CISS Insight Vol II No 23.pdf

Editor-in-Chief Ambassador Ali Sarwar Naqvi

Finance Manager Yasir Mehmood

Editor Iftikhar Uddin Hasan

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CISS Researchers Dr. Simbal Khan Farzana Siddique Huma Rehman Majid Mehmood Muhammad Fasial Khusrow Akkas Abbasi

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Editor’s Note

Nuclear deterrence forms the fulcrum of strategic stability in South Asia since India and Pakistan took the crucial decision to become nuclear powers. In fact deterrence had become operational even before the two neighbors tested their nuclear weapons. Both states had some inkling that the other was developing nuclear weapons, even though they may have been ignorant about the level of advancement of each other’s nuclear programs. There was always a fear lurking in the minds of decision makers in both countries that nuclear weapons may come into play if one attacked the other. That explains why no major war was fought between them after 1971. Both neighbors were conscious of the associated risks of allowing a military conflict to escalate beyond a certain level and avoided a major war. Kargil and the twin crises of 2001-2002 had limited objectives, and both countries had worked hard as these crises unfolded to keep the conflict below the nuclear threshold. Since India and Pakistan became overt nuclear powers in 1998, both states have worked assiduously to fine tune deterrence stability in the region in the face of myriad challenges. When a certain development tilts the stability in one country’s favor the other takes appropriate measures to restore stability. It may be noteworthy that despite terrorists’ attacks on the Indian parliament and Mumbai, and the military confrontation following these events, deterrence stability at the macro level had remained intact. A few scholars however, have voiced their concerns regarding the robustness of deterrence stability between India and Pakistan, and Pakistan’s nuclear program has received greater attention from these scholars. A few years back it was argued that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were not secure enough and they could be vulnerable to attacks by terrorists and in the worst case scenario, it was feared these weapons could fall into terrorists’ hands. In recent years this view has changed and there is greater recognition of the safety measures taken by Pakistan to secure its nuclear weapons. Another concern, however, which relates to cross border terrorism still persists in some circles. It is premised on the fears that a terrorist attack, similar to the Mumbai attack, could trigger a chain reaction which may precipitate a nuclear war between the two south Asian nuclear powers. This line of thinking is based

on the assumption that Pakistani and Indian decision makers do not have sufficient understanding of the logic of deterrence and do not fully comprehend the enormity of destruction in South Asia if nuclear weapons are ever used by either state. This argument does not take into account the fact that both India and Pakistan have built their security architecture around the central concept of deterrence. In the event of a Mumbai like attack by terrorists in the future the leaders of the two countries are more likely to reach out to each other, for crisis management, rather than taking their two countries on the path to destruction. Such approach has been taken in the past and there is no evidence to believe that they would not act rationally in the future. In this context, it is important to note that leaders in both India and Pakistan recognize that terrorists are non-state actors and are pursuing their own agenda, independent of any state, as evident from a statement of Mr. Salman Khurshid, the foreign minister in the last Congress government in India, when he visited Pakistan. CISS has addressed the issue of strategic stability in South Asia by organizing a number of roundtable discussions and conferences. It has engaged with experts of global and regional repute and has held discussions on various aspects of South Asian strategic stability. In 2013 CISS organized workshops with Carnegie Endowment, Washington (CEIP) and the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) London, on the subject of the nature of deterrence and deterrence stability in South Asia. The Center believes that deterrence stability in South Asia is increasingly being influenced by complex factors that might jeopardize stability in the region and therefore an on-going dialogue involving regional, domestic and global strategic community will help in creating better understanding that could lead to meaningful solutions. It is in the this endeavor that CISS has been focusing on the varied dynamics of strategic stability and the latest issue of Insight carries an article on an important debate pertaining to deterrence stability in the region. The issue also contains articles on a number of other subjects of current interests, and book reviews of recent publications.

JUNE 2014 PAGE

1. Pakistan Japan Relations and Prospects for Peace and Development in South Asia Salma Malik

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2. US Rebalancing Strategy in Asia Pacific Region Khusrow Akkas Abbasi

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3. Emerging Regional Security Architecture in the Middle East- Post Arab Spring Period Muhammad Faisal

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4. Ukraine Crisis and its impact on Regional Security Environment Farzana Siddique

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5. CISS Analysis: Mark Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers (International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper, IISS) Nuclear Security Summit Process and Pakistan CISS Team

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6. Book Reviews:

Gary J. Bass, The Blood Telegram: India’s Secret War in East Pakistan

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General V.P. Malik, India’s Military Conflicts and Diplomacy: an inside View of Decision making

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Daniel S. Markey, No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

SEPTEMBER 2014 PAGE

1. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: A Brief History of Transformation and Migration Dr. Simbal Khan

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2. Changing Security Dynamics in Asia Pacific Region Khusrow Akkas Abbasi

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3. Pakistan-Saudi Arabia Strategic Relations: An Assessment Khushboo Ahmad & Muhammad Faisal

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4. Role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Deterrence Stability: Comparison of NATO countries and South Asia Huma Rehman

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5. CISS Analysis: Obama’s Foreign Policy: An Analysis CISS Team

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6. Book Reviews:

Carlotta Gall, The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan 2001-2014

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Dargon Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty

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Tughral Yamin, The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia

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1

Pakistan Japan Relations and Prospects for Peace and

Development in South Asia

Salma Malik

Page 1 to 15

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US Rebalancing Strategy in Asia Pacific

Khusrow Akkas Abbasi

Page 16 to 31

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Emerging Regional Security Architecture in the Middle East- Post Arab Spring Period

Muhammad Faisal

Page 32 to 46

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Ukraine Crisis and its impact on Regional Security Environment

Farzana Siddique

Page 47 to 59

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CISS Analysis

Mark Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers (Institute of Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper, IISS), pp 166

Nuclear Security Summit Process and Pakistan

CISS Team

Page 60 to 68

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Khusrow Akkas Abbasi: Book Review

Book Review By Khusrow Akkas Abbasi

Gary J. Bass, The Blood Telegram: India’s Secret War in East Pakistan (Random House India, 2013), pp. 499.

The Blood Telegram: India’s Secret War in East Pakistan by Gary J. Bass provides a historical look into events surrounding the creation of Bangladesh. The book provides us an insight into how Cold War geopolitics influenced the course of war and also talks about the direct role of the US in India-Pakistan war of 1971. It has been published in India as well as in the US, though, under a different sub-title. Bass is also the author of The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention and Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals. The author is presently a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University. He is a former reporter of The Economist and has also written for The New York Times, The New Yorker, The Washington Post, and other newspapers, besides Foreign Affairs, and Foreign Policy. Blood Telegram is a detailed description of events leading to India-Pakistan war of 1971 and the creation of Bangladesh. The author has done extensive research by looking into primary sources, declassified documents of the US State Department and tapes of conservations of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, and has interviewed American and Indian eyewitnesses of the events. The book details atrocities committed against the civilian population during the war and how Nixon and Kissinger aided and abetted in what the author calls “genocide”. The author’s description of war events lays bare Nixon’s personal opinion about Indian and Pakistani leadership (both East and West Pakistanis) along with Henry Kissinger’s role in shaping the course of war. Similarly the author narrates Indra Gandhi’s and her key decision makers’ hatred against Pakistan. The writer calls them ‘Kashmiri Mafia’. Yahya Khan is blamed for placing too much trust on promised American help for controlling the situation in the former East Pakistan. A big portion of the early part of the book shows the atrocities committed by the Pakistani government against East Pakistanis. The author is of the view that Nixon could have played a role in stopping the large scale killings of the civilians.

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He could have also stopped the war by putting arms embargo against Pakistan but Cold War politics and national interests of the US stood in the way of taking such a step. In order to support his argument the writer narrates what is already well known that the US had moved the Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal, and persuaded Jordan and Iran to transfer arms to Pakistan besides encouraging China to get involved in the Indo-Pak war by heating border dispute with India. In the author’s view India was insidiously unrolling its plan for breakup of Pakistan when the US was looking at the developments from a larger geo-political lens. The author opines that Nixon believed Indian victory would boost the Soviet Union’s confidence which would have opened a new phase of proxy wars in the region. It was, therefore, necessary to support Pakistan. Bass explains that Mrs. Indra Gandhi, the Indian prime minister waited past the monsoon season to launch an attack on East Pakistan, justifying it on humanitarian grounds. During this period, she along with establishment hawks, army’s top brass and local commanders of border security force (BSF) organized camps for training the East Bengalis in guerilla tactics and provided them arms. They were subsequently launched against the Pakistan army. The author describes how Indians aided and abetted these guerillas (muktis). Attacks by these guerillas forced counter attacks by Pakistan army leading to civil war. The author also reveals how Indian media and think tanks bullied Indian government, prior to the war, and forced it not to let go of the opportunity to breakup Pakistan. The “Indo–Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation” signed in August, 1971 enabled India to procure weapons and heavy war machinery from Russia. The treaty also forestalled the possible China threat. Mrs. Indra Gandhi was convinced that fall of Dhaka would make Pakistan militarily so weak that separatist movements in Balochistan and NWFP (now KPK) would gain momentum and Pakistan will become so involved with its internal conflicts that it will not be able to stand up to India in future. Although the author has extensively cited original State Department documents and Indian sources on the subject, a major flaw of the book is that it has ignored Pakistani sources. Similarly the author unjustifiably labels Biharis living in East Pakistan as fifth columnists. Biharis were Pakistani citizens and they believed that their loyalty lay with the Pakistani state. Instead of Biharis the Mukti Bahanis

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probably deserved the label as fifth columnists in the context of the then Pakistani state. The Blood Telegram: India’s Secret War in East Pakistan is one of many books available on the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war and does not add anything new on the subject. However the author has consulted authentic documentary evidence which increases its academic value. The book is recommended to anyone with an interest in understanding India’s secret role in Indo-Pak war of 1971. Many Pakistanis know only from Indian and western sources of Pakistan government’s and specifically Pakistani military’s role during war and only few know what actually happened. There are a number of books by Pakistani writers as well on this subject. ‘Witness to Surrender’ by Saddiq Salik, Hassan Zahir’s ‘The separation of East Pakistan’, ‘Tragedy of Errors: East Pakistan Crisis, 1968-1971’ by Kamal Matinuddin, ‘Pakistan’s Crisis of Leadership’ by Gen Fazal Muqeem to name some, and a number of books written by military officers who participated in the war in East Pakistan. More importantly some Bangladeshi writers have also written on this important phase in their country’s history. Some of these writers have challenged the dominant narrative, made popular by the western and Indian writers, about the events in 1971 and the creation of Bangladesh.

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Huma Rehman: Book Review

Book Review By Huma Rehman

General V.P. Malik, India’s Military Conflicts and Diplomacy: An Inside View of Decision Making (Harper Collins Publishers: India, 2013), 300

Indian Military Conflict and Diplomacy by General V.P. Malik would be of interest to many Pakistanis as it discusses civil-military relations in India and several operations carried out by the Indian armed forces inside and outside the Indian territories. The author had been a part of them and gives Indian perspective on these operations.

General V.P. Malik is a retired Indian army chief and had served in many important positions before taking over his responsibilities as head of the army. He, therefore, had the advantage of observing many events, in which Indian army played a role, from close quarters. The author describes Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka (1987), and Operation Cactus in Maldives (1988) in some detail. However of more interest to Pakistani readers would be the chapter on Kargil Conflict (1999).

Operation Pawan and Kargil have been discussed at length as. The author blames lack of timely and actionable intelligence, on ground situation in Sri Lanka and activities of Tamil supporters in India’s Tamil Nadu state for failure of operation Pawan. The author is all praise for successful operation by the Indian military in the Maldives which thwarted an attempted coup de’ate for taking over power by Abdullah Lutfee, a businessman with the support of People’s Organization of Tamil Elam (POLTE). The aim was to establish a safe base for the POLTE to operate from outside Sri Lanka. Operation Cactus was not a major military operation with regard to the strength of forces opposing Indian military as only eighty odd civilian mercenaries were involved in the coup attempt. Its significance, according to the author, lay in the rapidity with which Indian forces acted and the fact that they carried out the operation so far away from Indian shores. The author’s praise for the successful completion of this operation seems exaggerated as Indian forces had almost negligible opposition confronting it. With regard to Kargil conflict the author describes what is already well known to

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Pakistani readers. He has copiously quoted selected Pakistani analysts to support his views on the subject.

On nuclear issue General Malik reiterates Indian government’s stand and supports India’s decision to acquire nuclear capability. On India’s nuclear doctrine he seems to deviate a little from his country’s official position of No First Use by stating, “It would be irresponsible on the part of any leader – civil or military – to sermonize that these (nuclear weapons) are political assets only, never to be used. If in spite of diplomatic effort, a crisis escalates beyond the acceptable security threshold and the existence of nation state is at stake, nuclear weapons, if available, may come into play.”

Author’s views on civil-military relations in India and organization of higher defense management are worthy of greater attention and may have a few lessons for us in Pakistan. In a democratic dispensation political leadership of the country directly exercises control over the military. Many here believe that military in India works under the political control. That does not seem to be the case. General Malik resents the fact that instead of political leaders bureaucrats control the decision making process with regard to strategic matters with little or no input from the military. This, according to the author, has led to disastrous results in the past. “Military’s role in threat assessment and military acquisitions has been unduly restricted.” He quotes Kanti Bajpai, a well known Indian strategic analyst, to support his argument. In order to further emphasise significance of this argument he quotes K. Subrahmanyam, a renowned Indian strategists. India’s civil-military structure according to K. Subrahmanyam became where ‘politicians enjoy power without any responsibility, bureaucrats wield power without any accountability and military assumes responsibility without any direction.’ General Malik suggests that better co-ordination between India’s political and military leadership can achieve quicker and lasting results. He narrates how this co-ordination worked to India’s advantage during the Kargil conflict. Co-ordination in wake of Kargil, according to him, was however ad hoc, which needs to be institutionalized.

General Malik believes that India has the potential to become a regional power, if not a global power but is handicapped by its ineffective higher defense management structure in which bureaucracy plays an undue role, and its prevailing strategic culture which impedes extension of Indian’s influence

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internationally. Strategic culture or lack of it, in the author’s opinion, has often resulted in India’s inability to drive home the tactical advantages gained by its armed forces in the past. He quotes 1948 Kashmir war, 1971 war and Kargil as examples of lack of strategic clarity in India’s national thinking.

The author recommends aggressive military diplomacy in order to increase India’s influence beyond its borders. He elaborates his own role in building military ties with Myanmar, Nepal, Israel and the United States.

India’s Military Conflicts and Diplomacy: An Inside View of Decision Making is an important contribution on available literature on Indian military. It gives an insider’s view on the decision making process in India during military conflicts and existing higher defense management. The book’s major flaw, however, is that descriptions of many conflicts included in the book give only the Indian perspective. Inclusion of views of India’s adversaries in these conflicts would have provided greater insight to the reader with regard to operations carried out by the Indian armed forces.

Huma Rehman is a

CISS Research Officer

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Majid Mehmood: Book review

Book Review By Majid Mehmood

Daniel S. Markey, No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 247

In No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad Daniel S. Markey argues that Pakistan has often been a hostile and difficult partner for United States to manage. In his opinion, however, despite several setbacks and failures in the bilateral relationship neither Pakistan nor the United States can afford a permanent breakup. Markey maintains that there are immediate, vital and emergent threats emanating from Pakistan that will have a negative impact on US’ regional interests in South Asia, Central Asia and Middle East. It is due to this reason the author, contrary to what many experts and officials may feel in Washington, argues that the United States cannot afford to disengage from Pakistan. The term “No Exit” in the title of the book borrowed from an old WWII French play Huis Clos is meant to convey this sense of compulsive engagement. Daniel Markey methodically surveys Pakistan – US relations disaggregated at three levels of domestic, regional and international politics. As a result the reader easily grasps the arguments presented in the book. Markey has linked all his arguments on these three levels with broader US interests in the region in a manner that they truly reflect his all – inclusive understanding of Pakistan and US policy objectives in the region. There are broadly two themes covered in the book. The first theme is that Pakistan has transformed into a more dangerous country for US interests and poses a complex foreign policy challenge for the US. Markey in his observations on Pakistan notes the societal trends towards the radical right, the growing deterioration of state institutions and governance weaknesses. He believes that these trends coupled with Pakistan’s geopolitical and geostrategic features will create problems for US policy. The Second theme is the set of recommendations he gives to US policy makers as to how they could salvage the interests of the United States under multiple possible scenarios vis a vis Pakistan.

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Writing about Pakistan’s domestic politico-economic milieu, Markey has identified four different faces of Pakistan: an elite dominated country where feudals and top industrialists have appropriated its resources; a garrison state where the political center of power is the military; a terrorist incubator and lastly, a land of youthful idealists. The author has explained the evolution of these distinct faces of Pakistani society and arrives at three conclusions about the future trajectory of Pakistani State: First is revolution and state failure, second is continuation of crisis of Pakistani state in case if the revolution does not happen, and third is the success of reformist politics within Pakistan. The author describes in some detail the roots of anti – American sentiments within all the sections of Pakistani society i.e. among the liberal, nationalists and Islamists. The book focuses on how these sentiments have played a role in frustrating US financial and political engagement with Pakistan. A significant portion of the book covers the larger geopolitical context of US engagement with Pakistan and the South Asia region. The author has correctly identified that US engagement with Pakistan did not exist in a vacuum and was influenced by what was happening in the broader region and at the international level. In Cold War days, the author argues, containment of communism was US strategic goal which led to the engagement with Pakistan and resulted in security alliances and economic support. In the current context, managing the rise of China is becoming the operative principle underlying US interest in continuing its engagement with Pakistan. So the interest is not in Pakistan per se, but the broader regional developments are driving US policy. In the concluding chapters of the book, Daniel Markey has outlined policy options for the United States and also discusses their implications. The three options he presents are: defensive insulation, military first cooperation, and a comprehensive approach. In defensive insulation, the author argues for a stronger US pressure on Pakistan in case the US continues to fails in getting cooperation from an increasingly hostile Pakistan. According to Markey, this should be done by building diplomatic, military and political barriers around Pakistan in its immediate neighborhood. He argues that the US should also be prepared to target Pakistan’s nuclear program militarily.

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On military cooperation, Markey says that the US should enhance its military to military cooperation with Pakistan in order to cultivate officers within the Pakistan military ranks. In Markey’s opinion, this strategy would be aimed at countering increasing Islamist and anti-American currents in Pakistan’s military ranks. On comprehensive approach towards Pakistan, Markey argues for increasing US spending on economic, cultural and political spheres in the country and thus build moderate constituencies there. At the same time he argues against subsidizing Pakistan’s economic growth. The author maintains that this work has to be done by Pakistanis themselves and the US role should only be supportive. For South Asia watchers, the book provides tools for a deeper understanding of US policy towards Pakistan and South Asia. Three other books on similar topics written by important scholars on South Asia have recently been published in the United States. These are Stephen Cohen’s ‘Shooting for a Century: The India Pakistan Conundrum’, Bruce Reidel’s ‘Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back’ and Vali Nasr’s ‘The Dispensable Nation’. It is interesting to note that Markey’s assessment is not fundamentally different from what has been discussed in these books. In fact, this book reinforces the view that there is continuity in the US approach towards South Asia which is anchored around three core principles: rebalancing to Asia – Pacific, containment of China and propping up India as a regional counter weight to China. As a new government came into the office in Pakistan in 2013, it appears that the Obama administration has reviewed the tactics of its approach towards the new government but not the strategic objectives. These tactics include components of all the three policy options laid out by the author, Daniel S. Markey e.g. managing anti – Americanism through less visible involvement, giving time to Nawaz administration to settle down, suspending drone strikes, pushing IMF to inject money into Pakistan’s economy, increasing people to people contact and supporting Nawaz’s overtures to India and support for Afghan elections. The book reaffirms the prevailing view across all the sections in Pakistan that the US - Pakistan relations will remain transactional at best and may turn outright hostile in certain situation despite what the pleasantries of strategic dialogue

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process may suggest. It is also difficult to agree with the author that any potential radical/revolutionary political change in Pakistan will lead to state collapse. Linking the two without any substantive evidence reflects the tendency towards oversimplification on the part of many western writers on a complex subject of state, society and political order in a developing Islamic state. It will be a test of Pakistani leadership to navigate the country out of complex strategic environment evolving in the wake of the US policies in the region. The book provides an excellent reading material for Pakistani and non–Pakistani academics, practitioners of policy and strategy in the fields of security, foreign policy, observers of the US-Pakistan, and US – South Asia relations.

September, 2014

1

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: A Brief History of Transformation and Migration

Dr. Simbal Khan

Page 1 to 9

10

Changing Security Dynamics in Asia Pacific Region

Khusrow Akkas Abbasi

Page 10 to 22

23

Pakistan-Saudi Arabia Strategic Relations: An Assessment

Khushboo Ahmad & Muhammad Faisal

Page 23 to 37

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Role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Deterrence Stability: Comparison of NATO countries and South Asia

Huma Rehman

Page 38 to 48

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CISS Analysis

Obama’s Foreign Policy: An Analysis

CISS Team

Page 49 to 52

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Carlotta Gall, The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan 2001-2014 (Penguin Books Ltd, 2014), 329

In The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan 2001-2014 Carlotta Gall argues that Pakistan is responsible for the resurgence of Taliban resistance post 2001 and negatively impacted US war strategy in Afghanistan. In her opinion, the patronage and protection that Taliban movement enjoyed within Pakistan after their retreat from Afghanistan was not coincidental but a matter of policy by the Pakistan army. The book is a narrative about the conditions, resources and methods used by the Taliban to stage a comeback within few years after their defeat in 2001. It also narrates how the local, regional and global developments helped the insurgency in maintaining its momentum against the Western forces. The title of the book “The Wrong Enemy” is a quotation from Richard C. Holbrooke, the United States special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, who said: “We may be fighting the wrong enemy in the wrong country.” As a part of her job as a reporter with daily New York Times, Carlotta Gall was able to observe the conflict and insurgency in Afghanistan at the local and regional levels by going into the field. She was able to travel in the pro-Taliban villages extensively, mainly in Southern Afghanistan, to study the insurgency’s main support base. Looking at the situation at the local level, Gall addresses and explains how poor governance in Afghanistan, local grievances of Pushtun tribes, Islamic influence, civilian casualties caused by US raids and their support for Afghan militias, resulted in creating the support base for the Taliban. At the regional level, Gall explains Pakistan’s linkages with Taliban, which in her view was an important reason for the worsening situation in Afghanistan. The author also highlights misplaced US priorities and insufficient resource allocation to Afghanistan as contributing factors for the Taliban gains during 2003-2009 period. The book attempts to give a voice to common man on the ground in Afghanistan and present the viewpoints of tribal leaders, former Mujahedeen and common

Book Review By Majid Mehmood

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villagers regarding the insurgency and state of governance in Afghanistan. Gall has reproduced, in the book, the wide spread grievances and resentments of the larger segments of Afghan population against the US led international forces and Kabul administration in an unadulterated manner. The broader chronicling by Gall on Afghan war, Pakistan’s relationships with militant groups and the thesis that the real enemy for the US in the region is Pakistan army and ISI is hardly new. The segment of the book which has attracted wider attention to the book are where the author talks about the security structure that she believed existed in Pakistan which knew Osama Bin Laden’s (OBL) exact whereabouts. Except for one unnamed inside source claimed by Gall, possibly from the US, the book provides no new information or definitive proof of Pakistani complicity in hiding OBL and the discussion remains limited to circumstantial evidence. Gall admits that the information of a special ‘one-man’ desk ran by the ISI to handle OBL was never confirmed by a second source but claimed in the book that two former senior government officials affirmed that the information was consistent with their own findings. This thin evidence, however, does not prevent her from claiming Pakistan’s complicity. Despite the unfounded sensationalism the strong point of the book is that Gall has reached out to people on the ground in Afghanistan in order to understand the societal support for Pushtun insurgency there. The author also managed to interview some of important operational commanders of the Taliban providing the readers a mix insurgent viewpoint of both resilience and some fatigue. The local account presented by the author reaffirms the viewpoint held by many experts of the subject that the fundamental driver of Taliban insurgency rests within Afghanistan. External circumstances are only a partial explanation of the enduring insurgency. American policy in Afghanistan has not escaped scrutiny and criticism in the book. The author criticizes US policy and considers it a major reason for instability in Afghanistan. Some components of US strategy that Gall scrutinizes are diversion from Afghanistan to Iraq, less resource allocation, military raids on civilian population and supporting criminal elements within Afghan society for limited tactical gains.

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She also explains how the US lost the battle of hearts and minds in Afghanistan by alienating local populations, thus creating space for the insurgents to expand their support base among the Pushtun tribes and villagers. A good example is the heartbreaking story of Dilawar, a naive taxi driver who was wrongly arrested in Khost in eastern Afghanistan, incarcerated in an isolation ward at the US airbase at Bagram and then beaten to death by his American jailors. She spent many weeks tracking down Dilawar’s family and obtained the death certificate issued by the US Army. On other occasions, Gall describes the anger and rage within the locals in the aftermaths of night raids and bombings on people gathered for the wedding processions. Gall has provided no insights on the larger regional geopolitical struggle in Afghanistan due to which regional powers, including Pakistan, have to maintain contacts, and support groups within Afghanistan. Unlike what Gall would like her readers to believe, supporting sub-conventional/proxy forces as tools of statecraft is a phenomenon not limited to Pakistan. In several other instances states in the region and other parts of the world have relied on proxies to enhance their security and mitigate geo-political threats. Moreover, Gall does not investigates Pakistan’s role in helping the US in integrating militant groups into US supported political system in Afghanistan or how information provided by Pakistan regarding their operations supported US war effort. Carey Schofield in her book Inside the Pakistan army: A women’s experience on the frontlines of the war on terror has described in detail how both major and minor Pakistan military operations in FATA, since 2002, were driven with US assistance and support. Details of secret meetings between US and Pakistan army’s senior leadership available through WikiLeaks reveal a different picture of US-Pakistan relations when it comes to Taliban and Afghanistan as opposed to the simplistic “double game” argument furthered by Gall. The book is a narration of the war in Afghanistan post 2001 written from a journalistic viewpoint. The book lacks in-depth analysis of various internal and external factors that were responsible for setback to the US forces in Afghanistan. It includes some new information related to Afghan war but hardly adds to the existing body of the knowledge on the subject. Moreover, majority of sources in the

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book regarding Taliban’s relationship with Pakistan are cited from Afghan intelligence sources which are reflexively anti Pakistan and are biased. The use of information in the book based on accounts by intelligence sources is an acceptable practice. As a journalist however, it is important to double check the information received from one source from another sources. Difficult as that may be, a more rigorous use of tools of research methodology could have been practiced by the author to better explain and contextualize the intelligence information. This approach is something which is missing in the book.

Majid Mehmood is a CISS Research Officer

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Farzana Siddique: Book review

Dargon Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty (Crown Publisher: United Sates of America, 2012), 529

Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty is an in-depth look at the growing income and wealth disparities between rich and poor countries. The central theme of this book is to explain the concept of inclusive and extractive political and economic systems, which according to the authors are responsible for the disparity of wealth among the countries. Authors have made a comparative analysis of the countries like US, Britain and Germany with the poor countries, such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central America and South Asia. The authors categorize the two sets of countries, the rich and the poor, according to the socio-political systems prevailing in each state. Developed countries have an inclusive system and most of the developing countries are practicing extractive political and economic systems. The whole debate in the book revolves around the framework of inclusive political and economic systems and its impact on an economic and political progress of the country whose institutions are practicing these systems. The authors have explained these concepts with the help of analogies and tested their theory on the basis of historical experiences of various states and their current status in the world. The book has fifteen chapters. In each chapter the authors explain, by discussing examples of different countries, that they are poor not because of their history, geography or culture, but because of lack of political and economic vision of leaders and functioning of their government institutions. The authors categorise the two sets of countries, the rich and the poor, according to the socio-political systems prevailing in each state. Rich countries have an inclusive system and the poor countries follow an extractive system. A state’s politics and economic system determine how its institutions create incentives for better economic growth. The authors have discussed the case of Nogales which is an area divided between Mexico and the USA and compared the Mexican part with Arizona in some detail.

Book Review By Farzana Siddique

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They point out that both these areas have similar climate and landscape yet the people living on the American side of the fence have a distinctively better standard of living as compared to those living on the Mexican side of the border. If people living on both sides of the border have the same culture, origin and geography then why those residing in one part are rich and in the other poor. This is the question the authors have tried to answer in their well researched and voluminous study on reasons behind failure of states to prosper. After raising some very profound questions in the first chapter the authors give answers in the subsequent parts of the book by discussing examples of different countries in different historical eras. Chapter number eleven titled Virtuous Circle can be considered the most important chapter of the book as the authors’ attempt to answer most of the questions raised earlier in the book. They conclude that key to prosperity of nations lay in adherences to the rule of law, which should treat all citizens equally without any discrimination of color, creed or race. The authors call this a virtuous circle. They explain the virtuous circle concept in detail with the example of Glorious Revolution of 1688 and how Black Act promulgated in 1723 paved the way for emergence of a pluralistic society that empowered common people in Britain and led to Industrial Revolution. Rich countries promote pluralistic societies and the rule of law as noted earlier. In comparison to rich countries the poor countries have an extractive system which exploits the weak and the poor segments of the society and protects the politically and economically privileged classes. Instead of applying the rule of law equally to all citizens it is selectively used to extract more privileges for the powerful elites of the country. The authors have called this a vicious circle. It is much like the Vicious Circle of poverty the economists have been talking about for years. In the chapter Why Nations Fail Today the authors further elaborate the extractive system by discussing the examples of some African, Asian and Latin American states. They note that countries with different geographical features, temperatures, latitudes and ruled by different colonial powers have remained poor because institutions in these countries continue to function as extractive political and economic systems. According to the authors democracy is the best political system in practice in the world today. They however differentiate

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between countries following a democratic system with an inclusive political system and those with an extractive political system even though the government in those countries may be democratic in form. Countries like the US, Britain and Germany practice democracy with inclusive institutional setup. Whereas country like North Korea practices an extractive model based on the communist foundation of their state’s governing system. This system has deprived people of their rights by allowing them minimum participation in political decision making of the country. Authors also discuss the cases of Middle Eastern and North African countries in recent past which have been shaken by the ‘Arab Spring.’ The authors believe that breaking the vicious circle is not easy but also not impossible. In their opinion revolutions and civil wars unfolding in the Middle East and Africa and might be able to break the vicious circle of poverty if they mould their politico-economic structure on the lines of inclusive political and economic systems. The analysis in the book has its limitations. Beyond their inclusive vs. extractive view of political and economic institutions the authors have not taken into account all other factors like history, geopolitics, social structure of society and leadership that impact the political character of a country. They never explain how a country can move to acquire more “inclusive” institutions. The theory which they have applied to draw comparison between inclusive and extractive concepts to explain all economic and political limitations of different continents, regions, and regimes is not sufficient to analyze the factors that determine the success or failure of a country. The authors believe that political “inclusiveness” must come first, even before growth is achieved. Yet most examples of economic growth in the last 50 years–the Asian miracles of Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, China and Singapore took place when their political system tended to be non-democratic. The book is worth reading as it is a good contribution to the existing literature on historical evidences of economic development and growth in wealth in different part of the world. The book is the result of in depth study of fifteen years research of Acemoglu and Robinson. It is also a master piece of great primary research of

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data collected by authors through extensive traveling. They collected extraordinary historical evidence from ancient empires to modern state systems to build a new theory of political economy with relevance to the current political and economic problems.

Farzana Siddique is a CISS Research Officer

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Kulsoom Belal: Book Review

Tughral Yamin, The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia (Islamabad: The Army Press, 2014), 272

Dr. Tughral Yamin’s The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia is his first book. The book is based on the work done by him for his doctoral dissertation but has been updated to address the current developments and issues. His recently published second book is Cyberspace CBMs between Pakistan and India. Yamin specializes on the issues of strategic stability and regional peace, confidence building measures and conflict resolution. The author has served in the Pakistan Army and retired as a brigadier. Currently he holds the position of Associate Dean at Center for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST). In The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia, the author argues that the dynamics of strategic stability inherent in the possession of nuclear weapons is as much applicable in the South Asian environment as it was during the Cold War period. Although the Cold War has become an over-analyzed subject the writer uses this as a context to discuss the significance of nuclear weapons in bringing stability between India and Pakistan. The author has premised his arguments on the theoretical work done by Bernard Brodie, Henry Kissinger, Herman Kahn, Robert Jervis etc. on the concepts of strategic stability and nuclear deterrence. The author has also looked in detail at the doctrinal and strategic development during the Cold War and showed how the concept of deterrence has been transformed by the states over the years to enhance the credibility for countering threats. He has critically analyzed the security dilemma between India and Pakistan emanating from the Kashmir dispute and the increasing military imbalance. Additionally, the book also presents a history of the evolution of arms control treaties both in the Cold War period and for South Asia. Thus, covering a wide range of topics to make a well rounded analysis on strategic stability The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia is a useful addition to the scholarly work done on South Asia.

Book Review By Kulsoom Belal

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The pivot of the author’s argument is that the ‘fear’ of inflicting unacceptable damage on one another deters the adversaries from escalating the conflict. In the nuclear era, the concept of deterrence has risen to a “new and inviolate level” as any nuclear use would result in a similar retaliation that would lead to total annihilation of both parties, which in other words would be an act of suicide. Thus, nuclear weapon states keep the level of crisis low to avert the danger of nuclear use by either state. Precisely this is the algebra of strategic stability between nuclear weapons states. The writer elaborates his argument and emphasizes that just as nuclear weapons maintained crisis stability in the past between the Cold War rivals, similarly, these weapons have and will continue to maintain strategic stability in South Asia’s ‘enduring rivalry’. The writer has referred to various crises between the US and the USSR and between India and Pakistan, and has showed that in all cases neither state wanted to escalate crisis to a level that would increase the probability of nuclear weapon use by either state. For example, he has compared the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 between the US and the USSR with 2001-02 military stand-off between Pakistan and India as incidents that came closest to nuclear use. However, in both these situations, while the states signaled the probability of nuclear use, they also used backchannel diplomacy to back down. The upshot of all these crises was that they always remained far from escalating to the next level. By relating these crises in detail, the writer explains that the rationality in deterrence theory transcends all states whether they are Cold War rivals or South Asian adversaries. The importance of The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia is that it puts forth an objective and well argued analysis of South Asian deterrence stability. The writer also argues that Pakistan, despite being a weaker and smaller state than India, with the possession of nuclear weapons is able to maintain balance of power against its adversary. This, in turn, has brought peace and stability between the two countries and in the region. The book presents a comprehensive analysis on the dynamics of strategic stability in South Asia and details the current state of strategic stability in the region. It gives the strategic assets of both India and Pakistan to show how the widening military asymmetry is tilted in India’s favor, making Pakistan increasingly vulnerable. The author says that the development of India’s offensive preemptive doctrine like Cold Start and Ballistic Missile Defense Shield with its improving conventional and

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nuclear force capability can drastically disturb Pakistan’s security calculus. This could result in arms race in the region, and therefore, can undermine strategic stability between the two neighbours. The book dedicates a chapter to the strategic culture of South Asia. Although it discusses strategic culture of India only briefly, it analyzes Pakistan’s strategic culture in greater detail. Predominantly, it discusses the role of the military in decision making but negates the popular misperception that military alone sits at the helm of affairs in the country. For example, the writer recounts that the decision to start Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program was entirely taken by Z A Bhutto. The other important aspect discussed by the writer about country’s strategic culture is the influence of United States in the decision making by Pakistani leaders. The writer has described it as ‘larger than life’. He recollects that Pakistani leaders preferred alliance with West to buttress the country’s security against its traditional enemy, India. However, over the years, each period of engagement with the US has left Pakistan more disillusioned. This has led to resentment among the public against the US. However, the writer adds that the US also wants to keep engagement with Pakistan because of its geo-strategic importance, for instance, during the Afghan Wars, and also because Pakistan is a nuclear weapon state. These factors add further complication in the relations between the two. The book also has minor limitations. For example, it does not take into account the arguments of nuclear pessimists of South Asia. The writer does throw a gauntlet to the nuclear pessimists by saying that they “fail to suggest a viable alternative” as since 1971, no full scale war has occurred between India and Pakistan because both countries have nuclear weapons. He only briefly discusses the command and control structure (C2) and safety of nuclear weapons in Pakistan. The concerns of nuclear pessimists regarding the C2 and safety and security of nuclear weapons should have been more substantially addressed as available literature on this subject is scarce. Second, whereas the book is divided into two parts; the first part discusses the Cold War scenario of strategic stability and the second draws its parallel in South Asian context. All theories are presented in one chapter instead of discussing them under their relevant head and contextualizing them with the discussion in the particular chapter.

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Notwithstanding the occasional lapses in proofreading, the book makes a lasting impact on the readers with its probing and detailed arguments. I would recommend this book to the students of international relations and strategic studies and all others who may be interested in subjects related to national security, strategic stability and nuclear deterrence.

Kulsoom Belal is a CISS Internee

CISS was established in October 2010 and has embarked on a challenging task, that of promoting a better understanding of international strategic issues pertaining to our region, both in Pakistan and abroad. We feel that there is a need now, more than ever before, for objective and impartial analyses and assessment of international issues from a Pakistan perspective.

CISS Insight Vol II No 23.pdf

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Transcript of CISS Insight Vol II No 23.pdf