DDI09 XO Counterplan Generic-2

7/31/2019 DDI09 XO Counterplan Generic-2

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XO CP and AFF answers Dartmouth 2K9 1

Executive Order CP****1NC****.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................3

..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................3

General 1NC...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................4

Generic 1NC...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................5

Nuke Terror Module............ ............ ............ ............ ........... ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ........... ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ........ ..

Heg Module (1/2)....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................7

Heg Module (2/2)....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................8

****Solvency****..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................9

Solvency--Funding................................................................................................................................................................................................................................10

SolvencyGeneric Reform...................................................................................................................................................................................................................1

Solvency-- Terrorism.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................12

SolvencyMilitary...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................13

SolvencyNew Agencies.....................................................................................................................................................................................................................14

SolvencyXOs are fast and effective....................................................................................................................................................................................................15

SolvencyXOs are fast.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................16****AT: Perm****...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................17

AT: Perm do both..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................18

AT: Perm do both (congressional actor).................................................................................................................................................................................................19

AT: Perm do both (court actor)..............................................................................................................................................................................................................20

AT: Perm do the CP (1/2)......................................................................................................................................................................................................................2

AT: Perm do the CP (2/2)......................................................................................................................................................................................................................22

****2NC PREZ POWERS****.............................................................................................................................................................................................................23

2NC EXTXO key to Prez Power (1/2)................................................................................................................................................................................................24

2NC EXTXO key to Prez Power (2/2)................................................................................................................................................................................................25

2NC EXTObamas Campaign Promises.............................................................................................................................................................................................26

2NC EXTPrez Powers (nukes)...........................................................................................................................................................................................................27

2NC EXTPrez Powers (heg)..............................................................................................................................................................................................................28

Impact CalculusPrez Powers (nukes)..................................................................................................................................................................................................29

Impact CalculusPrez Powers (heg).....................................................................................................................................................................................................30

AT: XOs dont increase Prez Powers......................................................................................................................................................................................................3

2NC EXTNuclear Terror Attack Impact.............................................................................................................................................................................................32

2NC EXTXOs key to Heg..................................................................................................................................................................................................................33

2NC EXT--XOs key to Heg...................................................................................................................................................................................................................34

****Normal Means****........................................................................................................................................................................................................................35

Normal MeansGeneric (1/2).................... ........... ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ........... ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ...... ...3

Normal MeansGeneric (2/2).................. ........... ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ........... ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ....... ....3

Normal MeansNatives.................. ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ........... ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ........... ..... ..... ..... ....3

Normal MeansCivil Rights................. ............ ............ ............ ............ ........... ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ........... ............ ........... ...3

Normal MeansEducation........... ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ........... ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ........ ..4

Normal MeansMedicare, Medicaid, unemployment insurance, social security................. ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ........... ............ ............ ............ ...... ....4

****AT: Rollback****..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................42

AT: Congress Rolls back.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................43

****Politics Shield****........................................................................................................................................................................................................................44

XO to politics....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................45

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XO link to politics.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................46

****Theory****...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................47

Agent CPs Good..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................48

Agent CPs Bad.....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................49

Severance Bad.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................50

Severance Perms Good..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................5

****AFF****.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................52

AFFXOs Government problems ....................................................................................................................................................................................................53

AFFXOsbigger problems................... ............ ............ ........... ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ........... ............ ............ ....... ..... ..... ....54

AFF--Supreme Court Rollback..............................................................................................................................................................................................................55

AFF--Congress Rollback.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................56

AFFNo Solvency Generic..................................................................................................................................................................................................................57

****AFF--Politics****.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................58

AFF--XO costs Pol Cap.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................59

AFF--XOs perceived by congress...........................................................................................................................................................................................................60

****AFF--Prez powers****..................................................................................................................................................................................................................6

2ACPrez Powers...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................62

AFFSOP ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................63

AFF-EXT--SOP Impact.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................64

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****1NC****

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General 1NC

TEXT: The President of the United States should

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Contention 1: Competition

A. Definitional: The means all parts theyre definitionally bound to defending all branchesMerriam-Webster'sOnline Collegiate Dictionary, No Date,http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionaryused as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole

B.

Contention 2: Net Benefit

Obama has to use his power to follow through on campaign promisesor hes going to lose it all.

Haque, Director of the Havas Media Lab, 2009Umair Haque, Director of the Havas Media Lab, How to Build (and Use) Thick Powerhttp://blogs.harvardbusiness.org/haque/2009/05/ power.html 5-21-09

He's ba-a-ack! Like a supervillain who's impossible to vanquish, Dick Cheney's moseyed on into town once again. What'sCheney's game? Simple: to utilize kryptonite to rob Obama of his superpower. Here's how next-generation strategy can

help Obama win Cheney's game instead. Obama's power is thick power. Thick power is a distant cousin of softpower. Like soft power, it is built by setting an example. When we can set an example that inspiresothers we are able to lead and others follow. In the right hands, and in the right context witnessObama upsetting both Hillary and McCain thick power is like having superpowers. But thick powerhas it's kryptonite. If you can be cowed, intimidated, bullied, or persuaded into backing away from yourprinciples, the example you set collapses. People no longer find it credible, and your ability to leadvanishes. The problem Obama has isn't Dick Cheney. Dick Cheney is irrelevant; he's just another evil old dude with(surprisingly fashionable) bad 80s glasses. Obama's real problem is staying true to his principles becausesetting an example is built on principles. Cheney's game is simple: to be Lex Luthor to Obama's Clark Kent.Cheney's goal is to dilute the thickness of Obama's power. How? By scaring and bullying Obama intobetraying his principles, so Obama can no longer lead by example. Cheney's game is about using the kryptoniteof compromise to rob Obama of his superpowers. Unfortunately, Obama's playing right into his hands, with moves like this.

What should Obama and every player who wants to utilize and grow thick power do instead? First: respondwith a restatement of principles. Obama shouldn't ignore Cheney entirely. Thick power means others count, especially

when they're evil because they give you a chance to put your principles in even starker contrast. Second: use it or loseit. That means: don't betray a single principle. How does thick power break? When one principle goes,the rest often collapse like dominoes because principles are mutually reinforcing elements of a largersystem of beliefs. Instead of betraying principles, double down, and begin employing them more fully

by, for example, investing in a Manhattan Project 2.0. Third: force the adversary to utilize thin power, setting acounter-example. Obama should call Cheney's bluffs because the best way to defuse thin power is to make people use it.Thin power is about controlling others and no one likes to be controlled. If Obama called Cheney's bluff, Cheney wouldbe forced to call on Republicans and my guess is more than one would refuse his call. Dick Cheney is one evil old dude

but the fact that he's missed the real point of thick power tells us he's not that smart. Thick power realizesincreasing returns: it builds alliances and allies create a powerful incentive to live up to yourprinciples, again amplifying the thickness of your power. See the awesome? We've come full circle to a keytheme: in a hyperconnected world, good (usually) beats evil. To win Cheney's game, all

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Generic 1NC

Use of executive order is key to maintaining presidential powers

Mayer 01

Kenneth R., Professor of political science at University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen :Executive Orders and Presidential Power, Princeton University Press, p.28-29, 2001This theoretical perspective offered by the new institutional economics literature provides a way of makingsense of the wide range of executive orders issued over the years, and is the centerpiece of my approach. Thecommon theme I find in significant executive orders is control: executive orders are an instrument of executivepower that presidents have used to control policy, establish and maintain institutions, shape agendas, manageconstituent relationships, and keep control of their political fate generally. 128 Within the boundaries set bystatute or the Constitution, presidents have consistently used their executive poweroften manifested inexecutive ordersto shape the institutional and political context in which they sit. There are, to be sure, limitson what presidents can do relying solely on executive orders and executive power, and presidents who push toofar will find that Congress and the courts will push back. Yet the president retains significant legal,

institutional, and political advantages that make executive authority a more powerful tool than scholars havethus far recognized. This emphasis on control allows for a longer-term view than that generally taken byinformal approaches to presidential leadership. I conclude that presidents have used executive orders to alterthe institutional and political contexts in which they operate. The effects of any one effort in this regard maynot be immediately apparent, and in many cases presidents succeed only after following up on what theirpredecessors have done. In this respect I view presidential leadership as both strategic and dynamic, aperspective that brings into sharper relief the utility of executive power to the presidency. I also differ withNeustadt on this score, as he looks at how presidents can be tactically effective within a particular structurecontext over which they have no control.


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Nuke Terror ModulePrez power key to stop nuclear terrorism

Taylor and Thomas, writers for Newsweek Magazine, 2009Stuart Taylor Jr and Evan Thomas, Writers for Newsweek Magazine, Obamas Cheney Dilemma 1-10-09

http://www.newsweek.com/id/178855In times of war and crisis, as presidents such as Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt discovered, the nation needs astrong chief executive. The flaw of the Bush-Cheney administration may have been less in what it didthan in the way it did itflaunting executive power, ignoring Congress, showing scorn for anyone whowaved the banner of civil liberties. Arguably, there has been an overreaction to the alleged arrogance andheedlessness of Bush and Cheneyespecially Cheney, who almost seemed to take a grim satisfaction in his Darth Vader-

esque image. The courts, at first slow to respond to arrogations of executive power after September 11,have pushed back. Many federal officials have grown risk-averse, fearing that they will be prosecuted ordragged before a congressional committee for fighting too hard against terrorism. (A growing number of CIAofficials buy insurance policies to cover legal fees.) Obama, who has been receiving intelligence briefings for weeks,already knows what a scary world it is out there. It is unlikely he will wildly overcorrect for the Bushadministration's abuses. A very senior incoming official, who refused to be quoted discussing internal policy debates,indicated that the new administration will try to find a middle road that will protect civil liberties without leaving the nationdefenseless. But Obama's team has some strong critics of the old order, including his choice for director of the CIA, Leon

Panetta, who has spoken out strongly against coercive interrogation methods. In Obama's spirit of nonpartisanship,the new crowd would do well to listen to Jack Goldsmith, formerly a Bush Justice Department official, now aHarvard Law School professor. At Justice, Goldsmith was the head ofan obscure but critically important unit calledthe Office of Legal Counsel. OLC acts as a kind of lawyer for the executive branch, offering opinionsclose tobindingon what the executive branch can and cannot do. It was an OLC lawyer, John Yoo, who in 2001 and2002 drafted many of the memos that first gave the Cheneyites permission to do pretty much whatever they wanted in theway of interrogating and detaining suspected terrorists (and eavesdropping on Americans to catch terrorists). Goldsmith,who became head of OLC in 2003, quietly began to revoke some of these permissions as illegal or unconstitutional. Therevolt of Goldsmith and some other principled Justice lawyers was a heroic story, kept secret at the time. Now

Goldsmith worries about the pendulum swinging too far, as it often does in American democracy. "Thepresidency has already been diminished in ways that would be hard to reverse" and may be losing itscapability to fight terrorism, he says. He argues that Americans should now be "less worried about anout-of-control presidency than an enfeebled one."

Nuclear Terrorism leads to global nuclear war, devastating the planet.

Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, political analyst for Al-Ahram Newspaper, 04Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Political Analyst for Al-Ahram Newspaper, Extinction! http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm, 8-2609

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would furtherexacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies

would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights,tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It wouldalso speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankindis to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third worldwar, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one sidetriumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects thewhole planet, we will all be losers.

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Heg Module (1/2)

Presidential powers key to solving numerous global problems and preserving hegemony

Deans 2k(Bob Deans, The American Presidency: White House Power Growing, The Atlanta Journal Constitution,1/23/00)Yet the U.S. presidency, long regarded as the most powerful institution in the world, arguably has assumedmore authority and reach than at any time in its history. While no one can doubt the growing impact of theInternet, Silicon Valley and Wall Street on the daily lives of all Americans, only the president can rally trulyglobal resources around American ideals to further the quest for equality and to combat the timeless ills ofpoverty and war. It is that unique ability to build and harness a worldwide consensus that is widening the

circle of presidential power. ''The presidency will remain as important as it is or will become more important,'predicted presidential scholar Michael Nelson, professor of political science at Rhodes College in Memphis, TennThe voice of all Americans The taproot of presidential power is the Constitution, which designates the chief

executive, the only official elected in a national vote, as the sole representative of all the American peopleThat conferred authority reflects the state of the nation, and it would be hard to argue that any country in historyhas possessed the military, economic and political pre-eminence that this country now holds. And yet, thenation's greatest strength as a global power lies in its ability to build an international consensus around

values and interests important to most Americans. On Clinton's watch, that ability has been almost constantlyon display as he has patched together multinational responses to war in the Balkans, despotism in Haiti, economiccrises in Mexico, Russia, Indonesia and South Korea, and natural disasters in Turkey and Venezuela. Theinstitutions for putting together coalition-type action --- the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organizationamong them --- are hardly tools of American policy. But the United States commands a dominant, in some

cases decisive, position in each of those institutions. And it is the president, far more than Congress, who

determines how the United States wants those institutions to be structured and to perform. ''Congress is aclunky institution of 535 people that can't negotiate as a unit with global corporations or entities,'' said AlanEhrenhalt, editor of It is the president, indeed, who appoints envoys to those institutions, negotiates the treatiesthat bind them and delivers the public and private counsel that helps guide them, leaving the indelible imprint ofAmerican priorities on every major initiative they undertake. ''That means, for example, that we can advance ourinterests in resolving ethnic conflicts, in helping address the problems of AIDS in Africa, of contributing to

the world's economic development, of promoting human rights, '' Governing magazine. ''It's the presidentwho is capable ofmaking deals with global institutions.'' said Emory University's Robert Pastor, editor of a new book, ''A Century's Journey,'' that elaborates onthe theme.

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Heg Module (2/2)U.S. hegemony prevents nuclear warKhalilizad 95

(Zalmay Khalilizad, director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program @ RAND & former US Ambassador to Afghanistan "Losing theMoment? The United States and the World After the Cold War," Washington Quarterly, Spring, Proquest)

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a globalrival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principleand vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United Statesexercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open andmore receptive to American values understood as democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such aworld would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclearproliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadershipwould help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoidanother global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership

would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

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****Solvency****

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Solvency--Funding

Presidents have discretionary spending to fund their objectives.Pika 02

(Joseph A Pika, John Anthony Maltese, and Norman Thomas, professors of political science, The Politics of thePresidency, 5th edition, p. 233)

In addition to budgeting, presidents have certain discretionary spending powers that increase their leverageover the bureaucracy. They have substantial nonstatutory authority, based on understandings withcongressional appropriations committees, to transfer funds within an appropriation and from oneprogram to another. The committees expect to be kept informed of such "reprogramming" actions.81 Fund transferauthority is essential to sound financial management, but it can be abused to circumvent congressionaldecisions. In 1970, for example, Nixon transferred funds to support an extensive unauthorized covert military operation inCambodia. Nevertheless, Congress has given presidents and certain agencies the authority to spendsubstantial amounts of money on a confidential basis, the largest and most controversial of which are forintelligence activities.

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SolvencyGeneric Reform

Executive Orders have empirically led to social reform.

LeRoy, Professor for the University of Illinois, 96Michael LeRoy, Associate Professor for the Institute of Labor & Industrial Relations and College of Law, University of Illinois,

Presidential Regulation of Private Employment: Constitutionality of Executive Order 12954 Debarment of Contractors who HirePermanent Striker Replacements LexisNexus.com 3-02

Second, many of these orders served as models for legislation. As a result of their experimentation, theyoccasionally provided Congress with blueprints for workable and politically feasible legislation . Thisexplains in part why Congress initially focused on race discrimination in enacting the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Presidential

orders had focused on this form of discrimination since 1941 and therefore developed a lengthy track record. It is notablethat every employment discrimination law regarding race, gender, age, and disability followed ratherthan preceded a related executive order.

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Solvency-- Terrorism

Presidential powers key for effective counter-terrorism

Lansford and Pauly 03

Tom Lansford, assistant professor of political science, University of Southern Mississippi, Gulf Coast Campus.Robert J. Pauly, Jr., adjunct professor of history and political Science at Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont,and Midlands Technical College.http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_04/06/lansfordpauly_exec/lansfordpauly_exec.html

Furthermore, American foreign policy is rooted in the notion of the sole organ theory which holds that thepresident is the sole source of foreign and security policy.15 This theory has served as the underpinning forthe dramatic twentieth-century expansion of executive power. For instance, the Supreme Court decisionUnited States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation (1936) gave executive agreements the weight of law (and

thereby bypassed the senatorial approval required of treaties), while Goldwater v. Carter (1979) confirmedthe ability of the president to withdraw from international treaties without congressional consent.16 The

result of this concentration of power has been the repeated presidential use of the U.S. military throughoutthe nations history without a formal congressional declaration of war and an increased preference by both

the executive and the legislature for such actions.17 One feature of this trend was consistency in U.S.

foreign policy, especially during the Cold War era. Even during periods when the United States experienceddivided government, with the White House controlled by one political party and all or half of the Congresscontrolled by the party in opposition, the executive was able to develop and implement foreign and security policywith only limited constraints.18 Given the nature of the terrorist groups that attacked the United States on 11September 2001, such policy habits proved useful since a formal declaration of war was seen as problematic interms of the specific identification of the foe and the ability of the Bush administration to expand combat

operations beyond Afghanistan to countries such as Iraq.

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http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_04/06/lansfordpauly_exec/lansfordpauly_exec.htmlhttp://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_04/06/lansfordpauly_exec/lansfordpauly_exec.html


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SolvencyMilitary

XOs can solve military actions

Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of the

Charles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the NationaAssociation of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration 2

Phillip J. Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of theCharles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association ofSchools of Public Affairs and Administration. By Order of the President: The Use & Abuse of Executive DirectAction pg.33 University Press of Kansas, 2002

Among the standard executive orders issued by each administration is a variety of actions concerningmilitary personel including adjustments of rates of pay and allowances for the uniform services andamendments to the manual for court marshall. Particularly during periods of heightened national securityactivity, orders are regularly used to transfer responsibility, people or resources from one part of the government

to the military or the reverse. Many orders have been used to manage public lands, but it is often notrecognized that frequently the lands are part of military reservations or sites. In fact, many of the ordersissued by presidents in time of war or national emergency are very focused actions of this sort. Even inpeace time there are manifold organizational issues to detail for statuettes but that require action beyondthe Department ofDefense. President Clintons order of succession of officers to act as secretary of the army is a typicalexample. (pg. 33)

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SolvencyNew Agencies

XOs fund new agencies


Charles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the Nationa

Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration 2Phillip J. Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of theCharles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association ofSchools of Public Affairs and Administration. By Order of the President: The Use & Abuse of Executive DirectAction pg.30 University Press of Kansas, 2002

Even so, many presidents have taken it upon themselves to create new agencies, eliminate existing organizations,and reorganize others by executive order with or without congressional approval. Louis Fisher points out that therewas so much of this activity during the New Deal that the Senator Richard Russell sponsored legislation toprevent the use of executive orders to create new agencies without legislative support and requiring that fundscould not be used to support such an agency for more than one year in order to give Congress authority to considerthe action and to give or withhold its consent . According to Fisher, Although Russell was a Democrat, like Roosevelt, he said that the President wasnot vested: with one scintilla of authority to create by an Executive Order an action agency of Government withoutthe approval of Congress of the United States. Reviewing the language of one of Roosevelts executibe orders, Russell concluded that it has not aleg to stand on or even a finger with which to catch hold of anything. (p30)

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SolvencyXOs are fast and effective

XOs are easy, fast, and convenient at passing significant policies




Executive orders are often used because they are quick, convenient, and relatively easy mechanisms formoving significant policy initiatives. Though it is certainly true that executive orders are employed for symbolicpurposes, enough has been said by now to demonstrate that they are also used for serious executive branch agencies underthe authority of the orders. Unfortunately, as is true of legislation, it is not always possible to know from the title of orderswhich are significant and which are not, particularly since presidents will often use an existing order as a base for actionand then change it in ways that make it far more significant than its predecessors.

The relative ease of the use of an order does not merely arise from the fact that presidents may employone to avoid the cumbersome and time-consuming legislative process. They may also use this device toavoid sometimes equally time-consuming administrative procedures, particularly the rulemakingprocesses required by the Administrative procedures, particularly the rulemaking processes required bythe Administrative Procedure Act. Because those procedural requirements do not apply to the president, it istempting for executive branch agencies to seek assistance from the White House to enact by executiveorder that which might be difficult for the agency itself to move through the process. Moreover, there isthe added plus from the agencys perspective that it can be considerably more difficult for potentialadversaries to obtain to launch a legal challenge to the presidents order than it is to move an agency ruleto judicial review. There is nothing new about the practice of generating executive orders outside theWhite House. President Kennedys executive order on that process specifically provides for orders

generated elsewhere. (59)

XOs create momentum for a new administrationCooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of the Charles Levin Award given bythe American Society for Public Administration and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration 2


Executive orders can also be used to hit quickly with policies aimed at important problems, providing a

strong and immediate sense of momentum for a new administration. These messages are sent to reassurean administrations supporters that the issue positions for which they campaigned are going to be actedupon. In the case of symbolic order, which are often used for this purpose, the reward can be given toallies without a serious commitment of political resources in Congress, legal resources in administrativerulemaking, or financial resources in Congress, legal resources in administrative rulemaking, or financialresources associated with building really substantive programs. They also serve to send a message topotential adversaries that the administration is truly in charge and moving. Those seeking to mobilizeopposition in such conditions find themselves reactive and defensive. (69)

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SolvencyXOs are fast

XOs are quick and useful when there is a short timeframe




Executive orders are particularly useful to address specific problems or temporary situations when thereis no time for legislation. It is not always necessary to declare an emergency in order to take such actions, but it is in anadministrations best interest to rescind the orders as soon as the emergency or special situation passes. They are usefulto institute investigations or studies aimed at future policymaking in a way that can calm politicallytroubled waters without committing the administration to any particular course of action. To point this out isnot to support the cynical use of such commissions, but there have been any number of important commissions that led tosignificant policy development. (pg 69)

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****AT: Perm****

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AT: Perm do both

Permutation does not solve- political micromanagement cripples policy, weakens public confidence in

government

Dilulio, Analyst for the Brookings Institute, 93John Dilulio Analyst for the Brookings Institute, Improving Government Performance 1993 www.brookings.com/improvegov.html

Political micromanagement and the mismatch of governments tools with its problems have crippledpublic management, increased government inefficiency, and impeded performance. Perhaps worst of all,they have provoked a widespread distrust of the American system: by elected officials, who cannot understand whyadministrators do not produce better results; by administrators, who complain about constant interference by elected officials as they try to do their jobs; and

by citizens, who curse elected officials and administrators both for squabbling among themselves and for overlooking why they are there to begin with.

Anything except the Executive Branch acting alone creates a government where the court reigns supreme

through tyranny

Paulson, Associate Law Professor, 93Michael Stokes Paulson, Associate Professor of Law at University of Minnesota Law School, The Merryman Power And The

Dilemma Of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, Cardozo Law Review, v.15, 10-93Lincoln's words upon becoming President in his First Inaugural strike the same theme even more strongly:

The candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government, upon vital questions, affecting the whole people,is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, ... the people will have ceased to be theirown rulers, having, to that extent, practically resigned their government, into the hands of that eminenttribunal. Not only does a judicial decision not bind the executive and the legislature in makingsubsequent policy, Lincoln argued, but the contrary suggestion, that the political branches must acquiescein Supreme Court judgments as supplying the rule governing all their actions, is inconsistent with democraticself-government: "the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned theirGovernment" to the judiciary. Lincoln was thus a vigorous advocate of what we today would call "nonacquiescence."

We must reject every instance of tyranny

Petro, Law Professor, 1974Sylvester Petro, Professor of Law at Wake Forest University, Toledo Law Review, 1974

It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once. Thus it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedomis of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism and theend of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhensyn. Ask Milovan Dijilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value and the proper

ordering any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare,then every invasion of freedom must be empathicallyidentified and resisted with an undying spirit.

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AT: Perm do both (congressional actor)

The perm still links to the D/A, only unilateral executive action solves the DA.

Moe and Howell, Fellow for the Hoover Institution and Harvard Professor, 99Terry M. Moe and William G. Howell, senior fellow for the Hoover Institution and Associate Professor for the GovernmenDepartment at Harvard University, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A theory, LexisNexus.com 12-99

If the president had the power to act unilaterally in this same situation, as depicted in Figure 1B, things wouldturn out much more favorably. He would not have to accept Congress's shift in policy from [SQ.sub.2] to[SQ.sub.2*] and could take action on his own to move the status quo from [SQ.sub.2*] to V--using his veto toprevent any movement away from this point. V would be the equilibrium outcome (as it was in the earlier case ofunilateral action). And although the president would still lose some ground as policy moves from the original [SQ.sub.2] to

V, unilateral action allows him to keep policy much closer to his ideal point--and farther from Congress's idealpoint--than would otherwise have been the case. He clearly has more power over outcomes when he canact unilaterally.

Turn: the Perm destroys prez powers, making the perm the least attractive option.Bellia, Law Professor at Notre Dame, 02Patricia L Bellia, Associate Law Professor for Notre Dame Law School, Executive power in Youngstowns shadowsLexisNexus.com, 02

Justice Jackson suggested that presidential powers "are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon theirdisjunction or conjunction with those of Congress." (59) He offered the following grouping ofpresidential actions and their legal consequences: 1. When the President acts pursuant to an express orimplied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in hisown right plus all that Congress can delegate. 2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressionalgrant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of

twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution isuncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practicalmatter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test ofpower is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of

law. 3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress,his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus anyconstitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a caseonly by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. (60)

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AT: Perm do both (court actor)

Unilateral Presidential Action is key, the Executive branch works best when the courts shut up.

Bellia, Law Professor at Notre Dame, 02Patricia L Bellia, Associate Law Professor for Notre Dame Law School, Executive power in Youngstowns shadowsLexisNexus.com, 02

To the extent that Justice Jackson's approach suggests that law has little role to play when Congress is silent, that approach

contains the seeds of a misplaced political question doctrine, allowing courts to skirt questions of executive powereven when other justiciability requirements are met. Once this route of judicial deference is open, it is alltoo tempting for courts to follow it--not only when Congress is silent, but when the President's conductconflicts with congressional policy. In short, courts tend to avoid exploring the President's constitutional foreignaffairs powers--express or implied--instead finding congressional authorization in questionable circumstances or simplyassuming that presidential action should stand as long as Congress is silent. This failure to develop a coherent theoryof presidential power, I argue, has an impact far beyond the specific questions about the distribution ofpowers in the few separation of powers cases that courts actually face. Executive Branch lawyers

regularly encounter complicated questions about the President's foreign affairs power. To the extent thatcourts' consideration of executive power questions would limit the acceptable and persuasive forms ofargument available to the Executive Branch, courts' silence compromises one of the most effectiverestraints on executive conduct. And to the extent that courts' consideration of executive power questions wouldaffirm the Executive Branch's mode of analysis, courts' silence unnecessarily prompts others to doubt the legitimacy ofExecutive Branch views.

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AT: Perm do the CP (1/2)

1. Congress appropriates funding for social serviceshttp://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/bill-categories/social-services/

Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 - Title I: Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency andRelated Provisions - Subtitle A: Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency - Amendspart A (General Provisions) of title XI ofthe Social Security Act (SSA) to direct the Commissioner of Social Security to establish a Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency Program (TWSSP) under which a disabled beneficiary may use a TWSSP ticket issued by the Commissionerto obtain employment, vocational rehabilitation services, or other support services, pursuant to an appropriateindividual beneficiary work plan that meets specified requirements. Includes among such requirements goals forearnings and job advancement, at the Commissioner's expense, from a participating employment network, public orprivate. Allows State agencies administering or supervising the administration of the State plan under title I of theRehabilitation Act of 1973 to elect to participate as an employment network. Sets forth requirements applicable toagreements between State agencies and employment networks. Describes employment network payment systems, includingan outcome payment system and an outcome-milestone payment system.

(Sec. 101) Provides that during any period for which an individual is using a TWSSP ticket, the Commissioner and anyapplicable State agency may not initiate a continuing disability or similar review to determine whether the individual is oris not disabled.

Requires payments to employment networks: (1) out of the social security trust funds in the case of SSA title II (Old Age,Survivors and Disability Insurance) (OASDI) disability beneficiaries who return to work; or (2) from the appropriation formaking Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payments under SSA title XVI, in the case of SSI disability beneficiaries whoreturn to work.

Establishes within the Social Security Administration the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Advisory Panel to advise thePresident, the Congress, and the Commissioner with respect to TWSSP work incentive issues, and those issues underOASDI, SSI, Medicare (SSA title XVIII), and Medicaid (SSA title XIX) as well. Authorizes appropriations.

Subtitle B: Elimination of Work Disincentives - Amends SSA titles II and XVI (Procedural and General Provisions) toprescribe specified measures designed to eliminate work disincentives. Prohibits review of an individual's disability statuson the basis of work activity. Provides for expedited reinstatement of entitlement to OASDI or of eligibility for SSIdisability benefits.

Subtitle C: Work Incentives Planning, Assistance, and Outreach - Amends SSA title XI part A to direct the Commissionerto establish a community-based work incentives outreach program for disabled beneficiaries that includes technicalassistance to organizations and entities designed to encourage disabled beneficiaries to return to work.

(Sec. 121) Authorizes appropriations for FY 2000 through 2004.

(Sec. 122) Authorizes the Commissioner to make certain minimum payments in each State to the protection and advocacysystem established under the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act for the purpose of providingservices to disabled beneficiaries, services which may include advocacy, or other services that such a beneficiary may needto secure or regain gainful employment. Authorizes appropriations for FY 2000 through 2004.

Title II: Expanded Availability of Health Care Services - Amends SSA title XIX to provide for expanding StateMedicaid options for workers with disabilities, including options to: (1) eliminate income, assets, and resource limitationsfor workers with disabilities who buy into Medicaid; and (2) provide opportunity for employed individuals with a medicallyimproved disability to make such a buy. Provides that Federal funds paid to a State for Medicaid payments may notgenerally be used to supplant the level of State funds expended for a fiscal year for programs to enable working disabledindividuals to work.

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AT: Perm do the CP (2/2)

(Sec. 202) Amends SSA title II to extend the period ofMedicare coverage for OASDI disability insurance beneficiaries.

Directs the Comptroller General to report to Congress on specified consequences of such extension.

(Sec. 203) Directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to: (1) award grants to eligible States to supportestablishment of State infrastructures to support working disabled individuals as well as to enable Stateoutreach campaigns on infrastructure existence; and (2) submit a recommendation to specified congressional committees onwhether such grant program should be continued after FY 2010. Makes appropriations for FY 2000 through 2011.

2. Perm do the CP is severance because it does not have congress acting. Severance is a voting issue:

If you have to take out part of the plan, the CP competes

a. Moving Target bad- They avoid clash and change the debate by severing out of DA links and the

CPs net benefits- huge time and strat skew, we base our 1NC strat off of the plan text.

b. This allows the affirmative to just advocate the CP in the 2AC, they have to win CPs are bad to win

the perm

c. Kills education- they can avoid any clash in policy comparison

d. The perm isnt an advocacy, if you sever its no longer a test of competetiveness

e. If aff can advocate the perm, they no longer have to be topical.

f. Voter for Fairness

[SDI Theory]

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****2NC PREZ POWERS****

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2NC EXTXO key to Prez Power (1/2)

XOs increase presidential power

Kreider, Political Science Dept of Wilkes U, 06Kyle Kreider, Political Science Department of Wilkes University, Review of Executive Orders and the Modern Presidency

Legislating from the Oval Office http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/warber0606.htm, 6-06

Warber concludes with a cursory examination of President George W. Bushs use of executive ordersand some thoughts on where future research should go. While his political opponents and somemembers of the media criticize President Bush for his penchant for acting unilaterally (in both domestic andforeign affairs), expanding the powers of the presidency, and sometimes bypassing the expertise found inCongress, the results demonstrate that Bush has not significantly departed from previous presidentsregarding the types and quantity of executive orders that he issued during his first term (p.124). However,what has been different under President Bush is his willingness to change existing public policy by revoking, superseding,or amending executive orders made by previous presidents. Yearly averages show President Bush to be second only toPresident Carter in revising inherited executive orders.

Executive Orders increase presidential power, and are faster than congressional legislation.

Gale Group, 06Gale Group, President assumes arbitrary power http://www.thefreelibrary.com/President+assumes+arbitrary+power-a01473895802006

Obviously, the office of president is becoming more powerful almost daily. There seems to be little or norestraint holding back the nation's chief executive. Presidents have for years taken the nation to war even though the

Constitution clearly grants such life-and-death power solely to Congress. If a president feels the need to assert hiswill, he simply issues an executive order, has it published in the Federal Register and, bingo, he gets hisway.

Even if they win executive orders are controversial, they are critical to increasing positive prez power

Alissa C. Wetzel J.D. Candidate, Valparaiso University School of Law, 8

(Alissa C. Wetzel, NOTE: BEYOND THE ZONE OF TWILIGHT: HOW CONGRESS AND THE COURT CAN MINIMIZE THEDANGERS AND MAXIMIZE THE BENEFITS OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS. Valparaiso University Law Review Fall, 2007 42 Val.U.L. Rev. 385)

For two centuries, executive orders have allowed Presidents to exercise enormous power. At times, thatpower has been used to implement important measures to advance the country. At other times, executiveorders have bred scandal and national shame. Upon closer examination of200 years of Constitutionaldialogue among the three branches of government concerning how much unilateral power a Presidentought to have, however, it becomes clear that although executive orders may appear tyrannical based onthe broad power they afford Presidents, in practice executive orders are useful tools of the Presidency,able to be checked by Congressional oversight and controlled by the Court. If correctly wielded, such Congressionaland judicial oversight can guarantee that executive orders will not allow Presidents to become the

despots so feared by the founding generation. Instead, by moving out of the zone of twilight andexercising proper oversight Congress and the Court can ensure that the President is able to [*430]administer the executive branch effectively, pass measures quickly, and occasionally rise above politicaldivisions and do the right thing.

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2NC EXTXO key to Prez Power (2/2)

XO key to prez powers

Gilman, Prof of law, 7Michele Estrin Gilman. Associate Professor and Director, Civil Advocacy Clinic, University of Baltimore School of Law. J.D,

University of Michigan Law School, IF AT FIRST YOU DON'T SUCCEED, SIGN AN EXECUTIVE ORDER: PRESIDENT BUSHAND THE EXPANSION OF CHARITABLE CHOICE, William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal April, 2007)

15 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 1103

The case study of the CCEOs suggests that one way to think about the President's powers within the zoneof twilight is to focus on efficiency and accountability, which are, after all, the underlying reasons forand benefits of having a unitary executive. Purely theoretical contentions about the virtues or vices of aunitary executive make untested assumptions about these constitutional values . n584 By contrast, theCCEOs demonstrate that we cannot presume that the President serves these values when he engages inpolicymaking. n585 Yet where these values are furthered, we have less to fear from presidentialpolicymaking and more confidence that the President is taking care that the laws are faithfully executed

pursuant to some norm other than his personal preferences. Moreover, putting some boundaries on thezone of twilight would make exercises of presidential power more transparent because the Presidentwould have to articulate a basis for his actions. In turn, the President's rationale could be judged on itsmerits, rather than forcing courts to engage in an often fruitless search for legislative intent that usuallyresults in the aggrandizement of executive power. In searching for a line between presidential lawmakingand gap- filling we should not forget that the Framers of the Constitution have given us valuablebenchmarks by which to judge presidential action. We best serve both original understandings and modernrealities by returning to the touchstones of accountability and efficiency.

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2NC EXTObamas Campaign Promises

The Entrenched double standards that the US has created for itself means that it will be hard for Obama to

secure all weapon materials, means that Obama must spend power to pass his plan.

Krieger, member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 03David Krieger, member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Is a Nuclear 9/11 in Our Future? 10-6-03http://www.wagingpeace.org/ articles/2003/10/06_krieger_nuclear-911.htm

The great difficulty in preventing a nuclear 9/11 is that it will require ending the well-entrenched nucleardouble standards that the US and other nuclear weapons states have lived by throughout the Nuclear Age.Preventing nuclear terrorism in the end will not be possible without a serious global program to eliminatenuclear weapons and control nuclear materials that could be converted to weapons.

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2NC EXTPrez Powers (nukes)

If Obama doesnt use his presidential powers now to secure nuclear weapon materials, the promise wont

be fulfilled. Extend Buel in 8 saying that leads to nuclear war.

Obama needs to use executive orders to get prez power, thats Taylor and Thomas. Lack of prez power

means securing nuclear weapons wont get passed. Empirical evFarley, writer for the LA Times, 05Maggie Farley, Writer for the Los Angeles Times, Entrenched stands threaten nuclear nonproliferation conferencehttp://seattletimes. nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2002260984_nuke03.html 5-3-05

At a key U.N. disarmament conference yesterday, the United States lashed out at Iran and North Korea for theirpurported pursuit of atomic weapons and demanded that Iran dismantle its uranium-enrichment facilities. But Iransaid it had an "inalienable right" to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and might restart its once-secret nuclear-energy program. The entrenched conflicts may set up the conference for failure, diplomats said.

Obama cannot waver on campaign issues lest he show the wrong signal.

Editorial, the Globe and Mail, 09Editorial, The Globe and Mail, The Rule of Law Prevails http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/ docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T7026846164&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T7026846168&cisb=22_T7026846167&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=303830&docNo=4, 1-23-09

By acting swiftly in announcing that he would close the prison for suspected terrorists at GuantanamoBay, Cuba, within a year, President Barack Obama vindicated the rule of law. Any wavering - bydeclaring that he needed to know who would be tried, and how, and what would happen with the others -would have sent exactly the wrong signal.

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2NC EXTPrez Powers (heg)

Presidential leadership is necessary for preventing multiple scenarios of hotspot nuclear war

South China Morning Post 00,

(December 11, 2008, found at LexisNexis Academic Database)

A weak president with an unclear mandate is bad news for the rest of the world. For better or worse, the personwho rules the United States influences events far beyond the shores of his own country. Both the global economyand international politics will feel the effect of political instability in the US. The first impact will be on Americanfinancial markets, which will have a ripple effect on markets and growth across the world. A weakened USpresidency will also be felt in global hotspots across the world. The Middle East, the conflict between India andPakistan, peace on the Korean peninsula, and even the way relations between China and Taiwan play out, will beinfluenced by the authority the next US president brings to his job. There are those who would welcome a

weakening of US global influence. Many Palestinians, for example, feel they would benefit from a lessinterventionist American policy in the Middle East. Even within the Western alliance, there are those who wouldprobably see opportunities in a weakened US presidency. France, for example, might feel that a less assertive USmight force the European Union to be more outward looking. But the dangers of having a weak, insecure USpresidency outweigh any benefits that it might bring. US global economic and military power cannot be wishedaway. A president with a shaky mandate will still command great power and influence, only he will beconstrained by his domestic weakness and less certain about how to use his authority. This brings with it the risksof miscalculation and the use of US power in a way that heightens conflict. There are very few conflicts in theworld today which can be solved without US influence. The rest of the world needs the United States to use itspower deftly and decisively.

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Impact CalculusPrez Powers (nukes)

Presidential powers is the biggest impact in the round

A. Magnitudepresidential leadership is necessary to prevent ___________________________

_________________________________________________________________________________

B. Probabilitythe President is key to formulating international coalitions and galvanizing efforts towardsresolutions to problems. The president is the image of the United States, Congress is too large to fulfill thePresidents role

C. Timeframethe decline of presidential leadership would lead to a fracturing of the world community Theperception of a strong president gives the perception of a resolved America, loss of that perception causes a quickslide to our impacts

D. Turns Case

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Impact CalculusPrez Powers (heg)

Presidential powers is the biggest impact in the round

A. Magnitudepresidential leadership is necessary to prevent multiple nuclear wars across the planet and isuniquely key to solve global crises, such as economic collapse and disease, thats Deans

B. Probabilitythe President is key to formulating international coalitions and galvanizing efforts towardsresolutions to problems. The president is the image of the United States, Congress is too large to fulfill thePresidents role

C. Timeframethe decline of presidential leadership would lead to a fracturing of the world community Theperception of a strong president gives the perception of a resolved America, loss of that perception causes a quickslide to our impacts

D. Turns Case

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AT: XOs dont increase Prez Powers

1. Extend Taylor and Thomas in 9 specifying Obamas nonpartisanship as the reason his XO is key to his

prez power.

2. And, each executive order expands Presidential Powers, thats Mayer in 1.

3. President can strategically act to expand powers of the executive branch via unilateral policies with little

opposition from the other branches

Moe and Howell 99

(Terry M and William G., senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and Associate Professor in the Government Department at Harvard

University, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A theory,Presidential Studies Quarterly 29.4, December 1999)

Shorn of its details, the argument we offer here is pretty simple. Presidents have incentives to expand theirinstitutional power, and they operate within a formal governance structure whose pervasive ambiguities--combined with advantages inherent in the executive nature of the presidential job--give them countlessopportunities to move unilaterally into new territory, claim new powers, and make policy on their own authority.Congress has only a weak capacity for stopping them, because its collective action problems render it ineffectiveand subject to manipulation. The Supreme Court is capable of taking action against presidents, but is unlikely towant to most of the time and has incentives to be sympathetic. This does not mean that presidents are uncheckedin their quest for power. They can only push Congress or the Court so far before these institutions react, so thereare constraints on how far presidents can go. They will moderate their actions accordingly. Moreover, presidents

are political animals, and this is an important check in itself on what they are willing to do. Generally speaking,they want to take actions that are popular, and they know that bold action in one realm of policy could havepolitical repercussions that undermine the presidential agenda in other realms. Thus, even if presidents figure theycan take unilateral actions that will go unchecked by Congress or the Court, they may often decide not to move onthem or to take much smaller steps than their defacto powers would allow. The grander picture, then, is not one ofpresidents running roughshod over Congress and the Court to dominate the political system. Rather, it is a pictureof presidents who move strategically and moderately to promote their imperialistic designs--and do sosuccessfully over time, gradually shifting the balance of power in their favor.

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2NC EXTNuclear Terror Attack Impact

Not only would a Nuclear Terrorist Attack be horrific, the economic implications would only exacerbate

the situation.

Diamond, Writer for USA Today, 08John Diamond, Writer for USA Today, A financial apocalypse isnt nearly as scary as a nuclear one http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/returnTo.do?returnToKey=20_T7019638019 10-9-08

As the Saga Foundation -- a non-profit organization focused on the threat of terrorism involving weapons of massdestruction -- argued in a recent white paper, the vast damage at and around a nuclear ground zero wouldbe dwarfed in scope by the national and global economic aftershocks. These aftershocks would stem notonly from the explosion itself but also from a predictable set of decisions a president would almostcertainly have to make in grappling with the possibility of a follow-on attack. Assuming, as the expertsbelieve likely, that such a weapon would have to be smuggled into the country, the president could beexpected to close the nation's borders, halt all freight commerce and direct a search of virtually anymoving conveyance that could transport a nuclear weapon. Most manufacturing would then cease. In a

nation that lives on just-in-time inventory, these developments could empty the nation's shelves in days.The effects of post-attack decision-making go far beyond this example. If U.S. intelligence determinedthat one or more countries had somehow aided and abetted the attack, we would face the prospect of full-scale war. Even short of that, the nation would demand, and the president would almost certainly order, alevel of retaliation at the suspected locus of the attacking group that would dwarf the post-9/11 militaryresponse. The possibility of follow-on attacks could transform our notions of civil liberties and freedomforever. And as former 9/11 Commission co-chairman Lee Hamilton has pointed out, a nuclear terrorist attackwould prompt a collapse in public faith in the government's ability to protect the American people. Thinkyour 401(k) hurts now? The presidential nominees, and the American people, should reconsider the tendency to view these

two issues -- economic crisis and the threat of catastrophic terrorism -- as separate problems. A nuclear attack on aU.S. city would not only devastate the target and kill possibly hundreds of thousands, it would also createinstantaneous national and global economic ripple effects with incalculable consequences. To put it inpersonal terms, if you think things are tough in the nation's financial sector now, imagine what your401(k) -- or your paycheck -- might look like six months after a nuclear detonation in Lower Manhattanor downtown Washington. Saga's study merely began what must become a much larger-scale effort to understand inthe fullest detail possible the consequences of an act of nuclear terrorism, not only the attack itself but also the decisionsthat would almost certainly follow. The idea is not to depress people but to motivate them.

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2NC EXTXOs key to HegNot only would a Nuclear Terrorist Attack be horrific, the economic implications would only exacerbate

the situation.

Diamond, Writer for USA Today, 08John Diamond, Writer for USA Today, A financial apocalypse isnt nearly as scary as a nuclear one http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/returnTo.do?returnToKey=20_T7019638019 10-9-08

As the Saga Foundation -- a non-profit organization focused on the threat of terrorism involving weapons of massdestruction -- argued in a recent white paper, the vast damage at and around a nuclear ground zero wouldbe dwarfed in scope by the national and global economic aftershocks. These aftershocks would stem notonly from the explosion itself but also from a predictable set of decisions a president would almostcertainly have to make in grappling with the possibility of a follow-on attack. Assuming, as the expertsbelieve likely, that such a weapon would have to be smuggled into the country, the president could beexpected to close the nation's borders, halt all freight commerce and direct a search of virtually anymoving conveyance that could transport a nuclear weapon. Most manufacturing would then cease. In anation that lives on just-in-time inventory, these developments could empty the nation's shelves in days.The effects of post-attack decision-making go far beyond this example. If U.S. intelligence determined

that one or more countries had somehow aided and abetted the attack, we would face the prospect of full-scale war. Even short of that, the nation would demand, and the president would almost certainly order, alevel of retaliation at the suspected locus of the attacking group that would dwarf the post-9/11 militaryresponse. The possibility of follow-on attacks could transform our notions of civil liberties and freedomforever. And as former 9/11 Commission co-chairman Lee Hamilton has pointed out, a nuclear terrorist attackwould prompt a collapse in public faith in the government's ability to protect the American people. Thinkyour 401(k) hurts now? The presidential nominees, and the American people, should reconsider the tendency to view these

two issues -- economic crisis and the threat of catastrophic terrorism -- as separate problems. A nuclear attack on aU.S. city would not only devastate the target and kill possibly hundreds of thousands, it would also createinstantaneous national and global economic ripple effects with incalculable consequences. To put it inpersonal terms, if you think things are tough in the nation's financial sector now, imagine what your

401(k) -- or your paycheck -- might look like six months after a nuclear detonation in Lower Manhattanor downtown Washington. Saga's study merely began what must become a much larger-scale effort to understand inthe fullest detail possible the consequences of an act of nuclear terrorism, not only the attack itself but also the decisionsthat would almost certainly follow. The idea is not to depress people but to motivate them.

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2NC EXT--XOs key to HegXOs maintain U.S. government credibility

Cooper, Gund Professor 2

Phillip J. Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Vermont and was the first recipient of the

Charles Levin Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association ofSchools of Public Affairs and Administration. By Order of the President: The Use & Abuse of Executive DirectAction pg.28 University Press of Kansas, 2002

Many of the executive orders issued by presidents have been delegations of authority originallyconferred on the president by statute to various agencies or officers of the executive branch. Althoughthese are rarely controversial matters in the contemporary era, they were matters of contention in earliertimes. For one thing, it is more common now for Congress to assign statutory obligations directly to specific agencies,sometimes precisely for the purpose of preventing White House frustration of legislative intentions. In an earlier period,

particularly up to and through World War II, Congress often assigned responsibilities to the president as head ofthe executive branch. Although it was understood that no president could personally attend to all of theseduties, there was concern about the legality of subdelegations to subordinate officials and, more

generally, about the possible loss of accountability that could result if authority drifted out of the veryvisible office of the president and down into the bureaucracy. These concerns were exacerbated by theBrownlow Commissions warnings about the loss of integration and effective organizational control of the executivebranch by the president. The problem seemed to grow more worrisome during the war years when a host of agencies wascreated to govern wide-ranging domestic activities as well as military and war production functions. In the early postwaryears, there was a wave of legislation that presented the president with many new obligations, including creation of what isnow known as the national security agencies. By the late 1940s, it was becoming clear that the president hadresponsibilities under some eleven hundred different statutes. (28)

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****Normal Means****

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Normal MeansGeneric (1/2)

Congress appropriates funding for social serviceshttp://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/bill-categories/social-services/

Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 - Title I: Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency andRelated Provisions - Subtitle A: Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency - Amendspart A (General Provisions) of title XI ofthe Social Security Act (SSA) to direct the Commissioner of Social Security to establish a Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency Program (TWSSP) under which a disabled beneficiary may use a TWSSP ticket issued by the Commissionerto obtain employment, vocational rehabilitation services, or other support services, pursuant to an appropriateindividual beneficiary work plan that meets specified requirements. Includes among such requirements goals forearnings and job advancement, at the Commissioner's expense, from a participating employment network, public orprivate. Allows State agencies administering or supervising the administration of the State plan under title I of theRehabilitation Act of 1973 to elect to participate as an employment network. Sets forth requirements applicable toagreements between State agencies and employment networks. Describes employment network payment systems, includingan outcome payment system and an outcome-milestone payment system.

(Sec. 101) Provides that during any period for which an individual is using a TWSSP ticket, the Commissioner and anyapplicable State agency may not initiate a continuing disability or similar review to determine whether the individual is oris not disabled.

Requires payments to employment networks: (1) out of the social security trust funds in the case of SSA title II (Old Age,Survivors and Disability Insurance) (OASDI) disability beneficiaries who return to work; or (2) from the appropriation formaking Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payments under SSA title XVI, in the case of SSI disability beneficiaries whoreturn to work.

Establishes within the Social Security Administration the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Advisory Panel to advise thePresident, the Congress, and the Commissioner with respect to TWSSP work incentive issues, and those issues underOASDI, SSI, Medicare (SSA title XVIII), and Medicaid (SSA title XIX) as well. Authorizes appropriations.

Subtitle B: Elimination of Work Disincentives - Amends SSA titles II and XVI (Procedural and General Provisions) toprescribe specified measures designed to eliminate work disincentives. Prohibits review of an individual's disability statuson the basis of work activity. Provides for expedited reinstatement of entitlement to OASDI or of eligibility for SSIdisability benefits.

Subtitle C: Work Incentives Planning, Assistance, and Outreach - Amends SSA title XI part A to direct the Commissionerto establish a community-based work incentives outreach program for disabled beneficiaries that includes technicalassistance to organizations and entities designed to encourage disabled beneficiaries to return to work.

(Sec. 121) Authorizes appropriations for FY 2000 through 2004.

(Sec. 122) Authorizes the Commissioner to make certain minimum payments in each State to the protection and advocacysystem established under the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act for the purpose of providing

services to disabled beneficiaries, services which may include advocacy, or other services that such a beneficiary may needto secure or regain gainful employment. Authorizes appropriations for FY 2000 through 2004.

Title II: Expanded Availability of Health Care Services - Amends SSA title XIX to provide for expanding StateMedicaid options

DDI09 XO Counterplan Generic-2

Documents

Transcript of DDI09 XO Counterplan Generic-2