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Africa Regional Summary

October 1, 2013


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Executive Summary

HIGH RISK

2 | P a g e

The threat of sophisticated and well-orchestrated Islamist militant attacks reemerged on the

continent after al-Shabaab militants attacked Nairobi's Westgate Mall and held dozens

hostage during a four-day siege. The incident left at least 67 people dead, hundreds

wounded and prompted bolstered security against potential attacks throughout Kenya,

Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa. Meanwhile, Islamist insurgents in West Africa made a

clear signal that they still constitute a threat to regional stability, as al-Qaeda in the Islamic

Maghreb (AQIM) conducted a suicide bombing in Mali's northern city of Timbuktu, while

Tuareg rebels and Malian soldiers clashed in Kidal. Furthermore, Boko Haram in northern

Nigeria has retained their ability to inflict major casualties against civilian and government

targets, indicated lastly by the killing of at least 70 students in Yobe State, despite an

intensive and persistent government crackdown against the group.

Highly anticipated legislative elections were held in Guinea for the first time in over one

decade following numerous postponements; however, the polls were overshadowed by

incidents of unrest and politically motivated violence in the lead-up to the vote. Despite a

peaceful election day, the E.U. observer mission's confirmation of electoral irregularities

elevates the potential for protests and subsequent violence from October 2, when provincial

results are expected. Moreover, Cameroon conducted peaceful parliamentary and local

elections, in which President Paul Biya's ruling party CPDM is expected to win a landslide

victory.

The volatility surrounding political demonstrations in nations under more authoritarian

regimes became evident as Angolan police dispersed protesters and arrested foreign

journalists covering the event in Luanda. Meanwhile, in Ethiopia's capital Addis Ababa,

opposition rallies by both the emerging Blue Party and the main opposition faction Unity for

Democracy and Justice (UDJ) were subjugated to harassment, detainment of senior

members and forceful disruptions by police.

Elsewhere, following a reduction in the restrictions against public gatherings in Ghana,

several civil society groups and opposition parties have announced their intent to protest in

Accra during the month of October against issues ranging from government corruption to

utility increments. In addition, peaceful demonstrations were continued in Tanzania by

dissident factions against the Constitutional Review Bill, and further rallies are slated to be

held over the coming weeks.

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The following list contains countries in the region with notable developments from the past two weeks. Please choose your country of interest by clicking on its name below.

HIGH RISK

DRC ......................................................................................................................... 4

Mali ......................................................................................................................... 6

Nigeria ..................................................................................................................... 8

South Sudan ........................................................................................................... 11

MEDIUM RISK

Angola ................................................................................................................... 13

Cameroon .............................................................................................................. 15

Ethiopia ................................................................................................................. 18

Guinea ................................................................................................................... 20

Ivory Coast ............................................................................................................. 22

Kenya .................................................................................................................... 24

South Africa ............................................................................................................ 27

Uganda .................................................................................................................. 29

LOW RISK

Ghana .................................................................................................................... 32

Tanzania ................................................................................................................ 34

Zambia ................................................................................................................... 37

Notable Dates for the Period of ............................................................................................. 39


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HIGH RISK

DRC

On September 19, Kinshasa announced that 100 of an estimated 1700 fighters in the

rebel M23 faction are not considered eligible for amnesty or reintegration in the Armed

Forces of the DRC (FARDC).

Suspected rebels affiliated to the M23 reportedly killed at least ten civilians in Bukoma,

close to Rutshuru in North Kivu. The militants are reported to have been carrying out

raids against Nyatura militia when the killings took place.

On September 21, two Chinese mining managers and a police officer were killed by

armed assailants in an attack on a mineral and gold transport convoy, in Orientale

Province, south of Bunia.

We advise against travel to outlying rural areas, particularly North Kivu, given ongoing

volatility and criminality, while restricting essential travel to Kinshasa.

Back to Table of Contents

ASSESSMENTS

Developments with M23

Negotiations between the M23 and Kinshasa are ongoing and slated to conclude at the

beginning of October. However, vast divides persist between each side's demands. The

M23 hinges its disarmament on the neutralization of the Hutu rebel Democratic Forces

for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the repatriation of Congolese nationals

currently living in Rwanda. Meanwhile, the DRC's announcement that 100 largely high-

ranking M23 fighters could face severe penalties, including capital punishment and long

term jail sentences could serve as a disincentive for the group to finalize an agreement.

Furthermore, should further allegations of M23 attacks in the eastern provinces emerge,

there is a credible possibility that Kinshasa may cancel the ceasefire and instigate further

FARDC offensives against the M23. In the event that hostilities renew, Rwanda, an

alleged backer of the M23, is likely to increase its rhetoric against Kinshasa. Given the

recent deployment of Rwandan soldiers to the border, regional states have become

concerned over a near-medium term conflict between Kinshasa and Kigali.

Threats to mining sector in east

The convoy attack follows a similar attack on a mineral transport convoy in which

another Chinese miner died in June, also in Orientale. Meanwhile, the Simba Mai-Mai

group recently killed eight local Congolese hostages captured from the Nyanga and

Kumu tribes, who often work for mining operations in Orientale. The fact that both

foreigners and locals cooperating with mining companies have been targeted

underscores a wide range of threats for various groups related to the lucrative sector.

The incidents underscore volatility throughout Orientale Province in relation to the

mining sector. Mining and other business operations in DRC’s eastern regions face


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persistently volatile conditions due to a variety of security threats including: attacks by

rebel groups and rogue Mai-Mais, criminal operations to abscond with materials and

resources, and aggrieved locals who allege that outside companies do not promote local

community development. Local communities in mining regions have previously been

engaged in land disputes with mining companies, claiming land infringement as well as

environmental damage to the areas around mining operations. This prevalent

disgruntlement with outside mining ventures exacerbates threats, as locals may be more

likely to hinder the continuity of business operations while also gaining monetary

benefits from the theft of the mineral resources.

Given the lack of security, persistent criminality and militancy, and widespread arms

proliferation, such attacks on mining operations are likely to continue. Additionally,

although mineral convoys are accompanied by Congolese policemen, there is a

possibility that members of local security forces are complicit in the attacks. There is a

potential that these policemen, in addition to local informants who may be engaged to

follow the movements of convoys, likely provide details to assailants that allow them to

attack convoys at the most vulnerable point on their routes Corruption is rampant

throughout the bureaucracy and all branches of security forces, including the military

and police, in the DRC. Low wages and scant monitoring or transparency provide little

incentive for such state employees to crackdown on this trend, which is likely to

continue to lead to inside job attacks on mineral operations in the east.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. We advise against travel to outlying rural areas, particularly North Kivu, given ongoing

volatility and criminality, while restricting essential travel to Kinshasa.

2. If traveling or residing in DRC, it is advised to properly vet and hire sufficient facility

security personnel. At-risk persons are advised to retain security personnel when

conducting all overland travel in both urban centers and outlying areas.

3. In the case you are confronted by armed assailants, it is advised to cooperate fully and

not engage in any behavior that could raise tensions and lead to violence.

4. It is advised to employ sufficient numbers of security personnel to monitor business

operations. In order to mitigate the risk of significant monetary losses from attacks on

mining operations, contact Max Security Solutions for on-site planning and security

consulting, which includes security infrastructure and security personnel.

5. In light of a persisting doctors strike in Kinshasa, Equateur, and Katanga, we advise to

avoid state-run establishments in favor of private clinics and hospitals with more

stringent regulation procedures. Check with your healthcare provider to see which

clinics and hospitals within your coverage are still operating at full capacity.

6. Those traveling overland in rural DRC are advised to consult with Max Security for

itinerary based planning and consultation before undertaking such a journey.



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HIGH RISK

Mali

Several attacks in the north targeting government targets underline the resurgence of

militant, Tuareg rebel activity; additional attacks likely as instability to continue.

Tuareg rebel groups suspend participation in negotiations, as ministers are attacked in

Kidal; underscores ongoing tensions, challenges to national reconciliation.

We continue to advice against nonessential travel to Mali at this time. If essential, it is

advised to limit travel to Bamako.


ASSESSMENTS

Renewed northern militancy

Several armed attacks have taken place in the northern regions of Mali in the last week

of September, including a suicide attack by four militants targeting a military base in

Timbuktu on September 28, which resulted in the death of two civilians. A firefight

between members of the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and military

forces was reported in the late night hours of September 29 in Kidal reportedly caused

by a disagreement between military forces and a Tuareg resident. On September 27, two

grenades were thrown towards Malian soldiers guarding a local bank in Kidal. Al-Qaeda

in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claimed responsibility for the suicide attack in Timbuktu

on September 30. This marked the first suicide attack in that city in six months.

Additional reports indicate that members of the MNLA were involved in the grenade

attacks.

The suicide attack in Timbuktu, which we assess was carried out by one of the Jihadist

movements, highlights the continued activity of such elements in the area. Additionally,

the incident underscores their persistent ability to successfully attack sophisticated and

strategic locales, despite ongoing security efforts, and their supposed weakened state,

following the military intervention. Furthermore, we assess that with a resurgence of

militant activity by jihadist organizations, the existent risk for kidnappings as well as the

targeting of Westerners in northern Mali has increased. Additionally, we assess that low-

scale localized attacks by MNLA members, in particular in the Tuareg stronghold of Kidal,

are likely to continue as an effort to pressure the central government to yield to rebel

demands, by demonstrating the potential consequences of an inability to find a

negotiated solution.

Tuareg rebel groups suspend participation in negotiations

On September 26, Tuareg and Arab groups, including the MNLA, High Council for

Azawad Unity (HCUA) and Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA), announced the suspension

of talks with the Bamako government. The groups citied the government's’ non

compliance with the June Ouagadougou agreement. Initial dialogue sessions began on


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September 17, despite an attack by supporters of the MNLA on ministers in Kidal. The

assailants attempted to prevent the ministers’ airplane from landing in Kidal, following

which they reportedly pelted their convoy with rocks. These incidents serve to

underscore increasing tensions in the north with the central government.

On September 18, MNLA vice president, Mahamadou Djeri Maiga, announced that the

group would negotiate with the government only if the stipulation for northern

autonomy is met. This came a day after President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK) stated

that federalism, independence and autonomy are not options and will not be part of

negotiations. Furthermore, the MNLA, the HCUA, and the MAA announced that they

adopted a joint stance, presenting a stronger position in talks with the government,

increasing the pressure on the IBK government. The militia agreement could also

indicate a solidification of the resolution of armed groups to resist relinquishing their

arms or political aspirations, which is likely to aggravate tensions with the central

government in Bamako. The suspension of talks therefore highlights the significant gap

that exists between government, Tuareg and Arab demands and expectations.

We assess that in the near term there remains a significant potential for additional

localized low scale attacks by Tuareg militia groups in the north, such as the grenade

attack reported in Kidal on September 27 that resulted in two injured soldiers.

Moreover, already heightened tensions in the northern regions are likely to increase

following the suspensions of talks, suggesting that the potential for an uptick in clashes

with security forces is likely.

That said, the request for an emergency meeting by Tuareg and Arab groups suggests

that a return to negotiations remains likely. Thus, we assess that negotiations will

resume in the near term, as both sides are set to gain from a peace agreement in

addition to being pressured by the international community to find a lasting solution

that would result in long term stability. Such an agreement is likely to include economic

and social development projects in the north, some of which may be supported by

neighboring countries such as Morocco.

In the medium term, a peace agreement would require concessions by the central

government, especially in relation to demands for independence in the northern area.

The important nature of this demand is highlighted by it being the main reason for the

suspension of talks with the Bamako government. As such, despite having announced

that there would be no autonomy, federalism or independence in the Tuareg areas, IBK

is unlikely to successfully mitigate demands by Tuareg groups who continue to serve an

important role in ensuring security in the northern areas.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. We continue to advice against nonessential travel to Mali due to the volatile security

situation at this time. If travel is necessary, refrain from leaving Bamako due to the

increased security risks. Practice heightened vigilance at all times.

2. If in Mali, avoid all political demonstrations and large gatherings as a general security

precaution, given the possibility of potentially violent unrest erupting.



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HIGH RISK

Nigeria

Tensions between Ombatse militia, government forces, and other ethnic groups are on

the rise in Nasarawa State.

Boko Haram has achieved major successes against security forces, despite government

efforts.

Police in Port Harcourt dispersed a gathering of teachers, accusing them of planning to

protest against the government, leading to labor unions threatening strike actions.

Travel to Nigeria can continue with stringent security protocols. We advise against non-

essential travel to the northern and Middle Belt regions at this time.


ASSESSMENTS

Ombatse militia revives clashes with Alago youth in Nasarawa

Youth of the Eggon and Alogo ethnicities clashed in villages near Lafia, the capital of

Nasarawa State on September 13 and 14. It is suspected that the clashes were initiated

by the Eggon Ombatse militia, who began attacking the Alogo. The fighting consumed

several towns, leaving at least 60 dead and forcing 30,000 residents to flee to other

towns and into neighboring Benue State. The militia also set fire to over 1,000 homes in

the towns. As a result of the incident, Nasarawa State lawmakers have expressed

support for the implementation of a state of emergency in Nasarawa, stressing that the

state borders the Federal Capital Territory and thus insecurity poses a threat to Abuja.

The Ombatse militia is religiously inspired, believing that they are required to rid their

state of vice. As such, we assess that this is not simply an ethnic clash, but has broader

implications. Nasarawa State lawmakers accuse the government security agencies of

doing too little to combat the threat posed by this group. Nasarawa State is ruled by the

opposition All Progressives Congress (APC), which may explain the Federal Governments

inaction in combating these groups. The Federal Government has in turn accused the

APC for its failure to contain the Ombatse, thus highlighting the potential for the

politicization of this conflict.

Security forces tracked down and killed the Ombatse leader in Adamawa state and killed

at least 12 other members in Nasarawa on September 17. The Federal Government

followed this by sending several hundred soldiers to the state to prevent further

eruptions of violence. These forces arrested at least 40 suspected Ombatse members,

and placed a partial ban on motorcycle use in surrounding areas. Despite the recent

successes of security forces in combating the militia, local lawmakers are still calling for a

state of emergency. The presence of security forces may lead to additional

confrontations as the Ombatse militia will likely target them in the coming weeks, in

retaliation for the assassination of their leader.


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Boko Haram carries out several successful attacks in northeast

In recent weeks, the Boko Haram Islamist militant group has carried out several

successful attacks in the northeast of Nigeria. Most prominent of these was in the town

of Benisheik on September 17, where a group dressed as Nigerian soldiers and arrived in

military vehicles, setting up checkpoints and assassinating oncoming motorists, killing at

least 160 before burning down over 100 homes. In addition to this and other smaller

attacks, on September 20, Boko Haram militants in Borno attacked a bank's armored car

and escort van, killing three police escorts, the drivers and eight additional people, and

stealing the cash in transit.

Boko Haram has shown its ability to operate effectively in the northeast despite a state

of emergency, lack of telecommunications, a newly-created army division and an active

vigilante group. Additionally, the group appears to be using attacks to procure funds,

weapons and ammunition, and even armored vehicles. Thus we assess that Boko Haram

is successfully increasing its arsenal as well as its funding, which is likely to enable it to

continue its activities in the medium term.

In its attacks, the militants usually set fire to government buildings, schools, homes, and

police posts, in a strategy to drive residents and the local administration out of towns

with strategic values as they are located on main roads in Borno. This tactic is likely to

permit the militants a hold over the logistical infrastructure and thus gain a stronger

grasp over the region

Unions involved in Rivers State conflict, calls for Police Commissioner to resign

Tensions between labor unions and the Federal Government came to a head on

September 26 in Port Harcourt, the capital of Rivers State, when police dispersed a

crowd of at least 13,000 teachers that had gathered to pick up their letters of

deployment. The police claim that the teachers were receiving placards and preparing to

protest. The placards allegedly called on President Jonathan to honor a 2009 agreement

between the Federal Government and the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU)

and called on Rivers State Governor, Rotimi Amaechi, to for president in 2016.

On the same day as the incident the Nigerian Union of Teachers' (NUT) declared support

for the ASUU, calling on the government to honor the 2009 agreement or face a

shutdown of the national education system. Thus, we assess that it is likely that the

teachers were, in fact, gathering to protest.

Amaechi, is a central figure in a feud with President Jonathan and the ruling People's

Democratic Party (PDP), which led to the emergence of the new PDP (nPDP) faction. It is

likely that Amaechi and the above unions are utilizing this opportunity to pressure a

common foe, President Jonathan. As such, it is likely that Rivers State will continue to

witness protests in the near term.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. We continue to advice against travel to Nigeria's northern states at this time due to the

ongoing violence and the persistence of the state of emergency in the northeast.

2. If travel to the north is essential, it is recommended to procure executive protection and

safe travel services.


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3. As a general security precaution, avoid all large gatherings and labor demonstrations in

Nigeria given the increased potential for such incidents to turn violent with little to no

prior warning.

Assessment and Recommendation

Short Summary Date

The security forces are on high alert during this holiday. Given the potential for a militant attack on this day, security forces are giving special attention to popular public areas and key infrastructure installations throughout the country. As businesses and government offices will be closed, take necessary measures to assure business continuity in advance. Avoid large public gatherings due to potential for militant attack and/or civil unrest.

Independence Day – Commemorates the autonomy of Nigeria from British rule.

October 1, 2013

Heavy security will be placed around prayer sites nationwide. Expect travel congestion as Muslims throughout the country travel to visit family homes. Probable travel delays and service disruptions are expected due to the public holiday. Take necessary measures to assure business continuity in advance. Avoid large public gatherings due to elevated potential for civil unrest.

Eid al-Adha (Festival of Sacrifice). Muslim holiday, commemorating willingness of Abraham to sacrifice his son, Ismael.

October 14-15, 2013



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HIGH RISK

South Sudan

On September 13, Sudan’s Co-Chair of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee, al-Khair al-

Fahim reportedly announced Khartoum’s complete rejection of holding a referendum on

the status of the disputed, oil-rich Abyei Region in October.

Residents of Abyei have staged three protests since mid-September to demand that the

previously suggested deadline to hold a referendum on the status of the region be

upheld.

On September 18, President Kiir alleged that the army has engaged in graft and other

illicit activities.

President Kiir announced that general elections, scheduled for 2015, may have to be

postponed due to a lack of funds to conduct a census and complete the constitution.

We advise against nonessential travel to all outlying areas outside of Juba, especially

Jonglei State and the northern border regions with Sudan.


ASSESSMENTS

Growing tensions over Abyei

The status of Abyei is one of the most controversial, unresolved issues between the

Sudans, both of which are unwilling to relinquish control over the region’s petroleum

reserves. As the majority of the voters in Abyei are from the pro-South Sudan Ngok

Dinka tribe, a referendum vote would likely grant sovereignty to Juba. Demonstrators in

recent protests have called upon the African Union (A.U.) to halt oil flows from Abyei

until Juba and Khartoum hold the referendum.

Despite the likelihood for further protests by Abyei residents, we assess that Khartoum

is likely to continue to use stalling tactics to postpone a referendum. In the past, as

pressure has increased to resolve Abyei, cross border attacks in the region have

increased. Many of these attacks have been blamed on Khartoum, who is alleged to

instigate sympathetic groups, such as the pro-Sudan, Misseriya tribe who lives part of

the year in Abyei, to launch attacks on pro-South residents. These attacks serve to

escalate tensions between the Sudans to such an extent that discussions to resolve the

status of the land are postponed. Throughout October, we assess that there is a risk of

increased volatility in Abyei and elsewhere on the border. In the event of a cross border

incursion by either country that results in a high number of casualties or the deaths of

prominent individuals, there is a possibility that oil flow could be interrupted again.

President Kiir's actions

The allegations against the army are notable as the first instance in which Kiir has

accused the SPLA of corruption since the country’s foundation in 2011. In contrast to

Kiir's silence, many human rights monitors as well as South Sudanese nationals have


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criticized the SPLA, as well as the political branch of the army, the ruling SPLM, of

corruption and ethnic discrimination. Kiir has launched a series of steps to crack down

on rampant corruption within the government and the police force in the last few

months. We assess that a partial impetus for this anti-corruption campaign has been

international pressure due to threats to withdraw aid and funding. In August, Kiir called

for an investigation of allegations that several officers in the SPLA have engaged in

human rights violations and ethnic killings.

As the SPLA is simultaneously the ruling political faction and the power entity within

South Sudan, a potential crackdown on the army could have significant repercussions on

Kiir’s power base. Potential political rivals, such as ex-Vice President Riek Machar, who

maintains a strong following in the SPLA, could seize upon feelings of betrayal in the

SPLA to create a faction of loyalty for his previously announced intention to run in the

elections in 2015.

It has been speculated that some of Kiir's recent investigations and removals of

members of the SPLA/M may be a move to weaken political rivals. In September, Kiir

has threatened to dismiss unspecified senior members of his cabinet, in addition to

permanently suspending former party Secretary General, Pagan Amum. Meanwhile,

Kiir's statement that 2015 elections may be suspended could indicate another means by

which the president could entrench himself in power. Kiir's targeting of rivals could give

impetus to these individuals to cement a potential power bloc. Allegations of corruption,

crime, and other violations against these individuals could also be a tactic to try to

delegitimize them. That is not to say that the allegations may not be based on fact.

However, as similar allegations are prevalent against many individuals associated with

the government, Kiir may be trying to turn his rivals into scapegoats against whom the

population may target their frustration against the government.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. We advise against nonessential travel to all outlying areas outside of Juba, especially

Abyei, Jonglei State and the northern border regions with Sudan.

2. If traveling or residing in South Sudan, it is advised to properly vet and hire sufficient

facility security personnel. At-risk persons are advised to retain security personnel when

conducting all overland travel in both urban centers and outlying areas due to rising

levels of criminal activity in the capital.

3. In the case you are confronted by armed assailants, it is advised to cooperate fully and

not engage in any behavior that could raise tensions and lead to violence.

4. Those traveling overland in rural South Sudan are advised to consult with Max Security

for itinerary based planning and consultation before undertaking such a journey.



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MEDIUM RISK

Angola

Police dispersed a protest on September 19, and arrested foreign journalists covering

the event; further underscoring the lack of political freedoms.

Necessary travel to Angola can continue as usual, while adhering to basic security

precautions.


ASSESSMENTS

Police disperse protest, arrest journalists

On September 19, Angolan police reportedly dispersed an anti-government protest in

Luanda that was organized by the Revolutionary Movement of Angola. The group failed

to obtain permission from authorities and was warned that any “acts contrary to public

order and security” would be repelled. The police arrested at least 23 protesters and

threatened to use force against four foreign journalists.

There has been a small protest movement in Angola since 2011, inspired in part by the

revolutions of the "Arab Spring." The movement has routinely attempted to hold

protests to call for democratic reform and a more equitable distribution of the country's

oil wealth. The government has consistently accused the opposition movement of

attempting to "incite war." Angola has a history of brutal civil war and so accusations of

this nature have the affect of inciting a deep dread amongst the population which is

already war weary. This in part may explain the hardships that anti-government

movements face in drawing supporters.

While the protest itself failed to draw significant numbers, it did manage to gain the

support of various unions and opposition parties. We assess that the low support was

likely in part due to the threat of a police crackdown, which was openly expressed by a

police spokesperson in a televised warning.

Despite the extremely low turnout, the police arrested three of the activists on grounds

of disturbing the peace. This heavy repression is thus a demonstration of the extent to

which Angolan authorities are unwilling to accept any level of dissent.

On September 20, as journalists were interviewing released activists, police surrounded

the group and arrested six of the activists and three journalists. The journalists were

released shortly afterwards, but the activists remain in detention. The arrest of

journalists and activists was immediately criticized by Human Rights Watch, who

demanded that the detainees be released and the police held responsible. Human Rights

Watch also criticizes the conditions under which the protesters and journalists were

detained, with insufficient holding cells and reports of physical abuse. This

condemnation demonstrates that there is an international acknowledgement of the lack

of democratic rights in Angola. However, we assess that this condemnation is unlikely to


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translate into any concrete concessions on behalf of the Angolan government or security

services.

Angola has a poor record of press freedom, and at 130 out of 179 countries is the worst

placed Portuguese speaking (Lusophone) country in the Reporters Without Borders

ranking. We assess that the events of September 19 and 20, demonstrate that the press

freedom in Angola is not likely to improve in the near term.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Necessary travel to Angola can continue as usual, while adhering to basic security

precautions.

2. As a general security precaution, avoid all public gatherings and demonstrations in

Angola, due to the heightened risk for unrest and violence.

3. Avoid the vicinity of all political gatherings, whether conducted in public or in private.



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MEDIUM RISK

Cameroon

The parliamentary elections in Cameroon were held on September 30, following a

peaceful campaign, interrupted by isolated incidents of crackdown on opposition rallies.

Political stability is likely to remain intact as the ruling Cameroon People's Democratic

Movement (CPDM) is expected to achieve a landslide victory.

On September 18, approximately 4,000 public sector employees marched in Yaounde

over unpaid governmental dues. The incident highlights growing civil discontent with

socio-economic hardships.

On September 19, Cameroonian security forces arrested a prominent dissident leader

from the Central African Republic (CAR), suspected of using Cameroon as a rear-base to

destabilize the ruling Seleka alliance government.

Travel to Cameroon's major urban centers may continue while it is advised to refrain

from all nonessential travel to outlying areas, particularly the Extreme North, due to

volatile security conditions.


ASSESSMENTS

Election campaign

On September 16, it was reported that the Cameroonian security forces forcibly cracked

down on opposition rallies in the city of Makenene, about 150 km northwest from

Yaounde. Thereafter, on September 19, several injuries were recorded as security forces

forcibly dispersed supporters of the primary opposition faction, the Social Democratic

Front (SDF), who clashed with activists of the ruling CPDM in the township of Nkambe in

the Anglophone Northwest region. Both incidents underline the security forces

intolerance towards opposition actions and the consistent anti-government sentiment in

the Anglophone areas. Notwithstanding, it highlights the government's ability to push

opposition actions from the urban centers towards the nation's outlying areas.

President Paul Biya deliberately chose to hold the elections during the rainy season, with

forecasted inclement weather conditions nationwide. Bad weather conditions are likely

to keep many away from the voting stations, especially in rural areas where roads are

not maintained properly. Thus, the president's ability to manipulate the polls increases.

We assess the polls are held only as a measure to mitigate domestic tensions and allow

Biya to easily alter the power balance to his benefit within his own faction, the CPDM.

An indication of the President's methods surfaced on September 13, as Biya increased

the amount of monthly allowances paid to traditional Chiefs across Cameroon, a step

that assures the latter's loyalty to Biya.

Meanwhile, the SDF already raised complaints against the Electoral Committee (Elecam),

alleging that the voter ID-cards have been falsified by Elecam and the CPDM. That being


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said, the SDF and other opposition factions are likely to claim rigged polls in a bid to

attract international attention thereby exert pressure on Biya.

Domestic tensions

The public employees' protest took place in downtown Yaounde along Avenue Konard

Ardeneur to Rue Lamido Rey Bouba from the national radio station towards the Ministry

of Finance. The marchers accused the government and banks of fraud and that funds

that were pledged to them by a presidential decree were partially blocked for unclear

reasons. The protest was notable for the large turnout, given the fact that the Biya

regime's entrenchment over the years has led to a prevalent apathy towards social

mobilization. The event underscores of growing civil discontent with socio-economic

hardships and dissatisfaction with the national administration’s perceived inability to

improve social conditions. Civil discontent is likely further exacerbated by rampant

corruption in the governmental sector.

The opposition seems to have failed to capitalize on the event in order to garner political

support ahead of the polls, which, in turn, underscores of the opposition's limited ability

to commence large protests. There is a vacuum in Cameroonian politics, which is

emphasized as disgruntled individuals seek ways to manifest their discontent by turning

to workers unions, rather than political parties. Altogether, we assess that additional

demonstrations could be staged in the near-medium term, accompanied by heightened

security measures.

Security situation

Cameroon's chronic insecurity along the northern and eastern borders with Nigeria and

CAR, respectively, persists accompanied by an underlying threat of violent spillover. In

northeastern Nigeria, state security forces continue to clash with the Nigerian jihadists,

Boko Haram. As long as the Nigerian internal conflict persists, Cameroon's Extreme

North is prone for an additional influx of refugees and potential infiltrations by Nigerian

Islamic militants.

Meanwhile, the political stability in the CAR is constantly jeopardized by supporters of

ousted president Francois Bozize and elements who deserted the Seleka alliance

following the successful coup d'état last March. Abdoulaye Miskine, who was arrested in

the city of Bertoua by Cameroonian troops, is the leader of a restive CAR faction, the

Democratic Front of the Centrafrican People (FPDC). It is likely that Miskine followers

and other adversaries of the newly formed regime in Bangui will continue to operate

from bases in Cameroon's East region in bid to topple President Michel Djotodia. Thus,

clashes between CAR rebels and Cameroonian security forces are possible, in addition to

reprisal attacks on Cameroonian territory by Seleka rebels.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is advised to avoid nonessential travel to Cameroon's outlying areas, in particular the

Extreme North region bordering Nigeria and the border areas with the CAR, due to

volatile security conditions.


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2. Avoid the vicinity of polling stations nationwide on September 30, due to elevated

potential for politically motivated outbreaks of violence.

3. It is advised to avoid nonessential travel to the periphery of Douala and Yaounde due to

elevated threats posed by criminal activities.

4. Those traveling in Cameroon are advised to contact Max Security Intelligence for

itinerary-based consultation and on-ground support.


Short Summary Date

Given simmering tensions with Anglophone Cameroonian factions who strive for autonomy, this day could witness limited unrest and demonstrations in Anglophone regions in the Northwest and Southwest Provinces. We advise to maintain heightened vigilance if conducting travel in Anglophone Cameroon given the potential for unrest.As this is a public holiday, anticipate interruptions to business continuity as government offices and many businesses will be closed.

Unification Day – Marks Independence of Anglophone Cameroon in the south and its unification with French Cameroon.

October 1, 2013

No special security concerns. Likely travel delays and service disruptions due to the public holiday. Take necessary measures to insure business continuity in advance. Avoid large public gatherings due to elevated potential for civil unrest.

Eid al-Adha (Festival of Sacrifice). Muslim holiday, commemorating willingness of Abraham to sacrifice his son, Ishmael.

October 14-15, 2013



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MEDIUM RISK

Ethiopia

Demonstrations held by the two most vocal and prominent opposition groups, the Blue

Party and Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ), were forcefully disrupted in Addis

Ababa over recent weeks.

Ahead of the UDJ's September 29 protest, at least 26 senior leaders were detained by

police, as the government utilizes a law that restricts public demonstrations.

Heavy fighting was reported between ONLF rebels and government forces in Ogaden

during the month of September, underscoring persistent volatility in the region.

Business travel to Addis Ababa can continue while avoiding the vicinity of protests, and

deferring from non-essential travel to outlying areas given potential for militant attacks.


ASSESSMENTS

Political crackdown against dissidents persists

The arrests of more than 100 Blue Party members and the detainment of 26 senior

leaders of the opposition UDJ prior of their September 29 march underscores the

potential for unrest ahead of and during rallies organized by dissidents. The government

has elevated the pressure against the factions to postpone their rallies on multiple

occasions, and has banned all opposition parties from holding protests at the central

Meskel Square, a move fiercely criticized by both the Blue Party and the UDJ.

The ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has recently

increased its utilization of a legislation that imposes restrictions on public

demonstrations. This became evident on September 22 when a Blue Party rally was

blocked 100 meters from the party headquarters in the Ginfele Area, and protesters

were returned to the starting point, where they were allowed to picket. A similar police

action was recorded when approximately one thousand UDJ activists held a peaceful

rally against the controversial anti-terror law and demanding the release of all political

prisoners. The restrictions against freedom of assembly are further indicated by the

numerous arrests of dissidents made in recent weeks.

The government has in recent months increased it use of harassment, detainment of

dissidents and forceful dispersal methods against opposition protesters. Therefore we

assess that the peaceful atmosphere from which the Blue Party emerged in June 2013

through a mass demonstration, when authorities allowed opposition movements

increased freedom, has been replaced by a more authoritarian approach by the EPRDF.

Opposition movements’ activities in Ethiopia have for years been inhibited by political

pressure from the government, perceived unequal parliamentary representation, and

harsh police crackdowns. Given that security forces are continuing its police to forcefully

suppress rallies, it is likely that any future rally will be met with further police aggression.


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Ogaden hostilities

Reports indicate that several instances of hostility have taken place between rebels of

the secessionist Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and Ethiopian government

forces over the course of September. According to local sources, at least 150 ONLF

fighters attacked a military camp near Jijiga in the eastern Ogaden region in mid-

September, leading to dozens of deaths on both sides. Neither the government nor the

ONLF has confirmed nor refuted the incidents.

Since there is no independent media outlet operating in Ogaden due to government

restrictions, the claims cannot be corroborated nor the death toll confirmed. However,

the claims will likely exacerbate the already heightened tensions between the ONLF and

the government. The African Rights Monitor (ARM) recently issued a report alleging that

the Ethiopian government has intensified its extra-judicial killings, and that reported

instances of torture, rape and land grabbing in Ogaden have increased significantly. The

ARM claims that government forces are increasing its use of "scorched earth" tactics, to

forcibly move locals from an area. In light of these allegations and the heightened

tensions between the parties, we assess that continued hostilities is likely to transpire in

the Ogaden region over the near term.

As several rebel factions are active in Ethiopia’s outlying areas, including the ONLF and

the Ethiopian Unity and Freedom Force (EUFF), which both have conducted deadly

attacks against government installations and officials in their respective areas of

operations, there is an underlying threat of militant attack in Addis Ababa as well.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. While business travel to Addis Ababa can continue, it is advised to contact Max Security

to receive itinerary based consultation and on ground support options for travel within

the capital and in outlying areas.

2. As a general security precaution, avoid all large gatherings and political protests in Addis

Ababa, given the potential for unrest at such events.

3. It is advised to avoid nonessential travel to outlying areas, in particularly the Ogaden

region, areas adjacent to the Somali border as well as the western Gambela region, due

to threat of militant attacks.



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MEDIUM RISK

Guinea

Legislative elections transpired peacefully on September 28 although numerous

anomalies were reported, including a lack of voting ballots.

The heightened political tensions are likely to increase ahead of and on October 2 when

provincial results are expected, and protests remain likely over coming days.

We continue to advice against all nonessential travel to outlying regions of Guinea at this

time due to the persistence of elevated ethnic tensions, while avoiding all protests in

Conakry given heightened potential for unrest.


ASSESSMENTS

Legislative elections

The first legislative elections in more than one decade took place on September 28, with

a reported 80% voter turnout, following yet another postponement on September 24.

Numerous anomalies were reported, including a lack of voting ballots, as well as

allegations that many residents were being prevented from voting because their names

did not appear on voter registration lists. These electoral irregularities have been

partially confirmed by the E.U. observer mission. That said, there were no significant

reports of unrest or violence, aside from localized heightened tensions between

opposition and government supporters in the Kaloum area of Conakry, which serves as

the city's central business and political district.

While the elections largely transpired peacefully, politically motivated violence persisted

throughout Conakry and nationwide in the lead-up to the polls. In Conakry, both

opposition and government supporters erected road barricades and burned tires,

blocking traffic circulation throughout many areas of the capital, including in the Ratoma

commune and Route Le Prince between Hamdallaye and Cosa. The pre-election unrest

resulted in the death of one policeman and a reported 70 injured.

On election day, main opposition leader Cellou Dalein Diallo threatened that dissidents

would return to street demonstration if incidents of fraud would be detected. This

statement underscores the continued potential for unrest over the coming days.

Therefore, despite final results not having been released yet, we assess that the

outcome, whether in favor of incumbent President Alpha Conde's government or the

opposition, is likely to result in mass demonstrations and likely ensuing unrest. As

previously witnessed in Guinea, such gatherings possess a high likelihood to devolve into

violence, with politically motivated unrest often spreading quickly throughout Conakry

and along ethnic lines nationwide. The aforementioned tensions are likely to be

mirrored on the domestic political arena, with opposition and government officials

expected to continue adopting a confrontational rhetoric, which in turn is likely to

exacerbate the potential for violence.


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In the near term, we assess that given elevated political tensions in the wake of the

legislative elections, there remains a potential for protests and unrest throughout the

country, particularly in Conakry. Additionally, as the country is slated to celebrate its

65th Independence Day on October 2, the same day that official election results are

expected, the risk for such unrest is particularly high in the vicinity of celebratory events

deemed political, due to possible participation of government ministers or officials.

RECEOMMENDATIONS

1. We continue to advice against all nonessential travel to outlying regions of Guinea at this

time due to the persistence of elevated ethnic tensions, while avoiding all protests in

Conakry given heightened potential for unrest.

2. We continue to advise maintaining heightened vigilance throughout Conakry due to the

possibility of general, politically related unrest.

3. As a general security precaution, avoid large gatherings and political demonstrations in

Guinea given the highly elevated potential for possibly violent unrest to erupt with little

to no warning.


Short Summary Date

As this is a public holiday, take necessary measures to assure business continuity in anticipation as government offices and many businesses will be closed. On October 2, we advise to maintain heightened vigilance if conducting travel in Guinea given the heightened potential for unrest.

Republic Day - Guinea will be celebrating 65 years of Independence with a public holiday on October 2.

October 2, 2013



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MEDIUM RISK

Ivory Coast

Persistently high criminal activity was recorded, particularly in Yamoussoukro, amid

growing tensions with the Dozo hunter community; additional clashes are likely as

security forces bolster presence.

While talks between the government and the opposition FPI resume, a political party

was created by moderate Gbagbo supporters indicating a potentially new political

landscape.

Those operating or residing in the Ivory Coast, are advised to avoid nonessential travel

to outlying areas given the heightened security risks.


ASSESSMENTS

Criminal activity

Security incidents related to continued criminal activity and road blocking resulted in

several deaths over the past few weeks, with a particular uptick in such activity in the

Yamoussoukro region. Sources suggest that most of the criminal activity in the capital is

related to increasing tensions between the military and the traditional hunter

community, known as Dozo. The initial incident reported occurred on September 12,

when two Dozos were killed by security forces after they attempted to arrest them. That

said, Dozo community representatives have blamed the military for targeting their

members, after having denied accusations of criminal activity, indicating that additional

hostilities are likely in the near term.

Rampant criminal activity was further highlighted by reports indicating an increase in

operations of an armed street gang that looted shops and conducted robberies at

gunpoint during night hours in the Abobo area, situated in Abidjan’s north. Additionally,

an Ivorian soldier was killed during an ambush in Agboville, also located north of

Abidjan, on September 21. Immediately following the attack, reinforcements arrived to

several surrounding villages, sending locals fleeing out of fear of additional violence.

Some locals claim that the soldiers attacked youths in the village, injuring several

individuals.

Criminality remains a major problem throughout Ivory Coast in both rural and urban

areas despite a recent bolstering of security forces’ presence. In spite of alleged police

crackdowns, widespread arms proliferation, corruption and incompetence among police

officers will likely continue allow criminal networks to thrive relatively unabated.

Political developments

The dialogue between the government and opposition Ivorian Popular Front (FPI)

resumed on September 24, following a hiatus of several months. The FPI, formerly led by

ex-President Laurent Gbagbo, who is currently being indicted at the International

Criminal Court (ICC) for human rights violations, is represented by returning leader


Pag

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Pascal Affi N’Guessan. N’Guessan was released from prison in the beginning of August

and is believed to be the reason for the more confrontational tone adopted by the party

in recent weeks. The uncompromising nature of the FPI is highlighted by the continued

demand for the release of all pro-Gbagbo prisoners as well as the return of exiled

supporters of the party, despite the fact that the government is highly unlikely to meet

these demands at this time. Therefore, we assess that although negotiations have

resumed, the potential for an agreement to be reached in the near term remains low

due to the wide discrepancies between the parties.

In the near term, we assess that the existing cleavages between pro-Gbagbo factions

and the government, which are mirrored within society, are likely to increase as

negotiations continue. These differences are likely to manifest themselves through

virulent political rhetoric and possibly violent confrontations.

Meanwhile, thousands of activists from the pro-Gbagbo League of Movements for

Progress (LMP) coalition, of the FPI is the main party, have left LMP to establish the

National Forum for Peace (FNAP). The new political faction was officially launched during

a rally held on September 24 in Yopougon, Abidjan. The newly established FNAP will be

led by Toure al-Moustapha, former leader of the Young Patriots Movement, which

supported former President Gbagbo and his FPI. FNAP calls for increased peace and

reconciliation with incumbent President Ouattara and his administration.

Although FNAP leader al-Moustapha is known as a pro-Gbagbo activist, the new group’s

call for reconciliation with President Ouattara may lead to heightened tensions with

other LMP parties, particularly the FPI. This is particularly true given that the FPI has

been associated with violent activities in the past and maintains a strong support base in

Yopougon. As such, there remains a potential for violent acts and possibly clashes

between FNAP activists and FPI supporters in the near-medium term.

Recommendations

1. Those operating or residing in the Ivory Coast, are advised to avoid nonessential travel

to outlying areas given the heightened security risks.

2. If travel to outlying regions is necessary, maintain vigilance and utilize properly vetted

on-ground support.

3. As to mitigate the risk against illegal security checkpoints, do not pull over for any

unmarked vehicles. In the event of an unmarked vehicle attempting to pull you over,

drive directly to the nearest police station

4. In the case you are directly confronted by armed assailants, it is advised to cooperate

fully and not engage in any behavior that could raise tensions and lead to violence.



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MEDIUM RISK

Kenya

● A prolonged siege and hostage situation took place at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi

conducted by al-Shabaab militants; the attack left at least 67 people dead and hundreds

injured, highlighting Kenya's inability to avert and combat a well-coordinated militant

attack.

● Police in Mombasa were put on high alert on September 27 and dispatched additional

security contingencies throughout the city following reports of an imminent attack by al-

Shabaab militants.

● The U.S.'s re-issuing of a travel advisory from July 5 following the Westgate attack met

harsh criticism from Kenya, but the U.S. move underlines that the threat of additional

attacks remains viable.

● Travel to Nairobi and other urban centers can continue while adhering to standard

security protocols against militancy and crime. Be aware of suspicious persons and

unattended bags and packages.

● Back to Table of Contents

ASSESSMENTS

Westgate Mall attack

The Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) took full control over the Westgate Mall in Nairobi’s

affluent Westlands neighborhood on September 25, following four days of siege and a

prolonged hostage situation conducted by Islamist militants belonging to the Somali-

based al-Shabaab militant group. More than one dozen assailants wearing camouflage

uniforms and equipped with bullet proof armor, rifles and hand grenades, assaulted the

Westgate Mall during the afternoon hours of September 21. Five attackers were

reportedly killed by security forces, and the death toll, currently standing at 67, is

expected to rise and forensics continue searching the partially wrecked building.

Reports have indicated that several of the attackers fled through tunnels or among

civilians as they were escorted away from Westgate just hours after the initial stages of

the attacks. In light of this, in addition to alleged poor coordination between security

agencies leading to several operational failures, fierce criticism has been directed at the

government and the security establishment following the attack. The developments

underscore the high level of incompetence among the Kenyan security forces in

combating such a well orchestrated attack as well as the lack of hierarchy and

communication between the different security agencies. As more details surface

concerning laxity by security forces during the Westgate incident, the pressure against

President Kenyatta and his cabinet to act decisively against militancy is likely to grow.

Given that al-Shabaab has recently issued additional threats against several targets in

the region, the risk of further attacks in Kenya remain viable in the near term. However,

given the significantly heightened security measures implemented throughout Nairobi,

Mombasa and the Somali border regions following the Westgate incident, we assess


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that the chances of a second major attack on this scale by al-Shabaab in Kenya’s urban

centers remains lowered at this time.

As al-Shabaab has maintained a strong long-term presence inside Kenya, waging a series

of low-level attacks primarily in Nairobi’s Eastleigh district and the nation’s eastern

regions. Thus, more up-scale areas such as Westlands have been under persistent threat

from militant attack since the 2011 Kenyan intervention in Somalia and will continue to

be. Therefore, the Westgate siege is only representative of the ongoing security threat

that Nairobi is facing and not indicative of an increased threat.

Mombasa alert of imminent attack

Beginning on September 27, central Mombasa experienced a heightened state of alert

as police was stationed throughout the city as several locales in Mombasa’s Central

Business District (CBD) and other areas of the city have reportedly received threats from

al-Shabaab. These include the TSS Tower, Electricity House, Mombasa Law Court,

Mombasa Trade Center, transportation hubs, Likoni Ferry, in addition to churches and

mosques. The police urged all residents to exercise caution, avoid the areas of the

aforementioned locales and report any suspicious individuals or packages to security

officers.

Al-Shabaab draws large support from Mombasa’s predominantly Muslim population and

enjoys the support of several radical Islamic clerics. The group is therefore believed to

have access to safe houses and bomb making facilities in and around the city. Moreover,

given the sophistication and detailed planning of the Westgate attack, any enhanced

security measures implemented at potential targets may be deficient in repelling a

coordinated attack similar in nature to the Westgate siege.

The reports indicating that numerous foreigners participated in the Westgate attack

highlights a possible change in modus operandi by al-Shabaab. As the group may

increasingly utilize Western born Muslims or converts to conduct major and well-

orchestrated attacks in the near term, security forces will likely have impaired ability to

halt such actions in advance. This is particularly true given that the Kenyan security

apparatus has predominantly focused on anti-militant operations in Nairobi and

Mombasa against Somali expats and Kenyan sympathizers of al-Shabaab in recent

months. Thus, security forces may have neglected militant sleeper cells led by

Westerners.

Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the Westgate attack, the Kenyan government as well as

its security and intelligence services has been strongly criticized for not preventing the

attack as well as acting unprofessionally and reacting slowly as the attack occurred.

Thus, there remains a possibility that the security establishment may respond

disproportionally or forcefully to any potential indication of militant attacks over the

coming weeks, as to not repeat these alleged mistakes.

U.S. travel advisory

As the U.S. State Department re-issued its travel advisory from July 5 in the aftermath of

the Westgate Mall attack by al-Shabaab militants, the move was fiercely condemned by

the Kenyan government. The Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the move


Pag

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unnecessary and uncalled for as “terrorism is a global problem and the U.S. itself has

suffered terror attack before.” The U.S. travel advisory urged its citizens planning to

travel to Kenya to evaluate their personal security in light of “continuing and recently

heightened threat from terrorism and high rate of crime in some areas.”

Despite previous calls by both President Kenyatta and opposition leader Raila Odinga

aimed at international community not to issue travel advisories in light of the Westgate

attack, the U.S. disregard for these calls underscores that the threat of additional attacks

remains real. As the Kenyan government has called the U.S. move "unfriendly," the

travel advisory could be the beginning of a diplomatic row that could take months to

mend. This is particularly true in light of Kenyan criticism against U.S. intelligence

services for not alerting Kenyan authorities of the Westgate Mall attack, as well as

Kenya's increasing lenience eastward toward China, demonstrated by major

development loans and infrastructure deals recently signed in Beijing.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Travel to Nairobi and other urban centers can continue while adhering to standard

security protocols against militancy and crime. Be aware of suspicious persons and

unattended bags and packages.

2. Avoid nonessential travel to the vicinity of locales frequented by foreigners, such as

shopping malls, entertainment venues, in addition to Western embassies, and

government and security installations such as police stations and military barracks, due

to their likelihood to become targets for militant attacks.

3. Travelers in Kenya are advised to avoid all nonessential travel to outlying areas,

particularly to the northeastern border region with Somalia and Ethiopia, due to the high

level of insecurity.

4. It is advised to avoid nonessential travel within Nairobi’s working class neighborhoods

during the evening and night hours due to elevated security risks posed

by criminal activity.



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MEDIUM RISK

South Africa

The South African crime statistics for 2012-2013 were released on Thursday, September

19, demonstrated that for the first time in eight years there has been an increase in

serious and violent crime, including murder.

The infamous leader of the "Hard Livings" gang, Rashied Staggie has been released from

prison on day parole fueling fear that there will be an increase in gang violence in the

Western Cape.

Business travel to South Africa can continue while avoiding all demonstrations and

practicing heightened vigilance against crime.


ASSESSMENTS

Crime statistics reveal increase in violent crimes including murders

Murder rates have increased by 6.5% in the past year, with an average of 43 murders a

day throughout the country. There were also increases in attempted murders, assaults,

residential burglaries, commercial crimes and drug related incidents. It was also

recorded that sexual offences have declined slightly over the past year.

Murder is the most easily measurable statistic, and as such is the most accurate gauge of

the crime situation in the country. This year's increase in murders comes against nine

years of consistent decreasing numbers, a point which the police expressed at length.

While sexual crimes did decline slightly, there are many who believe that this decline is

partially the result of decrease in reporting of incidents. An increase in assault and

violent crime does not match a sudden decrease in sexual violence, and so it is probable

that there is underreporting of cases of sexual violence. This may demonstrate that

victims of these crimes fear reporting them or do not feel that anything can be gained

through reporting such incidents.

Statistics reveal that more than half of the murders in the country occur in only 13% of

the police precincts, and that murder rates in low income areas are significantly higher

than in high income areas. This may demonstrate that the majority of murders are not

premeditated or committed as part of a crime, but are more likely the result of

arguments or domestic violence.

Contrary to this police precincts in areas with an extremely high average income, such as

Sandton in Johannesburg or Table View in Cape Town, have extremely low rates of

murder and in some cases did not record a single incident in the period 2012-2013.

The highest murder rates were recorded in the informal settlements and lower income

areas that surround Cape Town. This region has witnessed a major increase in drug

related crime and gang violence, which may be the basis for this statistic.

Central Business Districts (CBD) are the most at risk areas for violence in general,

including robberies, rapes, attempted murder and hijackings. Johannesburg remains the


Pag

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most dangerous CBD in the country, but Durban, Pretoria and Cape Town all reported

significant crime rates.

Violent crime rates grew besides an increase in the in the police force of 70,000

additional officers. This, coupled with the trend of murders in low income areas, may

demonstrate that crime in South Africa is rooted in societal shortcomings and poverty.

Thus the affliction of violent crime may not be solved by effective policing alone. It is for

this reason that we assess that crime, and especially violent crime is likely to remain a

major stumbling block to South African progress.

Rashied Staggie released from prison on day parole

Rashied Staggie, together with his twin brother Rashaad, who was murdered in 1996, is

the infamous leader of the Hard Livings gang which fought a vicious gang turf and drug

war in the 1990's. Staggie was arrested in 2004 on charges of rape and aggravated

robbery, but received day parole on grounds of good behavior. As part of the day parole,

Staggie will be allowed to leave the Pollsmoor Prison during the day hours provided he

has a job to attend to.

Gang violence has steadily increased in the Cape Flats region, especially in Manenburg,

from where Staggie hails, over the past half a year. Many attribute this rise in violence to

Staggie's imminent resurfacing, as gang members maneuver to claim positions or display

allegiance to the old leader.

Furthermore, the vigilante organization responsible for the lynching of Rashaad Staggie,

People Against gangs and Drugs (Pagad) has reemerged, and become increasingly visible

in the region. It is possible that Pagad and Staggie's "Hard Livings" gang may once again

clash.

Staggie has claimed that he will not re-enter the crime world, and has been employed by

a church as a full time motivational speaker. However, we assess that due to the already

rampant violence as well as the reemergence of Pagad, Staggie's release is likely to

result in an increase in gang and drug violence both directly linked to Staggie and

indirectly resulting from his presence on the streets.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. As a general security precaution it is advised to avoid all mass gatherings and public

protests in South Africa, due to the potential for violence at these events.

2. It is advised to avoid the rural areas of South Africa.

3. It is advised to avoid all unnecessary travel to the informal settlements throughout

South Africa, and especially outside of Cape Town.

4. Visitors to South Africa are advised to practice heightened vigilance against crime.



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MEDIUM RISK

Uganda

The Ugandan security forces were put on high alert following the Westgate Mall militant

attack in Nairobi, and increased border security was implemented, underscoring the

increased threat of militancy.

President Museveni may face several retired generals in the contest for Presidency in

2016, as newly retired Maj. Gen. Benon Biraaro has indicated his willingness to run for

President.

While business travel to Uganda can continue, we advise avoiding the vicinity of protests

due to the potential for unrest, as well as government and security installations given

the possibility for militant attacks.


ASSESSMENTS

Security forces on high alert

In light of the attack and siege on Nairobi’s Westgate Mall, Ugandan security forces have

beefed up their deployment in and around potential targets of militant attacks in

Kampala and nationwide. These include shopping malls, major supermarkets, Western

embassies, public spaces as well as government and security installations. Furthermore,

border security has been bolstered in the Malaba and Busia areas, as a step to block

possible infiltration of militants into the country. Inspector General of Police, General

Kale Kayihura, called on all Ugandans to remain vigilant against suspicious individuals or

objects, and reminded its citizens that Uganda remains high on the list of targets by al-

Shabaab and other militant groups.

Uganda was targeted by Somali-based militant group al-Shabaab in 2010, when a twin-

suicide bombing killed at least 70 people at an entertainment venue. Thus, in light of the

Westgate attack and recent increased threats by al-Shabaab and other regional Islamic

radical groups, we assess that the threat against Uganda is viable. This threat is

increasingly feasible given the reported increased cooperation between al-Shabaab and

the Ugandan rebel group Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), currently operating in eastern

DRC with approximately 1,000 fighter under its command. Thus, heightened security

measures are likely to remain in place over the coming weeks, particularly in light of the

prominent role that Uganda has played in the African Union Mission in Somalia

(AMISOM), in combating al-Shabaab and ousting the group from its former strongholds.

Moreover, President Museveni held a high-profile meeting with U.S. Secretary of

Defense Chuck Hagel in Pentagon, Washington D.C., mainly discussing the implication of

the Westgate attack and future efforts to combat al-Shabaab. Museveni, who has

proven to be a committed U.S. and Western ally in the fight against Islamic extremism in

East Africa and against rebel groups operating in central Africa, was commended by his

host for his and Uganda's persistent efforts against militancy in the region. Uganda was


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the first country to commit troops to AMISOM in 2006, and currently has more than

8,000 forces stationed in Somalia under A.U. command. We assess that following the

Westgate attack, Uganda, Kenya and other countries in AMISOM will be more

determined and likely receive increased international financial and military support in a

renewed effort to completely rid Somalia of al-Shabaab.

Retired generals challenge President

Ahead of the Presidential elections in 2016, speculation is rife for who President Yoweri

Museveni, or possibly his son Brigadier Muhoozi, will contend against for the highest

political office in Uganda. Apart from retired Gen. Mugisha Muntu, who is set to lead the

main opposition Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), reports indicate that newly retired

Major Gen. Benon Biraaro is considering running for president. The ruling National

Resistance Movement (NRM), which is commonly referred to as the "Movement," is

expected to be led by either Museveni or his son Muhoozi, whose rapid rise within the

ranks of the army has fueled speculation of his political ambitions.

The potential challenger Gen. Biraaro is a senior officer who rose in the ranks of the

Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF) from the Bush War days, and is believed to be

a former close confident of the outgoing Chief of Defense Forces Gen. Aronda

Nyakairima. Biraaro's possible participation in the presidential elections is notable as it

comes at a time of alleged increased division within the army following Gen. Sejusa

publication of a controversial letter pertaining that Museveni aims to have his son

succeed him as President. The political and military establishments in Ugadna are highly

interconnected and dependant of each other, and it is widely assumed that only high

ranking ex-military officers are able to vie for the Presidency.

Given that President Museveni has secured between 60-70% in the past two previous

presidential elections and that his NRM holds a comfortable majority in Parliament,

NRM is expected to emerge victorious of the 2016 election as well. However, under

increased pressure against opposition movements from the government, dissidents are

beginning to find common ground against the NRM. Thus, we assess that there will be

increased domestic calls for self-exiled renegade Gen. Sejusa as well as Gen. Biraaro to

challenge Museveni's power, who has held the Presidency since 1986. The elevated

restriction on freedom of assembly has decreased the frequency and size of opposition

demonstrations in recent weeks. These restrictions became particularly evident through

a legislation stipulating the ban for unauthorized political gatherings with more than

three people, and the law heightens the potential for unrest during opposition

demonstrations. Nonetheless, as opposition factions are reportedly cooperating more

intensely than before, we assess that dissidents' tactic of spontaneous as well as

planned protests are likely to resurge over the coming months.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. While business travel to Uganda can continue, we advise avoiding the vicinity of protests

due to the potential for unrest, as well as government and security installations given

the possibility for militant attacks.


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2. If confronted by security checkpoints or police officer, make sure to comply and

cooperate with their demands as to not raise suspicion that could lead to violent use of

force.

3. Avoid all nonessential travel to outlying regions given the activities of rebel groups,

particularly in western Uganda at this time.

4. Given the persistent threat of militant attacks through the activities of militant factions

in Uganda, we advise avoiding nonessential travel to the vicinity of government and

security installations, Western diplomatic institutions, and crowded public areas at this

point in time.

5. As a general security precaution, avoid the vicinity of all large gatherings and

demonstrations due to the potential for clashes with police and incidental risks to

bystanders.


Short Summary Date

Uganda will celebrate their independence with likely military parades and other events in public spaces in Kampala and nationwide. As there is an elevated threat of militant attacks by Islamists at this time, avoid all large gatherings and public events. As this is a public holiday, many businesses and government institutions will be closed. Take necessary measures to mitigate disruptions to business continuity.

Independence Day – Uganda will be celebrating 51 years of independence from British rule.

October 9, 2013



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LOW RISK

Ghana

Government increases utility tariffs, which has led to increasing calls for demonstrations,

as authorities are easing the restrictions on public gatherings.

Travel to Ghana can continue as normal while avoiding nonessential travel to the

nation's outlying areas and Greater Accra suburbs due to volatile security conditions.


ASSESSMENTS

Political Developments

The Ghanaian Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC) announced a 78.9%

increase in electricity and 52% increase in water tariffs to take effect on October 1. The

decision for increasing the water costs was allegedly made to help the Ghana Water

Company meet key operational costs, and make investments that will help ensure better

service delivery. The Electricity Company of Ghana (EGC), for its part, argues that they

are losing money for their services and thus cannot pay its suppliers. Additionally, Ghana

is making substantial investments in electricity-generating infrastructure that will

eventually lower production costs, but in the meantime requires greater financing to

make these projects feasible.

Energy generation in Ghana is heavily reliant on imports of relatively expensive crude oil

from Nigeria and the government is seeking to substitute this with natural gas. This

dependency is partly due to the incomplete West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) project,

which is to bring gas to Ghana via pipeline from Nigeria. To address this expensive

dependency, the government is working on other projects, such as the Western Corridor

Gas Infrastructure Project (WCGIP), which will transport gas from West Ghana to the

Takoradi Power Stations in Aboadze. The WCGIP is currently 72% complete and will lead

to a halving of the USD 3 million currently spent in purchasing crude oil for daily power

generation. Ghana also plans on setting up the infrastructure for using imported

liquefied natural gas (LNG). In order to realize these goals, the Ministry of Energy and

Petroleum (MoEP) in collaboration with Quantum Power Ghana Gas Limited held an

international LNG workshop from September 26-27. The country plans to shift to using

LNG to power all thermal plants throughout the country by 2016, and the government

claims that tariff costs will then decrease.

Ghanaians are naturally unhappy with the new costs. The country struggled with

spiraling inflation rates below-trend economic growth in recent years. As Ghanaians

struggle with rising living expenses the new utilities prices come at a particularly

unwelcomed time.

Various parties and groups have come out against the tariff increase. The People's

National Convention (PNC) minor opposition party of Ghana criticized the government

for this measure and stated that they will employ all means available to protect the


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welfare of informal sector workers and Ghanaians as a whole. The Committee for Joint

Action (CJA) pressure group also voiced disappointment and announced plans to hold an

emergency meeting to consider steps to counter the PURC move. Meanwhile, the Truth

and Accountability Forum (TAF) has suggested that they will organize massive

demonstrations in protest of the increasing utility costs. The group attempted to take

the PURC to court in June, but the case was dismissed. The group plans on holding

protests in Accra and nationwide if the government and the PURC does not reverse its

decision by October 3. In addition to demonstrations, the TAF plans to use all means

within available, including appealing the earlier court decision, to block the tariff

increase. Similar statements came from the Alliance for Accountable Governance

pressure group as well, which called on all opposition parties, especially the main

opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) to organize mass actions. The NPP, for its part,

hinted that the party will work to organize street protests against the tariff increase.

Given the assortment of opposition to the new, we expect to see large demonstrations

within the coming weeks, particularly following the October 3 deadline from the TAF.

The PURC was initially planning a 150% increase in electricity price increases and only

lowered this increment on September 25; as such, it is unlikely that the government will

significantly reduce the price increases, if at all. That being said, the Ghanaian

government and President Mahama in particular have been relatively successful in

procuring foreign investments in various infrastructural and development projects in

Ghana and given the above mentioned international LNG workshop, there exists a

chance that the government will seek to balance the tariff costs with investments from

abroad.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Travel to Ghana can continue as normal while avoiding nonessential travel to the

nation's outlying areas and Greater Accra suburbs due to volatile security conditions.

2. As a general security precaution, avoid the vicinity of all large political gatherings and

demonstrations throughout Ghana due to the potential for violence between security

forces and demonstrators.


Short Summary Date

No special security concerns. Probable travel delays and service disruptions due to the anticipated public holiday. Take necessary measures to assure business continuity in advance. Avoid large public gatherings due to elevated potential for civil unrest.

Eid al-Adha (Festival of Sacrifice). Muslim holiday, commemmorating willingness of Abraham to sacrifice his son, Ishmael.

October 14-15, 2013



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LOW RISK

Tanzania

On September 21, thousands of political opposition activists from various parties

attended a rally at the Jangwani grounds in Dar es Salaam to pressure President Kikwete

to refrain from signing the Constitutional Review Bill into law.

Opposition parties have called for further demonstrations, including nationwide rallies

on October 10, related to the same issue.

Police have arrested 15 individuals, including suspected al-Shabaab militants, in relation

to an acid attack on a Catholic priest on Zanzibar on September 13.

Tanzanian security forces have announced that they are investigating threats allegedly

issued by al-Shabaab via social media outlets since the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi

on September 21.

Business travel to Tanzania can continue while adhering to basic security guidelines.


ASSESSMENTS

Debate surrounding Controversial Review Bill

Opposition to the bill, also known as the Katiba Draft, is mounting, led by three main

dissident political parties, Chadema, the Civic Union Front (CUF), and the National

Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR)-Mageuzi. The various opposition

parties' solidarity on the issue is notable given their previous inability to form a concrete

bloc against the ruling Party of the Revolution (CCM), which has held onto power since

independence in 1962. The political opposition's union reflects a reportedly widespread

dissatisfaction with the bill, as civil society groups and academics have also expressed

their disagreement.

Those who decry the bill claim that the amendment would bestow an unfair amount of

power on the president and the ruling party. The amendment would give the head of

state the prerogative to appoint 166 out of 604 members of the Constituent Assembly.

The opposition also calls for 792 members to comprise the Constituent Assembly, with

50 percent of the representative from Zanzibar. The amendment's current form

stipulates 36 percent representation for Zanzibar.

Given the large turnout at the Jangawani rally, we assess that the planned October 10

demonstrations are likely to be well-attended. A heightened security presence in the

vicinity of the demonstrations is likely, and these forces may use force should

demonstrators become unruly. Meanwhile, the bombing of the Chadema political rally

in June suggests other threats to these rallies. Furthermore, in the event that Kikwete

ignores the opposition’s demands and signs the bill, we assess that protests are likely to

increase. Meanwhile, should Kikwete bend to political and popular pressure and refer

the bill back to the Constituent Assembly for further discussion, it is likely that tensions

will decrease and the demonstrations will be suspended.


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Militant risks to Tanzania

Although the affiliation of the suspected perpetrators of the acid attack to al-Shabaab

remains unconfirmed, there is a credible potential that al-Shabaab could have

connections with ideologically similar groups residing in Tanzania. The proven ability of

al-Shabaab, a Somali affiliate of al-Qaeda, to cultivate ties with regional groups allows

the more experienced group to coordinate both low-scale and high-profile attacks, often

with the direct participation of Somali members who likely supervise these militant

operations.

Zanzibar has a 98 percent Muslim population, which is a much higher concentration than

throughout the rest of Tanzania where Muslims account for roughly half of the

population. Since 2012, there are clear indications of growing extremist sentiment

within the Muslim community in Zanzibar, and religious tensions with the minority

Christian population have spiked following several attacks on priests. A local extremist

Islamist group in Zanzibar, Uamsho (Awakening), could likely have cultivated nascent

connections with al-Shabaab, especially as the Uamsho has issued explicit threats

against Christians on Zanzibar Island since October 2012.

However, threats of future militancy are also relevant throughout the mainland. A

church bombing in May in Arusha was followed by the apprehension of a five-man cell

with explosives in Dar es Salaam. The bomb fragments from the Arusha attack indicated

that they were not locally produced. Thus, those who perpetrated the attack could have

connections to trans-national terrorist organizations. Tanzania's relatively weak security

and porous borders leave it vulnerable to such infiltration. Furthermore, growing socio-

economic disparities and increasing religious fanaticism, have created conditions in

which militancy is likely to grow. We assess that the attention of trans-national terrorist

organizations is likely to be drawn to Tanzania in the aftermath of the recent events and

given violent religious clashes in autumn 2012 and in February 2013. As such, Tanzania

may become the target of future global terrorist group infiltrations and recruiting.

Tanzania is projected to increasingly assume a key role as a regional leader and as it

attracts international investment through continuous development of its abundant

natural resource potential. Both of these factors will make it a likely target for near-long

term militant attacks.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is advised to avoid the immediate vicinity of any large public gatherings and political

demonstrations, due to elevated security concerns.

2. It is advised to avoid the vicinity of religious establishments, and government or security

installations in the near term given the potential for religiously-motivated attacks or

unrest.

3. Practice heightened vigilance throughout in Tanzania, particularly in areas of mixed

Christian-Muslim populations, and be aware of any suspicious persons or packages,

particularly in vicinity of large crowds.

4. Business travel to Tanzania can continue while adhering to basic security guidelines.


Pag

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Short Summary Date

Businesses and government offices will be closed for Nyerere Day. Commemorations and public ceremonies will likely take place. Take necessary measures to assure business continuity in adavance. Avoid all large gatherings as a general security precaution.

Nyerere Day – Public holiday to commemorate the nation's founder, Julius Nyerere.

October 14, 2013



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LOW RISK

Zambia

There is an apparent split within the ruling PF centered on the position of Wynter

Kabimba as secretary general of the party.

The border between Zambia and the DRC was temporarily closed owing to growing

tensions between Zambian truck drivers and Congolese traders.

Travel to Zambia can continue at this time while adhering to basic security precautions.


ASSESSMENTS

Split within the ruling Patriotic Front

A split within the Patriotic Front (PF) has occurred over the position of part secretary

general Wynter Kabimba. Elements within the party accuse Kabimba of working to

divide the PF by positioning himself to run in the 2016 presidential elections.

The party secretary general is a key position, and from it Kabimba is able to manipulate

the construct and image of the PF. Thus we assess that it would be in the interest of his

detractors, who are most likely supporters of President Sata, to have him removed from

his post.

The belief that Kabimba intends to run for president in 2016 is closely linked to the

prevailing belief that President Michael Sata is sick, and will thus be unable to run for a

further presidential term, or may need to be replaced before the end of his tenure.

On September 17 President Sata threatened to dissolve the parliament, providing a

further indication that the PF may be interested in holding early or unscheduled

elections. Sata pointed to the growing opposition voices and his cabinet's inability to

defend the government from perceived opposition attacks. Sata has gained a reputation

of making controversial statements in the past, and this latest threat may be a further

example of this tendency, however it provides a clear indication of the tensions within

the ruling party as well as lending possible legitimacy to the early election rumors.

The movement against Kabimba seems to be employing youth cadres to spur discontent

and create a situation in which Kabimba cannot continue in his position within the party.

In Zambia, political violence is often carried out through youth cadres hired by powerful

party members to intimidate rival political groups. Thus, it is likely that the youth

protests against Kabimba are sponsored by upper ranking politicians within the PF. The

apparent compliance of security forces with these protests lends further credence to the

belief these youths are receiving backing from important political figures that may be

influencing the police response.

Kabimba has claimed that the youths are being sponsored by an ethnic and tribal clique

within the PF. This claim is disputed by youth leaders who claim that it demonstrates

that Kabimba himself is a tribalist, who does not like Bemba people. Party leadership has

gone to lengths to attempt to dispel the talk of tribalism within the party, as it


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demonstrates growing disunity. This statement thus further demonstrates the growing

cleavages within the ruling party, especially in light of a possible imminent power

struggle that may draw on ethnic allegiances.

We assess that further protests against Wynter Kabimba are likely in the near term.

These protests have already witnessed some unrest with youths blocking streets and

intimidating security agents. We assess that these demonstrations are likely to continue

to witness unrest, which may increase as Kabimba continues to refuse to be removed.

Border with DRC closed following riots

The border between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zambia was closed

following violence between Zambian truck drivers and local DRC traders on September

17.

There have been tensions in the area since the death of a Zambian truck driver in the

DRC led to riots in October 2012. Truck drivers from Southern African Development

Community (SADC) countries have bemoaned the situation in the DRC, where they

allege that they endure hostility, harassment and thefts. It is, thus, likely that the border

will remain hostile, and may continue to witness temporary closures as authorities

respond to ongoing tensions. This uncertainty is likely to cause disruptions to business

continuity due to interruptions to freight shipping between Zambia and the DRC.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Travel to Zambia can continue at this time while adhering to basic security precautions.

2. We advise to take measures to mitigate disruptions to business continuity such as

employing alternative freight shipping methods.

3. Avoid the vicinity of all large demonstrations and political rallies throughout Zambia due

to the likelihood for associated unrest and clashes.

4. In order to mitigate the risk of significant monetary losses from attacks on businesses,

including mining operations, contact Max Security Solutions for on-site planning and

security consulting, which includes security infrastructure and security personnel.



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Notable Dates for the Period of October 1 – October 15

Cameroon


Short Summary Date

Given simmering tensions with Anglophone Cameroonian factions who strive for autonomy, this day could witness limited unrest and demonstrations in Anglophone regions in the Northwest and Southwest Provinces. As this is a public holiday, anticipate interruptions to business continuity as government offices and many businesses will be closed. We advise to maintain heightened vigilance if conducting travel in Anglophone Cameroon given the potential for unrest.

Unification Day – Marks Independence of Anglophone Cameroon in the south and its unification with French Cameroon.

October 1, 2013

No special security concerns. Likely travel delays and service disruptions due to the public holiday. Take necessary measures to insure business continuity in advance. Avoid large public gatherings due to elevated potential for civil unrest.

Eid al-Adha (Festival of Sacrifice). Muslim holiday, commemorating willingness of Abraham to sacrifice his son, Ishmael.

October 14-15, 2013

Ghana


Short Summary Date

No special security concerns. Probable travel delays and service disruptions due to the anticipated public holiday. Take necessary measures to assure business continuity

Eid al-Adha (Festival of Sacrifice). Muslim holiday, commemmorating willingness of Abraham to sacrifice his son, Ishmael.

October 14-15, 2013


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in advance. Avoid large public gatherings due to elevated potential for civil unrest.

Guinea


Short Summary Date

As this is a public holiday, take necessary measures to assure business continuity in anticipation as government offices and many businesses will be closed. On October 2, we advise to maintain heightened vigilance if conducting travel in Guinea given the heightened potential for unrest.

Republic Day - Guinea will be celebrating 65 years of Independence with a public holiday on October 2.

October 2, 2013

Mozambique


Short Summary Date

As this is a public holiday, take necessary measures to assure business continuity in anticipation as government offices and many businesses will be closed. On October 4, we advise to maintain heightened vigilance if conducting travel in Mozambique given the heightened potential for unrest.

Peace and National Reconciliation Day – Public holiday to commemorate the peace agreement between the ruling Frelimo and opposition Renamo factions.

October 4, 2013

Nigeria


Short Summary Date

The security forces are on high alert during this holiday. Given the potential for a militant attack on this day, security forces are giving special attention to popular public areas and

Independence Day – Commemorates the autonomy of Nigeria from British rule.

October 1, 2013


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key infrastructure installations throughout the country. As businesses and government offices will be closed, take necessary measures to assure business continuity in advance. Avoid large public gatherings due to potential for militant attack and/or civil unrest.

Heavy security will be placed around prayer sites nationwide. Expect travel congestion as Muslims throughout the country travel to visit family homes. Probable travel delays and service disruptions are expected due to the public holiday. Take necessary measures to assure business continuity in advance. Avoid large public gatherings due to elevated potential for civil unrest.

Eid al-Adha (Festival of Sacrifice). Muslim holiday, commemorating willingness of Abraham to sacrifice his son, Ismael.

October 14-15, 2013

Senegal Assessment and Recommendation

Short Summary Date

No special security concerns. Probable travel delays and service disruptions due to the public holiday. Take necessary measures to assure business continuity in advance. Avoid large public gatherings due to elevated potential for civil unrest.

Eid al-Adha (Festival of Sacrifice). Muslim holiday, commemorating willingness of Abraham to sacrifice his son, Ismael, before God intervened and provided him with a lamb instead. A ram, goat, sheep, cow, or camel is typically sacrificed, with the family eating part and donating the rest to the poor.

October 14-15, 2013

Tanzania


Short Summary Date


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Businesses and government offices will be closed for Nyerere Day. Commemorations and public ceremonies will likely take place. Take necessary measures to assure business continuity in advance. Avoid all large gatherings as a general security precaution.

Nyerere Day – Public holiday to commemorate the nation's founder, Julius Nyerere.

October 14, 2013

Uganda


Short Summary Date

Uganda will celebrate their independence with likely military parades and other events in public spaces in Kampala and nationwide. As there is an elevated threat of militant attacks by Islamists at this time, avoid all large gatherings and public events. As this is a public holiday, many businesses and government institutions will be closed. Take necessary measures to mitigate disruptions to business continuity.

Independence Day – Uganda will be celebrating 51 years of independence from British rule.

October 9, 2013

DISCLAIMER: Please note that any views and/or opinions and/or assessment and/or recommendations presented in this text are solely those of Max Security. If you are not the named addressee you should not disseminate, distribute or copy this text. If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that disclosing, copying, distributing or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. Max Security Solutions accepts no liability for (i) the contents of this text/report being correct, complete or up to date; (ii) consequences of any actions taken or not taken as a result and/or on the basis of such contents. Copyright - 2013 Max Security

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