Consult Brazil Counterplan - Northwestern 2013 4WeekJuniors

8/13/2019 Consult Brazil Counterplan - Northwestern 2013 4WeekJuniors

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Consult Brazil CP

ContentsConsult Brazil CP ................................................ 1

1NC ................................................................. 2

1NC Impact Scenarios .................................... 4

Relations..................................................... 5

Latin American Democracy ........................ 6

2NC ................................................................. 7

2NC Overview ............................................ 8

*** Will Consult *** ................................ 11

Consult on Cuba ....................................... 12

Consult on Mexico ................................... 14

Consult on Venezuela .............................. 15

Consult on Latin America – Generic ......... 17

*** Perms *** .......................................... 21

“SHOULD” definition ................................ 22

A2 Perm do both ...................................... 23

A2 Perm do the cp .................................... 24

A2 Perm do the plan then cp ................... 25

A2 Perm do the plan and consult on other

issues ........................................................ 26

*** Solvency *** ...................................... 28

Cooperation – Generic ............................. 29

Brazil will say YES – Generic ..................... 31

Brazil says YES – Cuba .............................. 33

A2 Brazil doesn’t solve ............................. 34

A2 Normal Means .................................... 35

A2 Status Quo .......................................... 36

*** Impact Scenarios *** ........................ 38

2NC Democracy ....................................... 39

2NC Relations ........................................... 41

*** Theory *** ........................................ 44

A2 Consult CP Abusive ............................. 45

*** Net Benefit *** ................................. 48

Coop with Brazil on Cuba doesn’t link to

PTX ........................................................... 49

AFF ANSWERS .............................................. 51

Brazil says No – Generic ........................... 52

Brazil says No – Venezuela ...................... 54

Brazil says No – Cuba ............................... 55

Brazil says No – Mexico ........................... 56

Destroys Relations ................................... 57

Relations Already High ............................. 58

Consult CPs Bad ....................................... 59

“SHOULD” definition ................................ 60



1NC

Text: The USFG will engage in prior binding consultation with the Federative

Republic of Brazil over ________________ [insert plan text]. The United States will

advocate ________________ [insert plan text] during the consultative process andwill adopt the result of the consultation. We ’ll clarify.

Contention 1: It competes. The 1AC can’t do binding consultation. That would

be abusive.A. Violates “Resolved”: “Resolved” implies a definite course of action. The CP tests the

definite and immediate nature of the plan. If we win the CP is beneficial, we have

disproved the necessity of the resolution and the affirmative should lose. Any

permutation makes the plan conditional and severs the definite and immediate nature

of the plan text. This is a voting issue.

B. Makes the plan conditional: Consulting over the plan justifies the affirmative conditionplan on anything or answering case turns and offense with the “plan won’t” pass. This

means the negative is always one step behind and will never win.

Contention 2: Solvency

Binding consultation with Brazil key to US-Brazil relations

Luigi R. Einuadi, March 2011, ambassador, distinguished fellow at the Center for Strategic Research,

Institute for National Strategic Studies, and the National Defense University. Member for the Advisory

Council of the Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Brazil and the

United States: The Need for Strategic Engagement”,

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docupload/SF%20266%20Einaudi.pdf A prerequisite for improved mutual engagement will ¶ be changes in perspective on both sides. Mutually

beneficial engagement requires the United States to welcome Brazil’s emergence as a global power. Brazil is more than ¶ a tropical China35; it

is culturally and politically close to ¶ the United States and Europe. Brazil, in turn, needs to ¶ realize that the United States accepts its rise. Brazil

also ¶ needs to recognize that the United States still matters ¶ greatly to Brasilia and that more can be achieved working with Washington than

against it.¶ The United States and Brazil have vast overlapping interests, but a formal strategic partnership is

probably out of ¶ the question for both countries. In the United States, Brazil ¶ must compete for policy

attention with China, India, Russia, Japan, Mexico, and several European countries. It poses ¶ no

security threat to the United States. Moreover, despite ¶ Brazil’s importance in multilateral

organizations, particularly the UN, Brazil can be of limited practical assistance ¶ at best to the United

States in its two current wars. Brazil’s ¶ interests, in turn, may be fairly said to include the need to ¶

distinguish itself from the United States. Diplomatically, ¶ this means neither country can expect

automatic agreement ¶ from the other. Interests differ and it may be politically necessary to highlight

differences even when interests are similar. But both countries should make every effort to develop a

¶ habit of “permanent consultation” in an effort to coordinate ¶ policies, work pragmatically together

where interests are ¶ common, and reduce surprises even while recognizing that ¶ specific interests

and policies often may differ.¶ A first operational step, therefore, is for both countries to hold regular

policy-level consultations, increase ¶ exchanges of information, and coordinate carefully on ¶

multilateral matters. This is much easier said than done. ¶ The list of global issues on which Brazil is becoming a ¶

major player includes conflict resolution, all aspects of ¶ energy, including nuclear matters, all types of

trade, the ¶ environment, space, and the development of international law, including law of the seas

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docupload/SF%20266%20Einaudi.pdf





and nonproliferation. To ¶ share information and ensure effective consultation on so ¶ many functional issues will require finding ways

to lessen ¶ the geographic stovepiping natural to bureaucracy. The ¶ U.S. Department of State, for example, has historically ¶ organized itself

into geographical bureaus responsible ¶ for relations with countries in particular regions, leaving functional issues to offices organized globally.

This organization hampers the exchange of information and consultation with countries such as Brazil, whose reach and ¶ policies go beyond

their particular geographic region. ¶ One result is that multilateral affairs are still often an ¶ isolated afterthought in the U.S. Government. Are

there ¶ things the United States and Brazil could do, whether bilaterally or in the World Trade Organization, that would ¶ offset some of the

negative effects of the China trade on ¶ manufacturing in both their countries?36 Just posing the ¶ question reveals the complexity of the task.

[INSERT IMPACT CARDS]



1NC Impact Scenarios



Relations

Multilateral engagements are key to US-Brazil relations

Meiman 9(Kellie, led the Brasil/Southern Cone and trade practices of McLarty Associates, “The United States and Brazil Two perspectiv es

on dealing with partnership and rivalry”, Center for American Progress, March 2009,

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/brazil.pdf ) TC

The U.S.-Brazil relationship has always been complex—not surprising for two continental ¶ powers located in the same

hemisphere. It has often been characterized by positive bilateral engagement, counterbalanced by efforts to

isolate the other in regional and multilateral forums. This approach is no longer workable, and is in

neither country’s best interest. ¶ The combination of Brazil’s clear emergence on the world stage and the

United States’ ¶ need to reassert itself as a multilateralist creates potential to forge a partnership born

of ¶ overlapping interests. This is a moment when both Brazil and the United States need to ¶ prove themselves. Brazil needs to show that it is

prepared to make hard decisions tied to ¶ the role of global stakeholder, as it has done in Haiti by maintaining a critical peacekeeping presence

in the troubled Caribbean nation. And the United States must show that the ¶ era of U.S. unilateralism is over. Even

though Brazil will not agree with the United States on every issue, it is in the United ¶ States’ interest to forge a

cooperative, bilateral relationship. Brazil has much to contribute ¶ in regard to integrating emerging powers and technologies into

international frameworks, ¶ as well as an active interest in growing its global stakeholder role. Brazil should be encouraged to seize this mantlein a meaningful way.

Key to overall Latin American relations

Lyons 12 (John, Correspondent at The Wall Street Journal in Brazil “U.S. Seeks an Ally in Brazil”, The Wall Street Journal, April 8,

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304587704577332082752648096.html) TC

The issues in play reflect Brazil's growing economic reach. Brazil's biggest trade partner these days is China, not the U.S., and U.S. officials want

Brazil as an ally in nudging China to let its currency rise. Brazil's bigger economic presence in regional neighbors such

as Venezuela, Ecuador and Cuba could allow Brazil to act as a moderating force in a region that has

become more anti-U.S. in recent years. The U.S. is likely to seek Brazil's support on regional issues ahead

of a summit of hemispheric leaders later this month in Colombia. Some analysts say Brazil will urge Mr. Obama to add star power to aU.N.

environmental conference planned for Rio de Janeiro this year. Mr. Obama hasn't committed to attend.

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/brazil.pdf


http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304587704577332082752648096.html






Latin American Democracy

The plan’s unilateral action kills relations and Latin American democracy. CP

solves.LeoGrande 12 (William M., Dean, School of Public Affairs¶ American University, “Latin America Policy in the Next Two Years:

The Obama Administration and the Next Congress”, March 7, http://www.american.edu/spa/gov/upload/LeoGrande-Harvard-DRCLAS-3-15-11-

Final.pdf ) TC

By this unilateral shift in policy, Washington split the Latin American consensus and¶ belied its commitment

to multilateralism. The result was to damage relations with Brazil, and to¶ encourage the far right elsewhere

in Latin America to think they might be able to overthrow¶ democratically elected progressive

governments with the acquiescence of the United States.¶ In August 2009, the United States and Colombia announced a

Defense Cooperation¶ Agreement providing the U.S. military with access to Colombian military bases. The agreement¶ was announced

without prior consultation with other Latin American countries, and both¶ Venezuela and Brazil had strong negative

reactions. Once again, the unilateralism represented by¶ this lack of consultation reminded Latin Americans of

Washington’s interventionist past rather¶ than heralding a multilateral partnership.

Democracy deters conflict and war—numerous studies

Tomz and Weeks 11 (Michael and Jessica, Department of Political Science, Government, “The Democratic Peace: An Experimental

Approach”, January, https://www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/methods/papers/tomz.pdf ) TC

Few findings from the political science literature have received as much attention as the ¶ “democratic peace,” the discovery

that democracies almost never fight against other democracies. ¶ To some, the absence of military

conflict among democracies is so consistent that it approaches the ¶ status of an “ empirical law” (Levy

1988). Numerous studies have documented a correlation between democracy and peace. Most have ¶ found

that the democratic peace is dyadic, meaning that democracies are less likely to attack other ¶ democracies

but are no less likely to attack autocracies (Maoz and Russett 1993, Ray 1995, Oneal, ¶ Russett, and Berbaum 2003). Fewer studies have found

evidence of a monadic democratic peace, in ¶ which democracies are overall less likely than autocracies to use

military force. We therefore focus ¶ on why democracies tend to refrain from using force against other democracies.

http://www.american.edu/spa/gov/upload/LeoGrande-Harvard-DRCLAS-3-15-11-Final.pdf




https://www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/methods/papers/tomz.pdf







2NC



2NC Overview

The CP solves 100% of case but consults Brazil on key issues PRIOR to

implementing the plan

It competes. The 1AC can’t do binding consultation. That would be abusive.A. Violates “Resolved”: “Resolved” implies a definite course of action. The CP tests the

definite and immediate nature of the plan. If we win the CP is beneficial, we have

disproved the necessity of the resolution and the affirmative should lose. Any

permutation makes the plan conditional and severs the definite and immediate nature

of the plan text. This is a voting issue.

B. Makes the plan conditional: Consulting over the plan justifies the affirmative condition

plan on anything or answering case turns and offense with the “plan won’t” pass. This

means the negative is always one step behind and will never win.

Four Net Benefits:

First is relations, increased cooperation on regional issues allows for US-

Brazil collaboration on key issues and increases communication.

Second is democracy, consulting Brazil on the plan means that democratic

reforms will be introduced to Latin America which deters conflicts that are on

the brink now.

Third: Brazil consultation solves deterrence, nuclear terrorism, arms and

drug trafficking, and othersLuigi R. Einuadi, March 2011, ambassador, distinguished fellow at the Center for Strategic Research,




http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20266%20Einaudi.pdf

These words cannot be read simply as rhetoric ¶ rooted in the Third World trade unionism of the weak. ¶ Brazil is no longer weak. It

is the only BRIC without a ¶ nuclear bomb not because it could not produce one, but ¶ because it has

chosen not to, and its security doctrines ¶ are focused on protecting its borders and on deterrence ,

not on projecting global power. President Lula’s ¶ grandstanding with Turkey in Iran damaged his country’s credibility, but as

Brazil’s global reach matures, its ¶ multilateral skills and record of autonomy could prove 8 important assets in

efforts against the risks of nuclear ¶ terrorism and nuclear proliferation .¶ Like Canada and only a few

other countries, Brazil ¶ has a tradition of good UN citizenship . This characteristic is an important

asset for the United States to find ¶ in a friend nowadays. The author believes it was no accident that Sérgio Vieira de

Mello, the much admired UN ¶ peacemaker who lost his life in Iraq in 2003, was Brazilian. Brazil’s generally violence-free

domestic history, the ¶ absence of conflicts with neighbors, and its longstanding ¶ commitment to UN

principles and peacekeeping without the imposition of force are an important reservoir for ¶ conflict

resolution.42¶ The United States and Brazil face similar problems ¶ in their immediate neighborhoods.



Notable among these ¶ is trafficking in illegal drugs and arms , which contributes ¶ to citizen

insecurity, migration, and unaccustomed messiness along parts of their borders. These issues should ¶

all be included in a permanent consultation process, but ¶ Brazil’s approach of “South America for South Americans” does

not encourage effective cooperation with the ¶ United States on even such vital issues.¶ Brazil’s assertion of regional power to the exclusion ¶

of the United States is similar to China’s “active measures ¶ to promote Asian organizations that exclude the United States.”43 Initiatives such

as UNASUR that exclude ¶ the United States, but which include actively anti-U.S. ¶ governments, invite uncertainty. The answer for Brazil ¶ is

not to abandon UNASUR, let alone South American ¶ integration, but for both the United States and Brazil to ¶ ensure that they each developand sustain bilateral ties ¶ with individual countries in accordance with the particular interests and needs of those countries. (Will anyone ¶

deny that Mexico is on some matters more important to ¶ the United States than Brazil?)¶ Both the United States and Brazil

should actively ¶ support inter-American institutions like the OAS that ¶ bring both of them together

with other countries of ¶ the hemisphere. Most Latin American and Caribbean ¶ countries want good

relations with both the United ¶ States and Brazil, and multilateral activities are a key way to set and

observe rules for everyone. Multilateral formats also are useful to offset the asymmetries ¶ of power,

which have long hampered the United States ¶ in dealing with its neighbors, and which now are

beginning to bedevil Brazil as it grows more rapidly than ¶ most countries around it.9

Fourth is politics – the CP avoids it because forms of cooperation are popular

in Congress and won’t provoke hard-line disagreement



*** Will Consult ***



Consult on Cuba

Brazil would say yes – they’ve helped out Cuba economically in the past

EFE 11/2/11 [EFE, a Spanish international news agency created in 1939 by Spain's former minister ofthe press and propaganda Ramón Serrano Súñer and Manuel Aznar Zubigaray, “Brazil wants to help

Cuba update its economic model”, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2011/11/02/brazil-wants-

to-help-cuba-update-its-economic-model/, PS]

Brazil wants to help Cuba "update" its economic model and increase its exports, the Brazilian ambassador said

Wednesday at the Havana International Trade Fair.¶ Jose Eduardo Martins confirmed Wednesday that Brazil shares Cuba's "optimism"

regarding its economic outlook as a result of the reform plan being pushed by the government of President Raul Castro.¶ "I'm sure that

the Brazilian business community is not only coming here to sell, but also to help in the effort of

'updating' the Cuban economic model and in the effort of Cuba to increase its export capacity and

reduce imports," Martins said.¶ He spoke during the celebration of the Day of Brazil at the fair, which opened on Monday with the

participation of some 1,500 businessmen from 57 countries.¶ The Cuban foreign trade and investment minister, Rodrigo Malmierca,

emphasized Wednesday that Brazil and Cuba are promoting projects in the areas of health care, education,

computers and agriculture and livestock, among other sectors, and are intending to "promote" theareas of economic complementation.¶ "During 2012 we're going to continue deepening and broadening

our economic and trade relations toward new strategic objectives, placing emphasis on those that

allow Cuba to increase its exports to Brazil and to other countries," Malmierca emphasized.¶ He also

mentioned the ongoing construction and investment at the western Cuban port of Mariel as the "signature" project of bilateral economic

cooperation.¶ Brazil is set to invest as much as $500 million in expanding the facilities at Mariel with the aim of making it into the island's main

trade port.¶ In 2010, the 29 Brazilian firms that participated in the Havana Trade Fair closed 543 contracts valued at $69.1 million.¶ Brazil

and Cuba have tightened political and trade relations in recent years, and Latin America's biggest

economy has broad programs of cooperation and financing for infrastructure projects on the

Communist-ruled island.

Brazil would help Cuba – benefits themUPI 2/2/12 [United Press International, a major international news agency, whose newswires, photo,

news film and audio services provided news material to thousands of newspapers, magazines and radio

and television stations for most of the twentieth century, “Brazil eases Cuba into free market

economy”, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2012/02/02/Brazil-eases-Cuba-into-free-market-

economy/UPI-30261328184039/, PS]

Brazil is easing Cuba into the free market economy with a generous package of aid in cash and kind

and joint projects that give the Latin American country a pre-eminent position in Havana's heady mix

of communism and experimental capitalism.¶ Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff appeared to be in the right

place at the right time when she flew into Havana in a spirit of revolutionary camaraderie and clinched deals that secured Brazil's

status as the senior partner in a long-term, multifaceted relationship. ¶ Current bilateral trade exceeds

$642 million a year.¶ In talks with Fidel Castro, his brother President Raul Castro and senior Communist Party leaders, Rousseff readily

invoked her own revolutionary credentials as a former left-wing guerrilla fighter and chided the United States for continuing to operate its

Guantanamo Bay prison.¶ Her meeting with Fidel Castro was described in the media as an emotional encounter for the Brazilian president, who

as a young militant was one of many Latin Americans who admired the Cuban leader after the 1959 communist takeover.¶ Rousseff followed in

the footsteps of populist former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. But reports said she appeared quickly to have established rapport with the

Castro administration.¶ The "excellent" ties secure Brazil an advantageous position in Cub's hugely porous

economy, hungry for basic consumer goods, investment and modernization. Economic upgrading in all

sectors and a phased end to Cuba's international isolation offer lucrative opportunities for Brazil's

state and private sectors.¶ Brazil will invest $640 million in a $900 million modernization of the Mariel container port, west of

Havana, led by the Brazilian firm Odebrecht.¶ Brazil is also giving Cuba $400 million in credits for food imports and investing $200 million in

http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2011/11/02/brazil-wants-to-help-cuba-update-its-economic-model/




http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2012/02/02/Brazil-eases-Cuba-into-free-market-economy/UPI-30261328184039/










modernizing Cuban agriculture.Rousseff pledged Cuba a long-term commitment to help its economic

regeneration.¶

U.S. should consult Brazil on Cuba

Commander Carlos Iglesias, United States Navy, 2012, “United States Security Policy Implications of a

Post-Fidel Cuba”, U.S. Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408

On the other hand, this international dissention does hold some prospect for leveraging U.S. soft power. An

indirect approach would be to coordinate U.S. proxy actions with partner countries interested in

Cuba. This has the double benefit of leveraging U.S. soft power without compromising legislated

restrictions or provoking hard-line Cuban-American ire. In this approach, burgeoning relations with

Brazil and Mexico would be strong candidates. Devoid of the “bullhorn diplomacy” that have marginalized U.S.-Cuban policy

efficacy for decades, the U.S. could better engage the island through hemispherical interlocutors. At a minimum, U.S. interests would

be advanced through the proxy insights of what is occurring on the island in addition to the potential

displacement of anti-American influences (e.g. Chávez).100

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408






Consult on Mexico

Brazil would help Mexico – want closer links

UTC 12/19/12[United Technologies Corporation, an American multinational conglomerateheadquartered in the United Technologies Building in Hartford, Connecticut, “Brazil wants closer links

with Mexico; Rousseff plans to travel next March”, http://en.mercopress.com/2012/12/19/brazil-wants-

closer-links-with-mexico-rousseff-plans-to-travel-next-march, PS]

Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff is planning to visit Mexico in early 2013 taking advantage of the good

chemistry with the new leader Enrique Peña Nieto, and with the purpose of re-launching the

deteriorated relations between the two main economies of Latinamerica.¶ And the big excuse for the approach is

Petrobras, the Brazilian oil and gas giant with strong private participation and which has been a success in discovering and developing

hydrocarbons offshore. This capacity could turn Brazil into one of the world’s leading oil producers and exporters in a few years time.¶

Executives from Mexico’s petroleum giant, Pemex are fascinated with the success of Petrobras as a model for their own country and wish to

continue on the first collaboration steps planted by Peña Nieto and Rousseff when the then elected president visited Brazil last September.¶

“Peña Nieto caused a very good impression in Brasilia”, said diplomatic sources and “President

Rousseff is travelling to Mexico probably next March”¶ The trip should also help to make the ups and

downs relation more fluid, particularly since the early 2012 spat when Brazil imposed import quotas on Mexican manufactured

vehicles in an attempt to contain the bilateral trade deficit.¶ Making the relation with Mexico more solid is very

attractive for Brazil which has seen its economy stall with an annual growth of 1% in 2012, despite all

the stimuli, and a deteriorating relation with Argentina, that has become the main market for

Brazilian manufacturing.¶ Brazil is trying to tone down its protectionism with Mexico and last

September in private talks the Rousseff administration said it was willing to discuss an expansion of

the auto quotas. But there are also practical reasons since the cap was unable to contain the trade deficit with Mexico, which in the first

ten months of this year has soared to 1.8bn dollars, particularly attracted by the high selling Mexican Ford Fusion of which President Rousseff

has one.¶ The Brazilian auto industry is complaining that in the first seven months of the year the full twelve months Mexican quota has been

used up but cars keep coming in despite a 35% tariff.¶ However despite Brazilian optimism things could not be that easy since the Mexican

business community is distrustful of Brazil following what happened with the car agreement and also believe it is a “country with a far too

closed market”.¶ “I believe it makes sense to have certain scepticism” said trade consultant Luis de la Calle who was one of the negotiators of

the free trade treaty with the US and Canada. “The good chemistry is positive because without it you can’t advance

but at the end of the day it all comes down to each country’s interests, and what is best both for Brazil

and Mexico is a far more open trade relation”.¶ The president of Mexican businesspeople in Brazil, Eduardo Ragasol said

that the Peña Nieto/Rousseff relation is full of good signals, such as the approval in record time of the new Mexican woman ambassador in

Brazil. “But it’s too early to know when all this will materialize in concrete investments”.¶ Mexican corporations have been far more aggressive:

millions of Brazilians use Claro cellular phones and watch television on the NET cable system from Mexican tycoon Carlos Slim; they have

breakfast with Bimbo toasts and have soft drinks bottled by Femsa, all Mexican businesses.¶ Brazilians on the other hand have been rather shy

but could see a turning point in 2015 when Braskem begins to build a huge petro-chemical complex in Veracruz, with an investment of 3.5

billion dollars.¶ But for bilateral trade to keep advancing with a quality leap, some kind of agreement is

needed according to analysts. Given the complexity of the relation cooperation between Petrobras and Pemex could be a starting

point.

http://en.mercopress.com/2012/12/19/brazil-wants-closer-links-with-mexico-rousseff-plans-to-travel-next-march








Consult on Venezuela

The US should consult with Brazil over Venezuela

Luis Ferreira, 4-16, 2013, staff writer for thinkpolitic, “Post-Chavez Venezuela”,http://thinkpolitic.com/post-chavez-venezuela/

This brings us to a second area impacted by Chavez’s death – the international arena. Two hours before

Chavez’s death was announced, Maduro expelled two U.S. diplomats after accusing them of spying on Venezuela’s military. This could be just a

taste of a Maduro administration; a more aggressive foreign policy, especially against the United States, would be

a way to maintain the government’s legitimacy. Similarly, support for Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, and other friendly regimes

would be crucial for the stability of a Maduro administration. Already, governments throughout Latin America (which have all benefited from

Venezuelan support) have showed solidarity with the country. This could mean that Maduro would continue Venezuela’s hostile f oreign policy.

For its part, the United States should tread carefully but, most importantly, consult and work with

Venezuela’s neighbors – especially Brazil, the continent’s main regional power, which will have a

massive influence on the transition of power in Venezuela.

The US should consult Brazil on Venezuela

Harkin 04 {Peter Harkin; foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No.1 Jan-February 2004}

Brazil's involvement in Venezuela, on the perspectives, and avoid other hand, is likely to be a more

important feature of U.S.-Brazil relations. For the past conflict is critical. year, Brazil has chaired the "friends of

Venezuela, "a six-country group that includes the United States and has urged the Venezuelan government and insurgents

to resolve their political differences by holding a constitutionally authorized recall vote on President

Chavez's term. At the same time, however, Lula has pursued direct negotiations with the Chavez

administration, to foster bilateral economic ties and closer integration among South American states

Brazil has managed this precarious double act so far, but should the situation in Venezuela deteriorate Brasilia might have

difficulty pursuing both tracks at once without alienating Washington.

Brazil will help Venezuela – common economic incentives

Zibechi 10/2/12 [Raúl Zibechi, a researcher in social movements, journalist and writer. He is a

columnist and international analyst for La Jornada., “Brazil is covering Venezuela's back” ,

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/02/brazil-has-venezuela-back , PS]After Lula's arrival in government, the quality of Brazil's relationship with Venezuela leapt. In 2003, the trade between the two countries

amounted to $800m. By 2011, this figure had gone up to $5bn. The two countries tightened institutional links through

consultancy on public policies and training courses for leaders provided by the prestigious Brazilian research centre

Ipea (Institute of Applied Economic Research) and Embrapa (the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation), which opened offices in Caracas.¶

In 2005, Lula and Chávez signed the Brazil-Venezuela strategic alliance and in 2007, they started holding quarterly presidential meetings – an

unheard-of regularity – to accelerate the integration of infrastructure, which continued until 2010¶ In May 2011, Ipea, which is dependent on

Brazil's ministry of strategic affairs, published two important studies that highlight the progress made on integration, involving areas such as the

road, river and air transport systems. A "common economic area" is being created, stretching from the north ofBrazil to the south of Venezuela.¶ Brazil contributes to the industrial development of Venezuela to

help it reduce its dependency on oil exports and the import of 70% of all food consumed. Venezuela

has started to supply industrial consumables to north Brazil, creating complementary industrial chains

in the border area, in sectors such as the metal mechanics industry and agro-industry.¶ Brazilians

emphasise "the quantity and quality" of the region's resources. Venezuela has the largest oil reserves in the world,

having displaced Saudi Arabia, the third-largest bauxite reserves, the fourth-largest gold reserves, the sixth-largest natural gas reserves and the

10th-largest iron reserves. The Brazilian state of Roraima, on the border with Venezuela, holds the world's biggest reserves of gold, niobium

and tin, in addition to important deposits of thorium, cobalt, molybdenum, diamonds and titanium.¶ However, the main goals of Lula and

http://thinkpolitic.com/post-chavez-venezuela/


http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/02/brazil-has-venezuela-back






Chávez were geopolitical. Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, the most influential diplomat in the Brazilian chancellery, explained that Brazil's strategy

sought to prevent the "removal" of Chávez through a coup, to block the reincorporation of Venezuela into the North American economy, to

extend Mercosur with the inclusion of Bolivia and Ecuador and to hinder the US project to consolidate the Pacific Alliance, which includes Chile,

Colombia, Mexico and Peru.¶ This high level of contact and co-operation shows that the analysts who believe

these two nations represent opposites in their approach to the politics of the left are wrong. The

friendly relations forged by Chávez and Lula have continued under Rousseff. They present a challenge

to those seeking to undermine Venezuela by promoting a so-called "Brazilian" way: in fact the twomodels are closer than we are led to believe.



Consult on Latin America – Generic

Brazil wants consultation before US action in Latin America

Hakim 10 (Peter, president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank on WesternHemisphere affairs, “US-Brazil Relations: Expect More Conflict”, Inter-American Dialogue, October 21,

http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2490)

In the past year or so, the US and Brazil have squabbled over several hemispheric issues—as Brazil has

taken on a more assertive role in Latin America. Brazil surprised and irritated the US and neighboring Colombia when it

joined nearly every other South American nation in opposing a newly announced military arrangement allowing US expanded access to

Colombian military bases. By subsequently mending fences with Colombia and announcing its own, albeit more modest, military accord with

Washington, Brazil demonstrated a welcome flexibility and accommodation. It also made clear, however,

that US military initiatives in South America henceforth require prior consultation and agreement from

Brazil—which is hardly an unreasonable demand. Indeed, this should be routine by now for

Washington.

The US should consult with Brazil over Latin America

Luigi R. Einaudi, March 2011, ambassador, distinguished fellow at the Center for Strategic Research,





The United States has a basic national security interest in Brazil’s continuing democratic and market

oriented success, which improves its will and capacity to ¶ help address pressing global problems. We

are in a rapidly changing period of international relations, in which ¶ a high premium is put on skilled and effective diplomacy ¶ in order to

provide a measure of management to situations that could spin out of control. We are still haunted by nuclear weapons. In these

circumstances, Brazil plays ¶ an important role. It is in the U.S. interest to find as ¶ many ways as possible

not only to cooperate with Brazil, ¶ but also to engage with Brasilia as a regional and global ¶ partner

in the maintenance of peace and prosperity.¶ A prerequisite for improved mutual engagement will ¶ be changes in

perspective on both sides. Mutually beneficial engagement requires the Uniteda States to welcome Brazil’s emergence as a global power. Brazil

is more than ¶ a tropical China35; it is culturally and politically close to ¶ the United States and Europe. Brazil, in turn, needs to ¶ realize that the

United States accepts its rise. Brazil also ¶ needs to recognize that the United States still matters ¶ greatly to Brasilia and that more can be

achieved working with Washington than against it.¶ The United States and Brazil have vast overlapping interests, but

a formal strategic partnership is probably out of ¶ the question for both countries. In the United States, Brazil ¶

must compete for policy attention with China, India, Russia, Japan, Mexico, and several European countries. It poses ¶ no security threat to the

United States. Moreover, despite ¶ Brazil’s importance in multilateral organizations, particularly the UN, Brazil can be of limited practical

assistance ¶ at best to the United States in its two current wars. Brazil’s ¶ interests, in turn, may be fairly said to include the need to ¶

distinguish itself from the United States. Diplomatically, ¶ this means neither country can expect automatic agreement ¶ from the other.

Interests differ and it may be politically necessary to highlight differences even when interests are similar. But both countries should

make every effort to develop a ¶ habit of “permanent consultation” in an effort to coordinate ¶

policies, work pragmatically together where interests are ¶ common, and reduce surprises even whilerecognizing that ¶ specific interests and policies often may differ.¶ A first operational step, therefore, is

for both countries to hold regular policy-level consultations, increase ¶ exchanges of information, and

coordinate carefully on ¶ multilateral matters. This is much easier said than done. ¶ The list of global issues on

which Brazil is becoming a ¶ major player includes conflict resolution, all aspects of ¶ energy, including

nuclear matters, all types of trade, the ¶ environment, space, and the development of international

law, including law of the seas and nonproliferation. To ¶ share information and ensure effective consultation on so ¶ many

functional issues will require finding ways to lessen ¶ the geographic stovepiping natural to bureaucracy. The ¶ U.S. Department of State, for






example, has historically ¶ organized itself into geographical bureaus responsible ¶ for relations with countries in particular regions, leaving

functional issues to offices organized globally. This organization hampers the exchange of information and consultation with countries such as

Brazil, whose reach and ¶ policies go beyond their particular geographic region. ¶ One result is that multilateral affairs are still often an ¶

isolated afterthought in the U.S. Government. Are there ¶ things the United States and Brazil could do, whether bilaterally or in the World

Trade Organization, that would ¶ offset some of the negative effects of the China trade on ¶ manufacturing in both their countries?36 Just

posing the ¶ question reveals the complexity of the task.

Past commitments have not been pursued, we need to cooperate with BrazilNOW

Crandall 9 (Britta H., adjunct professor of political science at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, “Hemispheric

giants: The unusual story of United States policy toward Brazil into the 21st century”, Udini, 2009,

http://udini.proquest.com/view/hemispheric-giants-the-unusual-pqid:1896841681/) TC

INTRODUCTION On March 31, 2007, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva met with President George Bush at Camp David. Reserved for

strategically critical meetings and sensitive negotiations, the venue for the two presidents' discussions reflected the importance of the principal

issue at hand - reduction of the U.S. foreign oil dependence through the use of biofuels. To build upon the recent agreement between the two

countries to cooperate on the production and development of ethanol, President Bush vowed to deepen Washington's dialogue with Brazil.

This commitment to closer ties with Brazil revealed several developments of the South American giant's economic and geopolitical importance.

In addition to being the global leader in the production of sugar-based ethanol, in 2009 Brazil was a leading global exporter of beef, orange

juice, and coffee; its 2007 discovery of a massive deepwater oil field off its southern coast increased its energy independence and export

potential; it was an international creditor; and its economy was the eighth largest in the world. In fact, the Goldman Sachs investment bank

grouped Brazil together with Russia, India, and China (the so- called "BRIC" countries) to describe those emerging economies with such »

enormous economic potential that their economic strength would eclipse most developed countries by the year 2050. Brazil's relative

weight and importance relative to the West has only grown since the turn of the 21st century and is poised to

continue to do so, given energy changes at the global level and a renewed global urgency to find energy alternatives to oil. Moreover,

both Brazil and the United States are electoral democracies and are committed to non- 1¶ proliferation,

market-led economies, and the social welfare of their citizens. All told, the casual observer could be forgiven for concluding

that Brazil is one of the United States' closest and most important strategic and economic partners. Yet the Camp David meeting belied a very

different reality. In spite of Brazil's economic heft and growing political importance in the global arena, it has not

been prioritized in U.S. foreign policy decisions since the 1970s; before this time, Brazil was oftentimes treated as a strategic

partner and ally. Incongruent with Brazil's economic and strategic importance, the twenty-first century has seen scant operational discussions

in Washington on cooperation with Brazil. The Camp David meeting was an anomaly to this pattern of ambivalence. This is where a

paradox in the U.S.-Brazil relationship emerges: Brazil is anything but an insignificant country by both

global economic and political standards, yet it has apparently been treated as such by the United

States since the mid 1970s. Many policymakers and the public alike seemingly have very little concept of U.S. policy toward Brazil. One

high level State Department official even referred to Brazil as the "black hole" of U.S. foreign

diplomacy given its size and significance in relation to the low degree of engagement and attention

that emanate from the U.S. government.1 While the official statements between the two countries have been uniquely

friendly, recalling a long history of bilateral bonds, this verbal commitment has not been backed by congruent

examples of concrete policy cooperation or engagement at high levels since the late 1970s. 1 Anthony Harrington,

Ambassador to Brazil 1999-2001, Interview by Author, 12 June 2008. The Ambassador attributed this description of Washington's Brazil policy

to another unnamed official. 2Hence, explanations of U.S. policy toward Brazil based on the neglect assumption

have in common the urgent appeal for the U.S. government to pay closer attention to Brazil. The

sense of urgency belies Brazil's peaceful and friendly relationship with the United States, focusing

instead on the perceived fleeting window of opportunity for engagement, and the hitherto missed

opportunities in security, energy, and economic cooperation. William Perry expressed dismay at how "such a large andinfluential country in the hemisphere [had] escaped a sustained interest from the legislative branch," calling Brazil "too important to ignore."9

The literature overwhelmingly implores the United States to change its errant ways and wake up to the

reality of Brazil's size, economic importance, and potential as a strategic ally. In claiming that the United

States has ignored Brazil, implicit in the neglect assumption is the belief that any existent mid-level engagement is insufficient and

lacks gravitas or value. The widely-held acceptance of U.S. neglect of Brazil since the 1970s contrasted by the special relationship prior to this

time raises interesting and obvious questions. Why did the United States apparently abandon its alliance with Brazil? If indeed the United States

has neglected Brazil since the 1970s, what caused this shift? What were the factors that prompted attention between 1882 and the mid 1970s,

and are those factors currently present? Finally, have new factors emerged such as those centering around energy

http://udini.proquest.com/view/hemispheric-giants-the-unusual-pqid:1896841681/





development and agricultural trade which could prompt increased bilateral engagement? 9 William Perry,

"Brazil: Too Important to Ignore," CSIS Americas Program, Policy Papers on the Americas, VTL3 (15 July 1996). 6

When it comes to economic matters, the time is right to consult Brazil

Blank 13 (Rebecca, Deputy Secretary of Commerce, “Remarks on Strengthening U.S.-Brazil Relations at Columbia University Event in Riode Janeiro, Brazil”, March 20, http://www.commerce.gov/news/deputy-secretary-speeches/2013/03/20/remarks-strengthening-us-brazil-

relations-columbia-univers)

So the question is: Where do we go from here? What are the next steps in our journey together?¶ We

are now embarking on the next natural stage in the U.S.-Brazil relationship. From a foundation of robust

exchange in goods, services, and investments –all of which will continue to grow –we are now moving into sharing knowledge,

ideas and innovation. Leaders in both of our nations are beginning to understand the need for this

type of outreach from our knowledge communities. There have never been more opportunities for the United

States and Brazil to work together to encourage economic development and foster innovation –often at the same time.

The US and Brazil cannot ignore incentives to consult

Sotero 12 (Paulo, Director of the Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Why United States and BrazilWill Pursue a More Productive Bilateral Relationship”, Huffington Post, November 9, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paulo -sotero/why-

united-states-and-bra_b_2102004.html)

The growing presence of Brazilian global companies in the United Stated, complementing traditionally strong

American investments in Brazil, has created a two-way street where common interests are more visible and

pressure both governments to recognize the benefits of working together or risk paying a political

price for not doing so. Brazil's emergence as an substantive international actor and its rise as the world's sixth largest economy, have

introduced new factors in Brazilian-American relationship that authorities and bureaucrats in Washington and

Brasilia cannot afford to ignore. Once the host of numerous multinational companies from the United States and Europe, Brazil is

now also home to dozens of Brazilian controlled multinational enterprises that have dramatically expanded

their operations worldwide and, in particularly, in the United States. Some occupy substantial positions as

investors in key markets, such as the meat, beer, regional aviation and special steel industries. The growing presence of

Brazilian companies in the United States offers new perspective to matters such as the negotiation of a tax treaty thatthe two countries have talked about for four decades.

http://www.commerce.gov/news/deputy-secretary-speeches/2013/03/20/remarks-strengthening-us-brazil-relations-columbia-univers







*** Perms ***



“SHOULD” definition

Should is more than desirability—it’s an obligation

Summers 94 (Justice, Supreme Court of Oklahoma, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, The Oklahoma State Courts

Network, November 8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14)

Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference

or desirability . Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of

damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be

more than advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure

requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is

under an obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would

mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony").

Should demands immediacySummers 94 (Justice, Supreme Court of Oklahoma, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, The Oklahoma State Courts

Network, November 8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14)

The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed

a ruling in praesenti.14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old practice

culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid

phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2)

constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire

record.16 In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal

parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to

something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1

S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).



A2 Perm do both

The permutation is abusive and a voting issue:

First is Intrinsicness – the affirmative does something that’s neither in the

plan or CP text

1. That moots the CP because they can just say that we can do both – CPs

are uniquely key to testing the affirmative

2. It destroys neg strategy – perms that aren’t based on anything destroy

predictability – makes it impossible to predict every single scenario

they could permute – nullifies strat by allowing the aff to add new policy

options

3. Destroys education – we can’t learn about the plan and have to focus on

redundant theory debates

4. Ground – No CP ground means that they can runs tons of affs that can

easily be solved by another actor

5. Puts the aff in a double bind: either they lose because their perm is

REALLY abusive or they lose because now we can make Intrinsicness

arguments to all their harms and they have no advantage

Second is timeframe – the plan has to happen immediately – the aff must stick

by the time frame in the 1NC to avoid getting out of all neg args by alteringuniqueness – destroys neg ground



A2 Perm do the cp

The permutation is abusive and a voting issue

First is severance – the perm severs the certainty and desirability of the plan

text

1. Destroys education – they get to cut out part of their aff which means we

only learn about part of their plan which skews our education in the

round.

2. Fairness – skews neg strategy - if we can’t base our round strat on our

1NC links and the aff can just permute out of all of them the neg would

never be able to win a round

3. Ground – when the aff changes, none of the 1NC off case strategies willwork – independent reason to reject the team on potential abuse

Second is timeframe – the plan has to happen immediately – the aff must stick

by the time frame in the 1NC to avoid getting out of all neg args by altering

uniqueness – destroys neg ground

Third is that it makes the affirmative not topical – the perm proves that the aff

is Unresolved behind their plan and not topical. This is an independent voting

issue for jurisdiction



A2 Perm do the plan then cp

1. DOESN’T SOLVE/ LINKS TO THE NET BEN: Fiat is immediate but the

consultation must happen before in order to solve for US-Brazilrelations

2. MOVING TARGET: By shifting the timeframe of the plan and CP they can

shift their advocacy to avoid Das like politics and this KILLS NEG

GROUND AND STRATEGY. The 1AC is the focus of the debate. If they can

shift their advocacy that kills predictability and supports argumentative

irresponsibility.

3. SEVERANCE – Allowing rollbacks or amendments of the plan is skews

the Neg’s strategy. The 1NC is the foundation for the Negative’s strategy

in the round and illegitimate perms create a time and strategy skew.The perm could result in the status quo, which is core NEG ground.

4. KILLS COMPETITION– timeframe perms kill competitiveness of every

counterplan even those that are mutually exclusive with the plan—

Counterplans are key ground for the Neg to test the aff from multiple

angles and limit the topic.



A2 Perm do the plan and consult on other issues

1. INTRINSIC PERMS KILL NEG GROUND – The permutation nullifies all of

the 1NC by adding new policies. The 1NC is the foundation of Neg strat

and intrinsicness makes the aff a moving target, killing neg ground andskewing time and strategy

2. KILLS EDUCATION – The CP is key to test the Aff on whether or not the

plan should be a simple unilateral policy versus one that should be

consulted about or a multilateral action. The CP is key to this kind of

policy education and critical thinking for the Aff to defend their form of

policy making.

3. PERM IS NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE CP – By not consulting NATO that

becomes disadvantage ground. The affirmative chose to not include this

action. The CP is not artificially competitive

4. Links to the Net-Benefit



*** Solvency ***



Cooperation – Generic

Cooperation has benefits – Now key

Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for

Latin America Studies, Samuel W. Bodman, James D. Wolfensohn, 2011, “Global Brazil and U.S.-BrazilRelations”, Council on Foreign Relations,

http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil_TFR_66.pdf Cooperation between the United States and Brazil holds too much¶ promise for miscommunication or inevitable disagreements to stand¶ in the

way of potential gains. A strengthened U.S.-Brazil relationship¶ could be the basis for economic growth in

Brazil, the United States,¶ and globally, as well as for lasting peace and democratic stability in the¶

region, nuclear nonproliferation, international progress on combating¶ climate change, development

of a global renewable energy market,¶ global food security, and more legitimate and effective

international¶ institutions. Presidents Obama and Rousseff have laid the groundwork¶ for progress on many of these fronts. The

moment to build on this positive¶ foundation is now.

Brazil and the U.S. ought to cooperate to increase relationsJulia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for

Latin America Studies, Samuel W. Bodman, James D. Wolfensohn, 2011, “Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil

Relations”, Council on Foreign Relations,

http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil_TFR_66.pdf

The Task Force recommends that U.S. policymakers recognize Brazil’s¶ standing as a global actor,

treat its emergence as an opportunity for the¶ United States, and work with Brazil to develop

complementary policies.¶ Given Brazil’s rise over the past two decades, the United States must¶ now alter its view of the region and

pursue a broader and more mature¶ relationship with the new Brazil. It is time that the foreign policy of the¶ United States reflects the new

regional reality and adjusts to advance¶ U.S. interests, given what has changed and the changes likely to come.¶ Brazil and the United

States are now entering a period that has¶ great potential to solidify a mature friendship, one that

entails ever deepening¶ trust in order to secure mutual benefits. This kind of relationship¶ requiresthe two countries to move beyond their historic¶ oscillation between misinterpretation, public praise,

and rebuke, and¶ instead approach both cooperation and inevitable disagreement with¶ mutual

respect and tolerance.¶ The Task Force recommends open and regular communication¶ between

Obama and Rousseff and between senior officials of both countries.¶ As Brazil continues to rise and

the United States adapts to a multipolar¶ order, frequent dialogue will help anticipate and diffuse

tensions¶ that will surface as each country reacts and adjusts to a new and evolving¶ Overview 5¶

geopolitical dynamic. High-level contact will signal to each country’s¶ bureaucracy—historically

distrustful of one another—that the relationship¶ is a priority and that the success of each is in the

other’s interest.

More dialogue neededJulia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for

Latin America Studies, Samuel W. Bodman, James D. Wolfensohn, 2011, “Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil

Relations”, Council on Foreign Relations,


If the United States and Brazil are invested in a serious and deepening ¶ relationship, their

conversation must continue. As in U.S. relations¶ with such powers as India, China, Russia, or Germany, frank and high












level¶ dialogue with Brazil will allow both countries to identify, acknowledge,¶ and manage issues of

potential disagreement, which should not¶ destabilize the relationship in its entirety.

Cuba/Venezuela is a good starting point for better US-Brazil relations

Malamud and Garcia-Calvo 10 (Carlos and Carola, Professor of History of the Americas at the Universidad Nacional de

Educación a Distancia and Director of the Latin American Department at the Instituto Universitario Ortega y Gasset , and Research Assistant,

Elcano Royal Institute Research Assistant at the Elcano Royal Institute, “The US in Brazil’s Foreign Policy (ARI)”, Real Instituto Elcano, March 3,

http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/usa-

transatlantic+dialogue/ari31-2010) TC

In any case, a bilateral relationship is a two-way street, and although Brazil has criticised some US decisions

and positions in the region, and said repeatedly that Obama has done virtually nothing to create a new relationship with Latin America,

the Brazilian government has not taken any firm steps either to strengthen its ties with Washington.

Therefore, it is worth asking if its position on Cuba is the best way to do that, or if its constant

concessions to Chávez are. The last one came from Dilma Rousseuf, Minister of the Presidency and candidate of the Workers Party in

the next presidential election, when she refrained from criticising nationalisations in Venezuela or Chávez’s treatment of th e Venezuelan news

media. It would seem that Brazil is willing to demand and receive things from the US without giving anything

in return.

http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/usa-transatlantic+dialogue/ari31-2010







Brazil will say YES – Generic

Brazil wants consultation before US action in Latin America

Hakim 10 (Peter, president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank on Western

Hemisphere affairs, “US-Brazil Relations: Expect More Conflict”, Inter-American Dialogue, October 21,

http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2490)

In the past year or so, the US and Brazil have squabbled over several hemispheric issues—as Brazil has

taken on a more assertive role in Latin America. Brazil surprised and irritated the US and neighboring Colombia when it

joined nearly every other South American nation in opposing a newly announced military arrangement allowing US expanded access to

Colombian military bases. By subsequently mending fences with Colombia and announcing its own, albeit more modest, military accord with

Washington, Brazil demonstrated a welcome flexibility and accommodation. It also made clear, however,

that US military initiatives in South America henceforth require prior consultation and agreement from

Brazil—which is hardly an unreasonable demand. Indeed, this should be routine by now for

Washington.

When it comes to economic matters, the time is right to consult Brazil

Blank 13 (Rebecca, Deputy Secretary of Commerce, “Remarks on Strengthening U.S.-Brazil Relations at Columbia University Event in Rio

de Janeiro, Brazil”, March 20, http://www.commerce.gov/news/deputy-secretary-speeches/2013/03/20/remarks-strengthening-us-brazil-

relations-columbia-univers)

So the question is: Where do we go from here? What are the next steps in our journey together?¶ We

are now embarking on the next natural stage in the U.S.-Brazil relationship. From a foundation of robust

exchange in goods, services, and investments –all of which will continue to grow –we are now moving into sharing knowledge,

ideas and innovation. Leaders in both of our nations are beginning to understand the need for this

type of outreach from our knowledge communities. There have never been more opportunities for the United

States and Brazil to work together to encourage economic development and foster innovation –often at the same time.

Brazil wants to be consulted on regional matters

Lyons 12 (John, Correspondent at The Wall Street Journal in Brazil “U.S. Seeks an Ally in Brazil”, The Wall Street Journal, April 8,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304587704577332082752648096.html) TC

More than any single agreement, Ms. Rousseff may be seeking something that was a scarce

commodity for the volatile nation in past decades: respect. The country's leaders have sought to be treated

as a partner with the U.S. to be consulted on important regional issues since U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower

visited Brazil in 1960. Brazil has sought a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council essentially since the council came into existence. Such

demands used to draw mostly laughs. But that has begun to change with Brazil's economic growth. Mr. Obama is speeding up Brazilian travel-

visa applications, in part because Brazilians are starting to outspend Europeans in key U.S. tourist destinations such as New York and Florida.

The US and Brazil cannot ignore incentives to consult

Sotero 12 (Paulo, Director of the Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Why United States and Braz il

Will Pursue a More Productive Bilateral Relationship”, Huffington Post, November 9, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paulo-sotero/why-

united-states-and-bra_b_2102004.html)

The growing presence of Brazilian global companies in the United Stated, complementing traditionally strong

American investments in Brazil, has created a two-way street where common interests are more visible and

pressure both governments to recognize the benefits of working together or risk paying a political

price for not doing so. Brazil's emergence as an substantive international actor and its rise as the world's sixth largest economy, have

introduced new factors in Brazilian-American relationship that authorities and bureaucrats in Washington and

Brasilia cannot afford to ignore. Once the host of numerous multinational companies from the United States and Europe, Brazil is

now also home to dozens of Brazilian controlled multinational enterprises that have dramatically expanded








their operations worldwide and, in particularly, in the United States. Some occupy substantial positions as

investors in key markets, such as the meat, beer, regional aviation and special steel industries. The growing presence of

Brazilian companies in the United States offers new perspective to matters such as the negotiation of a tax treaty that

the two countries have talked about for four decades.

Brazil supports the US in Latin America

Harkin 04 {Peter Harkin; foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No.1 Jan-February 2004} BRAZIL has never aggressively challenged U.S. goals in Latin America. It has not questioned the U.S.

vision for hemispheric free trade arrangements enhanced security cooperation the collective

defense¶ of democracy; in fact, it has formally committed to working with Washington in each of these

areas. Yet, more than any other Latin¶ American nation, it has repeatedly demurred at Washington's ideas on how specific proposals and

initiatives should work in practice. Brazil is the only country in the region that has sufficient weight and¶ independence to credibly challenge the

United States.



Brazil says YES – Cuba

US-Brazil cooperation is the way to spur US-Cuban relations—the US can’t act

alone

Sweig 12 (Julia E., Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, Council on

Foreign Relations, “The Frozen U.S.-Cuba Relationship”, Council on Foreign Relations, February 28, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/frozen-us-cuba-relationship/p27510) TC

The second point is what's happening in Cuba. It's not realistic to expect the United States to undertake a

series of unilateral moves toward normalization; it needs a willing partner. I believe we have one in Havana but

have failed to read the signals. Raul Castro has now been in office since the beginning of 2008. Raul holds the reins on both foreign policy and

domestic policy, and, domestically, the politics of implementing a fairly wide range of economic and political and social reforms are his priority.

In a deal that was coordinated with the help of the Cuban Catholic Church and Spain, he released all of the political prisoners in Cuba. He also is

taking a number of steps that imply a major rewriting of the social contract in Cuba to shrink the size of the state and give Cuban individuals

more freedom--economically, especially, but also in terms of speech--than we've seen in the last fifty years. He has privatized the residential

real estate and car market[s], expanded much-needed agrarian reform, lifted caps on salaries, and greatly expanded space for small businesses.

He also is moving to deal with corruption and to prepare the groundwork for a great deal more foreign investment. He's moving in the direction

of the kind of reforms that every administration over the last fifty years has called upon Cuba to make, albeit under the rubric of a one-party

system. There's a broad range of cooperation--neighborhood security in the Gulf of Mexico, as Cuba has just started drilling for

oil, counternarcotics, and natural disasters--between the two countries that is still not happening, and that gives me the

impression that the United States has been unwilling to take "yes" for an answer and respond positively to

steps taken by Cuba. Brazil is a regional power and a global power; it plays in a number of spaces well beyond Latin

America. In the last couple of years it undertook some major investments, and those investments will grow in

Cuba--in infrastructure, in agriculture, in perhaps energy as well, and others. Brazil is clearly stepping into a space where

the United States should be, and the United States has made a decision to watch as that happens .

Brazil wants to improve U.S. – Cuba relations in order to remove the embargo

Partlow 09 {Joshua Partlow; Washington post foreign service writer; Brazil’s president to Seek a Change in US

Approach; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/13/AR2009031303032.html ;March 14, 2009}

Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim said in an interview that Brazil wants to find ways to improve

relations between the United States and Cuba and to change the perception that Washington cares

about Latin America only as a terrain for the war on drugs. Lula has also urged the United States to

reach a free-trade agreement with Colombia.¶ "We would hope that the United States and the Obamaadministration would not look to Latin America and South America under the prism of drug trafficking.Drug trafficking is one problem, it's a serious problem, but the relation is much broader and otherwise it

will be contaminated from the beginning," Amorim said. "If there is a message we would like to give, that would be one."¶ Thomas A. Shannon Jr., the assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs,said in an interview this week that current major initiatives with Brazil -- such as cooperation ondeveloping biofuels, combating racial discrimination and fighting AIDS and malaria in Africa -- alreadyoperate well beyond the realm of drugs.¶ "There's not a security or counter-drugs component to it," said

Shannon, who described Brazil as being "on the verge of greatness" and as "the kind of partner we want."¶

Washington's policy toward Cuba is also of particular importance in the region, where the U.S.

embargo is widely seen as an anachronistic failure. The Obama administration has eased travel

restrictions to Cuba, and some observers expect the president to announce larger changes in U.S.

policy toward the Caribbean nation around the time of the Summit of the Americas next month in

Trinidad and Tobago.¶ "I think we would certainly encourage dialogue, encourage the end of

isolation," Amorim said, adding that ending restrictions on travel and sending money back to Cuba would

not be enough. "I think something bigger has to be done," he said.

http://www.cfr.org/cuba/frozen-us-cuba-relationship/p27510




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http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/cuba.html?nav=el

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/cuba.html?nav=el






A2 Brazil doesn’t solve

Brazil on the rise now – 3 reasons

Meiman and Rothkopf 3/11/09 [Kellie Meiman and David Rothkopf, Staff writers for Real Clear

Politics, “The United States and Brazil: Two perspectives on dealing with partnership and rivalry”,http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/brazil.pdf , PS]The choice of using the G-20 as the mechanism to coordinate the international response ¶ to the crisis rather than the G-8 was a signal of the

growing centrality that leading emerging powers such as Brazil must play in effecting any meaningful

international response ¶ to the global markets meltdown. In addition, Brazil also hosted in late 2008 a

summit of ¶ Latin American heads of state that did not include the United States, a clear message

concerning Brazil’s sense of regional leadership as well as the growing desire among nations ¶

throughout the hemisphere to shake off what has been seen as the paternalistic embrace of ¶ the

United States. ¶ These international meetings are but a few indicators among many that have come

during ¶ the past eight years that the Obama administration is inheriting a relationship with Brazil ¶ that

will almost certainly be dramatically different from nearly a decade ago. As they assess ¶ the situation, U.S. policymakers will see that Brazil’s

rise is due to several key factors. First ¶ and foremost is Brazil’s economic growth, which is the result of

both sound economic ¶ management and stabilization of the currency, and of Brazil’s emerging role as

a leading ¶ commodity provider to many of the other fastest growing nations in the world, notably ¶ those

in Asia. As one observer put it, referring to Brazil’s agricultural exports, the country ¶ has built a massive industry “exporting rain to China.” ¶

The reference is to the fact that Brazil’s climate possesses many attributes that are in ¶ scarce supply in Asia’s two BRICs —China and India—

which has propelled Brazil to ¶ the top position in the export of many critical food products. The country’s great mineral ¶

resources augmented by recent very promising and substantial petroleum and natural gas ¶ finds have

amplified the agricultural boom. ¶ So, too, has the country’s pioneering efforts in the area of biofuels,

the growth of its financial ¶ sector—the region’s largest by far—and a host of other factors. But beyond

economic factors, ¶ the administration of Brazilian President Luiz Ignacio “Lula” da Silva— thanks to the deft ¶ leadership and

communications skills of the president himself and the tireless and enterprising efforts of his foreign minister Celso Amorim—has made

itself a critical player in a host ¶ of international issues from leading the developing world position at

critical intervals in the ¶ global trade round to playing a role as an effective mediator in critical regional

disputes. ¶ As a consequence of these changes, for the first time there is serious talk among policymakers worldwide

about Brazil assuming a permanent place at the head table of the international community. Initially, this

may come through continuing its role in the G-20, and ¶ having that group assume greater responsibilities, some of which were once the

exclusive ¶ province of the G-8. But as the size of the G-20 is unwieldy and a number of its members ¶ clearly not of the same economic or

political status as the largest developed and developing countries, there have been serious proposals—such as that of World Bank President ¶

Robert Zoellick—to shape a new alternative to the G-8, perhaps a G-12 or G-14, which ¶ could become the principal coordinating group on

global economic matters.






A2 Normal Means

CP normal means for energy policy—Strategic Energy Dialogue

Meyer 13 (Peter J., Analyst in Latin American Affairs, “Brazil-US Relations”, Congressional Research Center, February 27,

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf)

Energy has been another important area of U.S.-Brazilian cooperation in recent years. Brazil is ¶ widely

regarded as a world leader in energy policy for successfully reducing its reliance on ¶ foreign oil through the development of

alternative energy resources and increased domestic ¶ production. In addition to being the world’s second-largest producer of ethanol (after

the United ¶ States), Brazil currently generates 85% of its electricity through hydropower. Brazil also has ¶ recently discovered large offshore oil

deposits that have the potential to turn the country into a ¶ major oil and gas producer and an important source of energy for the United

States.106 To ¶ facilitate greater cooperation in the development of safe, secure, and affordable energy,

President ¶ Obama and President Rousseff launched a Strategic Energy Dialogue in March 2011.



A2 Status Quo

Current cooperative relations don’t solve

Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for

Latin America Studies, Samuel W. Bodman, James D. Wolfensohn, 2011, “Global Brazil and U.S.-BrazilRelations”, Council on Foreign Relations,


The richest and deepest connections between Brazil and the United¶ States tend not to involve direct

bilateral relations between the governments,¶ but rather third-country or subnational collaboration

and¶ private-sector partnerships. Some of the most promising collaborations¶ between Brazil and the United

States take place outside both¶ countries’ borders on counternarcotics, health and development

goals,¶ promotion of decent work, and biofuels cooperation.¶ The Task Force finds that there is ample room

for the federal governments¶ of the United States and Brazil to capitalize on the relationships ¶ being

built in third countries and by the countries’ governors,¶ private sectors, trade unions, and civil society

organizations. The¶ growth of these secondary and tertiary interactions presents an¶ opportunity to

build confidence and demonstrate commonality to the¶ two societies, at the same time laying the

groundwork for more structured¶ bilateral relations that benefit from the confidence and

partnerships¶ already in place.






*** Impact Scenarios ***



2NC Democracy

DPT true – empirics and studies prove

Placek 2/18/12 [Kevin Placek, Research Intern at the Japan Chair, Center for Strategic and

International Studies (CSIS), “The Democratic Peace Theory”, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/18/the-democratic-peace-theory/ , PS]

Proponents of the normative/cultural perspective, by contrast, argue that shared democratic and liberal values best explain

the peace that exists between democratic states. According to this view, democratic political culture

encourages peaceful means of conflict resolution which are extended beyond the domestic political

process to other democratic states because leaders in both countries hold a reasonable expectation

that their counterparts will also be able to work out their differences peacefully. Political ideology, therefore,

determines how democracies distinguish allies from adversaries: democracies that represent and act in their citizens’

interests are treated with respect and consideration, whereas nondemocracies that use violence and

oppression against their own people are regarded with mistrust and suspicion . The importance of perception

means that even if a particular state has ‘enlightened citizens and liberal-democratic institutions,’ unless other democratic states

regard it as a genuine liberal democracy then the democratic peace proposition will not hold. This

argument can, therefore, explain a number of contentious cases: Americans did not consider England

democratic in 1812 because England was a monarchy (War of 1812) and liberals in the Union did not

consider the Confederacy a liberal democracy because of their use of slavery (American Civil War). ¶

Although some scholars regard the institutional and normative explanations as mutually exclusive, a much more intuitive and persuasive

defence of the democratic peace theory emerges from combining these two viewpoints. Thus, the particular democratic practices

that make war with other liberal democracies unlikely – free and fair elections, the rule of law, free

press, a competitive party system – are driven by both ‘converging expectations about what

conventional behaviour is likely to be’ (institutions) and ‘standards for what behaviour ought to be’

(norms). These two explanations are complimentary and mutually reinforcing: cultural norms influences the creation and evolution of

political institutions, and institutions help generate a more peaceful moral culture over time.¶ A great deal of criticism of the democratic peace

theory is focused on methodology. It is argued that the subjectivity of the specifics definitions adopted in such highly empirical studies is likely

to significantly affect the results, making it difficult to validate the theory with certainty. But this is largely undermined by a large number

of studies that show democracies are highly unlikely to fight each other irrespective of the definitionof democracy, the type of cases considered, or the dispute/war threshold. Furthermore, there has

already been a significant increase in the number of democratic-democratic dyads from less than 2%

of all political dyads in the 19th century, to 13% from 1900-1945, and 11% over the 1946-89 period

without any major conflict.

Energy cooperation key to solve democracy and promote U.S. policies in LAC

Langevin 12 (Mark S. Langevin, Ph.D. Associate Adjunct Professor of Government and Politics at the

University of Maryland-University College, a Contributing Faculty at Walden University’s Graduate

School of Public Policy and Administration) (“Energy and Brazil-United States Relations A Discussion

Paper”, Brazil works, Sep 19,2012, https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B7MqlY1WLL8eZnJUNGxxZlpSQi1KcGRlYUlOeHRRZw/edit?usp=dr

ive_web)

¶ “We are approaching a seminal moment when Brazil and the United States share many key ¶ objectives in the

hemisphere… Brazil can and should be a crucial player with the United States in ¶ sustaining economic

reform and democracy, in promoting free trade and open markets, and in ¶ combating narcotics,

terrorism, and trans regional crime… If we want to sustain democracy, it ¶ won’t happen if democracy

fails in Brazil. None of these fundamental U.S. policies will work in¶ the end without Brazil. Brazil is the

fulcrum (Council on Foreign Relations 2001).”¶ Interestingly, the 2001 CFR task force did not mention the importance of energy as either a ¶

http://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/18/the-democratic-peace-theory/




https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B7MqlY1WLL8eZnJUNGxxZlpSQi1KcGRlYUlOeHRRZw/edit?usp=drive_web










bilateral or regional policy priority. In sharp contrast, in 2011 the CFR composed another ¶ independent task force that issued the report,

“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations,” and ¶ asserted that energy is and will remain a critical component of Brazil’s

economic and political agenda, driven ¶ by rising per capita energy consumption, development of

substantial domestic energy resources, ¶ and the need to expand existing energy infrastructure.

Brazil’s investment in this industry is a ¶ primary example of its domestic and international agendas

reinforcing each other. The United ¶ States and Brazil have common interests in improving energy

efficiency, reducing carbon ¶ intensity, promoting the development of biofuels, expanding the use ofnatural gas, and ¶ managing offshore oil exploration and development(Council on Foreign Relations 2011:31).”¶

This most recent CFR report acknowledges Brazil’s noteworthy rise as a global power in the last ¶

decade and analyzes the multiplying importance of energy at the global, bilateral, and national ¶ levels

of policymaking for both countries. In many respects, this CFR taskforce recognized and ¶ the Obama administration is

carefully measuring Brazil’s newly gained geopolitical weight ¶ earned from the discovery of the

massive, offshore pre-salt hydrocarbon reserves in 2006. ¶ There are other energy issues of mutual interest, but it is

petroleum that now drives foreign ¶ policy discussions and offers the greatest challenges and opportunities for bilateral partnership.



2NC Relations

A cooperative, bilateral relationship would benefit the US

Meiman and Rothkopf 3/11/09 [Kellie Meiman and David Rothkopf, Staff writers for Real ClearPolitics, “The United States and Brazil: Two perspectives on dealing with partnership and rivalry”,

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/brazil.pdf, PS]

The combination of Brazil’s clear emergence on the world stage and the United States’ ¶ need to

reassert itself as a multilateralist creates potential to forge a partnership born of ¶ overlapping

interests. This is a moment when both Brazil and the United States need to ¶ prove themselves. Brazil needs to show that it is

prepared to make hard decisions tied to ¶ the role of global stakeholder, as it has done in Haiti by maintaining a

critical peacekeeping presence in the troubled Caribbean nation. And the United States must show that the ¶ era of U.S.

unilateralism is over.¶ Today, Brazil is more outward looking from a diplomatic and business

perspective than at ¶ any point in its history, and would make a beneficial partner for the United

States as we ¶ confront the next four years. To bear fruit, however, the relationship must be built on a ¶ positive, well-coordinated agenda,

not as a reaction to difficult regional and global circumstances. Active maintenance of this initiative must come from the highest levels of both ¶

governments, without sacrificing the autonomy of each country’s foreign policy. ¶ Even though Brazil will not agree with the United States on

every issue, it is in the United ¶ States’ interest to forge a cooperative, bilateral relationship . Brazil has

much to contribute ¶ in regard to integrating emerging powers and technologies into international

frameworks, ¶ as well as an active interest in growing its global stakeholder role. Brazil should be

encouraged to seize this mantle in a meaningful way.

An international commercial policy is uniquely key to collaboration


Politics, “The United States and Brazil: Two perspectives on dealing with partnership and rivalry”,


Whereas competitiveness-focused policy was once viewed as serving primarily U.S. ¶ interests, Brazilian companies and industriesare now in a secure position internationally, ¶ having conquered markets globally. We need to

cultivate an environment where Brazil ¶ and the United States can collaborate on international

commercial policy in a pragmatic ¶ fashion, as in the U.S. relationship with Europe. This will not eliminate economic disputes;

¶ we still have many fights with our European friends. A pragmatic approach on trade and ¶ investment policy, however, will

allow us to pursue our shared interests in a way that has ¶ the potential to be exceptionally effective,

assuming both sides see this dialogue as mutually reinforcing our individual interests.

Consultation on issues such as trade will solve relations

Burnett 13 (Alistair, editor of Radio 4's The World Tonight, “Brazil and the US – Not on Same Page”, YaleGLobal, April 12,

http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/brazil-and-us-%E2%80%93-not-same-page) TC

RIO DE JANEIRO: Relations between the two giant democracies of the Americas, Brazil and the US, should be easy. After

all, the two countries have much in common. Both are complex societies, with territory stretching across their respective

continents and a history of European colonists taking land from indigenous Americans. Granting differences between British and Portuguese

colonial traditions, both were built by immigrants, most who came willingly and others like s laves, indentured servants or prisoners who didn’t.

Both are well-established democratic federal republics.¶ Yet, when it comes to foreign policy and trade relations there

are constant tensions. These could be addressed soon, with reports that President Dilma Rousseff will make a formal state visit to the

United States, the first of a Brazilian leader in two decades. US diplomats and analysts take the view that Brazil is often unhelpful, by which

they seem to mean it doesn’t always support US policy. For their part, the Brazilians say the US doesn’t want to accept that



http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/brazil-and-us-%E2%80%93-not-same-page







the world has changed and Washington can’t accept that it must deal with emerging economies on an

equal footing.



*** Theory ***



A2 Consult CP Abusive

1. Key to test the word “resolved” & “should” which imply definite action,

and tests “United States Federal Government” since the counterplan ismultilateral. This proves they are both predictable and key to neg

ground. American Heritage Dictionary 04

http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=should

2. Key to education –

A) We are topic-specific – our 1NC link cards prove African aid is

intimately tied to ____________.

B) It’s critical to geopolitical and foreign policy relations which is key to

debate because that’s the purpose of debate.

C) Key to U.S. foreign policy debateJohn Ikenberry 04, professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton,

10-23-2004 http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/news/fall2004/Ikenberry_article.pdf.

At the heart of the debate between conservative and liberal visions of unipolar order are

judgements about the costs and benefits of binding US power to wider global groupings . The Bush

administration has calculated that the costs of lost policy autonomy, and national sovereignty, is greater than the gains from co-operation. The liberal calculation isthat the lost autonomy associated with making binding commitments is worth less than the rewards generated by the institutional bargain. The Bush calculation has

been that although other states will withhold co-operation, in a unipolar world this means little. The liberal calculation is that an international order with rules and

institutions that are embraced by other states opens up the possi bilities for a thousand acts of diffuse reciprocity each week.

3. Not a moving target – We will always defend that Brazil says yes and the

counterplan solves all of the case.

4. Impact turning the net benefit checks abuse – Affirmatives always have

the option of impact turning the terminal impact such as LAC relations

bad, etc.

5. Probabilistic solvency deficit checks abuse – The counterplan

guarantees delay and potential veto.



6. We aren’t conditional fiat – We will always defend that we consult Brazil

over the affirmative plan, which gives the affirmative stable ground to

straight turn the counterplan.

7. Key to competitive equity – Consultation is key to check new affs and is aneg right to have a strategy to defeat new affs.

8. Best policy option – We have an obligation to assess the quality of the

counterplan versus the plan as policy-makers. The counterplan is a

reason to reject the affirmative through opportunity cost

9. Generic equalizer – Consult gives equal chance for underdogs to beat

powerhouses which is key for people to join debate.

10. Key to solve 2AC add-ons – Without them, the aff would always be

able to kill any counterplan by reading a new add-ons.

11. Stealing aff ground is inevitable – Kritiks, floating PICs, agent

counterplans, and many others skew resolutional focus.



*** Net Benefit ***



Coop with Brazil on Cuba doesn’t link to PTX

Commander Carlos Iglesias, United States Navy, 2012, “United States Security Policy Implications of a

Post-Fidel Cuba”, U.S. Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408

On the other hand, this international dissention does hold some prospect for leveraging U.S. soft power. An

indirect approach would be to coordinate U.S. proxy actions with partner countries interested in

Cuba. This has the double benefit of leveraging U.S. soft power without compromising legislated

restrictions or provoking hard-line Cuban-American ire. In this approach, burgeoning relations with

Brazil and Mexico would be strong candidates. Devoid of the “bullhorn diplomacy” that have marginalized U.S.-Cuban policy

efficacy for decades, the U.S. could better engage the island through hemispherical interlocutors. At a minimum, U.S. interests would

be advanced through the proxy insights of what is occurring on the island in addition to the potential

displacement of anti-American influences (e.g. Chávez).100







AFF ANSWERS



Brazil says No – Generic

No US-Brazil cooperation in Latin America—specifically Cuba and Venezuela

Hakim 12 (Peter, president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank on WesternHemisphere affairs, “Brazil and the US Security Agenda”, Inter-American Dialogue, February 6,

http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2855) TC

Similarly, the US and Brazil are on polar opposite sides of nearly every issue dealing with Cuba . Brazil

has also supported the development of new multilat-eral institutions in Latin America that ex-clude US

participation, and could potentially further curb US influence in the region. In neither case, however, is US

security a particular concern. Nor are the differing US and Brazilian approaches to Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela. Many in Washington

view Chavez as serious security problem and would welcome Brazil treating him more like a threat. But

Brazil’s good relations with the Venezuelan leader sometimes benefit the US by allow-ing Brazil to help, at least on occasion, to moderate his

virulent anti-Americanism. Some disagreements, however, have raised important US security concerns . Brazil

delivered its most forceful challenge to the US security agenda in Latin America in 2010, when it denounced a new US-Colombia security pact.

Washington and Bogota had both considered the pact to be little more than a natural continuation of past bilateral anti-drug, anti-guerrilla

cooperation. Moreover, the US viewed the Colombia agreement—which formalized US access to several Colombian bases—as a replacementfor its continued use of Manta Air Base in Ecuador, which President Correa abrogated when the US lease on Manta ran out. Brazil’s disapproval

mobilized opposition to the US-Colombia pact from nearly every South American country. The impasse was resolved when the Colombian

Supreme Court declared the treaty unconstitutional because it had never been presented for legislative consideration. Since then, President

Juan Manuel Santos has simply deferred any further action on the accord.

Brazil nervous of U.S. cooperation

Robert and Maxwell 1 (Steven and Kenneth R., a British historian who specializes in Iberia and Latin America, longtime member

of the Council on Foreign Relations, for fifteen years he headed its Latin America Studies Program, “A Letter to the President and a

Memorandum on U.S. Policy Toward Brazil”, Nova York: Council on Foreign Relations, February 12) TC

It takes two in order to build a sustained and positive relationship. Is Brazil ready? Given past history, we anticipate

that Brazil will be skeptical about a new U.S. initiative. The perception in Brazil is that the United States

has in the past been inconsistent in its approaches and has not always delivered on promises ofgreater engagement and consultation. There have been moments of close historical rapprochement between the United States

and Brazil to be sure, as well as moments of estrangement. This history will influence the way Brazilians react to U.S.

initiatives, and it is important to bear this in mind. The Barão do Rio Branco, the founder of Brazilian diplomacy, promoted the idea of a

special relationship with the United States. Thomas Jefferson also anticipated a special role for Brazil and the United States within an "American

system" predating the Monroe Doctrine. This positive tradition brought major benefits for the United States. During the Spanish American War

in 1898, the Brazilian Admiralty turned over a number of European ship-building contracts to the United States in order to increase American

naval strength; from 1917 to 1918 during World War I the Brazilian Navy patrolled the Atlantic; from 1944 to 1945 more than 25,000 combat

troops of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) joined Allied efforts in Italy, taking enormous casualties at the battlefields of Monte Castello;

also during World War II, Brazil provided the United States with key bases in the northeast for Atlantic operations; and in 1965 Brazilian troops

were dispatched to the Dominican Republic. Most officers of the Brazilian General Staff until the mid-1980s were veterans of the FEB and proud

of their association with the U.S. Army during World War II. Under the auspices of Nelson Rockefeller, during the 1940s Brazilian-American

cultural relations reached a high point of interaction, cross-fertilization, and mutual discovery.

Brazil is skeptical of the United States

Einaudi 11 (Luigi R., Acting Secretary General of the Organization of American States 2004, “Brazil and the United States: The Need for

Strategic Engagement”, INSS, March 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20266%20Einaudi.pdf) TC

As much as both countries need it, however, improved cooperation may require them to make changes ¶

for which they are not yet ready.44 Depending somewhat on their politics, many Brazilians will be dubious about

cooperation with the United States as long ¶ as it continues to massively subsidize and protect key ¶



agricultural products, maintains an embargo on Cuba, ¶ is thought by important political groups to

have ambitions on the Amazon or troops in South America, or ¶ fails to endorse Brazil’s UN Security

Council ambitions. Similarly, some in the United States will question ¶ working closely with a Brazil that they see

as enjoying ¶ the luxuries of the irresponsible until it accepts greater ¶ responsibility on nuclear nonproliferation (including ¶ more UN

monitoring of its facilities), distances itself ¶ from Iran, is more present on democracy and human ¶ rights issues (in the Middle East, Cuba, Iran,

and Venezuela), is more active on these issues at the UN and ¶ OAS, and generally treats the United States better in its ¶ diplomacy than it has

often done recently.



Brazil says No – Venezuela

Brazil won’t help Venezuela – conflicting governments

Zibechi 10/2/12 [Raúl Zibechi, a researcher in social movements, journalist and writer. He is acolumnist and international analyst for La Jornada., “Brazil is covering Venezuela's back” ,

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/02/brazil-has-venezuela-back , PS]

For most analysts, the political regimes of Venezuela and Brazil are very different. Some governments, such as Barack Obama's, suggest the

two regimes are opposites, even conflicting. But the solid alliance between the two countries, overlooked by the media, does

not mesh with these simplistic analyses.¶ The Venezulean government of Hugo Chávez is accused of being populist

and authoritarian, because the state plays a central role in the economy and society, and the regime

of showing a dangerous tendency towards single-party politics that makes it very similar to that of

Cuba.¶ The Brazilian governments of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-10) and Dilma Rousseff, on the other hand, support

private companies and have a good relationship with the opposition, to the extent that half a dozen

parties, ranging from communist to centre-right, make up the government led by the Workers party.

The leading players in Brazilian media, such as Rede Globo, do not mention the existence of censorship in the country.¶ One of the main

differences between the two countries is the relationship between the state and civil society. In Brazil,

social movements such as Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra (Landless Workers' Movement), arose against the state.

In Venezuela, they were created to a great extent by the state after Chávez got to power .¶ The

conservative media consider Venezuela to be a potential danger for the security of the US and a

threat to democracy and its neighbours. We should remember that the George W Bush administration assigned Brazil the role

of "moderating" Venezuela's alleged radical impulses. What these analyses fail to explain is why two regimes that are meant to be opposites

and incompatible with one another have established the most solid strategic alliance in the region, as solid or more so as that of Brazil and

Argentina.

No US-Brazil cooperation in Venezuela

Hakim 12 (Peter, president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank on Western

Hemisphere affairs, “Brazil and the US Security Agenda”, Inter-American Dialogue, February 6,http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2855) TC










cooperation. Moreover, the US viewed the Colombia agreement—which formalized US access to several Colombian bases—as a replacement

for its continued use of Manta Air Base in Ecuador, which President Correa abrogated when the US lease on Manta ran out. Brazil’s disapprovalmobilized opposition to the US-Colombia pact from nearly every South American country. The impasse was resolved when the Colombian








Brazil says No – Cuba

No US-Brazil cooperation in Cuba

Hakim 12 (Peter, president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank on WesternHemisphere affairs, “Brazil and the US Security Agenda”, Inter-American Dialogue, February 6,

http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2855) TC










cooperation. Moreover, the US viewed the Colombia agreement—which formalized US access to several Colombian bases—as a replacementfor its continued use of Manta Air Base in Ecuador, which President Correa abrogated when the US lease on Manta ran out. Brazil’s disapproval

mobilized opposition to the US-Colombia pact from nearly every South American country. The impasse was resolved when the Colombian





Brazil says No – Mexico

Brazil wouldn’t help Mexico – competing economies

Leff 6/19/12 [Alex Leff, the Americas editor for GlobalPost, moving back to the US after being its CostaRica correspondent since the website's inception. Alex was also Costa Rica stringer for Reuters.

Previously the Tico Times online editor, Alex also contributed to such publications as Miami Herald,

Voice of San Diego and Americas Quarterly as well as appeared as commentator on BBC radio and CBC

television, “Mexico vs Brazil: Who’s winning?”, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-

blogs/chatter/mexico-vs-brazil-brics-emerging-economies-g20, PS]

Off the field, though, the countries are jockeying to outdo one another as Latin America’s economic

powerhouse, and it isn’t always so friendly.¶ By name, Brazil has a clear early lead. It branded the “B” in

BRICS — that nifty acronym for the world’s largest emerging economies, also including Russia, India,

China and South Africa. At the turn of the noughts, when the term was coined, Mexico's growth paled

in comparison.¶ But the club could one day make way for “M” (BRICMS?), for Mexico, host of world leaders attending this week’s Group

of 20 meeting. ¶ On Wednesday, not to be outdone, Brazil takes the stage hosting world leaders at the Rio+20 sustainable development

conference. ¶ Mexico could become a "developed nation" within 15 years, predicts Carlos Slim, theworld's richest man — a Mexican.¶ Last year Mexico’s economy grew faster than Brazil’s and this year

it looks set to do it again. Last week, the United Nations’ Latin America commission put 2012

economic growth for Mexico at 4 percent, and Brazil at just 2.7 percent. ¶ This year tensions mounted

between the two countries over Mexico’s rising auto exports to Brazil. In March, the former bowed to latter,

choosing to reduce its car sales to Brazil.¶ Reuters aptly pointed out:¶ “The dispute has undermined relations between

Latin America's top two economies and laid bare the differences between free-trade disciple Mexico

and Brazil, which is increasingly resorting to protectionist measures.”¶ Meanwhile, Mexico’s auto production and

exports of cars and trucks have hit record highs, Bloomberg reports.¶ But it’s not just cars. The New York Times says, “Mexican factories

are exporting record quantities of televisions, cars, computers and appliances, replacing some Chinese

imports in the United States.”¶

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/chatter/mexico-vs-brazil-brics-emerging-economies-g20







Destroys Relations

The plan will lead to an increased division – wrecks relations

Meiman and Rothkopf 3/11/09 [Kellie Meiman and David Rothkopf, Staff writers for Real ClearPolitics, “The United States and Brazil: Two perspectives on dealing with partnership and rivalry”,


It should be quickly added, of course, that each of these institutional rebuilding processes ¶ contains not just the seeds

for cooperation, but also the potential for fomenting greater ¶ division between the United States and

Brazil. As a developed and a developing country, ¶ it is only natural that the natural countries’ self -interests are at

odds on certain key issues. ¶ Similarly, as economic competitors—with regard to the production of

agricultural products for example— divisions are natural. The United States helped establish the status quo ¶ and is

served by it. Brazil must change that status quo in order to grow and evolve. ¶ The United States wants to limit the nuclear

club, while Brazil has among the most advanced ¶ peaceful nuclear programs in Latin America, even

though it has chafed at international ¶ inspections of its facilities in the past, and its president has scoffed at what he perceives as ¶ the

unfairness of the international nuclear regime. Security Council permanent members ¶ want to protect their prerogatives, outsiders want toshare them. The United States has a special role within organizations such as the World Bank or the Inter-

American Development ¶ Bank, Brazil wants a greater role commensurate with its changing stature.

Consequently, ¶ each of these issues is likely to create new tensions—or exacerbate old ones in the

relationship. The answer in the long run and the answer for diplomats seeking to minimize tension ¶ is the same; deals will be cut

and trade-offs will be made. The question for Brazil will be—is ¶ the United States acting in good faith to help us advance our

interests wherever it is not in ¶ direct conflict with theirs?

Brazil wouldn’t support the US


Politics, “The United States and Brazil: Two perspectives on dealing with partnership and rivalry”,http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/brazil.pdf, PS]

Any real or perceived interference in the region by the United States would greatly upset ¶ Brazil. If the

United States decided that heavy-handed political pressure or intervention ¶ were required in regard,

for example, to Venezuela, Bolivia, or Ecuador, this could put ¶ Brazil in an uncomfortable position

where it has to choose between the United States ¶ and its neighbors . Since Brazil has spent years arguing for

South American unity, it would ¶ likely choose its neighbors or—even more likely—choose to interject itself

as a third ¶ party with a third point of view.¶ If economic pressures forced President Chavez to play the old populist card of

going after ¶ the regional bogeyman the United States, then perhaps through a series of ever-increasing ¶ provocations—including expanding

his on-going flirtations with the Syrians, the Iranians, ¶ the Russians—this could get out of hand and be seen as a test for

the Obama administration that it could not shy away from. ¶ This hypothetical situation could become

a reality sooner than later. The recent referendum eliminating term limits for elected officials in Venezuela is a development thatcould ¶ eventually trigger some form of U.S. intervention—direct or indirect—in the country. ¶ Though Venezuela is a key supplier of oil to the

United States, putting the latter in a ¶ delicate position with regard to carrying out a more interventionist foreign policy, further ¶ consolidation

of power in the hands of Hugo Chavez could eventually lead the United ¶ States to adopt different tactics.







Relations Already High

US-Brazil relations are positive now—cooperation on an array of issues

Meyer 13 (Peter J., Analyst in Latin American Affairs, “Brazil-US Relations”, Congressional Research Center, February 27,

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf)

As its economy has grown to be the seventh largest in the world, Brazil has utilized its newfound ¶ economic power to consolidate its influence

in South America and play a larger role in ¶ international affairs. The Obama Administration’s National Security Strategy

recognizes Brazil as ¶ an emerging center of influence, and welcomes the country’s leadership on

bilateral, hemispheric, ¶ and global issues. U.S.-Brazil relations generally have been positive in recent

years, though ¶ Brazil has prioritized strengthening relations with neighboring countries and expanding ties with ¶ nontraditional partners in the

“developing South.” While some foreign policy disagreements have ¶ emerged, the United States and Brazil continue to

engage on issues such as security, energy, trade, ¶ human rights, and the environment.



Consult CPs Bad

Consult CPs are a VOTER:

1. There is an infinite amount of organizations, countries, etc. that the

USFG could consult —this kills predictability which is key to fair,

educational debates and in-round clash.

2. Aff research burden: it’s IMPOSSIBLE for the Affirmative to research all

of the possible agents that could be consulted and defend their plan

against these. This kills education.

3. Moots Aff offense—does the plan but adds consultation before the aff’s

implementation, they steal affirmative ground and offense, this kills all

aff ability to attack the counterplan.



“SHOULD” definition

Resolved does not require immediacy

OPTED 9 (Old Plain Text English Dictionary, a public domain English word list dictionary, “Definitions from The Online Plain Text Eng lish

Dictionary: Resolve” One Look Dictionary Search, 2009, http://www.onelook.com/?other=web1913&w=Resolve)

Resolve (v. i.) To form a purpose; to make a decision; especially, to determine after reflection ; as, to resolve on a

better course of life.

Should expresses probability

AHD 92 (American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 1992 (4ed); Pg. 1612)

Should—2. Used to express probability or expectation: They should arrive at noon.

“Should” means desirable --- this does not have to be a mandate

AC 99 (Atlas Collaboration, “Use of Shall, Should, May Can,” http://rd13doc.cern.ch/Atlas/DaqSoft/sde/inspect/shall.html)

shall¶ 'shall' describes something that is mandatory. If a requirement uses 'shall', then that requirement _will_ be satisfied

without fail. Noncompliance is not allowed. Failure to comply with one single 'shall' is sufficient reason to reject the entire product. Indeed, it

must be rejected under these circumstances. Examples: # "Requirements shall make use of the word 'shall' only where compliance is

mandatory." This is a good example. # "C++ code shall have comments every 5th line." This is a bad example. Using 'shall' here is too strong.¶

should¶ 'should' is weaker. It describes something that might not be satisfied in the final product, but

that is desirable enough that any noncompliance shall be explicitly justified. Any use of 'should' should be examined carefully, as it

probably means that something is not being stated clearly. If a 'should' can be replaced by a 'shall', or can be discarded entirely, so much the

better. Examples: # "C++ code should be ANSI compliant." A good example. It may not be possible to be ANSI compliant on all platforms, but we

should try. # "Code should be tested thoroughly." Bad example. This 'should' shall be replaced with 'shall' if this requirement is to be stated

anywhere (to say nothing of defining what 'thoroughly' means).

http://rd13doc.cern.ch/Atlas/DaqSoft/sde/inspect/shall.html




Consult Brazil Counterplan - Northwestern 2013 4WeekJuniors

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