cantwell, D-Wash., and Reps. Chris Van Hollen, D-Md., and Peter Hoekstra, R-Mich., would create ‘opportunity zones’ in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan where many Taliban insurgents now hide.

“Sending hundreds more civilian aid workers to Afghanistan “to advance security, opportunity and justice,” Obama said. Clinton, he said, would push for more civilian aid from ‘our partners and allies, from the United Nations and internationalaid organizations’ at an international conference next week in the Netherlands.

“Increasing the budget for inspector generals in the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development to weed out ‘unaccountable spending, no-bid contracts and wasteful reconstruction,’ Obama said. Previous studies of U.S. civilian aid programs have found significant problems in U.S. aid efforts in Afghanistan. Last month, ‘USA TODAY’ reported that six different audits conducted last year by USAID’s inspector found only one program working largely as it was supposed to.

“Using the U.N. to create a new ‘Contact Group for Afghanistan and Pakistan” that will bring together NATO allies, Russia, China, India, Central Asian republics, nations in the Persian Gulf and Iran. ‘None of these nations benefit from a base for Al-Qa’idah terrorists, and a region that descends into chaos,’ Obama said. ‘All have a stake in the promise of lasting peace and security and development.”212

Long War Journal reads the Obama Plan announcement with different emphasis:

“Pakistan: Resolving the deteriorating security situation inside Pakistan was the first item mentioned by President Obama. The US will seek to bolster aid and support to Pakistan to improve Pakistan's capabilities in fighting the Taliban and al Qa’idah as well as promoting good governance and strengthening democratic institutions.

A military surge: The planned increased US troop deployments in Afghanistan have been public knowledge for some months. The US recently sent a brigade of more than 3,000 soldiers into the troubled central provinces of Logar and Wardak to tamp down the Taliban resurgence there. An additional 17,000 soldiers and Marines will deploy to southern and eastern Afghanistan, where the insurgency

212 - VanNuys, Stephen, Obama’s Plan for Afghanistan: We Are Rich Enough to Have BOTH Guns and Butter!, (US:AmericanMissive.com), 28 March, 2009


is the strongest. Also, an additional brigade of about 40,000 soldiers will be assigned to partner with the Afghan security forces as trainers.

Increase the size of the Afghan Army and police forces: The plan is to accelerate the expansion of the Afghan National Army from an estimated 80,000 troops to 134,000 and the police force to 82,000 policemen by 2011. "[A]nd increases in Afghan forces may very well be needed as our plans to turn over security responsibility to the Afghans go forward," Obama said.

Not mentioned by Obama is the creation of the Afghan Public Protection Force, the local security force designed to provide security for villages, roads, and installations. A pilot program of an estimated 4,000 members is currently underway in Wardak province, and if successful, may expand elsewhere.

Reconciliation: The US will seek to divide the reconcilable elements of the insurgency from the irreconcilables, and then defeat the hard core elements of the insurgency. Obama described this process as follows:

“There is an uncompromising core of the Taliban. They must be met with force, and they must be defeated. But there are also those who've taken up arms because of coercion, or simply for a price. These Afghans must have the option to choose a different course. And that's why we will work with local leaders, the Afghan government, and international partners to have a reconciliation process in every province.”

A civilian "surge": The US will surge the so-called "soft power" elements in addition to the military troop surge. It has been reported that more than 400 civilians from State, Commerce, Agriculture, Justice, and other government agencies will be sent to Afghanistan to improve governance, the economy, and agriculture.

Afghan governance reforms: The US and Coalition will attempt to hold the Afghan government accountable for its actions and promote reforms and good governance. The US will "seek a new compact with the Afghan government that cracks down on corrupt behavior, and sets clear benchmarks, clear metrics for international assistance so that it is used to provide for the needs of the Afghan people," Obama said.

International/Regional cooperation: The US will seek to resolve problems in Afghanistan by working together with Afghanistan's neighbors and the major players in the region. President Obama believes these countries share a common goal: the security of Afghanistan.

"[T]ogether with the United Nations, we will forge a new Contact Group for Afghanistan and Pakistan that brings together all who should have a stake in the security of the region -- our NATO allies and other partners, but also the Central Asian states, the Gulf nations and Iran; Russia, India and China," Obama said. "None of these nations benefit from a base for al Qa’idah terrorists, and a region that


descends into chaos. All have a stake in the promise of lasting peace and security and development." 213

OEF-A’s Drop-Out Year – 2006

In his January 2010 article in The National Interest, ‘Karzai and 22,000 Villages’, Dr. Ashraf

Ghani, 2009 elections Presidential candidate and former World Bank consultant, observes the

implications for what he considers 'the ... loss of will by U.S. and ISAF forces' in 2006. 214

Was it just 'loss of will' then, the lost opportunity for change, or was it the same catastrophic

US mil.gov planning, which was so amply demonstrated before the world with unanticipated

and unplanned for Katrina devastation and the Sunni Uprising in Iraq? The timeline tells:

11 May, 2005 - "A week after submitting his FY2006 budget to Congress, President Bush sent Congress an FY2005 emergency supplemental funding request. Included in the supplemental is more than $1.3 billion for the embassy in Iraq..." An emergency supplemental appropriation (H.R. 1268/P.L. 109-13), which included $592 million for embassy construction, was signed into law on May 11, 2005."215

23 August, 2005 – Hurricane Katrina makes landfall and destroys the American city of New Orleans, hundreds of thousands of survivors trapped in the sports stadium, in attics and on roofs, screaming to passing National Guard and overflying helicopters for aid, but none came, only martial law. Congress appropriates $60B, and spends more than $89.6 billion it doesn’t have in tax revenues.216

"It is estimated that the total economic impact in Louisiana and Mississippi may exceed $150 billion." 217 Sadly, other than FEMA moving citizens out of state, little is accomplished in actually spending that money on reconstruction improvements.

22 September 2005 – “Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, said that he had warned the Bush administration in recent days that Iraq was 'hurtling toward disintegration' (Mahdi Shi’ia death squads attacking Sunni neighbourhoods). 218

213 - Joscelyn, Thomas and Roggio, Bill, Analysis: US outlines new Afghanistan strategy. (US:LongWarJournal.org), 27 March, 2009 214 - Ghani, Dr. Ashraf, “Karzai and 22,000 Villages”, (WA DC:The National Interest) Number 105, Jan / Feb 2010, pp. 40-48 215 - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/US_Embassy_in_Iraq 216 - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane_Katrina 217 - Burton, Mark L.; Hicks, Michael J. "Hurricane Katrina: Preliminary Estimates of Commercial and Public Sector Damages." (Marshall University:Center for Business and Economic Research), September, 2005. 218 - MacAskill, Ewen, "Country is hurtling towards disintegration, Saudis warn", (UK:Guardian), 24 September 2005


Pressure begins to 'stand up' the Iraqi Army, required much heavier US spending that originally budgeted for, (and some suggest in 2007, during the first ‘surge’, including bribing Sunni sect leaders as ‘Iraqi Security Volunteers’ (ISVs)). 219

15 December, 2005 - Iraqi General Elections – Shi’ia take over control of Iraqi government. "The Sunnis have been fundamentally humiliated and want to overturn their humiliation," Katzman says. "They're just waiting for us to leave so they can grab a greater share of power." US State;Defense busy defending Green Zone for $2B US embassy construction.220

1 February, 2006 – “A top Iraqi Sunni Arab leader threatened Wednesday to call for a mass "uprising" across Iraq unless the Shiite interior minister is removed and the measures taken to stop sectarian attacks (by Mahdi Shi’ia death squads). 221

22 February, 2006 - Al Askari Mosque bombing signals wholesale explosion of Iraqi ‘situation’ into all-out internecine civil war. Sadly, State:Defense flubbed it.222

30 March, 2006 - Pentagon requests first of hundreds of millions of dollars in emergency funds, allegedly 'for military construction'."223 This ‘cracks the nut’ on mil.gov’s ‘emergency funding’ gig, jumping from $72B in 2007 to $138B in 2009.

"As of April 2006, the Bush Administration had sought $105 billion for repairs and reconstruction in the (Louisiana and Mississippi ) region, and this does not account for damage to the economy caused by potential interruption of the oil supply."224

8 April, 2006 - USAID Party Chief in Kandahar observes to our Afghan planning mission field party, "'Afghanistan is just a pot for Congress to throw money into. All the Afghan funding has already been diverted to Iraq and Katrina." 225

The Sunni Insurgency in Iraq continues to its peak in 2006 Congress is obsessed with mid-term elections, and State:Defense is obsessed with diverting criticism of their war conduct.

31 October 2006, Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal, says, "since America came into Iraq uninvited, it should not leave Iraq uninvited." If it does, one of the first consequences will be massive Saudi intervention to stop Iranian-backed Shiite militias from butchering Iraqi Sunnis.” 226

219 - Rosen, Nir, The Myth of the Surge, (US:Rolling Stone), 6 March, 2008 220 - http://www.cfr.org/publication/9447/iraq.html 221 - AP Worldstream 02-01-2006 222 - http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21867.pdf 223 - Branford, Becky (2006-03-30). "Iraq bases spur questions over US plans". BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4834032.stm 224 - St. Onge, Jeff, Epstein, Victor, "Ex-chief says FEMA readiness even worse," Boston.com, April 1, 2006 225 - Personal communication 226 - Prince Turki interview with CNN's Miles O'Brien, Saudi Ambassador to the US Prince Turki Al-Faisal interview with CNN's Miles O'Brien, aired October


7 November 7, 2006 - The US midterm elections removed the Republican Party from control of both chambers of the United States Congress.

14 December, 2006 – “King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia warned the US vice-president, Dick Cheney, (it is claimed) that the kingdom would provide money and arms to Sunni militias in Iraq if America withdrew its troops from the country.” 227

Do you see what the timeline is saying for the future of OEF-AF-PAK!? If those $200B odd

twin disasters of Katrina and Sunni Uprising were enough to derail US:ISAF OEF through all

of 2006, what's going to happen now, with the $14,000B Federal deficit, a $65,000B GAAT

obligation, a $203,000B derivatives exposure on Wall Street, and global banking collapse

being precipitated by Iceland’s default and a staggering drop in government tax revenues?

I suggest US:ISAF are going through the motions to keep ‘emergency funding’ advancing!

They're playing a low-grade Cowboys and Indians game of tag and vendetta tag-back with

the Taliban, to keep the 'war' in the world media. It is inconceivable that 110,000 Future

Warriors cost more than ~$25B a year in direct DoD warfare spending!! Of the $138B in

‘emergency funding etc.’ drafted for 2009 then, where is the other >$100B a year going!?

It’s going for the 3,400 NGO’s in Kabul 228, and over 104,000 mercenary contractors! 229

Every week that passes brings potential tsunamis of change to that Anglo-American Vision.

George Packer warns, “In 2008, with a new depression looming, interest politics finally overtook status politics, which is why the name-calling and (sub)cultural appeals of the McCain-Palin campaign didn’t work. In general, this turn benefits Democrats … and it has given Obama the chance to set the terms of political discourse for years to come. But if interest politics turns into the kind of populism that rejects all forms of institutional authority—and we’re closer than we’ve been since at least the nineteen-seventies—the public mood will sweep aside Obama’s program of reforms and quite possibly turn into a new sort of reaction: anti-bank, anti-Washington, anti-immigrant, anti-global. The populist temper and the paranoid

227 - Goldenberg, Suzanne, If US leaves Iraq we will arm Sunni militias, Saudis say, (UK:The Guardian), 14 December 2006 228 - http://afghanistan-analyst.org/ngo.aspx 229 - Cole, August, Number of US mercenaries in Afghanistan skyrockets, U.S. Adding Contractors at Fast Pace, (NY:Wall Street Journal), December 02,2009


style are not the same thing, but they are related in obvious ways: when the former loses its bearings, it degenerates into the latter.”230

Clearly, America’s foreign policy cabal under the Obama Administration is abandoning

Freedom and Democracy™ and Hearts and Minds™ in favor of that new/old banner, the

‘Hunt for bin Laden’™, mobilizing the resources of Central Asia and the US Taxpayer to

dismantle the Iraq Global War On Terror war machine and air transport it, piece by piece,

pound by pound, mile by mile, to the far eastern frontier of “Afghanistan-Pakistan”, using

$100 billion in emergency funding at a gulp, redeployed into a newly energized coalition

against ‘Those Who Would Seek to Do Us Harm’, a re-branding recently formulated, then

abandoned, by the SecState Clinton marketing team. 231

The Karzai Administration was in full agreement, as they should be. Status quo survives:

“The presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan welcomed the Obama administration's new plan for the conflict in the region on Saturday, with each highlighting key parts of the strategy for praise. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has come under strong international criticism in recent months for running a weak and corrupt central government. Some critics have included former U.S. officials, who accuse members of his family of profiting from the opium trade.

But the Afghan leader also has had harsh words for international forces operating in his country, condemning airstrikes and nighttime raids that kill civilians. Despite those tensions, Mr. Karzai was full of praise on Saturday for the new U.S. strategy, saying it turned out better than he expected.

"I am in full agreement with the new strategy announced," he said. "It is exactly what the Afghan people were hoping for and were seeking, ... it has our full support and backing."

The Afghan leader said the plan identifies crucial problems such as improving Afghan institutions and reconstruction efforts, targeting terrorist sanctuaries and including more countries in the region, such as Iran, in discussing the situation.

230 - Packer, George, Populism and Paranoia, (New York:The New Yorker), March 24,2009 231 - Gillespie, Thomas and Agnew, John, Finding Osama bin Laden: An Application of Biogeographic Theories and Satellite Imagery, (Cambridge: MIT International Review), 27 February 2009


Mr. Karzai also identified government corruption as an area that needs attention, but he did not elaborate.” 232

No need to elaborate on Afghan national government corruption, not when US:ISAF is

prepared to ‘knuckle down’ into a cross-border war which pits 100,000 US:ISAF troops and

their associated air and ground war machinery against 3,000,000 Pashtun’s in FATA alone:

”The argument for deeper U.S. military commitment to the Afghan War invoked by President Barack Obama in his first major policy statement on Afghanistan and Pakistan Friday - that al Qa’idah must be denied a safe haven in Afghanistan - has not been subjected to public debate in Washington. A few influential strategists here have been arguing, however, that this official rationale misstates the al Qa’idah problem and ignores the serious risk that an escalating U.S. war poses to Pakistan.

Those strategists doubt that al Qa’idah would seek to move into Afghanistan as long as they are ensconced in Pakistan and argue that escalating U.S. drone airstrikes or Special Operations raids on Taliban targets in Pakistan will actually strengthen radical jihadi groups in the country and weaken the Pakistani government's ability to resist them.

The concern raised by Hammes and Pollack about the war in Afghanistan spilling over into Pakistan paralleled concerns in the U.S. intelligence community about the effect on Pakistan of commando raids by U.S. Special Operations forces based in Afghanistan against targets inside Pakistan. In mid-August 2008, the National Intelligence Council presented to the White House the consensus view of the intelligence community that such Special Forces raids, which were then under consideration, could threaten the unity of the Pakistani military if continued long enough, as IPS reported Sep. 9.”233

At the last moment, Ambassador Eikenberry corrected his pre-nomination testimony to the

Congressional hearing (coached by Senator Kerry, he rephrased and dialled-back his intent

for ‘Afghanistan redevelopment’ for the record), in saying:

”If I was characterizing it as 'we will develop,' as opposed to 'we will assist the Afghans develop,' then I would like to stand corrected, because this is about enabling the Afghans to develop governments and rule of law, enabling the Afghans to develop their own security forces, enabling the Afghans to develop a sustainable economy. Those are the three critical components. When they come together,

232 - Newhouse, Barry, Karzai Says US War Strategy 'Better Than Expected', (WADC:VOA News), 28 March 2009 233 - Porter, Gareth, “Afghan War Rationale Questioned By Some Key Strategists: Analysis”, (Rome: Inter Press Service), 28 March 2009


success would be defined then as an Afghan state strong enough to not become an open safe haven for international terrorism.” 234

Figure 21 – © David Axe

An Oil-for-Food-Aid Requiem

So they are already backpedalling on reconstruction, and kicking the ‘self-governance’ can

(of worms) down the road, by allowing the criminal warlords and their corruption a free ride,

towards some ‘pay as you go’ future, as well they might, given the challenges of Obama and

Brown’s latest outburst against corruption in the Kabul government. Yet, with Afghanistan’s

poverty, drought, infrastructure collapse, looting, corruption, drug production and insurgency,

does US:NATO expect Afghanistan to both self-govern and to fight off jihadi terrorists?

Afghanistan needs to be very realistic in assessing their allies weaknesses and strengths. The

UK is focusing more on broadening its engagement in Afghanistan, not necessarily in terms

234 - Tapper, Jake. Speaking of Democracy in Afghanistan. (NY:ABCNews Political Punch), 28 March 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 149 of military activities, but in the development and social sectors. Economic development is

going to serve domestic UK political interests. UK wants to promote the idea that Taliban are

not invincible, and can be defeated. Pakistan and Afghanistan have historic importance to the

UK Command, who currently view Afghanistan through the lens of Helmand, and is trying to

change the Afghan civilian perception of ISAF through cultural events and community

involvement. The UK Military Doctrine embodies “Unity of Command and Unity of

Purpose”, but when you look at the larger context, the US-led coalition forces lack both unity

and purpose. Each distinct military command has been given a set of priorities that may vary.

The US State leadership issues a set of policy directives for ‘AF-PAK’, then only days later,

the UK comes up with its own “AF-PAK” policy. In their hope to better ‘coordinate’ efforts,

the US State appointed a Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador

Holbrooke. In a matter of weeks, UK, France and Sweden appointed a ‘Special Envoy’ of

their own. There is competition among the allies, fearing lack of representation in power

circles, rather than attention to the very real tasks at hand, which might require fewer links in

the long chain of command leaders.

Newly appointed US General McChrystal presented his report to President Obama, to that

end calling for an additional 40,000 troop ‘Surge3’. All of a sudden, previous “AF-PAK”

policies are trashed or due for upheaval. Too much attention is being given to expressing the

formalities and protocols ‘correctly’ at the major policy capitals, and too little attention is

given to the day to day situational realities on the ground in Afghanistan. Too much funding

is wasted shuttling ‘Special Envoys’ and so-called ‘Afghan Experts’ and ‘Security Analysts’

back and forth to State dinners, and too little funding is given to the US:ISAF troops to fight

al-Qa’idah effectively. The coalition forces are fighting the Taliban and al-Qa’idah on one

hand and struggling to meet their country’s fast changing policies on the other hand.

Diminution and Development - pg 150 The current mismanagement is not a lack of strategy, but more the opposite, too much.235

As I have pointed out earlier, in presenting US:ISAF policy to the American people and to

the Islamic world, ‘Assistance from the West’ is not just meant as a hand-out with a few kind

words of encouragement to ‘feel good’; it is $100 billions a year all-out Full Spectrum

Dominance™ foreign occupation and economic ‘revitalization’, not for Afghans, but round-

tripped to war mercenaries, that will only end with a fully ‘pacified’ rural society, one that is

centrally governed, centrally usuriously taxed, indebted and with all of its natural resources,

oil and gas siphoned off for slightly north of 5¢ on the US$1. That’s their overall plan, openly

stated right in the Western-written Afghanistan Hydrocarbon Law and Minerals Law!

As Mark Twain commented on the US military’s Spanish American War in the Philippines:

“We have pacified some thousands of the islanders and buried them; destroyed their fields; burned their villages, and turned their widows and orphans out-of-doors; furnished heartbreak by exile to some dozens of disagreeable patriots; subjugated the remaining ten millions by Benevolent Assimilation, which is the pious new name of the Musket; we have acquired property in the three hundred concubines and other slaves of our business partner, the Sultan of Sulu, and hoisted our protecting flag over that swag. And so, by these Providences of God--and the phrase is the government's, not mine--we are a World Power. In the 1900-1903 war to conquer the Philippines, the U.S. killed more than 1 million people. In the midst of that war, U.S. Army General Shefter said: "It may be necessary to kill half of the Filipinos in order that the remaining half of the population may be advanced to a higher plane of life than their present semi-barbarous state affords."236

A century later, and still the same derisive and racist trope from the US:UK military for the

‘problem’ in Afghanistan, reported in the media as an ‘appalling backward and incoherent

society’, ‘completely ungovernable’ (even though it governed itself for a millennia before),

and ‘right out of the Old Testament’. The West’s solution is the imposition of martial law and

235 - Unnamed former UK official 236 - Selfa, Lance, 'US Imperialism: A Century of Slaughter'. (Chicago:International Socialist Review), Issue 7, Spring 1999

Diminution and Development - pg 151 installing a net $1.7 billion Kabul burn-rate 237 on a country with a $3.4B Gross Domestic

Product (2008),238 followed by blatant expropriation of $100Bs of our natural resources, with

US gunships slaughtering any Afghan male caught in the open after dark, and dropping

Hellfire from their loitering UAVs, piloted remotely from secret trailers hidden halfway

around the world in the Nevada desert. There are no words which suffice....

“Washington does not object at all in principle to the retrograde religious extremism of the targeted sectarian groups in Pakistan -- or in Afghanistan, for that matter. For one thing, many of these same groups received copious support from America during the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan. And of course, Obama, like all of his predecessors, joyfully embraces -- even, yes, bows to -- perhaps the most retrograde, extremist religious regime on earth, Saudi Arabia. Never believe -- not for a moment -- that it is the content of faction's belief that determines Washington's attitude toward it. This determination is made solely on the basis of how that group advances -- or impedes -- American policy interests at any given time and place. One need only look at the vicious religious extremists embraced and empowered by the United States in both Afghanistan and Iraq in the past few years to see that.”239

I said in my Forward, I apologize to those who cannot accept the documented reality of the

Anglo-American vision, in its invasion and occupation. But we know from the First Gulf War

aftermath, these lofty sounding ‘aid’ programs often conceal the most egregious fraud and

embezzlement, by providing ‘aid distribution’ to de facto mini-dictators, instead of to their

starving peoples, in expectation of ‘resource redistribution’, a lofty euphemism for securing

natural resource expropriation contracts from these newly-certified ‘legitimate leaders’.

Of course Afghans appreciate the sacrifice of brave US:ISAF/NATO soldiers fighting on our

behalf, and heroic civilian workers risking their lives to bring Afghans new freedoms, and

give us breathing room to effect policy change. But where is the real reconstruction? As a

political scientist I view the reality objectively, and winnow from among these abstracts only

a small possibility of hope for the Afghan peoples. There have been pastoral US aid efforts, 237 - CIA World Factbook, ibid 238 - (IMF) http://www.indexmundi.com/afghanistan/gdp_real_growth_rate.html 239 - Floyd, Chris, When Blood is Their Argument, An Empire on Fire, from Patrick Cockburn, ibid

Diminution and Development - pg 152 $15 million over three years for water wells and latrines, for example, or 43¢ per year per

Afghan, that I described earlier, and indigenous self-help and stand-up programmes, as listed

in Appendix 2. But these programmes pale in comparison to the USAID:State Kabul staffing

expenditures. USAID issued an $80 million Transparency, Accountability, and Performance

(TAP) programme request, calling for some 30 plus private contractor specialists in

“Economic Growth and Agricultural Development, Population, Health and Nutrition,

Environment and Natural Resources, Democracy and Governance, Conflict Mitigation and

Post-Conflict Reconstruction, and Humanitarian Assistance”, likely to mentor ($100 millions

expense for) the 974 new State:USAID technocrat advisors, on their first tour in the Green

Zone ‘box Karzai in’ programme.240

But there were no capital development programme funds in these upgrading programmes,

although USAID is also seeking private funding requests for Financial Access for Investing

in the Development of Afghanistan (FAIDA), a ‘micro-loan’ program “to build a sustainable,

diverse and inclusive financial sector that can meet the needs of micro, small and medium

enterprises (MSMEs) throughout the country and generate quality employment.” 241

After the failed runoff election, President Obama subsequently threatened President Karzai

that ‘if corruption wasn’t brought under control’, (whatever that means, and however it might

be measured, given that your US Congress keeps unsuccessfully demanding an aid audit!)242,

‘that the US would withdraw all military forces from Afghanistan within six months!’243

240 - Transparency, Accountability, and Performance (TAP), Project Solicitation: M-OAA-GRO-ALPS-09-0175, (WA DC:USAID) 4 November 2009 241 - Financial Access for Investing in the Development of Afghanistan (FAIDA), Solicitation Number: 306-09-0544, (WA DC:USAID) 29 October 2009 242 - http://www.oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4316&catid=72:hearings&Itemid=30 243 - US gives Karzai six-month ultimatum to stem Afghanistan corruption, (UK:The Times) 4 November, 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 153 This may explain the suspension of USAID’s private services contract, ‘Engineering, Quality

Assurance and Logistical Support (EQUALS) Program’ to “provide USAID/Afghanistan

Office of Infrastructure, Engineering, and Energy (OIEE) with an Afghanistan-based team to

provide independent quality assurance for construction, design and maintenance projects.” 244

“Political will and a commitment to allocate costs and benefits fairly through rule-of-law institutions are both necessary to convert assets of all kinds--natural resources, financial connections, foreign investment, loans, aid, remittances, transfers of technology--into a diverse, prosperous country that offers numerous choices and opportunities for an entire populace to attain the "good life."

For a few to live in opulence while a great many are destitute is not development. Economists claim that $5,000 annual disposable income per person is sufficient for discretionary spending to take off. This represents development only if that income is getting to ordinary people. Unfortunately, corruption is doing more harm to development in third- and second- world countries than aid does good.

Realistically, corruption is a suicide strategy--whether pursued through obedience to traditional norms or from egoistical moral disorientation. If one expects development to work as planned, he/she can no longer simply dismiss kleptocracy with excuses of "business as usual" or "power corrupts." 245

In this chapter I have tried to reveal to Western reviewers that ‘beam in thine own eye’.

When Western media today refers to Afghanistan, they use only jingoist slurs like, ‘failed

state’, ‘corrupt dictatorship’ and ‘narco-mafia’! What pundits should be imaging is, ‘London

Blitz’, ‘Dresden Fire Storm’ and even a ‘New Hiroshima’. The former invokes an attacking

Crusader, the latter, invites a comforting Saviour, bringing hope to restore the historical

Afghanistan from pre-subjugation: “The immediate environs of Kabul have pretensions to as

much beauty as most places that owe their improvements entirely to the hand of man....time

244 - Engineering, Quality Assurance and Logistical Support (EQUALS), Solicitation Number: RFP-306-09-0535, (WA DC:USAID) 31 October 2009 245 - Gloster-Coates, Patricia and Quest, Linda, Kleptocracy: curse of development, (Salisbury:International Social Science Review), Spring-Summer,2005

Diminution and Development - pg 154 and human industry have combined to produce a soil fertility rarely exceeded. I have

nowhere seen such an abundance of fruit.”246

Darwin theorized that survival belongs to the ‘best fit’ for purpose, to the ‘niche player’, and

not, as is often deliberately misquoted by Western corporatist elites, to ‘the fittest’. It may

just be that Afghanistan’s ‘best fit’ would be in a symbiotic relationship with US:UK for the

orderly and ‘legitimate’ extraction of our rich natural resources, even if it means scrabbling

for pennies in royalties and dodging Hellfire missiles in the scrum.

Truly a Zeno Paradox, and proof that time is now of the essence for the future of Afghanistan!

As I will examine in Chapter 5, there’s nothing in our on-going dialogues with Afghanistan’s

neighbours to suggest that Afghans can hold out for a ‘better deal’ there either.

246 - Vigne, G.T., A Personal Narrative of a Visit to Ghuzni, Kabul, and Afghanistan, (London:Whittaker), 1840, pg 171-172

Diminution and Development - pg 155 Chapter 5 - Afghanistan’s Relations With Its Neighbours

Afghanistan is land-locked within mountain ranges. The nations that surround it are: Iran,

Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan-China, and Tajikistan; Jammu-Kashmir [Pakistan],

FATA-NWFP, Waziristan, Balochistan, and Pakistan proper, along the Indus Valley. From

our perspective, however, the Uzbeks, Kyrgs, Tajiks and Pashtun (Pakistanis) races are the

important participants in the daily life of Afghanistan; although, it is true that Iran as a

strategic neighbour, provides assistance to whichever groups are viewed most friendly to

Iranian trade at any one time, and Iran works to develop these trade relationships to further

the freight-forwarding business of its roads, railroads and pipelines to the Indian Ocean now

and in the future. [see maps in Appendix 1]

“Over the last 2000-odd years of Central Asian history, even back to the time of Alexander the Great when he came all the way from Macedonia, Afghanistan had occupied a vital strategic position in Central Asia; in Arnold Toynbee’s phrase, the “roundabout of empires”. It sits between three perennial centres of empire. To the north, an empire, maybe Turkic, maybe Mongol, more recently Russian, with a tendency to move down towards Afghanistan; to the west, Persia; to the south-east, India. In various periods, the land of Afghanistan has been divided between them, either as parts of their empires or else as spheres of influence. But while the question is clear enough – “Where should the frontiers between the empires be set?” – the geography of Afghanistan does not lend itself to any obvious answers. It does not offer anything in the way of coherent physical features to act as clear boundaries.”247

There are only four trade routes in and out of Afghanistan: Iran to the west; Pakistan to the

south and east; the former Soviet Stans, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan all to the

north; or, else a narrow and inhospitable mountain pass leading to the Taklamakan Desert of

Western China. China’s route remains a primitive mountain track, known as the Wakhan

Corridor. The roads and railroads through the Stan states pass through thousands of

kilometres of remote territory, stretching to Russia and the Eastern furthers of the EU. The

247 - Omrani, Bijan,.'The Durand Line: History And Problems Of The Afghan-Pakistan Border'.,(London:Asian Affairs),40:2,177 — 195, 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 156 established trade routes are Herat to Mashhad, Iran; Kandahar to Quetta, Pakistan; and Kabul

to Peshawar, Pakistan. In stark contrast to Anglo-American strategic interests, as the result of

strong and continuing American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) Zionist influence

on both US military and state foreign policy, the orderly and peaceful trade route into Iran

has been marginalized, so that strategic planning requires passage through the two perilous

Pakistani trade routes via the hard to guard Taliban-controlled, frontier (NWFP), on to the

Pakistani port of Karachi. Or, the new strategic transit port of Gwadar on the Iranian border,

thus through Baluchistan, to reach the vast resource-hungry Indian market further to the east.

Figure 22 - Sino-Indian Odd Couple (c) Arvind K.Pandey

It could be as simple as base war profiteering, Israel opposing an Iranian trade route logic to

keep AF-PAK in play, with the need for its arms dealing and its intelligence services; Iran

opposing Israel sovereignty to keep AF-PAK in play, and the market for its weapons and

jihadi brokerage services. Look at how long Israel and Palestine have kept that war going!

Although China is now a trade partner with Afghanistan, with a four-year development lease

for the massive Aynak copper reserves near Kabul, their route planning must lead south,

through Pakistan towards the port at Gwadar, since any trade route through Iran, however


desirable, would attract a strong negative

sanction from the US:ISAF occupation and its

overriding Zionist myopia, something which

China cannot currently afford at any price to

affect US MFN its status. PRC China must

substantially develop the resource within four

years, or forfeit their mining lease, according to

the original lease terms, which may or may not

be adjusted, according to geo-politics of the moment.

For the purpose of discussion, I am going to ignore Iran, China and the ‘Stans as significant

players in mainstream Afghanistan politics, especially while Pashtun President Karzai

remains in power. Iran, China and ‘Stans are intent on being Afghanistan’s ‘friends’, steering

clear of most internal policy, making no military commitments, and simply focusing on

business interests. In any case, both Iran and China are martial economies, and they don’t

broadcast their policies. We can speculate, but it would be pure conjecture only what the

motives of our new ‘friends’ might be.

Which leaves Pakistan, much of which was once Afghanistan before the British Raj drew the

arbitrary Durand Line, although the Pakistani government have largely written off any idea of

‘Pashtunistan’.

Figure 23 – Aynak Copper Mine Rail Export Routes


Figure 24 – So-called ‘Indus Valley Civilization’ © RupeeNews.com

“Long before the Crescent and Star flew atop Islamabad, long before Mohammed Bin Qasim invaded Sind, and long before the Mughals spread prosperity in all the nooks and corners of the subcontinent, long before the Sikh dynasty briefly controlled Kashmir, and long before the Chundra Gupta Vikramadatya ruled India, the people of Punjab, Sindh, Sarhad, and Kashmir were tied together as the people of Pakistan. The so-called ‘Indus Valley Civilization’, existed only in the Western part of the subcontinent, almost exclusively on the banks of the Indus (current day Pakistan). Therefore current day Pakistanis are inheritors of the Indus Valley Civilization. There was a civilization in present day Pakistan. “India” did not exist 5000 years ago. The Sumerians called it Meluhha and Mekan. We don’t know what they called it. No one can be sure. “Pakistan” existed 5000 years ago in the Indus Valley, even though the [civilization] probably did not call it Pakistan.” 248

Notice how cleverly the map of this ‘Indus Valley Civilization’ leaves the Indus Valley

proper, cutting off Afghanistan, and reaches west just to today’s modern border with Iran,

which did not then exist, and was the remnants of Persia, itself pushed further to the west by

Afghan domination over the whole region. This is the problem that Afghans face today, the

248 - Ansari, Moin, “Pakistan” existed 5000 years ago. IVC thrives as Pakistan today. The Geographic Two Nation Theory, (IN:RupeeNews.com) 27 November

Diminution and Development - pg 159 ‘airbrushing of history’ by Punjabis, exacerbated by the British East Indian Company’s and

Empire’s Durand Line, and its failure to achieve rescission after the British Raj fell in 1947.

FATA-NWFP, the Nexus of ‘AF-PAK’

FATA are the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan including the NWFP North

West Frontier Province. Other disputed areas include Waziristan and Baluchistan, former

Afghan provinces ceded rightly or wrongly to the newly-formed Pakistan as the British

withdrew in 1947 without the rescission of the Durand Line separating Afghanistan from

their former East Indian Empire.

Just like Jammu-Kashmir, provinces jointly disputed by Pakistan and India for over fifty

years, and Tibet, a former autonomous region still disputed by China and the ‘annexed’

Tibetan people, like Chechnya, like Abkhazia, the South Ossetian Autonomous Region and

Autonomous Republic of Adjara in Georgia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and not forgetting,

Palestine, FATA-NWFP has become the ethnic, religious and border dispute flashpoint of the

US:ISAF War in ‘AF-PAK’.

What is FATA like? According to the testimony of a FATA resident, the tribes of FATA

have a “crude wisdom” as they are geographically isolated from the rest of Pakistan. The

people are possessive of their culture and relationships and are proud of their past. Their main

concern is survival and they know how to use their landscape to achieve just that.

FATA remains isolated, but is not a liability. FATA has great transit potential, with roads and

rail to Afghanistan, and India via Wagah. The government of Pakistan has identified 125 sites

for small dams. According to the Pakistani delegation’s testimony, 46% of FATA residents

leave their villages to earn a living and this has made them skilled workers. With the global

Diminution and Development - pg 160 economic recession and their return home, there is an opportunity for the international

community to utilize their skills for local Pashtun-built development projects.

FATA produces off-season fruits, and the area is known to have deposits of minerals, coal,

copper and oil. This is one of the main reasons the government of Pakistan wants to start land

resettlement and deeper government involvement in the area. The government of Pakistan

wants the government of Afghanistan to formally recognize the Durand Line as the settled

official border, thus cementing FATA-NWFP as Pakistani territory. Allowing Pakistan to

achieve this goal would prove costly to Afghanistan for centuries to come.

It is worth mentioning FATA is neither now, nor has it ever been subject to Pakistani

constitutional law. In order to bring FATA under the Pakistani laws, articles 146 and 147 of

the Pakistani Constitution would have to be amended. At present only the President of

Pakistan has the ultimate say in matters relating to FATA.

Pakistan has always sought ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan by interfering in the Durand Line

territories, FATA, Waziristan and Baluchistan. Pakistan desires to have an outright influence

on Afghanistan through supporting Pakistani-friendly local governments as well as superior

economic advantages over Afghanistan, which the Durand Line gave it, by cutting off

Afghanistan from the Indian Ocean. This Pakistani perception and agenda for Afghanistan is

shaped by India’s growing role in Afghanistan, and the two countries’ historic rivalry.

To counter the efforts of the Pakistani government in FATA, the government of Afghanistan

must identify projects and programs which could help FATA become developed, but prevent

it from becoming absorbed into the Pakistan economy. Unfortunately, US adventurism

allegedly in pursuit of Osama bin Laden (and the dream of an oil pipeline and mine ore

railroad corridor) and the ‘Taliban harbouring Al-Qa’idah’ be-devils Pakistani domestic

policy to leave FATA alone as a quid pro quo with the Pashtuns. Instead, we have the US-

Diminution and Development - pg 161 sponsored invasion of the Swat Valley, and now both North and South Waziristan, which

unlike Swat, is out of bounds to the world media.

FATA’s current economic and security problems are indistinguishable from the Durand Line,

nor will a formal recognition or a renegotiation of the line as a legitimate international border

have much impact on solving FATA’s economic and social development. There is a need for

reforms, but there are differences of opinion on whether to interject strong measures or not,

and how quickly to do so. A strong interjection of foreign-sponsored reforms may cause local

resistance and it is something way beyond the bankrupt Pakistani government’s ability to

provide. Instead, foreign lenders will the continue to be disappointed with outright theft of

their aid monies by Islamabad, and despite the testimony of a Pakistani delegation at Wilton

Park, the Pakistani Government has approved the doubling of the annual funds for FATA.

“In Pakistan we discuss every country’s Afghan Policy, but we do not discuss our own Afghan Policy. We [Pakistanis’] discuss whether the Taliban defeat in FATA will result in their defeat in Afghanistan, as presumptions the Pakistani government makes about other countries’ [foreign] policies,” Senator Afrasiab Khatak said at the Wilton Park briefing. “FATA is controlled by Pakistani elements and used for its so called “strategic depth” when the time calls against Afghanistan.”249

The rest of Pakistan’s population does not seriously consider absorbing FATA into NWFP.

When the issue is raised by Sen. Khatak’s party, the Awamy National Party (ANP) is accused

of covert political interests intent on gaining more seats in the Pakistani Parliament.

“Beside Pakistan, Saudi Arabia is a stakeholder in the Taliban issue and Pakistan can’t do it

alone” Asif Durani, Deputy High Commissioner of Pakistan in London, said at the meeting.

“The madrassahs in FATA were created through the CIA funding and now they are funded

by Saudi money. They were mujahideen until yesterday, and now they [yesterday’s

mujahideen] are upset because Pakistan took a U-turn over FATA after 9/11.”

249 - Pakistani Senator Khatak, 16 October, 2009, Wilton Park briefing, London, UK

Diminution and Development - pg 162 Today, there is cell phone and internet service in FATA, and they have media productions.

The Pakistani military has opened one radio station and another one is at the planning stage.

Road networks to the rest of the major city centres are being improved. The Khasadar are

local security levies consisting of tribal members appointed by Political Agents.

The Bajaur’s Salarzai Lashkar (‘volunteer’) army is bitterly opposed to the Taliban, but many

of their leaders have been killed while clearing their areas from Taliban influence.

Pakistani leaders now say they want to engage Afghan support in the fight against Al-

Qa’idahand other foreign militants operating in Pakistan. My belief is that they make this

claim because these foreign elements are operating beyond the control of ISI and other

Pakistani government security forces, and Pakistan can’t effectively eliminate them. The on-

going attacks against Taliban base areas in Waziristan will be a test of their mettle, and

should reveal the presence or absence of Al-Qa’ida, unless they flee in advance of the

fighting.

The jihadi militant presence is a direct challenges to the State of Pakistan. According to a

retired Pakistani Naval officer, now serving at the Pakistani High Commission in London the

Taliban “could be taken care of later and they are not much of a threat”. He believes they

could be defeated easily or neutralised. The truth is that these Taliban fighters were, and

perhaps still are Pakistan’s proxies in Afghanistan, and Pakistan really want to shift

US:ISAF’s focus on to fighting Al-Qa’ida, which is no longer a threat to Afghanistan—since

Afghanistan no longer serves as a safe haven for them.

The UK has been supporting the NWF (Northern Frontier Forces), and has promised to hold

an international conference to support Pakistan politically, but does not support the

Khasadars. The US has pledged $750 million over the next five years for FATA, and it has

recently revealed a Defense fund which has been established to pay the Taliban to lay down

Diminution and Development - pg 163 their arms,250 which is somewhat ironic, since Karzai threw UK mediation envoy Michael

Semphill out of the country in 2008 for planning precisely the same thing, i.e. paying the

Taliban to change sides and fight Al-Qa’ida! This adds credence to my premise that US:UK

intend to ‘box Karzai in’ after the runoff elections, as other diplomats have rumoured.

Ontogeny Recapitulates Neotony

Until now, I have been describing reactive conditions resulting from outside interference.

Hassan Gardezi in a brilliant analysis describes the ontogenic neotony of the Pakistan State:

“ Pakistan at the end of British rule in South Asia was faced with a number of historically specific conditions which made it particularly vulnerable to the embrace of the new phase of imperialism. Ironically there was hardly any state structure in the two distant areas of the subcontinent which became Pakistan in 1947. A small number of Muslim and British officers from the elite Indian Civil Service (ICS) ... opted to serve the newly-installed government in Karachi.

Yet it did not take long for the colonial system of bureaucratic control and authoritarian centralism to reproduce itself in the new state structure. A primary reason for this outcome was the weakness of the available political organization and its roots in the civil society. Most of its middle-class cadres were left (behind) in northern and central India, and its leadership in Pakistan was dominated by landlords, nawabs (provincial viceroy) and tribal chiefs. Its idea of Muslim (League) nationhood in the subcontinent was hijacked by militant right-wing religious parties and recast into an ideology for the construction of a theocratic state. [Following the deaths and assassinations of important Pakistani leadership and installation of the former ICS elites, they]...dissolved the constituent assembly a year later, before it had formulated a constitution for Pakistan.

This completed the shift in state power from the politicians to the bureaucratic-military establishment, which began to devise the state apparatuses in the only model it knew, the colonial model.251

In other words, the newly-minted state of Pakistan became established as a military-colonial

outpost for the West, in exactly the dependent-colonialist model being established within

250 - http://www.thenews.com.pk/updates.asp?id=90211 251 - Gardezi, Hassan, “Making of the Neo-Colonial State in South Asia: The Pakistan Experience”, (Baltimore:Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East), Volume 20, Number 1&2, 2000, pp. 211-218

Diminution and Development - pg 164 Afghanistan today! “The essence of neo-colonialism is that the state which is subject to it is,

in theory, independent and has all the trappings of international sovereignty. In reality, its

economic system and thus its political system is directed from outside.”252 What Afghanistan

has as a ‘way forward’ then, judging from the Pakistani experience, is a societal regression to

militarism, increased bureaucracy and central planning, a rapid, orderly expropriation of our

natural resources for a maintenance fee, ‘cleared and held’ for a narcostate mafiocracy elite.

Any larger discussion of Pakistan itself, its political, military and economic policies, the Zia-

Musharraf-Zardari progression, or where Pakistan is going from here as our trading partner is

quite simply outside the scope of this thesis. The Durand Line issue has been fought over for

60 years, and just like the Israel-Palestine issue, it will continue to sour Central Asian politics

for decades, even though it is central to both Afghanistan-Pakistan, and US:ISAF goals in the

region.

‘The Pashtun Problem’

Who are the Afghan-Pakistani Pashtuns, and what do they want? Here are some of my

thoughts: a terrain map (see Appendix 1) shows the geography that has determined Pashtun

history. Pashtuns are united across the wide southern frontier of Afghanistan, in the glacial

moraine outwash plains south of the Hindu Kush, and divided in to three major areas

Pakistan; Baluchistan and Waziristan in the mountainous regions of FATA and the NWFP.

It has been agreed by observers since the British Raj that the Pashtuns are a highly complex

society and that individual Pashtun Tribes were seen not as a dividing, but a “unifying factor”

(Afghan pragmatism allows for exceptions both in national politics and in wars of

occupation.) Tribes are neither corporate nor political, but they have been vital in funding

252 - Nkrumah, Kwame, Neo-Colonialism, the Last Staget of Imperialism, (New York:International Publishers), 1965

Diminution and Development - pg 165 kings or making them, but when a king dies, the divisive nature of Pashtuns often gains the

upper hand. 253

Tribes are localized to their individual inherited lands and settlements, although the Ghalzai

have no homeland as such, and are spread all across both sides of the Durand Line. Tribal

leaders do not have institutional safety nets. Any individual can attract tribal consensus

through connection and generous hospitality. Generally one elder is made ‘leader’ in a jirga.

Economic survival is the prime tribal concern and war killings have marked the Pashtun

character forever. Merely noticing a particular person may cause relatives to turn against him

even when there is no previous family disagreement. Equally, turning against a particular

person or a leader may provoke the sympathy and support of other tribal relatives. The best

recent example of this was when, a few months ago, the British and American media turned

against President Karzai, for his weaknesses and lack of leadership in curbing corruption.

Karzai’s Western-friendly image among Afghans was immediately replaced by a sudden

renewal of popularity for their “independent” national Leader.

Taking Pashtuns for granted brings great misfortune in its wake. Even after asserting their

superior imperial power over Pashtuns, first the British Raj, then the Russian Soviet (and now

the American:ISAF), colonialists are eventually forced to come to some agreement with them

and withdraw. In this regard, understanding Pashtunwali is important in all dealing with the

Pashtuns. It is a code of respect and social order and represents tribal governance from the

bottom up. Pashtuns will fight if you take their land away and assert national power over

them. If the enemy is more powerful then they are willing come to an agreement with them:

‘don’t interfere in our affairs, and we will not interfere in yours’.

253 - Caroe, Olaf, The Pathans: 550 BC - AD 1957, (Oxford in Asia Historical Reprints:Taylor and Francis), December 15, 2000

Diminution and Development - pg 166 Yet interfering is precisely what the US:ISAF policy is intent on doing at the local level!

Pakistani Senator Khatak refers to the ‘Taliban’ phenomena promoted in the past by the

Pakistan government ISI and funded by the US CIA for strategic gain in Afghanistan as a

continuum of the anti-Soviet mujahedeen insurgency of the 1980s. The rise of Taliban into a

successful militancy is not socially-driven, but a proxy for Pakistani control of Afghanistan.

With Pakistani interference, wars of occupation and forced relocation, the traditions or norms

of Pashtunwali have been disrupted and have begun to break down among Pashtun tribes.

“The social culture of the Pashtuns was deliberately deconstructed [remoulded] from

traditional norms to a more conservative Islamic Mullah-led culture, to mobilize people

against the former USSR in the 1980s.” 254

For example, badal or ghach (revenge) can no longer be practiced effectively. There are no

mechanisms to support it, as more and more Pashtuns move to the major cities as isolated

individuals. These urbanized Pashtuns are melded where they work and live, without village

social codes which were generally helpful in maintaining law and order. Like Anglo-

Americans, they begin to suffer from a lack of guiding faith, and those avenues for revenge

which their tribal past offered, and like Anglo-Americans, they express that loss in a mindless

faith in populist themes and media violence.

In America’s genocidal past, purging their indigent Native American populations, a plains-

tribal movement of total despair grew up called ‘Ghost Dancing’. It combined the traditional

native practices of communal dancing and lavish feasting in their native tongue and dress,

(‘potlatch’), which they were forbidden to perform on their starvation rations- and disease-

ridden ‘reservations’ (‘internally displaced refugee camps’) where they had been detained.

254 - Professor Thomas Johnson, 16 October, 2009, Wilton Park briefing, London, UK

Diminution and Development - pg 167 This faith system was combined with worship of a prophesy for a peaceful end to white

American expansionism, in some future fabled millennium to come, whilst simultaneously

preaching traditional messages of clean and sober living, honesty and mutual cooperation.

The social psychologist will immediately notice strong similarities between Ghost Dancing’s

beliefs, and the Taliban beliefs in clean living and an honest life, and ‘Al-Qa’ida’s’ belief in a

millennial end to Anglo-American expansionism with the return to a mythical Caliphate. The

Anglo-American response to both beliefs was, and is, the same: wholesale slaughter.

With the American aboriginals, once the slaughter was completed and the tribes pacified, the

reservation system formalized their institutional apartheid. With the Canadian and Australian

aboriginals, once that slaughter was completed and the tribes pacified, the reservation system

moved to the next stage of ethnic cleansing, emphasizing the deliberate cultural destruction of

aboriginal family values and language, aiming for an eventual assimilation into the dominant

culture as a disenfranchised non-entity, an ‘abo’, a ‘nate’, on the hierarchical level of a burro.

The conflicts of the past three decades have made Pashtuns question their role in the greater

political and social context. The current occupation has increased Pashtuns’ social movement

and mobility, and their Tribal social contract is bent, if not yet broken. The current lack of

full Pashtun integration into the Afghan power structure will eventually hinge on some form

of appeasement and symbolic partisanship, which may cause great political and social unrest

among the Pashtuns between the ‘chosen’ and the ‘outlawed’. The continued and resolute

pressure from the neighbouring countries such as Pakistan and Iran may prove unhelpful.

Sadly, The Second Front in the Global War on Terror in Afghanistan-Pakistan will bear the

fruit of Anglo-American apartheid and negative interventions by its neighbours.

During the 1980s, as the CIA and ISI were fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, the young

mahajeers (‘refugees’) were being moulded into mujahideen by physical and psychological

Diminution and Development - pg 168 indoctrination. Physically, they were taught how to fight with small arms, which they did

well, but they were also brainwashed. The University of Nebraska published maths lesson

books for Afghan youth, which asked: 2 Kalashnikovs + 3 Kalashnikovs = ___ , or what the

answer was to: 3 dead Russians + 4 dead Russians = ___. If the answer to the first question

was 5, without stating ‘Kalashnikovs’, it would have to be marked ‘wrong’, or 50% correct.

And the answer to the second questions was 7, and not ‘7 dead Russians’, again, the answer

was only half correct. These efforts at indoctrination had their desired effect on a generation

of mujahideen and Taliban who learned the ‘New Math’.

The deliberate Cold War CIA:ISI indoctrination of the Pashtuns into the armed jihad form of

Islamic faith has been an ongoing tragedy for Afghanistan through the past three decades, and

is now the chief block to achieving sustained peace in the region. Not all Taliban are jihadist.

The Khyber Pass is a route connecting Kabul with Peshawar and is one of the main supply

roads for NATO. The Khyber Pass Mafia and local drug traffickers also claim to be Taliban

in order to protect themselves from local adversaries and law enforcement, just as ANP have

been found to claim they are acting on behalf of some major or provincial leader, when they

demand bahkshish, threaten kidnapping, or hold up vehicles at gunpoint.

The Ghalzai may be the largest tribe within the Taliban and Pashtuns may be the major

participants, but all Galzai and Pashtuns are suffering hugely in the allied war against the

Taliban. At the same time, Pakistan has systematically attempted to remove Pashtuns’

cultural identity by forcing the use of the Urdu language throughout the Pashtun lands; much

as the Anglo-Americans once forced the English language upon their dependencies. All this

does is make more Pashtuns sympathetic to the jihadist Taliban movement in Afghanistan

and Pakistan.

Diminution and Development - pg 169 Pashtuns want respect and understanding within their own cultural beliefs and practices, and

the West should be working with that grain of the traditions and not enforcing outside social

mores, especially upon a largely illiterate people (70%), where a rumour quickly becomes

‘fact’, and colloquial sympathies quickly become a nationalist movement.

With 85% of Pashtuns involved in agriculture, the West should invest heavily in agricultural

development, irrigation improvements, in the collectivization potential for seed and fertilizer

distribution without injecting BigAgra monopolies, and by bringing a modernization and

mechanization of agriculture to the Pashtun areas using low-cost Chinese farm equipment

which can be easily repaired and serviced within the means of the community.

The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan must work together in a true spirit of long-

term friendly cooperation for solving their problems and must not use Pashtuns and ‘Taliban’

as tools to achieve a Western economic or political conquest. They must reach individual

agreements that are tailored to the circumstances. They must start development projects in the

Pashtun areas and meanwhile convince locals that development is beneficial to them.

The Pashtu-Punjabi Diaspora of Pakistan

The dissolution of the British East India Company and Empire in 1947 was simply disastrous

for the subcontinent. Not only did they leave their Durand Line in place as a national border,

and force 25 million Pashtuns to live in a new artificially-created state, but Britain also split

the Punjab region in half, so Pashtun and Punjabi peoples once bound within the eastern

realm of the Ghaznaid Empire of Mahmud became Pakistan instead. The history of the

fission of India’s peoples into Hindus and Muslims is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the

end result was that Pakistan became the Islamic diaspora of Central Asia, as 10 million

people were displaced and divided and many millions died in just three days, destroying at a

stroke a flourishing culture of thousands of years. Along with Bengal, there is no other

Diminution and Development - pg 170 example in world history where a great civilization and culture was first conquered, then

systematically divided with such ruthless cruelty and abandonment. To use Margaret

Thatcher’s quaint expression, “Now you are going to get both barrels.”

The porous Durand border today is in fact a major trade and smuggling route.255 Pashtus in

Baluchistan, Waziristan, NWFP and FATA remain straddling across a fluid imaginary line,

trapped within an Islamic state largely ruled by Punjabis, while the Afghan government has

been ruled by the Pashtu majority, and closely allied first and foremost with Pakistan in trade

and politics. Afghans live on either side of the border easily, trading regularly back and forth

between Kabul and Peshawar and Kandahar and Quetta, much as the English trade with

Scotland, Wales and Ireland, and with Canada, America, Australia and New Zealand, UK’s

former colonies, still all are brothers and sisters in culture and language.

That Pakistan is important to Afghanistan there is no doubt. As the US Senate Hearings on

Afghanistan and Pakistan (April, 2009) indicate, American politicians and military analysts

views Pakistan as the most important neighbour of Afghanistan. China, India and the ‘Stans

go unmentioned. As Afghan’s, we hope Pakistan doesn’t take on quite the importance it

appears to be gleaning. $5 billion in US aid is proposed in a reintroduced Kerry-Lugar

Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, which pledges both economic and military aid to

Pakistan far in excess of the aid given to Afghanistan during the last seven years since the US

invasion. Why?

“Pakistan has been worried by India’s increasing interest in Afghanistan since the Bonn Conference in November 2001 at which Afghan factional leaders and UN officials met to discuss the formation of a post-Taliban government. At that conference it became clear that the pro-Pakistani Afghan Taliban would be purged from the new Afghanistan under Karzai and replaced by forces dominated by commanders from the Northern Alliance (NA).

255 Rupert Chetwynd, 28 December, London, UK


India is one of Karzai’s few remaining champions. Delhi sees the new Afghanistan as a part of its sphere of influence. It has four consulates in Afghanistan and has given its government $1.2 billion in aid: a remarkable sum for it to donate to a country that is 99 per cent Muslim and with which it has no common border. India’s most ambitious – and, for Pakistan, most alarming – Afghan project is a new highway that will provide a route to the Iranian port of Chabahar.

Not only will Afghanistan no longer need to use Pakistani ports, the road’s destination is a clear indication of India’s intention to consolidate an alliance with Iran in western Afghanistan in order to counter Pakistan’s influence in eastern Afghanistan. The road network, as they see it, is a new way to fight an old war. It’s precisely in order to resist the India-Iran bloc – as well as the emerging axis between Delhi and Washington – that the ISI has aligned itself with the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani.”256

But Pakistan may be disintegrating. The CIA blundered with Benazir Bhutto in their attempt

to push General Musharraf out of office. What were US strategic military and intelligence

planners thinking!? The cross-border Taliban and Al-Qa’idah attacks have increased

considerably since Bhutto was assassinated and Musharraf forced out. The NWFP-FATA

have always been held in delicate check, ever since General Zia created the hands-off

environment for madrassahs. Surely timing of the Bhutto-CIA putsch attempt was to some

extent anticipating the looming global economic recession. They must have known!

Then, instead of leaving Musharraf and his military establishment in power, and stifling

FATA harassment by holding the line at Ghazni, Khowst and Jalalabad with strong check

points well inside Afghanistan, now the US has had to launch another “$100 billion

emergency funding program for Afghanistan, Pakistan and other undisclosed national

security purposes.” It is almost as though US planners had this in mind all along, and why I

spent so much time in Chapter 4 describing their marketing of Global War on Terror.

Vampire capital corruption and war profiteering is poisoning everything!

256 - Usher, Graham, Taliban v Taliban. (London:London Review of Books), 9 April 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 172 Gerald Epstein describes the equivalent impact that corporate outsourcing is having on the

US manufacturing and service industries, “A big question is how to capture some of these

profits from offshoring and reinvest them into real investments in the U.S. that will generate

both more jobs and higher productivity. What is often left out of the discussion is the role of

public investments in education, infrastructure, research and development, and health. In

order to capture some of these profits for these kinds of investments, the U.S. government

needs greater ability to tax and re-invest these profits. That is being undermined by the same

globalization processes that are driving offshoring.”257

It’s a ‘Race to the Bottom’ global war for ‘zero-point’ labour and apex-point profits!

Swat Valley and Waziristan Pakistan Military Incursions

Where Zia-al-Haq had relied on a brutal domestic intelligence and assassination cadre similar

to the first interim Afghan government’s KHAD Intelligence Network, following itself on the

Soviet KGB model; and where Musharraf seemed to have adopted a hands-off policy towards

the frontier provinces after his embarrassment over 9/11, the newly elected Pakistani

President Zardari and his sponsor in Washington, DC, US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton,

have ‘taken off the gloves’.

257 - Epstein, Gerald, Gerald Epstein on the Fallout from Offshoring, from Bargaining Power, Distributional Equity and the Challenge of Off-Shoring, (Amherst:PERI), February, 2007


Figure 25 – Pakistan bombings © Newsline

The Pakistan Army invasion of Swat Valley created close to two million civilian refugees,

destroyed the wheat harvest just as it was beginning, scattered the livestock, and bombed the

villages. While some efforts were made to temporarily aid fleeing refugees, that level of

effort was inadequate to the real need. The current (October, 2009) invasion of Waziristan is

a three-pronged pincer movement which has again disrupted the lives of 100,000’s of

civilians, and destroyed their harvests, scattered their livestock and destroyed their homes.

It has also enraged the Taliban.

Following the UAV assassination-from-above of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leader

Baitullah Mehsud and his wife, as a response to the Swat Valley and Waziristan government

attacks, “the TTP and its affiliates struck twice with suicide bombings on 29th and 30th

August in different parts of the NWFP, killing 38 Khassadars (tribal levies)and policemen,

and sending a warning that they still has the capacity to fight back, despite Baitullah

Mehsud’s death.”


“Just a day after the brutal attack, a suicide bomb killed 21 Khassadars and injured another 27 in the border town of Torkham in Khyber Agency. The TTP claimed responsibility for the attack and threatened more to avenge Baitullah’s assassination in a US drone strike on August 5.

On August 30, the militants struck in Swat’s capital city, Mingora, when a suicide bomber snuck into a police station by scaling the boundary wall and caused an explosion which killed 16 newly-recruited members of the Special Police Force and injured another five. In fact, this was the fourth suicide bombing in Swat since July 13, when the IDPs started returning home to the (Swat) valley from Peshawar.

It is relevant to mention that the TTP, and even the non-TTP militant groups like those led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan and Maulvi Nazeer in Wana, have made it absolutely clear that they will take revenge on Pakistan’s security forces as well as the government for every US drone attack due to their belief that the Americans were launching missile strikes in the tribal areas with the full cooperation of the Pakistan Army.

The major worry, though, for the TTP should be the loss of public support in Pakistan. In particular, it has lost backing in its previous strongholds all over the NWFP. The suicide bombings in towns and cities and the killing of civilians has deprived it of sympathy from people who previously supported it. Even those Taliban attacks that have targeted personnel of the security and law-enforcement forces serve to turn public opinion against the militants.”258

Then in the wake of these bombings, horrific for the Pakistani people, US Secretary of State,

Hillary Clinton, seizing a photo opportunity at an historic college in a safe region of Punjab,

had the temerity to demand of Pakistan government that they did not know where the Taliban

were, or how to deal with them! For this she received a Freedom Award!

Following the Kabul bombings of the UN embassy compound that followed, the United

Nations is preparing to announce the withdrawal of a number of its foreign staff operating in

Afghanistan. The order is just waiting approval of Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General:

"It looks like the UN may be on the verge of pulling out two thirds of its international staff;

those who remain will be moved to secure accommodation compounds. We've heard from

258 - Yusufzai, Rahimullah, Staging a Comeback?, (Karachi:Newsline) September 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 175 high-level sources that this would be a radical reduction in operations. The UN staff would be

reduced in all agencies, not just the political one - UNAMA, but the World Food Programme,

the refugee agency, UNHCR”259

That executive order was subsequently confirmed as Ki-moon made a surprise visit to Kabul,

although UN Afghan mission chief Kai Eide claimed redeployment is only ‘temporary’.

Can’t We Just ‘Move Forward’?

Late in his second term, George Bush Jr revealed as plainly as possible the American Vision

in re “AF-PAK”, as the region is now being referred to by US Defence elites. Speaking to

The News in Pakistan, Dr. Shireen M Mazari briefed readers on secret demands made by

Bush to President Perves Musharraf, just after the US CIA’s disastrous attempt to disrupt

Musharraf’s attempts to remain in office by using his Supreme Court to change term limits:

“The first demand is for granting of a status that is accorded to the technical and administrative staff of the US embassy. The second demand is that these personnel be allowed to enter and exit Pakistan on National Identification (for example a driving license) that is without any visas.

Next, the US is demanding that Pakistan accept the legality of all US licences, which would include arms licenses. This is followed by the demand that all these personnel be allowed to carry arms and wear uniforms as they wish, across the whole of Pakistan.

Then comes a demand that directly undermines our sovereignty – that the US criminal jurisdiction be applicable in Pakistan to US nationals. In other words, these personnel would not be subject to Pakistani law.

In the context of Pakistan, the demand to make the US personnel above the Pakistani law would not be limited to any one part of the country! So the Pakistani citizens will become fair game for US military personnel as well as other auxiliary staff like military contractors.

The next demand is for exemption from all taxes, including indirect taxes like excise duty, etc. The seventh demand is for inspection-free import and export

259 - UN 'to scale back' Afghan mission, (Qatar:Al Jazeera.net) 05 November, 2009


of all goods and materials. So we would not know what they are bringing in or taking out of our country.

At number eight is the demand for free movement of vehicles, vessels including aircraft, without landing or parking fees! Then, at number nine, there is a specific demand that selected US contractors should also be exempted from tax payments.

At number ten there is the demand for free of cost use of US telecommunication systems and using all necessary radio spectrum. The final demand is the most dangerous and is linked to the demand for non-applicability of Pakistani law for US personnel. Demand number eleven is for a waiver of all claims to damage to loss or destruction of others’ property, or death to personnel or armed forces or civilians. The US has tried to be smart by not using the word "other" for death but, given the context, clearly it implies that US personnel can maim and kill Pakistanis and destroy our infrastructure and weaponry with impunity.

Effectively, if accepted, these demands would give the US personnel complete freedom to do as they please in Pakistan – in fact, they would take control of events in areas of their interest.”260

Newly appointed US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke had no time in Kabul to show his

hand regarding the Allied occupation’s intentions for Afghanistan under the Obama

Administration, other than an unfortunate amalgamation of ‘Afghan’ with the ‘Pakistan

Problem’, branded “AF-PAK”, and resembling more the NeoCon Bush Era of Sovereignty

and Empire™ than the NeoLiberal Clinton Era of Hearts and Minds™. But these are only

branding campaigns.

As is becoming increasingly clear as the days count down to the November runoff elections,

the PNAC programme of global One World Order hegemony continues apace under Obama.

Recent Pakistan government concessions to the Taliban controlling FATA were hotly

challenged by the Obama Administration. "I think the Pakistani government is basically

abdicating to the Taliban and the extremists," U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told

260 - http://thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=13430 [March 8, 2008]

Diminution and Development - pg 177 lawmakers in a hearing Wednesday in Washington. But on Thursday she added that ...

Islamabad was beginning to recognize the severity of the threat posed by militants.”261

Then the Karzai Administration sacked Western delegates, Michael Semphill and Mervyn

Patterson in February, 2008, giving them 48 hours to leave the country, after it was revealed

they were engaged in secret talks with the Taliban to lure them over to change sides, and to

train on behalf of ISAF interests in poppy eradication against the drug warlords in Herat.262

Is there anything from Afghanistan’s eastern neighbour that Afghans can use? Probably not.

Pakistan has always interfered openly in Afghanistan, the way large populations interfere

with their hinterlands. Pakistani populism and paranoia with respect to the British India

Empire’s religious apartheid separation of Pakistan from India would perpetually make any

Pakistan alliance a permanent roadblock against trade with India or China. Pakistan would

gain Afghan manufacturing and material resources. Amalgation of Afghanistan and Pakistan

would mean FATA bandits and Taliban zealots would run freely around our countryside.

But what about the Enhanced Partnership Act? If all English trade first had to be funnelled

through Dublin, would the British people embrace an Enhanced Partnership with Ireland Act?

If all of America trade had first to be funnelled through Mexico City, would the America

people embrace an Enhanced Partnership with Mexico Act?! Afghanistan needs multiple

international trading partner(s), not a sole monopoly trading bottleneck and fee brokerage.

Afghanistan needs trading security, not banana republicanism under the control of a

corrupted outlawed Mafiosi. What were the empire builders thinking!?

“To many observers, almost two decades after the fall of the Soviet Union the post-Cold War world’s future remains frightening. In an increasingly multipolar world, rapid advances in technology and globalization have dangerously empowered

261 - “Pakistan troops rush to Taliban-infiltrated area.” (AP:MSNBC), 23 April, 2009 262 - Starkey, Jerome, Revealed: British plan to build training camp for Taliban fighters in Afghanistan, (London:The Independent World) 4 February 2008


nonstate actors who compete for legitimacy with states and undercut long-held constructs of national autonomy and sovereignty. The community of nation-states, ensnared by its own bureaucratic inertia and dwindling capacities, cannot keep pace with these agile malefactors. More and more states contract out their responsibilities to commercial entities, further eroding their monopoly on power. In such an environment it can appear that crisis is imminent, powerful states will weaken, and weakened states will fail. The Westphalian state system will crumble, and the world will slip into a New Dark Age presaged by fragmented political authority, overlapping jurisdictions, fluid territorial boundaries, group marginalization, divided loyalties, no-go areas, and contested property rights.

But this Draconian future might not become reality.

This article suggests that the system of Westphalian states is not in decline, but that it never existed beyond a utopian allegory exemplifying the American experience. As such, the Dark Age premiseis really not about the decline of the sovereign state and the descent of the world into anarchy. It is instead an irrational response to the decline of American hegemony with a naïve emphasis on the power of nonstate actors to compete with nation-states. The analysis concludes that because the current paradigm paralysis places a higher value on overstated threats than opportunities, our greatest hazard is not the changing global environment we live in, but our reaction to it.” 263

‘We cannot, must not and will not walk away’

Then what does it come down to? It is maddening! In order to shift America’s attention and

resources to the east, the Defence establishment has to conceive an Enhanced Partnership Act

with the very nation which would do the most to destroy Afghanistan, on the faint hunch, and

with no exit strategy, that Anglo-Americans can buy Pakistani allegiance, and once resource

extraction roads, railroads and pipelines are built to the ocean, that those same Pakistanis,

which Defence knows include corrupt terrorist sponsors funded by certain Saudi interests,

will willy-nilly graciously extend transit rights to Western corporate conglomerates, to further

the extraction of Afghanistan’s resource wealth, and compete with those Saudi interests!

263 - Phillips, P. Michael, 'Deconstructing Our Dark Age Future', (Carlisle:US Army War College Quarterly), Summer 2009 Vol. XXXIX, No. 2

Diminution and Development - pg 179 Five years and some $675 billion dollars wasted on NeoCon ‘Shock and Awe’ in Iraq,

chasing the deliberate destruction of oil supply in order to boost up Houston - Calgary oil

production profits, shackling everyone on Earth with billions of dollars a day in higher

energy costs, and starving millions every day with higher commodity costs, all done under

the Supreme Command of the closest thing to a Reichsminister that America has seen since

Himmler, and still they lost the war!

“[Senator Graham] “From the 30,000 foot level here, General Petraeus, due to the success (sic) in Iraq would you now consider Afghanistan the Central Front in the War on Terror? “

[General Petraeus] “I think you’d have to take Afghanistan and Pakistan together ... as a problem set, those two together, yes, sir.“

[Senator Graham] “And you would consider that now the Central Front?”

[General Petraeus] “In fact, our focus is truly shifting to that front.”

[Senator Graham] “The Kerry-Lugar, uhh, Legislation, how empowering would that be to our efforts in Pakistan if the Congress would pass that?”

[General Petraeus] “Uhh, it will be of enormous importance, uhh, not just because of the tangible resources (sic) that it provides to Pakistan but also because of the sense of commitment that stands behind it as well, and the sustained nature of it.”

[Senator Graham] “Do you believe we should pass that as soon as possible?”

[General Petraeous] ”Uhh, [...jokes...] if you’re asking my best professional military advice, yes.”

[Senator Graham] “All right, ... but it would help the effort. Do you agree with that, Madame Secretary?”

[Undersecretary of Defence for Policy Flournoy] “Absolutely, yes.”

[Senator Chambliss] “Let me thank all you witnesses again, for your service.” 264

And that’s how it’s done. $5 billion on it’s way to Islamabad, and from this point forward, the

only neighbour available as a trading partner to Afghanistan is in the deep pocket of

264 - Author transcript from Senate Hearings on Afghanistan and Pakistan, April 1, 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 180 US:NATO. All our security secrets, COIN and human-intelligence developed by

Afghanistan’s ‘Standup’ ANA:ANP will now freely trade with our Pakistani ISI “ally”, who

are also in sympathy with the Taliban, and being funded in secret by Saudi! Pakistan is the

eastern front of a Saudi Al-Qa’idah Wahhabi dream for an Arab Caliphate!

Figure 26 – Total Global Humanitarian Aid versus Kerry-Lugar Amendment Military Aid to Pakistan265

“But the real question we are facing today is what will this extra $4 billion get us? This $4

billion will bring vital foreign aid increases to programs in Pakistan and Afghanistan. This

$4 billion will build civilian capacity and put our diplomats back on the front lines of

American foreign policy. This $4 billion will help make people all over the world safer, and

in the process, it will help keep America safer (sic).”266

There has been an immediate blow-back to the Obama Administration ‘Central Front in the

War on Terror’, Afghanistan-Pakistan, being pushed by the US Secretary of State’s office:

265 - http://manyeyes.alphaworks.ibm.com/manyeyes/visualizations/total-official-humanitarian-assistan 266 - Appeal for Kerry-Lugar Amendment to Restore $4 billion to Function 150 Account Foreign Affairs, 1 April, 2009 http://kerry.senate.gov/cfm/record.cfm?id=310950


“The 17-member bipartisan parliamentary committee on National Strategy in its final recommendations has proposed drastic changes in the national policy on war on terrorism to mark a clear shift from the policy that was framed by the outgoing president General Retired Pervez Musharraf.

The Committee, in its unanimous resolution has condemned in the strongest terms the increasing drone attacks on Pakistani territory which in its opinion were aggravating and expanding the terror attacks in settled and tribal areas and has demanded an immediate halt to them.

Mr. Rabbani said ‘It was good news that despite that every political party holds its own thinking about the national strategy the committee has been able to draft a unanimous resolution keeping the national interest higher then political interest on basis of which final provisional report will be submitted to both houses of parliament.

In response to a query, he said ‘No one can be given licence to trample on our sovereignty and we will not allow anyone to attack our people in lieu of any amount of assistance.’ He said the fresh US aid of US$1.5 billion a year was not meant for purchases of military hardware but for other projects.” 267

Pakistan wants national sovereignty against US:ISAF ... and $10 billion in US aid over five

years! Tell me a single problem that Pakistan is facing that Afghanistan is not facing!?

Terrorism, religious fanatics, corruption, minority rights, women rights, poverty, lack of

education.... Afghanistan’s best effort now may be to push for appointing new ministers and

governors in Kabul, who understands the intricacies of administering to their international

hegemony profit-centre, while balancing the dire needs of Afghan people for food, clothing,

shelter and transportation.

The Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) governs the treatment of civilians in armed conflict

and under occupation, and is a cornerstone of international humanitarian law. The convention

is binding upon the 189 states of the High Contracting Parties (HCP), including the United

States. It bans indiscriminate use of force against civilians, wanton destruction of property,

torture, indiscriminate bombing, the forced relocation from occupied lands for mining or oil

267 - Hassan, Ahmed, Parliamentarians call for change in security strategy. (Islamabad:Dawn Media Dawn.com) 07 April, 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 182 & gas camps by the establishment of foreign work camps, the ‘taking’ of land, water or air

without compensation, and requires judicial accountability for those who commit war crimes.

We will know the answer in mere days—while the Afghan parliament confirms each new

Karzai minister—chosen in agreement between President Karzai and the Ambassadors of

major powers to Kabul—as I discuss in the next chapter. Meanwhile, such a discussion will

allow us to explore the answer to one of the initial questions of this thesis: whether the

Afghan leadership is truly sovereign?

Diminution and Development - pg 183 Chapter 6 - The 2009 National Afghan Elections

Figure 27 - © Defence Link First line of defence

Whereas I discussed Afghanistan’s neighbours in the last chapter, now I’m going to turn

inwards, and ignore whatever influence those neighbouring countries have on Afghanistan.

Afghanistan just went through what at first appeared to be a populist democratic election.

There were dozens of candidates filing for the ballot, and more than a dozen who made it.

That the elections would degenerate so rapidly into farce and corruption, is a testament to the

utopian allegory, the Elphinstonian episteme, of a Western occupation that appears so naive.

A number of presidential candidates announced their candidature in public [Qugnoos.com] or

were widely expected to run (by enough of their followers) to mention them by name, if not

for this failed election’s field of dreams record, then in eager anticipation for 2014’s:268

268 - http://quqnoos.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=29&Itemid=97


Hamid Karzai [Incumbent] – A Popolzai

tribe Pashtun, President Hamid Karzai was

by turns inspired, nurtured, coddled,

criticized and now boxed-in by his US

handlers under the Enhanced Partnership

with Pakistan Act. Karzai established

himself originally as a centrist administrator; rather than as a leader, although to be fair, his

leadership was established, endoresed and enforced by the fiat of his US handlers.

No Afghan can claim to be leader of such a fractious national political entity, furthermore,

Karzai’s portfolio was: US:ISAF would provide the finance and security, his job was to build

up the national bureaucracy, create a semblance of an intelligentsia, transfer mineral and

hydrocarbon rights over to foreign capital, but not to complain too loudly about the details of

empire building. In the eyes of Afghans, Karzai is seen as weak, co-opted and surrounded by

corrupt individuals. The corruption charge is especially strong for his brother Ahmad Wali

Karzai, who is widely suspected of running the opium mafia from his estate in Kandahar.

Following an initial ~30% of the vote count, Karzai’s election numbers continued to creep

upwards and appeared to surpass the required 50% mark, until the news of the Special

Ambassador to the UN Peter Galbraith ‘ballot stuffing’ story broke. NYT’s claim from

unnamed ‘US government officials’ that Ahmed Wali Karzai is a drug lord,269 and on the

CIA payroll,270 further complicated Karzai’s runoff election.

As I mentioned in earlier Chapter 3, confidential Afghan allegations state that Ahmed Wali

Karzai is running a local strong-arm mafia instead, superimposing a Karzai media monopoly

269 - Risen, James, Reports Link Karzai’s Brother to Afghanistan Heroin Trade, (NY:New York Times) 4 October, 2008 270 - Filkins, Dexter, Karzai’s brother is said to be on CIA payroll, (NY:New York Times), 27 October 2009

Figure 28 – Hamid Karzai © Independent, UK

Diminution and Development - pg 185 onto US:ISAF, and ‘demanding 25% off the top’ from local businesses, hardly tactics of a

salaried Chief of the Kandahar Provincial Council, a man already allegedly ‘rolling in opium

wealth’ and ‘protected by US CIA’! That’s not how a drug lord behaves.

A more likely scenario to me is that these rumours represent the behind-the-scenes-in-plain-

view struggle between a fundamentalist Defence:CIA administration and war profiteering

contractor groups like XE, against a left-leaning State:USAID, using deliberate PSYOPS

(“disformation, misinformation psychological warfare”) and ‘leaked briefings’ to counter

recent State:USAID advances towards ‘Hearts and Minds’ reconciliation and reconstruction,

with Department of the Secretary of State Jacob Lew’s announcement of 974 new embassy

staff heading for Kabul. If right-wing reactionaries in Defence could topple Karzai in the

runoff elections, that would have boosted Defence:CIA expansionism against a possible

Irani- and Russia-aligned Abdullah government, setting the stage in my view for an all-out

civil war backed by massive troops surges increases under a massive emergency budget.

Mahmoud Karzai agrees, but puts it in a self-serving light, “This is being coordinated by the

ISI (Pakistani Intelligence Service). They [factions in ISI sympathetic to the Taliban] have

been behind the assassinations of several provincial leaders who are against the Taliban. And

my brother is the last major obstacle to them in the south. If they remove Ahmed Wali, the

Taliban will fill the void,” while gratuitously trying to align the Karzai family with the US

Defence establishment, “This is a smear campaign. James Risen has a vendetta against us.

And the Times is obviously being fed by the far-left lobbyist groups who are paying them to

do this. These leftists want Afghanistan destabilized, they want the Karzais out of power so

there is a vacuum, and then they can say it is such a mess that the Americans should abandon

the country. This is a coordinated plan, have no doubt about it.” 271

271 - Posner, Gerald, The Karzai Brothers Fight Back, (US:TheDailyBeast.com), 28 October, 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 186 Of course, his posture also lends credence to my Reactionary Right Guard within Defence

premise with its well-documented track record of willingness to commit to war for profit,

since the ‘leftist’ Clinton State Department has made every effort to keep Karzai in power.

We know Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s office has come out in favour of Karzai just as

soon as the first claims of a victory were made, and Clinton supported UN General Secretary

Ban Ki-moon when he sacked US Special Envoy Peter Galbraith in September for insisting

that the election was fraudulent.

· The Afghan IEC gave Karzai 49.67% of the vote after the election recount.272

Dr. Abdullah Abdullah [Afghanistan National

Front Shura-e-Nazar] – “Abdullah joined the

Panjshir Resistance Front, and in 1986 became an

advisor to Ahmad Shah Massoud fighting the

Soviets. In 2001 he was chosen as Foreign

Minister for the Interim Administration of

Afghanistan; a post which he lost in a cabinet reshuffle on March 22, 2006. He is generally

considered (along with former Ministers Mohammed Fahim and Yunus Qanuni) to be, a

leader of the Tajik faction, although his father is actually an ethnic Pashtun from

Kandahar.”273 Abdullah has the backing of the powerful northern Balkh provincial

governor, Muhammad Atta, and was the early front runner in the first election count. He has

since been vindicated in his claim of widespread vote tampering by the Karzai political

apparatus. Abdullah dropped out of the runoff election, rather than engage in a charade.

· The Afghan IEC gave Abdullah 30.59% of the vote after the election recount.

272 - http://www.afghanelections.org/pdf/PressRelease.IEC.21Oct09.pdf 273 - Babakarkhel, Zubair, Abdullah likely to be ANF's candidate: National Front. AF:e-Ariana.com), 04 Jan 2009

Figure 29 – Dr. Abdullah © Radio Free Europe


Dr. Ramazan Bashardost [unaffiliated] - An ethnic Hazara from

Ghazni, Bashardost is a young career bureaucrat and academic.

He spent all of the 20-year Soviet and Taliban Civil War era as

an expatriate student in France, pursuing advanced degrees in

international studies. Bashardost returned to Afghanistan in

2002 to work in the UN Department of Afghanistan's Foreign

Affairs Ministry. In 2003, he was appointed as Director of

European and Western Political Affairs Department Ministry,

but was forced to resign in 2005 after making outspoken complaints charging foreign NGOs

with draining off the Afghan aid funding pools, as others have more recently confirmed.

· The Afghan IEC gave Bashardost 10.46% of the vote after the elections recount.

Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai [Afghan Mellat Party] – Ghani is a

Pashtu-American expatriate who left the country for 24 years, then

returned. Dr Ghani became Karzai’s economic advisor after the

December 2001 Bonn Agreement, which he helped Lakhdar

Brahimi prepare, and was put in charge of reconstruction and donor

funding. He was Finance Minister from 2002 to 2004.

Ghani is considered a reformer, co-founding the Afghan Institute for State Effectiveness, and

is well regarded internationally. He has also served with the UN and the World Bank. Ghani

had to shed his pro-Western image and give up his American citizenship to accept office.

· The Afghan IEC gave Ghani 7.9% of the first count, but only 2.94% in the

official recount.

Figure 31 - © Ghani Campaign

Figure 30 © rediff news


Mirwais Yasini [Parliamentary Party ] – Possibly the

one truly ‘Afghan’ statesman in the running:

“For a period of 8 years (1993-2001), Yasini worked in active opposition to the Taliban regime as a social and political activist. After the fall of the Taliban in 2002, Yasini was appointed as the first Director of the Red Cross in

Nangarhar.Yasini was the Director of Foreign Relations and Economic Evaluation for the

Ministry of Finance. He was elected a member of the Emergency Loya Jirga, which met in Kabul.

In 2003, Yasini was appointed Director General of the Counter Narcotics Department of the National Security Council of Afghanistan. He was also an elected member of the Constitutional Loya Jirga and was elected as the first deputy speaker. In 2005, Mr. Yasini was appointed Deputy Minister, Ministry of Counter Narcotics in the Government of Afghanistan.

In 2005, Yasini was elected to the Lower House of the Afghan Parliament as a representative of Nangarhar Province. He is currently the leader of the largest parliamentary party in the Afghanistan lower house, the Afghanistan Parliamentary Party, and the First Deputy Speaker of the Lower House of the Afghan Parliament.”274

Yasini campaigned against Karzia on a strong anti-corruption platform.

· The Afghan IEC gave Yasini only 1.03% of the vote after the elections fraud

recount.

The chart below represents the complete voter turnout for the 2004 Presidential Election

in Afghanistan, and serves as a useful reference. Of the 70% of registered voters who

turned out to vote, 41% of them were women. The somewhat lower female voter turnout

can be attributed to many things. As the bulk of the political campaigning is done through

274 - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirwais_Yasini

Figure 32 - © Wikipedia


printed bills in Afghanistan, many women simply are illiterate and uninformed. Also,

local custom keeps them in the home, away from education and the right to vote.

Figure 33 - Unpublished presidential campaign white paper 2004 Elections

This tally is comparable to Pakistan, where women comprised 43.7 percent of the voters' list

United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific [UNESCAP], but

it serves to obscure the daily reality where women are often brutally suppressed, as a recent

incident in Baba Kot, Baluchistan, where in a so-called ‘honor killing’, five women were

murdered, of which three, aged between 16 and 18 years, were buried alive.275

Ironically, the representation of women in the Afghan legislature, at 27.3%, exceeds the

19.7% figure in the British House of Commons!276

Notable Also-Rans

275 - WLUML Newsletter, London. Issue 7. January 2009 276 - Women, Politics & Elections. London:Electoral Reform Society. No. 21:February, 2008

Diminution and Development - pg 190 Gulbuddin Hikmakyar [Hezib-e-Islami Party] – Hikmakyar [alt. spelling Hekmatyar] is a

former Islamist, in charge of jihad training camps in Peshawar during the Soviet era. I have

discussed him in greater detail in Chapter 3. Hikmakyar is fighting alongside the Taliban

forces against the Karzai government and ISAF and U.S. forces. However, any lasting

alliance between the Taliban and Hizb-e-Islami is impossible, as they have differences over

many issues. Hikmatyar believes in democracy, elections and women’s rights, but the Taliban

oppose these. Because Hikmatyar is foreign sponsored, but an Afghan patriot and opposes the

occupation, he may hope for popular support, but this will burden his campaign with the

images of death and destruction his Taliban alliance brings, and the US will do everything in

its power to capture and imprison him, before he can be legitimately elected.

“The recent meeting between a deputy of Richard Holbrooke, the United States special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and an emissary of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan (HIA), is by all accounts a landmark move in the United States' stated aim of involving militant groups in ending the conflict in Afghanistan.

The choice of Hekmatyar also indicates just how desperate the US is in finding an escape route from the escalating crisis in Afghanistan. While most of Taliban-led resistance is situated near the Pakistan Afghanistan borders, insurgents loyal to Hekmatyar hold complete command over Kapissa province's Tagab valley, only 30 kilometers north of Kabul. The HIA, whose political wing has offices all over Afghanistan and keeps 40 seats in the Afghan parliament, is fully geared to replace President Hamid Karzai in the upcoming presidential elections.”277

Dr. Anwar-ul Haq Ahadi [Afghan Social Democratic Party] – Ahadi was Karzai’s former

Finance Minister but stepped down in early 2009 after four years and announced he would

run for president. Ahadi served as the Director of Da Afghanistan Bank (Central Bank of

Afghanistan) from 2002 to 2004 and is highly educated with an impressive CV in banking

and finance, [Master of Business Administration (MBA), as well as a Ph.D in political

science]. He is Pashtu, from an important Afghan lineage.

277 - Shahzad, Syed, Holbrooke reaches out to Hekmatyar, (Hong Kong:Asia Times Online), 10 April, 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 191 Ali Ahmad Jalali [unaffiliated]: Another Pastu-American expatriate, Jalali worked as a

broadcaster for the Voice of America for 20 years before returning to Afghanistan in 2003 to

take up a role in the government. The well-regarded former interior minister quit after 2 1/2

years in September 2005, apparently upset over the involvement of Karzai officials in the

opium trade. However conflicting reports say he was allowed to resign for corruption and

returned to America, where he is or was under indictment in a US District Court.278 Insiders

say Jalali does not want to give up his U.S. citizenship, which would lock a run at the

presidency, but if he is under indictment, he cannot return to the US. Remarkably, Jalali is

popularly considered a military man and corruption fighter. As a ‘top military strategist’,

Jalali taught at the National Defense University, however there is evidence that he never

served in the mujahideen military against the Soviets, and instead fled to Peshawar and

became a CIA informer, which led to his US citizenship and for with Voice of America.

Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal [Hezb-i-Iislami Party] – Currently the Interior Minister and Asian

Development Bank Governor for Afghanistan. Afghans believe Arghandiwal is a man of

straw, a Hikmakyar tool, and that he really did not resign from Hikmakyar’s Hezib-a-Islami,

but has created a faux party so similar in name that Afghans will vote for Arghandiwal as a

proxy to Hikmakyar, knowing the Hikmakyar candidacy has no legs, due to his Taliban

background. On the other hand, if Arghandiwal is a legitimate candidate, he only has a short

time to build his national image and differentiate his party against a backdrop of Spring

Offensive violence.

Prince Abdul Ali Seraj [National Coalition for Dialogue for the Tribes of Afghanistan] - A

descendant of Afghanistan's royal family, Seraj is a Pashtun grandson of King Habibullah

and nephew of King Amamullah who ran nightclubs in Kabul. Like many Afghan political

278 - SUBPOENA IN A CIVIL CASE - AHMAD ALI JALILI. http://www.superpatriots.us/aboutthecase/jalalicase.pdf

Diminution and Development - pg 192 leaders and intelligentsia, Seraj escaped to the US during the Soviet occupation. His

campaign naturally is a royalist pledge to return Afghanistan to it fabled ancient days of yore.

Gul Agha Shirzai [unaffiliated] – Shirzai is a Barakzai tribe Pashtun, governor of Nangarhar

province and former governor of Kandahar before Assadullah Khalid. He joined his father in

the mujahedeen fighting against the Soviets and has become a Karzai ally. Sherzai has

admitted to receiving $1-million a week from his share of import duties and the opium trade

and was considered a violent and dangerous bandit before the Taliban takeover. Known for

his ability to ‘get things done’, his direct approach is the opposite of Pashtu-American

intelligentsia like Jalali and Ghani, and he appears to be a popular favorite with the US

military and media, but it is difficult to assess both his chances of winning the presidential

election, and his chancing of living long enough to enjoy the spoils. Regarding the insurgents,

he is quoted as saying:

“I will go to all the tribal elders, the way I have done it in Nangarhar. And we will negotiate

with the tribes who are supporting the Taliban,” Mr. Shirzai says, sitting in his bedroom at

the governor’s mansion in the provincial capital, Jalalabad. “We don’t have to rely only on

fighting and bombing and jet planes. That we use only for those people who won’t talk.”279

Hedayat Amin Arsala [unaffiliated] - Arsala is an old-school Pashtu-American with

experience working at the World Bank before returning to Afghanistan to act as a senior

advisor to the mujahideen leadership during the Soviet era. He was Minister of Finance in the

Transitional Government, then became a member of the Executive Council of the Loya Jirga

during the Taliban era. He has served as Vice President of the Transitional Islamic State and

has become an accomplished apparatchik today as Senior Minister in the Karzai Cabinet.

279 - Rosenberg, Matthew. U.S. Courts Former Warlords in Its Bid for Afghan Stability. New York:Wall Street Journal 20 March 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 193 Mohammad Hanif Atmar [unaffiliated] – “Mohammad Hanif Atmar, son of Mohammad Asef

Atmar, was born in 1968 in Laghman Province. He received a Bachelors Degree in Rural

Development Studies in the United Kingdom and earned his Masters Degree in International

Relations and Post-war Development from York University in the UK. He has also achieved

a diploma in Information Technology and Computer in the UK. From 1992 to 1994, he

served as an advisor for humanitarian programs in aid agencies both in Afghanistan and in

Pakistan. From 1994 to 2000, he served as Program Manager for the Norwegian Committee

for Afghanistan. Until 2002, he served as Deputy Director General of the International

Rescue Committee. In 2002, he was appointed as Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and

Development in the Transitional Government.”280 He has since been both Education Minister

and Minister of Interior in the Karzai Cabinet, switching his portfolios.

Burhanuddin Rabbani [Jamiat-e-Islami] – Old school Badhakshan tribe Tajik, Rabbani’s

group was the largest anti-Soviet mujahideen allied with Ahmad Shah Massoud and in

opposition to Gulbuddin Hikmakyar. He retained the title President of the Afghan

Government after the Taliban came to power, but was seen off by the Karzai Regime.

Rabbani was voted into parliament in September 2005 and finally returned to a position of

power in April 2007, when he became leader of the National Front.

Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad [unaffiliated] - An Afghan-born American brought up in Kabul,

Zalmay Khalilzad returned to Afghanistan in 2001, 30 years after he first left the country. A

Columbia University political science professor and US special envoy to Afghanistan under

Bush Jr., also he is a former US ambassador to the UN. Like Karzai, Khalilzad was a

consultant to UNOCAL.

280 - http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/cabinet_members.html#interior

Diminution and Development - pg 194 Abdul Rashid Dostum [collaborating with Karzai] – Former Deputy Defense Minister of

Afghanistan, former Communist and an Uzbek warlord of the Northern Alliance. As the

leader of Afghanistan's minority Uzbek community, Dostum is a controversial figure who has

often changed sides in Afghanistan's complex web of shifting alliances. Human rights

workers have accused Dostum of murdering up to 2,000 Taliban prisoners of war, and many

more adversaries before, a true ‘old school’ warlord.

The August Election Results

The initial August election results showed almost immediately a striking balance between

incumbent Hamid Karzai and his chief challenger, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. They each held

30% of the vote, however, that spread widened, as Abdullah’s count stalled, but Karzai’s

increased relentlessly to 40%, then 48%, and finally 54.8%. But there was no victory speech.

Rumours in Afghan political circles in Kabul suggested that Karzai was ready to announce a

50%+ win as early as the end of August, when Karzai’s actual tallies were still down around

the 30-40% level. Those rumours must have been immediately reported to the US Secretary

of State, because Special Ambassador Holbrooke flew to Kabul on ‘special business’ and

engaged in a ‘shouting match’ with Karzai, although his meeting was held in private.

US political pundits began a drumbeat for the need for a ‘legitimate’ candidate, as the

opposition candidates complained of widespread voting fraud. The Afghan Independent

Election Commission (IEC) and United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan

(UNAMA) initially reported similar suspicions, but no confirmations, ... and then the UN

industrial members were called away to the G-20 Summit on September 24-25, 2009, and

suddenly the Afghan elections fraud issue went very quiet.

Diminution and Development - pg 195 Matthew P. Hoh, former Senior US Civilian Representative to Zabul Province, resigned on

September 10th, with a damning litany of complaints he had witnessed firsthand, detailed in

his letter of resignation:281

· Glaring corruption and unabashed graft;

· A President (Karzai) whose confidantes and chief advisors comprise drug lords and war crimes villains, who mock our own rule of law and counter-narcotics efforts;

· A system of provincial and district leaders consisting of local power brokers, opportunists and strongmen allied to the United States solely for, and limited by, the value of USAID and CERP contracts and whose own political and economic interests stand nothing to gain from any positive or genuine attempts at reconciliation; and

· The recent election process dominated by fraud and discredited by low voter turnout, which has created an enormous victory for our enemy who now claims a popular boycott and will call into questions worldwide our government’s military, economic and diplomatic support for an invalid and illegitimate Afghan government.

Hoh’s final talking-point was a huge shot across the bow at USAID:State’s desperate attempt

to label the elections ‘certified and legitimate’. But his resignation would have been buried

after G-20, and Karzai would have been eventually announced as victor by Western media

‘vote count’ baby-steps, if not for US Special Envoy to the UN, Peter Galbraith. What his

challenge response article in the Washington Post revealed on October 4th, was what many

had suspected after Hoh’s resignation: corruption behind the voting count.

Galbraith had been sacked by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, obviously with US

SecState Clinton’s explicit approval, for refusing to let the ballot stuffing issue go away.

What Galbraith had to say stunned the political world, which so rarely sees not one, but two

of its own fall onto their swords in deference to the ‘Truth’:

“The fraud has handed the Taliban its greatest strategic victory in eight years of fighting the United States and its Afghan partners. The election was a foreseeable train wreck. Unlike the United Nations-run elections (held) in 2004, this balloting

281 - http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/hp/ssi/wpc/ResignationLetter.pdf?sid=ST2009102603447


was managed by Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission (IEC). Despite its name, the commission is subservient to Karzai, who appointed its seven members. Even so, the international role was extensive.

In early September, I got word that the IEC was about to abandon its published anti-fraud policies, allowing it to include enough fraudulent votes in the final tally to put Karzai over the 50 percent threshold needed to avoid a runoff. After I called the chief electoral officer to urge him to stick with the original guidelines, Karzai issued a formal protest accusing me of foreign interference. My boss sided with Karzai.” 282

The White House responded accordingly, with the Secretary of State’s Office supporting

Galbraith’s sacking, and pleading ‘can’t we just go forward’, while press secretary Robert

Gibbs declared the, “…responsibility that all Afghans are going to have in both putting

forward and -- putting forward a government that is viewed as, in the eyes of both,

importantly, the Afghan people as well as the international community, as truly legitimate."

National Security Adviser Jim Jones repeated the same mantra, saying on October 4th CNN

State of the Union, “Hopefully it’ll be certified and it’ll be seen as legitimate. That’s very

important.” In fact, he repeated it twice: ‘certified and legitimate’, ‘legitimate and certified’.

Again, Jones, “The key in Afghanistan… is to have a triad of things happen simultaneously,

namely security, economic development, and good governance and the rule of law.”

‘Certified and legitimate’, because a presidential Executive contract signing is required ‘on or

before February 5, 2010’ to sign away $100 billions of Afghanistan’s resources,283 and the

‘rule of law’, because a permanent US:ISAF surge is required to police those leaseholds.

On October 12th, Commissioner Mawlawi Mohammad Mustafa Barakzai resigned from the

ECC. On October 20th, the IEC finally and formally certified the vote: Karzai had received

49.7 percent of the votes, a claim higher than Galbraith’s panel of experts had found, but still

a razor’s edge below the over 50 percent required to avoid a runoff. What a Solomon’s Seal!

282 - Galbraith, Peter, What I Saw at the Afghan Election, (WADC:The Washington Post), 4 October 2009 283 - http://afghanistanpetroleum.com/documents.php?cat=2

Diminution and Development - pg 197 On October 26th, just a week later, Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources

Jacob Lew held a special news conference on C-SPAN to the discuss ‘The 974’, referring to

the 974 special agents of State/Treasury/Justice who will be flying off to Kabul in the wake

of the failed elections to engage in greater state-building, including 64 from Agriculture /

USAID, but 128 from Justice / Treasury, showing the priorities will be a few ‘stand alone’

projects in irrigation, agriculture and infrastructure, while the lion’s share of the work will be

in shoring up the Karzai Executive ahead of the natural resources contracts signing.

Ambassador Eikenberry has also requested an additional 300 policy and economic advisory

staff, which again lends credence to high-level rumours that Karzai is to be ‘boxed in’ as a

symbolic head of state, while the US takes over the administrative functions of Afghan

government. Karzai’s Executive isn’t the only one being boxed in. (see Appendix 2).

The Failed RunOff Elections

Prior to final IEC publication of the election results, US Senator John Kerry flew to Kabul

and engaged in extended conversations with the front-runner Karzai about accepting the final

vote tally of 49.7%, mandating a runoff election between Karzai and Abdullah. The public

wasn’t privy to those conversations, and neither was I, other than the media reporting they

prompted, ‘eating a lot of lamb kebab, and drinking a lot of green tea.’ Despite the

documented and later admitted election irregularities, Karzai refused to sack his IEC Chief,

who in return, refused to eliminate those “virtual” polling stations which had voted 100% for

Karzai with more voters than registered at those stations. The runoff fraud was on.

“The United States put pressure on Afghan president Hamid Karzai's rival, Abdullah Abdullah, to withdraw from the country's presidential (runoff) race and hand victory to Karzai, sources have told Adnkronos International (AKI).


Sources said the American pressure was part of a deal struck last week with the Pakistani military, which in exchange agreed to establish direct contact with the Taliban and obtain peace with Taliban-led insurgents in Afghanistan.

The deal was said to have been negotiated during US secretary of state Hillary Clinton's visit to Pakistan last week, when she met army chief of staff Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and the head of Pakistan's military intelligence Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha.

As part of the deal, the US ended negotiations with Abdullah which had included offering him the position of chief executive officer of Afghanistan.”284

Subsequently, runner-up Abdullah determined, correctly, that with loss of US backing, given

the same voting conditions and likely the same ballot stuffing, he could not mathematically

win in a runoff, and with great emotion, first asked his supporters to boycott the elections,

then declared he would withdraw from the race.

US SecState Clinton was swift to point out that Abdullah’s pullout, ‘would not affect the

legitimacy of the election’, even though the runoff was cancelled, and incumbent Karzai

‘won’ first by fraud, and then by default. There’s that US emphasis on overt legalism again,

‘certified and legitimate’, even if the election is seen to be fraudulent before the world.

Churchill once said that, “we are moving from failure to failure with boundless enthusiasm”.

While there is a great deal of confusion as to what the vision is for Afghanistan as an end-

game, democracy remains the preferred theme by the majority of the international donors,

and Afghans themselves seems to have a “go with the flow” attitude.

The components of the international policy in Afghanistan are the Military, Diplomatic and

Development agencies. The Military thinks that Diplomats and Development agencies are too

slow and impractical in response. Diplomats think that Military and Development agencies

are politically naïve. Development agencies think that Military and Diplomats are too 284 - Shahzad, Syed Saleem,Afghanistan: Karzai rival 'withdrew under US pressure', (Kabul:Afghan Online Press), 6 November, 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 199 concerned about the exit strategy, and implementation of their own policies. This internecine

conflict between and among donor groups and their Military, Diplomats and Development

agencies results in spending too much time and money debating and prioritizing, while

precious moments are lost, as I detailed in the previous chapters.

Time is ticking by at a different speed in Afghanistan. For the Taliban and militants, time is

of no concern—as they say “you have the clock and we have the time”—while for the

international community and its host, the Afghan government, it is of high concern. For

ordinary Afghans, time is linked with security and is moving very slowly. For the neighbours,

the presence of the American-led coalition in Afghanistan is linked to the perceived negative

and positive consequences. It is worth mentioning that Western combat forces are trained for

short durations and intense activities in accomplishing missions, which is totally opposite to

what is required in Afghanistan.

At the absence of a clear set of goals and shared vision for an end state that may address the

multi-level challenges in Afghanistan, the British find themselves in an influential role in

shaping the American view. The British see Afghanistan in the overall context of the region

with security concerns within India and Pakistan. The Americans are more concerned about

the economic potential of the central Asian states, how China looks to its port at Gwadar and

Iran’s growing role in the regional security.

The most recent update of the post Afghan elections, and prior to the anticipated American

approval of General Mc Chrystal’s surge recommendation, has come to light from a British

Minister who emphasized that the UK troops are in Afghanistan for reasons of their own

national security. According to this Minister: 285

285 - transcribed by author from Sir David Richard, UK CGF, Paddy Ashdown and DFID's Minister press conference, London, 6 November, 2009


1. the international community must maintain pressure on the Afghan government to build a credible body which can bring about good governance;

2. Political settlement must be inclusive that can welcome all to participate in the government including the Taliban;

3. The Afghan government to provide clear commitment to addressing corruption; and

4. The international community to provide support to the Afghan government to tackle corruption.

It is worth mentioning that Dr. Ashraf Ghani, former Afghan Finance Minister, said that, “it

is not the strength of the Taliban rather the weaknesses of the Afghan government” that make

the Taliban appear successful. Also, it is important to underline that the international

community has not fully kept its promises. Again, according to the aforementioned British

Minister, donors should:

1. Keep their word to the Afghan government and provide all the money and assistance they promised years ago which to this day has not yet been delivered.

2. Work through the Afghan government and not around it. Locally, foreign forces are pre-empting the government of Afghanistan by engaging locals and making promises—which often have not been fulfilled in the past—in return for their cooperation. This is by no means counterproductive, because foreign forces have delivered service to the area the Afghan authorities could not. However, it is causing the locals to think foreign forces are running business in Afghanistan and psychologically-debilitating the local Afghan authorities.

3. Allow Afghans to take over ownership of its destiny and the international community should help them achieve that.

In response to a question whether they see the negotiations and reconciliation with the

Taliban as a betrayal of moral values and of that of their fallen comrades, a British soldier

serving in Helmand province simply replied by saying “we can’t fight for ever”. Another

officer responded by saying “ you don’t kill your way out of it. You compromise your way

out of it”. These statements are a sample of the British military psyche which is based on

Diminution and Development - pg 201 learned lessons from Northern Ireland to former Yugoslavia and Africa’s regional conflict.

Importantly, the British military have a unique body of knowledge from their experiences

during their imperial empire era of making and breaking nations and states.

Prime Minister Gordon Brown recently added to these negative comments with his own,

speaking to Karzai, he, “urged progress on the key issues of security, governance,

reconciliation, economic development and regional relations.” Brown also gave a warning on

Karzai's government appointments, saying: "Cronies and warlords should have no place in

the future of a democratic Afghanistan," and proposed greater transparency in government

contracts. Brown added, "Sadly, the government of Afghanistan has become a by-word for

corruption. And I am not prepared to put the lives of British men and women in harm's way

for a government that does not stand up against corruption."286

In relation to Afghanistan, the British prefer compromise as a way out of the current security

chaos and with reference to the region, they resist any pressure on Pakistan. The Americans

prefer to bully their way out of the chaos using State Department proxies, and in relation to

the region, as a Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan amalgam (TAPI).

I hope this book has been exhaustive enough to reveal the depths of complexity of Afghan

life and politics. We’re not just a “Central Asian Sandbox Overrun with Tango”, as some in

the military have characterized us. While the human mind tires easily with details, and looks

for quick connect-the-dots patterns to settle upon, any kind of faith-based approach to Afghan

political interference only leads to disappointment. Leaders are not who they seem to be.

Programs as often as not, are the opposite of what they proclaim. Allegiances shift back and

forth with the blowing sands, always with the bahkshish. Success and stability can only be

achieved through proven ‘internal government of the tribes’ under ‘national cordial unity’.

286 - Karzai may lose West support, Brown warns, (Karachi:GeoTelevisionNetwork) 6 November, 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 202 All parties must be brought into the tent! This isn’t Anglo-American winner-takes-all style.

Instead Afghan legislators will be marginalized as both State, USAID and Defence surge into

the country in advance of the natural resources lease contracts signing. There will be a bleed

in both blood and treasure, with lofty speeches by the US President and EU leaders about the

‘importance of economic development’, but for the average Afghan, ... disenfranchisement.

In the closing chapter I will beg the reader not to look for simple buy-off solutions, for some

brand name catchy slogan, “Oh, let’s try that one!” The problems and issues are very real for

some 32 million indigent Afghans living in a ~$1 a day agrarian existence at the grassroots

level, beneath the towering Hindu Kush, and those whirlwinds that swirl about their lives are

a foreboding tell-tale of evils to come, if the donor nations let themselves get swept away by

vampire capitalists and their mercenary armies. Whether it’s flag-waving or book-burning,

and whether they wear US:ISAF camouflage or Taliban burkhas, it’s not reconstruction.

Afghanistan cannot wait and it cannot endure, another day, another month, another year of

these Anglo-American morality plays: the Cowboys & Indians, the British Raj, the Christian

Crusades. US:ISAF must ‘engage the dialogue’ immediately, and not continue to employ the

bogeyman of ‘Al-Qa’idah’ and perpetual ‘Surge’ mentality to hide the overt expropriation of

Afghan natural resources. Being the infidels’ little IDPs is not a condition Afghans will abide.

There are 100-years of energy for all Afghans in our national reserves of oil and gas, and

there are enough mineral lease royalties, if invested wisely by an honest government in

Kabul, to build requisite fuel refineries and distribution systems, to give Afghanistan self-

sufficiency. There is also the ‘Cuban medical miracle’, the most effective and cost efficient in

the world, which, if transplanted to Afghanistan, and again, if our mineral lease royalties are

invested wisely in hospitals, clinics and medical staff, to provide all Afghans with good

Diminution and Development - pg 203 medical care. The Afghan people themselves will take care of the rest, by rebuilding our

Garden of Paradise with our own hearts and hands.

Or, we can have the Western model of government, referred to as a ‘Banana Republic’.

“Remember, the United States is not a democracy - and has never been intended to be a democracy. It is what is called in the political science literature a polyarchy. A polyarchy is one in which a small sector of the population is in control of essential decision-making for the economy, the political system, the cultural system and so on. And the rest of the population is supposed to be passive and acquiescent.

The U.S. system was designed so that power was to be placed in the hands of what Madison called "the wealth of the nation" - people ... sympathetic to property and its rights and (who) will not allow infringement on them. The rest of society is supposed to be fragmented and broken up so that they do not do too much.

Well, that is the form of the system. A lot of things have changed in the last couple of hundred years. Franchise has extended, unions and popular groups have formed and many things have changed. But the main structure of the system remains about the same. Going to the question, the decision-making class has to be indoctrinated into the right forms of belief. They have to understand the permanent interests of the country, the rights and needs of the opulent and powerful.

The rest of the people - 80 per cent, it is just a rough number and not to be taken seriously - have to be distracted so that they do not interfere.”287

That, of course, is the real significance of ‘American Idol’, ‘YouTube’ and ‘Twitter’!

To borrow from Plato’s Allegory of the Cave :

“Plato imagines a group of people who have lived chained in a cave all of their lives, facing a blank wall. The people watch shadows projected on the wall (TV) by things passing in front of the cave entrance, and begin to ascribe forms to these shadows. The shadows are as close as the prisoners get to seeing reality. (He) then explains how the philosopher is like a prisoner freed from the cave and comes to understand that the shadows on the wall are not constitutive of reality at all, as he can perceive the true form of reality rather than the mere shadows seen by the prisoners.” 288

287 - http://www.chomsky.info/interviews/200111--.htm 288 - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allegory_of_the_cave

Diminution and Development - pg 204 For Afghans, at least the great majority who don’t live in caves, the impact of the national

government has been a curse on their everyday lives for 30 years now. They know its evils.

And their response to the US:UK insistence on a ‘legitimate’ national Executive, who will

immediately sign away all of Afghanistan’s natural wealth 289 is going to be more of this:

“The dead included 35 employees at the Ministry of Justice and at least 25 staff members of the Baghdad Provincial Council, said police and medical officials speaking on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak to the media. At least 721 people were wounded, including American contractors.”290

In the final chapter of the book, I hope to explain in detail Joe Bageant’s vision in American

Hologram, on how to perceive Plato’s shadows answer:

“Do what Gandhi advised, let the poor be the teachers. Go among them with nothing, one set of clothing and no money, keep your mouth shut, and do your best not to affect anything. Then just let the world happen to you, like they do in the so-called "passive societies," instead of trying to happen to it in typical Western fashion. Not trying to "improve" things. Maybe practice milpa agriculture with Mayans on the Guatemalan border, watching corn grow for three months. Fish in a lonely dugout, sun-up to sun-down, in the dying reefs of the Caribbean, with only a meal or two of fish as your reward. Do such things for a month or two.” 291

Do that, then you are ready to effect the rightful reconstruction of Afghanistan, not just talk

about reconstruction, the need for reconstruction, of reconstruction only after the countryside

is ‘pacified’, or reconstruction only after our natural resources have all been stripped away.

Where is the Afghanistan that your industrialized world has destroyed? Where is the paradise

that our first Amir once wrote of: ‘Whatever countries I conquer in the world, I would never

forget your beautiful gardens. When I remember the summits of your beautiful mountains, I

forget the greatness of the Delhi throne.’

289 - http://afghanistanpetroleum.com ibid 290 - Santana, Rebecca, Baghdad Car Bombs Kill Over 130, (US:Huffington Post) 25 October 2009 291 - Bageant, Joe. Escape from the Zombie Food Court. Speech at Adler School of Professional Psychology

Diminution and Development - pg 205 Chapter 7 – Consequences And The Call For Action

"I see in the near future a crisis approaching that unnerves me and causes me to tremble for the safety of my country. As a result of the war, corporations have been enthroned, and an era of corruption in high places will follow, and the money power of the country will endeavor to prolong its reign by working upon the prejudices of the people until all wealth is aggregated in a few hands and the Republic is destroyed."292

As I went to some lengths to describe in Chapter 4 my interpretation of the Anglo-American

Vision for Afghanistan and Pakistan as a Global Projection of Power, I would like to briefly

reiterate that theme, as it forms a central backbone to my premise of presumed good Afghan

governance. As is this historical interpretation from the London School of Economics:

The Third Way

(10) [Pres.]Clinton’s conviction that history was on his side was what used to be called “Whig,” where every past event led necessarily to the present, and the enlightened historian would show us the only way into the future. It demanded close collaboration with the social sciences, since they aimed to uncover the driving forces of change. The public history writers of today are still historicists in Karl Popper’s sense (Popper 1957; Albrow 1996: 97- 100). They quarry the social sciences for data, trends and theories and then craft a story that appears to compel certain policy choices. Commanding the direction of history has enormous persuasive appeal. Recognizing that he had allowed himself to be sidetracked at the beginning of his first presidential term, Clinton returned for his second term eager for an underlying big idea. He found a congenial ally in the new British Prime Minister, Tony Blair. In a key meeting at Blair’s country residence on November 2, 1997, the two leaders and their teams converged on a centre-left programme, the Third Way, where globalization became the linking storyline for new policies in a new world (Blumenthal 2003: 308). (11) As it happens the crafting of the American version of globalization owed quite a lot to British influence, and arose in the context of some years of extensive exchanges between the American New Democrats and British New Labour. In terms of policy ideas, such as moving people from welfare dependency to work, tax credits, or urban renewal the flow was very much from the US to the UK because the Americans had a four year lead in practice. The British contribution was to the theory of the Third Way and

292 - President Abraham Lincoln, personal letter to Colonel William F. Elkins, 21 November, 1864


its grounding in globalization. The team Blair assembled for his discussions with Clinton included Anthony Giddens, Director of the London School of Economics. His Beyond Left and Right (1994) built on his earlier work on globalization (Giddens 1990; Albrow 1996: 98-9) and helped to persuade Americans that European radical theory could acknowledge the triumph of capitalism and help justify the centrist turn in their own politics that Clinton had initiated. It became another prop to the second term theme of bridge building across the Atlantic. Giddens adopted the American usage of The Third Way (1998) to help create a shared progressive leftist outlook and “to transcend both old style social democracy and neo-liberalism”, not just in the English speaking countries but also more widely into the early years of the new Millennium. (12) In January 1998, the White House assembled a “thinkers’ dinner,” one of a series the President (Clinton) hosted, this time with a focus on globalization. He opened it by declaring “I have to be able to tell the story of America in a progressive way” (Blumenthal 2003: 315; Kettle 1998:2-3). The brainstorming that followed underpinned his announcement “we have found the third way” in his State of the Union speech later that month and “we have moved into an information age, a global economy, a truly new world” The speech managed to combine a globalization storyline with a litany of domestic achievements and a commitment to strengthening the social security system for the twenty first century (Waldman 2000: 216). It “reinvented” government (Osborne and Gaebler 1993), but it also projected a proactive global role, an extension of American power. Famously for Clinton there was no longer any division between foreign and domestic policies. This was the country that had won the Cold War and was built on the [Fukuyama] idea of creating the future. If globalization was the way, America had to lead the rest of the world along the path. (13) Both the Clinton and Blair versions of globalization perpetuated the Reagan/Thatcher free market verities but sought to soften the harsher nostrums like “there is no alternative” and “there is no such thing as society” with a concern for social justice. But the results of a Third Way approach to globalization depend on the global economic and strategic position of the country concerned. For Britain, throughout the Blair premiership, globalization justified programmes of domestic reform but also, at a more subliminal level, replaced nostalgia for lost empire with a sense of national mission on global issues. “Global Britain” therefore became an effective repositioning of a medium sized country to take advantage of global trends. For the United States, globalization was a question of reasserting control over its own and the globe’s future. (14) For a brief period leading up to and around the United Nations Millennium Summit in September 2000, there was a remarkable willingness on the part of heads of Western governments to subscribe to this overall perspective. After a meeting in Berlin on June 14, four heads of government reported: “We all embrace the potential of globalization. In fact our shared political conversation symbolized political globalization.” They looked to address the consequences of economic globalization, widen the benefits, strengthen civil society and create “a new international social compact.” They also


anticipated strengthening European institutions as the European Union moved toward welcoming ten new members. It was a passing dream that a progressive alliance of world leaders had discovered the direction of history and could lead their peoples along its path. But those who attempt to direct history are among its first victims. While globalization processes are everywhere, the fate of the global age will not be determined by globalization or even by those who claim to be on its side.”293

That Third Way itself relies on an exceptionalist vision derived from the British Empire:

“Afghanistan remains beholden to the vision of it first laid down by the British Raj in 1808–1809. As the power of the British colonial state became more firmly established in South Asia and it began to more aggressively assert itself outside its frontiers, it began to shape the world beyond those frontiers. Having imagined the Afghans in a certain way, the official mind worked hard to process whatever new information and experiences it had of the Afghans within that conceptual framework. That framework arguably did more to constitute Afghanistan for both the British and later the Afghans themselves than the earlier political activities of Ahmad Shah Abdali. The (British [East] India) Company’s information order and the colonial knowledge it produced were constitutive of the later Afghan state, a fact which in part accounts for its apparent instability. Yet the power of the colonial notion lay not in its conceptualization of Afghanistan, but in the manner it consequently shaped colonial action.”294

It’s ironic that as the Western occupation forces impose their expectations for adherence to

political, economic, military and church dogma on an Afghanistan largely created, then as

now, from the Western-made image, the Western corporatists have been forced to re-learn

traditional Afghan priorities, in their own struggles against this debilitating global economic

depression. It’s doubly ironic that this re-learning is occurring at a similar stage to another

former Super Power that had also pre-emptively sought to engage in empire building:

“The idea that the USA will go the way of the USSR seemed preposterous at the time. It doesn't seem so preposterous any more. The theory states that the United States and the Soviet Union will have collapsed for the same reasons, namely: a severe and chronic shortfall in the production of crude oil …, a severe and worsening foreign trade deficit, a runaway military budget, and ballooning foreign debt. I call this particular list of ingredients "The Superpower Collapse Soup." Other

293 - Albrow, Martin, A New Decade of the Global Age, 1996-2006, Globality Studies Journal, (NY:SUNY) No.8, 17 July, 2007 294 - Hopkins, Ben. 2008. ibid.


factors, such as the inability to provide an acceptable quality of life for its citizens, or a systemically corrupt political system incapable of reform, are certainly not helpful, but they do not … lead to collapse, because they do not put the country on a collision course with reality.” 295

Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev himself was the first to point out the almost eerie

similarities between the US experience in Afghanistan, and that of the former USSR, twenty

years ago. Both wars of occupation began under belligerent self-aggrandizing leadership:

Brezhnev’s Doctrine almost exactly mirrored the PNAC’s agenda, which became the pre-

emptively belligerent Bush43 Doctrine. Both leaders came to Afghanistan ‘looking right

through it’: Brezhnev as a buffer against the Free World, Bush as a pipeline route through it.

Both leaders pledged huge reserves of blood and treasure, and mired their countries in an

unwinnable war, each at the height of their own particular economic crisis. Then like Obama,

Gorbachev came to power pledging liberal progressive reforms of glasnost and perestroika,

but both failed to maintain that transparency and enact the changes that they had promised, as

the war sank deeper and deeper into dogma and cost-growth, and the Reactionary Right Wing

shelled their Executive with taut invectives (and with tank shells in the USSR!).

Both leaders sacked their Afghan puppet: Gorbechev making Karmal grovel and plead before

installing Dr. Najibullah, and Obama, the word is, essentially sacking Karzai, ‘boxing him in’

with new State/Treasury/Justice ‘Magnificent 974’ civilian advisers surging into Afghanistan.

Frankly, both men placed their full faith and their country’s full credit in international capital,

with the bank-brokers’ pledges of good intent that soon proved rapaciously false. The Soviet

Union collapsed three years later.

“Alan Greenspan chided us about "irrational exuberance" while consistently low-balling interest rates. It was the "Goldilocks economy" not too hot, not too cold. Remember that? And now it turns out that it was actually more of a "Tinker-bell" economy, because the last five or so years of economic growth was more or less a

295 - Orlov, Dmitry, Social Collapse Best Practices, http://informationclearinghouse.info/article22183.htm


hallucination, based on various debt pyramids, the "whole house of cards" as President Bush once referred to it.

But this game will soon be over, and they don't have any idea what to do next. So, what is there for them to do? Forget "growth," forget "jobs," forget "financial stability." What should their realistic new objectives be? Well, here they are: food, shelter, transportation, and security.” 296

Food, shelter, transportation and security. The four basics. Not as easy to achieve as you’d

think. Action Aid, UK, researched the development path Afghans are being told to pursue:

“The comparison between the richer and the poorer developing countries … shows how financial markets have failed developing countries on two fronts. Countries like South Africa have bought into the rhetoric of financial liberalisation and the promises of untapped wealth that could be mobilised for development. These countries opened up their markets and now face the consequences – a possible serious reversal in development. This … indicates that there was no great pay-off in development terms for the risks countries took in opening up – South Africa’s development performance was no better than that of countries that took a more cautious approach – and that openness, which brought dubious rewards, now puts any development gains at risk.

But other countries never had this choice – a financial system organised purely around short term returns simply didn’t register the existence of the poorest countries. At the moment, this might seem like a lucky escape. But in the long run, countries with little domestic capital will need to get money for development from somewhere. Evidence suggests that domestic capital is the most stable and has the biggest pay-off in development terms. All countries, even the poorest, would be well-advised to look to how they can mobilise more domestic resources through, for example, increasing tax revenues from foreign investors and encouraging citizens to keep their money in local banks. But the very poorest countries face absolute limits on how much domestic capital they can mobilise for development. For them, as for all countries, the question should be how they can engage with international markets to get the development benefits of more capital, without the risks of that capital being of the footloose, extractive and non-productive variety that much foreign investment and financial flows have proved to be.

It is this question that should be at the heart of the attempt to create a better international financial system out of the wreckage of this crisis.”297

Implications for Afghan Policy

296 - Dmitry, Orlov, ibid 297 - Where does it hurt? The impact of the financial crisis on developing countries. ActionAid Hamlyn House, UK

Diminution and Development - pg 210 “The development of the vulnerability index over time, and the link to what we know about

policy changes, tells a few harsh truths about how global and national economies have been

managed over the last 20 years, as this crisis has been slowly building. At the moment,

financial globalisation for developing countries is all risk and little benefit. The countries that

have done best have primarily used their own resources for development, supplemented with

foreign capital as needed, while those whose strategy or circumstances relied on opening up

to international markets as a quid pro quo for development loans did not see enough benefit

to compensate for the huge debt costs they are now experiencing. Others have been left on

the sidelines. This has some important lessons for development:

• The importance of domestically generated development. It’s clear that both from a poverty and a vulnerability perspective, it’s better to have a solid domestic base from which to build financial institutions. This means that the ongoing commitment of many rich countries to continued financial liberalisation in poor countries under the guise of ‘free trade’ agreements needs to be challenged. • The importance of diversified financial flows. Shocks can and will happen, however the economy is designed. It’s important that financial flows are as diversified, and as predictable, as possible. A mix of domestically generated and foreign flows is crucial. To raise domestic flows, governments need to increase their tax revenues. • The importance of controlling risk in the global economy. Anyone interested in development should be interested in controlling risk. This means a global economy that is managed to reduce the risks of sudden shocks – to private flows, government flows, and short and long term flows. The regulatory net needs to be spread very wide if the range of shocks that can derail development is to be contained, and both source and recipient countries need to have access to the full array of capital controls needed to control these risks. • The importance of transparency. Those countries that opened themselves up to international financial markets in the 1990s did not have full information about how those markets worked or what the risks were of exposure to them. Like developed countries, they were at the mercy of the ever-more complex financial instruments devised by banks to conceal the functioning of the markets and ensure that they had the upper hand in every transaction.


• The importance of regulating financial markets so that it becomes thinkable to provide funds in the poorest countries. At the same time as managing risk, financial markets need to be organized to encourage more long-term investments and investment in countries that lack their own domestic capital but at the moment are ignored by international capital altogether. • The importance of involving even the poorest countries in decisions about global financial markets. The data shows that all countries are affected by the financial crisis, so all countries have a stake in improving the system. It’s essential all countries have a say in how the system is reformed, not just G20. Tinkering around the edges won’t help. The extent of global integration, and the way that this crisis has reached deep into the economies of many poor countries, means that anyone interested in reducing poverty needs to be calling for a broad agenda at the G20, where the many and varied sources of risk and vulnerability in the global economy can be addressed. Top of the agenda should be: Changing how financial markets operate so that they: • Control risk, so that countries with little option but to build their financial markets from external sources can do so with confidence. • Improve transparency: on the government side by reforming tax havens to ensure that information is automatically exchanged between them, and on the company side by requiring that companies report their profits and financial transactions on a country-by-country basis. • Encourage the development of regionally based financial markets in developing countries, to maximise the possibilities of local resource mobilisation and to increase their global weight with other financial institutions. Supporting development by: • Helping in the development of domestic financing. Reducing capital flight, through greater transparency in company accounting and in a reduction in banking secrecy would be an important start. • Providing assistance to countries affected by the crisis, to ensure that poor people do not suffer the consequences of badly managed markets. In particular, those countries suffering from either the crisis or the recession, but who cannot afford their own stimulus packages, will need extra assistance to cope with the short term impact of the crisis and to restart their economies on a more stable footing in the medium term.

• Ensuring that additional financing is provided in a way that supports longer term, more resilient development, by ensuring that foreign assistance is geared toward


developing domestic capacity and resource mobilisation rather than assuming that foreign flows must hold the key to development.” 298

What is the ‘way-forward’?

Figure 34 - http://cursor.org/stories/emptyspace4.html

“The principal question guiding today’s hearing is whether the accountability community is

prepared to ramp up its own efforts to mirror the massive increase in resources that the U.S.

will devote to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the coming years. (2009)”299

As I have discussed, Afghanistan has become a global ‘hotspot’, a maelstrom of conflicting

political, economic, militant and ecclesiastical cultures devolved over the last 30 years. At the

moment, Afghanistan enjoys, and suffers from, foreign occupation by US:ISAF military

forces pushing their global political and economic dictates upon an agrarian population

anchored in the principles of local self-governance, Muslim brotherhood and ‘Pashtunwali’

ethos. The occupiers provide security against jihadists, but engender and draw out even

298 - Where does it hurt? ibid 299 - House Oversight Committee on Fraud, Waste & Abuse Chairman Tierney Introduction 9 September, 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 213 greater jihad by their actions. The occupiers provide sources for funding, but only along a

top-down metric imposed upon the populace without discussion, and with stunning failures,

incompetence, overruns and cataclysmic corruption.

John Pike, of Global Security.org, is troubled by the emphasis on human rights and gender

equality: ‘Tell me `We are going to darken the skies with drones to take out terror leaders,' I

can live with that. Tell me we are still going to force Western-style gender equality on the

most backward place on the planet and I despair.’300

Former British Ambassador Craig Murray is more concerned about blowback from UAV

strikes, observing, “It should be self-evident that these brutal [UAV] attacks will stoke

resentment of the US in Pakistan. They are helping to create the fundamentalism which [US

Secretary of State] Hillary Clinton claims horrifies her. Which leads me to wonder, as I have

wondered so often in the ‘War on Terror’, whether apparently brutish action by the United

States is in fact intended to provoke a (jihadi) reaction.”

Ali Ahmad Jalali is a Distinguished Professor at the Near East/South Asia Strategic Center

for Strategic Studies in the National Defense University in Washington D.C. He served as the

Interior Minister of Afghanistan from January 2003 to October 2005, and briefly considered a

presidential run in the August 2009 elections:

“The Afghanistan conflict must eventually end through reconciliation and conflict-resolution processes, rather than military victory. The insurgency is not a monolithic entity, but a diverse and diffuse assortment of groups fighting for different reasons. These range from local grievances and personal enrichment, to a desire for national power and the advancement of the global jihadist cause.

The majority of insurgents fall into the former camp, and may be dissuaded from fighting if their interests and grievances are addressed. However, the core leadership

300 - Potter, Mitch. 2009. ibid


of the Taliban and their followers and affiliates share a revolutionary commitment to overthrowing the Afghan government.

There can be no accommodation reached with the Taliban, whose commitment is to overthrow the Afghan government.

There can be no accommodation reached with these people, whose vision for Afghanistan is irreconcilable with the Afghan people’s desire for peace and security, and the international community’s desire for regional stability.

Despite the stated commitment of the Afghan government and its international partners to national reconciliation with the Taliban and other insurgents, the process has been void of strategic vision, clarity of parameters and unity of effort. Rhetoric has been more prominent than substance.

The failure of the Bonn Accords to produce a viable peace plan was further exacerbated by the absence of a cohesive long-term post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation strategy in Afghanistan. A narrow focus on fighting terrorism created numerous limitations for political approaches to reach out to reconcilable elements that later managed to regroup and launch the insurgency. “301

We’ll Know It When We See It

Figure 35 - USAID PSC RFP to Outsource Opium Eradication to a Contract Adviser to GoA

Special Ambassador to Afghanistan - Pakistan Richard Holbrooke soft-pedalled a question at

a press conference held at the right-wing Center for American Progress on 12 August, 2009,

301 - Rubin, Elizabeth, Is It Time to Negotiate With the Taliban? (NY:NYTimes), 1 September, 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 215 regarding future reconstruction in Afghanistan. “We’ll know it when we see it”, he laughed,

borrowing the famous US Supreme Court litmus test for measuring racial achievements.

Holbrooke and his dozen senior advisors, only one of whom is a native Afghan, went on to

boast that the US is now “out of the poppy eradication business” and is “moving forward on

alternative development programs for Afghan farmers,”302 in echoing the promises and goals

stated by President Karzai at The Afghanistan Support Conference, Paris, France, June 2008,

in which he stated:

“Afghanistan’s security is also deeply tied to narcotics. This menace undercuts efforts to build a legitimate economy and it also is also a major contributor to corruption and an impediment to peace and stability. Lately, we have had success with respect to poppy eradication: about two thirds of Afghanistan’s provinces are either totally poppy-free or becoming so during the course of the current year. We must capitalize on our gains and prevent these provinces from falling back. We also must not forget that to our destitute farmers, opium is about survival. The key to counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan, therefore, must be meaningful and sustainable alternative livelihoods for our rural population. May I add that while opium is produced by Afghan farmers, its trafficking is a regional and international criminal phenomenon. The international beneficiaries of the narcotics trade, unfortunately, have not received as much attention as is needed to disrupt demand.”303

Yet almost the same day, USAID advertised with an Alternative Development Program

Personal Service Contract (PSC) for a US-funded specialist to train the Afghan Government

in the total eradication of poppy cultivation by 2013! Well, sure, that would outsource the

problem wouldn’t it! Then what will Afghan farmers live on? Golden Rice™ ?!

And where are those grand alternative development projects? Also in USAID that week, an

advertisement for a Water Program Manager! To bring what? “Restoring tens of thousands of

water wells… and digging fifty thousand latrines”! You can’t find the program link now,

302 - http://www.americanprogress.org/events/2009/08/holbrooke.html and http://images2.americanprogress.org/CAP/2009/08/081209.mp4 303 - http://www.afghanemb-canada.net/en/speeches/2008/june/president_speech_paris_conference.php

Diminution and Development - pg 216 USAID uses graphic scans for all announcements instead using of text-based PDFs, so that

the information can’t be Google’d or archived on the internet. I’ve transcribed it below:

USAID|AFGHANISTAN SOLICITATION 306-09-117/OIEE, Head, Water Group

“US Government’s (USG) water program is designed to address the challenges in the water supply and sanitation sector to which USAID funding is earmarked (Water for the Poor Congressional earmark). The USG’s water program aims to support the water and sanitation sector reforms of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), which seek to commercialize the urban water sector, increase cost recovery and improve management. The USG is supporting through an $8.5 million 3-year project (2008-2011) the commercialization of Afghan water utilities by assisting four Strategic Business Units (SBUs) improve water services and advance towards full recovery of Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs. The USG is helping develop sub-sector strategies and policy documents that will unify planning activities of the seven Afghan ministries currently working in the sector. The Mission is also putting into place a $50 million 3-year, demand-driven mechanism to support Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to establish potable water systems in order to address priority needs of rural communities, primarily in the southern and eastern parts of the country.”304

So their grand Alternative Development Program for Afghan Water Infrastructure is set at

$50 million over 3 years for the Afghan population! This is less than individual US State

Parks budgets! For 30,000,000 Afghans on 250,000 square miles of wilderness, it amounts to

only 48¢ per Afghan per year, to dig shallow brackish water wells and pit toilets, … but $8.5

million over 3 years for four lucky (so far unnamed) commercial Strategic Business Units! Is

USAID even allowed to fund private commercial units?! Again, not one word in the media!

In reality, that $50 million in water development aid will never make it out-the-door of the

Afghan Ministry of Water and Power, while $100 billion’s in Afghan natural resources held

by the Afghan Ministry of Mines is now being privately auctioned off to US:UK extraction

304 - http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/proxy/Document.313.aspx

Diminution and Development - pg 217 multinationals by a US-based manager Gustavson Associates, and still not one word from

Special Ambassador Holbrooke, President Karzai, President Obama, Prime Minister Brown,

or President Zarkari about these world-class natural resources extraction projects.

“This is the world of Hamid Karzai and his 'necktie' associates. No connection exists between this economy and that of the hundreds of thousands in the informal, urban economy or of the millions in Afghanistan's rural lands. A bifurcated economic system exists, as it has since the onset of western modernization in the 1950s. But, to assert that such a bifurcated economic system exists, does not mean - contra Rubin - that the subsistence sector is non-monetized. It is, as revealed in the very large role played by agricultural indirect taxation.

The small urban upper and middle class lives today in a world disconnected from the tribal-peasant sea, just as its predecessors under Zahir Shah and the Soviet-leaning regime did. In matters of daily life - work, entertainment, consumption, dress, education, pace of life, desires - it "sees" only its cohorts who, in turn, provide it with meaning, money, services, goods and friends.”305

The Afghan Government Needs Better Consigliere

As stated in Chapter 4, the discussion of Profit Sharing Agreements (PSAs) and resource

royalties is far, far beyond the scope of this paper, although the recent explosive increase in

the prices of commodities has caused the US, Canada and EU to aggressively study their own

royalties issues, publish in-depth analyses and fee comparisons, and in several cases, adjust

their royalty rates upwards, as Alberta did in October, 2007, to 40% of net profits plus

0.23077% per dollar increase in oil price over CN$120, or 9% of gross profits plus 0.12308%

per dollar increase in oil price over CN$90. Of course, there are none of these considerations

in the Afghan Hydrocarbon Law, and Afghan resource royalties appear to be lowest on earth.

There is enough information already available to determine where Afghanistan sits in relation

to the world, and how these foreign-written hydrocarbon and minerals laws will play out. The

November, 2007, lease of the Aynak copper reserves to China MCC went for a reported

305 - Herold, Marc, 'Livin' Large Inside Karzai's Reconstruction Bubble', (US:Cursor.org) 24 September, 2003. http://cursor.org/stories/afghaniscam.html

Diminution and Development - pg 218 bonus bid of $3.89 billion, and a yearly annual rent payment of $400 million. There has been

no discussion of royalties, but what might those royalties be, based on international averages?

“A small number of independent experts, perhaps no more than a dozen individuals and companies, support royalty review work around the world. Over the years, common objectives and practices for royalty review have evolved. Our audit findings suggest that the following are common royalty review elements. We define royalty review as five interrelated processes:”

1. continuous monitoring; 2. technical review; 3. policy development; 4. consultation, and; 5. amending the royalty regime.” 306

Again, there are no provisions for these processes in the Hydrocarbon Law or Mineral Law.

Indeed, any royalties, taxes and fees considerations in government ‘take’ are in unpublished

foreign-language ‘Regulations’, which have not been publicly discussed or even referred to

by the Karzai Executive, even as these natural resources are being actively auctioned off.307

In addition, natural resource-extraction contracts generally provide for Impact and Benefit

Agreements (IBAs), as for example, in Pakistan, where mining concessions are required to

pay into a Worker’s Welfare Fund. In Alberta, Canada, the Mineral Resources Directorate of

the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development requires IBA funding to offset

environmental and indigenous harvest resource damages from mining operations, with IBAs

commonly negotiated on a bilateral basis between mining companies and indigent NGOs.

However, again, there is no provision for these IBA remediation processes in the Afghan

Hydrocarbon Law or Mineral Law, and in World Bank’s writing of these resource extraction

regulations, there are no environmental monitoring, mitigation, remediation or compensation

306 - Annual Report, ibid

307 - http://afghanistanpetroleum.com

Diminution and Development - pg 219 clauses whatsoever in the published Hydrocarbon Law at Ministry of Mine! [although they

do appear in the Ministry of Mine Minerals Law].

“The Minister of Mines said: “Afghanistan has a significant amount of oil and gas, and their exploitation requires knowledge, experience and modern equipment. If the government was to implement this activity, it would have to wait at least 30 years to obtain the required facilities and financial capacity to undertake this activity. Today, consistent with the requirements of the Hydrocarbon Law and the experience of other countries, these activities are devolving to the private sector.”

Mr. Adel said: “During a 26 day trip to different countries and with the unceasing help of foreign experts, many companies expressed their interests in investment in Afghanistan. The end result of this trip is that 11 companies working in the field of oil and gas and 14 other mineral exploration companies have sent us formal applications of interest, which will be opened in front of you.”308

Even if IBAs are entertained and negotiated, any narrowing of the class of beneficiaries is

bound to create violent divisions. Part of this is due to traditional land-ownership being

confined to irrigated lands, while non-irrigated land has been traditionally thought of as no-

man’s land, available to settle or trespass, although undoubtedly the National government in

Kabul will seek to exact its claim on all occupied lands which contain extractable deposits of

resources, and summarily evict any untitled tenants or landholders in mining areas, oil fields,

pipeline, rail and road corridors, and general strategic security highpoints, while being forced

by law and cultural precedent to negotiate with irrigated land tenants, land holders, traditional

clans and warlords who may also be affected, Bush’s famous, “Have’s and Have-more’s”.

There are no provisions for these IBA class determinations, for non-class indigent ‘squatter’

evictions and for relocation compensation to the displaced tenants or landholders in the

Afghan Hydrocarbon Law or Mineral Law. There is no enhanced framework for early

consultation with indigent clans, nor any comprehensive approach to funding their

participation in IBA negotiations. There are no provisions for giving teeth to the laws and

308 - http://mom.gov.af/index.php?page_id=83

Diminution and Development - pg 220 regulations, yet the natural resource leases are being auctioned and PSA contracts being

signed off, right now, while humanitarian and environmental issues have been kicked down

the road. A report prepared by Integrity Watch, Afghanistan, is an absolutely stunning

indictment of these lapses and egregious lack of administrative planning and oversight, in

pointing out a Chinese mining project in Pakistan brought no discernable local value.309

Beyond relocation compensation are the legacy issues, ‘indigent people may be worse off

following the closing of a mine than they were before it opened if the legacy of the project

and its IBA includes disappointed expectations, skills that are no longer readily marketable,

and disruptions in traditional social structures and ways of life.’ 310

There are no societal impacts or benefits issues addressed in the Afghan Hydrocarbon Law or

Mineral Law, but these were written by the West! How can that be? World Bank and IMF are

constituted with charteres requiring them to respect the domestic social and political policies

of members estates, including environmental and human rights issues. One of the Bank’s

major steps in addressing criticism of its policies in the 1990’s was to include environmental

concerns in its Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) by incorporating Environmental Action

Plans (EAPs) into these documents.

Both World Bank and IMF have always publicly emphasized that while they made strong

suggestions and provided technical assistance with regard to the design of impact adjustment

programs, the onus is on the borrower country to design and implement its own adjustment

program.311 Afghanistan has only the Minister of Mines, Engineer Ibrahim, and he was

309 - Huntzinger, Emmaneul, Aynak Copper Mine, Opportunities and Threats for Development from a Sustainable Business Perspective, A Report by Integrity Watch Afghanistan, January 2008 310 - Kennett, Steven, Canadian Institute of Resources Law Issues and Options for a Policy on Impact and Benefits Agreements 27 May 1999 http://www.impactandbenefit.com/DIAND.IBA.CIRL.May399.pdf 311 - Wendt, Nicole et al The World Bank & IMF Respond to Criticisms, in The E-Book on International Finance and Development Part 2-III, The University of Iowa Center for International Finance and Development. http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/ebook2/contents/part2-III.shtml

Diminution and Development - pg 221 (presumably) responsible for outsourcing the auction process for mining and hydrocarbon

leases to US resources management firm Gustavson Associates, Denver, ‘Oil and Mining

Geology Experts & Appraisers in Exploration, Development and Valuation’, which is right

now privately short-listing and negotiated-auctioning off ofAfghanistan’s natural resources,

with no public transparency and with no social policy content consideration whatsoever!

In fact, what the World Bank has set out to accomplish is the wholesale expropriation of all

of Afghanistan’s natural and human resources, for the absolute minimum in royalties to keep

the Kabul government in operations, and keep the Afghan National Army:Afghan National

Police militias in khaki camouflage and carbines to suppress the inevitable surge of internally

displaced refugees (IDR), as more and more Afghans are forced to flee to neighbouring

countries, or emigrate to industrialized nations to look for work, as world food and energy

prices soar with growing global populations and a booming Asian economy, an untenable

situation which ISAF member Australia, at least, is only too well already aware of.

The proof that World Bank and IMF development fosters social disintegration and

expatriation in recipient countries is found in their own statistics:

“The topic of remittances has become a popular one in the international financial community in recent years as both the rate and volume of remittances have increased exponentially. Gathering accurate data on international remittances has been very difficult for a number of reasons, including the fact that a good portion of the transfers is made on an informal basis. Some official statistics do exist, however, and they present startling numbers. In 1995, remittances to developing countries totaled about $57.8 billion and shot up to $96.5 billion by 2001. The World Bank estimated that in 2005 migrants sent home approximately $167 billion, up 73% from 2001 (the true amount could be 50% higher or more). In 2006, the World Bank reported that remittances grew to approximately $206 billion; others put the figure at $298 billion. These flows have led analysts to conclude that the growth of


remittances has exceeded private capital flows and official development assistance to developing countries.”312

In terms of audit actuals, World Bank and IMF loans and grants are destroying third world

countries, in order to ‘save’ them. Now as a result of the global economic down turn affecting

the industrialized nations, we will inevitably see client states shrink not only in GDP, not

only in loss of remittances income, but struggle also against higher import costs, and loss of

its reserves investments held in Western banks, the four horsemen their apocalypse.

As the joke goes, “...once the immediate economic crisis is over...long-term re-development

will be subcontracted to the technocrats, who will trot out the same tired nostrums: Trade

liberalization, financial liberalization and large doses of deflation to provide macroeconomic

stability, [that served in their destruction of both the Soviet and Argentinean economies]." 313

Not one word of this is to be found in the Western media. Not one word of this has been

addressed by President Karzai, who publicly dotes on: ‘peace, good relations with the US and

Saudi, schools, roads, agriculture and water’ in his recent campaign trip to Logar Province,

ironically home to the China MCC copper leasehold at Aynak. Here again, Not one word!

In almost childish affront to observers, the Afghan Ministry of Mines claims it will abide by

the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), in issuing these mining and drilling

leases, but Ministry of Mine already has failed to do so with the $300 billion copper reserve

lease awarded to China MCC, back in 2007! Afghanistan hasn’t yet registered with EITI,

which lists only Azerbaijan as compliant, and EITI doesn’t even list Afghanistan as a

candidate country!314

312 - Carrasco, Enrique and Ro, Jane. Remittanced and Development, in The E-Book on International Finance and Development Part 4-II, The University of Iowa Center for International Finance and Development. http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/ebook2/contents/part4-II.shtml 313 - Elliot, Larry, "A Choice Only Afghanistan Can Make," (London:The Observer), 15 October, 2001 314 - http://eitransparency.org/countries

Diminution and Development - pg 223 Well then, what about the EU and its neighbouring countries and all of their economic

priorities and integration problems? Is there any hope for Afghans there? Apparently not, for

on 12 April, 2009, the US signed a new military agreement with Islam Karimov, the Butcher

of Tashkent’ for new supply lines of US forces in Afghanistan through Uzbekistan - thus

conclusively killing any hope that the Obama/Clinton administration would prioritise human

rights in their foreign policy. The increase of US forces in Afghanistan is in progress. The

ultimate goal remains the revival of the UNOCAL plan for an Afghanistan pipeline through

Pakistan [Baluchistan] to enable Central Asia's massive hydrocarbon resources to reach the

Indian Ocean and Delhi. But the offseting result of US actions throughout Central Asia and of

their support of deeply corrupt regimes in Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, continues to

be the growth of fundamentalist Islam. A radical change of US policy is needed. Instead,

like a desperate riverboat gambler, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is upping the ante.”315

Humanitarian aid observers reach similar conclusions: ‘The argument here is mainly

ideological: on one side, we have the proponents of linking assistance and security. This can

be done in a very brutal way in a counter-insurgency context ('if you tell us where the Taliban

are, we will provide you with assistance’). It can be done in a more subtle fashion as with the

“clear-shape-hold-and-build ” or so-called “integrated approaches ” being launched in

Afghanistan today, where assistance is provided to win over “swing districts ”. In both cases,

the ideological contention is that assistance ‘delivers ‘ security. On the other side of the

argument, this claim is disputed: development is always a conflictual process involving

winners and losers. It is all about politics.”316

315 - Murray, Craig, Hillary and Pakistan. 25 April, 2009 http://www.craigmurray.org.uk/archives/2009/04/hillary_and_pak.html 316 - Donini, Antonio. “Khaki and Pink: a Humanitarian Perspective on Stabilization Operations in Afghanistan.” Paper ISA's 50th Annual Convention "Exploring The Past, Anticipating The Future". NYC. 15 February 2009


“The Dutch have devoted considerable monetary resources to these efforts (Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan Province) relative to the size of their economy. They committed $74 million (Canadian dollars) in 2006, $107 million in 2006 and $117 million in 2007 (Parliamentary Information 2008, 4). To a large extent these funds have flowed through to the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), a collection of civil-military teams engaged in a variety of reconstructive, diplomatic and security training efforts in Uruzgan.

Despite the considerable monies being devoted by the Dutch to reconstruction, and the stated priority of reconstruction within the overall strategy, observers have noted some operational issues within the Netherland’s PRT. As Rietjens notes, a lack of inter-agency communication and co-operation, together with insufficient consultation with locals and military inexperience in civil-military joint operations, have resulted in the PRT’s, ‘decreased sustainability, a lack of cohesion with social structures, a lack of ownership, and mismatches between the assistance activities and the actual needs.’317

It looks like a war of attrition, but there are strong strategic reasons for the West to perpetuate

the long occupation: Afghanistan’s massive, world-class, oil, gas, copper, iron, bauxite and

strategic mineral deposits. Although the national government of Afghanistan has established

onerous Hydrocarbon Law and Mineral Law production sharing agreements yielding Afghans

a meagre return, we may yet see more just redistribution of resource royalties that American

citizens enjoy in Alaska, or Canadian citizens enjoy in Alberta, (as example, the preferred

all-citizen annual-dividend as share-in-perpetuity model of the Alaska Permanent Fund), and

there are nevertheless clear advantages to pursuing resources development, as seen from an

unemotional perspective:

- The new economic prospects for training and employment of Afghan resource miners

and oilfield workers, which in turn would lead to additional sources of revenues within

the growing national economy, and in the future, perhaps a potential expat workforce

sending money home;

317 - McCoy, John. "Two Strategies in Afghanistan: Canadian and Dutch Approaches to Counter-Insurgency" Paper ISA's 50th Annual Convention "Exploring The Past, Anticipating The Future". NYC. 15 February 2009


- The exploitation of outlands that were of little or no arable value which that might be

exploitable after the extraction, through mandatory extracted-land recovery into some

form of permaculture, similar to what is currently mandated for some US strip mined

areas;

- A multiplier effect from increase in government royalty revenues (if these revenues

remain undiverted by corruption) applied into the national economy;

- The general improvement in the status of the national roads and construction of other

critical infrastructure facilities (haulage roads, railroads, pipelines, water resources)

throughout the country;

- An incentive to resettle the displaced, now returning diaspora, through government

programs and foreign aid for co-development of irrigation and power infrastructure into

the rural areas;

- The plain fact that foreign peace keeper forces and NGOs may be withdrawn unless

the leases and licenses are granted, the infrastructure is built, and the natural resources

are developed. Voters and military planners in the West may demand an end to

indefinite foreign adventurism.

“America’s decision to garrison Iraq after its initial goals of removing Saddam and

eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction were achieved, added little, if anything, of

strategic value to American security, but the presence of so many conventional American

forces did present America’s enemies in the Muslim world with an opportunity they would

have otherwise missed: the chance to directly attack U.S. forces, damage American military

prestige and exhaust American economic resources while strengthening their own. By the

beginning of 2008, the most serious unanticipated outcome of this exposure was a monthly

Diminution and Development - pg 226 bill of $12 billion to maintain U.S. forces in support of a Shiite-dominated government in

Baghdad that was and is effectively tied to Iran.”318

Worse, the planners may chose to indiscriminately slaughter rather than ‘win hearts and

minds’, that infamous, ‘destroy the village to save it’ of the Viet Nam War. Joshua Foust

writes that the extreme US aversion to troop casualties, using MRAPs, armour-plated

HumVees and heavy body armor, are antithetical to building up the intimate solidarity with

the local Afghan populace that counter-insurgency requires, and will likely result in brief fire

fights before the heavy artillery is called in and civilian casualties sky-rocket:

“It is that mentality - severe risk aversion, coupled with attention paid to process rather than outcome - that risks ultimately undoing the Western mission in Afghanistan. As an institution, the U.S. Army seems unwilling to make the difficult choices necessary to create the conditions for peace: a population that is adequately protected from the crime, drug, and war lords, and therefore no longer contributing to the desperate regional instability.”319

Political philosopher John Gray warns, “And when you push it, it comes down to a kind of symbolic expressive function whereby even if the effect of certain policies – then it doesn't matter, because the purpose of the policy is not actually to effect a real-world change but to keep the spirits up.”

Bread, Tea and a Job

If you are looking for an answer to Afghanistan, here it is, in President Karzai’s wise words.

Let’s set out a road map together towards the future of a successful Central Asian knowledge

base, by focusing on the urgent needs of the Afghan People for food, shelter, transportation

and job security:

What Are We Going to Eat? – The onerous experience in Colombia through the US-backed

militarization of the Colombian government and the wholesale use of aerial defoliants, is one 318 - MacGregor, Col. Douglas, “Refusing Battle”, (Springfield:Armed Forces Journal), April, 2009. 319 - Foust, Joshua, “Garrisons and force protection crowd out other objectives in Afghanistan”, (NY:Reuters) 27 March 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 227 of the very most poor indigents being driven off of unregistered lands they have held for

generations, then these properties are being re-titled for lease to international agribusiness.

Worse, uplands defoliated of coca are also sterile for food crops, as very nearly happened in

the early years of the Afghan War after a US proposal to defoliate with that powerful and

persistent Monsanto herbicide RoundUp™. Afghans are a proud people, but the Geneva

Conventions also mandate that an occupying nation(s) must provide adequate security,

shelter, water and food for the occupied citizenry. US:ISAF have failed by any metric.

"We got plenty of money in Washington. What we need is more priority."

--George W. Bush, Washington, D.C., June 2, 2008.

Figure 36 – Afghan market scene

The goal of the Rebuilding Afghanistan Markets Program (RAMP), paid for by USAID, is to

focus on reconstruction and rehabilitation, rural finance and agricultural production. The

main commodities the United States and Afghans are concerned with are livestock, poultry,

dried vegetables, fruit, and grapes. This helps the economy and may hopefully provide an

alternative to illegal poppy farming, as for example, with the emerging saffron program. The

2004-2006 RAMP program was run by US development firm Chemonics. “The company —

Diminution and Development - pg 228 with the help of the Afghanistan government, expatriates, and local Afghan workers — took

that $145 million of (USAID) seed money and ballooned it into $1.6 billion worth of good

for the country”, (although they don’t explain the metrics or provide an audit for that claim).

Figure 37 - Twin Towers © Nick Rain

I have described in previous chapters the issues with some USAID agribusiness aid, with its

insistence on monopolizing by sole-source patented Western grain varietals, wiping out in

two or three seasons 10,000s of local and adapted grain variants, and enslaving farmers

forever to purchase credits for their yearly supply of US seed, pesticides and fertilizers. The

Indian experience, in which thousands of similarly indentured farmers have committed

suicide, should serve as a warning to Afghans, beware a Crusader horse. Afghan fruits and

nuts are some of the finest varieties in the world, the root stock for many fruits of Western

agriculture, particularly your green grapes, for which we receive not one penny in royalties.

Instead, our native agriculture of thousands of years is threatened by monopoly and patent

indenture imposed by Western agribusiness, fronted for by the USAID and IMF.

Diminution and Development - pg 229 How Will We Achieve Agricultural Independence & Food Security? – As I described earlier,

the bonus payments and royalties already agreed upon by China MCC are more than enough

to convert Afghanistan’s huge natural gas resources into two 500,000 t/yr nitrogen fertilizer

plants, which would provide Afghans with agricultural security for the next 300 years! Just

the bonus payment from, say, American-Alcoa for the Afghan bauxite resources is more than

enough to build dozens of irrigation reservoirs on both sides of the Hindu Kush with canals

and pipelines distribution, and provide Afghans with irrigation security for a millennium.

Afghanistan’s irrigation systems survived for centuries since the time of Alexander the Great,

and elaborate systems for distribution of the irrigation waters, seed and fertilizer. The wars

largely destroyed all that, but it can be rebuilt. All we need is reconstruction to begin again.

With irrigation will come a national demining programme and needed massive reforestation,

orchard and viticulture programme to re-establish what was ‘The Garden of Central Asia’.320

The concern about corporate monoculture and Western food patent sharecropper penury is

that its claims of safety are apocryphal. Comparative statistical studies of test data provided

for Monsanto’s GMO corn have now shown that the test results “clearly underlines adverse

impacts on kidneys and liver, the dietary detoxifying organs, as well as different levels of

damages to heart, adrenal glands, spleen and haematopoietic system,” reported Gilles-Eric

Séralini, a molecular biologist at the University of Caen.” 321 322 323

Feeding already malnourished, stunted Afghans with GMO food is tantamount to genocide,

especially as GMO pollen will forever adulterate native varietals that it will interbreed with.

”Last year, the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) reported that 19,000 320 - http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Article.853.aspx 321 - http://www.biolsci.org/v05p0706.htm#headingA11 322 - http://foodfreedom.wordpress.com/2010/01/01/three-approved-gmos-linked-to-organ-damage/ 323 - http://www.ucsusa.org/food_and_agriculture/science_and_impacts/impacts_genetic_engineering/environmental-effects-of.html

Diminution and Development - pg 230 hectares of (GMO) corn was planted in Helmand producing roughly 40,000 tons. The USAID

corn will seed 3,600 additional hectares resulting in up to 16,000 tons of corn. Roughly 200

hectares will produce 1,000 tons of peanut.”324 325

“A notorious paper by Martin Qaim (University of Bonn) and David Zilberman (University

of California, Berkeley) was published in the top journal Science, claiming outstanding (80

percent) yield increases from Monsanto’s GM cotton; and projected the results as relevant to

farmers throughout the developing world. The paper drew a storm of protest, as it derived all

its data from Monsanto, and its findings were completely at odds with the reports coming

from Indian farmers. Dr. Devinder Sharma, a food policy expert, called Qaim and

Zilberman’s paper a “scientific fairytale”. 326

Figure 38 - © RAMP/Jason Hagen

In fact, Bt cotton yields in India proved to be half those of native varietals, and where losses

occurred, Bt experienced twice the devastation. "When the French were reluctant to allow

Monsanto's seeds to sprout on French soil, Secretary of State Madeline Albright and U.S.

Trade Representative Charlene Barshevsky intervened on Monsanto's behalf. When the

324 - http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Article.330.aspx 325 - http://www.i-sis.org.uk/savePolishCountryside.php 326 - http://www.i-sis.org.uk/farmersSuicidesBtCottonIndia.php

Diminution and Development - pg 231 French still refused to yield, President Clinton personally took up the matter with French

Prime Minister Lionel Jospin and gave him "an earful. And when that did not work, Vice-

President Gore followed up with a phone call to the French Prime Minister. Ultimately, the

French gave in to the steady, high-level (US) pressure." 327

There is no food security for Afghans, when indentured to global monopolist 328 food patents

by seeds provided by pay-per-use Western bio-technology, a monopoly that even developed

the anti-Life ‘Terminator’ gene, to prevent artisanal collected seeds from sprouting!

Where Will We Live? – Resettlement of our millions of internally displaced refugees and our

millions of orphans can never take place in isolation. Just look at Gaza, sixty years on! NGOs

are profit-driven like any commercial business, and they need failed clients as their raisson

d’etre. Foreign military and nation-building occupiers have no interest in resettlement issues,

their goal is in pacification and privatization, and frankly, self-aggrandizement. There are

3,400 NGO’s in Kabul!! We need a focused national development in marginal lands with

arable potential, and harsh immigration laws to preserve resource work camp jobs. Work

camps means steady workers’ income, means families’ resettlement, means new villages,

even if just for a decade or two while Afghan agriculture is rehabilitated and re-expanded,

and populations relocated and resettled. It represents the way out of this miasma.

“Any new initiatives should include money for such programs already in place, like the National Solidarity Program (NSP), which has been successfully implemented in nearly twenty two thousand villages (and been praised by analysts, anthropologists and politicians worldwide). These programs have managed to provide drinking water, improved roads and functioning schools to many Afghans.”329 330

327 - Lambracht, Bill, St Louis Post Dispatch, requoted in Sharma, Devinder, Genetic Modification, Food and Sustainable Development: Telling the Story, in Joe Smith ed., The daily globe: environmental change, the public and the media, (London:Earthscan Publications Ltd.), 1st ed., June 2000, pp.84 328 - US versus Monsanto Company and Delta and Pine Land Company, April 4, 2008 (WADC:Federal Register) 329 - Ghani, Dr. Ashraf, Karzai and 22,000 Villages, (WA DC:The National Interest) Number 105, Jan / Feb 2010, pp. 40-48

Diminution and Development - pg 232 How Will We Get to Market? – Beyond the Afghan national ring-road highway system,

which was improved not for the people of Afghanistan, but for US:ISAF forces to move their

armour, there have been few road construction projects and almost no effort made at traffic

planning. That is not to say that those in Afghan government have not made the attempt.

Figure 39 - Historical Planning Map of Kandahar © GoA (in Arabic)

I have a (2006) traffic-master planning report and funding proposal prepared by the principal

engineer for the US-firm Anthae Company, Robert Marmaduke PE, acting under personal

service contract (PSC) to then Governor of Kandahar.

The project involved the first-ever effort to train local Afghans to measure traffic intersection

geometry and conduct traffic counts, in the successful preparation of a ~$300,000 funding

proposal to create a Kandahar Traffic Master Plan, for the construction of signalled- or

roundabout-controlled arterial street intersections connection throughout the entire city. The

geometry and traffic counts report became the basis of the funding proposal prepared with

330 - http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Article.948.aspx

Diminution and Development - pg 233 expert tele-consultants from South Africa and India, then presented to Governor Khalid and

his aides, along with myself, and the USAID Party Chief attending, for their approvals.331

That USAID representative took the Anthae principal engineer aside, and as he later reported

to me, told him, ‘The people of Afghanistan don’t decide what gets built, the (US) Defense

Department does; ... anyway, nothing is getting built around here anytime soon.’

US Command pulled out of Kandahar shortly after that, and was replaced by ISAF troops. I

mention Kandahar only because it’s the main highway from Herat to Quetta, Pakistan, sitting

directly along the proposed Trans-Afghan Pipeline Initiative (TAPI) oil pipeline route from

Turkmenistan to Pakistan. Afghan officials are fully aware of this plan, and so is USAID, the

TAPI is already a decade old. Imagine our chagrin, in seizing initiative to begin preparation

of a Kandahar traffic master plan, to be told by USAID to forget about it!

Will Our Resources Be Shared Equitably? – As I described in depth in earlier chapters, just

the bonus payment from China MCC for the Afghan copper resource alone is more than

enough to build a 40,000 barrel per day oil refinery, one which would provide Afghans with

fuel and energy security for the next 100 years. Just the bonus payment from, say, India

Arcelor-Mittal for the Afghan iron & coke resources is more than enough to build 1,000’s of

megawatts of hydropower dams and distribution power lines on both sides of the Hindu

Kush, and provide Afghans and their neighbours with clean energy security for a century.

We call on Resources Canada and their First Nations to share their expertise in resource

planning and indigent issues, in developing world standard revenue sharing, environmental

331 - Kandahar Traffic Master Plan - Site Evaluation, Project Scoping and Consultant Administration Proposal, (US:Anthae), April, 2006

Diminution and Development - pg 234 protection and remediation. World Bank tendered contracts with Gustavson Associates 332

only address issues of resource leasing and privatization, and are in fact, mercenary in scope:

· Identification and Preservation of Essential Documents · Reserves Estimates under Western Standards · Packages for Promotion of Investment in Afghanistan · Creation of Blocks for Bidding · Integration with Other Studies Concerning Emergency Aid · Estimates of Realistic Production Rates · Results of Market and Economic Analysis · Extensive Training of Afghani Officials

The Gustavson Oil Report and followup USGS study underlines my earlier claims, that from

the moment Taliban emissaries met with future Cheney Energy Policy Committee members

in Houston in 1997, the pre-emptive invasion and occupation of Afghanistan was sealed.

Moreover, while America was reeling from the 9/11 attacks and their brave Special Forces

were exposed to risk fighting at Tora Bora, those same mercenary interests were already at

work with World Bank, drafting up the first Afghan Hydrocarbon Law and Minerals Law!

Gustavson has since brokered the China MCC Aynak copper lease and the Orient Oil leases

for Afghan oil & gas, without Regulations for environmental or social remediation, without

existing Environmental Inspectorate, and without (their claims of) international transparency.

As well, the Hill Report contracted for by World Bank almost immediately concludes that for

domestic oil & gas development, “the Afghan Gas State Enterprise is not a sustainable entity.

Furthermore, the current political and regulatory climate of Afghanistan, the pricing structure

for oil and gas, and non-payment by gas consumers are not conducive to private investment

332 - Executive Summary, Final Report, Promotion Of Oil And Gas Producing Areas To The Private Sector, Grant Agreement No. H007-Af Islamic Transitional State Of Afghanistan, Ministry Of Mines And Industry, Emergency Infrastructure Reconstruction Project, 7/6/2005

Diminution and Development - pg 235 in the sector.” 333 The report recommends that the existing natural gas compressor stations be

decommissioned, and that the existing Kud Bergh fertilizer plant be decommissioned as well.

Nevertheless, the Hill Report confirms my claim, “(i) on the basis of the projected growth of

fertilizer demand in Afghanistan, the size of an appropriate grass root replacement plant

would not be less than 300 thousand tons per year (TPY); (ii) the estimated cost of such a

plant is about $250 million (2005); and (iii) the viability of the plant would be dependent on

low (world) price of gas (at about $1.50.MMBTU) and low (world) cost of capital (<5%),

both of which implies significant government subsidy.”

The report goes on in summarizing its Gas Demand Study for Kabul and the Northern

Regions and Sheberghan – Kabul Pipeline study to recommend a dual fuel power plant for

Kabul, and suggest a 24” gas pipeline can be built to Kabul for only $487.5 M (2005)! The

Hill Report Task #2 for an Afghan oil refinery recommends a 10,000 BOPD refinery with

150MW power plant (to burn ‘bottom ends’) for ~$224 million (2005)! Scaled up to my

40,000 BOPD suggestion, the energy project would still be under one billion dollars! 334

“For Afghans to successfully rebuild their country, new initiatives have to be undertaken to satisfy the increasing energy needs of the country. In this circumstance, there is urgent need to deploy sustainable and environmentally clean energy sources, such as geothermal energy, which is abundantly available in Afghanistan. The current electric power capacity in Afghanistan based on available data could be estimated to be somewhere in the range of 400 MW (megawatt of energy). Hydroelectric dams, most notably at Kajaki, accounts for 260 megawatts, which represents only about 5 percent of the total hydroelectric potential of the country. ...if we assume the level of power consumption by developing countries such as Turkey, Mexico, or Egypt, which is ten times lower than that of the United

333 - Hill International, Inc. Evaluation Of Investment Options For The Development Of Oil And Gas Infrastructure In Afghanistan Afg/0361/Tf 030397 Project No. Pag238/R Borhan/Rev.13 March 28, 2005 Main Report 334 - Hill International, Inc. Evaluation Of Investment Options For The Development Of Oil And Gas Infrastructure In Afghanistan, Afg/0361/Tf 030397 Project No. Pag238/R Borhan/Rev. 3 August 15 2004 Task 2: Evaluation Of A Small Refinery


States (IEA, 1998), as an optimal hypothetical target, ... Afghanistan ... requires at least 3.5 GW (gigawatt of energy) of electrical power.” 335

There it is! The full hydroelectric potential of Afghanistan is ~5.2 GW, more than enough to

meet demand, and our tremendous geothermal potential, both for electric power generation

and also for district heating uses in residential, agriculture and manufacturing, is enormous!

Moreover, both of these resources, hydroelectric and geothermal, are clean and renewable,

which would give Afghanistan the opportunity to participate in the Carbon Cap & Trade.

Clearly only a few $B’s are sufficient for Afghanistan to achieve energy and agricultural

independence, with an end to foreign balance of payments loan usury, less than US:ISAF

spends in a single month! Where is the World Bank ‘go forward’ on this? Where is all the

$138B US:ISAF funding really going, if not to warfare!? Where is achievable energy and

food independence mentioned in President Karzai’s oft-repeated Vision for Afghanistan?!

What About Our Healthcare? – Afghanistan has one of the highest child mortality rates in the

world, one of the highest child malnutrition rates, and certainly the highest overall

Figure 40 – Afghan Child Death Statistics

335 - Saba, D. S., Najaf, M. E., Musazai, A. M., and Taraki, S. A., Geothermal Energy in Afghanistan: Prospects and Potential, (NY:Center on International Cooperation, New York University), February 2004

Diminution and Development - pg 237 handicapped orphan numbers. Afghan women have the second highest childbirth death

statistics in the world, and very low physician/medical care availability ratio, less than Anglo-

American citizens afford their barn animals. The common causes of death are apocalyptically

primitive: war, starvation, infection, injury and exposure.

The Cuban medical care example is an attainable means to reverse this dire situation, based

on their well-established translation to other countries miracle, if only the US would de-list or

co-exist with Cuba as a ‘terrorist’ state. Small inroads made by BioPharm corporations such

as Abbott Labs are simply not adequate.336 Cubans are not as easily put-off entering war

zones, the way many Western NGOs such as Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans

Frontières) must refuse to participate, and it would cost US:ISAF nothing other than their

open hatred for Castro’s populist success, and their overt schadenfreude at its demise. The

Afghan government has more than enough aid funds to pay for Cuban medical brigades.

How Will Our Children Learn? – UNAMA is the UN agency charged with education, in

coordination with USAID construction of schools, and the Afghan Ministry of Education

hiring teachers and administering tests. UNAMA reports, “Net enrolment ratio in schools –

number of students in primary and secondary education is 6,139,101 – with girls numbering

2,191,046. 1.7 million girls study in primary schools across Afghanistan.”337 However this

represents only 2/3rd’s of school age boys and a mere 10% of school age girls in some areas.

Oxfam’s stated goal is to, “To reinforce the understanding that women are most affected by

the lack of health care and access to education – and that health and education for women has

many wider benefits (e.g. for their families and communities).” Through the works of author

Greg Mortenson, the Central Asia Institute is promoting and supporting community-based

336 - http://www.abbottfund.com/ 337 - http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Publication/UNAMAfactsheet%20VAW-Nov%202009.pdf

Diminution and Development - pg 238 education, especially for girls, in remote regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Other NGOs

are also making increased efforts towards achieving basic education. Even the provincial

government in Bamyan launched a campaign to make the province 100 per cent literate.

By now, everyone realizes education is the key for future generations. This can be made a

profit-centre, not just continuing education as English as the Second Language (ESL), but

focused training in the trades and the real-world professions, to prepare for the work at hand.

The World Health Organization (WHO) has identified an unquenchable need for cadres of

trained Afghan medical personnel. Other NGOs have developed forward looking business

plans to select upper-level school students and educate them to higher certificate, out of

country if needs be. Then Uzbek-Kyrgi and Pakistani ‘ally’ trade school business plans can

be developed and made profitable, using humanitarian funds and resource royalties, until the

schools are well-established by reputation and alumni donations.

We also must not miss the opportunity for a national public radio system of education. Even

today, education in Canada and Alaska’s far north Eskimo communities is carried out by

radio and internet with teachers and teaching resources in urban locations, broadcasting to

their students into the darkness, as the sun goes down and after the evening meal. A solar-

powered battery, low-wattage LED reading light, and a small radio is all that it would take!338

What About Our Community Hygiene? - USAID development programs focus on “health,

energy, infracture, private enterprise, competitiveness, rule-of-law, anti-corruption/

trafficking, and democratization and local government.”339

One of the programs USAID concentrates on, at least in other more developed third world

countries, is their Urban Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (IUWASH) projects, as for example,

338 - http://www.marketingvox.com/social-computer-hits-doorsteps-of-third-world-029310/ 339 - Intermediate Program Management and Policy Advisor, USAID M/OAA-09-SPECOPS-0004

Diminution and Development - pg 239 their $30-$40 million program in Indonesia for a Millennium Development Goal (MDG)

target to “halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without sustainable access to safe

drinking water and basic sanitation” from a 1990 baseline, by providing piped sanitary water

and sanitary sewer or septic systems. Special Ambassador Richard Holbrooke announced a

similar plan for Afghanistan, a $50 million plan for digging wells and latrines across the

entire country, but at a cost of only 43¢ per Afghan per year, not counting the tremendous

administrative overhead burden borne by Kabul and USAID officials draining that account.

The African experience is beginning to show that high-tech solutions to development are not

nearly as important as the simple expedients, such as mosquito-netting, clean water and de-

worming, or solar powered battery systems powering a water well, a light-bulb for reading

and a radio. Afghanistan has already auctioned off its fabled copper reserves, now it’s oil.

Where are the dividends, the resource royalties, the rents, taxes, where are they going to?

What became of the $3.4 billion lease bonus that China MCC paid to Kabul?! We need

accountability, proper audits plus innovation for fundamental utilities infrastructures!

With $300 billion that the US has already spent on this occupation, every Afghan home

should have a flush toilet, and every family, a son or daughter with a Harvard degree!

Will You Protect Us From Trafficking? –

“Afghanistan is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children trafficked for the purposes of forced labor and commercial sexual exploitation. Afghan boys and girls are trafficked within the country for sexual exploitation, forced marriages to settle debts or disputes, forced begging, as well as forced labor or debt bondage in brick kilns, carpet-making factories, and domestic service. Afghan children are also trafficked to Iran and Pakistan for forced labor, particularly in Pakistan’s carpet factories, and forced marriages. Boys are promised enrollment in Islamic schools in Pakistan, but instead are trafficked to camps for paramilitary training by extremist groups.


Figure 41 - Never alone © RAWA.org

Afghan women and girls are trafficked within the country and to Pakistan and Iran for commercial sexual exploitation and temporary marriages. Some Afghan men force their wives or daughters into prostitution. Afghan men are trafficked to Iran and Pakistan for forced labor and debt bondage, as well as to Greece for forced labor in the agricultural or construction sectors. Afghanistan is also a destination for women and girls from Iran, Tajikistan, and even China trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation. Tajik women are also believed to be trafficked through Afghanistan to Pakistan and Iran for commercial sexual exploitation. Trafficked Iranian women transit Afghanistan en route to Pakistan.”340

There are literally millions of internally displaced Afghan refugees and more than a million

and half war orphans, still living in the streets or in tent camps after more than 30 years!

Freedom from Incarceration - It’s important to remember, for those who have fretted over

President Karzai’s release of captured drug lords before the August election, that Afghans,

and Muslims in general, have a far different concept of ‘justice’ and ‘retribution’ than the

Western Christian nations with their elaborate Catholic and Calvinist ‘guilt’ indoctrinations.

Neither does Afghanistan allow a US Prisons-for-Profits privatized system of incarceration.

340 - Trafficking in Persons Report 2009, (WADC:US Department of State) http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/123361.pdf

Diminution and Development - pg 241 The PDPA and Soviet era were especially harsh for Afghans. Anyone suspected of being a

foreigner, of giving aid to, or being an agent or spy for a foreigner, would be jailed. If they

had no money to pay for their own food, and no family to bring food to them, they starved.

There is no ‘government social safety network’ in Afghanistan. Families who have lost their

provider, and children who have lost their parents, freely starve on the streets right outside

the Afghanistan Presidential Palace (ARG) and the Green Zone Embassy Row. Afghans

cannot afford the usurious tithe-tax of maintaining a national prison system for the foreign

colonialists, or accept incarceration in a US-occupation prison at Bagram Airfield AFB, or

any of the other secret rendition prisons the US maintains around the world. This is not

negotiable. It is a violation of Afghanistan’s sovereignty under World Court jurisdiction!

Figure 42 - Effect of Reagan 'Just Say No' Anti-Drug Laws and Privatized Prisons

Freedom from Genocide – There are exhaustively researched accounts by recognized

international authorities, including Human Rights Watch, and RAWA.org, attesting to

continued, and growing collateral deaths in Afghanistan, at an astounding 16:1 ratio.

Diminution and Development - pg 242 In Bala Baluk village of Farah Province, on the 5th of May, 2009, US airstrikes targeted

civilian homes, killing more than 150 people, mostly women and children. On March 5,

2008, outside Hyderabad, Kandahar Province, an unarmed Afghan man was stopped at a

checkpoint by Sgt. Joseph D. Newell, of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd US Special Forces Group.

The Afghan man was shot dead by Newell, who then cut off the man’s ear as a war souvenir.

Newell was acquitted of all charges. In the first week of 2010 already, and in retaliation for

suicide bomber deaths of eight CIA agents and a Jordanian military advisor, it’s likely that

Afghan civilians will be summarily executed in retribution. UNAMA (United Nations

Assistance Mission in Afghanistan), for its part, neither confirms nor denies collateral

damage, prevaricating that, “it may be that, UNAMA is underreporting civilian casualties.”

But we agreed to talk about our ‘go forward’. See how easy it is to slip back into mayhem!?

Figure 43 - This could be your child © Prof. Marc Herold

How Will Our Women Find Their Voice? – You may recall that I mentioned Afghan women

hold more positions of legislative representation than Britain’s own boys club, but clearly the

lives of women in Afghanistan are ‘very, very difficult here’, as they would describe it. Much

of this is tradition and poverty at the rural level. Men save their entire lives for a bride, many

Diminution and Development - pg 243 until they are old men, then the only bride they can find are child-brides, sold to them by

equally impoverished families with too many mouths to feed. As education and literacy

returns to Afghanistan, especially knowledge of the West and its looser social mores, even

greater stress will be placed on Afghan women to escape poverty and its bonds, fight for an

advanced education, then struggle to find a paying job making a decent living, and a mate.

It does not help for the West to portray their struggle as ‘victims’, or the war in Afghanistan

as one to ‘liberate Afghan women from slavery’, any more than America’s own frontier past,

where women held secondary-status, or America’s civil war, the little documented unspoken

fact of de facto slavery for both poor whites and blacks which continues across the South,

even today. Because President Lincoln declared slavery abolished, it didn’t just disappear!

So you wouldn’t portray your poor Southern women as ‘victims’, and you have purged from

your history the slavery of your non-English immigrants, because it causes social unrest. But

your triumphal exceptionalism and schadenfreude, your racism and NGO greed for more aid

drives the West to portray all Afghan women as cruelly treated slaves! In your own country,

‘By the mid 1990's, at least fifteen hundred women each year were murder victims from

domestic violence.’341 According to America’s Center for Missing and Exploited Children,

58,200 children in the United States were abducted by nonrelatives in 1999!

Let’s just leave it there. Give us the opportunity to improve, without the dogma and guilt.

How Will We Co-exist in Peace? – As a recognized political party in Afghan history, and

successful military force, allied with Pakistani ISI and funded by international ‘Al-Qa’idah’,

the Taliban are a force that must needs be reckoned with. Whether it’s by back-channel

envoys, or more formal ‘Paris Peace Accord’ equivalents, the Taliban must be brought into

341 - US Department of Justice-Office of Justice Programs http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/intimates.htm 2004

Diminution and Development - pg 244 the fold. It is clear, first, that US:ISAF military engagement, however successful on the battle

field, is causing huge collateral damage and creating far more Taliban that it is killing,

hardening the political views and making it fundamentally impossible to achieve peace.

Where not too long ago the Afghan population were glad to see the Taliban depart, now that

weathervane has swung. Second, unlike Sri Lanka, there is no ‘final shore’ that the Taliban

can be pineed against and destroyed, not without the occupying powers committing wholesale

ethnic-cleansing. Yet Anglo-America continues to berate Afghans and our Taliban past for

harbouring Osama bin Laden. Why is that? Perhaps it is their ignorance of Pashtunwali code,

that Pashtuns must provide sanctuary—which is not recognized by the USA—and when

sincerely asked for forgiveness, give shelter even to their enemies?! Instead your own leaders

offered to bribe our war heroes, then if they refused, to bomb us in return for our natural

resources, which belong equally to all Afghans! What kind of ‘honor code’ is that?

President Karzai claims he is ‘known for consensus’ code of honour, but sacked Michael

Semple, who was seeking accommodation with Taliban defectors. Yet many feel Karzai’s

family members are openly involved in the opium trade, using Taliban as enforcers and

collectors. Dr. Abdullah supported a different view, calling for an end to highly centralized

government—something he and his Northern Alliance members vigorously opposed in the

Loya Jirga in early 2002—in order to ‘bring hopes for the people of this country’.342

The Libyans have had success with such a system in that area: “Leaders of one of the world's

most effective jihadist organizations, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), have

342 - ‘Abdullah Won’t Work for Karzai” – State of the Union (US:CNN) 23 October 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 245 written a new "code" for jihad. The LIFG says it now views the armed struggle it waged

against Col. Moammar Gadhafi's regime for two decades as illegal under Islamic law.”343

“In the winter of 2000, while writing … from Afghanistan, I asked Taliban leaders why they

did not hand over bin Laden to the United States, when his continued presence in their

country had turned the entire world against them. They were quick to distance themselves

from the embassy bombings, but were adamant - note the tribal mind-set - not to betray their

"honored" guest. In Pashtun culture, once you give sanctuary, you cannot revoke it.” 344

“… in an age of high-tech terrorism, there are important lessons to be learned from Afghanistan. First, an ounce of nation-building prevention will be worth a pound of military-operation cure. The ensemble of approaches summarized under the term .nation-building,. for all their slowness and difficulty, must be vital parts of any strategy to blunt radical Islamism’s appeal. Second, while nation-building will not always require the comprehensive reconstruction of the polity, economy, and physical infrastructure of a bludgeoned land, it does require all these things in Afghanistan, and so a sustained international effort under U.S. leadership is indispensable. Third, the political component of nation-building must fit local cultural, ethnic, political, and social realities.

For Afghanistan, this means creation of a federal government with gradual de-warlordization. and demobilization of private militias, not the tug-of-war between northern minorities and Pushtuns that the structure of the present Transitional Administration is fostering. Fourth, to move beyond the entrenched problems of a failed state, an adequate force of international peacekeepers and aid workers must provide the security and drive physical and political reconstruction, respectively.”345

The US Army War College posits: “Nearly eight years after 9/11, senior US leadership is

redefining the “war on terrorism” as a global counterinsurgency effort, one that requires both

kinetic force and indirect, “smart power” collaboration by civilian agencies. “The Department

of Defence has taken on many of these burdens that might have been assumed by civilian

agencies in the past,” said Secretary of Defence Robert Gates. “Forced by circumstances, our 343 - Robertson, Nic and Cruickshank, Paul, New jihad code threatens al Qaeda, (US:CNN), 10 November, 2009 344 - Hussain, S. Amjad, Engaging Afghanistan now is the preferred option, (Toledo:Toledo Blade), 19 October 2009 345 - Goodson, Larry. ibid

Diminution and Development - pg 246 brave men and women in uniform have stepped up to the task, with field artillerymen and

tankers building schools and mentoring city councils—usually in a language they don’t speak

. . . . But it is no replacement for the real thing, civilian involvement and expertise.”346

What is our ‘Marshall Plan’ for Afghanistan? – Afghanistan requires a strong Marshall Plan

redevelopment program, but one which can be entirely repaid out of the $100s billion of our

world-class natural resources which we will be sharing with private extraction corporations.

The Office of USAID has made a start formulating this organization:

The ‘Services under Programme and Project Offices for Results Tracking (SUPPORT), Phase II’, contracts will be designed to provide expert programme management and/or performance monitoring for USAID in-country uplift in:

1. Agriculture and Alternative Development; 2. Democracy and Governance; 3. Economic Growth; 4. Infrastructure, Engineering, & Energy; 5. Provincial Reconstruction Team; and 6. Social Sector Development (Education and Health).347

The ‘Transparency, Accountability and Performance’ (TAP) services contract subject matter experts (SMEs) are expected to provide expertise in, (1) Economic Growth and Agricultural Development; (2) Population, Health and Nutrition; (3) Environment and Natural Resources; (4) Democracy and Governance; (5) Conflict Mitigation and Post-conflict Reconstruction; and (6) Humanitarian Assistance.348

Still, we can’t rely on Western aid programs and drilling & mining consortiums to have our

best interests at heart. I have included a preliminary listing of necessary environmental and

remediation programs below, for inclusion in the work portfolio of the Afghan Ministries:

Post-conflict environmental and remediation program requirements

· Post-conflict environmental assessments 1. Carry out a comprehensive country-wide environmental assessment;

346 - Silverberg, Daniel, and Joseph Heimann, "An Ever-Expanding War: Legal Aspects of Online. Strategic Communication", (Carlisle:US Army War College) Parameters 39 Summer 2009: 77-93 347 - Services under Program and Project Offices for Results Tracking (SUPPORT), Phase II, ibid 348 - Transparency, Accountability and Performance, USAID M/OAA-GRO-ALPS-09-0175


2. Carry out a full environmental assessment of forests and orchards;

3. Carry out a full environmental assessment of artisanal mining/timber sector;

4. Implement environmental rehabilitation activities in those field assessments;

· Environment in the reconstruction process 5. Integrate ‘environment’ into the Afghan reconstruction process;

6. Make Afghan employment training part of the environmental sector;

7. Undertake indigent environmental impact assessments (EIAs);

8. Create an Environmental Protection Ministry for resource extraction;

· Resource laws information and awareness 9. Provide resource and environment law training for lawyers and judges;

10. Revitalize international cooperation on resource extraction standards;

11. Establish resource boundaries and resettlement mitigation/compensation;

12. Establish PSA, royalties, taxes and fees review commission, outside MoM;

13. Establish independent royalties audit and collection agency, outside MoM;

14. Establish an Afghanistan Permanent Fund for resource royalties investment;

· Resource development program planning 15. Establish debt forgiveness for reforestation/grassland replanting carbon swap;349

16. Establish crash development plan to rebuild and expand irrigation systems;

17. Establish crash grow-out plan for national vineyard/orchard campaign;

18. Establish a solar-power water well, rooftop and solar oven distribution program;

19. Establish a solar-power drip irrigation program for vineyard/orchard/garden;

20. Establish national radio tower network with a resource education campaign;

· Super-Corridor planning 21. Establish ambassadorial team to meet with Pakistan and UN for border swap;

22. Establish crash development plan to engineer, plan and construct right-of-way;

349 - http://www.gnhealth.com/articles/pdf/PromotedtoHeadline.pdf


23. Establish crash development plan for super-highway, rail and pipeline features;

24. Establish energy distribution system for regenerative-braking recovery program;

25. Establish cell tower network and security monitoring systems along corridor;

· Super-Energy planning (executed in sequence as the other programs have begun) 26. Establish ministerial office of Renewable Energy and Carbon Cap & Trade;

27. Establish crash geo-survey plan to identify hydro- and geothermal power sources;

28. Establish development planning for renewable energy project capital funding;

29. Establish energy co-location with extractive industries and manufacturing centres;

30. Establish national major hydro- and geothermal sites and transmission network;

Former 2009 Afghan Presidential candidate Dr. Ashraf Ghani, himself an old World Bank

advisor and ally, proposes a traditionalist ‘carrot-and-stick’ centrist-regulator approach:

“The development challenge in Afghanistan is to formulate a doctrine of counterinsurgency economics. Instead of relying on the ineffective aid bureaucracy, innovative approaches are needed to make the money allocated to Afghanistan support Afghan priorities and address Afghan needs. Under existing authorities, USAID has the flexibility to provide direct budget support to the Karzai administration. If aid monies were contingent upon the adoption of a significant reform program by the Afghan government, the transformational impact would be significant. U.S. civil and military assistance could be five to nine times more effective if Afghanistan was treated as a pilot for foreign-assistance reform. A unified, predictable aid regime—guaranteed for five years with a series of transparent rules for effective and accountable utilization—would also be an enormous change for the better.”350

Strangely, Ghani doesn’t mention specifics of development. As a former World Bank official,

why didn't he mention those World Bank reports recommending an Afghan fertilizer plant,

power plant, oil refinery and gas pipeline!? All he’s interested in is the aid money! As we saw

with the clandestine redirection of Afghanistan’s State:Defense budget to Iraq and Katrina in

2006, ‘guaranteeing’ anything for five years with America is now politically impossible. As

350 - Ghani. Dr. Ashraf, Karzai and 22,000 Villages, ibid

Diminution and Development - pg 249 Congressional hearings have testified 351, the existing USAID and Aid to Kabul programs

remain unaudited and unaccounted for. How can we possibly increase effectiveness by ‘five

to nine times’ by turning over those funds to a known corrupt regime, in creating additional

layers of bureaucracy, Ghani’s World Bank and some quasi-national Inspectorate General?!

Indeed, if Global-Corporate demands only one thing, ‘on time,...and under budget’, with its

Race to the Bottom rapacious search for ‘Zero-Point’ Labour and ‘Free-Trade’ Resources,

where is that demand being met by our governing bodies in the US, UK or in Afghanistan?!

Mil.gov has baldly squandered eight years of our lives, and a trillion dollars of treasure!

“…there is a tremendous bitter disappointment here in Palestine, and indeed wider than that, at the role that President Obama is currently playing, or rather not playing. His speech in Cairo was a wonderful piece of work. It was mesmerizing. It transfixed the Arab public opinion, that finally, after the Bush years, we had some hope. But in practice, Obama’s policy—and one assumes Hillary Clinton is carrying out his policy—is exactly the same as the policy of the Bushites towards the people here. And there’s bitter, bitter disappointment about that.”352

Finding the Balance-of-Power Between Empires

After all the hundreds of billions have been redeployed, and all these billions of words are

written and like as not ever read, a worst case scenario for Afghanistan’s survival in a post-

9/11 global economy may be to embrace a Western occupation as our “Last Best Hope” for

surviving as a ‘nation’, given fierce and relentless pressure to turn back society as manifested

by the Salafi jihadists and Vulture capitalistas, as they bear down on the rough-and-tumble

resource extraction scrum that Afghanistan will become.

But while US:ISAF allies continue their negotiations among those of Iran, Russia, China,

Turkmenistan, Pakistan and India in sizing up their resource extraction ‘go-forward’s’,

351 - Troubles Persist at Defense Contract Audit Agency, US Fed News Service, September 24, 2009 352 - George Galloway, British MP, speaking on Democracy Now, 7 January 2010, about the Gaza blockade

Diminution and Development - pg 250 searching for ways so GWOT doesn’t explode into a catastrophe, as US and Taliban war

dogma locks up our countryside at perpetual fundamentalist loggerheads, the lives of a

hundred million Central and South Asian citizens are hanging precariously in the balance.

Whether we embrace the occupation, remember, we are not asking for a handout. What we’re

asking for is a proper accounting and standard resource royalties! We are requesting equitable

reconstruction across all public sectors, not just mining and oil/gas, and we also expect the

establishment of fiduciary maintenance and development funds for Afghans, borrowing from

Western industrial countries and other well-established resource revenue-sharing contracts.

If we can’t have our energy and agricultural independence, at least give us small market and

community centres in the larger villages, solar-powered structures with tiled floors, where

villagers can meet, trade goods, exchange ideas, and in the evening, improve their literacy.

Our coda for Afghanistan’s épistémè was given by Baharaki freedom fighter, Sadhar Khan:

"Look here, look at these hills. There has been far too much dying in these hills. Every rock,

every boulder that you see before you is one of my mujahideen, shahids, martyrs, who

sacrificed their lives fighting the Russians and the Taliban. Now we must make their sacrifice

worthwhile, we must turn these stones into schools.”353

"What do you need here?" [US General] McChrystal asked.

A translator turned the general's words into Pashto.

"We need schools!" one Afghan called back. "Schools!"

"We're working on that," McChrystal said.

"Those things take time." 354

353 - Mortensen, Greg and Relin, David, Three Cups of Tea, (NY:Penguin Books), 2006 354 - Filkins, Dexter, Stanley McChrystal’s Long War, (NY:New York Times), October 14, 2009


Afterword

“According to Simone Weil, hope means listening to the silence of God, fixing one’s

attention on the world and making it possible to be truly aware of both beauty and horror, to hear the wonderful cry of the geese and the horrific cries of murdered children. … and in the silence of God we find a hint of the Other. …. Or maybe she is wrong and we are truly, irremediably, fully alone. In that case, all we have is charity in the darkness of the world.” 355

Figure 44 - Afghan Orphans © Nick Rain

355 - Bernard Émond, [explaining his play La Neuvaine]


Appendix 1

Maps of Afghanistan

September 10, 2001: "Those who control the oil routes out of Central Asia will impact all

future direction and quantities of flow and the distribution of revenues from new production."

James Dorian in Oil & Gas Journal, published on the day before 9/11 attacks.

Figure 45 –Major Cities (National Geographic)


Figure 46 - Ethnicity Map (National Geographic)


Figure 47 - Refugee Map (UNHCR)


Figure 48 – High Resolution UNJLC Logistics Map available at http://www.logcluster.org/countries/afg/copy_of_general-logistics-and-planning-map/download?resolution=a1


Figure 49 - US:ISAF Authority, by Province


Appendix 2

“The State is the reality of the substantial Will, which it has collected in the special self-consciousness of its Universality, which is in and of itself reasonable. This substantial unity is an absolute unmoved end in itself, in which freedom comes into its own highest Law, as the highest final purpose of this law against the individual's, whose highest duty is to be members of the State.” G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Law

Afghan Ministries and Governmental Departments $1.7B per year Gatekeepers to Power and Privilege in Kabul

Ministries/Departments

Ministers/Deputies (as of 4Q08)

Authorities/Functions

Department of Central Statistics (CSO)

Abdul Rahman Ghafoori

Collect and disseminate national statistics

Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Food [Agriculture, Irrigation & Livestock after 2004]

Obaidullah Ramin

Oversees preservation and supervision of agricultural affairs and cattle rising. Oversees the preservation of reserves and the development of the forests responsible for increasing agricultural productive output and raising the economic standards of farmers. Ministry of Border & Tribal Affairs

Asadullah Khalid

Has responsibility of coordinating Tribal and Border. Ministry also promotes the right of minority tribes by integrating them into education and helping them in resolving disputes between tribes and ethnic groups. Ministry of Commerce and Industries

Diminution and Development - pg 258 Wahidullah Shahrani

International Trade Directorate Industry Affairs Directorate Transit and Trade Facilitation Directorate Industrial Parks Directorate Private Sector Development (PSD) Directorate Managerial Affairs of State Owned Enterprise (SOE) Corporation Directorate Legal and Regulatory Affairs Directorate Business Licensing Directorate Planning and Research Directorate Finance and Administration Directorate Emergency Customs Modernization and Trade Facilitation (ECMTF) Afghanistan National Standardization Authority (ANSA) Popalze Popal, CEO

Develop and maintain Afghan National Standards Safeguard Human Health through Testing and Certification Develop a Metrology to calibrate measuring instruments Promote Technical Progress Facilitate trade via standardization activities Act as regulation developer in specified fields / activities Ministry of Communications and Information Technology

Amir Zai Sangin

Information Communications Technology (ICT) Information Communications and Information Technology Inst (ICTI) Responsible for telecommunications (phone, TV, radio and internet) development. Ministry of Counter Narcotics

Colonel General Khodaidad

Police 119 Counter Narcotics Police Border Police Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND) Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF) Survey, Monitoring and Evaluation Law Enforcement and Judicial Reform Drug Demand Reduction

Diminution and Development - pg 259 Alternative Livelihoods Provincial Relations Strategic Communication and Public Relations Ministry of Defense

General Abdul Rahim Wardak

Build a national militia capable of keeping the peace, and defeating terrorism.

Ministry of Economy [merged from Ministry of Planning and Ministry of Reconstruction]

Dr. Mohammad Jalil Shams

Prepares coordinates and implements national plans. Completes development projects in cooperation with NGO's, providing grant capital and personnel. Afghanistan Reconstruction & Development Services (ARDS) Ministry of Finance

Dr. Omar Zakhilwal

Establish a national customs tax, vehicles tax, sales and income tax system. Responsible for the management and execution of budget, collection of taxes, organization and control of public expenditures and payments. Operates the Division of Administrative Services Manages Asian Development Bank programs for irrigation development Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta

Protocol Directorate General First through Fifth Political Divisions Regional Economic Cooperation Department Multilateral Relations and International Financial Institutions Trade, Transit and Investment Department Bilateral Relations Department UN Affairs Department Planning and Policy Department Center for Strategic Studies Institute of Diplomacy Law & Treaties Department Cultural Affairs Department Office of Human Rights & Women's International Affairs Press and Information Department Media Relations Department

Diminution and Development - pg 260 The Office of Chief of Staff Office of Communications within MoFA Directorate General of Communication and Archives Archive Directorate Technology Department Directorate General of Administrative Affairs Human Resources Directorate Finance & Accounting Department Procurement and Services Department Director General of Consular Affairs Deputy for Consular Affairs Deputy for National Visa and Passport Deputy for issuance of Visa for foreign Nationals Parliamentarian Affairs Department Ministry of Hajj and Pilgrimage

Nematullah Shahrani

Arrangements for pilgrims traveling to Mecca. Appoints all mosque leaders.

Ministry of Higher Education

Dr. Mohammad Azam Dadfar

Promotes education in all areas of the country. Develops a national culture against literacy-Provides skilled teachers and personnel for the education system. Broad Access and Improved Quality without Discrimination in Student Admission Honoring Culture, Religion & Tradition, Incorporating Modern Scientific Knowledge Educational Quality and Institutional Management Meeting International Standards

Ministry of Information & Culture

Abdul Karim Khuram

Controls the press, and moderates freedom of expression to respect local mores.

Ministry of Interior

Mohamad Hanif Atmar

Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) Demobilization and Integration Commission (D&RC) Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources & Environment

Diminution and Development - pg 261 Ahmad Yusuf Nuristani

[ authority transferred to Ministries of Agriculture & Finance]

Ministry of Justice

Minister Sarwar Danish

Department of Legislative Drafting Department of Publications Department of Administration Department of Government Cases Department of Social Organizations and Political Parties Department of Prisons Department of Juvenile Justice General Legal Department Kabul Province Legal Department Ministry of Light Industry

Alim Razim

Ministry of Mines & Heavy Industry [since renamed Ministry of Mining]

Eng. Ibrahim Adel

Survey the availability and use of natural resources in Afghanistan. Contracts for planning and laws regarding natural resource use and industrial affairs.

Ministry of Planning

[merged with Ministry of Reconstruction under Ministry of Economy]

Ministry of Public Health

Dr. Sayed Mohammad Amin Fatimie

Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS) National Malaria and Leishmaniasis Control Program (NMLCP) Afghanistan HIV/AIDS Prevention Project (AHAPP) Interface with WHO programs for Tuberculosis and Measles prevention

Ministry of Public Welfare

Sohrab Ali Saffary

Ministry of Public Works

Abdul Qadir

Diminution and Development - pg 262 Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice

Moulvi Mohammed Qasim [providing oversight for now virtually defunct ministry]

Ministry of Reconstruction

[merged with Ministry of Planning under Ministry of Economy]

Ministry of Refugees

Karim Barahowie

Coordinate with UNHCR Refugee Agency for Afghan resettlement programs

Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation & Development

Mohammad Ehsan Zia

Afghanistan Institute for Rural Development (AIRD) Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Program (AREDP) Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF) Emergency National Solidarity Project (NSP II) Inter-Communal Rural Development Project (IRDP) JICA Support Programme for Reintegration (JSPR) Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghansitan (MISFA) National Area-Based Development Programme (NABDP) National Rural Access Programme (NRAP) National Solidarity Programme (NSP) National Surveillance System (NSS) Reform & Institutional Strengthening (Reform) Rural Water Supply & Sanitation (WatSan) Social Protection Department (SPD)

Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation

Hamidullah Qaderi

Control over National Airport in Kabul and ~60 provincial and village airports Control over Ariana National airline, and licensing for all foreign airlines Coordinate with Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) and US:ISAF military

Ministry of Urban Development

Engineer Yousef Pashtun

Ministry of Water & Power [also referred to as Ministry of Water and Energy]

Mohammad Ismail Khan

Diminution and Development - pg 263 Da Afghanistan Breshna Mossesa New and Renewable R&D Center Spinghar Construction Power Construction Unit Secondary Cities Emergency Power Project Developing 58 power sector projects

Ministry of Women's Affairs

Dr. Husn Banu Ghazanfar

Support displaced and chronically poor families Support women's human rights Represent women's issues in health, child birth, rearing and domestic violence Minister of Work, Social Affairs, Martyred, and Disabled

Noor Mohammad Qarqeen

Provides job opportunities for Afghans in cooperation with other ministries and departments. Keep permanent records of all the orphaned and disabled.

Table 1 – State Comparisons, Afghanistan and Texas

(2008 CIA & IMF data) State of Texas

Nation of Afghanistan Area 696,241 km2

647,500 km2

Population 24,326,974

32,738,376 GDP (PPP) $1,245 B

$3.4 B

State Agencies (approx.) 68

107 Gen. Gov. Budget (annual)356 $2.0 B

$2.7B 357

Revenues (annual) $84 B

$0.89 B 358 $Gov per $PPP 6.7%

79.4%

$GGB per $Rev 2.3% 303%

“...the budget is the skeleton of the state stripped of all misleading ideologies.” 359

356 - LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD FISCAL SIZE-UP 2008–09 BIENNIUM 80th Texas Legislature, March 2008 357 - Does not include $227 B spent by US taxpayers, or unaccounted-for $10B’s US:ISAF aid monies 358 - Does not include $2.6 B in Reconstruction Trust Fund Loan, or IMF loans 359 - Schumpeter, Joseph A, “The Economic Crisis of the Tax State.” International Economic Papers, 4; (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1954

Diminution and Development - pg 264 USAID Programs, (Zabul Province)

“...significant increases in USAID/Afghanistan’s budget and program portfolio since 2002 had outstripped workforce resources available for tracking results, periodic reporting, responding to ad-hoc information requests, budget analysis, program evaluation, and other project development and program office functions. Direct hire, US PSC, TCN and FSN personnel ceilings were, and continue to be, constrained by limited office space, housing, high ICASS costs, OE budget limitations and security restrictions, thereby making it difficult to address the challenges....

USAID/Afghanistan’s FY 2010 budget has increased substantially, and the Mission’s overall staffing level is expected to increase by more than 300 employees. As a result ..., USAID/Afghanistan determined that a second phase of the SUPPORT contract, beginning in May 2010, will be required (to deliver) ... Fifteen or more evaluation reports per year.” 360

Completed Activities Alternative Development • Support to National Area Based Development Program August 2005 - October 2007 Democracy & Governance • Afghanistan Rule of Law Project (ARoLP) March 2003 - May 2009 • The Ministry of Women’s Affairs Initiative to Strengthen Policy and Advocacy (MISPA) January 2006 - January 2008 • Support to the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) May 2004 - December 2007 • Afghanistan Local Governance Assistance Project (ALGAP) September 2004 - June 2007 Education • America's Rapid Response to the Education Needs of Afghanistan February 2002 - April 2004 Health • Tuberculosis Control Assistance Program (TB CAP) October 2008 - September 2009 • UNICEF Salt Iodization in Afghanistan October 2008 - September 2009 360 - USAID Services under Program and Project Offices for Results Tracking (SUPPORT), Phase II, RFI-306-09-0541

Diminution and Development - pg 265 • Polio Eradication Activities under Health and Emergency Response Support September 2003 - September 2009 • UNICEF Nutrition Program in Afghanistan October 2008 - September 2009 Infrastructure • REFS - Power September 2002 - June 2007 • Afghanistan Energy Assistance Project May 2004 - March 2007 Ongoing Activities Agriculture • Afghanistan Farm Service Alliance (AFSA) March 2008 - March 2010 • Pastoral Engagement, Adaptation and Capacity Enhancement (PEACE) July 2006 - June 2010 Democracy & Governance • Support to Sub-National Governance Institutions (RC East/South) June 2008 - December 2009 • Building Independent Media in Afghanistan April 2003 - September 2010 • Initiative to Promote Afghan Civil Society (I-PACS) January 2005 - September 2010 • City Links Project February 2007 - September 2010 • Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (UNDP/ELECT) November 2007 - November 2010 • Afghanistan Municipal Strengthening Program (AMSP) May 2007 - November 2010 • Consortium for Electoral and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS) March 2003 - June 2011 • Support to the Electoral Process (STEP) June 2008 - June 2011 • Capacity Development Program (CDP) February 2007 - January 2012 Economic Growth • Afghanistan Small and Medium Enterprise Development (ASMED) October 2006 - October 2011 • Economic Growth and Governance Initiative (EGGI) August 2009 - August 2014 Education

Diminution and Development - pg 266 • Printing of Text Books March 2007 - June 2011 Health • Communication for Behavior Change: Expanding Access to Private Sector Health Products and Services in Afghanistan (COMPRI-A) February 2006 - March 2010 • WHO Health and Emergency Response Support Grant: Polio Eradication Activities September 2003 - September 2010 • Disease Early Warning System (DEWS) October 2006 - September 2010 • Strengthening Pharmaceutical Systems (SPS) May 2008 - September 2010 • MEASURE DHS Phase III: Afghanistan Maternal Mortality Study May 2009 - December 2010 • Health Systems 20/20 October 2008 - September 2011 Infrastructure • Strategic Provincial Roads (SPR) November 2007 - December 2011 Provincial Reconstruction Teams • Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP) April 2007 - April 2010 • Food Insecurity Response for Urban Populations (FIRUP) - South and East March 2009 - September 2010 • Local Governance and Community Development (LGCD) Project October 2006 - September 2010

"I have lost understanding of and confidence in the strategic purposes of the United States' presence in Afghanistan. I have doubts and reservations about our current strategy and planned future strategy, but my resignation is based not upon how we are pursuing this war, but why and to what end."

Matthew P Hoh, former Senior US Civilian Representative to Zabul Province, who resigned his post on 10 September, 2009.


Appendix 3

Figure 50 - Mahomed Azim Khan of Caubul, 1840

The Code of Pashtunwali (پشتونوالي) 361

Pashtun are considered Sunni Muslims (the followers of Islam) at birth. When a baby is born, Pashtun whisper the call for the prayers in the baby`s ears. The male circumcision ceremony is held at the same time as the birth celebration (at about the age of one week old). Pashtun youth officially join the rituals of prayers and fasting when they reach sexual maturity, but in practice they often begin the rituals much earlier. A Pashtun tribal council is called a ‘Jirga’.

Pashtun are characterized by their Pashto language and their practice of Pashtunwali. Examples of Pashto are words used for the code of Pashtunwali, which is an ancient traditional code of conduct and honor. These include ‘Mailmastia’ (hospitality); ‘Torah’ (sword also means courage); ‘Ghairate’ (protection for one’s honor); and ‘Badal’ (Revenge).

Overview

Pashtunwali is a concept of living or philosophy for the Pashtun peoples, and is regarded as an honor code and unwritten law. Though Pashtunwali dates back to pre-Islamic times, its practice by the Pashtun does not contravene Islamic principles. It is practiced by the Pashtun in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and expatriate members of Pashtun Diasporas around the world.

361 - Courtesy of Mr. Yamah Sharifi

Diminution and Development - pg 268 Pashtunwali is an ancient code of honor` that is a set of rules guiding both individuals and communal conducts. Pashtunwali is practiced socially by the majority of Afghans.

Pashtun embrace an ancient tradition, spiritual and communal identity tied to a set of moral codes and rules of behavior, in a linear record of history spanning over five thousand years. Pashtunwali promotes self respect, independence, justice, hospitality, love, forgiveness, revenge and tolerance towards all, especially to (strangers or guests). It is considered a personal responsibility for every Pashtun to discover and rediscover the essence and meaning of Pashtunwali in their daily lives.

Pashtunwali is a dominant force of Pashtun culture and identity. Pashtunwali is conservative, oligarchic, and centuries old but still a changing phenomenon in Pashtun culture and socio-economic structure. Pashtunwali has been able to maintain a powerful moral balance within Pashtun society and has undergone various political, economical and cultural changes for its reform. It has developed into a complementary part of Pashtun cultural practices and as an accepted format for an ethnic constitution.

Pashtunwali consists of terms of moral authority, such as Khpelwaki (Self Authority); Jirga (Assembly); Mishertob (Elders); Ezzat (Respect of all people); Roogha (Reconciliation or compromise); Badal (Revenge); Barabari (equality); Teega/Nerkh (law); Aziz, Azizwali (Clan, Clanship); Terbor, Terborwalai, (Cousin and Tribal Rivalries); Nang, (Honor); Ghairat (Pride); Oogaha Warkawel (to Help Somebody in Need); Nanawati Warkawel (to Offer Asylum and Protection); Asher (Shared Cooperative Work); Zhamana (Commitment); Chegha (Call for Action); and Suolah, (Truce).

Pashtunwali is the large and complex informal local government across all of Central Asia. Pashtunwali has a structure in terms of Jirga, Sialy and Barabari; it has a defensive system in terms of Jierga, Chegha, and Arbakai, (the system of village militia or defense power); and it’s a legal system in terms of Jirga, Teegha, Nerkh Pannah and Roogha. This system managed all social and internal affairs of Pashtun society both before and after the institution of Islam.

Pashtunwali embodies all the principle of a self sufficient social group. Its twin principles of Sialy (competition) and Mailmastia (hospitality) embody those social principles that ensure both progress through competition and survival through cooperation. The elements of conflict and co-optation are equally balanced in the makeup of Pashtunwali. Within this balance, the concept of Nang (honor), Sialyi (competition) and Badal (revenge or retribution) remain open to interpretation, as the social needs and collective perception of the group change with time.

Code of Practice

· Faith - Trust in God (known as ``Allah`` in Arabic and ``Khdai`` in Pashtu). The nature of trusting in one creation generally comports to the Islamic idea of belief in only one God. In terms of faith in action, a Pashtun must always strive to think good thoughts, speak good words and do good deeds.

· Behavior - Pashtun must behave respectfully towards all creation including people, animals and the environment around them. Pollution of the environment and its destruction is against the pashtunwali practice.

· Unity - Above the Pashto language they speak, above the blood-bond they keep, above the wealth they create, pashtunwali unites the Pashtun as one people across the


world. Where there is true unity, every effort to disunite them will only serve to strengthen the unity they have. What happens to one, happens to all.

· Equality - Every man and woman is considered equal. It is this concept that has necessitated the development among Pashtun of the Jirga system, where decision making takes place with the participation of all members of the Pashtun society. Every person wants a say in their future and will fight for their right to have their opinion heard. All people must therefore deal with each other, with a proper civility or respect, and no one may impose their will upon another.

· Freedom and independence - The belief in the freedom of physical, mental, religious, spiritual, political and economic realms is for all to use, male and female, so long as it is done without bringing harm to other. The free have nothing to gain from their freedom without the discipline to first, do no harm.

· Proselytizing - Pashtunwali says that no individual has the right to place their demands upon others who are not their own children, regarding what they believe.

· Hospitality and sanctuary - Being hospitable to all mankind, especially to guests, and even to the most hostile of enemies may (if asked for) be provided sanctuary, asylum or protection, as well as food and other aids.

· Justice and forgiveness - If one intentionally wrongs another, the victim has the right, even an obligation, to avenge this injustice in equal proportion. If one intentionally wronged you, and you did not seek justice nor did the person ask for forgiveness than a debt is owed to you by them, which can only be fulfilled once justice (either through compensation, an act of revenge or a decision of the Jirga council) has been provided to recompense the wrong done.

· Brotherhood and trust - The belief that fellow Pashtun brothers and sisters should be trusted and freely assisted to the greatest extent possible.

· Honor - Pashtuns must maintain their independence and dignity. Honor has great importance in Pashtun society and most other edicts and codes of life are aimed towards the preservation of one`s honor or pride.

· Self respect - Individuals must respect themselves in order to be able to respect others, especially those they do not know. Respect begins at home, among family members and relatives.

· Compassion and co-operation - The poor, the weak and the challenged must be supported with alms. Inclusion is always preferred to exclusion, to defend against tyranny, fascism and overzealousness. Work smarter, first, than harder.

· Family - The family must be glorified as a sacred conviction, responsibility and duty with respect for wives, daughter, elders, parents, sons, and husbands.

· We are one family - Fellow Pashtun must be cared for. There may be hundreds of tribes, but they all have one destiny in union with each other.

· Knowledge - Pashtun seeks objective knowledge in life, art, science and culture, which are considered the fruits of life granted by God.

· Pashtun history - Great value is placed in Pashtun history, with its factions and pluralism, its tragedies and victories. It teaches Pashtun to keep an open mind, and to continue the search for truth, much of which has vanished into history itself.

· Fight evil - Evil with this constant war with God. Evil must be fought and good must prevail over evil. It is a Pashtuns’ duty to fight evil, whenever they come face to face with it.

· Honesty and promise - Pashtuns are known for keeping their promises and being honest at all situation and times. A true Pashtun will never break his promise.


· Hospitality - Pashtun treats all guests and people who enter their homes with great respect and always go by the saying ``Mailma de Khodai Malgarai Dai`` (a guest is God’s friend…) so making your guest happy correlates to making God happy.

Principal Concepts

Some useful concepts that signify individual or collective Pashtun tribal functions are given below in Pashto language. The first four form the major components of pashtunwali code.

· Mailmastia (hospitality) - Showing hospitality and profound respect to all visitors, regardless of distinction of race, religion, national affiliation as well as economic status and doing so without any hope of remuneration or favor. The Pashtuns are widely considered to be the most hospitable people in the world and Pashtuns will go to great extents to show their hospitality, so much so, that in some cases it has been observed that Pashtun even provide enemies with sanctuary.

· Badal (justice/revenge) - Seek justice over time or over space to avenge a wrong. This applies to an injustice committed yesterday or even 1000 years ago, if a wrongdoer still exists. Justice in Pashtun lore need elaborating, even a mere taunt or (paighor) is regarded as an insult- which can only usually be redressed by shedding the taunter’s blood (or his next closest male relation); this in turn leads to a blood feud that can last for generations and can involve whole tribes with loss of hundreds of innocent lives. Normally blood feuds are thus settled in a number of other ways.

· Nanawateh (asylum) – Meaning ’sanctuary’ in Pashto language, it is a basic tenet of the Pashtunwali code. Nanawateh gives the requester complete asylum, and once granted by the Pashtun clan, the seeker is protected at all costs against his or her enemies. It means that all Pashtun are willing to suffer, fight, and even die for anyone who comes knocking at his door seeking refuge, even if it’s the worst enemy. The nanawateh is also used when a vanquished party is prepared to go into the house of the victors and ask their forgiveness, in a peculiar form of ’chivalrous’ surrender, in which an enemy seeks ’sanctuary’ at their enemy’s home.

· Zemaka (land/earth) - A Pashtun must defend their land or property from incursion.

The Honor Code

Nang (honor) – The various terms below are those which tribal men must observe to ensure his own honor, and that of his family, is upheld. Preservation of honor entails the defense of family and independence, within the cultural and religious requirements.

Namuse (honor of women)- A Pashtun must defend the honor of Pashtun women at all costs and must protect them from verbal and physical harm.

Hewad (country) - Love for one`s nation in Pashtun social culture is not just important, it is essential. A Pashtun is always indebted to their nation and must strive to perfect and improve it. A Pashtun consider it his obligation to defend his country against any foreign incursion. Defense of nation means defense of honour, value, culture, tradition, countrymen and self.

Doud-pasbani (protecting Pashtun culture) - It is obligatory for a Pashtun to protect Pashtun culture from dilution and disintegration. Pashtunwali advises, in order to successfully

Diminution and Development - pg 271 accomplish this, a Pashtun must retain the Pashto language since Pashto is the prime source of Pashtun culture. It`s understanding is not just important but essential. Not being able to speak Pashto is often translated by Pashtun society as the inability to understand the Pashtun culture, values, ethics, history, and community.

Thokhm posbani (protecting the Pashtun race) - Pashtun with their distinct Afghan features are often immediately recognizable. Pashtun must take another Pashtun as a married partner. This stems from a general belief that half-caste Pashtuns do not retain the Pashtun language, culture, and physical features.

De pashtunwali perawano (adhering to the Pashtun race) - In order to keep ones descendents from becoming outcast, a Pashtun must adhere to the pashtunwali principle of culture, kin and pedigree. Those who do not will ultimately face expulsion from Pashtun society.

Important Pashtun Terms

Lashkar (tribal army) - It implements the decision of Jirga.

Jirga or loya Jirga- Assembly of tribal elders called for various purposes whether waging war or composing peace, Tribal or inter tribal.

Chlweshti (the fortieth) - Derived from the word ’forty’, this refers to the force that would implement the decision of a Jirga. Every fortieth man of the tribe would become a member. A Shalgoon is a force derived from the number twenty.

Badraga a (tribal escort) - A tribal escort composed of members of that tribe through which the travelers are passing. If a badragga is violated a tribal feud follow.

Hamsaya (neighbors) – A non-Pashtun group or clan who attaches themselves to a Pashtun group, usually for protection. The Pashtun protector is called a Niak. Any attack on a hamasaya is considered an attack on the Pashtun protector.

Mlatar (literally tying the back, or support) - This refers to those members of the tribal clan who will actually fight on behalf of their elder leaders.

Nagha (tribal fine) – A tribal fine decided by the council of elders, imposed upon wrongdoer.

Rogha- Settlement of dispute between two functions in Pashtun culture.

Hujira- A common place for sitting or sleeping for males in the village. Visitors and unmarried young men sleep in the Hujira.

Loshy warkawel- Literally means giving of pots, utensils and other things needed for the person who seeks shelter in the village, the idea that the tribe will do everything to protect an individual granted nanawateh from all enemies.


Abbreviations and Terms 362 ‘055’, a predominantly Arab and Asian paramilitary formation that was formerly known as Brigade 055 has transformed into a larger, more effective fighting unit known as the Lashkar al Zil, or Shadow Army ‘313’, jihad cell originating with Mohammad Ilyas Kashmiri, a Kashmiri-born al-Qa’idah leader and former Pakistan Special Service Group soldier, believed to be the jihadi general allied to al-Qa’idah leader Mullah Omar 3D, Defence, Diplomacy, Development 3W, Third World (non-industrialized nations) ‘9/11’, attack against World Trade Center (see ‘WTC’) and Pentagon using civilian aircraft in 2001; [considered PNAC’s ‘Pearl Harbor Moment’ to initiate pre-emptive global domination] ABF, attacks by fire ABM, anti-ballistic missile ACAP, Afghan Civilian Assistance Program ACINT, acoustic intelligence (listening posts) ACRP, Afghanistan Community Renewal Program ADB, Asian Development Bank ADP, Afghan Development Program (USAID) AEC, Agency Evaluation Committee AF, Air Force (US) AFB, Air Force Base (US) AFN, Afghanis – Local Currency of Afghanistan [NOTE: Afghans are not ‘Afghanis’] ‘Af-Pak’, Afghanistan-Pakistan War [aka ‘Second Front in Global War on Terror’] AFMIS, Afghanistan Financial Management Information System AGE Anti-government element AID, Agency for International Development [USAID] AIHRC, Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission ‘airbrushing history’, psyops program of eliminating narratives, research and all evidence (including by arson and assassination) which conflicts with official State version of history AKDN, Aga Khan Development Network ‘al-Qa’idah’, US CIA label used to encapsulate now international ‘Islamic Jihad’ state cells ALGAP, Afghanistan Local Governance Assistance Project AMB, Ambassador ANA, Afghan National Army ANBP, Afghanistan New Beginnings Program ANDS Afghanistan National Development Strategy ANP, Afghan National Police (militia) (AF) ANP, Awamy National Party (PK) ARDS, Afghanistan Reconstruction and Development Services ARoLP, Afghanistan Rule of Law Project ARTF, Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund ASD, Assistant Secretary of Defense (US) ASMED, Afghanistan Small and Medium Enterprise Development

362 - Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 30 May 2008) at http://www.militarynewsnetwork.com/publications/militaryterms.pdf

Diminution and Development - pg 273 ASP, Afghanistan Stabilization Program ‘asynchronous warfare’, hit-and-run insurgent warfare against heavily-armoured forces; also refers to civilian terrorism applied against national government or occupation military ‘Axis of Evil’, Bush Era branding effort to conflate PNAC Crusades with ill-defined ‘bad men’ dictatorships (e.g. those not sponsored by US:UK) ‘backchannel’, a method of communication outside normal bureaucratic procedure BAF, reference to Bagram, main US airbase at Kabul BIP, Branding Implementation Program (USAID), specific labelling required on all packaging, stating that, ‘This assistance is from the American People’ ... in English. ‘blowback’, unintended consequences of a planned action (unanticipated counter-response) C3, command, control, and communications (US) ‘Caliphate’, banner slogan used as rallying cry by al-Qa’idah to obtain their jihadi support, referring to an idealized ancient era after Greco-Roman collapse, when Islamic Caliphate encompassed all of MENA, and was considered the ‘center of civilization’ during Europe’s ‘Dark Ages’. Caliphate was first defeated by Crusaders in 1099, hence jihadi casus belli. CAP, Combined Action Platoon CAS, Controlled American Source CAWSS, Central Authority for Water Supply and Sewerage CBS, Canadian Based Staff CDC, Community Development Council CDR, Combined Delivery Report CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women CGAP, Consultative Group for Assistance to the Poorest CIA, Central Intelligence Agency CiC, Commander in Chief (US POTUS) CIDA, Canadian International Development Agency CIP, Commodities Import Program CHU, Containerized Housing Unit (US) CJCS, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff CL, classified ‘Clear and Hold’, US transition military strategy to abandoned ‘Hearts and Minds’, with no endgame: clear and hold, ...and then what? Since abandoned for some new COIN strategy. CM, Chairman’s (of JCS) memorandum CMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps CNTF, Counter Narcotics Trust Fund CODEL, Congressional delegation COIN, Counterinsurgency Warfare [as, Clintonian, ‘Hearts and Minds’, a form of military psyops upon an occupied civilian population] COMINT, communications intelligence COMPRI-A, Communication for Behavior Change: Expanding Access to Private Sector Health Products and Services in Afghanistan CONUS, Continental United States ‘Crusades’, Christian military attacks against the Muslim-held Holy Lands during the Middle Ages, now largely forgotten in the West, but still alive in Islamic history, even as the US still remembers 9/11, and will likely enshrine that event in its permanent State liturgy. CSA, Chief of Staff of the Army CSAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force CSC, Corrections Services Canada

Diminution and Development - pg 274 CTZ, corps tactical zone DAB, Da Afghanistan Bank DAC, Development Assistance Committee DCI, Director of Central Intelligence DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission DDAs, District Development Assemblies DDI, Deputy Directorate for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency DDR, Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration DEWS, Disease Early Warning System DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency DIAG, Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups DEL, delegate; delegation DFAIT, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade DfID, Department for International Development (UK) DND, Department of National Defence DNS, Debt-for-Nature Swap DOD, Department of Defense DOD/ISA, (DoD) Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs DOS, Department of State DPRG, Defense Program Review Group ECM, electronic counter measures EMBTEL, Embassy telegram ‘emergency funding’, In 2007, the US Defense Department initiated the first ‘emergency funding for Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and other undisclosed national security purposes’ program, which includes an unaudited slush fund for domestic psyops. The ‘emergency funding’ program has since grown by leaps and bounds to an astounding $138B for 2009. EOB, Executive Office Building EPRT, Embedded (with Military) Provisional Reconstruction Team (USAID) EQUALS, Engineering, Quality Assurance and Logistical Support EQUIP, Educational Quality Improvement Program EXDIS, exclusive distribution (extremely limited distribution) FAIDA, Financial Access for Investing in the Development of Afghanistan FAARP, Forward Arming and Refueling Point (US) FAL, forward air liaison FATA, Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (see NWFP) FEOP, Foreign Exchange Operations Fund FININT, financial intelligence by following electronic bank transactions FIRUP, Food Insecurity Response for Urban Populations FLASH, indicates message of highest priority requiring attention of US Secretary of State FMS, foreign military sales FOB, Forward Operating Base (US) FPs, Facilitating Partners FY, fiscal year FYI, for your information GAO, Government Accountability Office (US) GCC, Gulf Cooperation Council for (e.g. oil-producing) Arab States of Persian Gulf Region

Diminution and Development - pg 275 ‘Ghost Dancing’, a 19th Century Native American proselytising faith in the final days of ‘reservation’ resettlement (permanent detention camps) under permanent White occupation, advocating honesty, cleanliness and fair play, in a stylized ceremonial dance meant to evoke a restored utopia where all White settlers would have gone; nearly identical to the Taliban belief in faith, virtue, clean living and a restored former Caliphate of Islam. Psychically debilitating in these extreme cases, Richard Rorty described this (more general sense of malaise within wider society) as an anti-anti-ethnocentric ‘Copenhagen syndrome’. 'glasnost', policy of maximal publicity, openness, and transparency in Soviet government introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev near mid-point of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and failing State economy, following the Brezhnev Era of Soviet expansionism and belligerence. Together with 'perestroika', calling for liberal political and economic reforms, Gorbachev’s movement is strikingly similar to the progressive liberal slogans of US President Obama, also made at sim. stage of US occupation of Afghanistan and failing US economy, after Bush Era expansionism and belligerence, [a similarity Gorbachev himself was first to point out]. GMT, Greenwich Mean Time GOA, Government of Afghanistan ‘Gorgon Stare’, new high-resolution UAV video capability, allowing multiple-feed remote visual and individual target acquisition, over an area of several square miles [‘insect eye’], as part of US plan to ‘automate and Afghanize’ the ‘Af-Pak’ war into a self-sustaining operation GWOT, Global War on Terror, US war of occupation in Iraq, also OIF, ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ [sim. ‘GWOT2’ as ‘Second Front in War on Terror’ for Afghanistan-Pakistan War, ...now not used under latest COIN policy], emphasis on ‘Terror’ is PNAC psyops to conflate US pre-emptive attack and occupation of sovereign country(s) with bogeyman ‘Other’. HCR, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees HEW/HHS, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare / Health & Human Services (US) ‘Hearts and Minds’, a form of COIN, rarely successfully achieved in war, to win over an occupied population by convincing them the occupation is both legitimate and unstoppable; [used with a degree of success in non-war, e.g. ‘Flower Revolutions’, former Soviet States, to convince the People COINs ‘popular citizens movement’ was genuine, and newly-installed mafiocracy was legitimately ‘their own’, as also Argentina under ‘reformist’ Carlos Menem; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4dbb4U8v3YQ&feature=related a neo-liberal changeling] HQ, headquarters HUMINT, human intelligence (US) intelligence provided by interrogation and espionage HumVee, basic ground troop transport vehicle [since armoured, upgraded later with MRAPs] IALP, Integrated Alternative Livelihoods Project (Kandahar) IARCSC, Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission ICC, International Supervision and Control Commission ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross IDA, International Development Association IDB, Islamic Development Bank IDLO, International Development Law Organization (Rome) IDP, Internally Displaced Persons IDR, Internally Displaced Refugee (est. 2.5M, and 1.6M orphans) IEC, Independent Electoral Commission IFI, International Financial Institutions IG, Interdepartmental Group IMF, International Monetary Fund IMINT, satellite image intelligence

Diminution and Development - pg 276 IMPACS, Institute for Media Policy and Civil Society INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State INR/IL, Office of Information Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research I-PACS, Initiative to Promote Afghan Civil Society IRoA, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs ISI, Pakistan national Inter-Services Intelligence agency, equivalent to US CIA ISAF, International Security Assistance Force ‘Islamic jihad’, Arab political insurgent movement, originally against Israeli settlement in Palestine, fanned into flames and widespread terrorism with USA occupation of Saudi, the Muslim holy land, in 1990, based on now-proven Defense disinformation; becoming a global insurrection following PNAC-inspired occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, [see ‘Caliphate’] JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum JEMB, Joint Electoral Management Body JEMBS, Joint Electoral Management Body Secretariat JUSMAG, Joint United States Military Assistance Group JUSPAO, Joint United States Public Affairs Office KIA, killed in action KDR, reference to US:UK airbase at Kandahar KHAD, Afghan secret service intelligence equivalent to Soviet KGB and Pakistani ISI ‘Khalq’, (‘Masses’) a ‘leftist’ faction of PDPA, prior to Soviet occupation [see ‘Parcham’] ‘Last best hope of man on earth’, banner slogan coined by Neo-Conservative figurehead former US President Ronald Reagan in final days of Anti-Communist Cold War, in refer to US exceptionalism; used by President GW Bush Jr to rally GWOT after 9/11 as "Last Best Hope For Mankind"; again by Senator John McCain in failed bid as successor. Accompanied by a rampant field of American flags and ‘Star Spangled Banner’ war anthem. [see ‘PNAC’] LDCs, Least Developed Countries LES, Local Engaged Staff (CIDA) LFA, Logical Framework Analysis LIMDIS, limited distribution LOC, lines of communication LOTFA,Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan MA, Monitoring Agent MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group MAC, Military Assistance Command MASF, Military Assistance Sales Funded ‘madrassah’, Islamist training school (sim. full-immersion Christian ‘Sunday school’), during Soviet occupation of Afghanistan by then Pakistani President Zia-al-Haq within FATA:NWFP as human bulwark defence against Communism using CIA funding, later revealed as psychological indoctrination centres for ‘Islamic jihad’. MAP, Military Assistance Program MAPA, United Nations Mine Action Program for Afghanistan MAT(s), Mobile Advisory Team(s) MCN, Ministry of Counter Narcotics (GoA) MCP, Management Capacity Program

Diminution and Development - pg 277 MENA, Middle East North Africa, a loose economic union of Islamic countries MEU, Marine Expeditionary Unit MEW, Ministry of Energy and Water (GoA) MFIs, Micro Finance Institutions MFI, Microfinance Institute MISFA, Microfinance Investment and Support Facility for Afghanistan MISPA, Ministry of Women’s Affairs Initiative to Strengthen Policy and Advocacy (GoA) MIWRE, Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources and Environment MoC, Ministry of Communication (GoA) MoE, Ministry of Education (GoA) MoF, Ministry of Finance (GoA) MoFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (GoA) MoI, Ministry of Interior (GoA) MoJ, Ministry of Justice (GoA) MoM, Ministry of Mines (responsible for Hydrocarbon Law and Minerals Law) (GoA) MoPW, Ministry of Public Works (GoA) MOWA, Ministry of Women's Affairs (GoA) MP Member of Parliament MRRD, Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development MR, Military Region MRAP, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (military vehicle) MR-ATV, Mine Resistant All Terrain Vehicle MRRD, Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development (GoA) MUDH, Afghan Ministry of Urban Development and Housing ‘Mullah Omar’, Mohammed Omar is widely credited for codifying ‘Taliban’ movement initiated under former Pakistani President Zia-al-Haq. Omar calls himself a ‘Talib’ (he did not graduate madrassah) so ‘Mullah’ is an honorarium NABDP, National Area-Based Development Program NAPWA National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCO, non-commissioned officer NCTC, National Counterterrorism Center (US) NEEP, National Emergency Employment Program NEEPRA, National Emergency Employment Project for Rural Access NESA, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis (US CIA) NIE, National Intelligence Estimate NODIS, no distribution (other than to persons indicated) NOFORN, no foreign dissemination NGO, Non-Governmental Organization NPP, National Priority Program NPSO, National Program Support Office NSP, National Solidarity Program NRAP, National Rural Access Program NSA, National Security Agency (US) NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum NSC, National Security Council NSP, National Solidarity Program NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum

Diminution and Development - pg 278 NWFP, North West Frontier Provinces of Pakistan (see FATA) OASD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs OBL, Osama bin Laden, spiritual leader of ‘al-Qa’idah’ and allegedly co-conspirator in 9/11 attack, considered dead by Pakistani leaders, but forever omnipresent in US:ISAF psyops OC, Oversight Consultant (see PSC) OCONUS, outside the continental United States ODA,Official Development Assistance ODNI, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (US) OEF-A, Operation Enduring Freedom - Afghanistan OEP, Office of Emergency Preparedness OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights OIF , Operation Iraqi Freedom OMB, Office of Management and Budget ONE, Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency ‘Operation Anaconda’, US code name for action in Shahi-Kot Valley, after Tora Bora ‘Operation Panther’s Claw’, UK forces code name for Summer 2009 ‘surge’ operation ‘Operation Polo Step’, US forces code name for covert 1998 operations in Afghanistan OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense OSI, Office of Strategic Influence; “in February, 2002, the US Pentagon announced a plan to create an Office of Strategic Influence to provide (propaganda) ‘news and information’ both domestically and abroad to help manipulate public opinion and further its military objectives. Following a public outcry, the Pentagon said it would close the office -- news that would have sounded more convincing had it not come from a place that announced it was planning to spread disinformation." President Bush on November 1, 2001 signed an executive order that gives all incumbent and former presidents since 1980 (Reagan) full veto authority in perpetuity over public access to documents in their publicly-archived Presidential Papers. OTA, Office of Terrorism Analysis, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency P, US President Obama (also POTUS) PAD, Project Approval Document ‘Parcham’, (‘Flag’) a ‘rightist’ faction of PDPA, prior to Soviet occupation (see ‘Khalq’) PC Provincial Council PDPA, People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, elite intelligentsia bureaucracy running the national pro-Marxist government in Kabul, prior to Soviet occupation 'perestroika', (see ‘glasnost’) PFEM, Public Finance and Expenditure Management PFM, Public Financial Management PFIAB, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board PKMB, Performance and Knowledge Management Branch (CIDA) PL–480, Public Law 480 (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service Food for Peace Act) PM, Prime Minister, also, Afghan Pro Memory PNAC, Project for New American Century, amalgamation of supremacist beliefs sim. Mein Kampf, championed by Fukuyama’s, ‘End of History’: as a One World Government Super-Power. VP Cheney, SecDef Rumsfeld and UN Ambassador Khalilzhad were among PNACs co-founders, with Defense advisors, Perle, Feith and Wolfowitz, shaping the “Bush Doctrine’ analogue to Soviet ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’, and leading the US down the same road to collapse POL, political issues in the Department of State Central Files POW, prisoner of war PR, public relations

Diminution and Development - pg 279 PRC Program Review Committee ([USAID] PRR, Priority Reform and Restructuring (also Peace, Reconciliation, Reintegration President Hamid Karzai’s attempt to reintegrate Taliban into Afghan secular society) PRT, Provisional Reconstruction Team (USAID) ‘Predator’, armed, remotely-piloted single propeller-driven reconnaissance and attack UAV PSC, Personal Services Contract (US) PSU, Program Support Unit (CIDA) ‘psyops’, psychological operation(s), both against the enemy and also against the home front to legitimize war and achieve strategic goals by media repetition. Goebbels defined its use, ‘"It must confine itself to a few points, and repeat them over and over.” PTI, Pakistan Transition Initiative (PK) RAMP, Rebuilding Afghanistan Markets Program (USAID) RAU, Result and Accountability Unit (CIDA) RCT, regimental combat team RD, rural development RECCE, reconnaissance ‘Reaper’, armed, remotely-piloted single turboprop-driven reconnaissance and attack UAV REFTEL, reference telegram RF/PF, Regional Forces/Popular Forces RG, Record Group ‘RPG’, Rocket Propelled Grenade [Soviet innovation for asynchronous insurgency warfare] RRMAF, Results and Risk Management and Accountability Framework SAC, Strategic Air Command SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SECTO, series indicator for telegrams from US Secretary State to the Department of State SEAL, Support to the Establishment of the Afghanistan Parliament SEPTEL, separate telegram SGU(s), Special Group Unit(s) ‘Shi’a’, (see ‘Sunni’) SIGINT, Signal Intelligence SLCDP, Senior Leadership Competency Development Programme (AF) SOE, Statement of Expenditures SME, Subject Matter Expert SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate SPR, Strategic Petroleum Reserve (US) SPS, Strengthening Pharmaceutical Systems SRLA, Strengthening the Rule of Law in Afghanistan S/S, Executive Secretariat of the Department of State ‘Sunni’,( simplistically) adherents of Islam who believe in choosing their religious Imam (‘leader’) from among a circle of elders, as opposed to Shi’a, who believe only the direct descendants of the Prophet Mohammed (pbuh) may assume the Imam’s authority, so are considered ‘orthodox’ and ‘fundamentalist’ [sim. sense as Catholics versus Protestants] TACAIR, tactical air strikes TAFS, Technical Assistance and Feasibility Studies TAP, Transparency, Accountability, and Performance Project TBS, Treasury Board Secretariat

Diminution and Development - pg 280 TSA, Treasury Single Account ‘Taliban’, fundamentalist extremist movement, former Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) ‘Tango’, derogatory (military alphabet) slang for ‘Taliban’, [sim. ‘Gook’ during Viet Nam] TAC, Tactical Air Command TDY, temporary duty TOT, time of target TS, Top Secret U, Office of the Under Secretary of State UAE, United Arab Emirates UAV, armed, remotely-piloted, single-engine reconnaissance and attack aircraft UN, United Nations UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNDP, United Nations Development Program UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNMACA, United Nations Mine Action Center for Afghanistan UNMAS, United Nations Mine Action Service UNODC, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNOPS, United Nations Office for Project Services USA, United States Army USAF, United States Air Force USAID, US Agency for International Development USG, United States Government USIA, United States Information Agency USMC, United States Marine Corps USN, United States Navy USSOC, United States Special Operations Command VAAP, vulnerability assessment and assistance program ‘Wahhabism’, Islamic belief system attributed to Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, (18th century), advocating purging Islam of all ‘modern innovations’, as well referring to an ultra-orthodox Salafist adaption of Sunni sharia, sim.Halacha of Charedi ultra-orthodox Judaism WB, World Bank WH, White House WHO, White House Office (series indicator for White House messages) WIA, wounded in action WISDIM, Warfighting and Intelligence Systems Dictionary for Information Management WSAG, Washington Special Actions Group ‘WTC’, World Trade Center, destroyed in 9/11 attack and symbolic rallying flag for PNACs GWOT, [now referred to as just ‘9/11’, accompanied by lurid psyops attack-video replays, and deliberately conflating that Afghans and Afghanistan had nothing to do with the attack] WRAF, Women's Rights Fund Afghanistan ‘Zionism’, Israeli settlers response to anti-Israel sentiment in Arab world, following British division of Palestine into Israeli-controlled and Palestine-controlled territories. In its essence, a supremacist racist religious movement within Israeli democracy, championed by the Likud Party, (sim. PNAC), representing religious apartheid, non-citizen status for Arabs, building settlements, gerrymandering and apartheid walls. Zionism is a casus belli of Islamic jihad.


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Diminution and Development - pg 290 Carrasco, Enrique and Ro, Jane, “Remittance and Development”, in The E-Book on International Finance and Development Part 4-II, The University of Iowa Center for International Finance and Development, http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/ebook2/contents/part4-II.shtml Chan,Samuel, “Sentinels of Afghan Democracy: The Afghan National Army”, (US Army:Professional Writing Collection), Vol. 7, February, 2009. http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume7/february_2009/2_09_1_pf.html Chin, Larry, “Players on a Rigged Chessboard: Bridas, Unocal, and the Afghanistan Pipeline,” (US:OnlineJournal.com), March 6, 2002. Cole, August, Number of US mercenaries in Afghanistan skyrockets, U.S. Adding Contractors at Fast Pace, (NY:Wall Street Journal), December 02,2009 Cramer, C. and J. Goodhand. “Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better? War, the State and the 'Post-Conflict' Challenge in Afghanistan.” (The Hague:Development and Change) 33(5): pgs 885-909, 2002 Dale, Catherine, "War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress”, (WA DC:Congressional Research Service), January 23, 2009 Dilegge, Dave, “Hearts and Minds.” (US:SmallWarsJournal.com), 21 October 2007 http://smallwarsjournal.com Dobbin, Murray, “Afghan Election's Outcome Doesn't Matter”, (Vancouver:The Tyee) 27 Aug 2009 at http://thetyee.ca/Opinion/2009/08/27/AfghanOutcome/ Donini, Antonio, “Khaki and Pink: a Humanitarian Perspective on Stabilization Operations in Afghanistan.” Paper ISA's 50th Annual Convention "Exploring The Past, Anticipating The Future", NYC. 15 February 2009 Draper, Ron, “And He Shall Be Judged”, (New York:GQ Magazine) 17 June, 2009, http://www.gq.com/news-politics/newsmakers/200905/donald-rumsfeld-administration-peers-detractors Drilling For The Truth: More Information Surfaces On Unpaid Oil Royalties, (US:POGO.org), 1 January, 1997 Elliot, Larry, "A Choice Only Afghanistan Can Make," (London:The Observer), 15 October, 2001 Epstein, Gerald, Gerald Epstein on the Fallout from Offshoring, from Bargaining Power, Distributional Equity and the Challenge of Off-Shoring, (Amherst:PERI), February, 2007 “Ex-Taliban fighter tells of training, cash, orders from Pakistani military”, (Kabul:Kabulpress.org), June 30, 2008. Farmer, Ben, “Afghanistan: senior female judge accuses Hamid Karzai over release of drug lords”, (London:Telegraph), 06 Sep 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 291 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/6147248/Afghanistan-senior-female-judge-accuses-Hamid-Karzai-over-release-of-drug-lords.html Filkins, Dexter, “Stanley McChrystal’s Long War”, (NY:New York Times), October 14, 2009 Filkins, Dexter, “Karzai’s brother is said to be on CIA payroll”, (NY:New York Times), 27 October 2009 Fisk, Robert, “Anti-Soviet Warrior Puts His Army On the Road to Peace”, (London:The Independent), 6 December 1993 Floyd, Chris, When Blood is Their Argument: An Empire on Fire, http://www.chris-floyd.com referencing, Patrick Cockburn, US Surge will only prolong Afghan war, (London:The Independent) 6 December, 2009 Foster, John, “A Pipeline Through A Troubled Land: Afghanistan, Canada, And The New Great Energy Game”, (Ottawa: CCPA, Foreign Policy Series) Volume 3, No. 1, June 19, 2008 http://www.policyalternatives.ca/documents/National_Office_Pubs/2008/A_Pipeline_Through_a_Troubled_Land.pdf Foust, Joshua, “Garrisons and force protection crowd out other objectives in Afghanistan”, (NY:Reuters) 27 March 2009 “From The Secret Files On King Zahir's Reign In Afghanistan, 1970-1973”, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 59, Edited by William Burr, October 26, 2001 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB59/ “G20 leaders tout consensus, $1 trillion in aid “ (Scarborough:CTV Canada), 2 April 2009 http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20090402/G20_economy_090402/20090402?hub=Politics Galbraith, Peter, “What I Saw at the Afghan Election”, (WADC:The Washington Post), 4 October 2009 Galeotti, Mark, “Decline and Fall. September 1991: Farewell, Soviet Union”, (Berkshire:Jane’s Intelligence Review), September 1991:436 Galloway, Gloria, How Canada does counterinsurgency, (Toronto:The Globe and Mail) 6 November, 2009 Gardezi, Hassan, “Making of the Neo-Colonial State in South Asia: The Pakistan Experience”, (Baltimore:Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East), Volume 20, Number 1&2, 2000, pp. 211-218 Ghani, A.,C. Lockhart and M.Carnahan, M., “Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State-Building”, Working Paper no 253, (London: Overseas Development Institute), 2005

Diminution and Development - pg 292 Ghani, Dr. Ashraf, “Karzai and 22,000 Villages”, (WA DC:The National Interest) Number 105, Jan / Feb 2010, pp. 40-48 Gillespie, Thomas and Agnew, John, “Finding Osama bin Laden: An Application of Biogeographic Theories and Satellite Imagery”, (Cambridge: MIT International Review), 27 February 2009 Giustozzi, A, “Respectable Warlords? The politics of state-building in post-Taleban Afghanistan.” Working Paper no 33. (London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics), 2003 Gonzales, Vince, “THE WAR ON WASTE - Rumsfeld Says 2.3 Trillion Dollars Missing”, (US:CBS News), 10 September, 2001 Goodhand, Jonathan, "Aiding Violence Or Building Peace? The Role of International Aid in Afghanistan", (London:Third World Quarterly), vol. 23, no. 5, Oct. 2002, pp. 837-859. Goodson, Larry, "Afghanistan's Long Road to Reconstruction", (The Johns Hopkins University Press:Journal of Democracy), Volume 14, Number 1, January, 2003 Gottlieb, Sanford, “Uncle Sam's Foreign Military Bases.” (Washington DC:Center for Defense Information), 20 October 1991 http://www.cdi.org/adm/Transcripts/505/ Groh, Ty L, “Ungoverned Spaces: The Challenges of Governing Tribal Societies”, (Monterey:Naval Postgraduate School), June 2006, Report Number: A373154

Hassan, Ahmed and Ali, Kalbe, “Government approves Iran gas pipeline”, (Islamabad:Dawn Media), 08 April 2009. Hassan, Ahmed, “Parliamentarians call for change in security strategy”, (Islamabad:Dawn Media), 07 April, 2009. Hegghammer, Thomas. “Global Jihadism after the Iraq War.” (WA DC:Middle East Journal):60, no. 1, 2006 Herold, Marc, "Karzai & Associates' Trickle Down Reconstruction," 12 May, 2002, at http://cursor.org/stories/karzai.htm Human Rights Watch. Afghanistan - Crisis Of Impunity - The Role of Pakistan, Russia, and Iran in Fueling the Civil War. July 2001 Vol. 13, No 3 at http://www.afghan-network.net/Culture/hrw-afghanreport.pdf Herold, Marc, “Livin' Large Inside Karzai's Reconstruction Bubble”, (US:Cursor.org) 24 September, 2003. http://cursor.org/stories/afghaniscam.html Hulse, Carl, "Democrats Have Qualms Over War in Afghanistan", (NYC:NYTimes), 23 April, 2009 “IMF Members' Financial Data by Country”, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/exfin2.aspx?memberKey1=10&date1key=2009-03-08

Diminution and Development - pg 293 “Iraq's Full, Final and Complete Disclosure ("FFCD") Regarding Chemical Weapons To The United Nations Special Commission ("UNSCOM")”, at http://cryptome.info/0001/iraq-ffcd.htm Johnson, Col. John. “Currahee Memorial Dinner.” 506th Infantry. 16 August 2008

Johnson, Thomas, Mason, M. Chris, "The tragic mistake was eliminating the Afghan monarchy in the new Afghan Constitution", (Boston:The Christian Science Monitor) 20 August 2009 http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0820/p09s01-coop.html Joscelyn, Thomas and Roggio, Bill, “Analysis: US outlines new Afghanistan strategy”, (US:LongWarJournal.org), 27 March, 2009 Johnson, Thomas, “An Analysis of Taliban ‘Night Letters’, Small Wars & Insurgencies”, (Vancouver: Afghanistan Conflict Monitor) Vol 18, Issue 3 September 2007, pages 317-344. http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCs/Docs/Pubs/Small_Wars_%20Pub.pdf Joscelyn, Thomas and Roggio, Bill. “Analysis: US outlines new Afghanistan strategy.” Long War Journal. 27 March, 2009. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/03/analysis_us_outlines.php Karabell, Zachary, “The wrong threat: the United States and Islamic fundamentalism”, (New York:World Policy Institute), World Policy Journal, V12, No.2 Summer 1995, pp 37(12) Kennett, Steven, Canadian Institute of Resources Law Issues and Options for a Policy on Impact and Benefits Agreements 27 May 1999 http://www.impactandbenefit.com/DIAND.IBA.CIRL.May399.pdf Lambracht, Bill, St Louis Post Dispatch, requoted in Sharma, Devinder, Genetic Modification, Food and Sustainable Development: Telling the Story, in Joe Smith ed., The daily globe: environmental change, the public and the media, (London:Earthscan Publications Ltd.), 1st ed., June 2000, pp.84 Le Billon, Philippe, “The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed conflicts”, (Amsterdam:Political Geography), Volume 20, Issue 5, June 2001, Pages 561-584 “Legislative Budget Board Fiscal Size-Up 2008–09 BIENNIUM”, 80th Texas Legislature, March 2008 at http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/focus/80highlights.pdf MacGregor, Col. Douglas, “Refusing Battle”, (Springfield:Armed Forces Journal), April,

2009

Madsen, Wayne, “Afghanistan, the Taliban and the Bush Oil Team”, (Montreal:Centre for Research on Globalisation), globalresearch.ca, 23 January 2002 “Mauled by dogs and then shot.” Shirkatgah Newsheet 20 No. 4, (Karachi:ShirkatGah.org), http://www.shirkatgah.org/newsheet_20_No_4_2008.htm#Mauled%20by%20dogs%20and%20then%20shot

Diminution and Development - pg 294 Maxfield, Jack, “Central and Northern Asia: A.D. 801 to 900”, (US:CNX.org) at http://cnx.org/content/m17833/latest/ McCoy, John. "Two Strategies in Afghanistan: Canadian and Dutch Approaches to Counter-Insurgency" Paper ISA's 50th Annual Convention "Exploring The Past, Anticipating The Future". NYC. 15 February 2009 Mir, Amir, “60 drone hits kill 14 Al-Qa’idah men, 687 civilians”, (Islamabad:The News), 10 April 2009 Moore, Molly, “The Taliban’s deadly rise to power”, (WA DC:The Washington Post), 16 September, 2001 Murray, Craig, “Hillary and Pakistan”, (UK:CraigMurray.org), 25 April, 2009 http://www.craigmurray.org.uk/archives/2009/04/hillary_and_pak.html Muttitt, Greg, “Crude Designs: The RipOff of Iraq’s Oil Wealth”, (New York:Global Policy Forum - Institute for Policy Studies), November 2005 http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/185/40632.html Netanyahu, Benjamin, 18th Annual John M. Ashbrook Memorial Dinner : "Fighting Terrorism", 3 May, 2002 http://www.ashbrook.org/events/memdin/netanyahu/home_speech.html Newhouse, Barry, “Karzai Says US War Strategy 'Better Than Expected'”, (WADC:VOA News), 28 March 2009 Nicholson, Brendan, “40% of Afghan aid 'never arrives'”, (Melbourne:The Age) , 14 October, 2009 at http://www.theage.com.au/world/40-of-afghan-aid-never-arrives-20091013-gvnk.html “Obama Announces New Afghanistan, Pakistan Strategies”, (WA DC: Washington Post), Author Transcript, March 27, 2009 Olsen, Tarjei, “Afghanistan: Justice is Hard to Import.” (Online:Afghan Development News), 11 August 2008 Omrani, Bijan,”The Durand Line: History And Problems Of The Afghan-Pakistan Border”, (London:Asian Affairs),40:2, pgs. 177 — 195, 2009 Packer, George, “Populism and Paranoia”, (New York:The New Yorker), March 24,2009 “Pakistan troops rush to Taliban-infiltrated area”, (AP:MSNBC), 23 April, 2009 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30361451/page/2/ Perlez, Jane and Shah, Pir Z, ”Taliban Exploit Class Rifts in Pakistan.” (NYC:NY Times), 16 April 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 295 Phillips, P. Michael, “Deconstructing Our Dark Age Future”, (Carlisle:US Army War College Quarterly), Summer 2009 Vol. XXXIX, No. 2 Philipps, Dave, “Casualties of War, Part I: The Hell of War Comes Home.” (Colorado Springs:Colorado Springs Gazette), 26 July 2009 at http://www.gazette.com/articles/iframe-59065-eastridge-audio.html Pilger, John, “Obama's 100 days - the mad men did well”, (US:JohnPilger.com), 30 April, 2009. http://www.johnpilger.com/page.asp?partid=530 Porter, Gareth, “Afghan War Rationale Questioned By Some Key Strategists: Analysis”, (Rome: Inter Press Service), 28 March 2009 Porter, Gareth, “U.S. Lacks Capacity to Win Over Afghans.” (Rome:Inter Press Service International), 23 April, 2009 http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=46578 Posner, Gerald, “The Karzai Brothers Fight Back”, (US:TheDailyBeast.com), 28 October, 2009 Potter, Mitch, “Obama Retools Afghan War Strategy”, (Toronto:Toronto Star), 28 March, 2009 http://www.thestar.com/comment/columnists/article/609795 “Preliminary Assessment of Non-Fuel Mineral Resources of Afghanistan, 2007” http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2007/3063/fs2007-3063.pdf “Press Release of the Stop Stoning Forever Campaign: Stoning Continues in Iran: At least 10 More People are at Risk of Death by Stoning”, (Tehran:Meydaan), 10 January, 2009 http://www.meydaan.org/english/showarticle.aspx?arid=733 Qadar, Dr. Sohaib, “Outline of Fiscal Tax Structure Applicable to Upstream Petroleum Companies Operating in Pakistan”, Advisor - Association of International Petroleum Negotiators, Author Copy “RC(S) – the US Embassy View USAID/STATE DEPARTMENT”, January 2009 http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/107203.pdf Risen, James, “Reports Link Karzai’s Brother to Afghanistan Heroin Trade.” (NY:New York Times), 4 October, 2008 Robertson, Nic and Cruickshank, Paul, New jihad code threatens al Qaeda, (US:CNN), 10 November, 2009 Rosen, Nir, The Myth of the Surge, (US:Rolling Stone), 6 March, 2008 Rosenberg, Matthew, “U.S. Courts Former Warlords in Its Bid for Afghan Stability”, (New York:Wall Street Journal), 20 March 2009 Rubin, B, “Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan”, (WA DC:Journal of Democracy), 5(3): 5-19 , 2004

Diminution and Development - pg 296 Rubin, B, "Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan: constructing sovereignty for whose security?", (London:Third World Quarterly), 27(1): 175-185, (2006) Rubin, Elizabeth, “Is It Time to Negotiate With the Taliban?”, (NY:NYTimes), 1 September, 2009 Rubin, Michael, “Afghanistan: As Bad as It’s Reputation?”, (Philadephia:The Middle East Quarterly), September. 2000. Vol. 7 Number 3, http://www.meforum.org/72/afghanistan-as-bad-as-its-reputation Saba, D. S., Najaf, M. E., Musazai, A. M., and Taraki, S. A., Geothermal Energy in Afghanistan: Prospects and Potential, (NY:Center on International Cooperation, New York University), February 2004 Sayyed Ahmad Chekeb Hossainy Qods'Allah, “Limites de l'Empire Afghan sous Ahmad Shah Durrani”, 2007 at http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Afgempdur.jpg Sedra, Mark and Middlebrook, Peter, “Revisioning the International Compact for Afghanistan”, (Washington DC:Foreign Policy in Focus), 2 November 2005. Selfa, Lance, “US Imperialism: A Century of Slaughter”. (Chicago:International Socialist Review), Issue 7, Spring 1999 at http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/155/25951.html Shahzad, Syed Saleem, “Holbrooke reaches out to Hekmatyar.” (Hong Kong:Asia Times Online), 10 April, 2009 Shahzad, Syed Saleem,Afghanistan: Karzai rival 'withdrew under US pressure'(Kabul:Afghan Online Press) 6 November, 2009 http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Politics/?id=3.0.3960270699 Sharlet, Jeff, "Jesus killed Mohammed: The crusade for a Christian military”, (NY:Harpers), May, 2009. http://harpers.org/archive/2009/05/0082488 Sheer, Robert, “Indefensible Spending”, (Los Angeles:LA Times), 1 June, 2008 http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-op-scheer1-2008jun01,0,7121603.story Sheridan, Michael, “How the Taliban slaughtered thousands of people”. (London:The Sunday Times), 1 Nov 1998 at http://www.rawa.org/times.htm Silverberg, Daniel, and Joseph Heimann, "An Ever-Expanding War: Legal Aspects of Online. Strategic Communication", (Carlisle:US Army War College) Parameters 39 Summer 2009: 77-93 Smith, Chris; Tatnell, Scott, “JFTC Counterinsurgency Overview Briefing”, (LTC Troy J. Anhalt Counterinsurgency Training Center – Afghanistan), 2004 Sorensen, G. “War and State-Making: Why doesn't it work in the Third World?” (Newbury Park :SAGE, Security Dialogue 32(3): 341-354. 2001.

Diminution and Development - pg 297 Spinney, Chuck, “Grassley Sounds Off on Obama's Man at the Pentagon”, (Petrolia:CounterPunch), 13 February, 2009 http://www.counterpunch.org/spinney02132009.html Stanikzai, Zainullah and Hashmi, NATO strike kills nine civilians in Helmand, Afghanistan, (Kabul:RAWA News), 5 November 2009 http://rawa.org Starkey, Jerome, “Revealed: British plan to build training camp for Taliban fighters in Afghanistan”, (London:The Independent World) 4 February 2008 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/revealed-british-plan-to-build-training-camp-for-taliban-fighters-in-afghanistan-777671.html Stenersen, Anne. “Blood Brothers or a Marriage of Convenience? The Ideological Relationship between al-Qaida and the Taliban.” Paper ISA's 50th Annual Convention "Exploring The Past, Anticipating The Future". NYC. 15 February 2009 Stearns, Denis, Freedom Means Never Having to Be Logical..., (Seattle:Food Safety News), 15 october, 2009 “Subpoena In A Civil Case - Ahmad Ali Jalili” reproduced at: http://www.superpatriots.us/aboutthecase/jalalicase.pdf Sut Jhally, Justin Lewis, & Michael Morgan, “The Gulf War: A Study of the Media, Public Opinion, & Public Knowledge”, (Amherst:Department of Communications, U Mass), 1991 Tapper, Jake, “Speaking of Democracy in Afghanistan.” (US:ABCNews) Political Punch, 28 March 2009 “The CIA's Intervention in Afghanistan”, Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, (Paris:Le Nouvel Observateur), 15-21 January 1998 http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BRZ110A.html “The New Great Depression and India”, (Mumbai:Research Unit for Political Economy (RUPE)), No. 47, March 2009 The Taliban File Part III, “Pakistan Provided Millions of Dollars, Arms, and Buses Full of Adolescent Mujahid to the Taliban in the 1990's”, Edited by Sajit Gandhi, (WA DC:George Washington University), March 19, 2004 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/index4.htm “Timeline of Competition between Unocal and Bridas for the Afghanistan Pipeline”, (Hartford:World Press Review), December 2001 http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51/119.html Tiron, Roxana, “U.S. spends $3.6 billion a month in Afghanistan”, (WA DC:The Hill) 14 October 2009 http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/63171-us-spends-36-billion-a-month-in-afghanistan “Senate Armed Forces Committee Hearings on Afghanistan and Pakistan”, (US:C-SPAN), Author Transcription, April 1, 2009

Diminution and Development - pg 298 Schumpeter, Joseph A, “The Economic Crisis of the Tax State.” International Economic Papers, 4; (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1954 Turner, Bryan, “Sovereignty and Emergency: Political Theology, Islam and American Conservatism”, (Thousand Oaks:Theory, Culture & Society), Aug 2002; vol. 19: pp. 103 - 119. UN 'to scale back' Afghan mission, (Qatar:Al Jazeera.net) 05 November, 2009 US versus Monsanto Company and Delta and Pine Land Company, April 4, 2008 (WADC:Federal Register)

“U.S., Taliban bargained over bin Laden, documents show”, (US:CNN), 19 August, 2005.

“UK Ambassador to Afghanistan Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles’ leaked memo says "Mission is doomed" (US:HighBeam.com), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-186237234.html’ US gives Karzai six-month ultimatum to stem Afghanistan corruption, (UK:The Times), 4 November, 2009 “USGS Projects in Afghanistan Oil and Natural Gas” http://afghanistan.cr.usgs.gov/oil.php

Usher, Graham, Taliban v Taliban. (London:London Review of Books), 9 April 2009

VanNuys, Stephen, “Obama’s Plan for Afghanistan: We Are Rich Enough to Have BOTH Guns and Butter!”, (US:AmericanMissive.com), 28 March, 2009 http://americanmissive.com/2009/03/28/obama-on-afghanistan-we-are-rich-enough-to-have-both-guns-and-butter/ Venn, Couze, “World Dis/Order”, (Thousand Oaks: Theory, Culture & Society), Vol. 19, No. 4, 121-136, 2002 Waldman, A, “In Afghanistan, U.S. Envoy Sits in Seat of Power”, (NYC:New York Times), 17 April, 2004 Wallitsch, Thomas A, “Afghanistan works to create court system out of chaos”, (Allentown:Allentown Morning Call), 16 June 2006 http://afghandevnews.wordpress.com/2006/06/16/afghanistan-works-to-create-court-system-out-of-chaos/

Wendt, Nicole et al “The World Bank & IMF Respond to Criticisms”, in The E-Book on International Finance and Development Part 2-III, The University of Iowa Center for International Finance and Development. http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/ebook2/contents/part2-III.shtml

“Where does it hurt? The impact of the financial crisis on developing countries”, (ActionAid Hamlyn House Macdonald Road London N19 5PG, UK ), March 2009 http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/where_does_it_hurt_final.pdf

Diminution and Development - pg 299 Wilkerson, Lawrence, “Is US Being Transformed Into a Radical Republic?”, (Baltimore:Baltimore Sun), 23 April 2006 “Women, Politics & Elections”, (London:Electoral Reform Society), No. 21: February, 2008 “World Bank, Managing Development - The Governance Dimension”, Washington D.C., 1991 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/03/07/000090341_20060307104630/Rendered/PDF/34899.pdf Yusufzai, Rahimullah, Staging a Comeback?, (Karachi:Newsline) September 2009 __________________________

Diminution and Development - pg 300 Interviews/Meetings/Lectures: Bageant, Joe, Escape from the Zombie Food Court, Speech at Adler School of Professional Psychology, 3 April, 2009 available at: http://www.joebageant.com/joe/2009/04/escape-from-the-zombie-food-court.html Colonel General Khodaidad, Minister of Counter Narcotics, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (London), 2008 Dr. Sherzoy Rahmim Mohammad, Ambassador, Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, (London), 2008 Dr. Spanta Rangin Dadfar, Foreign Minister, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (London) 2008 Interview with Fazal Ur Rahman Oriya, (Kandahar:Surgar Weekly) Issue 186, April, 2009 Interview with Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 13 June, 1997 available at: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-17/brzezinski1.html Johnson, Col. John. Currahee Memorial Dinner. 506th Infantry. 16 August 2008 Pilger, John, Obama and Empire, (US:YouTube), 2009 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gXL998q7skI Mr. Qanooni Younus Mohmmad, President of Wolesi Jirga (House of Representatives) National Assembly of Afghanistan, (London Heathrow Airport), 2008 Mrs. Barakzai Shukria, Member of Parliament, Wolesi Jirga (House of Representatives) National Assembly of Afghanistan, (London), 2008 Mr. Arsalah Amin, Senior Minister, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, (London), 2008 Unnamed Business Owner, with thread of US:CA media contract cancellations, 2009 Unnamed Senior Official, Non-Afghan Government, (London), 2008 _________________________

Diminution and Development - pg 301 Films and Videos Anderson, Paul T, There Will Be Blood, (US:Ghoulardi Film Company), 2007 [fictionalized parallel to $100B’s in Afghan natural resources expropriation] Argentina's Economic Collapse [parallel to US neo-lilberal economic policies failure], esp. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4dbb4U8v3YQ&feature=related Benn, Colleen. A, Who is Charlie Wilson? [From DVD: Charlie Wilson’s War] (LA:Universal Studios), 2008; also Nicols, Mike, Charlie Wilson’s War, (US:Universal Studios), 2007 [fictionalized US CIA involvement in Soviet occupation of Afghanistan] Curtis, Adam, The Living Dead - Three Films About The Power Of The Past, 3/3: The Attic, 1995 at http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-314906531328011893&hl=en# Curtis, Adam, The Power of Nightmares Episode 1 - Baby It’s Cold Outside, 2004 at http://www.daanspeak.com/TranscriptPowerOfNightmares1.html Kurosawa, Akira, Shichinin no Samurai (‘Seven Samurai’), (Japan:Toho), 1954 [fictionalized parallel to banner slogan ‘The Good War’ in Afghanistan-Paksitan] Orlov, Dmitry, Social Collapse Best Practices, http://informationclearinghouse.info/article22183.htm Redford, Robert, Lions for Lambs, (US:United Artists ), 2007 _________________________

Diminution and Development - pg 302 World Wide Web Links: [some may have gone 404] http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Article.330.aspx

http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/pen-l/2002m03.1/msg00347.htm

http://www.afghandevnews.wordpress.com/2006/06/16/afghanistan-works-to-create-court-

system-out-of-chaos/

http://books.google.com/books?id=aLwoAAAAYAAJ&dq=kingdom+of+Caubul&printsec=f

rontcover&source=bl&ots=kreVw_we9h&sig=GrsxoMxtAU24dOSthrGE75mT99o&hl=en&

ei=Gg8zSu2yBJPCsQOm5OSmDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2

http://blog.wired.com/defense/2009/02/mumbai-style-at.html

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Afgempdur.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allegory_of_the_cave

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_conquest_of_Afghanistan

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_election,_1992

http://frontlineclub.com/blogs/frontline/2009/03/javed-yazamy-killed-in-kandahar.html

http://go.worldbank.org/0AO2EMUL90

http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Press.MinorityNews&ContentRecord_

id=667fcf4d-7e9c-9af9-7a96-fe90922e918f

http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/517/cicupdate.pdf

http://img122.imageshack.us/img122/712/enduringturmoilzv4.jpg

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st&proxystylesheet=systest

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http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=2940709n

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1

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"... the soul will either be disturbed, or it will be at rest, in which case it regulates thoughts and actions harmoniously. Freedom from disturbance is the condition that causes human happiness, and this is the ethical goal, ... a state in which the soul lives peacefully and tranquilly, undisturbed by fear or superstition or any other feeling."

Democritus, 380 BC

Diminution and Development by Peter Torbay

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