Davie - Believing Without Belonging-Is This the Future of Religion in Britain

8/10/2019 Davie - Believing Without Belonging-Is This the Future of Religion in Britain

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Social Compass37(4), 1990, 455-469

Grace DAVIE

Believing without Belonging: Is This theFuture of Religion in Britain?

Les statistiques concernant rapparten ance aux inst itutions religieuses et

celles qui, d autre part, sont relatives aux modeles de croyance nous

o f f rent deux indicateurs distincts, mais lies, de la religiosite. Chacun

d eux pose des prob lemes au chercheur mais, consideres conjointe-

ment, Us peuvent nous orienter vers des questions centrales. On peu t

meme dire que c'est la combinaison exacte de ces deux variables qui

caracterise la religion br itannique a la fi n du 20eme siecle. II sembleque la croyance persiste alors meme que rappartenance continue a

baisser ou, plus exactem ent, que la croyance diminue (a diminue) m oins

vite que rappartenance. II en resulte un desequilibre marque entre lesdeux indicateurs. Les deux premieres parties de rarticle ont pour but de

fa ir e ressortir les implications de ce desequilibre p our une analyse de la

religion dans la societe britannique contemporaine. Deux perspectives

particulieres focalisent notre atten tion: la prem iere pose la question deschangements profonds entre generations, la seconde exam ine quelques

aspects de la religion de la classe ouvriere. La troisieme pa r tie analyse les

mem es donnees mais d un po int de vue un peu different. On y consi-

dere certains types de croyance religieuse dans la societe britannique etla fagon do nt ils sont lies a des contex tes particuliers.

Introduction and Outline

Membership figures for religious institutions and statistics relating to pat

terns of religious belief provide us with two distinct, though related,

indicators of religiosity. Each poses some problems for the social investi

gator, but taken together they can point us to some crucial questions.Indeed, the precise com bination between these two variables is, surely, what

characterizes British1religion in the late 20th century. Believing, it seems,

persists while belonging continues to decline or, to be more accurate,believing is declining (has declined) at a slower ra te th an belonging

resulting in a marked imbalance between the two variables; this imbalance

pervades a very great deal of our religious life. It characterizes what might betermed the implicit religion of the British people in the last decades of the20th century.

We need, however, to look at the relationship between these two vari

ables believing and belonging from more than one perspective. Notonly does the relationship between the two change over time it was

different in the past and may well differ in the future it also reflects thepressures of particu lar contexts within contemporary Britain. To start with,


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456 Believing withou t Belonging

the relationship between believing and belonging varies considerably

between the different countries that make up the United Kingdom. The

proportion of the population claiming religious membership is more than six

times greater in Northern Ireland than in England (see Table 1). The implications of this marked variation are considerable. But even within England,

the relationship alters in response both to regional (even local) factors, and

to different types of existence, contrasting, say, urban or rural ways of life.

Secondly, there are marked variations in religious behaviour (once again

both in believing and belonging) between different social environm ents inBritain. We need, fo r example, to examine the ways in which these variables

interact in one social class rather than another, in one racial group rather

than another and bearing in mind the divergent behaviour of men and

women with respect to religious life.The first two sections of this article aim to draw out the implications of

this kind of approach for an analysis of religion in contemporary Britain.

Since the article is relatively short, two particular perspectives provide a

focus: the first raises the question of profound generational changes; thesecond looks at some aspects of working-class religion (not least the religious patterns prevalent in the inner city, or to use a more technical

phrase in our urban priority areas).

In adopting this necessarily limited approach, we need, however, to bearin mind a whole series of underlying questions concerning the way in which

religious institutions relate to the broader currents of religious belief incontemporary society. These relationships raise some very fundamental

issues for the sociologist of religion, indeed for the sociologist in general;they concern, for example, the changing nature of social institutions, their

role in the creation and dissemination of belief systems, and the individuals

intricate and continually evolving relationship to such systems.2The follow

ing questions are central to this kind of analysis:

What, precisely, is the relationship between the active religious minority in a society and

the inactive religious majority? How far is one dependent on the other? Why is the

former so often predominantly middle class? Does a believing majority make the worko f a minority harder or easier? D o the former, for example, co nstitute a pool from which

the latter can fish, or do they become a rival set-up, an alternative religious focus for

society? If so, what is the nature of this alternative belief? Is there a minimum size

beyond which the active minority is no longer effective in a society? What factors, apart

from size, might determine this effectiveness? Through which institutional mechanisms

can church m embers work ou tside o f the church itself? Who has access to these institu

tions? What, in this connection, is the role of religious education or of religious broad

casting? (Davie, 1989: 85-6)

The third part of the article uses the same material, but looks at it from a

slightly different angle. It considers certain types of religious belief

within contemporary Britain and the way that these types relate to particu larcontexts. For example suburban, middle-class belief is, for the most part,

articulate ; it is expressed in a predictable range of consciously chosenactivities and leads to a distinctive kind of church life. On the other handtraditional rural patterns of belief are rarely expressed; they are, primarily, experiential and do not necessarily connect with specifically religious


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Davie 457

behaviour. Religious membership becomes a question of being ra ther than

doing. We shall see that very real problems emerge when the two types of

behav iour become focused on a single church.

All three sections of the article depend upon a framework of statistics.These are summarized in Tables 1-4.3Much of this material is self-evident.On the other hand , it is, perhaps, w orth underlining one or two features that

are central to the argument.

The most obvious of these underpins the whole approach and concerns

the profound imbalance between any statistics of church membership and

those concerned with religious belief. In short, a large majority of people in

contemporary Britain continue to believe but have ceased to belong to their

religious institutions in any meaningful sense (compare Tables 1 and 3).

Given that this group of people forms a majority within the population, it is

ironic that sociologists appear to know very little indeed abou t their religious

beliefs and the way th at these impinge on daily life. What, exactly, is the

nature of British implicit religion ?

Alongside this mismatch, it is, however, important to note the relativelylarge latent membership of the Church of England (see Table 2). This conti

nues to be the church from which a majority of English4 people choose to

stay away, except, that is, to mark the turning points in life: birth, marriageand most of all death . Despite a lack of regular attendance, it is to the

Church of England that most English people turn when the services of a reli

gious institution are required. Understanding the implications o f such residual allegiance and its relationship both to the practising religious minority

and to the wider culture seem to me, therefore , of crucial significance for thestudy of contemporary British society.

Generational Shifts in Religious Behaviour

Older people have always been more religious than the young. Whether the

elderly have regarded God as judgemental (the source of all their troubles)

or as a father figure (the rock in the storm of life), they have always takenhim more seriously than the young. This kind of generational difference has

been reflected in church membership statistics fo r some time, and it is,increasingly, supported by studies of religious belief. Table 4, for example,

demonstrates the strong correlation between age and religious commitment

that emerged from the European Values survey. It seems that belief in God(and specifically belief in a personal God) declines with each step down theage scale, as, indeed, does practice, prayer and moral conservatism. In

short, a religiously and morally conservative majority among the retiredbecomes a religiously conservative minority in the 18-24 age-group. We

should, moreover, note that these correlations hold for many other European countries besides Britain (Stoetzel, 1983; Harding and Phillips, 1985).

Clearly there are a great many d ifferences within the category young

people .5We need, fo r example, to know whether there are denominationaldifferences in belief and behaviour for the actively religious young; we need,in addition , to know the significance of social class and gender. Nonetheless,


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TABLE 1

Church membership: 1985 summary figures by individual country

Members Ministers Churches

England Wales Scotland N. Ireland England Wales Scotland N. Ireland England Wales Scotland N. Ireland

Anglican l,675,471a 115,896 37,000 157,000 12,762a 698 240 364 16,632 1,521 315 440

Methodist 435,764a 22,561 7,008 61,099a 3,312 193 34 244 7,405a 415 73 126

Baptist 167,940a 45,611 17,666 8,000 1,948a 245 175 70 2,310 785 190 85

Presbyterian 127,197 7 9,2 16 a 90 1,9 14 274 ,737 l ,159a 268 1,513 532 l,879a 1,212 2,142 595

Other Churches 406,55l a 84,248 56,027 26,078 8,341a 420 418 182 6,731a 1,144 723 409

To ta l P ro te st an t 2 ,8 12 ,9 23 3 47 ,5 32 1,019,615 526,914 27,522 1,824 2,380 1,392 34,948 5,077 3,443 1,655

Roman Catholic 1,342,547 146,673 285,554 353,019 4,380a 200 1,111 549 3,034a 324 478 420

Orthodox 21 6,23 5a 2 ,1 42 a 1,480a 179a 165a 5 2 150a 6 6 2

Total

Christian 4,371,705 496,347 1,306,649 880,112 32,067 2,029 3,493 1,941 38,132 5,407 3,927 2,077

Percentage of

adult

population: 11 22 32 75

aRevised figure.

Source: Brierley (1988, p. 150).

Believing

without

Belonging


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Davie 459

the underlying question remains the same whatever the internal patterns

within this group. Are we, in the late 20th century, experiencing a massive

generational shift with respect to religious behaviour, rather than a mani

festation of the normal life-cycle? If we conclude, as many commentatorsdo, that the form er is the case, the implications for the future o f religious life

in this country are very considerable indeed. The point at issue can be

summarized quite simply: just how far can familiar patterns of religious life

(both structures and culture) maintain themselves if more and more young

people not only opt out of the system temporarily but stay out of it perm a

nently? This is one of the most crucial questions facing the contemporary

churches. It cannot, moreover, be answered within the religious institutions

themselves, but concerns the relationship that those institutions have with

the wider society.We need, however, to remember in commenting upon the possibilities

of a new situation that there has already been an important (thoughrarely perceived) generational shift in British religion. A nd, in the short term

at least, the churches have been able to adapt to this change, though they are

TABLE 2

Total community figures (millions)3

Religion 1970 1975 1980 1983 1985 1987

Church of England*5 27.8 27.5 26.6 26.1 25.7 25.6Other Anglicans 1.6 1.5 1.4C 1.3 1.3 1.3

Baptists 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6

Methodists 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3

Presbyterians 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7

Roman Catholics'5 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2

Orthodox 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5

Other Trinitarian Churches 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3

Total Trinitarian Churches 40.4 39.8 38.4C 37.8 37.4C 37.5

Church of Scientology 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6

Other non-Trinitarian Churches 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8

Jews 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3

Hindus 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3

Muslims 0.3 0.5 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.5

Sikhs 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5

Other religions 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3

Total non-Trinitarian Churches

and other religions 1.7 2.4 3.7 3.8 4.2 4.3

Total all religions 42.1 42.2 42. lc 41.6 41. 6C 41.8

Percentage total ChristianChurches o f population 72 71 68 67 66 65

Percentage total all religions of

population 75 75 75 74 73 73

aEstimate. bBaptised membership. cRevised figure.

Source: Brierley (1988, p. 151).


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460 Believing without Belonging

TABLE 3

Indicators of religious commitment, Great Britain compared with the European

average (percentages)

Great Britain European average

Indicators o f religious dispos ition

Often think about meaning and

purposes of life 34 30

Never think life meaningless 50 44Often think about death 15 18

Often regret doing wrong 8 10

Need moments of prayer, etc. 50 57

Define self as a religious person 58 62

Draw comfort/strength fromreligion 46 48

God is important in my life 50 51Have had a spiritual experience 19 12

Indicators o f orthodox belie f

Believe in personal God 31 32

(Believe in a spirit or life force) 39 36Believe in:

God 76 73

Sin 69 57

Soul 59 57Heaven 57 40Life after death 45 43

The Devil 30 25Hell 27 23

Personally fully accept

Commandments demanding:

No other gods 48 48Reverence of Gods name 43 46Holy Sabbath 25 32

Source: Abrams et al. (1985, p. 60).

not always conscious of so doing. Prewar generations in Britain, to a greaterextent than is often appreciated, grew up under the influence of the

churches, or, at least, under the influence of a wide network of para-church

organizations. They may not have practised their faith very regularly but

they possessed, nonetheless, a degree of religious knowledge that had at leastsome sort of connection with orthodox Christianity. Since the war thepattern has altered radically . Nominal belief in God persists, so too does arelatively friendly attitude towards the churches. In contrast, not only is

practice minimal, so too is religious knowledge. When and if the postwargenerations of the population approach their churches for example, forbaptism or for marriage those who receive them can assume very little

indeed in the way of credal awareness. Orthodox Christianity and popularbelief have, inevitably, been drifting apart .

Are we now (as we enter the last decade of the 20th century) experiencing a


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TABLE 4

Socio-demographic profile of religious commitment

Overall religious commitment:combined scale (%)

Variable

Low

w

Low-

Medium Medium

(%) %

Medium-

High

%

High

%

Totalsample

(N = 100%)

Age:18-24 39 27 15 11 9 19325-44 24 31 16 16 14 44645-64 14 21 19 20 27 335

65 + 14 11 18 28 28 202

Significance = 0.000

Gamma 0.29

Sex/employment status o f women:

Male 27 25 18 14 15 576

Working female 18 23 17 23 20 311

Non-working F 15 23 14 22 26 314

Significance 0.000

Gamma 0.21

Terminal education age:

14 yrs or under 15 15 18 25 28 36115-17 yrs 24 29 17 16 14 628

18 yrs + 26 23 14 15 22 208

Significance 0.000

Gamma 0.14

Locality:Village 17 22 19 21 21 322

Small town 24 23 17 19 17 547

Large town 22 27 14 16 21 330

Significance 0.13

Gamma 0.05

Socio-economic group:

A B 22 23 17 18 20 192

Cl 25 24 16 14 21 263

C2 23 24 19 18 17 387

DE 17 24 15 23 21 353

Significance 0.21

Gamma 0.05

Income level (327 missing cases):

Under 3840 15 20 15 25 26 250

3840-7199 19 26 16 17 21 307

7200 + 28 27 18 13 15 322Significance 0.0001

Gamma 0.15

Missing cases 32

Total (%) 22 24 17 19 19 1201 (max)

Source: Abrams et al. (1985, pp. 70-71).


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further generational shift in religious behaviour? The sociological evidence

seems to indicate that this might be the case, not least the European Values

study: significant numbers of their 18-24 age-group are rejecting even

nominal belief. In short, for many young people, disconnected belief is,increasingly, giving way to no belief at a ll.6

There is, however, another way of looking at things. If we widen the

definition of religion to include questions about the meaning of life, the

purpose of m ankin ds existence, the fu tu re of the planet and m ans respon

sibilities to his fellow man and to the Earth itself, we may find a very

different pattern of religious behav iour among the young. The evidence

remains largely impressionistic but it seems likely that the 18-24 age-group

may respond to these profound ecological, moral, ethical (and surely

religious) issues much more positively than they do to traditional religiousinstruction.

Of course, this line of argument begs many questions which cannot be

ignored, even if a full discussion of their implications is impossible in a short

article. Have we, for example, shifted ground so completely that we are no

longer talking about the same phenomenon? And even if we agree that the

approach itself is legitimate, it is clear that we need to know a great deal

more about the elusive and changing links between religion and socialmorality, or between religion and ethical behaviour. Just how far is it

possible to talk in any meaningful sense about one without the other? The

issue becomes, moreover, more urgent rather than less, in that contemporary society almost by its very natu re throws up issue after issue

which lie, precisely, on this bou nd ary .7Bearing this in mind, we might suggest the following rather tentative

conclusion: religion and religious values are not so much disappearingamong young people as being redirected. This redirection is, nonetheless,

altering (very profoundly) the relationship between popular belief and the

institutional churches, that is surely the relationship between believing

and belonging.

The Urban Working Class

The discrepancy between believing and belonging is at its sharpest in urban

working-class areas, and above all in those parts of our cities designated as

urban priority areas. Belief persists, but the expected reluctance to practisereligion is, in this part of our society, compounded by a further factor; that

is, a mistrust of any kind of institutional life. David Sheppard puts this asfollows:

It doesnt take long to discover that the great majority of urban working class people in

Europe and Britain are alienated from the institution o f the church whatever

church as they are from all institutions (Foreword to Ahern and Davie, 1987: 7-8).

A second point is equally significant; this situation of alienation is nothingnew. Indeed some sections of the urban working class in Britain have been


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without any real contact with their churches for several generations.

How, then, has working-class belief been able to maintain itself despite a

prolonged divorce from institu tional Christianity? And what effect has this

divorce had on the nature of working-class belief?Part of the explanation lies in what might appear a self-contradictory

statement. It is at one and the same time true that higher social groupings are

on average more inclined to belief and practice than lower ones, and that

increased educational levels (normally associated with higher social class)

have a negative effect on religious belief. In other words the nature of therelationship between belief and practice varies depending upon the social

class in question. In a middle-class environment people are more likely to

make conscious choices about both belief and practice; if they do one theydo the other. In contrast, in a working-class environment (where levels ofeducation are lower), there is, apparently, no perceived need to put belief

into institutional or liturgical practice. Indeed it could be argued that the

reverse is true; in many u rban areas church-going is seen as at best unnecessary and at worst hypocritical.8

A further point is also important. Not only is working-class belief largely

unrelated to religious practice, it is, very often, not articulated at all.Working-class religious views frequently take the form of unexamined

assumptions; they exist almost unconsciously and remain in a latent form

until needed . What triggers the need varies, but it is very often the crises,

or the turning-points in life, that bring religious ideas to the fore. It is thiskind of situation (abnormal almost by definition) that continues, despite

everything, to bring the urban working class into contact with its churches,

and most of all with the Church of England.

So far these needs can be met, just. The institutional churches are able,

though sometimes with great difficulty, to maintain a structure even in those

parts of society where the going is hardest. The overall pattern of religious lifeis, however, changing. More and more people within British society are, it

appears, wanting to believe but without putting this belief into practice. In

other words, some aspects of working-class religious behaviour (notably the

lack of regular church attendance) traditionally thought o f as exceptionsto the rule are becoming, increasingly, the norm al patterns o f our society.

It is easy to slip into value judgements about different types of religious

behav iour and to conclude th at things are, th erefore , not only changing, but

getting worse . This is not necessarily the case; working-class modes o f

behav iour may be diffe rent, but they are ju st as valid as middle-class ones.We need, nonetheless, to acknowledge the shifts that are taking place and to

ask questions about them. This section raises one question in particular: just

how far can our present structures of religious life maintain themselves ifincreasing numbers of people in our society prefer a passive rather than

active relationship to these structures?9 We have, in fact, returned tothe sociological issues outlined in the introductory section; in particular

to considering:

Is there a minimum size beyond which the active minority is no longer effective in

society? What factors, apart from size, might determine this effectiveness? Through


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which institutional mechanisms can church members work outside of the church itself?

Who has access to these institutions? What, in this connection, is the role of religious

education or of religious broadcasting?

Clear-cut answers are, however, less easy to supply than the questions. We

can, nevertheless, begin to explore some of these connections within the

following, rather tentative, typology of belief.

A Suggested Typology o f Belief

The Typology

The inner city

The suburbThe city centre

The countryside

The Roman Catholic churches

The black churches

Religious broadcasting

Religious education

Belief depressed

Belief articulatedCivic belief

Belief assumed

Belief expressed

Communal belief

Believing without belonging,

par excellence

Belief: injected or rejected

The examples of belief proposed in the typology given here are by no meansexhaustive. The typology could, for example, include many more denomi

national illustrations. Nor is it possible, let alone desirable, to discuss each

one o f these types in turn as if it were a closely defined phenomenon peculiar

to a discrete social situation. Rather, the labels are intended to evoke a

distinctive characteristic, a particular flavour even, that differentiates belief

in one part of ou r society from another, and the way that this particular type

of belief relates (or fails to relate) to religious practice. In practice, of

course, the types are almost always mixed.

The first four examples are, for the most part, found in distinct geo

graphical locations. On the other hand it is undeniable that within the urbancontext, inner city and suburb are inevitably associated with identi

fiable social classes and any further analysis must take account of theseconnections.

We have already looked in some detail at the depressed nature of muchinner-city (working-class) belief. Indeed there are some commentators who

might suggest that belief has, in any meaningful sense, disappeared altogether from large parts o f our cities. This view seems to me mistaken (Ahern

and Davie, 1987). Nonetheless the nature of working-class religious behaviour undoubtedly contrasts very sharply with the articulate belief of the

middle-class suburbs. We need, moreover, to underline a further contrast:these divergent patterns of belief result in very different types of churches.This is not a question of denominational differences; the contrasting typescan, for example, be seen very clearly within the Church of England.

If we look first at the inner city, it is clear that in this part of society mostchurches rely for their very existence on the parochial system.10 If the


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Davie 465

Church of England were not obliged to meet its parochial obligations, here

as in every other part o f English society, it would have disappeared long ago,

for inner-city churches enjoy little success by conventional standards;

congregations are small and, very frequently, they struggle for financialsurvival. On the other hand any proposed closure of a church will be met bya chorus o f disapproval from non-members as well as members. The services

of that church are more widely appreciated than is often realized.

In contrast the suburban church flourishes. We should, in addition, note

its tendency to operate on a market (as opposed to a parish) principle,

attracting worshippers from a wide geographical area. These are, very often,articulate individuals who choose, very consciously, the type of church to

which they wish to belong. Their churches are characterized by high levels ofactivity, endless committees and a much clearer distinction between

members and non-members than is found elsewhere in society. In other

words middle-class organizational patterns reflect middle-class ways ofbelieving.

If we turn now to the rural church, we find that it is different again. It is,moreover, a rapidly changing church; or, more precisely, it is a church that

is struggling (hard) to come to terms with a rapidly changing situation.

Traditionally the rural church has been the focus of largely unspoken cor

porate belief. Village people assume that they are members of this church

unless proved otherwise; they see no need to indicate this membership

through specifically religious activity. Their belief is essentially experiential.This long-standing, unquestioned, indeed unquestioning, arrangement has,

however, been overtaken by events. Profound (and seemingly irreversible)economic changes have resulted in an ever-increasing stream of newcomers

who arrive, daily, in our small towns and villages. A large proportion of

these new arrivals come from the suburbs, bringing with them suburban

ways of believing and suburban habits of church life. The resulting clash

between the two styles of belief (rural and suburban) very frequently

centred on one Anglican church (the traditional village church) can be

very painful indeed.

The second group within the typology illustrates patterns of believing andbelonging for two religious minorities in this country (this par t of the analy

sis could be extended much further). Indeed it is imp ortant to remember that

religious minorities always behave differently from majorities with respectto both believing and belonging. For example, Roman Catholic practice in

this country is markedly higher than in Latin countries, even in working-

class areas. This kind of difference has to be explained sociologically. Butquite apart from the context, Roman Catholic obligation requires a degree

of practice absent from the Protestant churches. In consequence, the relationship between believing and belonging is bound to be different for

Catholics whether they are a minority or not. The typology needs to reflectsuch differences.

If we turn now to the black churches, they, to some extent at least, illustrate a b roader category the immigrant churches.11 These churches not

only draw people together for a particular type of worship, but, in addition,

provide a focus for a whole range of su pport mechanisms for the immigrant


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community. They are, moreover, remarkably successful in this undertaking.

It is worth pointing out that in so doing, the black churches appear to reverse

the traditional or English connections between church and community. For

many black congregations, the community grows out of the church which is

its principal reason for existence. In contrast, an English church, and the

Church of England is the most obvious example, forms a religious focus

within a given community for those who choose to take up its services.

(There are, as we have seen, many different ways in which this take-up maybe effected .) Indeed, the relationships between a community and its church,

or churches, are as diverse and elusive as those between believing and

belonging.

The final examples in the typology introduce a different dimension

altogether. They do not concern churches as such at all, at least not in anydirect sense. Religious broadcasting is, surely, an almost pure case of

believing withou t belonging. It is, moreover, significant that it is one of the

few religious activities in our society which is increasing in popularity

(Winter, 1988). Given this popularity, it is hardly surprising that the

religious broadcasters have an uneasy relationship with the churches. In

many ways they do the churches job better than they can, demonstrating

considerable professional expertise and ensuring performances of a consist

ently high quality so much so that the local churches are, rightly, fearful

of the competition. On the other hand, the local churches know perfectly

well that religious broadcasting makes good a number of their own deficiencies, and in a way that is helpful to both parties. To a considerable extent,

religious broadcasters bolster the religious values within society on which

bo th they and the churches depend for their survival. In short, religious

broadcasting is both friend and foe to the institutional churches. Either way,

however, it is an activity which disturbs the conventional relationship

between believing and belonging.

To some extent religious education is similar; once again it both helps and

hinders the churches, though not necessarily in the same way as religious

broadcasting. In order to understand some of the ambivalence between the

churches and religious education, we need to remember that the latter comeswith an element of compulsion (an element considerably strengthened by the

1988 Educa tion Act). Moreover, it seems though there is a very great deal

of debate about the precise connections in this area that compulsion has,

to some extent at least, led to rejection, and not least among the young. Onthe other hand, we should not lose sight of the fact that schools remain one

of the most important sources of religious knowledge, if not of religiousbelief, in this country. Indeed, they are, very often , the only source.

In view of this, it seems pertinent to ask whether the little knowledge thatis passed on by this route may not, in fact, be a dangerous thing. Injections

of religious instruction through the school system do not always have the

desired effect; they may be counterproductive. Indeed this possibility affectsnot only the life of the churches, but also for very different reasons that of the government. From the perspective of the churches and theirfuture, it is unlikely that religious education in schools however

imaginative will produce a nation of church-goers (always assuming, of


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Davie 467

course, that this is what we are after); from the perspective of the govern

ment, it is far from clear that compulsory religious education will, neces

sarily, result in an upturn in public morality.

The final point returns us to a crucial area of debate that we have alreadymentioned and one that is central to the work o f sociologists of religion. Ju sthow do religious beliefs and practice relate not only to each other but to the

moral and ethical issues that confront, and will continue to confront,contemporary society?

We can finish with a topical example. Contemporary medical science

(very often associated with secularization) is increasingly able to offer

treatment which is beneficial both to childless couples and to those whose

children are likely to be at risk from hereditary disease. However, the

medical techniques in question depend heavily upon research on humanembryos: research which is, plainly, unacceptable to certain sections of the

population, not least to some (though by no means all) o f its church-goers.

An article such as this is not concerned with the moral rightness of any

particular party in this ongoing debate. It does, however, need to underline

the fact that this kind of controversy is likely to become more rather than

less common in modern society (Hervieu-Leger, 1986). And, if this is the

case, who, exactly, is going to create an acceptable framework in which the

necessary decisions can be made? Whether this discussion is primarily moralor religious is a moot point. What is abu ndantly clear is that the issues raised

will concern both belief and practice (the manner in which belief is givenpractical expression) within modern society, but it will connect these two

variables in a way quite distinct from the links that have associated them in

the past. On the other hand, it seems to me unlikely that any committee

assembled to work out some guidelines in this difficult and rapidly

changing area will, even in our supposedly secular society, be complete

without considerable representation from the institutional churches. Indeedin this respect the churches which remain, despite everything, our

most significant doctrinal resource may become more rather than less

influen tial.12

Working ou t the implications o f these changes, both long- and short-termis central to the study o f implicit relig ion.13

NOTES

* Comparisons can, o f course, be made with other countries in this respect. It

may well be that a large part of West Europe displays a similar imbalance between

these variables though the precise way in which this is formulated may vary

considerably. In the Scandinavian countries, for example, there is almost a

situation of belonging without believing. Nominal attachment to the State Churchespersists, but such at tachment implies ne ither par ticu lar beliefs no r regular practice.

2 For these ideas, I am to a large extent indebted to R. Campiche, who has

examined similar connections in Switzerland as part of a research project entitled

Pluralite confessionnelle, religiosite diffuse, identite culturelle en Suisse . Thisproject is, in turn , associated with a nat ional research initiative: Pluralisme culturel

et identite nationa le .


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3 The tables on religious practice are taken from Brierley (1988); those on belief

from the European Values Project (see Abrams et al., 1985; Harding and Phillips,

1985; Stoetzel, 1983). The precise use of terms in both these areas is problematic.

Close reference to the source of this material is essential in order to understandexactly how the terminology has been applied in these particular cases.

4 English people choose to stay away from the Church of England. Scottish (or

Welsh, or Northern Irish) people have very different patterns of religious loyalty.

These differences are closely related to their national identity. In view of space, the

discussion concentrates with one or two exceptions on the indigenous popu

lation of England. The statistical material, however, covers a wider perspective in

order to place the English pattern within its proper context.

5- Indeed the category young people is, in itself, problematic. This has fol

lowed the age groupings o f the European Values study.

6 This evidence can be found in a variety of sources. In add ition to the European

Values study, there are extensive references to work on children and young people inBarley (1987) and Field (1987). These literature reviews underline Leslie Francis verydetailed work on young people, religious education and the churches, for example L.

Francis (1982, 1984 and 1985). More indirectly, we should also note Wadsw orth and

Freeman (1983).

7- The argument here and in subsequent sections of the article is close to that

advanced by D. Hervieu-Leger (1986: 224-7). Hervieu-Leger argues that modern

society is, in many ways, destructive of religion; at the same time, however, modern

ity creates and will continue to create a moral space within society that reli

gion, alongside other agencies, cannot but be called upon to fill. Secularization is not

a question of religion confron ted by rationality: cest le processus de reorganisa

tion permanente du travail de la religion dans une societe structurellement impuis-

sante a combler les attentes quil faut susciter pour exister comme telle (p. 227). For

an English summary of Hervieu-Legers work , see his Religion and Modernity in

the French Context: For a New Approach to Seculariza tion , Sociological Analysis(forthcoming).

8- This point is discussed in some detail in Ahern and Davie (1987). It also reflects

the findings of the Leeds Study on Conventional and Common Religion (Leeds,

Religious Research Paper, no. 12), and R. Hoggarts classic study of the uses of

literacy (Hoggart, 1957).

9 In many ways, this parallels the question asked in the previous section about

the religious behaviour of young people. In both cases and the two should betaken together the central issue at stake is the future of our religious institutionsand their capacity to be effective in contemporary Britain.

,0* That is, a system that networks the entire country. This does not mean that

particular parish boundaries are immutable. It does imply that everyone belongssomewhere, whether they choose to acknowledge this or not.

11 Immigrant churches include, of course, members of other faiths. The argu

ment of this paper has been restricted to Western Christianity, but there is no reason

why the approach could not be extended to other religions. Indeed within different

faith communities, a variety of pa tterns may emerge with respect to the relationship

between institu tionalized practice and more diffused beliefs. The comparative per

spective is important.I2- Once again, this point was brought to my attention by Campiche, see Note 2.13 One of the fora for such a debate is provided by the Network for the Study of

Implicit Religion. Further information about this particular network can be

obtained from: Canon Dr Edward Bailey, Winterbourne Rectory, Bristol BS17 1JQ,UK.


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Davie 469

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abrams, M., Gerard, D. and Timms, N., eds, 1985, Values and Social Change in

Britain , Macmillan, London.

Ahern, G. and Davie, G., 1987, Inner City God: The nature o f belief in the inner

city , Hodder and Stoughton, London.

Barley, L.M., 1987, Recurrent Christian Sources , in W.F. Maunder (ed.) Reli

gion: Reviews o f United Kingdom Statistical Sources, vol. XX, Pergamon Press,

Oxford.

Brierley, P., ed., 1988, UK Christian Handbook 1989/90, Marc Europe, London.

Davie G., 1989, Religion in M. Haralambos (ed.) Developmen ts in Sociology,

vol. 5, Causeway Press, Ormskirk.

Field, C .D., 1987, Non-recurrent Christian Da ta in W.F. Maunder (ed.) Reli

gion: Reviews o f United Kingdom Statistical Sources, vol. XX, Pergamon Press,Oxford.

Francis, L., 1982, Youth in Transit: a Profile o f 16-25 year olds , Gower, A ldershot.

Francis, L., 1984, Teenagers and the Church: a Pro file o f church-going Youth in the

1980s, Collins, London.

Francis, L., 1985, Rura l Ang licanism: a Future fo r Young Christians, Collins,

London.

Harding, S.D. and Phillips, D., 1985, Contrasting Values in Western Europe,Macmillan, London.

Hervieu-Leger, D., 1986, Vers un Nouv eau Christianisme, Cerf, Paris.Hervieu-Leger, D., Religion and M odernity in the French Context: a new

approach to secularization , Sociological Analysis, forthcoming.Hoggart, R., 1957, The Uses o f Literacy , Penguin, Harmondsworth.

Leeds, Religious Research Paper no. 12, Conven tional Religion and Com mon

Religion in Leeds , Interview Schedule: Basic frequencies by question.

Stoetzel, J., 1983, Les valeurs du temps present, Presse Universitaire de France,

Paris. English title: Europe at the Crossroads.

Wadsworth, M. and Freeman, S., 1983, Generation Differences in Beliefs: a Cohort

Study of Stability and Change in Religious Beliefs ,British Journal o f Sociology

34(3).Winter, D., 1988, Battered Bride: The B ody o f Faith in an Age o f D oubt, Monarch,

Eastbourne.

Grace DAVIE. Graduated in Sociology from the University of Exeter.

PhD in the Sociology of Religion from the London School of Econom

ics. Publication: Inner City God: The Nature o f Belief in the Inner City ,London, 1987. ADDRESS: Department of Sociology, Armory Build

ing, Rennes Drive, Exeter EX4 4RJ, UK.

Davie - Believing Without Belonging-Is This the Future of Religion in Britain

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