December 2016 - max-security.com · December 2016 . Back to Table of Contents MAX Security...

December 2016

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The month of November saw political rumblings occur across the entire Asian continent as a number of highly

controversial issues were debated within the political and public sectors, causing multiple significant protests.

Additionally, the ever-present matter of Islamist militancy continued to affect parts of Asia, particularly playing a more

significant role in Southeast Asia than in previous months, although issues of global jihad were also noted in the

subcontinent, where it has traditionally played a larger role. Intercommunal and inter-religious violence remained a

prevalent throughout the subcontinent also, as violence between different Muslim sects, as well as between Muslim and

Hindu communities, caused a number of casualties. Finally, the armed conflicts in Myanmar’s Shan State and Kashmir

continued to render the areas wholly unsafe.

The political rallies which shook Asia in November spanned across eight countries, as a number of unique but important

issues led to hundreds of thousands of demonstrators coming out in force to protest their governments on multiple

occasions. One of the largest of the eight was seen in South Korea, as President Park’s ongoing scandal over an improper

relationship with a nongovernmental associate saw multiple rallies of over 100,000 people in the center of Seoul, calling

for the resignation of the seasoned politician in disgrace. Meanwhile, following a unilateral decision by the Modi

government in India to recall a number of bank notes they believed to be used for corrupt purposes, mass protests and

unrest were recorded in dozens of large and small cities in India. In Hong Kong, smaller but still significant protests

occurred surrounding Beijing’s role in the Self-Administrative Region’s Legislative Council, following the attempted

swearing in of a number of pro-Independence councilors. While in Taiwan protests erupted following the government’s

decision to hold a vote on same-sex marriage. Pakistan and Malaysia were both scheduled to have mass and potentially

violent protests in early November, however, the rally in Islamabad was called off after a semi-mutual agreement was

reached between the government and protesting party, while in Malaysia the government managed to minimize the

turnout. Lastly, in Indonesia, a large-scale protest, was held in the capital against Jakarta Governor who was accused of

quoting the Quran in a manner perceived by Islamist groups as being offensive, and an additional protest is slated to be

held on December 2.

Islamist militancy remained a key issue in Asia but became far more potent in the Southeast where both the Philippines

and Myanmar saw a rise in small IED attacks towards the end of the month. In the case of Myanmar, the government has

pointed towards the Rohingya minority, who are currently at odds with the government in Rakhine State and have been

accused of attacking both civilian and military targets. In the Philippines, the Maute group carried out a series of

successful and attempted attacks on the US Embassy, a Catholic church, and an advance team for President Duterte’s

upcoming visit to Mindanao. Additionally, in Sri Lanka, claims of Islamic State recruitment and anti-Muslim rhetoric have

exacerbated Muslim-Buddhist tensions, as the government fears a rise in Islamic Militancy may occur.

In the same regard, tensions between Hindu and Muslim groups continued in Bangladesh as Hindu’s accused the

government of not doing enough to tackle the issue of Islamist radicals attacking Hindu installations, an issue which is

likely to lead to protests in the coming months. Furthermore, Pakistan’s Karachi witnessed a significant uptick in attacks

on Shiite Muslims from Sunni extremists and in a somewhat more rare occurrence, accusations arose that Shiite groups

were themselves retaliating by attacking Sunni individuals as tensions and violence between the two groups remain

elevated.



PAKISTAN ..........................................................................................................................................................................4

BANGLADESH ...................................................................................................................................................................5

INDIA .................................................................................................................................................................................6

INDONESIA .......................................................................................................................................................................7

MALAYSIA .........................................................................................................................................................................8

MYANMAR ........................................................................................................................................................................9

PHILIPPINES ................................................................................................................................................................... 10

SRI LANKA ...................................................................................................................................................................... 11

AUSTRALIA ..................................................................................................................................................................... 12

HONG KONG .................................................................................................................................................................. 13

MALDIVES ...................................................................................................................................................................... 14

SOUTH KOREA ............................................................................................................................................................... 15

TAIWAN .......................................................................................................................................................................... 16



Following weeks of unrest in preparation for a major

protest which was slated to take place in Islamabad,

organized by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) under the

leadership of Imran Khan, over the Panama Papers

scandal, the Supreme Court ordered the ruling Pakistan

Muslim League–Nawaz (PML-N) to submit the Terms of

Reference for the Panama Papers judicial commission.

While this was portrayed as a political victory for the PTI by

their leadership, it was also deemed to help them save face

as it appeared that the shutdown protest in Islamabad,

which had been poised to be one of the largest protests of

2016, appeared to be seeing significantly diminishing

turnout. That said, much of the party’s key political

supporters are likely to view the cancellation of the protest

as a betrayal of the party’s values, which are strongly anti-

corruption, viewing the change in circumstances to be

indicative of the party’s decrease in popularity. As such, the

events of November 2 are likely to further erode public

confidence in the party as perceptions of the PTI’s

weakness have been steadily reinforced by its inability to

achieve any stated goals, including the removal of Prime

Minister Nawaz Sharif, following its much larger and more

prolonged anti-government protests in 2014. Nonetheless,

PTI will likely continue to resort to conducting protests in

the event that PM Sharif is not seen to be adequately

reprimanded.

The November 4 killing of three clerics of the banned radical

Sunni Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) group indicates the

continued operational presence of sectarian-linked targeted

assassins in Karachi, despite sustained Rangers paramilitary

presence in the metropolis. While the individuals directly

involved in perpetrating the November 4 murders have yet to

be apprehended or identified, it remains possible that Shiite

sectarian militias such as the Sipah-e-Mohammad may have

been involved, given the targeting of ASWJ clerics.

Furthermore, the attacks may also have been launched in

retaliation for the October 29 attack on a Shiite place of

worship in Karachi’s Nazimabad area which was later claimed

by the al-Alami faction of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) militant

group, as well as the Islamic State. The subsequent unrest led

by Shiites may have been triggered by perceptions that while

attacks on Shiites go unpunished, similar targeting of majority

Sunnis in Pakistan draws an instant response from law

enforcement agencies. As the Islamic State expands its

influence in Pakistan by coordinating with local sectarian

groups like LeJ, especially in restive Balochistan, we assess that

ripple effects might also be felt in Karachi, particularly given

the known links to such groups to Karachi’s sectarian militants.

Therefore, gradual uptick in incidents of sectarian-linked

violence is liable to occur over the coming months in Karachi.

PTI cancels November 2

Islamabad lockdown

after Supreme Court

rules in favor of

corruption probe

Karachi sectarian

violence kills six; arrest

of Shiite leaders

triggers unrest

Over 50 killed in Islamic

State (IS) claimed attack

targeting Shiites in Hub,

Balochistan

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The recent attacks against Hindus in the east-central

Brahmanbaria District highlight the sustained threat to

religious minorities in Bangladesh from radical Islamist

groups. The attacks remain notable in light of the scale of

damage inflicted in the arson attacks, impacting at least

200 houses. Additionally, the timing of the attack, during

the final days of the Diwali festival, signals the sustained

elevated threat, particularly during religious high holidays.

Potential tensions are typically liable to escalate due to the

public nature of celebrations in districts with a mixed

religious demographic or those with a stronger presence of

minority communities. Meanwhile, the continuing protests

by activist and student groups over the violence likely stem

from the perception that the government’s response

towards apprehending the perpetrators has been

unsatisfactory. Additionally, further delays in the

dispensation of monetary compensation to those affected

by the violence are liable to draw out protests in the near

term. Meanwhile, the Awami League (AL) government is

liable to frame the conflict as an attempt by the Islamist

Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) party to destabilize the country by

stoking sectarian tensions. A narrative such as this would

lend support to the AL’s ongoing campaign against the JeI

for the alleged operational assistance and religious

patronage the government claims that it provides to

Islamist militant groups in Bangladesh.

The political violence in the central district of Narsingdi

likely comes ahead of the local district council elections

slated to take place on December 28, with similar episodes

liable to occur in politically-disputed districts. That said,

inter-party violence has significantly decreased since 2014,

accompanying a similar decline in the political viability of

Bangladesh National Party (BNP). This likely was the result

of the BNP’s boycott of the general election that year, and

the AL’s subsequent targeting of the party’s leadership,

which has diminished the BNP’s ability to achieve mass

mobilization for its rallies. However, a likely outcome of the

BNP’s decline could be an increase in Awami League intra-

party factionalism in the near term, due to increased

political competition to secure candidacy within the party.

Multiple acts of violence

reported against

Hindus in

Brahmanbaria District

Student groups hold

protest rallies in Dhaka

over attacks on

religious minorities

Section 144 imposed in

Narsingdi District over

violence between rival

AL political factions

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It appears that the recent demonetization scheme by the

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-

led government is likely to

gain significant political

capital ahead of the 2017

state elections. Additionally,

while the policy was

forecasted to cause

significant disruptions to the

general public and result in

civil unrest, the government’s

subsequent inclusion of

waivers for key demographic

groups such as for farmers

acquiring seeds has likely

assuaged short-term

concerns over the policy.

Meanwhile, the opposition’s

early reticence to protest the move was likely due to its

framing as an anti-corruption measure. However, the

failure of the opposition parties to agree on a common

program of protest against the policy due to inter-party

differences indicates the political advantage that the Modi

government is liable to gain in the coming months.

Localized civil unrest is liable to continue in non-BJP

controlled states, and may likely gain temporary traction at

the national level, should demonetization have an impact

of the end-of-the-year economic growth indicators.

The recent escalation of the armed conflict between India

and Pakistan is evident in the increase in the range of

cross-border shelling, as casualties in civilian towns in the

Kashmir region indicates that the conflict is no longer

limited to the immediate vicinity of the Line of Control

(LoC). This development can likely be attributed to the

ongoing domestic tensions in both countries. While India

appears to remain steadfast in its rhetoric to retaliate

against alleged ceasefire violations by Pakistan, its primary

concern at present time is to appear tough on cross-border

infiltration, and not to initiate a full-scale conflict. This

assessment is supported by the fact that Delhi has balked

from rescinding major civil treaties between the two

countries, such as the Indus Water Treaty (IWT), despite

saber-rattling about revisiting its provisions. Much of

Delhi’s reluctance to cut off the water supply to Pakistan

from the Indus River stems from its own fears that China,

Pakistan’s ally, would implement similar measures in

response, with the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River, which is a

vital source of water to India’s eastern region. This delicate

balance of regional interdependence for natural resources

may likely act as a buffer against the full-scale war in the

subcontinent. That said, should India make significant

changes to the IWT, the conflict between the two countries

is liable to severely escalate, with Pakistan interpreting

such as move as an act of aggression, and inviting the

potential intervention of the international community.

Government

demonetizes Rs 500,

1,000 notes to check

black money

Congress protests

demonetization in Delhi

Three Indian soldiers

killed in cross-border

firing in Kashmir

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The recent blasphemy controversy of Ethnically Chinese Christian Jakarta Governor Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama has

propelled disaffection towards the leader to new lows. The November 4 rally reflects a worrying trend of extremism in

Indonesia’s largely moderate social and religious fabric. Religious tensions have increased as hardline groups, such as

the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), have utilized the controversy to

publicize their opposition to any non-Muslim assuming a public

position in Indonesia. The support of top Muslim clerical bodies,

like the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), at the rally, further

served to legitimize the sentiments of fringe groups like FPI and

bring their hardline, pro-Muslim stance in the mainstream. Such

reinforcement may ultimately bolster the ambitions of and public

support for such ideologies further, as can be inferred by the FPI’s

additional plans to mobilize in the coming days and weeks.

Additionally, ethnic tensions have increased, with demonstrations

against Ahok having gradually taken on anti-Chinese

undercurrents and some protesters reportedly chanting “Crush the Chinese” at the rally. Although a large portion of

Indonesia believes that the ethnic Chinese minority still has large clout in economic affairs, overt racism or aggression

has not been recorded widely since the 1998 anti-Chinese riots in Jakarta. Hence, such disaffection maintains the

potential to re-ignite historical resentment and result in unrest. Lastly, militancy is a concern, with the Islamic State’s

online message instructing attacks on security personnel deployed at the rally, coupled with the claims by the National

Police Spokesman, further reinforcing the underlying threat of IS-influenced unrest in Indonesia. This is likely

encouraged by the rhetoric surrounding Ahok and hardline calls for the punishment of a “non-believer”. Thus, the

potential threat of lone wolves or small-scale cells carrying out attacks on police or army personnel during such future

rallies remains, as the large attendance may aid efforts to escape undetected. This combination of rising religious

tensions, ethnic division, and militancy has the potential of materializing into sustained polarization in Indonesia, to the

point that even if Ahok were to drop out of the February 2017 race to be Governor, Jakarta would still face challenges to

its security in the near term. Nevertheless, although Ahok's approval ratings have significantly dropped from the

leading position he had in the past months, he remains a prominent contender in the running to be Jakarta Governor.

Anti-Ahok rally

attended by thousands

in Central Jakarta

Ahok questioned by

Jakarta Police over

alleged blasphemous

comments regarding

Quran

National Police

Spokesman claims nine

arrested during

November 4 rally linked

to Islamic State group

Source: Indonesian Survey Circle

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While tens of thousands of people attended the highly-anticipated Bersih 5.0 rally on November 19, the turnout was

still less than demonstrations over the same cause last year. Additionally, Prime Minister Najib Razak’s arrest of

prominent activists, including Bersih 5.0 Chairwoman Maria Chin Abdullah, suggests that the government use a range

of coercive means more liberally than in the past. This is likely an attempt to consolidate his position ahead of 2018

elections. In order to shore up his nationalist base, a portion of

which is represented by the activist and anti-Bersih Red Shirt

movement, it remains possible that PM Razak will tacitly allow anti-

Western sentiment to flourish. An instance of this could be seen in

the November 2 protest, in which an opposition media outlet was

accused of being an “agent for foreign powers” due to a grant

received from a foundation run by a well-known foreign

businessman. The protesters also alleged that the foundation had

been funding Bersih.

These domestic developments reflect shifting geopolitical alliances:

Malaysia has made a relatively dramatic pivot toward China over

the past month, as the historic defense deal signed between the

two countries suggests. This may fuel rising criticism from the US

against Kuala Lumpur ahead of the elections, which could stoke

further anti-American sentiment among the PM’s supporters.

Indeed, such action would likely serve to stoke activism on all sides

in Malaysia, at once compelling opposition activists to bolster their

criticism of the government while also instigating sharp reactions

from the Red Shirts and the current government. Relatedly,

although the recent Bersih protest was smaller compared to past gatherings, the arrest of their leader will likely compel

frequent, small-scale protests into December.

Red Shirt protesters call for news

portal to shut down after grant

from foreign fund revealed

Maria Chin Abdullah arrested

with 11 other senior opposition

activists on eve of massive Bersih

5.0 protest

US State Department

calls Maria Chin

Abdullah’s arrest

“troubling”

Malaysia and China agree on

historic defense deal, bilateral

South China Sea dispute

mechanisms

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The decision to launch the offensive was likely one of

desperation on the part of the Kachin Independence Army

(KIA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, Ta’ang

National Liberation Army and the Arakan Army, as the

ethnic militias, known collectively as the Northern Alliance, were was

facing pressure to bow to the demands of the National

Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) by both the civilian government

and their collective patron, Beijing. China’s displeasure with

increasing violence on the border, which causes disruption

to trade and weakens its position as a responsible backer

of the militant groups, was evident in the forced closure of

KIA offices along the border. However, ultimately the

Northern Alliance’s strategic value to China far outweighs

the perils of its support, suggesting that Beijing will

eventually pursue discreet measures to constrain the

successes of the Myanmar military in an attempt to reduce

tensions. One such deterring measure may include the tacit

allowance of the United Wa State Army (UWSP) to

increasingly supply arms to the groups. As the civilian

government continues to back the actions of the military in

using force to pressure the alliance to sign the NCA, the

UWSP, which strongly objects to the agreement, will

increasingly cooperate with the alliance. In this context,

despite Beijing and Naypyidaw’s shared desire for lowered

tensions, the current round of fighting will likely sustain

itself, and may even increase, in the months leading to the

next peace conference in February 2017.

The small explosions in Yangon are notable as militancy is

rare in the city, with the last notable incident occurring in

2013. The bombs were unsophisticated, being composed

of chemicals, gunpowder, and glass bottles. However, as

the country’s new government and reduced international

sanctions have opened up the possibility of a tourism

boom, the government is likely unwilling to take chances.

Interestingly, while the culprits remain unknown, politicians

have suggested that the bombings were in response to the

ongoing violence in Rakhine State. In this context,

exacerbating the threat in Yangon may be part of a

broader state strategy to develop a legitimate pretext for

escalating operations in Rakhine State, which has attracted

international criticism. As the situation in Rakhine State is

unlikely to improve in the near future and may further

deteriorate, the potential for additional bombings of this

nature in Yangon remain possible, albeit minimal.

The Northern Alliance launch joint

offensive against Myanmar Army in

Shan State; three IEDs detonated in

Muse Township

Rumors suggest

China-backed UWSP

supplying weapons

to Northern Alliance

against military

Two KIA offices in

China shut down

after being

surrounded by

military troops

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Following the abduction of another foreign national in early

November, it appears that Abu Sayyaf has continued to

refocus their operations on kidnapping as a way to offset

losses due to the ongoing Philippine Army operation and

President Rodrigo Duterte’s war on drugs. While

abductions and attacks on foreign targets have long been

part of the modus operandi of Moro Islamist militant

groups, Catholic targets have not seen any notable recent

attacks. Therefore, the move to attack a church on

November 27 was likely an attempt by the Abu Sayyaf-

linked Maute group to draw attention away from their own

losses during the recent government assaults against their

strongholds in Lanao del Sur and increase tensions

between Muslim and Christian communities. In that regard,

the Maute group is likely looking to discourage public

support for the military campaign by attacking targets that

are viewed as staple parts of traditional Philippine life. This

was likely also the motivating factor behind the November

28 and 29 attacks against the US Embassy in Manila and a

Presidential Convoy in Lanao del Sur. While any targeting of

US entities in the Philippines is rare due to positive public

sentiment, more attacks against traditional government

targets are liable to occur as militant Moro groups continue

to experience losses in Mindanao. Additionally, churches

and other Catholic sites face an elevated risk during the

upcoming holiday season, particularly in larger Catholic

cities such as Davao and Manila.

The protests were widely held across the country,

particularly in Manila by groups not only opposed to the

Marcos family but also anti-incumbent President Duterte

groups, who view him and the Marcos family as close

political allies. The issue compounded much of the fears of

parts of Manila society over the perceived rise in

authoritarianism in the Philippines which is personified

through the figure of President Marcos. Despite the

significant unpopularity of the decision, given that the

burial has now taken place and the action is unlikely to be

reversed, these types of protests will slowly die down. That

being said, considering the high levels of contention

surrounding the issue, it is likely that it will reemerge in

future anti-Duterte protests.

German national

abducted by Abu Sayyaf

group near Sulu

Former President

Marcos buried in

controversial ceremony

Two injured in bomb

attack on Mindanao

church

Militant bombing

attacks against

government targets



The veracity of the claim made by the Justice Minister over

Sri Lankan IS fighters remains unclear, in part due to

disagreements within the government over the alleged

influence of global jihadi groups on Sri Lankan Muslims.

This was evident in the subsequent contradicting claims

made by other government representatives about the lack

of an IS presence in Sri Lanka. It appears the government’s

seeming retreat from its earlier statement was likely to

mitigate the backlash from Muslim groups and minimizing

the damage it could have on the country’s international

reputation. Regardless, tensions will continue to be

heightened between the Muslim minority and Sinhala-

Buddhist majority over recent proposals to amend Muslim

civil law on issues such as marriage. Additionally, they are

likely to be stoked by Buddhist hardline groups such as

Bodu Bala Sena (BBS), who have expressed their opposition

to Muslim certification of food and religious attire.

Consequently, perceived sentiments of alienation within

the community can potentially serve as a recruitment tool

for transnational Islamist militant groups such as IS, who

may release jihadi propaganda targeted at Sri Lankan

Muslims in future publications, as they did in November

2015. Meanwhile, cities such as Kandy, as well as the

Western Province, which have a history of inter-religious

violence, remain potential flashpoints for the outbreak of

localized violence in the foreseeable future.

The statements by President Maithripala Sirisena

condemning the police’s use of forcible dispersal measures

at a disabled veterans’ pension protest, as well as the

speedy constitution of committees to investigate the

incident, is largely informed by the strong public support

the armed forces command in Sri Lanka. Similarly, the

Sirisena government’s assent to the protesters’ demands

for pension benefits by February 2017 was likely meant to

offset any negative impact such a controversy could have

on their electoral prospects in upcoming local elections in

April 2017. Consequently, civil unrest over the issue is liable

to decline in the near term. That said, the incident signals

the likelihood that aggrieved groups, such as workers

unions or activist groups seeking victims’ compensation,

will use the local elections to gain traction for their cause,

resulting in an uptick in protest rallies in Colombo ahead of

the elections.

Police use water

cannons, tear gas to

disperse army veterans

rally in Colombo

Muslim groups in

Eastern Province

protest planned

changes to Muslim law

Justice Minister claims

32 Sri Lankans currently

part of Islamic State

ranks in Syria



The protests on November 5 and November 20 highlight the contentious nature of Australia’s immigration policy. Over

the past 20 years, the country has typically accepted between 12,000 and 13,000 refugees per annum, however, conflict

in the Middle East has prompted Australia to accept a further 12,000 refugees fleeing from Syria, which has

subsequently contributed to the noticeable rise of the anti-immigration One Nation party, the group behind many of

the increasingly visible anti-immigration manifestations.

The November 20 rally was a protest against the self–immolation of an asylum seeker on November 18, at a bank in a

suburb of Melbourne. Although this incident was deemed isolated on account of the asylum seeker’s alleged mental

health problems, it is likely that far-right groups will use perceived future crimes and misdemeanors by asylum seekers

as a pretext for further protests.

Anti-immigration sentiment is not uncommon in Australia, as typified by the 2005 Cronulla race riots during which

young white Australians violently clashed with Lebanese-Australian youths in a beachside suburb of Sydney. That being

said, there are now a number of anti–racism groups in Australia who regularly attend anti–immigration rallies to voice

their opposition to far-right groups, which has played a role in increasing the levels of disruption and sometimes unrest

which stem from such demonstrations. Furthermore, this may be indicative of the increasingly polarizing nature of the

immigration issue, which will no doubt play a role in future electoral campaigns in the coming years.

Further, the news that lone wolf IS militants are active in Australia has only increased racial tensions. Both a stabbing

attack and a foiled plot to bomb the Sydney Opera House in September 2016 have increased the levels of concern over

Islamic refugees, as well as compounding xenophobic sentiments in certain sectors of Australian society. This is

reinforced by the fact that IS are a losing significant ground in their former strongholds in Iraq-Syria and may attempt

to divert its attention to Australia, as well as the Asia-Pacific region more generally. If further lone wolf attacks were to

occur, this would lead to further anti-immigration protests and attacks against minority groups.

Protests in Melbourne

relating to resettlement

of 120 refugees

Asylum seeker self-

immolates in

Melbourne

Anti-immigration

protest organized by

far–right groups in

Melbourne



Hong Kong’s oath-swearing controversy, which first erupted on October 12 when two incoming legislators from the pro-

independence Youngspiration party changed the wording of their oaths, escalated precipitously in November. On

November 2, civil society and legal groups responded to reports that Beijing was planning to intervene in a Hong Kong

court’s decision over whether the legislators could take up their seats by marching throughout downtown Hong Kong.

Their concerns were borne out on November 6 when Beijing’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee decided

to intervene and interpreted Hong Kong’s Basic Law to invalidate their oaths. As a result, a Hong Kong court on

November 15 disqualified the two Youngspiration members. Beijing’s ultimate decision to intervene in the oath-

swearing controversy represents a major escalation on its part. It further contributes to deepening concerns among

segments of the Hong Kong population, as well as among international observers, that the city-state’s autonomy vis-à-

vis mainland China and its rule of law, both ostensibly guaranteed under the “one country, two systems” paradigm, are

progressively eroding. Some have criticized the Youngspiration legislators over a perceived lack of political cunning;

instead of stating their views before they were legally sworn-in, they could have waited and then commanded more

power as an official legislator. Still, the outcome of this saga will ultimately deepen animosity among local Hong

Kongers towards Beijing and the mainland. Hong Kongers already largely disagree politically with Beijing and its local

proxies; had seats in the city’s Legislative Council been apportioned according to only the election results from the

representative geographic constituencies, pan-democratic and pro-independence forces would have a commanding

majority of 59 percent. However, because of the body’s functional constituencies, which are dominated by pro-Beijing

business and political interests, Beijing has been able to command a majority. This structural inequality, the

disqualification of several pro-independence candidates before the election, and Beijing’s intervention in the current

scandal continue to polarize the respective camps and stave off the prospect of political compromise. Furthermore, by

indirectly punishing the Youngspiration duo, Beijing’s decision may bolster the political prospects of the pan-democracy

camp, which still opposes Beijing yet appears to be more competent in doing so. In any case, protests over the issue,

especially if by-elections are held to fill the now-vacated seats, will likely intensify in the near future, organized and

exacerbated by both the disqualified and still-remaining pro-independence councilors. Counter-protests by pro-Beijing

outfits are likely in response. In the charged political climate currently prevailing in Hong Kong, this tit-for-tat response

could manifest a sudden escalation in the scale and severity of protests, with the possibility of mass rallies and unrest

as was seen in the Occupy HK movement in 2014.

Civil society groups

protest Beijing’s

planned intervention in

oath-swearing

controversy

Beijing intervenes,

prevents pro-

independence

legislators from taking

seats

Hong Kong court orders

pro-independence

legislators to vacate

seats



The month of November witnessed the continuation of the power struggle between former President Maumoon Abdul

Gayoom and incumbent President Abdullah Yameen Abdul Gayoom for control of the ruling party, the Progressive

Party of Maldives (PPM). However, the former President suffered a major setback in early November when three of the

eight Gayoom-loyalist lawmakers, who publically withdrew support to Yameen in late October, rejoined the Yameen

faction. This also weakens Gayoom’s chances of securing a two-third majority in the Maldives parliament for a no-

confidence vote against current parliament speaker and Yameen-loyalist Abdullah Maseeh; which on accomplishment

would have been regarded as a major step towards impeaching President Yameen. At present, it remains unclear if

Gayoom’s possible attempts to impeach Yameen would be aimed at securing the 2018 Presidency for his own kin,

however, this may have been the reason why Gayoom refused to directly offer Yameen the party nomination, and

instead insisted on a primary election within the party.

Meanwhile, recent public statements made by Yameen suggest that he remains keen on regaining the former

President’s sympathies, particularly given his continued referral to Gayoom as party President. That said, Yameen’s

suggestions that the Gayoom should continue to operate according to the party council, currently under Yameen’s

control, indicates his unwillingness to cede political control of the PPM to his predecessor. Therefore, Gayoom is likely

to reject such seemingly friendly overtures by the President, sensing the latter’s likely intent to keep Gayoom as a

relatively powerless party president to retain the PPM’s domestic political legitimacy as a unitary entity.

If at all the Gayoom faction continues to remain keen on impeaching Yameen, it will have to work closely with other

opposition parties like the Maldives Democratic Party (MDP) and the Jumhooree Party (JP). However, in the near term, it

remains unlikely that such an alliance will function effectively, given the relatively high trust deficit between three

groups; a situation that primarily emanates from JP's history of shifting political alliances that includes working with

the opposition MDP against Gayoom during his presidential tenure, and later working against MDP during its tenure as

well.

President Yameen

refers to Gayoom as

‘party president’, urges

return to PPM fold

Gayoom’s office in Male

raided by police over

alleged missing party

documents

Yameen faction

reportedly seeks

amendment of Political

Parties’ Act to bar

candidates that fail to

secure party ticket from

contesting

independently



On November 29, embattled President Park Geun-hye

made her third televised address to the nation offering to

“leave to parliament everything about my future including

shortening my term.” While her own Saenuri party has

floated a date of April 30, 2017, for her resignation,

opposition lawmakers have rejected these proposals in

favor of impeachment. This would require 28 Saenuri

lawmakers for it to pass with the required two-thirds

majority, which had already been covered by about 40

members stating willingness to support the motion.

However, new reports are coming out that Saenuri

defectors may choose to support the April 30 plan instead.

At the very least, this will likely delay the impeachment

vote, if not threaten its success entirely. Sources in

parliament had indicated that the motion could be voted

on by as early as December 2 or 9, but now the 2016

window might be missed entirely, working to President

Park’s advantage. Either way, the constitution dictates that

the Supreme Court will then have up six months to rule on

a final decision, extending the timeline into 2017 no matter

what the eventual outcome.

In the meantime, protests can be expected to continue as

the general public views Park’s newest statement as yet

another diversionary tactic. Additionally, stalling on the

impeachment process is likely to further antagonize the

public and stoke unrest. At this point, with protests getting

larger as time goes on, the end of the uprising depends on

more the impeachment process than anything else; should

the ball get rolling before the new year, it will likely alleviate

some of the public pressure.

The lead-up to the ratification of the General Security of

Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) on November 23

saw opposition members revisiting the issue of the brutal

Japanese occupation of the peninsula that ended more

than 70 years ago. The bill nonetheless passed despite

facing considerable protest from opposition parties and

student-led protests, likely due to the perceived serious

threat posed by North Korea’s ongoing nuclear program.

Given that the South Korean government remained

resilient in the face of similar resistance from citizens’

groups surrounding the controversial THAAD anti-ballistic

missile system deployments, it is unlikely that the deal can

be challenged despite its considerable opposition. That

said, during this period of unprecedented unrest in the

country, the unpopular agreement will likely encourage

even wider participation in subsequent anti-Park protests

like that seen on November 26.

First round of mass

anti-Park protests

Impeachment process

begins

Japan intelligence deal

ratified

Park offers to leave her

fate to parliament

https://trailer.web-view.net/Show/0X10E9B171CCF431066B4C3A72714349647794CB633CBDBE934E65FC43F5A55148552835B8FF6C759D.htm

https://cdn-media.web-view.net/i/etwtwhch/SK_protest.jpg



Legislation under review that would legalize same-sex

marriage in Taiwan has provoked an escalating series of

protests for and against the reform around Taipei’s

Legislative Yuan. While rallies on both sides have attracted

significant levels of support and attendees, the most

notable protest was one on November 17, when 10,000

demonstrators demanded the draft bills allowing same-sex

marriage be rejected. Still, despite the impressive show of

support, opinion polls continue to suggest that over 70

percent of the Taiwanese public supports same-sex

marriage; over 50,000 turned out for Taipei’s Gay Pride

Parade earlier in October. Additionally, given its campaign

promises and platform, the ruling Democratic Progressive

Party (DPP) under President Tsai Ing-wen seems poised to

discount the protesters against and approve the legislation

in early 2017, which would make Taiwan the first country in

the Asian continent to do so. Still, the fact that the issue is

now politicized, with elements of the more-conservative

Kuomintang (KMT) opposition calling for public

consultations or even a referendum on the issue, means

that demonstrations over it are likely to intensify in the run-

up to its eventual passage or defeat in the coming months.

After just six months in office since her May 2016

inauguration, current Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen is

battling plummeting public approval ratings and stepped-

up protests from the opposition and civil society groups. In

particular, on November 17, hundreds protested against

government plans to lift restrictions on food imports from

areas in Japan affected by radiation, and on November 23,

the opposition KMT blamed the failure of a domestic airline

on the DPP administration. While lowered approval ratings

are a common phenomenon in Taiwanese democracy,

Taipei has made a series of political mistakes that are

imperiling the stability of the regime. First of all, the DPP

has attempted to temper the anti-China wave it rode in on

in order to placate an increasingly angry Beijing, which has

economically punished Taiwan by lowering mainland

tourist numbers, among other methods. This half-way

policy still antagonizes Beijing while not living up to the

expectations of China-skeptics in Taiwan. Additionally,

government reversals on issues like pensions, holidays,

and labor contracts have provoked the KMT and civil

society groups to mobilize against the DPP’s perceived

failings. Unless President Tsai is able to score decisive

policy achievements on a few of the above issues, her

government’s fortunes will likely continue to sag. In the

interim, disaffection towards the government’s

administration and protests over the same are likely to

persist in the near term.

Protests occur in Taipei

against same-sex

marriage legislation,

food import policy

Opposition KMT

criticizes government

over economic record,

cross-strait relations

Demonstrators rally in

Taipei to support same-

sex marriage legislation



Asia

Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation

December 25-27

Australia, Hong Kong

December 25

India, Bangladesh,

Myanmar, Singapore,

South Korea, Thailand

December 25-26

Sri Lanka, Indonesia,

Malaysia, Pakistan

December 11

Maldives

December 12

Malaysia, Bangladesh, Sri

Lanka, India, Indonesia,

Pakistan

Christmas is celebrated on

December 25 by Christians all

around the world, the festive

holiday commemorates the Nativity

of Jesus Christ.

Mawlid, or the birthday of the

Prophet Mohamed, is celebrated by

Muslims during the month of

Rabiulawal, the third month of the

Muslim calendar. Shias observe the

event on the 17th of the month,

while most Sunnis observe it on the

12th of the month.

Christmas is widely celebrated as a public holiday

across the region, particularly in former British

colonies and Christian countries. While public and

private offices are largely closed on December 25,

some countries have closures on the two weekdays

following as well as half-day working hours on

December 24. Consequently, we advise those

operating or residing in in Asia to allot for

disruptions to business continuity on the above

days. Additionally, there remains a security risk

from Islamist militancy, especially in Christian-

minority states such where the community has

been previously targeted, such as Pakistan,

Bangladesh, and Indonesia.

Given that the day is celebrated as a public holiday

in some countries in the region, public offices are

liable to be closed on the day. Additionally, private

business may operate with a minimal presence on

the day as well. Those operating in countries where

the day is observed are advised to allot for

disruptions to business continuity.

December 31

New Year’s eve marks the end of the

solar calendar.

New Year’s Eve is not a religious holiday and

therefore is not strictly observed as a nonworking

holiday across Asia, although many countries

nonetheless recognize it. Celebrations usually

include large public gatherings to count down until

the next new year begins. Those operating in

countries observing the holiday are advised to allot

for disruptions resulting therefrom.

Bangladesh – Back to portion


December 16 Victory Day is celebrated to mark the

victory of the Allied forces of

Bangladesh over the Pakistan

military in the 1971 War of

Liberation.

Given the nationalistic nature of the holiday,

government offices are liable to be closed or

operating with a minimal presence. Additionally,

military parades are known to take place, especially

at the National Parade Ground in Sher-e-Bangla



Nagar in Dhaka. We advise to allot for disruptions to

travel in light of potential closures due to the

parades, as well as disruptions to business

continuity resulting from local closures.

Japan


December 23 The Emperor's Birthday will be

celebrated as a national holiday,

with special ceremonies taking place

at the Imperial Palace in Tokyo.

The Emperor’s Birthday is only one of two days in

Japan when the Imperial Palace is open to public

foot traffic, and as such many well-wishers flock to

Tokyo in order to participate in the ceremonies,

leading to severe congestion within in the city and

especially the city center. With this in mind, we

advise those in Tokyo to allot for significant

disruptions to business and travel during the

holiday.

Maldives – Back to portion


December 31 The Day Maldives Embraced Islam is

celebrated as a national holiday.

Public and private offices will close

for the occasion.

Private and public offices will close on December 31

leading to possible disruptions to business

continuity. Those operating or residing in the

Maldives should take necessary provisions for the

closures.

Myanmar – Back to portion


December 21

Kayin New Year Day falls on the first

day of Pyatho, the month that comes

at the end of rice harvest time in the

Kayin people’s lunar calendar. The

holiday celebrates traditions and

culture of the Kayin people, the third

largest ethnic group in the country,

through festive events and dances.

The holiday is especially celebrated in the Kayin

capital, Hpa An, with an abundance of celebratory

events, including dancing, rice eating, speeches,

student award ceremonies, and exhibits on Kayin

history. While Kayin New Year is an ethnic-specific

holiday, it is also a public holiday and is celebrated

all over Myanmar. Kayin Christians and Buddhists

both observe the day, and many tourists take part

in the celebrations as well. In this context, and given

the closure of embassies, banks, government

offices, and many private businesses, we advise to

allot for significant disruptions to businesses

continuity.

Philippines – Back to portion


December 24

Rizal Day will be celebrated as a

national holiday across the

Private and government offices will be closed and

traffic exiting Manila is likely to be highly congested



Philippines commemorating

Philippine national hero Jose Rizal.

as people travel to the countryside to celebrate Rizal

Day and New Year’s Day the following day. Those

operating or residing in the Philippines should a lot

for disruptions.

Sri Lanka – Back to portion


December 13 Unduvap Full Moon Poya Day, the

festival celebrates the arrival of the

Bo tree sapling, believed to be

brought by Anuradhapura, Ashoka’s

daughter.

Shops and businesses are typically closed on the

Poya days, and additionally, the sale of alcohol and

meat is banned specifically on the festival day. We

advise to allot for disruptions to business continuity

on the above day in light of the slated closures.

Thailand


December 5

The late King’s Birthday will be

celebrated as a national holiday.

Given the king’s recent untimely death, observance

of his birthday this year is expected to have a

marked participation, along with extra events

planned by the central government. Mass

ceremonies are planned for the Grand Palace on

December 1, 2 and 5, and as such traffic in Bangkok

and the vicinity of Buddhist shrines nationwide is

likely to experience heavy congestion, meaning that

those in the vicinity of either should allot for

significant disruptions to both travel and business

continuity.

December 12 Constitution Day commemorates

the passing of the Constitution of

Thailand on December 10, 1932.

Although the date of the holiday doesn’t coincide

with the anniversary of the actual event, Thai law

mandates that non-working holidays that fall on a

weekend are to be celebrated on the next working

day, which in this case is December 12. As a public

holiday, local businesses and government offices

will be in observance and many city-dwellers will opt

to take advantage of the three-day weekend by

traveling back to their hometowns, leading to

significant traffic throughout the weekend.

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