Hardline Posture Counterplan Hardline Posture CP 1nc Shell.................................................................................................2Hardline Posture CP – 2nc AT Xi-Trump Summit = High Relations..........................................4Appeasement DA Net Benefit – 1nc Shell...............................................................................5Appeasement DA Net Benefit – 2nc Impact Calculus..............................................................9North Korea DA Net Benefit – 1nc Shell................................................................................10North Korea DA Net Benefit – Trade Pressure China Say Yes...........................................13North Korea DA Net Benefit – 2nc Yes China Leverage.........................................................14Xi Bad DA Net Benefit – 1nc..................................................................................................15Xi Bad DA Net Benefit UQ – 2nc Ext......................................................................................19Xi Bad DA Net Benefit Link – Trade Liberalization Xi Power.............................................20Xi Bad DA Net Benefit Link – High Relations Xi Power......................................................22Xi Bad DA Net Benefit Impact – Third Term CCP Collapse................................................23Politics DA Net Benefit – Agenda Good................................................................................25AT US-China Relations Adv....................................................................................................26AFF – Trade War DA..............................................................................................................27AFF – Global Protectionism/Economic Stability DA..............................................................29AFF – AT Tariff Threats Good................................................................................................30AFF – AT North Korea Net Benefit........................................................................................32AFF – AT Appeasement Net Benefit......................................................................................34

Hardline Posture CP 1nc Shell

The President of the United States should threaten the People’s Republic of China with:

- Retaliatory trade tariffs and defensive cyber response if the PRC fails to regulate IPR theft, dumping, and offensive cyber operations

- Secondary sanctions, trade tariffs, and additional installation of BMD in allied territory if the PRC refuses to enforce existing sanctions on North Korea and impose additional sanctions

- Regular US Naval freedom-of-navigation operations in the Spratly and Paracel Island territories if the PRC continues to build militarized islands in the South China Sea

The CP solves – first impressions between Trump and Xi are key – taking a hard line puts Xi on the defensive and allows Trump to re-take control of US-China relations Auslin 4/4(Michael Auslin, frequent contributor to National Review and the author of The End of the Asian Century, “How Trump Can Seize the Initiative with Xi Jinping,” April 4, 2017, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/446420/trump-meets-xi-jinping-first-impressions-matter)

On trade, the administration might be less inclined to punish tariffs than it earlier indicated, but Trump should put Xi on notice that the U.S. will no longer tolerate cyberattacks and the theft of intellectual-property rights. He can make clear that he is willing to sanction individuals and

companies that are involved in stealing or profiting from American firms, and he can also intimate that America has its own cyber capabilities in response. He can communicate as well that his administration will actively look at specific sectors where Chinese dumping might be occurring, thus putting pressure on Xi to deal with the problem before the Americans decide to act. Next, Trump has to make pressuring North Korea a priority for Xi. North Korea has become the administration’s first international crisis. It is also a headache for Trump’s relations with China. Not only has Beijing pressured Trump to freeze military exercises with ally South Korea, in exchange for a purported

North Korean freeze on nuclear and missile tests, but it has also vociferously objected to the installation of a new U.S. missile-defense system in South Korea. Ironically, this has helped China seem the peacemaker, paternalistically warning that America and North Korea are recklessly heading toward conflict, and urging both sides to calm down. In this light, Xi looks

more responsible and more influential in Asia than the American president does. By now, it is clear that Beijing has little political leverage over Kim Jong-un. However, China’a economic power is real . Threatening sanctions again and even access to the global financial system, Trump should demand that Xi crack down on both Chinese banks and the hundreds of companies doing business with North Korea. Beijing might not even know every entity involved in the multibillion-dollar cross-border trade, but past administrations have failed to impose any costs on China for propping up

Pyongyang. Further, Trump can threaten to widely provide ballistic-missile-defense systems to U.S. allies beyond South Korea, including Taiwan and India , in response to the growing North Korean threat. This is something China wants to avoid, seeing it as aimed ultimately at its own missile capabilities. More broadly, Trump can wrestle some of the initiative on security issues away from China . Beijing’s apparent statesmanship on the Korean peninsula does not extend to its own security interests. Just last month, the Chinese military

threatened a U.S. Air Force bomber flying over the South China Sea, claiming that it was in Chinese airspace. That won’t deter U.S. military operations in the region, but it reveals

the belligerent mindset in Beijing on display in December, when the Chinese navy briefly seized a U.S. Navy underwater drone. Moreover, China continues to militarize the islands it has constructed in the disputed Spratly Islands group. Trump should act decisively to uphold international law by announcing to Xi that the U.S. Navy and Air Force will undertake a regular schedule of freedom-of-navigation operations in the contested

waters around the Spratly and Paracel Islands , and we will invite partner navies to join. More specifically, he can let his guest know that

any move to militarize the Scarborough Shoal, off the Philippine coast, will result in a constant U.S. naval presence and the provision of significant arms sales to regional states. It’s possible that none of these policies will succeed in change Beijing’s own calculations, but they will let Trump set a baseline for Sino–U.S. relations over the next four years . They may

also slow down China’s momentum and force Xi to consider just how adversarial a relationship he wants with the United States while his own economy continues to slow down dramatically. First impressions among world leaders make a difference . Ronald Reagan put Mikhail Gorbachev

on the defensive, a position from which he never recovered. John F. Kennedy’s seeming weakness encouraged Nikita Khrushchev to build the Berlin Wall and put nuclear missiles

in China. Donald Trump needs to send a message that he takes seriously the necessity of getting relations with China right, for U.S. interests above all.

Hardline Posture CP – 2nc AT Xi-Trump Summit = High Relations

The Xi-Trump summit doesn’t solve any of the net benefits – no new agreements announced and Syria strikes were show of weakness – hardline action now is key to compel Chinese actionChandler 4/10(Clay Chandler, Fortune, “The Trump-Xi Summit Was a Showdown That Wasn’t,” Fortune, April 10, 2017, http://fortune.com/2017/04/10/trump-xi-summit-showdown/)

It's been another wild week in Trumpworld. On Tuesday Trump banished Stephen Bannon, mastermind of his campaign victory, from the National Security Council. On Thursday, he ordered air strikes on Syria, reversing his long-standing opposition to entangling the United States in conflicts in the Middle East. But the big stunner came on Friday, when

Trump’s much-touted face-off with Chinese president Xi Jinping mostly fizzled, ending in warm declarations of good will and mutual respect—but little more.

What a let-down! For weeks global pundits had stoked expectations that the world’s two most powerful men would go mano a mano at Mar-a-Lago. Hadn’t Trump had railed against China on the campaign trail for “stealing” American jobs? Hadn’t he vowed to officially label China a currency manipulator on “Day One” of his presidency? Didn't he promise to slap Chinese imports with 45% tariffs?

In the days ahead of the summit, Trump himself fueled speculation of conflict , taking to Twitter to blame China for America’s “massive

trade deficits and job losses,” and predict his meeting with Xi would be a “very difficult one.” His aides told The New York Times the White House was “planning to roll out its

first concrete measures on trade” and “hardening its position” on China. In an interview with the Financial Times, Trump warned that if China didn’t do more to pressure North Korea to abandon its nuclear testing program, the U.S. was prepared to take unilateral action.Many reports suggested Xi, too, was girding for combat. A host of pundits speculated the Chinese president, taking a page from Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe's playbook, was preparing to outfox Trump with a long list of “tweetable deliverables” -- vague but seemingly significant proposals purporting to increase Chinese investment in the U.S.

As it turned out, the summit was all smiles . At the conclusion of talks Friday, Trump hailed the meeting as having made “tremendous

progress” and declared the U.S. – China relationship “outstanding.” He predicted “lots of very potentially bad problems will be going away.”Xi was similarly upbeat. “We have engaged in deeper understanding, and have built a trust - a preliminary working relationship and friendship,” he said. “I believe we will keep developing in a stable way to form friendly relations.”The two leaders seemed genuinely at ease with each other. There was none of the awkwardness and personal tension that marred Trump’s meetings with German chancellor Angela Merkel (with whom Trump famously refused to shake hands), or Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull (whom Trump lambasted for pressing a “dumb” deal on refugees when the two men spoke by phone). On their first night, representatives from the two countries dined on pan-seared Dover sole with champagne sauce and dry-aged prime New York strip steak--an upgrade from the Big Mac dinner Trump vowed on the stump to serve Xi in their first meeting.

But there were no details, either. No new agreements were announced. There was no

indication of the two nations had come to any sort of specific understanding about how to

deal with the North Korean nuclear threat , improve access for U.S. companies in China , or

curb the U.S. trade deficit with China .Trump's Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, speaking after the meeting, said the two nations had agreed on a "100 day plan" to tackle trade disputes, and promise there would be "way-stations of accomplishment" during that process. Ross, flanked by Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, stressed that the main achievement of the summit was that the two leaders had established a personal rapport. Trump has accepted Xi's invitation to pay a state visit to China this year. The two sides have set up four new mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation in security, the economy, law enforcement and cybersecurity, replacing the existing Strategic and Economic Dialogue.

Trump's advisers sought to put a positive spin on the fact that the meeting with China was overshadowed by Trump's abrupt decision to bomb Syria, arguing that the move demonstrated the U.S. leader's willingness to use military force when necessary, and that Trump's show of resolve would make the China take his threat to deal

unilaterally with North Korea more seriously. Some analysts hailed Trump's strike against Syria as an act of Nixonesque "strategic unpredictability."But, as Foreign Policy Asia editor James Palmer notes in this essay, it would be uncharacteristic of a Chinese leader to interpret unpredictability as a sign of strength. In Xi's worldview, unpredictability is more likely to be seen as evidence of weakness, poor

planning and indiscipline . So whether the drama of interrupting dinner to unleash Tomahawks on a rogue nation has bolstered or undermined Trump's

leverage in future negotiations with China remains to be seen.

Appeasement DA Net Benefit – 1nc Shell

The plan’s engagement with China is appeasement and ensures Chinese expansionism – only hardline action early in the Trump administration balances Chinese expansionism – the permutation fails because it signals an incoherent US balancing strategyAuslin 4/4(Michael Auslin, frequent contributor to National Review and the author of The End of the Asian Century, “How Trump Can Seize the Initiative with Xi Jinping,” April 4, 2017, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/446420/trump-meets-xi-jinping-first-impressions-matter)

By the time of his inauguration, it seemed as though President Trump had wrested the

diplomatic initiative from Beijing , warning that he would slap tariffs on Chinese goods to even out an unfair playing field, dramatically taking a phone call from Taiwan’s president, and musing about upending 40 years of diplomatic relations based on the One China policy. We could have seen all this as the prelude to tough negotiations with Xi on issues ranging from the South China Sea to currency manipulation. Once taking office, however, the administration seemed to tack back: It largely emphasized cooperation on security issues and downplayed

any specifics on trade retaliation . Moreover, by pulling out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership,

the administration left the field open for China to pursue its own multilateral trade agreement in Asia. Then, just a few days ago, the president and his team once again adopted a harder line on the South China Sea and trade. The White House may believe that the mixed signals keep Beijing off-balance, but they just as easily give an impression of a policy that has not yet

cohered . So as the world press looks forward to a few days in the Florida sunshine, the stakes could not be higher for this first meeting between the heads of the world’s most powerful countries. Can Trump wrangle all the loose ends of his China policy, and come up with a coherent, firm, and credible approach by the time he meets Xi? The biggest danger Trump faces when he sits down with Chinese president this week at Mar-a-Lago is that he might be

put on the defensive . Xi is coming off a lauded speech defending free trade at the World Economic Forum at Davos in January, while Trump is struggling to deal with North Korea and has yet to articulate an alternative to the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Surrendering the dynamic in Sino–U.S. relations to Xi in this first meeting could determine the administration’s Asia policy

for the next four years . Trump risks facing a confident Chinese leader who will come seeking to capitalize on his recent successes. Even if Trump doesn’t have a full Asia policy — in no small part because he does not yet have most of his foreign-policy team in place — he needs to have at least a basic set of positions ready to present to his Chinese counterpart. First, the president needs to walk back Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s endorsement of China’s call for “mutual respect” and “win-win cooperation” that Tillerson made in Beijing last month. China watchers knows that “mutual respect” means staying out of areas China considers vital to its interests,

not to mention highlighting Beijing’s desire to be seen as an equal to the United States. Trump

cannot be seen as acquiescing in China’s new model of great-power relations . Instead, the

president should call for a new realism in Sino–U.S. relations , recognizing that both countries

will seek to maximize their national interests and that America will hold the line on protecting its position in Asia and will zero in on unfair Chinese trading practices.

Chinese expansionism collapses US hegemony and the liberal international order – US-China rivalry is inevitable, only a coherent balancing strategy avoids Chinese regional hegemonyBlackwill & Tellis 15(Robert Blackwill, Senior Fellow at Council on Foreign Relations and former Ambassador to India, Ashley Tellis, PhD and senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China, Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 72 from the International Institutions and Global Governance Program, pgs. 3-6)

In the aftermath of the American victory in the Cold War and the dissolution of containment, U.S. policymakers have struggled to conceptualize a grand strategy that would prove adequate to the nation’s new circumstances beyond the generic desire to protect the liberal

international order underwritten by American power in the postwar era. Though the Department of Defense during the George H.W. Bush administration presciently contended that its “strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future

global competitor ”—thereby consciously pursuing the strategy of primacy that the United States successfully employed to outlast the Soviet Union— there was

some doubt at the time whether that document reflected Bush 41 policy.5 In any case, no administration in Washington has either consciously or consistently pursued such an approach. To the contrary, a series of administrations have continued to implement policies that have actually enabled the rise of

new competitors, such as China , despite the fact that the original impulse for these policies—the successful containment of the Soviet Union—lost

their justification with the demise of Soviet power.

Because the American effort to “integrate” China into the liberal international order has now generated new threats to U.S. primacy in Asia —and could eventually result in a

consequential challenge to American power globally —Washington needs a new grand strategy toward China that centers on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy. This strategy cannot be built on a bedrock of containment, as the earlier effort to limit Soviet power was, because of the current realities of globalization. Nor can it

involve simply jettisoning the prevailing policy of integration. Rather, it must involve crucial changes to the current policy in order to limit the dangers that China’s economic and military expansion pose to U.S. interests in Asia and globally.These changes, which constitute the heart of an alternative balancing strategy, must derive from the clear recognition that preserving U.S. primacy in the global system ought to remain the central objective of U.S. grand strategy in the twenty-first century. Sustaining this status in the face of rising Chinese power requires,

among other things, revitalizing the U.S. economy to nurture those disruptive innovations that bestow on the United States asymmetric economic advantages over others; creating new preferential trading arrangements among U.S. friends and allies to increase their mutual gains through instruments that consciously exclude China; recreating a technology-control regime involving U.S. allies that prevents China from acquiring military and strategic capabilities enabling it to inflict “high-leverage strategic harm” on the United States and its partners; concertedly building up the power-political capacities of U.S. friends and allies on China’s periphery; and improving the capability of U.S. military forces to effectively project power along the Asian rimlands despite any Chinese opposition—all while continuing to work with China in the diverse ways that befit its importance to U.S. national interests.

The necessity for such a balancing strategy that deliberately incorporates elements that limit

China’s capacity to misuse its growing power , even as the United States and its allies continue

to interact with China diplomatically and economically, is driven by the likelihood that a long-term strategic rivalry between Beijing and Washington is high. China’s sustained economic success over the past thirty-odd years has enabled it to aggregate formidable power, making it the nation most capable of dominating the Asian continent and thus undermining the traditional U.S. geopolitical objective of ensuring that this arena remains free of hegemonic control. The meteoric growth of the Chinese economy, even as China’s per capita income remains behind that of the United States in the near future, has already provided Beijing with the resources necessary to challenge the security of both its Asian neighbors and Washington’s influence in

Asia, with dangerous consequences. Even as China’s overall gross domestic product (GDP) growth slows considerably in the future, its relative growth rates are likely to be higher than those of the

United States for the foreseeable future, thus making the need to balance its rising power

important . Only a fundamental collapse of the Chinese state would free Washington from the obligation of systematically balancing Beijing, because even the

alternative of a modest Chinese stumble would not eliminate the dangers presented to the United States in Asia and beyond.

Of all nations—and in most conceivable scenarios—China is and will remain the most significant competitor to the United States for decades to come.6 China’s rise thus far has already bred geopolitical, military, economic, and ideological challenges to U.S. power , U.S.

allies, and the U.S.-dominated international order . Its continued, even if uneven, success in the future would further undermine U.S. national interests. Washington’s current approach toward Beijing, one that values China’s economic and political integration in the liberal inter- national order at the expense of the United States’ global preeminence and long-term strategic interests, hardly amounts to a “grand” strategy, much less an effective one . The need for a

more coherent U.S. response to increasing Chinese power is long overdue .

Hegemony is sustainable and solves every scenario for escalation – hegemonic collapse ensures wildfire proliferation, economic collapse, arms races, and regional conflictsBrooks and Wohlforth 16(Stephen G Brooks, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth, William C Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Prof of Government at Dartmouth, Foreign Affairs May/June, “Once and Future Superpower,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower?cid=nlc-fatoday-20160520&sp_mid=51424540&sp_rid=c2NvdHR5cDQzMUBnbWFpbC5jb20S1&spMailingID=51424540&spUserID=MTg3NTEzOTE5Njk2S0&spJobID=922513469&spReportId=OTIyNTEzNDY5S0)

Given the barriers thwarting China’s path to superpower status, as well as the low incentives for trying to overcome them, the future of the international system hinges most on whether the United States continues to bear the much lower burden of sustaining what we and others have called “deep engagement,” the globe-girdling grand strategy it has

followed for some 70 years. And barring some odd change of heart that results in a true abnegation of its global role (as opposed to overwrought, politicized charges sometimes made about its already having done so), Washington will be well positioned for decades to maintain the core military capabilities, alliances, and commitments that secure key regions, backstop the global

economy, and foster cooperation on transnational problems . The benefits of this grand strategy can be difficult to discern, especially in light of the United States’ foreign misadventures in recent years. Fiascos such as the invasion of Iraq stand as stark reminders of the difficulty of using force to alter domestic politics abroad. But power is as much about preventing unfavorable outcomes as it is about causing favorable ones, and here Washington has done a much better job than most Americans appreciate. For a largely satisfied power leading the international system, having enough strength to deter or block challengers is in fact more valuable than having the ability to improve one’s position further on the margins. A

crucial objective of U.S. grand strategy over the decades has been to prevent a much more

dangerous world from emerging , and its success in this endeavor can be measured largely by

the absence of outcomes common to history: important regions destabilized by severe

security dilemmas, tattered alliances unable to contain breakout challengers, rapid weapons

proliferation, great-power arms races, and a descent into competitive economic or military

blocs. Were Washington to truly pull back from the world , more of these challenges would

emerge, and transnational threats would likely loom even larger than they do today. Even if such threats did not grow, the task of addressing them would become immeasurably harder if the United States had to grapple with a much less stable global order at the same time. And as difficult as it sometimes is today for the United States to pull together coalitions to address transnational challenges, it would be even harder to do so if the country abdicated its leadership role and retreated to tend its garden, as a growing number of analysts and policymakers—and a large swath of the public—are now calling for.

Appeasement DA Net Benefit – 2nc Impact Calculus

Best historical evidence proves appeasement ensures Chinese expansionism and conflict – hardline action now is key to avoid greater future escalation – only the CP solves the root cause of East Asian instability Jacobs 15 (Bruce Jacobs, professor of Asian Languages and Studies at Monash University, “Appeasement will only encourage China”, November 1, 2015, http://www.theage.com.au/comment/appeasement-will-only-encourage-expansionist-china-20151101-gknz2l.html#ixzz4D642C1lo)

The tensions in Asia today have only one cause: China . On the basis of false "history", China claims the South China Sea, the East China Sea and Taiwan. Yet China has no historical claims to the South and East China seas. Historically, south-east Asian states conducted the great trade in the South China Sea. China had almost no role. Furthermore, geographically, the contested areas are close

to Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines, while they are more than 1000 kilometres south of China. China's claims for sovereignty in these areas have no historical basis and its constructing of "islands" on submerged reefs only demonstrates China's expansionism . Similarly, in the East China Sea, China's claims to the Senkaku Islands (which China calls the

Diaoyutai) have no historical foundation. The People's Daily of January 8, 1953, stated that the "Senkaku" Islands belonged to the Ryukyu Archipelago, and a World Atlas published in China in 1958 showed that these islands belong to Japan. China's claims that Taiwan belongs to it also have no historical basis. Mao Zedong, in his famous 1936 interview with Edgar Snow, stated that Taiwan should be independent. Only in 1942 did the Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang) and the Chinese Communist Party separately claim that Taiwan was Chinese. In Taiwan's history, a Han Chinese regime based in China has only controlled Taiwan for four years, from 1945 to 1949. These four years were perhaps the saddest in all of Taiwan's history because Chiang Kai-shek's government killed tens of thousands of Taiwanese in the infamous 2.28 (February 28, 1947) massacres. The dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek and his son and successor, Chiang Ching-kuo, ruled Taiwan from 1945 until the latter's death in early 1988. Their rule was a Chinese colonial project that privileged Chinese who had come with Chiang Kai-shek and systematically discriminated against native Taiwanese. Only with the accession of Lee Teng-hui to the presidency after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988 could Taiwan begin its democratisation process. Now Taiwan, a country with a population the size of Australia, has become a democratic middle power. The so-called "one China" policy of many countries including the United States and Australia is a relic of the old Chiang Kai-shek/Chiang Ching-kuo dictatorship, which pushed a "one China" policy without consulting Taiwan's population. All the major Western democracies, as well as Japan and India, now have substantial if unofficial diplomatic offices in Taiwan. And, although these nations do not publicise the point, all have de facto "One China, one Taiwan" policies. The

arguments of people such as Age columnist Hugh White are dangerous. They ignore the cause of tension in Asia and say we have to be careful about becoming involved in a war.

History has taught us that "appeasement" of such expansionist powers as China does not stop war. Rather, it only temporarily postpones armed conflict and ultimately leads to a much

larger war later . Appeasement of China only enhances Chinese perceptions that the US is a

toothless paper tiger. It creates a sense among China's generals and political leaders that they can pursue expansionist policies without international protest. The pretence that Taiwan's vote for its own president and legislature can lead to war is false. Both main candidates, Tsai Ing-wen and Eric Chu, want to maintain the status quo – that Taiwan is de facto an independent state but that it will not announce this. Australians would be appalled if we were told by a foreign power that voting for either Malcolm Turnbull or Bill Shorten would lead to

war and that we should vote accordingly. We must be clear that China is the only country threatening anyone

else in Asia . The close talks between leaders of such countries as the US, Japan, India and Australia demonstrate that Asia's democratic countries have become

aware of the risks.

North Korea DA Net Benefit – 1nc Shell

The counterplan ensures Chinese pressure on North Korea but the plan’s trade concessions mean the perm fails – only threatening trade tariffs compels China to put pressure on North Korea – China says yes because the US has sufficient economic leverageGuilford 4/6(Gwynn Guilford, reporter for Quartz who writes about the global economy, China, and her obsession with the sea, before joining Quartz, she spent six years in China researching the economy for hedge funds, “The 9 charts you need to understand the US-China relationship before the Trump-Xi summit,” April 6, 2017, https://qz.com/949645/the-9-charts-you-need-to-understand-the-us-china-relationship-before-the-trump-xi-summit/)

Trump seems to be approaching trade as more of a means than an end. This brings us to one of the summit’s top priorities, North Korea , which has been testing missiles dangerously close to US allies Korea and Japan, and is still

developing a nuclear weapons program despite calls from the UN to cease and desist. Experts estimate the country already has between 10 and 40 nuclear warheads. On top of that, Kim Jong Un also claims to have a hydrogen bomb in the works.

Trump wants Xi to impose sweeping sanctions on North Korea. China wields tremendous

power over the rogue nation , both political —technically, the two countries share the same

ideology—and economic . In fact, nearly all of the goods North Korea legally buys from the outside world come from China—as the White House noted in a pre-summit press briefing. In other words, Chinese trade sanctions would devastate North Korea.

And yet, despite all of its clout, China hasn’t done much to force North Korea to the table. And why should it? Sanctions could cause the Kim regime’s demise. That “would create a far worse situation—the near-certain reunification of the two Koreas and the consequent loss of China’s security buffer against the US,” notes Minxin Pei, an expert on Chinese politics at Claremont McKenna College. In addition, a collapsing North Korea risks sending massive inflows of North Korean refugees into China.

How might Trump make China play ball? “I think trade is the incentive ,” he told the FT when asked about what

might persuade China to help the US on the North Korea issue. “It is all about trade.”And here he has a point.

Conversely, the China is a much smaller source of demand for US goods .

Along these lines, another plank of leverage over China is US foreign investment , which China

needs to help meet Xi’s stated goal of becoming more innovative. So it’s plausible that Trump

holds enough economic power to compel China to sanction North Korea . Another important lever is Trump’s threat to go it alone, echoing US secretary of state Rex Tillerson last month, who said that “all options are open” on North Korea.Then there’s North Korea itself; if it launches another missile during the summit, as it did earlier today, Xi would “have a hard time not responding,” says China expert Bill Bishop.

What, then, would constitute a victory for Xi in Florida? To slightly tweak a Woody Allen quip, a lot of his success comes simply from showing up. By setting up the meeting in Mar-a-Lago instead of the White House, the administration has already “ ceded a powerful source of

leverage over their Chinese counterparts,” says Ely Ratner, former national security adviser to the US vice president. And in the absence of a clear China strategy, the meeting validates the “ two world powers ” dynamic that China aspires to.China’s ultimate goal is to edge the US out of Asia and stop it from trying to contain China through alliances with the other smaller Asian nations that geographically box it in. This map gives a pretty good sense of why China is so anxious to expand its influence and territorial control.

Despite the “Asian pivot” that was supposed to deepen engagement in the region during former president Barack Obama’s tenure, China has been establishing military outposts on small atolls of rocks and sand throughout the South China Sea, allowing it to extend its range of military and commercial control.

China’s territorial claims and island-building bonanza in the South China Seas is a direct threat to the interests of southeast Asian countries, which rely on the US “to back them up when they stand up to China,” says Michael Fuchs, a former deputy assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs.

“After the meeting, it’s likely that China will do what it often does: quietly send its diplomats around the region to spread the message that the US is cutting deals with China at the

expense of America’s regional partners ,” writes Fuchs in a blog post. Trump’s erratic behavior in the region makes this easier to swallow. If the summit ends with Trump seeming to prioritize his relationship with China above other Asian nations, the US’s regional alliances will weaken. That boosts China’s regional clout— another clear win for Xi .So what does a Trump win look like? We can expect that, following in Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe’s footsteps, Xi will announce Chinese plans to invest in the US—a big number that’s conveniently tweetable. But this concession is more a PR move than an actual boost for the US. Investment in some sectors—particularly real estate, a Chinese favorite—actually drives up asset prices instead of building productive capacity. And it won’t necessarily shrink the trade deficit. (For one, Chinese investment in the US drives up the value of the dollar against the yuan.)China may even dangle investments focused on Wisconsin, Michigan, and Ohio—states key to Trump’s surprise victory in the 2016 election—according to Elizabeth Economy, a

senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Clearly, Xi and his team know what makes Trump tick. But if Trump sells himself too cheaply, he may be unable to extract meaningful policy concessions from China on North Korea and trade policy.This summit, a meeting of the two most powerful men in the world, is Trump’s first major foreign policy challenge. What will be worth watching is whether Trump settles for short-term concessions that make for good sound bites—or tries to

play the long game by prioritizing keeping China contained and Asia stable.

North Korea is preparing for war – regime threat perception means failure to reverse nuclearization causes nuclear first strike against the USFisher 16(Max Fisher, Editor and writer @nytimes for The Interpreter, a column exploring the ideas and context behind major world events, “Maybe North Korea’s Nuclear Goals Are More Serious Than Once Thought,” July 13, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/14/world/asia/maybe-north-koreas-nuclear-goals-arent-a-farce-after-all.html)

Put another way: What does North Korea believe it will gain from nuclear weapons that is worth these costs?

Experts have not settled on a consensus answer, but offer a range of possible explanations. What these theories share is a sense that North Korea’s leadership believes it is facing a potentially existential crisis and is willing to take extreme

steps to survive .Some analysts say the North Korean warnings of a looming conflict with the United States and South Korea might not just be for show, but rather indicate that the country’s leaders earnestly believe war could be coming .In this view, the country would need more than just a single bomb to deter its enemies. It would require a nuclear program large enough to make such a war winnable.Details about North Korea’s advances suggest the outlines of a war plan , Mr. Lewis said. The country seems to be building the capability to launch rapid nuclear strikes against nearby military targets, such as the United States military bases on Guam and the Japanese island of Okinawa, as well as South Korean ports where any American invasion force would land.“I think their hope is that the shock of that will cause us to stop,” Mr. Lewis said. “Then the whole point of the I.C.B.M.s is that there is something in reserve” to threaten West Coast American cities, in theory forcing the United States to stand down.Mr. Fitzpatrick argued that even if North Korea does not intend to carry out such a plan, it hopes that raising concerns of a nuclear conflict will “drive a wedge between the United States and its allies,” particularly South Korea.Should North Korea acquire a nuclear-capable missile that could hit Washington State, some Americans might well question the value of continuing to guarantee South Korea’s security.

“The North Koreans would like people to doubt that the United States would trade Seattle for Seoul,” Mr. Fitzpatrick said, referring to a Cold War adage that the United States accepted risks to its own cities so as to defend those of its allies.B. R. Myers, a North Korea scholar at Dongseo University in South Korea, takes this theory one step further. The nuclear program, he believes, is meant not only to scare off the United States, but to one day coerce the South into accepting the North’s long-stated demand: reunification on its own terms.“It is the only goal big enough to make sense of a nuclear program that has made the D.P.R.K. less secure than it was 10 years ago,” Mr. Myers said, using the abbreviation of North Korea’s formal name.North Korea’s greatest source of insecurity, he argued, is not its enemies abroad — whose efforts at rapprochement it has long spurned — but its own looming crisis of legitimacy.Because the country positions itself as the true protector of the Korean people but is so much poorer than the South, it has “no reason to exist as a separate state,” Mr. Myers wrote in a recent research paper. Unification “is therefore the only long-term solution to the regime’s chronic security problems.”While such scenarios may sound outlandish, Mr. Lewis pointed to the 2003 United States-led invasion of Iraq and NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya, which led to the grisly

deaths of those countries’ leaders. North Korea is far weaker than its enemies, whom the country sees as bent on its destruction. And it faces a possible legitimacy crisis of the sort that seems to topple another government every year.These fears, analysts say, could be spurring Kim Jong-un to drastically change his country’s

behavior — upending long-held assumptions in the process.

Korean war causes extinction – massive climate disruptions – best studies confirmHayes and Hamel-Green ‘9(Peter Hayes, Honorary Professor, Center for International Security Studies, & Michael Hamel-Green, professor in social sciences in the College of Arts at Victoria University Melbourne, 2009, The Path Not Taken, The Way Still Open: Denuclearizing The Korean Peninsula And Northeast Asia, Dec. 14, 2009. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from http://apjjf.org/-Peter-Hayes/3267/article.html)

The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community.

At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack , whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions.

But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more

quickly than global warming . Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited

nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range

100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater

decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological

and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other

potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global

one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

North Korea DA Net Benefit – Trade Pressure China Say Yes

US trade pressure works and forces China to enforce sanctions on North Korea – Chinese economic fragility means they say yes to threats and are forced to abandon the Kim regimeIverson 17(Shepard Iverson, foreign professor in the Institute for Korean Studies at Inha University in South Korea, “How To Stop North Korea: A Geoeconomic Approach,” February 28, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/02/28/how-to-stop-north-korea-a-geoeconomic-approach/#b80f99d18f13)

Although Beijing’s support for Pyongyang seems unwavering, enlisting China’s cooperation may not be as prohibitive as observers might think. When China and North Korea originally formed an alliance, both countries were weak, suspicious, isolated and the object of Cold War containment by the U.S. and its allies. China has since moved beyond this state, joined global institutions, and now depends on the international system as the world’s largest trader.Conventional wisdom is that China prefers a divided peninsula in order to preserve a fraternally allied communist authoritarian state as a buffer between itself and democratic South Korea. However, there is little practical rationale for this today . In addition to the borderless diffusion of knowledge and information via the Internet, with over 2 million men in boots and 2,000 fighter aircraft, no modern army would push toward Beijing over land through Korea. Indeed, there are reasons China should welcome a unified Korea, since the presence of the U.S. military and its missile defense system (THAAD) would no longer be necessary.Although China’s North Korea policy remains anchored to the past, influential factions in the PLA and the CCP regard the Kim regime as a threat to regional stability. Party elites are uneasy about an unruly state on their border that may provoke a U.S. military response or prompt regional nuclear proliferation. These security concerns plus U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s no-nonsense approach to what he calls "China’s Crimea-like territorial expansion" in the littoral waters of Asia-Pacific, and President Trump’s fair trade alarm puts Beijing in triple

jeopardy at a time of economic fragility .

China has made itself vulnerable to financial crisis after years of inefficient domestic economic policies and by massively subsidizing its geostrategic objectives. After a decade of spending beyond its means, and now with a stagnating global economy, and reduced exports the CCP is on the brink of a serious debt crisis and cannot afford diplomatic or trade

complications with the U.S. —that is responsible for 10-15% of its GDP and tens of millions of export-related jobs.Although geopolitical hardliners still prevail over a new generation of policy pragmatists, their

authority is not unlimited, and Beijing is not immune to its own populist pressures . Indeed, since the Mao era, Chinese leaders have exhibited admirable faculty for reform in response to changing real-world circumstances. China may not renew its relationship with the Kim regime

indefinitely .

North Korea DA Net Benefit – 2nc Yes China Leverage

China has the leverage to resolve North Korean nuclearization – China provides 20% of North Korea’s GDP and key fuel and food supplies – persuading China to use leverage and enforce sanctions resolves the North Korean nuclear threatIverson 17(Shepard Iverson, foreign professor in the Institute for Korean Studies at Inha University in South Korea, “How To Stop North Korea: A Geoeconomic Approach,” February 28, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/02/28/how-to-stop-north-korea-a-geoeconomic-approach/#b80f99d18f13)

Taking Beijing at its word, many analysts presume China has little influence over North Korea and its nuclear missile program. However, evidence of substantial economic leverage suggests otherwise. A recent Congressional research report estimated that China purchases 90% of North Korea’s commercial exports, provides 80% of its consumer goods, 90% of its energy, over $100 million in UN-banned luxury goods, and enough food to feed over 1 million people per year. North Korea captures large profits from this relationship, which despite Beijing’s alleged discomfort with Pyongyang’s provocations, has quietly increased four fold since its first nuclear test in 2006 (as shown below).

North Korea's trade surplus with China is essentially foreign aid since it is inconceivable it will ever be paid back—as

with $10 billion in Russian debt forgiven after decades in arrears. Total Chinese aid has now surpassed $20 billion; it was $1.2 billion in 2015 as the result of $4.5 billion in

imports and $3.3 billion in exports. Utilizing unpaid work camp labor, North Korea’s exports of mineral products and textiles may return a 90% profit. As China props up the Kim regime, it may undervalue its exports by at least one-third —a strategic discount.

Given these assumptions, in addition to receiving $1.2 billion in imports it did not pay for, North Korea profited $3 billion on its exports and received a $1.1 billion strategic

discount on Chinese imports. Therefore, China’s trade and aid resulted in a $5.3 billion fungible profit for North Korea in 2015, the equivalent of nearly 20% of its GDP and 90% of its estimated $6 billion military budget.Experts describe North Korea as more dependent on aid than the poorest countries in Africa. The

highest-ranking émigré and a senior member of the Korean Workers Party asserts: “Without Chinese capital goods, it would be

impossible for the North Korean government to operate , and ordinary people would not be able to carry on with their daily lives.”Indeed, if China were to abide by UN sanctions and suspend support for North Korea, without luxury goods for elites, oil for the military and essential commodities for its people, it is

improbable the Kim regime would last long —even if food aid was maintained at humanitarian levels. Contrary to public remarks and the

appearance of discord, it is clear that Beijing underwrites the stability of the Kim regime and funds its nuclear weapons program. With growing international pressure to withhold trade and aid, this begs the question of why China continues supporting the House of Kim.

Xi Bad DA Net Benefit – 1nc

Xi’s power is on the brink now, but the plan’s concessions ensure he consolidates power at the 19th Congress – the counterplan’s pressure crushes his authority and ensures concessions to Trump Bloomberg News 4/5(“Why Xi Jinping Needs to Tread Carefully When He Meets Trump,” April 5, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-04-05/xi-s-mission-in-mar-a-lago-pacify-trump-ahead-of-party-congress)

For Xi, the meeting represents an opportunity to establish a personal rapport with Trump and potentially stave off a trade war that threatens to make China’s economic

slowdown much more painful. Yet it also carries risk: An errant Trump tweet or off-the-cuff remark seen as disrespectful could give ammunition to party members who want to thwart Xi’s reform plans .

“Major conflict with the United States in the first half of the year would be very bad news for Mr. Xi because it could undermine the leadership credentials he’s been cultivating for the past five years,” said Zhang Lifan,

a Beijing-based historian whose father was a minister under Communist rule before being purged in the Cultural Revolution. “It’s the most unstable, risky and fragile moment for Mr. Xi domestically. Trump might use this to put pressure on

him .”Five of the ruling Communist Party’s seven most powerful leaders might be replaced at the 19th Party Congress later this year, along with scores of other senior positions. The horse-

trading is already underway among party factions.

Helped by state-run media and a landmark speech at Davos this year, Xi has crafted an image of a poor man’s champion at home and a leading proponent of globalization abroad. His government has built artificial reefs to assert territorial claims in the South China Sea and retaliated against South Korea for allowing the U.S. to install a missile-defense system to protect against North Korea, a Chinese ally.Trump has repeatedly blasted China for stealing American jobs, militarizing the South China Sea and failing to do more to stop North Korea. He threatened to use the One-China policy regarding Taiwan as a bargaining chip to get better trade terms before eventually relenting in a February phone call with Xi.

“The Chinese have been dealing with a very difficult situation with the Trump administration,” said J.

Stapleton Roy, former U.S. ambassador to China who has met every top Chinese leader since Mao Zedong’s successor, Hua Guofeng. “They have calculated that the key to managing the relationship in the short term is trying to establish a relationship

of reasonable mutual confidence between the two presidents.”

China has concentrated on wooing the president’s daughter, Ivanka Trump, and her husband, presidential adviser Jared Kushner. In Florida, Xi will bring his wife Peng Liyuan, a celebrity folk singer and fashion icon who was once more famous than her husband. The pair are expected to arrive in West Palm Beach shortly after noon on Thursday.“There will be time, particularly in the first day, for them to get to know one another in a more informal kind of interaction, as well as a dinner,” a senior Trump administration official told reporters ahead of the trip, according to a published transcript. The leaders won’t play golf, which is frowned upon in China as part of Xi’s anti-graft campaign. ‘Very Difficult’Both sides have sought to set the tone for the summit. In a tweet last Friday, Trump predicted a “very difficult” meeting, complaining about the U.S. trade deficit with China and job losses. Two hours later, a Chinese official deflected questions about the tweets and hailed the possibility of a “new starting point.”Trump plans to discuss trade, the economy and North Korea at the meeting, according to the senior administration official. In an interview with the Financial Times this week, Trump said he wouldn’t be surprised “if we did something that would be very dramatic and good for both countries.”Read more about China wooing Ivanka, Jared KushnerBeijing would view a getting-to-know-you meeting as progress even without a major deal, according to a Chinese official, who asked not to be identified because the discussions were private. The meeting will probably be difficult as Trump predicted, particularly if he pushes hard, the official said.China has prepared several options for give-and-take depending on what Trump requests, according to the Chinese official. Beijing has assessed that Trump cares most about visible economic wins and some security issues, according to the official, who added that they saw his tweets on North Korea as a bargaining tactic ahead of the meeting.When Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met Trump in February, he proposed investing in infrastructure to create American jobs in a bid to offset criticism over its currency. Xi may try something similar as Trump looks to meet campaign pledges to rebuild the country’s roads and bridges.

Xi will likely explain the domestic pressures he faces as China enters a “ complex and critical phase of reforms,” according to Cui Liru, former president of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations in Beijing. The government is weighing an overhaul of state-run enterprises and opening up more sectors, challenging entrenched interests and raising fears of job losses as economic growth hits the slowest pace in a quarter century.

Xi needs to show a domestic audience that he can manage Trump , said Steve Tsang, director of SOAS China Institute

at the University of London. China may have agreed to an early summit because they see an opportunity to strike a better deal before Trump has a full team in place and a clearly defined strategy, he said.

Xi wants “a deal that shows that he can do business with Trump,” Tsang said. “If Xi can secure that, he puts himself in a good position in reassuring the domestic constituencies in the run up to the 19th congress.”

Xi’s consolidation of power leads to a third Presidential term – that breaks leadership transition rules and collapses CCP stabilitySui Noi 16(Goh Sui Noi, East Asia Editor, The Straits Times, “Will Xi go for a third term?” The Straits Times Asia Report, December 2016/January 2017, pgs. 24-25)

The attempt to characterise Mr Xi as the “core” of the CCP – a term used to describe then President Jiang Zemin but not Mr Xi’s immediate predecessor Hu Jintao – began in January, but did not gain much traction. However, his supporters at the sixth plenum in October tried successfully to have Mr Xi formally named as the “core” leader.

Still, while this showed consolidation of power by Mr Xi ahead of the 19th party congress, that he needed to be formally named “core” leader could mean a certain amount of resistance to his

leadership among vested interest groups affected by his policies – such as anti-corruption and

reduction of overcapacity – that needs to be overcome .When Deng Xiaoping in 1989 designated Mr Jiang the core leader – the very first time the term appeared – together with himself and Mao Zedong, it was to shore up support for Mr Jiang. This was because Mr Jiang was an outsider from Shanghai – where he was party chief – brought in to head the party after the purging of then party general secretary Zhao Ziyang.

So Mr Xi’s ability to name his own people to the PSC – at least three of the five seats in order to control the party’s top decision-making body – will be closely watched as another indicator of

the extent of his power .And as the party prepares for the leadership transition, rumours have been flying thick and fast that Mr Xi might break some rules, including keeping his anti-corruption czar Wang Qishan, who will be over the age limit of 68 at the 19th congress.There is even speculation that Mr Xi himself will want to stay on for a third term in 2022 – for a myriad of

reasons – breaking the rule of a two-term limit for PSC members.

If Mr Xi does break any of the unwritten rules, he will be undoing the painstaking

institutionalisation of the leadership succession process begun by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s to emphasise collective leadership and prevent anyone from becoming too powerful.RULES GOVERNING APPOINTMENTIn a recent article, China-watcher Alice Miller of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University described the three rules governing appointment to the PSC and concluded that Mr Xi would “continue to act within the constraints of institutionalised collective leadership”, mainly because he lacked the “surpassing” power to break out of them.According to Dr Miller, these three rules were followed over the past two decades, and the first is that retirement of both standing committee and regular members of the Politburo “has followed a defined age limit”, set at 68 in 2002.The second rule is that, apart from younger leaders appointed to the PSC in preparation for succession as party general secretary and state premier, new appointments to the PSC have to be drawn from regular members of the Politburo who are not due for retirement.The third is that from the pool of eligible Politburo members, appointments to the standing committee are made on the basis of age. To these might be added a fourth, of a two-term limit for PSC members.

Dr Miller wrote that the rules may be to prevent the “ all-out free-for-all competition for power that

plagued the later Mao Zedong and early post-Mao years”. Those were some of the most

turbulent years of the communist era .Also, taken together, the rules “broadly respect experience and merit over narrower calculations of factional and personal politics, and so prioritise criteria essential to managing a country whose power and prosperity have grown, and whose stake in orderly and stable politics has grown accordingly”.

Still, there are other China experts who believe that Mr Xi might tinker with or break some of

the rules , for several reasons, to put his own men in place and even to go for a third term himself. One of these is that Mr Xi has not been able to have as free a hand as he would have liked because several members of the PSC are not of his choice.At the 18th party congress power transfer where Mr Xi took over the reins of the party, compromise was made so that five of the PSC members would serve only one term because they will be 68 or over by 2017.Three of them are said to be part of the Shanghai faction of former president Jiang Zemin.Premier Li Keqiang, 61 – the only one, apart from Mr Xi himself, eligible to serve a second term because of his age – is part of the Communist Youth League, the faction of former president Hu Jintao.Only Vice-Premier Wang Qishan, 68, and Mr Yu Zhengsheng, 71, chairman of top advisory body the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference – both princelings like Mr Xi – are seen to be part of the President’s inner circle. Of the two, Mr Wang is seen as Mr Xi’s most effective ally, helping him to consolidate power and implement his new policy initiatives.Perhaps because of this, there is the speculation that Mr Xi will attempt to keep Mr Wang on the PSC in 2017, despite this contravening the age-limit rule.THE THIRD TERM INCENTIVE

As for Mr Xi going for a third term, China expert Huang Jing of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy thinks “ there is strong incentive ” for the President to do so.First of all, with his hands somewhat tied in the first five years, he will only have the next five after the 19th party congress to have a relatively free hand to put the country firmly on the path towards his vision of China’s rejuvenation, reunification with Taiwan, escaping the middle-income trap, establishing the legacy of the CCP and re-establishing China as a world power. Another more personal

reason is that in his anti-graft drive, he has made many enemies and will not want to retire until he can be sure of putting a successor in place whom he can trust, said Professor Huang.Mr Xi’s consolidation of power and even his staying for a third term is not necessarily a bad thing, say analysts like Prof Huang.At this juncture of China’s development, a strong leader is needed- and Mr Xi has shown himself to be one – whether it be pushing economic and political reforms amid a slowing economy or managing China’s relations with the rest of the world, including the United States, wary of its rise.

But another China expert, Professor Andrew Nathan of Columbia University, wrote: “ Xi’s concentration of

power poses great dangers for China.”He quoted Deng Xiaoping in a speech the patriarch gave in 1980: “Over-concentration of power is liable to give rise to arbitrary rule by individuals at the expense of collective leadership... There is a limit to anyone’s knowledge, experience and energy. If a person holds too many posts at the same time, he will find it difficult to come to grips with the problems in his work and, more important, he will block the way for other more suitable comrades to take up

leading posts .”

CCP collapse crushes the stability of the international order – causes laundry list of global conflicts to escalatePerkinson 12 (Jessica Perkinson, Thesis, “The Potential for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark,” American University, April 19th, http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/10330/Perkinson_american_0008N_10238display.pdf?sequence=1)

Should the CCP undergo some sort of dramatic transformation – whether that be significant reform or complete collapse,

as some radical China scholars predict2 – the implications for international and US national security are vast . Not only does China and the stability of the CCP play a significant role in the maintenance of peace in the East Asia n region, but China is also relied upon by many members of the

international community for foreign direct investment, economic stability and trade . China

plays a key role in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula as one of North Korea’s only allies, and it is argued that instability within the Chinese government could also lead to instability in the already sensitive military and political situation across the Taiwan Strait . For

the United States, the effect of instability within the CCP would be widespread and dramatic .

As the United States’ largest holder of US treasury securities, instability or collapse of the CCP could threaten the stability of the already volatile economic situation in the US . In addition,

China is the largest trading partner of a number of countries, including the US, and the US is reliant upon its market of inexpensive goods to feed demand within the US.It is with this in mind that China scholars within the United States and around the world should be studying this phenomenon, because the potential for reform,

instability or even collapse of the CCP is of critical importance to the stability of the

international order as a whole . For the United States specifically, the potential - or lack thereof - for reform of the CCP should dictate its foreign

policy toward China. If the body of knowledge on the stability of the Chinese government reveals that the Chinese market is not a stable one, it is in the best interests of the United States to look for investors and trade markets elsewhere to lessen its serious dependence on China for its economic stability, particularly in a time of such uncertain economic conditions within the US.

Xi Bad DA Net Benefit UQ – 2nc Ext

Xi’s power is on the brink now – foreign policy losses and US trade conflict mean he won’t be able to dictate the 19th Congress – actions like the plan are key to re-establish his authorityCampbell 4/2(Charlie Campbell, Beijing Correspondent for Time, “Style and Substance Are Both Concerns When China's Xi Jinping Meets President Trump,” April 2, 2017, http://time.com/4722468/china-xi-jinping-donald-trump-florida-mar-a-lago-north-korea/)

Trump is bruised domestically following the failure of his signature health-care reform legislation to pass Congress. It’s unclear whether this will make him conciliatory or prickly.

Xi also has domestic travails . He is without a big foreign policy win in the Asia-Pacific, other than warming ties with

the Philippines following the election of President Rodrigo Duterte. Elsewhere, Taiwan is more estranged than ever, Japan and South Korea are perturbed by his refusal to deal with Pyongyang, while Australia last week nixed a joint extradition treaty.But Chinese officials seem most worried about the trade issue. Fortifying China's already slowing economy is especially important for Xi coming into the 19th Chinese Communist Party Congress in the fall. This five-yearly gathering is where brass hats jostle to get their chosen favorites into key jobs. Most members of the Politburo Standing Committee — the nation’s top political body — are set to resign due to an informal

age limit, including prominent Xi allies. Xi — who was named a “core leader” like Mao Zedong last year — should also pick his successor. But there is growing speculation that he might break with protocol in one or both these regards, essentially rewriting the nation’s governing precepts . Such bold moves might be derailed by a trade war or other major dispute with the world’s largest economy. “Mr. Xi is in a difficult situation,” says Scott Harold, an East Asia expert with RAND Corp.

Xi Bad DA Net Benefit Link – Trade Liberalization Xi Power

The plan’s a win for Xi and boosts his power ahead of the conclave – Trump’s taking a hard line on trade now – the aff’s perceived as evidence Xi’s a master negotiatorGuilford 4/6(Gwynn Guilford, reporter for Quartz who writes about the global economy, China, and her obsession with the sea, before joining Quartz, she spent six years in China researching the economy for hedge funds, “The 9 charts you need to understand the US-China relationship before the Trump-Xi summit,” April 6, 2017, https://qz.com/949645/the-9-charts-you-need-to-understand-the-us-china-relationship-before-the-trump-xi-summit/)

Trade is an obvious point of contention and an important item on the leaders’ agenda—something Trump made clear in tweets shortly after the summit was announced.

Despite a good bit of bluster on both sides, the diplomatic face-off in Florida provides a much-needed chance to (re)calibrate the power dynamic between the world’s two biggest economies. And it has important domestic implications for both countries as well. After his promised health care plan imploded, Trump could really use a deal with China on trade or security to burnish his much-vaunted negotiating skills. This should be doable given that presidents typically have more power over foreign policy than they do over other issues. Meanwhile, Xi’s core task is looking good in advance of the twice-a-decade party conclave in October, a critical chance for him to consolidate power. Coming across as an

equal to Trump will help .Unfortunately, finding common ground in this complicated relationship might prove tough. For one thing, Trump has adopted an aggressive line on Chinese exports. A central theme of his campaign, Trump’s

China-bashing on trade has continued since he took office. His main beef is that China consistently exports to the US vastly more than it buys in return.Trump has said he wants to impose tariffs on Chinese exports to the US, arguing that China’s currency manipulation and unfair business practices cheapen its exports, putting US companies out of business. In a recent meeting, Stephen K. Bannon and Jared Kushner, two of Trump’s top advisers, complained to Trump that “China was deliberately depressing its currency, which undercuts American goods,” reports the New York Times (paywall).If Trump goes after Xi on currency manipulation, he risks coming away looking foolish—and squandering precious diplomatic capital. It’s true that China unfairly helps its companies, including by banning foreign companies from investing and competing in many sectors. And for a long time, allegations that China was cheating through currency manipulation were also true. And then there’s the fact that China’s currency has lost a lot of value against the dollar since 2014.But the loss of value is more complicated than simple “cheating.” As Chinese growth has slowed, money has gushed out of China, driving the yuan’s value down. Since then, contrary to what Trump claims, the government has been selling down its reserves of foreign currencies in order to prop up the yuan. In other words, it’s been making the yuan, and consequently China’s exports, more expensive than they should be.Compared with the currencies of its major trading partners, the yuan is still quite a bit overvalued.“We should welcome the helpful role that China has played keeping its trade-weighted exchange rate stable for the past year,” says David Dollar, an expert on China’s financial system, in a blog post. “Naming it a currency manipulator would be inaccurate and unhelpful.”So will Trump rag on Xi for cheapening the currency even though the facts don’t really support him? It’s possible. The president told the Financial Times that “when you talk about currency manipulation, when you talk about devaluations, [China’s leaders] are world champions.” Then again, he also said,”I don’t want to talk about tariffs yet, perhaps the next time we meet.”Trump seems to be approaching trade as more of a means than an end. This brings us to one of the summit’s top priorities, North Korea, which has been testing missiles dangerously close to US allies Korea and Japan, and is still developing a nuclear weapons program despite calls from the UN to cease and desist. Experts estimate the country already has between 10 and 40 nuclear warheads. On top of that, Kim Jong Un also claims to have a hydrogen bomb in the works.Trump wants Xi to impose sweeping sanctions on North Korea. China wields tremendous power over the rogue nation, both political—technically, the two countries share the same ideology—and economic. In fact, nearly all of the goods North Korea legally buys from the outside world come from China—as the White House noted in a pre-summit press briefing. In other words, Chinese trade sanctions would devastate North Korea.And yet, despite all of its clout, China hasn’t done much to force North Korea to the table. And why should it? Sanctions could cause the Kim regime’s demise. That “would create a far worse situation—the near-certain reunification of the two Koreas and the consequent loss of China’s security buffer against the US,” notes Minxin Pei, an expert on Chinese politics at Claremont McKenna College. In addition, a collapsing North Korea risks sending massive inflows of North Korean refugees into China.How might Trump make China play ball? “I think trade is the incentive,” he told the FT when asked about what might persuade China to help the US on the North Korea issue. “It is all about trade.”And here he has a point.Conversely, the China is a much smaller source of demand for US goods.Along these lines, another plank of leverage over China is US foreign investment, which China needs to help meet Xi’s stated goal of becoming more innovative. So it’s plausible that Trump holds enough economic power to compel China to sanction North Korea. Another important lever is Trump’s threat to go it alone, echoing US secretary of state Rex Tillerson last month, who said that “all options are open” on North Korea.Then there’s North Korea itself; if it launches another missile during the summit, as it did earlier today, Xi would “have a hard time not responding,” says China expert Bill Bishop.

What, then, would constitute a victory for Xi in Florida? To slightly tweak a Woody Allen quip, a lot of his success comes simply from showing up. By setting up the meeting in Mar-a-Lago instead of the White House, the administration has already “ ceded a powerful source of

leverage over their Chinese counterparts,” says Ely Ratner, former national security adviser to the US vice president. And in the absence of a clear China strategy, the meeting validates the “ two world powers ” dynamic that China aspires to.China’s ultimate goal is to edge the US out of Asia and stop it from trying to contain China through alliances with the other smaller Asian nations that geographically box it in. This map gives a pretty good sense of why China is so anxious to expand its influence and territorial control.Despite the “Asian pivot” that was supposed to deepen engagement in the region during former president Barack Obama’s tenure, China has been establishing military outposts on small atolls of rocks and sand throughout the South China Sea, allowing it to extend its range of military and commercial control.China’s territorial claims and island-building bonanza in the South China Seas is a direct threat to the interests of southeast Asian countries, which rely on the US “to back them up when they stand up to China,” says Michael Fuchs, a former deputy assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs.

“After the meeting, it’s likely that China will do what it often does: quietly send its diplomats around the region to spread the message that the US is cutting deals with China at the

expense of America’s regional partners ,” writes Fuchs in a blog post. Trump’s erratic behavior in the region makes this easier to swallow. If the summit ends with Trump seeming to prioritize his relationship with China above other Asian nations, the US’s regional alliances will weaken. That boosts China’s regional clout— another clear win for Xi .

Xi Bad DA Net Benefit Link – High Relations Xi Power

Improving US-China relations is key to Xi’s consolidation of power – economic and political uncertainty mean he fails at the 19th CongressKaiman 4/4(Jonathan Kaiman, LA Times, “As he gets ready to meet Trump in Florida, China’s Xi Jinping has a lot to worry about,” Los Angeles Times, April 4, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-xi-anxiety-20170404-story.html)

Yet Xi’s greater concerns for the meeting are almost certainly domestic . The Communist Party is preparing for a major leadership reshuffle at its 19th party congress in November, when Xi is expected to further consolidate power.Xi will need a strong domestic economy — and considerable political support — to ensure

that things go his way. A fallout in U.S.-China relations could jeopardize his ambitions .

Xi Bad DA Net Benefit Impact – Third Term CCP Collapse

Xi’s consolidation of power causes CCP collapse – destroys regime resilience, creates political infighting, and crushes institutional rules that maintain leadership stability – their impact defense doesn’t assume unprecedented changes in CCP rulesNathan 16(Andrew Nathan, professor of political science at Columbia University, he specializes in Chinese politics, foreign policy, human rights and political culture, “Who Is Xi?,” New York Review of Books, May 12, 2016, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/05/12/who-is-xi/)

Xi has made himself in some ways more powerful than Deng or even Mao. Deng had the final word on difficult policy issues, but he strove to avoid involvement in day-to-day policy, and when forced to make big decisions he first sought consensus among a small group of senior leaders.

Mao was able to take any decision he wanted regardless of the will of his senior colleagues, but he paid attention to only a few issues at a time. Xi appears to be running the whole span of important policies on a daily basis, without needing to consult senior colleagues or retired elders.

He may go even further . There are hints that he will seek to break the recently established

norm of two five-year terms in office and serve one or even more extra terms . He has had himself

designated as the “core” of the leadership, a status that his immediate predecessor, Hu Jintao, did not take for himself. At this point in a leader’s first term we would expect to see one or two younger politicians emerging as potential heirs apparent, to be anointed at next year’s nineteenth Party Congress, but such signs are absent. One of the rumors circulating in Beijing is that teams of editors are compiling a book of Xi’s “thought” (sixiang), which would place him on a level with Mao as a contributor to Sino-Marxist theory, a status not claimed by any of Mao’s other successors to date.

Xi’s concentration of power poses great dangers for China . No one put it better than Deng Xiaoping, in a speech, “On the

Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership,” delivered on August 18, 1980:Over-concentration of power is liable to give rise to arbitrary rule by individuals at the expense of collective leadership, and it is an important cause of bureaucracy under the present circumstances…. There is a limit to anyone’s knowledge, experience and energy. If a person holds too many posts at the same time, he will find it difficult to come to grips with the problems in his work and, more important, he will block the way for other more suitable comrades to take up leading posts.

It was to avoid these problems that Deng built a system of tacit norms by which senior leaders were limited to two terms in office, members of the Politburo Standing Committee divided leadership roles among themselves, and the senior leader made decisions in consultation with other leaders and retired elders.

By overturning Deng’s system, Xi is hanging the survival of the regime on his ability to bear an enormous

workload and not make big mistakes. He seems to be scaring the mass media and officials outside his immediate circle from telling him the truth. He is trying to bottle up a growing diversity of social and intellectual forces that are bound to grow stronger . He may be

breaking down , rather than building up, the consensus about China’s path of development among economic and intellectual elites and within the political leadership. By directing corruption prosecutions at a retired Politburo Standing Committee member, Zhou Yongkang, and retainers of other retired senior officials, he has broken the rule that retired leaders are

safe once they leave office, throwing into question whether it can ever be safe for him to leave office. As he departs from Deng’s path, he risks undermining the adaptability and resilience that Deng’s reforms painstakingly created for the post-Mao regime.As the members of the red aristocracy around Xi circle their wagons to protect the regime, some citizens retreat into religious observance or private consumption, others send their money and children abroad, and a sense of impending crisis pervades society . No wonder

Xi’s regime behaves as if it faces an existential threat . Given the power and resources that he commands, it would be reckless to predict that his attempt to consolidate authoritarian rule will fail. But the attempt risks creating the very political crisis that it seeks to prevent .

Politics DA Net Benefit – Agenda Good

The plan crushes Trump’s political capital – soft-line trade expansion and security cooperation with China causes Trump to flip-flop on his core political narrative – no link turns because the China lobby doesn’t exist Rudd 4/7(Kevin Rudd, former prime minister of Australia and president of the Asia Society Policy Institute in New York, “Domestic concerns matter for Trump and Xi in Florida meeting,” Financial Times, April 7, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/3c62a276-1941-11e7-9c35-0dd2cb31823a)

What about Mr Trump’s domestic political concerns? His message to the American people during the campaign was clear: America has been taken for a ride by the rest of the world, particularly China, and has suffered economically in lost jobs, dying industries and broken cities. Mr Trump wants a genuinely level playing field, particularly on trade, so that the yawning two-way $350bn trade deficit is closed. While analysts will debate the merits of the president’s overall arguments on trade, his views are deeply entrenched on the trade deficit , and form an essential part of his domestic political narrative from which he will not retreat.Mr Trump also knows the pro-China lobby in the US is disappearing . Congress has long been sceptical about China, on issues from human rights to cyber espionage. American business believes they have been net losers on intellectual property theft, anti-dumping and Chinese restrictions on US exports. As for the US national security establishment, Chinese policies in the South China Sea have led to the conclusion that China is now expansionist . Of course,

China rejects all this, but Mr Trump will not see much domestic downside in taking a hard line with Beijing.

AT US-China Relations Adv

The aff doesn’t solve US-China relations – Xi’s the prime mover, not Trump – long-term relations are impossible because China’s driven by expansion and refuses Western democracy and international lawDrecker 4/6(Brett Drecker, former Hong Kong-based foreign correspondent, USA Today, “Trump and Xi meeting is no ‘sunshine summit’: Column,” April 6, 2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/04/06/trump-xi-meeting-relations-human-rights-column/100115208/)

That President Trump is meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping so early in his administration has some policy wonks hoping for a thaw in relations and a constructive collaboration between the two leaders. Don’t count on it .Despite being held at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate in balmy south Florida, the tete-a-tete between these two superpowers is anything but a sunshine summit. From foreign policy

to trade to human rights, the great wall separating the two nations has not been taller since Richard

Nixon opened U.S. relations to the Middle Kingdom in 1972 .At the forefront of the agenda this week is the problem of incorrigible North Korea, a gulag state that shoots missiles towards Japan any time it wants attention. That Beijing, Pyongyang’s only important ally, has put no effort into reigning in its neighbor calls into question how serious the Chinese are about being a responsible member of the global community.But having such a bad actor around is helpful for Beijing , mainly because it makes the Chinese

Communist Party look less bad by comparison . The West shouldn’t be fooled by the misimpression of a kinder, gentler China.Consider Hong Kong, the former British colony that was handed over to Beijing in 1997. Despite promises of “one country, two systems” that would honor local autonomy and western legal traditions, the communist overlords have moved consistently to crush popular sovereignty in the

wealthy port city.In last month’s election for Hong Kong’s chief executive, only 1,200 residents handpicked by Beijing were allowed to vote out of a population of 7.3 million. Xi’s government nullified the September election of two Hong Kong legislators for refusing to take an oath to the Communist Party.

Human rights are even worse on the mainland, where the government has accelerated its persecution of Christians, cracked down on freedom of the press, and is sentencing pro-democracy and human rights activists to long prison terms.Outside its borders, China’s military buildup is upsetting the fragile balance of power in the Pacific.

Two decades ago, Beijing tried to win friendships across Asia through foreign aid and development projects.Now, Xi’s party is out to take what it wants by building military bases in contested waters of the South China Sea, and sending naval vessels to loom threateningly in the region and warplanes to invade others’ airspace. Japan scrambled fighters 644 times to counter Chinese incursions in one nine-month period last year.The red bear in the room of any foreign policy discussion in the early Trump era is Russia. Nixon embraced Chairman Mao in a sly geopolitical gambit to drive a wedge between the two communist powers, China and the Soviet Union. The need to keep these two nuclearized strategic adversaries divided still exists, but they have been developing closer ties in recent years.One question is whether the Trump administration is leaning towards a reset with Moscow and more contention with Beijing as a way to keep the two authoritarian powers apart, put pressure on China to cooperate more earnestly with Washington, and remake the geopolitical landscape.Other important issues on the table at Mar-a-Lago include trade and Beijing’s alleged currency manipulation. Xi will talk tough, but at the end of the day, American consumers can find other suppliers for cheap goods, but it is impossible for China to replace the massive U.S. market it needs to buy its products. Either way, the status quo will prove hard to disrupt without a skeptical Congress on board for change.

Media coverage tends to make everything solely about Donald Trump, but the success of the Trump-Xi summit and U.S.-Sino relations is largely up to China . The Chinese people believe it is their turn to take a

prominent place among the world’s elite. If so, Beijing needs to start acting like it is ready for more global responsibility.

AFF – Trade War DA

Threatening tariffs crushes US-China relations and causes nuclear war – the counterplan ensures trade retaliation, and escalates to SCS conflict, Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and causes collapse US security alliancesPei 16(Minxin Pei, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, “A Trade War With China Is Likely Under Donald Trump,” November 10, 2016, Fortune, http://fortune.com/2016/11/10/donald-trump-china-trade/)

U.S.-China relations, doubtlessly the world’s most important bilateral ties, are about to get a

stress test .Among many potential foreign policy challenges facing the administration of president-elect Donald Trump, a rapid deterioration in the relations between Washington and Beijing will have profound – and decidedly negative –

consequences for global peace and prosperity. The most immediate trigger of a downward spiral of U.S.-China relations, which have been carefully nurtured by both Republican and Democratic administrations over decades, is almost certain to be a trade war with China . A centerpiece of Trump’s winning campaign strategy is trade protectionism. To gain the support from blue-collar manufacturing workers in the American heartland, Trump has vowed, among other things, to

abrogate trade agreements and impose unilateral tariffs. In the case of China, he has floated the idea of slapping tariffs as high as 45% on imports from China.If Trump carries out his campaign pledge, China’s exports to the U.S., worth $483 billion in 2015, could collapse . Needless to say, American exports to China, estimated at $116 billion as

of 2015, will plunge as China retaliates . The economic consequences of such a trade war will not be restricted only to the U.S. and the Chinese economy. Since 35% of China’s exports in 2015 was “processing trade” (China imports components from other countries and then assembles them for exports), $169 billion of Chinese exports to the U.S. in 2015 actually represented imports from

Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and others. Obviously, these economies, all critical trading partners of the U.S., will be collateral damage .Besides a potential trade war, U.S.-China economic relations could suffer another blow during a Trump administration: more restrictions imposed on Chinese investments in the

U.S. Trade protectionism is likely to be extended to restrictions on Chinese acquisition of American technologies and companies because of fear that they could endanger American jobs. The prospect of concluding a U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty (BIT) now looks very dim.

As trade and investment constitute the most important foundation of U.S.-China relations, the dismantling of this foundation will cause spillover effects in other areas , most critically East Asian security.Despite its recent muscle-flexing in the South China Sea, Beijing’s security policy in East Asia has always been constrained by its economic interdependence with the U.S. As the mutual

bond of commerce unravels under a Trump administration, China could be much less

restrained in challenging American security interests in East Asia.

Should Chinese leaders decide to do so, they would be encouraged by Trump’s campaign rhetoric about reducing American security commitments to its allies in Asia. In all

likelihood, Beijing may want to test whether a Trump administration will honor long-standing American security guarantees to its friends and allies in East Asia. In light of the near certainty that Trump will scrap President Barack Obama’s strategic “pivot to Asia” (which includes the

Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, as its economic pillar), Chinese leaders will be especially

emboldened to challenge American presence in Asia.Of the potential regional flash points that could bring U.S. and China face to face in a dangerous military confrontation, two stand out – the South China Sea and Taiwan.Under President Barack Obama’s administration, the U.S. has consistently opposed China’s unilateral claims to sovereignty over much of the South China Sea. If Trump believes

that the South China Sea is none of Washington’s business, Beijing will likely further escalate its activities, such as building military facilities and drilling for oil, thus escalating risks of conflict with Vietnam and the Philippines. As more than $5 trillion worth of commerce transits through the South China Sea each other, a military conflict or acceptance of China’s de facto control of the area will gravely undermine American security interests .The other flash point is Taiwan. In January this year, the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party decisively won the presidency and the

legislature of the self-governing island, which China also claims. Relations between Taiwan and China are deteriorating . Washington maintains a delicate “One-China policy,” which maintains official ties with Beijing but also honors its commitments to Taiwan’s security. One obvious danger is that Trump , who

has no knowledge or experience in this area, could say or do something that Beijing perceives

as reflecting a fundamental policy shift . In particular, Trump’s aversion to maintaining American security commitments in East Asia could

be interpreted by China as his willingness to abandon Taiwan.

Such a reading could encourage Beijing to engage in military intimidation against Taiwan to test Trump’s resolve, thus precipitating a crisis.Before Trump’s stunning victory on Wednesday, the conventional wisdom was that Hillary Clinton would take a tougher policy toward Beijing than Trump. Now that Trump is

headed for the White House, it is worth noting that his China policy, to the extent there is such a thing, consists of trade protectionism on the one hand and abandonment of long-standing security commitments on the other. If anything, this is a recipe for conflict .

AFF – Global Protectionism/Economic Stability DA

US-China retaliatory tariffs cause global protectionism and trade wars – creates cascades of economic turbulence and crushes allied economies Anand 17(Kshitij Anand, The Economic Times, “Trump’s Signal of Protectionism Raises Risks of Trade Wars, Retaliatory Tariffs,” January 21, 2017, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/stocks/news/trumps-signal-of-protectionism-raises-risks-of-trade-wars-retaliatory-tariffs/articleshow/56699343.cms)

“US President Trump’s assertion that ‘We will follow the two principles of Buy American & Hire American’ is an unambiguous signal of the start of a new era of fierce protectionism for American jobs

and trade as well as isolationism,” Ajay Bodke, CEO & Chief Portolio Manager – PMS, Prabhudas Lilladher, told ETMarkets.com.

“A Trumpian view that looks at global trade and commerce and geo-strategic alliances as a

zero-sum game with losers and winners against a win-win for both trading partners and geo-strategic allies can only fuel trade wars

and raise fears among allies dependent on America for security,” he said.

Before taking oath as US President, Trump had vowed to label China as a currency manipulator for purposes of a competitive trade advantage. He threatened to impose a tariff of up to 45 per cent on Chinese exports to the US, a move that may set off a

trade war .If China devalues its currency further, it may lead to a fierce currency war, which will be unsettling for global markets. A devaluation of the yuan would be accompanied by volatility in the rupee, pressures on experts as well as weakness in equity markets.

One of the main reasons that made China the global manufascturing hub was globalization. Amid rising debt levels, the latest economic estimates do not show a bleak picture yet, but if manufacturers pull out of China, the GDP growth of 6.8 per cent recorded in the fourth quarter is likely to take a hit .“Countries like India and China have been the biggest gainers of globalization. The US has also gained enormously, but unfortunately, Trump does not see the gains. He only seems to think in terms of jobs that have been transported across to other countries,” said Mythili Bhusnurmath, Consulting Editor, ETNow.The Trump era would also mean more rate hikes by the US Fed and a fall in corporate taxes in the US.“If Trump stimulates the economy significantly, that will push interest rates and the dollar highere, which will create problems, worse if he implements protectionism,” Devan Kaloo, Head of EMs, Aberdeen AM, said in an interview with ETNow.However, experts feel India stacks up quite well in that respect, and it is a safe haven within the emerging markets basket. But, it will still hurt the sentiment of the investment community.

Bodke said trade wars, retaliatory tariffs and barriers to free movement of people and trade can cause turbulence in global markets .

AFF – AT Tariff Threats Good

The counterplan crushes US global leadership but fails to solve the US economy – creates trade retaliation, raises consumer prices, and hurts US companies globally – only US-China economic engagement leads to stable global governanceYang 17(Yao Yang, dean of the National School of Development at Peking University and director of the China Center for Economic Research, “It will be easy but short-sighted for Trump to punish China,” Financial Times, March 8, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/e76e50c6-ff4b-11e6-96f8-3700c5664d30)

Despite the seeming disarray of his first month in office, President Donald Trump has remarkably kept many of his campaign promises. However, one of his most frequent — naming China as a currency manipulator — is as yet mere words.

The new administration is holding back America’s leadership in global governance , as shown by the withdrawal from the

Trans-Pacific Partnership. Mr Trump and his close advisers believe bilateral deals are a better way to achieve “America First” — so why are they not chasing China? I believe they have not yet worked out how to gain over China through such pacts.

Many in the US hold that China has reaped disproportionate advantages through globalisation, and that millions of American jobs have been lost due to imports from the country. In academic circles, most economists believe this is an inevitable cost of globalisation and the

only way out for the US is to shift the population from lost jobs to new jobs in high-end services and high-tech industries. Mr Trump and his advisers take a more hawkish view that Beijing has gained by manipulating its currency , suppressing wages, subsidising exporters and disregarding the environment. As a result, it should be punished.Certainly, the US has ways to punish China. Naming it a currency manipulator alone would make Beijing lose face — which it cares about . Imposing punitive tariffs on Chinese exports and restricting

mergers and acquisitions, particularly from state-owned enterprises, are other options. That is why many international observers believe a trade war between the two countries is inevitable.

But what would the US gain by punishing China?Punitive tariffs will hurt US consumers . One of the big advantages of being an American is being able to enjoy the lowest priced goods

produced in virtually every corner of the world. Americans buy Chinese goods because they are often the cheapest; making them more expensive might force Americans to buy from other countries, but not necessarily the US.

Such measures will not help American workers, either. The kind of jobs that would be targeted are not likely to return to the US. Apple’s iPhone causes several billion dollars of deficit for America’s trade with China. But, suppose Apple moves the iPhone factories to the US; will there be enough Americans willing to work on the assembly lines even in the jobs left by increased automation?

Finally, American companies will not gain — indeed, many will be hurt . Some 40 per cent of the Chinese trade surplus with the US is created by American companies operating in China (another 20 per cent is created by other foreign companies working in China). If Chinese exporters are penalised, those companies will also be punished . And, if China retaliates, companies on both sides will lose.That the Trump administration has not devised a strategy to deal with China is certainly due in part to those uncertainties. A rational person does not hurt others for the joy of it. Mr Trump has to find ways to make China yield to American interests — he has to come up with deals that advance mutual gains. Here are some of them.First, the two countries can sit down and talk about the exchange rate. Mr Trump accuses China of manipulating the renminbi. In one and half years, Beijing has lost about $1tn in foreign reserves defending the value of the currency. The two countries have a common interest in preventing further devaluation of the renminbi, creating opportunities for monetary co-ordination such as a slower pace of US interest rate rises and tighter border control of Chinese capital outflows.

Second, talks on a bilateral investment treaty should be revived. The bottleneck is the “negative list” of sectors in which China would continue to restrict foreign investment. There are still many irrational regulations governing the Chinese economy, including those restricting foreign investment in high-end services. A short negative list would help American companies because

high-end services are arguably one of the US’s strong points. In addition, the BIT will smooth

the path of Chinese companies in the US and encourage them to invest more there.Third, the two should sign a free-trade agreement. Mr Trump may find this idea unappealing now but it would open China’s door to American exports . The US door has long been open to Chinese exports, first under

the “most favoured nations” arrangement, then under the World Trade Organisation. But China maintains high tariffs on imported consumer goods. Its people are becoming

richer and more able to buy foreign goods; the rebalancing of the economy is under way; and domestic consumption is increasing. The country is set to become a big consumer goods market and an FTA with the US would now benefit American companies more than Chinese ones.If, as he claims, President Trump is a dealmaker, such moves will appeal to him. And as the Chinese are also good dealmakers, with pragmatism an inherent part of their culture, Sino-US trade relations can be much brighter than has seemed likely .

AFF – AT North Korea Net Benefit

The CP doesn’t solve – China doesn’t have sufficient leverage over North Korea to pressure for de-nuclearization – regime purges and black market profitsGaouette 4/6(Nicole Gaouette, CNN Politics, “Trump, Chinese leader face North Korea dilemma,” April 6, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/06/politics/trump-xi-north-korea/)

Analysts say there aren't any really new options for dealing with Pyongyang . "Dialogue, pressure and deterrence, or military measures -- it's really just a question of how the Trump administration is going to shuffle the deck they inherited," Snyder said.The US could apply more pressure on North Korea directly. Yoho suggests using "robust support for injecting outside information" into the closed country, to disrupt its control over its citizens, as well as more sanctions. The administration announced a new round on March 31.

Another option is to pressure Beijing by applying so-called secondary sanctions against Chinese firms that do business with North Korea, which Snyder said will cause friction. "How do you unilaterally impose sanctions on Chinese firms doing business with North Korea without risking the cooperation you need from China to put pressure on North Korea," he asked.

Others argue that this line of approach puts too much faith in the sway China holds over Pyongyang . Experts note that since taking power, Kim has systematically purged and killed rivals, many of whom had been diplomatic conduits to Beijing."I think we're putting way too much faith in thinking that China's got absolute control over North Korea," said retired Lt. Gen. Wallace Gregson, a former commander of US Marines in the Pacific. He argues that sanctions on North Korea are undermined by Pyongyang's massive

black market profits from businesses like counterfeiting and drug dealing."The North Korean leadership sits atop a worldwide global mafia and money flows in channels that are at least difficult to get to, even if we know about them," said Gregson, now senior director for China and the Pacific at the Center for the National Interest.

China’s pressuring North Korea now – Trump-Xi agreement, South Korea/China sanctions deal, and US show of force in Syria mean existing sanctions regime will be enforcedFoster 4/10(Alice Foster, Express UK, “USA v North Korea? Will the US attack North Korea?” April 10, 2017, http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/790229/USA-v-North-Korea-will-US-attack-Pyongyang-missile-tests-nuclear-threat)

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said Donald Trump and Xi Jinping had “extensive discussions around the dangerous situation in North Korea” at a summit at in Florida last week. “President Xi clearly understands, and I think agrees, that the situation has intensified and has

reached a certain level of threat that action has to be taken,” he told CBS’s Face the Nation.

Mr Tillerson did not elaborate on what those actions might be but his comments suggest that the Trump administration’s position may

be hardening on North Korea’s nuclear programme . Although a US Navy strike group is headed towards the Korean peninsula in a show of force, Washington has previously leaned towards sanctions and pressure to deter North Korea.

The US is highly unlikely to launch an attack on North Korea because the move could possibly

escalate tensions to nuclear war .America also recognises that the importance of having a joint approach with China, which remains North Korea’s most important ally in the region.

On Monday China and South Korea agreed to slap tougher sanctions on North Korea if the country carries out nuclear or long-range missile tests, according to an official in Seoul. International tensions have been heightened after the US President ordered missile strikes on a Syrian airbase in response to a deadly chemical attack by the Assad regime in Syria. Iran and Russia - key allies of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad - have indicated that the US strike on Friday crossed 'red lines' and they would respond to any new aggression.But this morning, former MI6 head Sir John Sawers warned that tensions with North Korea were actually a much bigger threat to world peace than the war in Syria. “If you are looking for a world crisis which could bring about the dangers of a clash between great powers then North Korea is a bigger concern than Syria,” he told BBC Four’s Today programme.

“I think what the Chinese are beginning to understand is that if this can’t be solved peaceably through negotiations, through pressure, then there is serious risk that the US will have only

one option left, which is the military option .”He said that the Americans have strengthened forces in the Korean Peninsula, deployed a battle group and demonstrated that the “ US was willing to use force against another state to uphold international order”.He added: “This is all part of a move, part of a calculation by the Trump administration that North Korea has to be treated very seriously, a very high priority.“And ultimately it needs a joint US Chinese approach to deal with this unless we are to avoid a further conflict on that peninsula.”

AFF – AT Appeasement Net Benefit

Appeasement theories are wrong and Chinese expansionism is a myth – even “worst case scenarios” don’t justify US military escalation or aggressive force posture – regional states effectively counter-balance China, and China can’t directly threaten the USSlater 17(Jerome Slater, Professor Emeritus of political science, SUNY Buffalo, “A Coming War With China?,” January 4, 2017, The Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jerome-slater/a-coming-war-with-china_b_13949580.html)

To begin with, most China and regional specialists are skeptical of pessimistic or alarmist

assessments of the Chinese threat in Asia. Rather, they argue that despite the admittedly worrying Chinese military buildup in general and in the South China Sea in particular, together with its assertive claims to small islands also claimed by other Asian states, Chinese behavior is best understood as motivated not by the grandiose policy of seeking “hegemony” over the region, but by more limited goals.In this view, then, China’s policies have been essentially defensive and reactive , driven by fears of the intentions of the U.S. and its Asian allies as well as by its historically understandable sense of vulnerability to perceived threats on its borders or neighboring oceans. To be sure, it seems apparent that China is also pursuing more assertive policies because of its economic interests in the disputed South China islands as well as because of largely symbolic issues, such as nationalist claims to “sovereignty” over the contested areas, particularly including its insistence that Taiwan must still be regarded as part of China and eventually must be “reunited” with it. It is important to note that many knowledgeable historians have said that these symbolic sovereignty claims have some historical validity , and heretofore they have not been challenged by U.S. presidents and governments.The real issue, then, is why these relatively limited Chinese goals should be seen as threatening to U.S. national security. Even if China develops expansionist intentions , it is hard to see why U.S. military power is necessary to maintain a “balance of power” in Asia—even assuming such a balance is essential to U.S. national security. In the absence of a U.S military role, states like Japan, Australia, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Vietnam—especially if they act collectively— would hardly be helpless to defend themselves

and their vital interests against any Chinese expansionism .In any event, even a worst-case scenario would not justify a U.S. preventive war to preserve a “balance of power” in Asia. That is, suppose a radically expansionist China succeeded in destroying the balance of power in Asia and, somehow, gained control of all the land masses, population, and resources of Asia? Even in that radically implausible case, U.S. national

security would not be at stake .There are only two ways in which our security could be threatened: by conventional invasion or by a nuclear attack. No defense expert takes seriously the notion that China — even one far more powerful than today’s — would be interested in, or capable of, crossing thousands of miles of ocean and invading a nuclear-armed United States. As for the nuclear danger, it

already exists, for China is capable of a massive nuclear attack against the U.S. from the weapons within its homeland, a threat that is already (or very soon will be) unpreventable and essentially absolute. That being the case, any subsequent Chinese expansionism would be irrelevant. Put differently, the most likely “threats” — Chinese border conflicts with neighboring states or military clashes over sovereignty claims in the South China Sea — have the least relevance to

U.S. national security , while the most theoretically dangerous ones — Chinese military

expansionism throughout Asia — are the least likely to occur .In sum, the best way for the U.S. to protect its national security from potential Asian threats is to jettison its balance of power policies and never again go to war there .