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ADVISORY BOARD

Dr. Naeem Ahmed Salik, Senior Research Fellow CISS

Dr. Adil Sultan, Ph.D Qauid-e-Azam University

Dr. Tahir Amin, VC, Bahauddin Zakariya University

Dr. Shabana Fayyaz, Assistant Professor, Qauid-e-Azam University

Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema, President Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad

Dr. Salma Shaheen, Independent Analyst, United Kingdom

Dr. Christine M. Leah, Ph.D, Australian National University

Dr. Walter Anderson, Senior Adjunct Professor, John Hopkins University

Dr. Rizwan Zeb, Independent Analyst, Australia

EDITORIAL BOARD

Editor in Chief Ambassador (Rtd) Ali Sarwar Naqvi

Editor Col. (Rtd) Iftikhar Uddin Hasan

Associate Editor Ms. Saima Aman Sial

Assistant Editor Ms. Maryam Zubair

IT Support Shahid Wasim Malik

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Quarterly Journal ofCenter for International Strategic Studies

Vol-VI, No.1March, 2018

4 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities

PAGE

ARTICLES:

i

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities Muhammad Sarmad Zia

1

ii

The US-India Strategic Partnership: Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Response Riaz Khokhar

23

iii

China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan Samran Ali

50

iv

Formulation of Pakistan’s Cyber Security Policy: Comparative Approaches Afeera Firdous

70

BOOK REVIEWS:

i Ben Buchanan, The Cybersecurity Dilemma-Hacking, Trust and Fear Between Nations

95

ii The Longest August: The Unflinching Rivalry

between India and Pakistan 99

iii Chris Ogden ed. New South Asian Security: Six

Core Relations Underpinning Regional Security 104

CONTENTS



Pakistan’s Foreign Policy:

Challenges and Opportunities

Muhammad Sarmad Zia

Introduction

A country’s foreign policy is the lens through which it sees the rest

of the world. It is of crucial significance in correctly reflecting its

ambitions, goals and apprehensions vis-à-vis its neighborhood as

well as the regional and the international milieu. In order to

maintain cordial and balanced relations in the international arena,

states employ several different tactics and methods. In the course

of achieving this, states face many hardships. In this paper,

Pakistan’s foreign policy will be analyzed to lay out the challenges

it is facing currently and also the opportunities that are present for

Pakistan to explore.

It is a well-known fact that Pakistan’s foreign policy has undergone

changes several times over the last few decades. Both military

dictators and democratic leaders have shaped the country’s foreign

policy according to their governing styles, thought processes,

political influences and their understanding of the country’s

security imperatives. Meanwhile, the external factors such as

evolving regional, geo-political and global environment have played

an equally critical role in shaping the foreign policy of Pakistan in

different eras. Pakistan’s foreign policy at any given time is a

resultant of both these factors.

In achieving its foreign policy milestones, Pakistan has faced many

challenges and experienced pressure from global and regional

powers. The geo-political factors interplay with national

imperatives, which leads to a bargain between the two, and

adjustment of both domestic and foreign policy.



A country’s foreign policy draws its strength from its domestic

power potential, more commonly known as its national power.1 The

elements that combine to forge national power can vary from a

country to country and are dependent on how the policy makers

utilize them. Pakistan’s strength lies in its geography, human

resource, natural resources, military, technological base, and high

morale of the population amongst others. Pakistan is situated in one

of the most important regions of contemporary world and can be

considered as a crossing point of world’s major energy routes and

economic linkages.2 Pakistan’s founder, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad

Ali Jinnah appreciated Pakistan’s geo-strategic importance and in

an interview to an American journalist in Septmeber 1947, he said,

“Pakistan is the pivot of the world, placed on the frontier on which

the future position of the world revolves.“3 Moreover, the situation

in Afghanistan, China’s interest in Pakistan, the rising strategic

importance of the Indian Ocean Region and Indo-Pak nuclear

stability-instability paradox mark Pakistan’s importance in the

international arena.

It is important to discuss the current situation in Pakistan – in light

of the evolving geo-strategic environment – to understand the

contours of Pakistan’s foreign policy which are constantly being re-

examined, re-organized, refined and redefined.4 Pakistan played an

instrumental role against Soviet Union in Afghan War during 1980’s

and again in US invasion of Afghanistan post 9/11, which resulted

in the reconfiguration of power quotient of stakeholders in

Afghanistan. Moreover, the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001

precipitated grave destabilization inside Pakistan. The current

democratic situation in Pakistan is a result of the threats emanating

from many different sources which include several non-state

actors. The aftermath of the war in Afghanistan and India’s use of

non-state actors5 inside Pakistan has resulted in Pakistan

incorporating an internal security model and a security setup that

requires a strong injection of human resource and capital.



For Pakistan, fostering a strong economic and security relationship

with a more powerful country is vital to its stability. Any

compromise on the security of the state, internal or external, is out

of question for any government in the country. Pakistan’s economic

and strategic imperatives are based on its national interest and

whilst in the current day and age no country can progress in

isolation, the essence of any policy is to ensure that it benefits the

state itself. Pakistan’s relations, bi-lateral or multi-lateral with

other states, are based on how they can promote the Pakistani state.

Pakistan’s internal and external security, cordial relations with all

states, economic development human development, protection of

overseas Pakistanis and projection of its soft image are some of the

imperatives of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Quaid-e-Azam’s vision of

Pakistan’s foreign policy was laid out in these words,

Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill

towards all the nations of the world. We do not cherish

aggressive designs against any country or nation. We

believe in the principle of honesty and fair play in national

and international dealings and are prepared to make our

utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and

prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will

never be found lacking in extending its material and moral

support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the

world, and in upholding the principles of the United

Nations Charter.6

The official text on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) website

lays out the objectives of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy as:

Promotion Pakistan as a dynamic, progressive, moderate,

and democratic Islamic country.

Developing friendly relations with all countries of the world,

especially major powers and immediate neighbours.

Safeguarding national security and geo-strategic interests,

including Kashmir.



Consolidating our commercial and economic cooperation

with international community.

Safeguarding the interests of Pakistani Diaspora abroad.

Ensuring optimal utilization of national resources for

regional and international cooperation.7

The current government of Pakistan has actively been trying to

achieve these objectives through its different ministries and

departments – all over the country; and embassies and offices – all

over the world. Although there is much work to be done and many

goals yet to be achieved, there are many milestones that Pakistan

has achieved over the years.

Decision-making in Pakistan

In the years since its inception, the decision-making process vis-à-

vis foreign policy in Pakistan has undergone several changes. The

military dictators, at least in the early years, it can be argued, used

the rational decision-making model8 which circumvented the

bureaucracy and other legs of the decision-making process. Since

the government was headed by a single person along with a small

group of close aides, the role of other power centers or offices

remained low. On the other hand, the civilian governments tend to

arrive at decisions using up different models such as the

organizational model or the governmental politics model.

Nonetheless, even in democratic set-ups, the rational actor model

(RAM) is often used to help explain the decisions. The tussle

between different ministries, power centers and political parties

has been a major challenge in Pakistan which can be explained

through the organizational model.

In the last ten years, Pakistan is leaning towards an increasingly

democratic set-up which is the first step in bringing in a foreign

policy decision-making based on democratic values. The decision-

making is a product of bargain and negotiation between internal



factors which include the political leadership, foreign ministry,

military, and influential moulders of public opinion; and the

external factors such as evolving geo-strategic environment, global

economic trends, relations with a certain state or group of states

and harmonization with the requirements set by international

organizations.

With the third democratic government poised to set in after the

2018 elections, it is also likely that the institutions responsible for

policy making will gain strength. This will have a two-pronged

effect; one, that it would strengthen the democratic system, and

two, it will foment an environment where decision-making

becomes independent of personalities and instead draws strength

from the institutional set-up.9 Currently the Foreign Office, Prime

Minister’s office and military play an important role in shaping up

the country’s foreign policy as all three offices have different angles

and vantage points to assess the domestic and geo-political

environments.

Regards to important foreign policy and national security matters,

the Former Director General Inter-Services Intelligence Maj.

General Ashraf Jahangir Qazi notes that the security agencies,

primarily ISI in Pakistan, have a major impact on the formulation of

foreign policy through briefing to the Prime Minister and cabinet;

wherein regular reports to foreign office and communication

between numerous levels of ISI and Foreign Affairs both at home

and abroad – and input given to Joint Staff Head Quarters, Defence

Council and Defence Committee of the Cabinet play a vital role.10

This information is provided to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

which has the primary responsibility of formulating policies and

keeping in view the foreign policy options based on various factors

and in accordance with changing environment and requirements.

The next step in the process is the policy draft being forwarded to

the Cabinet of the Prime Minister which may approve or reject a

policy recommendation. From here, if approved, it goes back to the

Ministry of Foreign affairs which then supervises its execution and



implementation. The core intelligence input into the decision-

making and formulation of foreign policy is provided by the

intelligence agencies, and primarily by the ISI which conveys this

information formally by three means:

1. Briefing to the Cabinet by DG ISI.

2. Regular reports to foreign office and interaction between

various echelons of ISI and MOFA (Ministry of Foreign

Affairs) both at home and abroad.

3. Briefing at JSHQ which the DG ISI gives to all the service

chiefs. Similarly, DG ISI gives his input to Defence Council

and Defence Committee of the Cabinet. Apart from this,

informally the Prime Minister may ask for a paper on any

topic to be formulated by the Intelligence or the Foreign

Office can require any information from ISI.11

In 2014, DCC was reconstituted into Cabinet Committee on National

Security (CCNS) to focus on national security policies of the

state.12 It is headed by the Prime Minister, and its members include

the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior and Finance,

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chiefs of Staff of

Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force. The committee meets to discuss

national security and foreign policy challenges and uses the input

from all concerned parts of the government. Upon the formation of

CCNS, Prime Minister Khaqan Abbasi’s office laid out its objectives

as,

The Committee will focus on the national security agenda

with the aim to formulate a national security policy that will

become the guiding framework for its subsidiary policies –

defence policy, foreign policy, internal security policy, and

other policies affecting national security.13

In the process of decision-making it is critical to understand that

Pakistan has a highly sensitized public ready to react to any

adventurous foreign policy action that goes against the generally

accepted norms and public opinion. Therefore, it is a difficult task



to drift away in a major way from the status-quo policies vis-à-vis

certain states. For instance, Pakistanis have an affinity towards

Muslim states, especially in the Middle East with Saudi Arabia and

UAE particularly. The Pakistani government enjoys brotherly

relations with both states; however, Pakistan decided to remain

neutral in the Saudi-led intervention Yemen against Iranian back

Houthis in 201514 owing to its national security issues as well the

problems associated with the intervention itself.15 This irked the

majority of Pakistani public who fervently support Saudi Arabia’s

regime owing to its status as custodian of the two most holy places

in the Islamic world. Similarly, Pakistan’s relations with China are

sacrosanct in both official and public domains. Therefore, the

foreign office must exercise extra caution with regards to devising

policies for these countries.

Overview of International Strategic Environment

A look at the international strategic milieu is a necessary

constituent of a discussion of the foreign policy of Pakistan. It would

be helpful in understanding how the relations and events are

unfolding in the neighboring, regional and global regions. The

interplay of regional and global power politics is also a factor and

determinant in shaping the foreign policy of a state. Pakistan’s

position in the world in terms of its geography, geo-political

position, military might, economic position and relations with other

states are some of the elements that determine how it is seen in the

world as well as affected by any transformations at regional and

global level. A complement to this phenomenon is also the interest

of different states in a region or a particular state.

It is important to see how Pakistan’s relationship with US – a global

power – and China, an economic powerhouse is shaping up. There

are a few changing trends in the international system which directly

affect Pakistan. A growing Indo-US relationship, the evolving

situation in Afghanistan, and the overarching US-China and US-



Russia relationships are both directly and indirectly impact to how

Pakistan pursues its foreign policy.

It can be seen that the US has an increasing tilt towards India. After

signing the Indo-US Nuclear Deal in 2008,16 there is a visible

alignment of goals by both states in South Asia and Indo-Pacific

region. While the US might seek to maintain its influence in South

Asia by empowering India and countering China, Indian objectives,

however lie beyond South Asia to attain global rather than just

regional relevance. The US policy in Afghanistan and its support to

India’s increasing economic activity in Afghanistan indicate the

shift in US’ Pakistan policy. President Trump’s South Asia policy,17

again, lays out how its priorities in South Asia have evolved and the

overall strategic goals that the US seeks to achieve.

The overall strategic environment is developing in the way that the

US sees China’s rise in terms of its economy and military revamping

as a threat to its global dominance.18 It is also true that the US

appreciates that China is beyond US’ control and China’s

maneuvering, in complete contrast to that of the Soviet Union, has

allowed it to cultivate economic, military and social links in many of

its neighboring states which give it the space to exercise its muscle.

China’s One-Belt, One-Road Project, despite its apparent economic

outlook is also seen as a status-quo challenge to the US. China’s

ambitious connectivity project circumvents any design to contain

the country in anyway. Pak-China Economic Corridor becomes a

factor of concerns for the US and India, as both view it as an effort

to decrease US’ influence in South Asia and other regions

constraining Indian space from expanding its influence. The US has

always been wary of Pak-China close relations19 and does not want

China to be dominating the economic and political sphere in South

Asia.

With Russia’s entry into the global power politics, the US and its

allies have termed it as a revisionist state. In the wake of the conflict

in Syria, Russia has taken the forefront and challenged the military



might of the US and its allies’ to keep Syria’s president Bashar-ul-

Assad in power.20 A growing Russo-China nexus can also be seen

with many joint economic projects worth billions of dollars. Both

states decided to trade in their own currencies, which will lessen

dollar’s importance. In South Asia’s context, as relations between

India and US climb new highs, the relations between Pakistan and

Russia also have witnessed a landmark change in energy and

military domains.

While it is fairly reasonable to infer that Russia’s warming up to

Pakistan is linked to Russia trying to diversify the market for its oil

and gas companies, defence production and securing new allies, it

also signifies Pakistan’s position in the regional context. Currently,

Pakistan and Russia also have a convergence of interests in

Afghanistan.

Challenges for Pakistan’s foreign policy

Pakistan is currently at a juncture where policy-making and its

implementation face immense challenges from both within and

without the government system. Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry has

capable officials, who are well-versed in both diplomatic relations

and crisis management, therefore, unwarranted, and excessive

political interference may impede efficient policy implementation

process. On the other hand, incapable political supervision is also

responsible for many issues at the national and international levels.

While the bureaucracy performs its daily duties and is headed by

the foreign secretary who is a career diplomat, the political head of

the ministry is the foreign minister who is responsible for the

state's diplomacy. However, from 2013 to 2017, Pakistan did not

have a Foreign Minister – the Prime Minister himself tended to

Foreign Ministry business, which was an added responsibility for

the country’s leader.21 This approach had several problems, some

of which include a passive foreign policy stance at many forums

where the foreign minister’s direct and personal involvement on



these occasions would have created greater impact.22 It was also the

first time a democratically elected government had completed its

tenure and transition of power had taken place to another

democratically elected government. It was a time for Pakistan to

celebrate and promote this newly achieved success by appointing a

minister who could project Pakistan’s soft-image all over the world.

Currently, Pakistan is facing an internal strife coupled with

aggression from two of its four bordering states i.e. India and

Afghanistan, and border force skirmishes with Iran. The internal

dynamics of the country in terms of its economy and human

development are also a downward trend. Pakistan’s position in the

global arena is in recent years losing its importance and has only

been in the lime-light for all the wrong reasons. Despite meeting the

same criterion as India on the Nuclear Supplier’s Group, Pakistan’s

attempt to join the multilateral forum has failed to garner much

support from the West. Moreover, Pakistan being put on the

watchlist of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) which is an

intergovernmental body responsible for understanding terrorist

financing risks, developing global standards, and evaluating

countries' compliance is yet another failure on the foreign policy

front.23 Pakistan had previously been on the list until 2015,24

however, the placement on it once again is a cause for concern for

Pakistani experts on foreign policy and international law. It also

underlines how Pakistan is losing ground at the international

negotiation tables.25

Moreover, it brings out a very important aspect of alliances and

their limitations in international relations. Whilst Pakistan and

China refer to each other as their iron-brother and each state

supports the other at international and regional level, in the case of

FATF, China too had to retract itself from voting in favor of

Pakistan.26 Similarly, Saudi Arabia, with which Pakistan enjoys

brotherly relations, also pulled its support.27 Such foreign policy

failures have immense ramifications for the country’s struggling

financial markets and are bound to hurt the economic stability.



As the regional geo-strategic environment seems to be developing,

a few points must be kept in mind. First and foremost, Pakistan is

losing its importance vis-à-vis India at many international forums.

Moreover, due to India’s economic success, a well drafted foreign

policy and an efficient highly visible overseas diaspora, it has

succeeded in sidelining Pakistan. While it is true that India’s rising

importance is attributed to other factors such as the US seeking to

contain China through India, it has also been immensely successful

in setting up its own narrative. One example of acceptance by the

global media and governments of India’s version is the ‘surgical

strikes’ episode in 2016.28 While Pakistan invited the international

media to conduct an independent survey of the area that India had

claimed to have carried out the so called surgical strikes in, the

Indian government refused to provide any proofs of these strikes.

India’s blatant refusal to allow the international media to verify

Indian claims did not turn the West’s view in Pakistan’s favor either.

It also undermines a core objective of Pakistan’s foreign policy – the

issue of Kashmir. Pakistan wants to resolve the issue amicably as

per the wishes of the people of Kashmir, however the Indian

government has increasingly been employing military means to

subjugate the protesting Kashmiri youth that does not want

Kashmir’s future to be linked to India.29 India’s use of Public Safety

Act (PSA) and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) has

been instrumental in state-wide protests against Indian

aggression.30 The use of pellet guns which resulted in hundreds of

people getting blinded, injured and killed,31 and using Kashmiris as

human shields by the Indian Army32 have caused world-wide

protests against India’s tyranny in Kashmir.33 Nonetheless, India

has convinced the western countries that uprisings are instigated

by Pakistan which uses non-state actors to arm rebels against the

government.34

As the US interests in the region evolve, Pakistan will find it

increasingly difficult to deal with them. The growing Indo-US nexus

will pose several more challenges for Pakistan amid China’s rise and



the competition for power in the Indian Ocean Region. Pakistan’s

low economic growth and internal destabilization with sectarian,

ethnic and political strife are only limiting the state’s options at the

international level.

Opportunities for Pakistan

In the current geo-political and geo-economic situation, Pakistan is

fortunate to be at the crossroads where it can benefit from China’s

rise in both these dimensions. Pakistan’s status as the flagship

project in China’s Belt and Road Initiative also known as One-Belt

One Road (B&R/OBOR) bestows upon Pakistan immense

opportunities. With an investment and loan facility being afforded

to Pakistan by China in the form of Pak-China Economic Corridor

(CPEC), it can bring in many opportunities for economic growth and

internal economic consolidation in the long run. There is an

immense break for Pakistani traders, farmers, and industrialists to

use this upcoming avenue to reach out to new and diverse markets

for their goods. At the government level, the trade route can be used

to boost economic relations with central Asian, African, and

European states as Pakistan provides the shortest route to China to

China to reach Europe and Aftrica.35 By making Pakistan an

economic hub,36 the country’s image can be changed from a

hardliner and extremist state to one of economic connectivity and

development.

As the project materializes and progresses, it will make Pakistan an

investment center. At this point, Pakistan needs to ensure it fosters

an environment feasible for economic activity and regional

connectivity by improving its security situation. It must be

appreciated that China’s resilience regarding this project is based

on all-weather friendship with Pakistan as well as the benefits

China hopes to reap from the CPEC initiative. However, other states

would not indulge or follow suit if they get the impression that the

security situation of the country has not improved. Pakistani armed



forces have worked tirelessly in the last decade to fight terrorists

and has major successes to its credit. Operations against the

militants are on going and most of the country is peaceful, barring

a few occasional cases. This picture of peaceful Pakistan has to be

disseminated to the rest of the world. Pakistan’s diplomacy at the

regonial and international level can play a major role in promoting

this change.

It is pertinent that Pakistan makes use of this opportunity. At a time

when Pakistan is struggling to maintain its alliance with the US

amidst changing geo-political environment, fighting off terrorism

and militancy inside the country,37 finding it difficult to keep a

steady economic growth annually and facing international criticism

on many fronts,38 it is imperative that Pakistan does not forego the

benefits of CPEC.

Similarly, the US long-term plan regarding Afghanistan can also

provide Pakistan with more cards to play with on the table. It is

mainly up to the United States to find a solution to the Afghan war

and stabilize the country. Pakistan should play whatever role it can

in achieving this goal but remain continually engaged with the US.

Whilst Pakistan has been a strong proponent of dialogue with the

Taliban39, the Afghan authorities did not agree on the prospect of

such talks. However, in a recent development, the Afghan

government40 has asked to hold dialogue with Taliban to resolve

the issues. Pakistan, as before, can play a crucial role in facilitating

these talks to help bring the conflict to an end. While it is difficult to

postulate what the US endgame in Afghanistan is, Pakistan can reset

its course more clearly once the peace-talks conclude. It will

provide Pakistan with the leverage it needs in Pak-US relations and

work well in Pakistan’s interests.

In the wake of India’s efforts to isolate Pakistan in 2016 post Uri

attacks in Kashmir, the situation for Pakistan had changed

cataclysmically. In the words of India’s Prime Minister Narendra

Modi, “We will isolate you. I will work for that.” Such rhetoric



emanating from none other than the Indian Prime Minister was

serious for Pakistan to consider as it were essentially to translate

into action. At the United National General Assembly in 2016 and

2017, India articulated its objectives of getting Pakistan labelled as

a terrorist state. India’s External Minister, Sushma Swaraj directed

accusations at Pakistan of financing terrorism in South Asia.41

Naturally, this pushed Pakistan to defend itself against the charge-

sheet presented by India and garner international support in its

favor. Pakistan’s permanent representative to the United Nations,

Maleeha Lodhi responded to India’s allegations and reminded the

United Nations that it was in fact India that had illegally occupied

Kashmir42 and that the UN resolution on Kashmir required due

diligence as India’s incessant human rights violations in Kashmir

could no longer go unnoticed. Her speech included emphasis on the

Kashmir issue in the following words,

We’ll make sure that the international community knows

where we are, and how the people of Kashmir look towards

the UN to fulfil its long-standing obligations. This is an issue

the PM would obviously raise with the Secretary-General. It

is also an issue which we have been raising over the years —

whenever we get an opportunity to speak about the right to

self-determination.43

The use of UNGA forum to raise and discuss the Kashmir issue is

important because of the indifferent attitude India has adopted

pertaining to the issue of Kashmir. India’s nonchalant attitude

regarding Kashmir and not agreeing to hold dialogues with

Pakistan over it makes it even more crucial to bring it out on a global

stage. With a well-researched and organized campaign based on

facts, Pakistan can draft a working plan to advocate Kashmir case at

the international forums. This will not only dispel misinformation

regarding the issue but also educate other states about the

atrocities being committed in the disputed region by India.



On the other hand, Russia’s warming up to Pakistan has to be

figured in both the success story for Pakistan as well as an

appreciation of the evolving geo-political alliances in the region. In

2014, Russia lifted its arms embargo on Pakistan44 which is a

landmark change in the relations between the Cold War

adversaries. Opening up a consulate in Peshawar,45 Russia’s

military exercises with Pakistan army inside Pakistan,46 and a visit

to North and South Waziristan signify the beginning of a new era of

friendship.47 On the economic side, Russia has showed interest in

improving economic ties with Pakistan.48 With regards to foreign

policy, Russia abstained from naming Pakistan at the BRICs summit

in India and defended Pakistan against the Trump strategy in South

Asia.49 Russia has also said that it is not opposed to Pakistan joining

the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which provides Pakistan with

yet another international ally and supporter in its bid to become an

NSG member.50

The improvement in Pak-Iran relations came amid top level visits

by Iran’s Prime Minister Dr. Hassan Rouhani’s visit to Pakistan in

201651 followed by Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Qamar

Bajwa’s visit to Iran in 2017.52 It offers a renewed opportunity to

both Pakistan and Iran. The border skirmishes and rumors of rift

between Iran and Pakistan was put to rest by Iranian Foreign

Minister’s 3-day visit to Pakistan in March 2018.53 His visit signifies

the importance of Pak-Iran relations. As the Indian financed

Chahbahar portis being developed,54 its purported status as a rival

to CPEC was a cause for concern for Pakistan. However, Iran

dismissed Chahbahar as a rival to Gawadar and instead showed

interest in joining CPEC.55

Pakistan’s decision to remain neutral in Yemen War, while a

principled stance based on resolving internal security matters first,

also resonated well in the Iranian decision-making echelons.

Nonetheless, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have a defence agreement

wherein Pakistan has deployed a contingent of its forces in the

Kingdom for training and advice missions.56 It also means that Pak-



Saudi relations do not translate into a zero-sum game for Pak-Iran

relations.

With the Iranian nuclear agreement also known as the Joint

Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) conducted in 2015,57 some

of the economic sanctions were lifted off Iran with more to be lifted

as Iran achieves the milestones stipulated in the agreement. This

development can benefit Pak-Iran relations with regards to the

Iran-Pakistan pipeline, previously withheld due to international

sanctions on Iran as well as political hurdles, which will help

ameliorate Pakistan’s energy situation. With sanctions lifted off,

Iran’s improving economy will also provide space for an increased

trade between the two states. Moreover, an improved relation with

Iran means Pakistan will have another ally on regional and

international forums.

Conclusion

Pakistan’s foreign policy is currently going through a change owing

to many internal and external factors. It is a mix of Pakistan’s

security imperatives, national requirements, and international

commitments. Simultaneously, Pakistan’s foreign policy is based on

the evolving regional and international geo-strategic environments.

As any country in a globally integrated system, Pakistan’s foreign

policy cannot function without taking into account regional and

international policy direction. It is important to appreciate

Pakistan’s status as a mid-range power with limited resources as

well. Similarly, Pakistan’s internal situation and its role in War on

Terror has been a major factor in further limiting its resources.

Nonetheless, there are many components of foreign policy making

which can be improved upon and help foment a better policy.

Pakistan’s decision-making apparatus requires both focus and

personnel trained to understand the theoretical and practical sides

of the foreign policy. It is vital that history is used a guiding principal



to avoid past mistakes. In the process of decision-making,

consideration must be given to the challenges that every

opportunity brings with it so that contingency plans can be

prepared. It is also important that long-term policies are not

tampered with. Continuity and consistency of policies will help

Pakistan’s credibility in the international realm.

The list of internal and external challenges being faced by Pakistan

are numerous. The internal destabilization inside Pakistan financed

by India and routed through Afghanistan needs to be checked. At

the same time, Pakistan must actively advocate its case regarding

the matter of non-state actors being sponsored by India inside

Balochistan and FATA region.

As India’s increasingly powerful lobby in the US Congress has

convinced the US that Pakistan is harboring non-state actors used

to hurt US interests and developments in Afghanistan and terrorize

India, it is crucial for Pakistan to be vigilant of further US actions

against Pakistan. Aside from this, Pakistan must vindicate itself

through diplomacy and provision of proof that it is rooting out all

types and kinds of militants.

Moreover, while it is important to check and monitor India’s foreign

policy closely, Pakistan’s policy needs to be independent of what

India seeks to achieve. It is very important to analyze the

imperatives of Pakistan’s foreign policy considering what Pakistan

can accomplish with a policy that is designed to achieve specific

objectives. Generally, Pakistan’s actions at the international forums

are seen either as a response or in retaliation to India’s statements

and actions. This results in Pakistan’s viewpoint or bid being

ignored by major powers and international bodies. In order to

achieve better results Pakistan needs to be more proactive at the

international level.

Similarly, Indo-Afghan relations aimed at sidelining Pakistan also

do not serve Pakistan’s interests. Pakistan has played a positive role

in the reconstruction process of Afghanistan and provided land and



sea routes to the US military to combat insurgent groups over the

years. Moreover, despite Pakistan’s role in peacebuilding efforts

through facilitating talks with Taliban in the past in Afghanistan,

both Afghanistan and the US ignore Pakistan’s sacrifices and efforts.

Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, Pakistan has both capacity and

ability to improve its image, relations, and position in the global

arena. With new elections due in few months a new government

will be formed in the center. The new incumbents in the office will

likely pay more attention to achieving Pakistan’s foreign policy

goals to help it regain its rightful place internationally.

Muhammad Sarmad Zia is a

Research Assistant at CISS

Endnotes

1 M. Ishaq, “A National Conference on Elements of National Power,” Ministry of

Planning Development and Reform. http://pc.gov.pk/uploads/pub/4th-CPEC-Paper-

Conference-on-EoNP-2.pdf

2 Ibid.

3 Margaret Bourke-White, A Report on the New India, Simon and Schuster, New

York, 1949

4 Shaheen A. Gillani, “Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan”, Pakistan

Institute of Legislative and Development and Transparency, 2004.

5 Transcript of RAW agent Kulbhushan’s confessional statement, DAWN, 30th

March, 2016. https://www.dawn.com/news/1248786

6 M. K. Akbar, Pakistan Today (Mittal Publications: 1997) p. 57

7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan, Foreign Policy, 2012-2013

http://www.mofa.gov.pk/content.php?pageID=Foreign%20Policy

http://pc.gov.pk/uploads/pub/4th-CPEC-Paper-Conference-on-EoNP-2.pdf

http://pc.gov.pk/uploads/pub/4th-CPEC-Paper-Conference-on-EoNP-2.pdf

https://www.dawn.com/news/1248786/transcript-of-raw-agent-kulbhushans-confessional-statement

http://www.mofa.gov.pk/content.php?pageID=Foreign%20Policy



8 Tulasi R Kafle, “Making a Difference: Allison’s Three Models of Foreign Policy

Analysis," Foreign Policy Analysis (2011).

http://www.academia.edu/592889/Making_a_Difference_Allisons_Three_Models_of

_Foreign_Policy_Analysis

9 Ibid.

10 PILDAT, Short course on Strengthening National and Provincial Legislative

Governance Project, Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan, April 12 - 15, 2004.

http://www.millat.com/wp-

content/uploads/pdf/democracy/1/fp_proceedings_04_2004.pdf

11 Ibid.

12 DCC to be reconstituted as Committee on National Security, Dawn News, 22nd

August, 2013, https://www.dawn.com/news/1037613

13 Prime Minister’s Office Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Prime Minister chairs

meeting of Defense committee of the cabinet (dcc), Press release, 22nd August, 2013.

http://pmo.gov.pk/press_release_detailes.php?pr_id=88

14 Dan Roberts and Kareem Shaheen. "Saudi Arabia Launches Yemen Air Strikes as

Alliance Builds Against Houthi Rebels." The Guardian, 25th March, 2016,

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/26/saudi-arabia-begins-airstrikes-

against-houthi-in-yemen,

15 Abdul Basit, “Pakistan & the Yemen war: perils of joining the Saudi-led

coalition." RSIS, 8th April, 2015, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-

content/uploads/2015/04/CO15084.pdf

16 Jayshree Bajoria and Esther Pan. "The US-India nuclear deal." Council on Foreign

Relations, Introduced in the joint statement released by President Bush and Indian

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on July 18, 2005, the deal lifts a three-decade U.S.

moratorium on nuclear trade with India. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-india-

nuclear-deal

17 Complete text of Donald Trump speech on strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia,

The News, 29th April, 2018, https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/225202-Complete-

text-of-Donald-Trump-speech-on-strategy-in-Afghanistan-and-South-Asia

18 Bates Gill and Gudrun Wacker, eds., China's Rise: Diverging US-EU Perceptions

and Approaches (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2005)

19 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Military and Security Matters, by Thomas L.

Hughes, Washington, D.C.: 2003,

https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB114/chipak-1.pdf fbi-

honest.html (accessed April 10, 2018).

http://www.millat.com/wp-content/uploads/pdf/democracy/1/fp_proceedings_04_2004.pdf

http://www.millat.com/wp-content/uploads/pdf/democracy/1/fp_proceedings_04_2004.pdf

https://www.dawn.com/news/1037613/dcc-to-be-reconstituted-as-committee-on-national-security

http://pmo.gov.pk/press_release_detailes.php?pr_id=88

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/26/saudi-arabia-begins-airstrikes-against-houthi-in-yemen

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/26/saudi-arabia-begins-airstrikes-against-houthi-in-yemen

https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/CO15084.pdf

https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/CO15084.pdf

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-india-nuclear-deal


https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/225202-Complete-text-of-Donald-Trump-speech-on-strategy-in-Afghanistan-and-South-Asia

https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/225202-Complete-text-of-Donald-Trump-speech-on-strategy-in-Afghanistan-and-South-Asia



20 Ilan Goldenberg and Julie Smith, U.S-Russia Competition in the Middle East is

Back and the Trump Administration needs a strategy to deal with it, Foreign Policy

News, 7th March, 2017. http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/07/u-s-russia-competition-

in-the-middle-east-is-back/

21 “Missing Foreign Minister,” Dawn News, 21st July, 2015.

https://www.dawn.com/news/1195337

22 Durdana Najam, “Without Foreign Minister Pakistan Fails on Diplomatic Fronts,”

Daily Times, 3rd June, 2016. https://dailytimes.com.pk/78188/without-foreign-

minister-pakistan-fails-on-diplomatic-fronts/

23“List of Countries on FATF List,” http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/#Pakistan,

also see, “FATF removes Pakistan from list of terror financiers.”


24 Shahbaz Rana, “Pakistan to go on FATF Terror Financing List in June,” The

Express Tribune, 29th April,2018. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1643185/1-pakistan-

go-fatf-terror-financing-list-june/

25 Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Defeat in UN body Prompts Introspection,” Dawn News, 1st

November, 2015. https://www.dawn.com/news/1216769

26 Umair Jamal, “Why did China pull support for Pakistan at the Financial Action

Task Force,” The Diplomat, 26th February, 2018.

https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/why-did-china-pull-support-for-pakistan-at-the-

financial-action-task-force/

27 Ibid.

28 Nitin.A.Gokhale, “The Inside Story of India’s 2016 Surgical Strikes,” The

Diplomat, 23rd September, 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/the-inside-story-

of-indias-2016-surgical-strikes/

29 Gauri Chatterjee, “BJP doesn't get it: Kashmiri youth want azadi, even if it means

moving to Pak,” First post, 29th April, 2018. http://www.firstpost.com/politics/bjp-

doesnt-understand-kashmiri-youth-they-want-freedom-even-if-that-means-going-

with-pakistan-2955118.html

30 “India: Repeal Armed Forces Special Powers Act,” Human Rights Watch, 19th

October, 2011. https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/19/india-repeal-armed-forces-

special-powers-act

31 Amnesty International. (2015). Losing Sight in Kashmir: The Impact of Pallet

Firing Shotguns. Amnesty International Publications.

https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/losing-sight-in-kashmir-the-impact-of-pellet-

firing-shotguns/

http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/07/u-s-russia-competition-in-the-middle-east-is-back/

http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/07/u-s-russia-competition-in-the-middle-east-is-back/


https://dailytimes.com.pk/78188/without-foreign-minister-pakistan-fails-on-diplomatic-fronts/

https://dailytimes.com.pk/78188/without-foreign-minister-pakistan-fails-on-diplomatic-fronts/

http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/#Pakistan


https://tribune.com.pk/story/1643185/1-pakistan-go-fatf-terror-financing-list-june/

https://tribune.com.pk/story/1643185/1-pakistan-go-fatf-terror-financing-list-june/


https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/why-did-china-pull-support-for-pakistan-at-the-financial-action-task-force/

https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/why-did-china-pull-support-for-pakistan-at-the-financial-action-task-force/

https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/the-inside-story-of-indias-2016-surgical-strikes/

https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/the-inside-story-of-indias-2016-surgical-strikes/

https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/19/india-repeal-armed-forces-special-powers-act

https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/19/india-repeal-armed-forces-special-powers-act

https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/losing-sight-in-kashmir-the-impact-of-pellet-firing-shotguns/

https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/losing-sight-in-kashmir-the-impact-of-pellet-firing-shotguns/



32 Padmapriya Govindarajan, “A Human Shield in Kashmir Raises Questions about

Indian Army Overreach,” The Diplomat, 26th April, 2017.

https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/a-human-shield-in-kashmir-raises-questions-about-

indian-army-overreach/

33 Amnesty International. (2015). Denied: Failures in Accountability for Human

Rights Violations by Security Force Personnel in Jammu and Kashmir. Amnesty

International Publications. https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/denied-failures-in-

accountability-for-human-rights-violations-by-security-force-personnel-in-jammu-

and-kashmir/

34 Tariq Naqash, “2 civilians killed, 5 injured by Indian shelling across LoC: AJK

official,” Dawn News, 20th January, 2018. https://www.dawn.com/news/1384154

35 Zahid Chaudhry, “CPEC shortest route for Gulf to access China: Sartaj,” Pakistan

Observer, 14th December, 2016. https://pakobserver.net/cpec-shortest-route-for-gulf-

to-access-china-sartaj/

36 Mushahid Hussain, “CPEC to Make Pakistan Hub of Regional Connectivity,”

Associated Press of Pakistan Corporation, 14 November, 2017

37 Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, Pakistan Security Report 2017, PIPS, vol.10

(1) Jan-June 2018. https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-

content/uploads/2018/01/sr2017-overview.pdf

38 Noor Zahid, Pakistan Faces Rising Criticism Over Inability to Curb Extremism,

VOA News, 21st September, 2016

39 “Kayyani Supports Dialogue with Taliban,” The Express Tribune, 12th October,

2013. https://tribune.com.pk/story/617120/kayani-supports-dialogue-with-taliban/

40 Hamid Shalizi and James Mackenzie, “Afghanistan's Ghani offers talks with

Taliban 'without preconditions',” Reuters, 28th February, 2018.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban/afghanistans-ghani-offers-

talks-with-taliban-without-preconditions-idUSKCN1GC0J0

41 Muhammad Zulqarnain Zulfi, “We created institutions of excellence, Pakistan

created terror factories: Sushma at UN General Assembly,” The Times of India, 23rd

September,2017. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/we-created-institutions-

of-excellence-pakistan-created-terror-factories-sushma-at-un-general-

assembly/articleshow/60809354.cms

42 Zoya Anwar, Kashmir issue an obligation for Pakistan to Kashmiris: Maleeha

Lodhi, The News, 16th September, 2017. https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/230319-

Kashmir-issue-an-obligation-for-Pakistan-to-Kashmiris-Maleeha-Lodhi

43 Ibid.

44 “Russia lifts arms embargo to Pakistan: report,” Dawn News, 2nd June, 2017.


https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/a-human-shield-in-kashmir-raises-questions-about-indian-army-overreach/

https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/a-human-shield-in-kashmir-raises-questions-about-indian-army-overreach/


https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/sr2017-overview.pdf

https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/sr2017-overview.pdf

https://tribune.com.pk/story/617120/kayani-supports-dialogue-with-taliban/

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban/afghanistans-ghani-offers-talks-with-taliban-without-preconditions-idUSKCN1GC0J

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban/afghanistans-ghani-offers-talks-with-taliban-without-preconditions-idUSKCN1GC0J

https://www.dawn.com/news/1110131/russia-lifts-arms-embargo-to-pakistan-report




45“Russia Opens Honorary Consulate in Peshawar,” The Express Tribune, 20th

February, 2018. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1639895/1-russia-opens-honourary-

consulate-peshawar/

46 “DRUZBA2017: Pakistan, Russia hold Anti-Terror Exercise,” The Express

Tribune, 25th September, 2017. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1515661/pakistan-russia-

begin-military-drills/

47 “Russian Military Delegations Visit North, South Waziristan,” Dawn News, 30TH

March, 2017. https://www.dawn.com/news/1323792

48 “Moscow, Islamabad Eye Greater Economic Co-operation,” Dawn News, 20TH

February, 2018. https://www.dawn.com/news/1390568

49 Polina Tikhonova, “China and Russia Defend Pakistan Against Trump’s Strategy,”

Value Walk, 28th April, 2018. https://www.valuewalk.com/2017/08/china-russia-

trumps-pakistan-strategy/

50 “Russia Support Pakistan’s bid to join elite Nuclear Trading Club,” The Express

Tribune, 15th December, 2017. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1584950/1-russia-

supports-pakistans-bid-join-elite-nuclear-trading-club/

51 Javid Hussain, “Iranian President’s visit to Pakistan,” The Nation, 29th March,

2016. https://nation.com.pk/29-Mar-2016/iranian-president-s-visit-to-pakistan

52 Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Pakistan Determined to Expand Ties with Iran: Bajwa,” Dawn

News, 7th November, 2017. https://www.dawn.com/news/1368817

53 “Iran’s Foreign Minister Arrives in Pakistan to Enhance Trade Ties,” Dawn News,

11th March, 2018. https://www.dawn.com/news/1394616

54 Kamlendra Kanwar, “Iran inaugurates extension to Chabahar Port: Project is

India's counterpoise to increasing Chinese control of sea lanes,” First Post, 29th

April, 2018. https://www.firstpost.com/world/iran-inaugurates-extension-to-

chabahar-port-project-is-indias-counterpoise-to-increasing-chinese-control-of-sea-

lanes-4241035.html

55 Syed Sammer Abbas, “Iran wants to be part of CPEC, says Rouhani,” Dawn News,

22nd September, 2016. https://www.dawn.com/news/1285404

56 Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Army says troops being sent to Saudi Arabia,” Dawn News,

16th February, 2018. https://www.dawn.com/news/1389722

57 “Iran Nuclear Deal: Key Details, BBC News,” 13th October, 2017.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655

https://tribune.com.pk/story/1639895/1-russia-opens-honourary-consulate-peshawar/

https://tribune.com.pk/story/1639895/1-russia-opens-honourary-consulate-peshawar/

https://tribune.com.pk/story/1515661/pakistan-russia-begin-military-drills/

https://tribune.com.pk/story/1515661/pakistan-russia-begin-military-drills/



https://www.valuewalk.com/2017/08/china-russia-trumps-pakistan-strategy/

https://www.valuewalk.com/2017/08/china-russia-trumps-pakistan-strategy/

https://tribune.com.pk/story/1584950/1-russia-supports-pakistans-bid-join-elite-nuclear-trading-club/


https://nation.com.pk/29-Mar-2016/iranian-president-s-visit-to-pakistan



https://www.firstpost.com/world/iran-inaugurates-extension-to-chabahar-port-project-is-indias-counterpoise-to-increasing-chinese-control-of-sea-lanes-4241035.html





23

The US-India Strategic Partnership: Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Response

Response

CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1

The US-India Strategic Partnership:

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Response

Riaz Khokhar

Introduction

The US-India strategic partnership is considered the watershed

moment in the bilateral relationship between India and the United

States1. It is underpinned by the historic civil-nuclear agreement as

well as defence agreements for transfer of “high-end [military

hardware]” 2 to India. Moreover, joint naval exercises of the US and

India in the Indo-Pacific, including Indian demand for a liaison in

the Arabian Sea, have potentially expanded India-Pakistan’s

geostrategic competition from land to sea3. For Pakistan, the US’

civil nuclear deal distorted the uniform criteria governing the

nuclear export control regime. Pakistan has proposed a criteria-

based approach to civil-nuclear trade and the NSG membership.

The growing transfer of advanced military technology and dual-use

nuclear material to India has created strategic instability in South

Asia’s volatile region. Therefore, in order to restore the strategic

balance, Pakistan has taken a two-pronged approach. Besides

further strengthening its ties with China, Pakistan is also expanding

its defence relations and increasing cooperation in

counterterrorism efforts with Russian Federation. Simultaneously,

Pakistan has been working on its nuclear capability and adjusting

its nuclear doctrine with a view to maintain its deterrence against

India.

Apart from that, India is actively engaged in its efforts for

diplomatically isolating Pakistan by projecting it as a state sponsor

of terrorism. India’s latest military doctrine has made its nuclear

policy ambiguous, and its threats of surgical strikes have

destabilized the South Asian region. In this context, Pakistan’s

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Response


foreign policy response has been both pragmatic and balanced. In

order to cope with the challenge of diplomatic isolation, Pakistan is

intensively working on improving bilateral economic and security

ties with regional countries. It has maintained its strong relations

with some Gulf countries and pursued a neutral approach in the

Saudi-Iran rivalry. Moreover, Pakistan’s high-level engagement

with Afghanistan, Central Asian republics and other regional

countries signifies Pakistan’s active diplomacy to ward off Indian

efforts aimed at its isolation. In this context, Pakistan has become

part of many regional economic and security agreements such as

TAPI, CPEC, and SCO, which would promote regional economic

integration and harmony of interests among member states.

This paper analyses strategic imbalance created by the US-India

strategic partnership in the South Asian region, and Pakistan’s

foreign policy initiatives to restore the balance in the region.

US-India Strategic Partnership

During the Cold War, US and India could not become allies due to

Jawaharlal Nehru’s nonalignment policy and preference for

strategic autonomy and the US’ anti-Communist ideology. Strobe

Talbot, the US diplomat, considered “incompatible obsessions”—

India’s with Pakistan and America’s with the Soviet Union—as the

main hurdles to US-India cooperation in that era.4 Resolution of

such a “palpable difficulty” in the US-India bilateral relationship

was the main agenda of Talbot-Singh dialogues held after the 1998

nuclear tests. The focus of the dialogue, between Strobe Talbot and

Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh, expanded from nuclear

proliferation issues to involve broad challenges such as nature of

the international system, counter-terrorism, climate change and

developing strategic cooperation5. US President G.W. Bush sought

to remove the bottlenecks in the US-India relationship and

therefore started extensive diplomatic engagement with the Indian

government. Most importantly, he signed the civil-nuclear deal with

25


Response


India, which is considered the major breakthrough in their bilateral

relations.

Civil-Nuclear Deal

US President George Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan

Singh agreed in 2005 to enter into a civil nuclear cooperation

initiative. The agreement initiated the process of cooperating

with India in civil-nuclear trade and bring it in consonance with

the international non-proliferation standards. It was indeed a

complex process as it needed amending several US’ laws

governing nuclear cooperation. Therefore, it took them three

years to formally enter into an agreement. As a prerequisite for

the civil-nuclear trade, India agreed to separate its civilian and

military facilities in 2006. An amendment was made in the US’

1954 Atomic Energy Act (AEA) in 2006. The amended law is

known as Henry J. Hyde Act. It exempted India from the

requirements of the US AEA and the Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT), which ban nuclear trade with a non-NPT member state.

US President could provide an exemption to a country signatory

to the proposed agreement. The US and India concluded an

agreement in 2007, known as the 123 agreement, which

stipulated terms and conditions for the civil-nuclear cooperation

between the US and India. On August 1, 2008, the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) approved the safeguard

agreements and the inspection plan with India. The Nuclear

Suppliers Group (NSG) approved the Indo-US civil nuclear deal

in September 2008. Finally, the US Congress approved the 123

agreement in October 2008.6

Critics of the 123 agreement point out that it not only undermined

the rationale against nuclear proliferation but also contributed to

strategic instability in South Asia.7 The civil nuclear deal enabled

India to receive dual-use nuclear technology, including materials

26


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and equipment that could be used to enrich uranium or

reprocess plutonium—materials necessary for making an atom

bomb.8 Furthermore, Bush and subsequently Obama

administration actively worked to get India an NSG membership

but the move was blocked by China, which instead demanded

that the NSG membership should not be country-specific, but

criteria-based.

Defence and Security Cooperation Between US and India

In the rapidly changing geostrategic dynamics in the post-9/11

period, the United States considered India, in the US envoy to India

Kenneth Juster’s words, as “the net provider of security and stability

in South Asia”.9 The agreement signed between President Bush and

Indian prime minister Vajpayee, called Next Steps in Strategic

Partnership (NSSP), in January 2004 and the Obama

administration’s $10 billion deal with India in 2010 elevated

their bilateral strategic cooperation to new heights. President

Obama declared it as the “defining partnership of the twenty-

first century.”10

Also, the ten-year agreement of Defense and Trade Technology

Initiative (DTTI) in 2012 provided much impetus to India’s

defence indigenization process. In June 2016, the US Congress

passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the

FY17, which recognised India as a “Major Defense Partner”.11

Traditionally, India’s top suppliers of arms have been Russia and

Israel. At present, the US is the second largest defence exporter

to India, only after Russia. India’s defence imports from the US,

nearly $300 million a decade and a half ago, have reached $15

billion in the 2008-2017 period.12 The United States sold 22

Predator Guardian drones in June 2017, making India the first

non-NATO partner to acquire this advanced technology.13 Other

advanced defence sales to India included P-8 maritime patrol

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aircraft, C-130 and C-17 transport aircraft, M777 howitzers, and

Apache and Chinook helicopters.

The export of the highly advanced defence technology has been

made after India’s signing of the Logistic Security Agreement

with some modifications, including rechristening it as the

Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in

August 2016. Thus, the modified version of LEMOA stipulated

mutual use of bases on a “case-by-case” basis, not permanently,

and that the logistical support would not be obligatory on the

other party.14 Moreover, India has also agreed to sign another

agreement, namely Communication and Information Security

Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), which they renamed as

Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement

(COMCASA). This agreement allows the “high-end secure

communication network to be installed on platforms being sold

to India”, as well as, “enabling an interoperable environment for

[US-India militaries] to conduct joint operations” using the

similar communication network.15

However, some challenges remain with respect to the success of

these agreements. One, Indian defence establishment is

reluctant to give ‘access to US personnel for periodic inspection

of the communication system’, terming it as intrusive. Two, it

would be difficult for India to integrate its Russian origin

military equipment on the US platforms.16 Besides, India’s

possible purchase of $6 billion missile defence system, S-400

Triumf systems, from Russia may raise some concerns in the US’

policy circles as the US imposes sanctions on the future defence

acquisitions from Russia.17

The recent move by the United States to place Indian defence

attaché in its Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) at

Bahrain is considered a “path-breaking” development in their

bilateral defence cooperation. As such, the naval gamut of the

NAVCm, ENT—Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf and the

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Arabian Sea—resonates with Indian strategic objectives in the

Arabian Sea.18

India’s naval power is further strengthened by its investments in

naval ports of Chabahar in Iran and Dumq in Oman, Assumption

Islands in Seychelles, Agalega in Mauritius, and its own Andaman

and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal. The US also possesses

naval and military base at Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean

Territory. With their bilateral agreement of LEMOA [and

COMCASA] in place, the US and India could jointly or reciprocally

use each other’s naval bases [and share defence and communication

network].19 Australia’s investments in naval ports at Cocos and

Christmas islands further add value to the maritime defence

network of the US and its allies.20 The inclusion of Japan in the

maritime framework of port facilities in the Indo-Pacific Ocean

supports the four countries’ stance of free and open seas.

The Quadrilateral Group, referred to as Quad, is formed by the US,

India, Japan and Australia to conduct naval exercises in the Indo-

Pacific Ocean region. In the Malabar Exercises of 2017, the US, India

and Japan participated in the maritime exercises. Australia, as part

of the Quad, was also invited to participate, but it showed its

reluctance to join. According to its officials, it did not seek to

provoke China in the prevailing geostrategic environment.21

Recently, India hosted navies from 16 countries on March 6,

2018, for biennial Milan22 exercises at the Andaman and Nicobar

Islands23 at the juncture of the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman

Sea.24

India and the United States have also been engaged in coordinating

bilateral counter-terrorism efforts. They launched the first ever US-

India Counter Terrorism Designation Dialogue in December 2017.

It constitutes sharing of information, designations of terrorists,

combatting financial crimes and networks, and disrupting and

dismantling terrorist camps both regionally and globally25.

29


Response


According to India’s 2017 Joint Armed Forces Doctrine, India’s shift

from Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) to Credible Deterrence

has inherent ambiguities with regard to changes in its nuclear

policy.26 Indian state officials, including Shiv Shankar Menon,

former national security advisor and Manohar Parrikar, the former

defence minister, have questioned the operational effectiveness of

the No First Use doctrine. They maintain that in a war situation, NFU

would be the first casualty.27 In this context, India’s incorporation

of ‘surgical strikes’ as a retaliatory policy instrument has validated

Pakistan’s suspicion vis-à-vis India’s conventional military strikes

inside Pakistan’s territory. According to Khalid Banuri, Former

Director General Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (ACDA)

the changes in Indian nuclear posturing has signified full spectrum

of the conflict, including coercive diplomacy, economic

strangulation, and diplomatic isolation of Pakistan.28

India has made efforts for destabilizing Pakistan through state-

sponsored terrorism and through Afghanistan. Pakistan’s capture

of India’s serving navy commander Kulbhushan Jadhav and his

confessions testify about India’s terrorist and sabotage activities

inside Pakistan’s Balochistan province and metropolitan cities.

Apart from causing security instability, India has also tried to

economically isolate Pakistan. India withdrew from participating in

the 2016 SAARC Summit in Islamabad29 as well as influenced some

other regional countries, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh and

Bhutan, to join its boycott of the conference.30 Beyond that, India

has sought to promote the BIMSTEC—Bay of Bengal Initiative for

Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation as an

alternative to the SAARC framework for regional cooperation. It

invited all the BIMSTEC members to join the BRICS summit in

2016.31 In the same spirit, India has used the 2008-Mumbai attacks

as a sticking point to portray Pakistan as a state sponsor of

terrorism. India’s foreign minister Sushma Swaraj, in her 2018 UN

speech criticised Pakistan for the cross-border terrorism,32

disregarding India’s own oppressive policies in Kashmir.

30


Response


Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Response

The foremost concerns of Pakistan with reference to the US-India

strategic partnership are as follows. One, growing transfer of arms

disturbs balance of power between India and Pakistan. Two, giving

India a larger role in Afghanistan increases insecurity of Pakistan.

Three, the US overlooks India’s human rights violation in Kashmir,

which in turn emboldens India’s oppressive regime. Four, as a

result of India’s testing of submarine based nuclear missiles, such

as Arihant, Indo-Pak rivalry has shifted from land to sea.

First, the issue of US-India civil-nuclear trade and transfer of

advance defence equipment in the region. Pakistan neither

possesses the resources nor appears to have an intention to lock its

horns in an arms race with India. Pakistan has raised its concerns

at the UN General Assembly on various occasions against “growing

transfer of conventional armaments especially in volatile

regions”.33 In South Asia’s volatile environment, one state’s

excessive military spending has the potential to disturb the delicate

strategic balance, causing damage to peace and stability in the

region. As regards the US’ strategic partnership with India, Pakistan

has argued against the double standards in the sale of nuclear fuel

and conventional arms in South Asia. Destabilized South Asia would

remain a hindrance in the maintenance of peace in the region.

Pakistan’s foreign secretary Tehmina Janjua conveyed these

concerns to the UN General Assembly’s Disarmament and

International Security Committee in October 2016. She also added

that the US’ civil-nuclear and dual-use defence technology deals

with India only serve US’ myopic commercial and strategic

interests, ignoring the long-term goal of security and stability.34

Pakistan considers the India-specific amendment in NSG regime

not only as a discrimination against it but also a distortion of the

criteria governing the civil-nuclear trade.35 Instead, Pakistan has

sought the civil-nuclear trade or the NSG membership based on

uniform criteria. In the US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue Joint

31


Response


Statement in March 2016, the US “acknowledged Pakistan’s

ongoing efforts to harmonise its strategic trade controls with

those of multilateral export control regimes”.36 It also noted its

appreciation for Pakistan’s active engagement with IAEA

through participating in the nuclear security summits as well as

hosting IAEA’s training activities in the country.37

The US administration, however, demanded certain concessions

from Pakistan in exchange for the NSG membership. These

concessions constitute Pakistan’s limiting nuclear weapons and

delivery system to the necessary levels that deter a nuclear

attack from India. Two, ending further development of tactical

nuclear weapons; and, three, not developing a missile that can

hit targets beyond the Indian territory.38 Pakistan argues that it

considers itself a dependent variable in the nuclear dynamic,

while India is the independent variable39 and its nuclear

development is directly proportional to India’s. Moreover,

Pakistan’s short-range missile system is aimed at deterring India

from conducting border incursion under its Cold Start strategy.

Besides constant negotiations on civil-nuclear trade, Pakistan has a

long history of defence relationship with the US. The last phase of

their bilateral defence cooperation began in 2001 after the 9/11

incident. Since then, their relationship has progressed

intermittently. After Pakistan’s alliance with the US in the war

against terror, the United States provided both civilian and military

assistance in exchange for Pakistan’s logistical, military and

intelligence cooperation.

However, after routing Al-Qaeda and establishing a new

government set-up in Afghanistan, the US lost focus on Afghanistan

and got involved in Iraq. The US again shifted its attention to

countering Chinese threat in Asia and engaged with India and other

like-minded states. Meanwhile, the Afghan Taliban exploited

America’s inconsistent policies and waged an insurgency in

Afghanistan.40

32


Response


In Pakistan also, local militants resorted to nation-wide violence

after the 2007 Red Mosque incident. Since then, Pakistan was

involved in countering domestic terrorism. Therefore, it could not

simultaneously take military action against the Afghan insurgents

that targeted the US and Afghan forces in Afghanistan and at the

same time fight Pakistani Taliban (TTP), who targeted civilians and

military installations. The US did not understand Pakistan’s

compulsions and stressed on it to deal with the forces inimical to its

interests in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, after the successful military

operation Zarb-e-Azb in 2014, Pakistan destroyed and dismantled

organized presence of terrorists in the country, including those

located in the tribal territory along the Pakistan border with

Afghanistan.41 Taliban located in these areas were believed to be

conducting across the border strikes in Afghanistan.

Contemporarily, the US administration has supported the

incumbent Afghan government’s recent peace offers to the Afghan

Taliban for a political settlement. Besides, it also noted Pakistan’s

meaningful role in partnering with the US in facilitating peace

efforts in Afghanistan.42 Yet, the United States continues to level

allegations of the presence of terrorists’ sanctuaries and suspended

military assistance to Pakistan.

China-Pakistan Defense and Economic Cooperation

Since the US had refused to provide Pakistan with advanced

defence technology in the past on several occasions, as is evident

from its repeated suspension of the sale of F16s, Pakistan turned

to China for help. Chinese cooperation in the defence sector of

Pakistan is manifest in Pakistan’s imports of over 55% of

Chinese arms in the 2008-12 period.43 The imports increased to

70% between 2012 and 2017, following the decline of US

defence exports to Pakistan in the same period, according to the

recent SIPRI report.44

33


Response


The hallmark of their joint defence cooperation has been the

coproduction of JF-17 thunder jetfighter aircraft (aka FC-1

Xiaolong/Fierce Dragon) by Chinese Chengdu Aircraft Industrial

Corporation and Pakistan Aeronautical Complex.45 Some

scholars, critical of Pakistan’s missile development, claim that

China also helped Pakistan produce solid fuel short-ranged

Shaheen-I [and medium-ranged Shaheen-II46] ballistic

missile[s]. The development of these missiles were carried out

in National Defense Complex (NDC), a ballistic missile

manufacturing facility.47 Since 2008, it remains a focal point for

Pakistan’s missile development programs. To its credit is the

developing of redesigns of several models, including Hatf-

2/Abdali, Hatf-3 Ghaznavi, Hatf-4/Shaheen-I, and Hatf-

6/Shaheen-II missiles, which were first built by SUPARCO and

PAEC. The NDC also produced the first land-attack cruise missile,

Hatf-7/Babur.48

China agreed to sell eight nuclear-capable submarines to

Pakistan in 2016, half of which would be co-produced at Karachi

Shipyard Engineering Work. Besides, the critics also claim that

China has been helping Pakistan in the production of indigenous

drones.49 One of the indigenously built armed drone, Burraq,

reportedly struck a Taliban stronghold in Shawwal valley killing

three terrorists.50

Another feature of Pakistan-China relationship is their joint

military exercises. Pakistan-China counter-terrorism operations

started in the 1990s in the face of rising threat from Uighur

terrorists. Besides, PAF and Chinese PLA have also been engaged

in yearly exercises known as Shaheen.51 One of the important

objectives of China-Pakistan counter-terrorism operations has

been to protect Chinese workforce and projects being carried

out under CPEC.52

Until recently, the engagement in economic areas was considered

the weakest link in the strong relationship between Pakistan and

34


Response


China.53 However, after the inauguration of China-Pakistan

Economic Corridor (CPEC) that is going to change. The sixty-billion-

dollar project aims at infrastructural development, energy

generation and developing transport communication systems.54

Once all the projects under the CPEC are completed, it has the

potential to make Pakistan economically integrated with other

regional countries. The Early Harvest Projects like power plants,

roads construction and transport projects are to be completed in

2018. However, the real challenges come with reference to the

development of industries, railway networks, and the long-term

financial arrangements between the two countries. Costing of the

projects and their repayment arrangements,55 including the

possibility of massive debt-burden on Pakistan, are some of the

critical challenges facing the CPEC.

CPEC has attracted the interest of several regional countries like

Iran, Afghanistan, Russia and Central Asian republics. Iranian

ambassador to Pakistan Mehdi Honardoost termed it as a project of

peace and tranquillity in the region, besides of course regional

integration.56 Hence, he urged other regional countries also to join

the project.

Pak-Russia Cooperation

Through most of the Cold War period, Pakistan and Russia

remained unfriendly due to divergent security interests in the

region. However, changing geostrategic realities led to adjustments

in their foreign policies. Growing threat of Islamic State (IS) and

issues of terrorism and drug-trafficking in the region have led

Russia to expand its political, security and economic ties with

regional countries.57 Pakistan fits well in this new framework as it

also shares similar concerns and seeks to expand its defence

relationship with Russia. As a result, both the countries have

engaged in multilateral frameworks for regional security and

stability. Pakistan and Russia are part of multilateral security

35


Response


cooperation arrangements such as Dushanbe Four, Shanghai

Cooperation Organization (SCO),58 and Moscow Conference on

International Security (MCIS). The seventh session of MCIS was

held on 4-5 April 2018. Under security cooperation arrangements.

Participating countries shared their experiences in countering

militant threats, preventing illicit drug-trafficking, and bringing

about peace and stability in Afghanistan.59

In November 2014, the first time in forty-five years, Russian

Defense Minister, Sergei Shoygu, visited Pakistan and signed a

defence agreement.60 Following the signing of the agreement,

Pakistan purchased four Mi-35 combat helicopters worth $153

million in August 2017 and plans further purchases as well. They

are also negotiating the sale of Su-35 and Su-37 combat aircraft.61

Moreover, in October 2015, Pakistan and Russia signed a $2 billion

deal for the construction of North-South (Lahore-Karachi) gas

pipeline.62 Russia has also signalled its support for Pakistan’s stance

on membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It is indeed a great

leap forward from its previous stance. A Russian diplomat, Pavel

Didkovski, in a recent seminar, titled Disarmament, Non-

Proliferation and Strategic Stability, held in Islamabad in December

2017, appreciated Pakistan’s effective nuclear export control

regimes and unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing.

Furthermore, he expressed his country’s support for the criteria-

based membership in the NSG for the non-NPT nuclear states.63

Another important feature of their growing ties is their joint

military exercises in Russia’s North Caucasus in September 2016,

known as Druzhbha (Russian: friendship).64 Russia was also part of

Pakistan’s Aman-17 international naval exercises in the Arabian

Sea in February 2017.65 The objective of these exercises is to

coordinate training and assistance in countering terrorism in the

region. In a recent meeting, the Pak-Russia defence ministers met

in Moscow in March 2018 and shared their concerns regarding the

Islamic State’s growing presence in Afghanistan and reaffirmed

36


Response


their commitment to continue cooperation against terrorism in the

region.66

Restoring Strategic Balance through Nuclear Deterrence

Pakistan began its military nuclear program after India conducted

a nuclear test in 1974. Pakistan realized that neither could it match

India’s conventional superiority nor could it depend on external

military help in a future crisis. Now, with India becoming a nuclear

weapons state, Pakistan should be overpowered. Therefore,

developing strategic deterrence became a priority with it to

overcome the conventional imbalance with India as well as to

provide deterrence against India’s nuclear weapon.

The growth of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons depends on its

production capacity and, more importantly, the growth of India’s

nuclear arsenal and build-up of its conventional power.67 To date,

Pakistan’s most mature nuclear weapon delivery system is air-

based. Along with it, Pakistan has also developed land-based and

sea-based nuclear weapon system of ballistic and cruise missiles.68

The launch of submarine-based cruise missile—Babur-III—has

completed Pakistan’s nuclear triad, and has given it the second

strike capability.69 Pakistan’s nuclear policy is embedded in the

country’s security policy. Salient features of the policy are follows.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy

Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence is the determinant of strategic

stability in South Asia.

Pakistan’s short-range, low-yield nuclear weapons are

aimed at offsetting India’s conventional military power.

Pakistan is committed to developing Full Spectrum

Deterrence (FSD) in line with its Credible Minimum

Deterrence policy. The objective of Full Spectrum

37


Response


Deterrence is to checkmate both nuclear attacks of India and

its military intrusion in Pakistan’s territory.

Pakistan is also committed to Strategic Restraint Regime as

well as composite dialogue for resolving all outstanding

issues with India.70

Pakistan’s Relationship with its Neighbouring Countries

Besides maintaining and growing a strategic and economic

relationship with major powers, Pakistan has also been engaged in

security and economic cooperation with regional countries.

Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan continues to be

undermined by allegations of cross-border terrorism and

prevalence of mistrust. However, intensive engagement by both the

countries bilaterally as well as multilaterally has the potential to

produce positive results. Agreements like the APTTA and

Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity

(APAPPS) encompass a broad framework for structural

engagement in many areas of mutual concern. These areas include

counterterrorism, border management, preventing drug-

trafficking, refugees’ repatriation, peace and reconciliation and

economic development.

The multilateral agreements such as CASA and TAPI can also prove

helpful in boosting bilateral economic trade. Additionally,

translating cultural links and geographic proximity into economic

synergies would also assist in expanding transit facilities and

trade71. For this, revision of the APTTA—that formerly helped boost

the bilateral trade and is in limbo since 2016—is long overdue.

Furthermore, Pakistan’s digitization and systematic regulation of

border crossings will help not only smooth movement of people and

goods but also help in reducing illegal trade. Afghanistan’s

participation in the CPEC and the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) could

play a positive role in improving bilateral ties.

38


Response


Pakistan became a member of the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization (SCO) in June 2017. The SCO membership and the

operationalization of the Gwadar port have enhanced Pakistan’s

significance for the CARs as the country provides them with natural

overland routes and connectivity to the Arabian Sea.72 For

improving economic engagement, there have been frequent

reciprocal visits from leaders of Pakistan and Central Asian

republics—Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and

Kazakhstan. These states, being land-locked, can use Pakistani

ports for their trade with Gulf countries and can help Pakistan meet

its energy requirements.

In this context, the Central-Asia-South-Asia (CASA)-1000 is

important. It is a $1.2 billion, 750km long electricity transmission

line, which would help Pakistan import electricity from Kyrgyzstan

and Tajikistan through Afghanistan. Total energy transmitted by

the project would be 1,300 MW, of which 300MW would go to

Afghanistan and 1,000MW would be supplied to Pakistan. Recently,

the $8 billion, 1,840 km TAPI gas pipeline project was also launched

on February 23, 2018. Pakistan and India would each receive 1.325

billion cubic feet per day (bcfd) gas and Afghanistan would receive

0.5 bcfd under the project.73 It is pertinent to note that India does

not have an overland trade route to Central Asia and that it costs

India twice to send its goods to C. Asia through the Chabahar port.74

Pakistan has also maintained security and economic cooperation

with other regional countries like Nepal, Sri Lanka and the

Maldives. Shahid Khaqan Abbasi became the first prime minister of

Pakistan, in over two decades, to make an official visit to Nepal on

March 5, 2018. Though Pakistan has had diplomatic meetings and

engagements with Nepal at multilateral forums, the recent visit of

Pakistan’s PM to Nepal marked a strategic dimension. As Nepal

currently possesses the chairmanship of the SAARC, the Pakistani

PM urged Sharma Oli, the newly elected prime minister of Nepal, to

convene the SAARC summit in Islamabad. In addition, Pakistan also

encouraged Nepal to be part of the Chinese BRI and informed him

39


Response


of the importance of CPEC and its role in regional economic

integration.75

Pakistan invited Sri Lankan president as the chief guest on its

Republic day on 23rd March 2018. Sri Lankan President Maithripala

Sirisena also supported Pakistan’s bid to host the SAARC summit.

Besides, he also thanked Pakistani PM for Pakistan’s support at the

UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) as a “true friend and a

brother” in its turbulent times.76 A trade exhibition held in Sri Lanka

under the rubric of The Pakistan Single Country Exhibit in January

2018. It is expected that the exhibition would help boost bilateral

trade between the two countries.77

Pakistan also shares with the Maldives a sustainable partnership in

the economy, tourism, education, climate change, and countering

terrorism. Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives were engaged in

trilateral military exercises, Eagle Dash-1, in 2016. Pakistan

provided training to and shared its experience with the armies of

both the countries in counterterrorism operations.78 Pakistan’s

army chief, General Bajwa was the first highest foreign dignitary to

visit the Maldives79 after the country’s lifting of 45-days-emergency

on 22nd March 2018.

Pakistan’s Relationship with Gulf Countries

Pakistan’s relationship with the Gulf countries forms a strategic as

well as the economic basis. Pakistan’s efforts to strengthen

relations with the Gulf countries also constitute a bulwark against

India’s efforts for raising its security and economic profile in the

Middle East.80 India’s ability to expand its security relations beyond

the safety of sea lanes, through which it imports oil from the Gulf, is

limited. Its strong relations with Iran and Israel simultaneously

have also led to its low-security profile in the Middle East.81

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Response


Pakistan has balanced its relationship with Saudi Arabia and Iran.

In the purview of security threats from neighbouring rebel forces to

Saudi Arabia, Pakistan deployed its troops to protect the Kingdom’s

territorial integrity and for the security of the holy places. It has also

made it clear, at the same time, that Pakistan’s forces would not be

available against another Muslim state.82 Iran’s foreign minister

Mohammad Javad Zarif acknowledged that just as Iran’s relations

with India are not against Pakistan; Iran understood that Pakistan’s

relations with Saudi Arabia were not against it.83 Meanwhile, in

order to concretize their bilateral relationship, both Iran and

Pakistan have also conducted joint counterterrorism exercises and

have worked for strengthening border security management.

Added to Pakistan’s strategic relationship are its strong economic

ties with Gulf countries. According to Pakistan’s Economic Survey,

of the total nine million overseas employees 54.8 percent work in

the Middle East. The remittances they send annually on average

since 2011 amount to nearly $20 billion.84 Pakistan’s major trading

partners in the Middle East are UAE and Saudi Arabia. In the FY

2016-17, Pakistan’s total imports from the UAE amounted to $5.84

billion, $1.95 billion from Saudi Arabia, and $864 million from

Qatar. To these countries, Pakistan exported goods and services

worth $852 million, $300 million, and $42.6 million, respectively.85

Apart from Arab Gulf countries, Pakistan’s trade volume with Iran

reached $1.5 billion in the FY 17, while both the countries have

made a commitment to increase it to $5 billion in FY 21. For this to

happen, they will have to work together for “establishing banking

channels, holding trade exhibitions, and addressing tariff and non-

tariff barriers”.86 On a recent visit of Iranian Foreign Minister Jawad

Zarif to Pakistan, both the countries pledged to deepen economic

connectivity through benefitting from the complementarities of the

Gwadar and Chabahar.87

In addition, Pakistan and Iran have also been working to finalise the

Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, which is facing tremendous challenges.

41


Response


These challenges constituted the United States’ sanctions on Iran

and the resulting reluctance of Pakistani banks to establish their

branches in Iran.88 However, even after lifting of the US sanctions,

Pakistan has not been able to work on the pipeline, due to its

financial constraints.

Conclusion

In sum, Pakistan has not objected to the US’ strategic partnership

with India. What concerns Pakistan the most is that the US is

pursuing discriminatory policies in providing India with high-end,

dual-use defence technology. The increasing acquisition of military

power through such advanced defence weaponry has made India

aggressive in its relationship with Pakistan. Thus, exploiting its

strategic partnership with the US, India has actively worked to

diplomatically isolate Pakistan through both projecting Pakistan as

a state sponsor of terrorism and refusing to engage with Pakistan in

regional economic organizations such as the SAARC. Pakistan, on

the other hand, has responded in equal measure, to counter India’s

hostile policies against it. Through the acquisition of advanced

conventional weapon systems as well as developing full-spectrum

deterrence at the strategic and operational level, Pakistan has

successfully counterbalanced India’s nuclear threat and

conventional superiority. In addition, Pakistan has also made

efforts for availing itself the most of its geo-strategic importance in

the region by pursuing intensive economic and security

engagement. Pakistan’s balancing act in the Saudi-Iran rivalry,

including strengthening its ties with the Gulf countries, testifies to

Pakistan’s pragmatic diplomacy. Moreover, its rigorous efforts for

stabilizing its relationship with Afghanistan would achieve two

ends: one, stability in Afghanistan is in parallel to stability in

Pakistan; two, it will help improve trade and transit not only with

Afghanistan but also with Central Asian states. Toward these ends,

initiation of such economic projects as CASA, TAPI, APAPPS and

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Response


CPEC and potential revitalization of APTTA would play a concrete

role. Successful execution of these projects, along with Pakistan’s

continuous high-level engagement with regional countries for

economic and security cooperation, would certainly bring about

peace, prosperity and stability in the region.

Riaz Khokhar is a


Endnotes

1 Jayshree Bajoria and Esther Pan, “The US-India Nuclear Deal,” Council on

Foreign Relations, November 5, 2010, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-india-

nuclear-deal

2 Cara Abercrombie, “Removing Barriers to US-India Defense Trade,” Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, January 10, 2018,

http://carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/10/removing-barriers-to-u.s.-india-defense-

trade-pub-75206

3 Shishir Gupta, “Soon, India defence attache at the US navy Bahrain command,”

Hindustan Times, March 21, 2018, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-

news/soon-india-defence-attache-at-us-navy-bahrain-command/story-

iTGPB5sLbOlod11MlprWjI.html

4 Strobe Talbot, “Engaging India,” New York Times, November 28, 2006,

https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/28/books/chapters/engaging-india.html

5 Stephen P. Cohen, India and America: An Emerging Relationship (Kyoto, Japan: A

Paper presented to the Conference on Nation-State System and Transactional Forces

in South Asia, December 2000),

https://www.scribd.com/document/174805839/India-and-America-An-Emerging-

Relationship-Stephen-Cohen

6 “Fact Sheet: US India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative,” US Department of

State (Archive), October 15, 2008, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/c17361.htm ;

“Fact Sheet & Briefs, The US Atomic Energy Act Session 123 At Glance,” Arms

Control Association, February 2018 (updated),

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/AEASection123 ; Prashant Hosur, “The

Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Agreement,” International Journal, (Spring 2010): 435-



43


Response


448.; “Timeline: Twists and Turns in the India-US Nuclear Deal,” Reuters, October

2, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-usa-nuclear-timeline/timeline-

twists-and-turns-in-the-india-u-s-nuclear-deal-idUSTRE4912HG20081002

7 Jayshree Bajoria and Esther Pan, “The US-India Nuclear Deal,” Council on

Foreign Relations, November 5, 2010, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-india-

nuclear-deal

8 Ibid.

9 “Remarks by Kenneth I. Juster US Ambassador to India, US-India Relations:

Building a Durable Partnership for the 21st Century,” US Embassy and Consulates in

India, January 11, 2018, https://in.usembassy.gov/u-s-india-relations-building-

durable-partnership-21st-century/

10 Shivaji Kumar, “How Obama Revived US-Indian Relations,” The National

Interest, June 6, 2016, How Obama Revived US-Indian Relations

11 “Remarks by Kenneth I. Juster US Ambassador to India, US-India Relations:

Building a Durable Partnership for the 21st Century,” US Embassy and Consulates in

India, January 11, 2018, https://in.usembassy.gov/u-s-india-relations-building-

durable-partnership-21st-century/

12 Maria Abi-Habib, “India is Close to Buying a Russian Missile System, Despite US

Sanctions,” The New York Times, April 5, 2018,

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/05/world/asia/india-russia-s-400-missiles.html

13 Ibid.

14 Varghese K. George, “India, US sign military logistics pact,” The Hindu, October

18, 2016, http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/India-US-sign-military-

logistics-pact/article14598282.ece

15 Pranab Dhal Samanta and ET Bureau, “India, US to reopen talks on Comcasa,”

The Economic Times, March 27, 2018,

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-us-to-reopen-talks-on-

comcasa/articleshow/63474835.cms

16 Ibid.

17 Maria Abi-Habib, “India is Close to Buying a Russian Missile System, Despite US

Sanctions,” The New York Times, April 5, 2018,


18 Gupta, “Soon.”



https://in.usembassy.gov/u-s-india-relations-building-durable-partnership-21st-century/





http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/India-US-sign-military-logistics-pact/article14598282.ece

http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/India-US-sign-military-logistics-pact/article14598282.ece


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19 Ankit Panda, “India Gains Access to Oman’s Duqm Port, Putting the Indian Ocean

Geopolitical Contest in the Spotlight,” The Diplomat, February 14, 2018,

https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/india-gains-access-to-omans-duqm-port-putting-

the-indian-ocean-geopolitical-contest-in-the-spotlight/

20 David Brewster, “Cocos and Christmas Islands: building Australia’s strategic role

in the Indian Ocean,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 13, no. 2, (February 24,

2017): 155-173.

21 Ankit Panda, “India Australia Hold First Two-Plus-Two Foreign and Defense

Secretaries Meeting,” The Diplomat, December 13, 2017,

https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/india-australia-hold-first-two-plus-two-foreign-and-

defense-secretaries-meeting/

22 Milan is a Hindi word for ‘Tryst’ or ‘meeting’. It signified meeting of world navies

in India for naval exercises.

23 Pakistan’s Shaheen-III ballistic missile can reach these Indian islands,

according to General Kidwai.

24 “Multilateral naval exercise begins in Andamans,” The Times of India, March 6,

2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/multi-lateral-naval-exercise-begins-

in-andamans/articleshow/63191024.cms

25 “Joint Statement on the First U.S.-India Counterterrorism Designations Dialogue,”

US Department of State, December 19, 2017,

https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/12/276679.htm

26 Khalid Banuri, “Panel Discussion on Indian Armed Forces Joint Doctrine 2017: A

Critical Appraisal”, Islamabad Policy Research institute, February 28, 2018; Sanjana

Gogna, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons and the Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” IDSA,

September 11, 2017, https://idsa.in/idsacomments/pakistan-nuclear-weapons-and-

the-indian-nuclear-doctrine_sgogna_110917

27 Rama Lakshmi, “India’s defense minister questions its no first-use nuclear

policy—then says it’s his personal opinion,” The Washington post, November 10,

2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/11/10/indias-

defense-minister-questions-its-no-first-use-nuclear-policy-then-says-its-his-personal-

opinion/?utm_term=.d91f3e76613a

28 Ibid.

29 “India pulls out of Pakistan-hosted 19th SAARC summit,” Dawn, September 27,

2016, https://www.dawn.com/news/1286460

30 Anwar Iqbal, “Pakistan seeks bigger SAARC to counter India’s influence,” Dawn,

October 12, 2016, https://www.dawn.com/news/1289685

https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/india-australia-hold-first-two-plus-two-foreign-and-defense-secretaries-meeting/

https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/india-australia-hold-first-two-plus-two-foreign-and-defense-secretaries-meeting/

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/multi-lateral-naval-exercise-begins-in-andamans/articleshow/63191024.cms

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/multi-lateral-naval-exercise-begins-in-andamans/articleshow/63191024.cms

https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/12/276679.htm

https://idsa.in/idsacomments/pakistan-nuclear-weapons-and-the-indian-nuclear-doctrine_sgogna_110917

https://idsa.in/idsacomments/pakistan-nuclear-weapons-and-the-indian-nuclear-doctrine_sgogna_110917

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/11/10/indias-defense-minister-questions-its-no-first-use-nuclear-policy-then-says-its-his-personal-opinion/?utm_term=.d91f3e76613a





45


Response


31 Betwa Sharma, “How India’s Diplomatic Isolation of Pakistan Goes beyond

SAARC,” The Huffington Post, October 3, 2016,

https://www.huffingtonpost.in/2016/10/03/how-indias-diplomatic-isolation-of-

pakistan-goes-beyond-saarc_a_21484380/

32 “Text of Sushma Swaraj’s speech at U.N. General Assembly,” The Hindu,

September 25, 2017, http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/text-of-sushma-

swaraj-speech-at-un-general-assembly/article19746157.ece

33 “Pakistan neither wants, nor engaged in arms race in South Asia: envoy,” DAWN,

October 21, 2016, https://www.dawn.com/news/1291383

34 Ibid.

35 Tariq Osman Hyder, “US-India Nuclear Deal and Pakistan The Years Ahead,”

Policy Perspectives 10, no. 2, (2013)

https://www.jstor.org/stable/42909310?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

36 “U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement,” U.S. Embassy, March 1, 2016,

https://pk.usembassy.gov/u-s-pakistan-strategic-dialogue-joint-statement/

37 Ibid.

38 Jonas Schneider, “A Nuclear Deal for Pakistan?” CSS Analysis, no. 187, March

2016, 3.

39 Firouz, Caren, and Reuters, Sartaj Aziz on Pakistan’s Foreign and Security Policy,

(Council on Foreign Affairs, March 1, 2016)

40 Markey, “No Exit.”

41 “Haqqani network sanctuaries completely destroyed in Pakistan,” Aaj Shahzeb

Khanzada Kay Sath, Geo News, January 5, 2018)

https://www.geo.tv/latest/175493-unorganised-presence-of-haqqanis-possible-

destroyed-sanctuaries-khawaja-asif ; and, Karman Yousaf, “No safe haven’:

Pakistan rejects US report on Taliban, Haqqani network”, The Express Tribune, July

20, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1462534/no-safe-haven-pakistan-rejects-us-

report-taliban-haqqani-network/

42 “Senior U.S. Official from the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs

Ambassador Alice Wells visits Pakistan,” News and Events, US Embassy and

Consulates in Pakistan, April 3, 2018, https://pk.usembassy.gov/pr-04032018/

43 Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (London: C.

Hurst & Co., 2015), 93-100.

https://www.huffingtonpost.in/2016/10/03/how-indias-diplomatic-isolation-of-pakistan-goes-beyond-saarc_a_21484380/

https://www.huffingtonpost.in/2016/10/03/how-indias-diplomatic-isolation-of-pakistan-goes-beyond-saarc_a_21484380/


https://www.jstor.org/stable/42909310?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

https://pk.usembassy.gov/u-s-pakistan-strategic-dialogue-joint-statement/

https://tribune.com.pk/story/1462534/no-safe-haven-pakistan-rejects-us-report-taliban-haqqani-network/

https://tribune.com.pk/story/1462534/no-safe-haven-pakistan-rejects-us-report-taliban-haqqani-network/

https://pk.usembassy.gov/pr-04032018/

46


Response


44 “Asia and the Middle East lead rising trend in arms imports, US exports grow

significantly, says SIPRI,” New and Events, SIPRI, March 12, 2018,

https://www.sipri.org/news/press-release/2018/asia-and-middle-east-lead-rising-

trend-arms-imports-us-exports-grow-significantly-says-sipri

45 Jonah Blank, “Pakistan and China’s Almost Alliance,” The RAND Blog, October

16, 2015, 3.

46 Ibid.

47 Lisa Curtis, “China’s Military and Security Relationship with Pakistan,” The

Heritage Foundation, May 26, 2009, https://www.heritage.org/testimony/chinas-

military-and-security-relationship-pakistan

48 “National Defense Complex,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, September 27, 2011,

http://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/634/

49 Dr. Ahmad Rashid Malik, “The Growing Pakistan-China Defense Cooperation,”

ISSI Issue Brief, October 7, 2016, 2.

50 “Pakistani armed drone kills in first attack,” Time of Israel, September 7, 2015,

https://www.timesofisrael.com/pakistani-armed-drone-kills-in-first-attack/

51 Blank, “Pakistan.”

52 Malik, “The Growing.”

53 Small, “The China.”

54 “CPEC Significance/Potential, China Pakistan Economic Corridor,” Official

website CPEC, accessed April 15, 2018, http://cpec.gov.pk/significance-potential/4)

55 Ibid.

56 Inamullah Khattak, “Afghanistan desires role in CPEC, says Afghan envoy,” Daily

Dawn, October 14, 2016; Fuad Shahbazov, “Will the China Pakistan Economic

Corridor be a gateway to Central Asia?,” The Diplomat, May 25,2017); Imtiaz

Ahmad, “Russia to join China Pakistan Economic Corridor,” Hindustan Times,

November 26, 2016); The Newspaper’s Staff Reporter, “Iran keen to join CPEC,

says envoy,” Dawn, January 27, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1311031

57 Vladimir Moskalenko and Petr Topychkanov, “Russia and Pakistan: Shared

Challenges and Common Opportunities,” Carnegie Moscow Center, May 2014, 1.

58 Ibid.

https://www.sipri.org/news/press-release/2018/asia-and-middle-east-lead-rising-trend-arms-imports-us-exports-grow-significantly-says-sipri

https://www.sipri.org/news/press-release/2018/asia-and-middle-east-lead-rising-trend-arms-imports-us-exports-grow-significantly-says-sipri

http://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/634/

https://www.timesofisrael.com/pakistani-armed-drone-kills-in-first-attack/

http://cpec.gov.pk/significance-potential/4


47


Response


59 “MCIS, VII Moscow Conference on International Security,” Ministry of Defense

of the Russian Federation, MCIS, accessed on April 8,2018,

http://eng.mil.ru/en/mcis/index.htm; Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan says ‘Geostrategic

Reasons Bring it Closer to Russia’,” Voice of America, April 4, 2018,

https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-says-geostrategic-reasons-bring-it-closer-

russia/4332017.html

60 Kashif Hussain, “What Russia’s Changing Role in South Asia means for

Pakistan,” The Diplomat, January 20, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/what-

russias-changing-role-in-south-asia-means-for-pakistan/

61 Ibid.

62 Almas Haider Naqvi and Yasir Masood, “Rejuvenating Pakistan-Russia Relations:

Discernible Trends and Future,” ISSI, No.4, 2017, 12.

63 “Russia supports Pakistan’s bid to join elite nuclear trading club,” The Express

Tribune, December 15, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1584950/1-russia-

supports-pakistans-bid-join-elite-nuclear-trading-club/; Sib Kaifee, “Russia signals

support for Pakistan’s NSG candidature,” Arab News, December 18, 2017,

http://www.arabnews.com/node/1210756/world

64 Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan Russia begin ‘Friendship 2017’ joint Anti-Terror Drill,”

Voice of America, September 25, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-russia-

friendship-joint-anti-terror-drill/4043265.html

65 Hussain, “What Russia’s.”

66 “Pakistan, Russia concerned over growing IS threat,” Dawn, March 22, 2018,


67 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2016,”

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 31, 2016,

https://thebulletin.org/2016/november/pakistani-nuclear-forces-201610118

68 Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen, “Trends in World Nuclear Forces,

2017,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, July 2017, 7.

69 “Press Release, No PR-125/2018-ISPR,” ISPR, March 29, 2018,

https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=4660

70 Kile, “Trends in World.”

71 Fahd Humayun, “Pak-Afghan Trade Relations, Looking Ahead,” Jinnah institute,

The Afghanistan Essays, 2018, 5-7.

72 Rizwan Zeb, “Pakistan in the SCO: Challenges and Prospects,” The CACI

Analytical Articles, February 8, 2018,

https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13496-pakistan-in-

the-sco-challenges-and-prospects.html

http://eng.mil.ru/en/mcis/index.htm

https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-says-geostrategic-reasons-bring-it-closer-russia/4332017.html

https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-says-geostrategic-reasons-bring-it-closer-russia/4332017.html



http://www.arabnews.com/node/1210756/world

https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13496-pakistan-in-the-sco-challenges-and-prospects.html

https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13496-pakistan-in-the-sco-challenges-and-prospects.html

48


Response


73 Mir Sherbaz Khetran, “TAPI: A Recipe for greater Regional Cooperation,” ISSI,

Issue Brief, March 19, 2018, 2.

74 Munir Akram, “The New Great Game,” DAWN Opinion, June 12, 2016,


75 Kamal Dev Bhattarai, “Why Was the Pakistani Prime Minister in Nepal?,” The

Diplomat, March 10, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/why-was-the-pakistani-

prime-minister-in-nepal/

76 “Sri Lanka keen to enhance trade with Pakistan,” The Nation, December 20, 2017,

https://nation.com.pk/20-Dec-2017/sri-lanka-keen-to-enhance-trade-with-pakistan;

Naveed Siddiqui, “Sri Lanka backs Pakistan’s bid to host SAARC summit: Foreign

Office,” Dawn, October 18, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/1364642

77 “Pakistan’s Single Country Exhibition-2018 opens in Colombo from Jan 12-14,”

Colombo Page, January 8, 2018,

http://www.colombopage.com/archive_18A/Jan08_1515422634CH.php

78 “COAS visits NCTC Pabbi for trilateral exercise, Eagle Dash-1,” The Nation,

February 4, 2016, https://nation.com.pk/04-Feb-2016/coas-visits-nctc-pabbi-for-

trilateral-exercise-eagle-dash-1; Mateen Haider, “Pakistan, Maldives sign four

MoUs,” DAWN, May 7, 2015.

79 “Pakistan army chief arrives in Maldives,” Maldives Independnent, March 31,

2018, http://maldivesindependent.com/politics/pakistan-army-chief-arrives-in-

maldives-137000

80 Abhijit SIngh, “India’s Middle Eastern Naval Diplomacy,” Middle East Institute,

July 27, 2017, http://www.mei.edu/content/map/indias-middle-eastern-naval-

diplomacy

81 Ibid.

82 Huma Yusuf, “Pakistan in the Middle East: A Cautious Balance,” The Diplomat,

October 4, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/pakistan-in-the-middle-east-a-

cautious-balance/

83 Christophe Jaffrelot, “The Friend of My Enemy,” Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, April 5, 2018,

https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/05/friend-of-my-enemy-pub-7600

84 “Pakistan Economic Survey 2016-17,” Government of Pakistan, Ministry of

Finance; and, Riazul Haq, “Pakistani workforce in Middle East facing the worst

despite giving the best,” The Express Tribune, October 31,2016,

https://tribune.com.pk/story/1215631/workforce-middle-east-facing-worst-despite-

giving-best

https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/why-was-the-pakistani-prime-minister-in-nepal/

https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/why-was-the-pakistani-prime-minister-in-nepal/

https://nation.com.pk/20-Dec-2017/sri-lanka-keen-to-enhance-trade-with-pakistan

http://www.colombopage.com/archive_18A/Jan08_1515422634CH.php

https://nation.com.pk/04-Feb-2016/coas-visits-nctc-pabbi-for-trilateral-exercise-eagle-dash-1

https://nation.com.pk/04-Feb-2016/coas-visits-nctc-pabbi-for-trilateral-exercise-eagle-dash-1

http://maldivesindependent.com/politics/pakistan-army-chief-arrives-in-maldives-137000

http://maldivesindependent.com/politics/pakistan-army-chief-arrives-in-maldives-137000

49


Response


85Asad Hashim and Alia Chughtai, “Pakistan’s ties with the Gulf countries,”

Aljazeera, June 9, 2017,

https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/06/pakistan-ties-gulf-countries-

170609141743286.html

86 Saleem Shahid, “Diplomats call for boosting Pakistan-Iran trade,” DAWN,

February 12, 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1388902

87 “Pakistan, Iran vow to enhance bilateral trade to $5b,” SAMAA, March 13, 2018,

https://www.samaa.tv/economy/2018/03/pakistan-iran-vow-enhance-bilateral-trade-

5b/

88 “Iran-Pakistan Trade hampered by Absence of banking Channels,” Financial

Tribune, January 27, 2018, https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-

economy/80788/iran-pakistan-trade-hampered-by-absence-of-banking-channels

https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/06/pakistan-ties-gulf-countries-170609141743286.html

https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/06/pakistan-ties-gulf-countries-170609141743286.html


https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/80788/iran-pakistan-trade-hampered-by-absence-of-banking-channels

https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/80788/iran-pakistan-trade-hampered-by-absence-of-banking-channels


China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan


Samran Ali

Introduction

China is growing from a regional to a global power. According to the

power transition theory, the rise of China places it in a natural

competition with the United States both economically and

militarily. China’s economic interests stretch from its immediate

neighborhood to other continents. It is also working on reviving the

Old Silk trade route, which covers its western regions, and Central

and South Asia. It is also investing heavily in these regions. States’

economic interests go alongside with their political interests. The

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, and other

economic ventures would, therefore, allow China to use soft power

to shape the public opinion in several regions.

China’s growing economic and political interests pose security

challenges for it as well, which in turn demand a proactive foreign

policy. The rivalry between the US and China is growing amid the

US policy of Pivot to Asia and the alliance between Chinese regional

rivals and the US. These factors are urging China to take measures

for safeguarding its interests in the region and beyond. Although

the US under President Trump has withdrawn from Trans-Pacific

Partnership (TPP), its strategic objectives and policies in the region,

crafted in the last few decades, have not changed i.e. ‘Japan as

keystone,’ ‘India as counterweight’ and the regional alliance of

democratic countries.

Violence in Afghanistan can have ripple effects on the Chinese

internal security, particularly on the western region Xinjiang, which

has a majority of ethnic Uyghur Muslim population. The Situation in

Afghanistan has remained volatile from Afghan Jihad to never-

ending War on Terror. Extremist ideologies were nurtured and



exported to neighboring Pakistan, Turkmenistan and the other

Central Asian Republics (CARs) in the past. East Turkestan Islamic

Moment (ETIM) has been involved in violent acts in the past. It is

feared that if extremists come to power again in Afghanistan, their

ideologies and terrorist activities may get a boost and the security

situation in the region may become even more precarious.

Presence of US troops in Afghanistan has also generated a

paradoxical situation. The troops' presence aims at bringing peace

and stability in Afghanistan but the US boots on the ground are also

a politically destabilizing factor. The Taliban, fighting against the US

troops, consider them occupation forces which must be ousted from

the Afghan soil.

Since Afghan soil became a playing field for competing interests of

global and regional powers1 in the 1980s and subsequent

internecine fight for power in the 19990s, Afghanistan’s security

situation has been worsening except for the period when Taliban

were in power there. The solution to the Afghan problem has

become as complex as Afghan history of internal fights. A number

of Afghanistan’s neighbors and some major powers now have

stakes in Afghanistan. This paper will analyze the Chinese rationale

and approach towards Afghanistan situation and possible

implications of Chinese policy for regional peace and stability,

particularly how it would impact Pakistan.

Evolving Afghan Geo-Political Situation

The 19th Century’s Great Game between the Russian and British

Empire was about the distrust and deep suspicion of each other’s

intentions in the region. The Russians were fearful of the British

making inroads in Central Asia and the British were concerned

about the security of India. Today power contest is between the US

and China and to lesser extents between the US and Russia.

Pakistan, India, Iran, and others are playing subsidiary roles.2



President Trump’s National Security Strategy regards Russia and

China as ‘key challenge’ affecting the US global standing and terms

them ‘revisionist’ states.3 The US interests in Central Asia are

mostly strategic. It aims to isolate the Central Asian Republics

(CARs) against Russian and Chinese influence. China and Russia see

US’ interests in CARs as standing challenge to their security

interests.4 The influence and footprint of China are, however,

growing in Central Asia with its increasing investments and trade

in the region.5 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is also

working to enhance cooperation among its member states. In

Afghanistan, divergent interests of several powers are becoming

increasingly visible. The convergence of Russian, Chinese and

Pakistani interests in Afghanistan have placed them on one side of

the spectrum and the US and India on the other.

The US has not been successful in achieving its objective of wiping

Taliban out of Afghanistan and establishing a central government

which is capable of governing the whole country. The security

situation in Afghanistan has further deteriorated after withdrawal

of ISAF forces in 2014. According to Special Inspector General for

Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), militants are expanding their

control and influence into other territories while the influence of

the government is decreasing.6 Political polarization has also

increased in past few years. Now there are more groups fighting in

Afghanistan than in 2001, when the US entered Afghanistan. ISIS

fighters are also reportedly moving there after facing defeat in Syria

and Iraq. According to UN Secretary-General’s Report, the present

situation remains volatile as Afghan Taliban and Islamic State in

Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan Province (ISIL-KP) showed a

continued capacity to inflict mass casualties in Afghanistan.7

The US-Afghanistan Security Partnership Agreement, which

entered into force on January 1, 2015, provides authorization for

presence and actions of United States security forces in Afghanistan.

Under the agreement, when deemed necessary, the US forces could

also take part in security operations in Afghanistan. There is also no



exact timeline given for complete US forces withdrawal from

Afghanistan, creating more ambiguity. President Trump, initially a

critic of the war in Afghanistan, changed his stance after taking over

the Presidential office. His Administration, in fact, took a tougher

stance against the Taliban and came up with its New Afghan

Strategy. This strategy allowed deployment of additional troops in

Afghanistan, encouraged greater Indian role in Afghanistan and

holds Pakistan responsible for not taking actions against Afghan

Taliban as well as allegedly providing them safe havens.8 The new

strategy does not lay emphasis on the political and governance

problems in Afghanistan. This strategy also indicates that Trump

Administration is trying to seek a military solution of the Afghan

problem.

There are chances that Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will

lose control of several peripheral areas if the US troops are

withdrawn totally from Afghanistan.9 The withdrawal will create a

power vacuum which may be filled by either Afghan Taliban gaining

power and control of the whole of Afghanistan or would lead to total

turmoil.10 The latter situation is likely to become similar to 1990s

when political elites and warlords were engaged in fighting each

other. This chaos may not be confined only to Afghanistan, it has the

potential to undermine the peace and security of its neighbors in

South and Central Asia including China and particularly Pakistan.

The chaotic Afghanistan situation provided conducive conditions

for Tahrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, militants from Uzbekistan and

Uygurs from Western China, and more recently the presence of ISIS

is likely to pose a whole new level of threat to the region.11

Chinese Interests and Policies in Afghanistan

China had kept a low profile in Afghanistan in the past. It had,

however, maintained secret contacts with some groups to restrain

them from working against the Chinese interests. These included

the flow of extremism into the Chinese Western region and security



of Chinese Companies operating in Afghanistan.12 China’s low-key

position has also not challenged the US political leadership role in

Afghanistan.13 But, as China is growing both economically and

politically, it is taking more interest in regional and global affairs.

Afghanistan as a neighbor of China holds more significance for the

former today than in the past. It has become an area of interest for

the Chinese foreign policy as it considers a peaceful Afghanistan a

key to stability in the region. Chinese actions in Afghanistan are also

partly motivated by the realization that China as a major power has

a responsibility in maintaining regional peace and security.14

President Trump during his state visit to China in November 2017,

also discussed Afghanistan’s future and the threat of terrorism with

President Xi, indicating the importance of Chinese role in

Afghanistan. China’s permanent representative to the United

Nations, Ma Zhaoxu at the Security Council Debate on Afghanistan

said, “Peace and stability in Afghanistan have a direct bearing on the

well-being of the Afghan people, as well as on security, stability, and

prosperity in the region.”15 He also termed Afghanistan as an

important country in the context of Belt and Road Initiative and that

the international community must provide firm support to achieve

peace and security in Afghanistan.16

Interests of Afghanistan are also converging with that of China. For

Afghanistan, Beijing can help meet two of its major needs.

Afghanistan needs resources for reconstruction and secondly, to

play a role in influencing Pakistan17 to take steps against Afghan

Taliban, allegedly operating from their bases in Pakistan.

Peace and Stability in Afghanistan

As mentioned earlier, Chinese main concerns are peace and

stability in Afghanistan. There are two major reasons driving

China’s concerns. One is the internal insurgency in Afghanistan and

the other presence of US troops in the war-torn country. The



stalemate between Taliban fighters and US troops deployed there

have left the Chinese with fewer choices in Afghanistan.

According to Director of Center for Shanghai Cooperation

Organization Studies, Fudan University, Zhao Huasheng, Xinjiang’s

stability is the “starting point” for China’s Afghanistan policy.18

There is a constant fear of the support to extremists in Western

China from Afghanistan. The Xinjiang region of China is home to

more than 8 million Muslims in which anti-Han sentiments have

grown among the Uyghurs since the 1990s. They complain of

discrimination and marginalization of their community in the

overall development of China.19 Some experts see the Uyghur issue

as an internal Chinese security problem, but for some it is seen in

the context of global jihad as it has a religious dimension and

Uyghurs have reported contacts with external militant groups.20

Majority of the Uyghurs harboring anti-China sentiments are

organized under the ETIM umbrella. The ETIM has ties with Al-

Qaeda, Afghan Taliban and reportedly IS which is expanding its

presence in Afghanistan.21 Presence of potent militant groups in

China’s neighborhood is worrisome for it. IS aspires to establish a

global network of jihad,22 and poses a greater threat to China than

militants adhering to any other ideology. In late February 2017, IS

released a video featuring a man from Xinjiang vowing to carry out

terrorist attacks in China.23

The presence of US troops and intelligence agencies in Afghanistan

is another factor that adds to China’s security concerns. When US’

forces entered Afghanistan in 2001, China viewed this development

as a US military base right next to Chinese western border.24 Former

Afghan President Hamid Karzai has termed the US military

presence not only to fight Taliban but also to keep an eye on its

major adversaries in the region.25 China also thinks the US will not

exit Afghanistan completely, as it would be perceived as its defeat

and a major embarrassment internationally. It also realizes that the

US will maintain its military presence in Afghanistan as long as it

remains unstable. China also fears that US withdrawal may result in



a civil war within Afghanistan, which is not in its interests. China,

therefore, doesn’t object to US’ presence under current

circumstances, but it doesn't want the extended US military

presence in its neighborhood.26

Paradoxically US presence in Afghanistan is also a major factor

contributing to instability in Afghanistan. Taliban regard the US

forces as occupation forces, which provides them with a legitimate

reason to fight against them as well as garner support of the other

Afghans. The absence of a withdrawal timeline and increase in US

forces in Afghanistan has also cast doubts on US objectives in

Afghanistan. The suspicions were also echoed by the Iranian

Foreign Minister Dr. Javad Zarif, the other neighbor of Afghanistan,

on his visit to Pakistan. He stated that the US was not interested in

bringing peace in Afghanistan and security of the region. He

stressed on cooperation among regional countries for peace.

In continuation of its troublesome policies, the US has also sought

to increase Indian influence and role in Afghanistan.27 Trump

termed India as "a key security and economic partner of the United

States" and said that developing a strategic partnership with India

was a "critical part of the South Asia strategy for America". India,

however, has declined to send its troops to Afghanistan and

emphasized on the economic and infrastructure development in

line with Chinese policy on Afghanistan. China, in larger geopolitical

context, would not want Afghanistan with a support base for

extremists, go under the Indian influence.

Other threats posed to China by insatiability in Afghanistan include

the flow of drugs into China from Afghanistan. According to the

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), opium

production in Afghanistan in 2016 increased by 43% to 4800 tons

from 3300 tons in 2015.28 Much of the drugs emanating from

Afghanistan find their way into China through Central Asia. In order

to control the drug trafficking, China has proposed an anti-drug task

force working under SCO.



China Reconnecting with the World

At a time when policies of protectionism are bring favored by the

countries in the West, China is connecting with the world with trade

and cooperation to further its economic objectives. The primary

policy tools for China have been its trade and investment in

different world regions. President Xi Jingping is working to revive

the Old Silk Road under the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) to connect the

vast territories in Europe and Asia with trade, infrastructure, and

cultural links.29

China wants to expand the China Pakistan Economic Corridor

(CPEC), that comes under BRI, to Afghanistan. The project involves

the construction of two highways and railways connecting

Afghanistan with Pakistan.30 CPEC, China believes, will connect

Afghanistan with Pakistan and China economically and help

stabilize Afghan economy. The route will be further extended to

Central Asia. The appointment of the new Chinese ambassador to

Afghanistan was indicative of Afghan inclusion in CPEC. His

experience as the director of Silk Road Fund established under BRI

made him preferred choice for this. According to Liu Zongyi, a

senior fellow at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies,

“The appointment of Liu [as new Chinese ambassador to

Afghanistan] is a carefully considered one. He was raised in Xinjiang

and has experience in South Asia.” He also said, “China is

spearheading economic cooperation and development for regional

security, especially around its neighbors.”31

Chinese Diplomatic Efforts

The situation in Afghanistan is clear, if China takes sides in

Afghanistan among the fighting factions, it will offend the other

groups that are not supported. Preferred policy tool for China,

therefore, is through the pursuit of a diplomatic and political

solution for the Afghan problem. In its strategy for peace and



stability, Afghanistan aims to achieve five major goals. It includes an

Afghan-owned and Afghan-led peace process, capacity building of

Afghanistan to take responsibility of its own affairs, facilitating the

reconciliation process with Taliban, supporting Afghanistan

development and reconstruction process and lastly supporting

Afghanistan in developing external relations based on mutual

respect.32

A flurry of diplomatic activities, involving a number of states in

Afghanistan's neighborhood was witnessed after the unveiling of

new the US-Afghan Strategy-2017. Quadrilateral Coordination

Group (QCG) met in October 2017 in Oman. Russia hosted the SCO-

Afghan Contact group meeting at the foreign ministerial level in the

same month and China was host to Afghan and Pakistani foreign

ministers for trilateral discussions. Kabul Process Conference also

took place in February 2018. China is part of all these initiatives

aimed at stabilizing Afghanistan. China also appointed veteran

diplomat Sun Yuxi as a special envoy to Afghanistan.

Unlike other powers, China never entered Afghanistan militarily.

Due to this China enjoys a non-controversial and a cleaner image

among the Afghan people and militant groups. It also enjoys the

trust of the central government in Afghanistan. With no historical

baggage and a clean image, China is ideally suited to play the role of

an honest broker for peace in Afghanistan. The Kabul Process is one

such initiative. Kabul Peace Process works within the Chinese

vision of Afghanistan peacebuilding as the process is Afghan-owned

and Afghan-led aimed at taking forward a focused intra-Afghan

dialogue on peace. Many regional and extra-regional powers

participate in these talks. United Nations Organizations, European

Union, and NATO also back this process. Two meetings of Kabul

Process have been held so far. In the latest meeting, Afghan

President Ashraf Ghani offered talks to Taliban with no pre-

conditions in a major policy shift.33 The offer involved an office for

Taliban in Kabul, Afghan passports for Taliban, resettlement for

militants’ families and assistance in removal of top Taliban leaders



names from international terrorist blacklists. Chinese Foreign

Ministry Spokesperson welcomed this development and offered to

play a role in the reconciliation process.34 But the signals from the

US don’t augur well for the peace process. President Trump’s new

national security adviser, John Bolton, has stated that in face of

growing Taliban, Islamic State and Al-Qaeda threats, the US can't

walk away from the war in Afghanistan.35

According to experts, China has developed contacts with Taliban

over the years and has held meetings with them in both Pakistan

and China. It is preparing to deal with whatever political forces

emerge in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal.36 China, after

trilateral discussions on Afghanistan with Pakistan and Russia in

December 2016, favored the removal of Taliban from UN sanctions

list for strengthening peace dialogue between insurgents and the

Afghan government.37

Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Afghanistan

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) can provide an

important regional forum to seek a solution for Afghan conflict. SCO

evolved side by side with the Afghan War on Terror after 9/11.

Afghanistan was granted an observer status in the organization in

2012. SCO-Afghan Contact Group was established in 2005 to further

the communication between Afghanistan and SCO members. SCO is

opposed to the use of military means and external intervention in

Afghan conflict and stresses on internal reconciliation by

encouraging all political factions to engage in negotiations. It is

opposed to the presence of external forces in Afghanistan saying it

will jeopardize regional security.38

SCO is still evolving and developing its framework.39 Among other

factors behind limited SCO role in the regional security sphere is the

parallel Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) dominated

by Russia. CSTO is clear in its sole objective of the provision of



security to member states, unlike the SCO which has multiple sets

of aims and objectives ranging from security to culture and tourism.

CSTO has a Collective Rapid Reaction Force whereas SCO does not

have any.40

Russian President’s Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov,

said in an interview that in face of the possible threat of terrorism

from Afghanistan, Russia is taking steps with other member states

of CSTO to increase the readiness of the post-Soviet security bloc

and is also working with Afghanistan-SCO Contact Group in this

regard.41 Both SCO and CSTO had signed an agreement to broaden

mutual cooperation on security, crimes, and drug trafficking.

Meanwhile, the presence of US and NATO is also a factor in limited

SCO role in Afghanistan. China itself has mostly relied on US and

NATO when it came to the provision of security to Chinese

investments and interests. But China believes that to curb violence

and extremism, the economic and social developments are more

viable options.

The recent induction of Pakistan and India in SCO may also hinder

its capacity for dealing with Afghan conflict as objectives of these

states vis-à-vis Afghanistan are divergent. Pakistan and India

became the full members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

(SCO) in June 2017. After getting the permanent membership of the

SCO, both the countries will get more engaged in the Central Asian

affairs.

No Hard Power Option

Most of the experts agree on the point that Chinese will not get

militarily involved in Afghanistan. They term Chinese military

involvement in Afghanistan amounting to inviting trouble42 owing

to its proximity to restive Xinjiang province. Chinese Defence

Ministry recently denied reports of building a military post for

Afghan National Forces and termed the news groundless. It said



China and Afghanistan had normal security cooperation and that

China is supporting Afghanistan in improving defense and counter-

terrorism efforts.43 China focuses on the capacity building of the

Afghan forces so that they can effectively deal with the militants and

enforce government’s writ. It provided Afghanistan with military

aid for the first time in June 2016 which included logistic equipment

and weapons. Details of the supplies, however, were kept secret.44

General Fang Fenghui, the Chief of the General Staff of the PLA on

his visit to Afghanistan said China would provide $72 million worth

of military aid to the host country. China is also strengthening its

security on the border with Afghanistan. It is building a 75 km road

up to 10 km of the border, a supply depot and mobile

communication center for rapid movement of its military in the

region.45

Implications for Pakistan

Pakistan’s interests complement the Chinese interests in

Afghanistan, mainly stabilizing the internal situation in

Afghanistan. Pakistan and China both face the threat of terrorism

from Afghanistan. Afghan soil has been used by militants for

subversive activities in Pakistan for decades and China fears the

same for itself. Both want a central government, capable of

effectively governing the whole of Afghan territory and bringing

peace and stability in the country. Alignment of Pakistani interests

with Russian Federation and China has helped Pakistan in the

diplomatic arena. When the US blamed Pakistan for lies and deceit,

China praised Pakistani counterterrorism efforts. Chinese Foreign

Ministry spokesman, Geng Shuang said, “Pakistan has made great

efforts and sacrifices for combating terrorism and made prominent

contributions to the cause of international counterterrorism, and

the international community should fully recognize this.”46

Pakistan experienced extremism and a strong wave of terrorism

after 9/11 and start of the US War on Terror. According to Pakistan



government figures War on Terror has caused 123 billion US

Dollars loss to Pakistani economy besides the loss of 50,000

civilians and 6,000 military personal’s lives.47 Pakistan today

perceives genuine threats from inside Afghanistan.

In face of security challenges from Afghanistan, Pakistan has finally

begun fencing of its border with Afghanistan, which it had been

planning to do for a very long time. Once completed fencing will

help improve security in the peripheral border areas. According to

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) General Zubair

Hayat, two hundred thousand Pakistani security forces are

deployed on the western borders.48 The stable situation on western

borders will also lower the need for resources and number of

security personnel there. These resources can be diverted to other

defense and social needs.

Pakistan has also offered assistance and training to Afghan security

forces but met with a cold response. Only six Afghan cadets arrived

in Pakistan for training for the first time in 2015.49 Afghanistan has

yet to respond to Pakistani offer of a bilateral strategic cooperation

agreement, made by then COAS Raheel Sharif in 2011, and offer to

equip one of the brigades of Afghan National Army.

The increased Chinese involvement will help Pak-Afghan relations

which are dominated by mutual mistrust. The Afghan government

has been under US and Indian influence and adhere to mostly

western narrative about Pakistan. Increased Chinese involvement

in Afghanistan can help remove some mistrust between

Afghanistan and Pakistan. China in this regard has tried to address

the mistrust by holding trilateral talks with Pakistan and

Afghanistan. The first round of Trilateral Strategic Dialogue of

China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan was held in Kabul in February

2015. They discussed regional situation and trilateral practical

cooperation.50 China also hosted the 1st China-Afghanistan-

Pakistan Foreign Ministers' Dialogue in December 2017. The goals



of the dialogue included helping Pakistan and Afghanistan improve

and develop their mutual relationship.51

Strategically, for Pakistan, China can act as the balancing factor vis-

à-vis US and India in Afghanistan. Both China and Pakistan want a

limited Indian role and influence in Afghanistan. India is using

Afghan territory to support the TTP and Baloch insurgents against

Pakistan. The major part of Indian funded development projects in

Afghanistan is undertaken in its eastern provinces bordering

Pakistan. Pakistan believes that the Indian agents in the disguise of

officials working on these projects are involved in planning,

organizing and supporting militancy in Pakistan’s Balochistan

Province. Taking the training of Afghan security forces as an

example of Indian influence, India had trained up to two thousand

Afghan soldiers in its military academies in 2013,52 and one

thousand more were in training in 2014.

Pakistan wants to reach out to Central Asian Republics (CARs) for

enhancement of mutual economic and trade relations. CARs have

huge potential for trade growth with Pakistan. They have combined

population of 66 million and gross domestic product of 206 billion

US Dollars. However, Pakistan trade volume with CARs is much less

than its potential. Pakistan traded US $89 million worth goods in

2014 with Tajikistan and US $24 million with Uzbekistan.

Afghanistan is the most feasible land route for reaching out to

Central Asia.53 CASA-1000 energy project is currently under

construction, but its viability also depends on the security situation

in Afghanistan as it passes through several Afghan provinces

including Kunduz and Nangarhar with substantial militant

presence. Chinese aim to extend CPEC into Afghanistan and Central

Asia. If it is realized, CPEC will connect CARs to Pakistani ports,

making Afghanistan a land bridge and greatly benefit CARs,

Afghanistan and Pakistan economically.

The prosperity brought economic cooperation and CPEC can make

conducive conditions in Afghanistan for those Afghan refugees



living in Pakistan to return to their home country. Pakistan is

currently host to 1.3 million registered and about 0.6 million

unregistered Afghan refugees.54 Pakistan wants repatriation of

these refugees to Afghanistan with dignity. But Afghanistan and the

US call internal Afghan situation not yet suited for the return of

these refugees.55

Conclusion

The study of China’s policy towards Afghanistan shows that the

Chinese role is increasing in Afghanistan due to security and

economic reasons. The security situation in Afghanistan has a direct

impact on the Chinese internal security, and its economic plans in

Afghanistan and in its neighborhood. The IS growing footprints in

Afghanistan and US plans staying for the long term in Afghanistan

are also adding to Chinese concerns. Amid these concerns, China

and other stakeholders in the region are working hard strive for

peace and stability in Afghanistan. China and other Afghan

neighbors like Pakistan and Russia want a political and diplomatic

solution to the Afghan problem. If Taliban show their willingness to

become a part of the peace process, it would give a major boost to

achieving peace in Afghanistan. The US on its part can facilitate the

peace process in best interests of the region by negotiating its exit

from Afghanistan.

Indications, so far, however, are that the US wants a military

solution of the Afghan problem. The United States is keeping its

forces in Afghanistan at least "until the end of 2024 and beyond"

under the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). It is increasing its air

campaigns and troops deployment under Trump’s new strategy.

However, the United States military have not had a major success

against Taliban. Taliban have maintained their fighting capacity and

demonstrated it by capturing provincial capital Kunduz in 2015 and

recently bombings in the heart of Kabul. They have also made US

withdrawal from Afghanistan a pre-condition for peace



negotiations to take place. A political settlement of Afghan remains

the most viable option.

With regards to implications of China's Afghan policy for Pakistan if

the Chinese influence and diplomatic clout over Afghanistan are

exploited well by Pakistan it can further Pakistani interests in

Afghanistan. China is making diplomatic efforts for eradicating

mistrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan. China wants friendly

Pak-Afghan relations to decrease the challenges posed to CPEC

from militants based in Afghanistan. The overall involvement of

China into Afghanistan can have a positive outcome for Afghanistan

and the region.

Samran Ali is a


Endnotes

1 Riaz Muhammad Khan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and

Resistance to Modernity, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 162.

2 Munir Akram, “The new Great Game,” Dawn, June 12, 2016,


3 “President Donald J. Trump Announces a National Security Strategy to Advance

America’s Interests,” White House, December 18, 2017,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-

announces-national-security-strategy-advance-americas-interests/

4 Stephen J. Blank, “US Interests in Central Asia and Challenges to Them,” March

2007.



5 Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky and Paul Stronksi, “U.S. Policy Toward Central

Asia 3.0,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 25, 2016,

http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/25/u.s.-policy-toward-central-asia-3.0-pub-

62556

6 United States Congress, Quarterly Report, Special Inspector General for

Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), (30 January 2018)

7 United Nations, General Assembly, The Situation in Afghanistan and its

Implications for International Peace and Security: Report of Secretary-General,

A/72/651 (15 December 2017)

8 “Full Transcript: Donald Trump Announces His Afghanistan Policy”, The Atlantic,

Aug 21, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/full-transcript-

donald-trump-announces-his-afghanistan-policy/537552/

9 Sean Mann and Stephen Watts, “Afghanistan after the Drawdown,” Brookings, July

6, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/07/06/afghanistan-after-the-

drawdown/

10 Sandra Destradi, Nadine Godehardt and Alexander Frank, “The ISAF Withdrawal

from Afghanistan: Perceptions and Reactions of Regional Powers.” GIGA Focus

Global 2012, 10,

11 Harleen Gambhir, "ISIS in Afghanistan." Backgrounder, Institute for the Study of

War (2015): 6.

12 Jingdong Yuan, “China and Afghanistan: Challenges and Opportunities,” in New

South Asian Security, ed. Chris Ogden, (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2016), p. 79.

13 Zhao Huasheng, China, and Afghanistan: China's Interests, Stances, and

Perspectives, A Report of

the Center for Strategic and International Studies Russia and Eurasia Program,

March 2012

14 Zhao Huasheng, “What is behind China’s Growing Attention to Afghanistan,”

Carnegie, March 08, 2015, http://carnegie-mec.org/2015/03/08/what-is-behind-

china-s-growing-attention-to-afghanistan.

15 “Statement by Ambassador MA Zhaoxu at the Security Council Debate on

Afghanistan,” China’s Permanent Mission to United Nation, March 08, 2018,

http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t1542996.htm

16 Ibid.

17 Jingdong Yuan, “China and Afghanistan: Challenges and Opportunities,” p.77.

18 Ibid.



19 “Xinjiang Territory Profile,” BBC, November 2016 17, 2018,

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16860974

20 Shamil Shams, “Why China's Uighurs are joining jihadists in Afghanistan,” DW,

July 24, 2015, http://www.dw.com/en/why-chinas-uighurs-are-joining-jihadists-in-

afghanistan/a-18605630

21 Ibid.

22 Harleen Gambhir, "ISIS in Afghanistan."

23 “ISIL video threatens China with 'rivers of bloodshed',” Aljazeera, March 1, 2017,

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/isil-video-threatens-china-rivers-

bloodshed-170301103927503.html

24 Wang Jin, The US Withdrawal, and One Belt One Road: Chinese Concerns and

Challenges in Afghanistan," Strategic Assessment 19, No. 3 (October 2016)

25 Pamela Constable, “Hamid Karzai’s dark theories are gaining traction in

Afghanistan,” The Washington Post, February 14, 2018,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/hamid-karzais-dark-theories-

are-gaining-traction-in-afghanistan/2018/02/13/31df39e0-0e19-11e8-998c-

96deb18cca19_story.html?utm_term=.7d39e041e87f

26 Richard Ghiasy, “Why Afghanistan’s Stability is so Important to China?” South

China Morning Post, May 22, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-

defence/article/2095156/opinion-why-afghanistans-stability-so-important-china

27 “President Unveils New Afghanistan, South Asia Strategy,” US Department of

Defence, August 21, 2017,

https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1284964/president-unveils-new-

afghanistan-south-asia-strategy/

28 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016 –

Executive Summary, (United Nations 2016)

29 China Power Team, "How will the Belt and Road Initiative advance China’s

interests?" China Power, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative/

30 Saibal Dasgupta, “China Trying to Extend Belt Plan to Afghanistan to Expand

Influence,” Voice of America, May 08, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/china-

trying-to-extend-belt-plan-to-afghanistan/3842278.html

31 Teddy Ng and Laura Zhou, “Beijing sends in new envoy in a sign it wants a bigger

role for Afghanistan in ‘New Silk Road',” South China Morning Post, February 02,

2018, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2131819/beijing-

sends-new-envoy-sign-it-wants-bigger-role



32 Zhao Huasheng, “China and Afghanistan.”

33 Hamid Shalizi and James Mackenzie, ”Afghanistan’s Ghani offers talks with

Taliban 'without preconditions',” Reuters, February 28, 2018,

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban/afghanistans-ghani-offers-

talks-with-taliban-without-preconditions-idUSKCN1GC0J0

34 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference, March

1, 2018,

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t153

8767.shtml

35 “Americans frustrated as military still in Afghanistan: US NSA John Bolton,”

Tribune, March 24, 2018, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1668234/9-americans-

frustrated-us-military-still-afghanistan-us-nsa-john-bolton/

36 Andrew Small, “Why Is China Talking to the Taliban?” Foreign Policy, June 21,

2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/21/why-is-china-talking-to-the-taliban/

37 “Russia, China favor taking Taliban off UN sanctions list,” Tribune, December 28,

2016, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1277084/russia-china-favour-taking-taliban-off-

un-sanctions-list/

38 Zhao Huasheng, “China and Afghanistan.”

39 Sartaj Aziz, “Concluding Address,” in proceedings of SCO Role in Regional

Stability Prospects of its Expansion, Islamabad 2013, IPRI

40 Raj Kumar Sharma, “SCO’s Role in Afghanistan: Prospects and Challenges,”

Mainstream, VOL LIII No 24, June 6, 2015,

http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article5721.html

41 “Russia puts Post-Soviet security bloc on alert over likely terror threat from

Afghanistan,” TASS, February 9, http://tass.com/politics/989170

42 Dirk van der Kley, “China’s Foreign Policy in Afghanistan,” Analysis, October

2014.

43 "China denies plan to build a military base in Afghanistan," Reuters, January 25,

2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-afghanistan/china-denies-plan-to-

build-military-base-in-afghanistan-idUSKBN1FE196

44 Franz J. Marty, “The curious case of Chinese troops on Afghan soil,” The Central

Asia-Caucasus Analyst, February 03, 2017,

https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13424-the-curious-

case-of-chinese-troops-on-afghan-soil.html

45 Jingdong Yuan, “China and Afghanistan: Challenges and Opportunities,” p. 82.



46 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang's Regular Press Conference on

January 2, 2018,”

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t152

3228.shtml

47 “Pakistan lost over 50,000 civilians in the war on terror,” Tribune, January 3,

2018, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1599831/1-pakistan-lost-50000-civilians-war-

terror/

48 “General Hayat says no outside or military solution to Afghan problems,” Geo,

September 09, 2017, https://www.geo.tv/latest/157281-pakistan-fought-worlds-

biggest-battle-against-terrorism-cjcs-mahmood

49 “Pakistan trains Afghan army cadets,” BBC, accessed on February 6, 2015,

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31164119

50 First Round of China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Held in

Kabul,” MFA, February 10, 2015,

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1236606.shtml

51 “The 1st China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Foreign Ministers' Dialogue Convenes,”

MFA, December 26, 2017,

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1522541.shtml

52 “Afghanistan sends India a weapons wish-list ahead of NATO withdrawal,” Daily

Mail, November 20, 2013, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-

2510786/Afghanistan-sends-India-weapons-wish-list-ahead-NATO-

withdrawal.html#ixzz59cIN5pUI

53 Riaz Muhammad Khan, “Afghanistan and Pakistan.”

54 “Extension in Afghan refugees’ stay beyond June 2018 unlikely,” Tribune,

January 9, 2018, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1603798/1-extension-afghan-refugees-

stay-beyond-june-2018-unlikely/

55 “Afghan refugees: US averse to Pakistan’s repatriation plan,” Tribune, February 2,

2018, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1624340/1-afghan-refugeesus-averse-pakistans-

repatriation-plan/


Formulation of Pakistan’s Cyber Security Policy: Comparative Approaches

Formulation of Pakistan’s Cyber Security Policy:

Comparative Approaches

Afeera Firdous

Introduction

Contemporary period has evidenced such swift advancements in

computer technologies that the era is described as the Digital Age.

The most astonishing change that the digital age brought, is the

development and advancement of interdependent, interconnected,

and globalized network of computer and communication devices. In

the twenty-first century, this network of networks has transformed

into a global interactive platform for joint activities, and the trading

of information and ideas by people globally.1 In recent years,

cyberspace expanded practically exponentially. It offers a stage for

innovation and well-being, and provides ways to further

advancements. Along with the positives, there are also some

negatives of this new technology. With the global scope of a light or

unregulated digital infrastructure, there are great risks which affect

nation-states, private organizations, and personal rights of an

individual. Today, many states almost completely depend on

cyberspace in regard to education, health, communications, energy,

transport, infrastructure, financial services and military forces

movements.

Cyber operations are increasingly being used by states to

accomplish their political, economic, and military objectives.

Unfortunately, non-state actors are also resorting to cyber

operations for their nefarious purposes. The enhanced scope and

incidence of cyber-attacks as a political tool forms an extremely

dangerous trend in international relations. Vulnerable data systems

are attractive targets for other states and non-state actors. As the

dependence on information and communication technologies (ICT)



has increased with the sophisticated methods, the tendency of

cyber-attacks has also transformed from small-scale intrusions and

financial breaches to highly organized state-sponsored attacks. To

be able to protect from the threat posed to vulnerable data on

cyberspace, states take multiple initiatives such as formulating legal

frameworks to regulate cyber use, but most significant is the

articulation of a policy framework to develop nation’s approach

against such threats.

Threat Scenario and Significance of National Policy

Framework

Cyber threat has changed in its nature, scope and scale in the past

few years. There are some examples of use of cyber deterrence like

Stuxnet which put back Iran’s nuclear program by several years,

cyber compellence such as hacking of Sony Picture Entertainment

(SPE), influence on political outcomes such as alleged Russian

hackers’ involvement in US Presidential elections and world-wide

cyber ransomware attacks like Petya, NonPetya and WannaCry

when billions of dollars were paid as ransom globally. The Center

for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has maintained a list

of significant global cyber incidents since 2006.2 This list consists of

three hundred and thirteen incidents, focusing on cyber-attacks on

governments, defense and high-tech companies, or economic

crimes and each incident resulted in the losses of more than a

million dollars. There are a few recent examples of cyber incidents

which pose dire consequences for national security.

Speaking at a public event in Islamabad, Chief Technical Advisor of

United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Mr. Tariq Malik3

related an example of cyber compellence that few years back Saudi

Arabia started working on an agreement with AirBus to buy

aircraft. When the agreement got finalized, country A (he

intentionally did not name the country) hacked all the data related



to agreement between Saudi Arabia and AirBus. Country A

informed the Saudi officials that agreement data had been hacked.

The hacked data revealed that some of the Saudi officials were

involved in taking commission/bribe in the agreement. Then,

country A proposed to Saudi officials that whether Saudi Arabia

needed to cancel the agreement with AirBus and buy aircraft from

Boeing or country A will share the data with AirBus and French

government. Saudi Arabia, thus, was left with no option but to

cancel the agreement with AirBus and sign an agreement with the

Boeing.

An Indian journalist, Rachna Khaira, associated with The Tribune

newspaper reported that, in January 2018, an anonymous agent on

WhatsApp had sold Aadhar4 data to her for only $7.84 (Rs.500).5

The hacking of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIAI)

and its Aadhar system provided the access to the personal data of

more than one billion Indian citizens. After a month, the news of

Chinese cyber espionage against African Union (AU) emerged.

French daily, Le Monde, published a report that China had tapped

confidential data of IT networks of African Union headquarters,

which was built by Chinese investor, for five years from 2012 to

2017.6 In February 2018, another incident happened when

Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games website went offline for more

than twelve hours. The US intelligence officials claimed that few

hundred computers had been hacked by Russian hackers during the

Olympic opening ceremony which not only effected its website but

also interrupted wifi service and televisions at the Olympic

stadium.7 US officials termed this attack as false-flag operation

while saying that the Russian hackers did so, trying to make it

appear as though the intrusion was conducted by North Korea.

In March 2018, New York Times reported that 2017’s cyber-attacks

on the Saudi petrochemical companies were not aimed to destroy

data or fold the operations of the plants, but were intended to

disrupt the company’s operational procedures and trigger an



explosion to cause physical damage.8 Cybersecurity researchers

fear that the attackers could repeat it in other parts of the world,

since different countries, all over the world, depend on the same

American-engineered computer systems that were compromised in

Saudi petrochemical plant. During the Russian Presidential

elections in March 2018, Russia’s Central Election Commission

reported that there was a cyber-attack on commission’s website on

the election day, which targeted its information center.9 In the same

month, another scandal came to press about personal data leak of

Facebook to Cambridge Analytica.10 Christopher Wylie, who

assisted a Cambridge University academic to obtain the data, said

that Cambridge Analytica collected millions of Facebook profiles of

US voters and used them to build a powerful software program to

predict and influence choices at the ballot box.11 This software

program was not only used by Donald Trump’s election team but

also for winning Brexit campaign in UK.

The FBI assesses that only US losses from cybercrime in 2016

exceeded $1.3 billion,12 and some industry experts predict such

losses could cost the global economy $6 trillion by 2021.13 In 2008,

cyber threat was not even a part of US worldwide threat assessment

report, but in 2018, Worldwide Threat Assessment report of the US

intelligence community considered cyber threat as top threat to US

and its allies, leaving fear of WMD and terrorism behind.14 Director

of National Intelligence (DNI) also acknowledged that the potential

of surprise and risk in the cyber domain will increase in the next

year and beyond.15

The answer to the question ‘What is Cyber Security Policy and why

it is important?’ is a bit intricate. US Department of Homeland

Security has defined cyber security policy “it includes strategy,

policy, and standards with regards to the security of and operations

in cyberspace. It encompasses the full range of threat reduction,

vulnerability reduction, deterrence, international engagement,

incident response, and recovery policies and activities, including



computer network operations, information assurance, law

enforcement, diplomacy, military, and intelligence missions as they

relate to the security and stability of the global information and

communications infrastructure”.16

Policy making is most important of all components of a state’s

security framework, for it lays the goals and over all objectives that

a state desire to pursue. The strategy, on the other hand, allows the

state to mobilize its resources and potential for accomplishment of

those objectives. States usually have separate policy and strategy

for achieving the overall objectives such as foreign policy, defense

policy and economic policy etc. Cyberspace has emerged as a

serious threat for national security of the state. As Ola Hjalmarsson

states that within the framework of the securitization theory17,

some concepts are important: a securitizing player is a title given to

the actor who evokes the sense of securitization, the referent entity

is the object which is considered as it is needed to be securitized by

the securitizing actor, the spectators or audience is the populace

which requires to be persuaded of the weakness of the referred

entity, and the requisite of outstanding steps to guard it so that the

process of securitization becomes a success.18 Modern states

perceive certain activities in cyberspace as potential threat,

therefore a national cyber security policy is all the more significant

to preserve national interests in cyberspace.

Comparative approaches in Cybersecurity Policies

The inherent vulnerable nature and weakness of cyberspace and

increasing number of cyber-attacks constantly threaten the

security and economy of states, as well as the daily life of citizens.

More than fifty countries have framed their cyber security

policies/strategies to mitigate the serious cyber security threats

faced by their nations. A national cyber security policy/strategy is

not only designed to protect national cyberspace from vindictive



cyber threats, but due to diverse and unpredictable threat

landscape, significant variations can be rooted in the preventive,

defensive, and offensive approaches implemented by different

nations.19

International Telecommunications Union (ITU)20 categorizes

countries’ efforts with regards to cybersecurity on five parameters

i.e. legal, technical, organizational, capacity building and

cooperation. In 2017, ITU’s Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI)

ranked Singapore at the first place, with regards to its efforts in

cyber security, ahead of US, UK, Russia, France, Estonia, Canada and

Israel.21 Top ten ranking countries are shown in Table 1.

ITU Ranking Country

1 Singapore

2 US

3 Malaysia

4 Oman

5 Estonia

6 Mauritius

7 Australia

8 Georgia, France

9 Canada

10 Russian Federation

Table. 1 ITU’s Global Cybersecurity Index 2017



Different countries have also included action plans in their cyber

security policies/strategies. The US, UK, France, Netherlands and

Germany have specifically acknowledged dual aspects of cyber

security like cyber offense and cyber defense.22 All the national

cyber security strategies, however, have similar objectives of

protecting the cyberspace against potential threats and enhancing

cyber resilience. Countries have taken into account their peculiar

cyber threat landscape, socio-political conditions, security trends,

traditions, level of awareness while developing their cyber security

approaches.23 The formulation of cyber security policy/strategy

effort gained serious attention after 2008 when from simple

breaches state-sponsored cyber-attacks such as an incident in

Estonia in 2007 came to notice.24 The US had, though, published its

first cyber security strategy draft in 2003, before the cyber-attacks

became so common.25 Publication and revision of national cyber

security policies/strategies of different countries are given in Table

2.

Countries Year Policy/Strategy Issued

US Strategy 2003

Strategy Review 2009

Policy 2011

Strategy for critical infrastructure 2014

Dept. of Defence’s Strategy 2015

UK Strategy 2009


Australia Strategy 2009

Canada Strategy 2010

Action Plan for Strategy 2013



Estonia Strategy 2008


France Strategy 2011

Germany Strategy 2011

Japan Strategy 2013

India Strategy 2013

Saudi Arabia Strategy 2013

Table 2. Timeline of Cyber Security Strategies

United States

Countries such as UK, US, Estonia, Netherlands, and Czech Republic

have frequently published updated drafts of their cyber security

strategies, but the US is the only country which has regularly

reviewed and updated its cyber security strategy. The most recent

document on cyber security strategy26 was published by US

Department of Defence in April 2015. In the document, US has

defined its strategic goals as follows:

Form and sustain ready forces and capabilities to conduct

cyberspace operations.

Build defence for DoD networks, protect data, and lessen

vulnerabilities to DoD missions.

Be prepared to defend the US homeland and US vital

interests from disruptive or destructive cyberattacks of

significant consequence.

Build and maintain viable cyber options and plan to use

those options to control conflict escalation and to shape the

conflict environment at all stages.



Build and maintain robust international alliances and

partnerships to deter shared threats and increase

international security and stability.

The document also describes the central role of DoD’s Cyber

Mission Force (CMF) which was approved in 2012. It stated that

after being operational, CMF will consist of 6200 military/defence,

civilian and contractor support personnel from all military

departments. CMF comprised cyber operators organized into 133

teams and sub-teams such as Cyber Protection Force, National

Mission Force, and Combat Mission Force etc. DoD cyber strategy

mentioned all types of cyber offenders like China, Iran, North Korea;

and non-state actors such as Islamic State (IS) etc as potential

source of threat for the US.

India

India announced its first national Cyber Security Policy27 in 2013,

against the backdrop of Snowden’s revelations about NSA

surveillance program.28 India’s cyber security policy charted key

areas of focus such as building protected cyber ecosystem,

producing assurance framework, creating mechanisms for security

threat early warning, vulnerability management and response to

security threats, secure e-governance mechanism and resilient

critical information infrastructure, promote R&D and cyber

security awareness, develop human workforce, and integrate

public-private partnership. Some significant cyber policy objectives

of India are as follows:

Build a strong regulatory framework for securing

cyberspace ecosystem.

Build a 24 x 7 apparatuses on national and sectoral level for

tracking down strategic information about dangers to ICT

infrastructure and crafting response.



Establish a 24 x 7 National Critical Information

Infrastructure Protection Center (NCIIPC).

Build a force of 500,000 professionals trained in cyber

security till 2018 through capacity building programs.

Develop effective public private partnerships and

collaborative engagements through technical and

operational cooperation and contribution for enhancing the

security of cyberspace.

Build global cooperation by promoting shared

understanding and leveraging relationships for furthering

the cause of security of cyberspace.

Arun Sukumar, the head of the Cyber Security and Internet

Governance Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF)29

India, called it “a statement of first principles” rather than a

comprehensive framework.30 Though, India’s cyber security policy

is not a detailed document but it could work as a working draft to

start with. In 2014, India established National Critical Information

Infrastructure Protection Center.31 On the other hand, India

projected to build a force of 5,00,000 cyber professionals within five

years but it could not meet the numbers as envisioned.32 National

cyber security policy also outlined necessity of a nodal agency to

coordinate all the matters related to cyber security within the

country. In 2017, India IT Ministry setup a National Cyber

Coordination Center (NCCC) to examine the country’s online traffic

to identify threats.33 Indian government has also made operational

Botnet and Malware Cleaning Center to detect malicious software

in devices of citizens and clean them.34

Pakistan’s Efforts in Formulating National Cybersecurity

Policy

Countries, around the world are deploying online services and

Pakistan is also developing IT services and integrating it to different

sectors. Microsoft’s most recent Security Intelligence Report (SIR)



showed Pakistan amongst the states which are most at risk of

malicious software attacks.35 National Database and Registration

Authority (NADRA) maintains a centralized national ID database of

Pakistan, which is shared among banks, passport offices, Election

Commission of Pakistan (ECP), mobile networks and Federal

Investigation Agency etc. NADRA is the only organization which

registers and stores the information about the population.

According to Threat Track Security 2014 report, NADRA is on the

top ranking organizations in the world because of use of state of the

art technologies for its services.36

Use of IT is the most effective means for improving governments

delivery systems in the contemporary era. E-governance helps to

improve by increasing efficiency of the services provision and

enables government organizations to offer timely services to the

citizens. Some of Pakistan’s e-government components are Federal

Board of Revenue (FBR); Excise, Taxation and Norcotics

departments; Karachi Metropolitan Corporation, Punjab and

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police Service; Punjab Metrobus Authority;

Civil Aviation System; and Federal Public Service Commission

(FPSC). Pakistan also has some online business and financial

services such as online banking transaction facilities, mobile

banking, mobile and postal money transfer services, Pakistan Stock

Exchange etc. NADRA could be an attractive target for cyber-

attackers to block or sabotage its essential services, hack personal

confidential information and use them for their illegal purposes. In

December 2012, Turkish hackers had claimed to have accessed the

NADRA system and the Federal Investigation Agency’s (FIA)

servers, potentially acquiring personal data of millions of

Pakistanis.37 Later in 2015, NADRA officials admitted that its critical

database has gone through serious hack attempts originating from

US, India and Israel.38 In 2013, several cyber-attacks on the Election

Commission of Pakistan website were foiled but the website itself

was shut down to avoid further attacks.39 Apart from these

examples, cyber-attacks by Indian and Pakistani hackers, on one



another, have become common practice such as ahead of each

other’s independence days40 and after the announcement of

Kulbhushan Jadhav’s death penalty.41

Pakistan has not, yet, devised a cybersecurity policy/strategy.

There are, however, some significant measures taken by Senate of

Pakistan in this direction. In July 2013, Senate Committee of

Defence, in collaboration with Pakistan Information Security

Association (PISA), organized a policy seminar on the topic of

“Defending Pakistan through Cyber Security Strategy”.42 Chairman

Senate Committee on Defence and Defence Production, Mushahid

Hussain Syed announced 7-point Action Plan for Cyber Secure

Pakistan, as follows:

Cyber security threat should be accepted and recognized as

new, emerging national security threat by the Government

of Pakistan, similar to the threats like terrorism and military

aggression.

Relevant legislation should be done to preserve, protect and

promote Pakistan’s cyber security, drafting for which has

already begun. The bills will be presented in Parliament for

Cyber Security.

Establishment of a National Computer Emergency Response

Team (CERT).

Establishing a Cyber-Security Task Force with affiliation

with Ministry of Defence, Ministry of IT, Ministry of Interior,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Information and

security organizations plus relevant and leading IT

professionals to formulate Cyber Security Strategy for

Pakistan.

Under the office of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

Committee, an Inter-Services Cyber Command should be

established to coordinate cyber security and cyber defence

for the Pakistan Armed Forces.



Within the framework of SAARC, Pakistan should take the

initiative to initiate talks among the member states

particularly with India to establish acceptable norms of

behavior in cyber security domain among the SAARC

countries so that these countries are not engaged in cyber

warfare against each other.

Soon, the Senate Defence Committee, in cooperation with

the Pakistan Information Security Association (PISA), will

have a special media workshop to promote awareness

among the public and educate opinion leaders on the issue

of cyber security.

Mr. Amar Jaffri, former Additional Secretery FIA and Head of

Pakistan Information Security Association, informed in an

interview with the author that Chairman Senate Committee of

Defence and Defence Production, Mushahid Hussain Syed, had

formulated a group of experts Cyber Security Task Force in 2014.

Mr. Jaffri, himself headed the task force which was tasked to

formulate cyber security policy/strategy and legal framework. A

forty-member team comprising experts from the government,

armed force, FIA, police, intelligence community, business,

academia, IT and cyber security specialists etc, met for eighteen

months and drafted four policy documents. The documents

included cyber security laws, cyber security policy, cyber security

strategy, and draft of national cyber emergency response team.

Senator Mushahid had presented all the draft documents to Senate

for approval.

In March 2014, the Minister of State for Interior Balighur Rehman

also acknowledged that a cyber-security strategy was being devised

to counter cyber-attacks.43 Later in April, Mr. Mushahid Hussain

Syed presented a private member bill, on National Cyber Security

Council Act.44 The purpose of the bill was to launch a high level

policy research institution to conduct research and analysis on

policy matters related to cyber security. Proposed council would



support individuals, private companies and government branches

in capacity building; formulate policy and strategies; assist the

government, academia and IT professionals; help in taking

collaborative measures with other countries and international

organizations; and help in developing and maturing legal

frameworks in cyber domain.

The bill had clearly specified functions and powers of the National

Cyber Security Council. Some of the functions are as follow:

Formulate national cyber security policy45 and strategy.46

Monitor cyber security legislative framework and

recommend improvements in legislations.47

Recommend policies and regulatory means of

standardization, harmonization and accreditation with

regards to critical information infrastructure.48

Coordinate with other states and international entities on

implementation of policies, legislations and initiatives.49

Facilitate communications between government and

private sector, academia and cyber security experts on

issues relevant to cyber security.50

Establish an advisory group to provide operational,

technical, policy and industry advisory inputs on strategic

plans.51

Develop ten or twenty year vision with regards to cyber

security52

Conduct research on upcoming cyber threats and promote

general awareness.53

While chairing a meeting of national-level cyber security response

committee, Minister of State for Information Technology, Anusha

Rahman stressed the need to devise a comprehensive cyber

security policy, using a multi-stakeholder model.54 She also

underlined the need for a holistic approach and a coordinated effort



to ensure the security of the data right from the cell phone of an

individual to the government ICT data/information.

In April 2017, Ministry of Information Technology and Telecom

(MoITT) released the first draft of Digital Pakistan Policy.55 Digital

Policy/IT Policy lays emphasis on four sectors for the application of

policy requirements to address and improve country’s position in

governance, entrepreneurship, knowledge capital, accessibility,

demand stimulation, and ICT skills. These areas are:

Sectoral digitalization.

Cross-sector cooperative measures.

IT sector sustainability.

Entrepreneurship and innovation.

According to MoITT, this policy will serve as the foundation for the

establishment of a holistic Digital Ecosystem in the country with

advance concepts and components for rapid delivery of next

generation IT services, applications and content.56

Way Ahead

With the cyber perpetrators gaining strength day by day, cyber-

attacks methods are continuously evolving at a faster pace. No

nation can, therefore, stay completely secure from cyber-attacks.

Pakistan needs to focus on developing a comprehensive cyber

security policy at a rapid pace. There are some features which must

be part of Pakistan’s cyber security policy:

Maintain and support a secure and resilient cyberspace.

Safeguarded critical national cyber assets and

infrastructures.

Development of a robust cybersecurity regulatory,

legislative, and assurance framework.



Establishment of National Computer Emergency Response

Team (CERT) / Cyber Security Incidental Response Team

(CSIRT).

Cyber security awareness campaigns for common users.

Development and improvement of indigenous cyber

security technologies and services.

Protection of the online rights of netizens.

Support of public-private collaboration.

Encouragement of international cooperation in cyber

security domain mainly with the neighboring and regional

countries.

Cyber security is quite a vast domain. Since there are no commonly

understood definitions of cyber security key terms, Pakistan needs

to define term such as cyber security and cyberspace explicitly. In

the last few years, besides terrorism, and natural hazards etc.,

cyber-attacks, cyber espionage and cyber terrorism have also

become a global menace. A comparative analysis reveals that

countries have now realized the importance of cyber security and,

therefore, regard it as one of the top-tier national security issues.57

Different countries have allocated specific budgets for cyber

security measures. According to publically available data, UK

spends £1.9bn,58 India Rs. 110 crore,59 and US with highest annual

cyber security spending up to $19 billion.60 Pakistan also needs to

prioritize to allocate sufficient funds, in the annual, budget for cyber

security projects. In the cyber domain, the criticality of an

infrastructure is defined by the services and core values that it

provides and the digital information it processes, stores and

transmits. The choice of critical sectors or infrastructure by any

country is highly impacted by the country-specific peculiar

conditions and traditions, cyber threat perception, sociopolitical

factors, and geographical conditions. Pakistan also needs to clearly

define its critical assets or infrastructure in its national cyber

security policy in different areas such as telecommunication and



ICT, banking and finance, government and particular e-services, like

electricity and water supply, health services, transportation,

emergency and rescue services, and national security services like

the police and armed forces etc.

Some countries have established inter-departmental cyber security

response capabilities i.e. they have distributed the task of cyber

security amongst multiple existing organizations working under

various governmental departments.61 The establishment of these

organizations within the government is greatly influenced by cyber

threat perception, resource allocation, defense etc. Pakistan also

needs to decide whether it is going to follow the example of France

and Estonia to create a new coordinating body to deal with cyber

threats or it is going to adopt inter-departmental cyber security

response capabilities. For a country to effectively deter targeted

cyber threats and incidents, it is essential to have technical teams

that efficiently disseminate threat information to the concerned

authorities and provide cyber protection and resilience capabilities.

Various forms of such teams include Computer Emergency

Response Teams (CERTs), Computer Security Incident Response

Team (CSIRT) and Information Sharing and Analysis Centers

(ISAC). The government needs to establish a national CERT on the

priority basis. Table 3. shows some countries who have established

their CERTs earlier.

Country CERT Established

Australia 2010

Canada 2003

Estonia 2006

France 2008

Germany 2012



India 2004

Israel 2014

Japan 1996

Malaysia 1997

Saudi Arabia 2006

Turkey 2007

UK 2014

US 2003

Table 3. CERTs establishing year of various countries

Pakistan needs to emphasize on cyber security capacity building

initiatives e.g. training, awareness, R&D programs etc mentioned in

the draft cyber security document. Whether on national or

international levels, cyber security requires multi-stakeholder

approach for effectively tackling cyber issues and increasing cyber

resilience. Because of the global nature of cyberspace, apart from

intra-nation cooperation (public, private sectors, ISP’s etc), intra-

state and international collaboration are also required. Pakistan is

now part of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which

provides good opportunities to collaborate with other countries or

international organizations. Shanghai Cooperation Organization

has special focus on cyber security issues. It holds annual cyber

drills. Pakistan needs to initiate collaborative measures to get

assistance of friendly countries to develop cyber security policy,

strategy and national CERT. India has recently approved an Armed

Forces Cyber Division,62 Pakistan also needs to focus on building its

tri-services cyber capabilities.



Conclusion

In the contemporary international world, internet has played

vibrant role in bringing global connectivity. But, on the other hand,

exploitative cyberspace operations have increased the arena of

security threats for nation states, both in civilian and military

domains. Cyber intrusions have drastically increased in the recent

years, which causes economic loss of billions of dollars annually, as

the cybersecurity experts predict that offensive cyber operations

could cause loss of trillions of dollars to the global economy in the

next decade. Cybersecurity experts also acknowledge that the

potential of risk in cyberspace will escalate in coming years rather

that deceasing.

The increased number of offensive cyber operations, by states and

non-state actors, have made the policy makers around the world

conscious of the need to think about solutions for changing threat

environment in cyber domain. Countries across the world have

recognized the potential threats in cyberspace.

Keeping in mind the dire consequences of any such attack on

Pakistan, government must take timely steps to counter cyber risks.

Apart from government, private companies and organizations also

need to prioritize and focus on protecting their systems and data,

and make regular risk assessments. It is needed to make well-

judged investments in cyber defense capabilities to secure the

systems and accomplish national objectives. It is high time to

understand that countering and diminishing the cyber threat needs

a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan. Few baby-

steps have already been taken by the government, but a lot more is

needed to be done to secure country’s cyberspace.

Afeera Firdous is a




Endnotes

1 US policy documents characterize the Internet as a “network of networks.” See

Department of Homeland Security, Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted

and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure (Washington, DC:

Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2009, 8)

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_fin

al_0.pdf.

2 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Significant Cyber Incidents,”

https://www.csis.org/programs/cybersecurity-and-governance/technology-policy-

program/other-projects-cybersecurity, accessed on March 13, 2018.

3 Mr. Tariq Malik is former Chief Technology Officer at GHQ and he also has been

former Chairman of NADRA.

4 Aadhar Data is compilation of data-set of Indian citizens, containing their personal

information such as name, DoB (age), contact details (address, mob no, e-mail),

fingerprints, and facial photograph. 5 Rachna Khaira, “Rs 500, 10 minutes, and you have access to billion Aadhaar

details,” The Tribune, January 3, 2018, http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/rs-

500-10-minutes-and-you-have-access-to-billion-aadhaar-details/523361.html.

6 Shannon Tiezzi, “If China Bugged the AU Headquarters, What African Countries

Should Be Worried?,” The Diplomat, January 31, 2018,

https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/if-china-bugged-the-au-headquarters-what-african-

countries-should-be-worried/.

(Original Report) Joan Tilouine, “A Addis-Abeba, le siège de l’Union africaine

espionné par Pékin,” Le Monde, January 26, 2018,

https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/01/26/a-addis-abeba-le-siege-de-l-

union-africaine-espionne-par-les-chinois_5247521_3212.html.

7 Ellen Nakashima, “Russian spies hacked the Olympics and tried to make it look

like North Korea did it, U.S. officials say,” The Washington Post, February 24, 2018,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-spies-hacked-the-

olympics-and-tried-to-make-it-look-like-north-korea-did-it-us-officials-

say/2018/02/24/44b5468e-18f2-11e8-92c9-

376b4fe57ff7_story.html?utm_term=.30076f78c8fb.

8 Nichole Perlroth and Clifford Krauss, “A cyber-attack in Saudi Arabia had a deadly

goal. Experts fear another try.,” New York Times, March 15, 2018,

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/technology/saudi-arabia-hacks-

cyberattacks.html.

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final_0.pdf


https://www.csis.org/programs/cybersecurity-and-governance/technology-policy-program/other-projects-cybersecurity

https://www.csis.org/programs/cybersecurity-and-governance/technology-policy-program/other-projects-cybersecurity

http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/rs-500-10-minutes-and-you-have-access-to-billion-aadhaar-details/523361.html

http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/rs-500-10-minutes-and-you-have-access-to-billion-aadhaar-details/523361.html

https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/if-china-bugged-the-au-headquarters-what-african-countries-should-be-worried/

https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/if-china-bugged-the-au-headquarters-what-african-countries-should-be-worried/

https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/01/26/a-addis-abeba-le-siege-de-l-union-africaine-espionne-par-les-chinois_5247521_3212.html

https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/01/26/a-addis-abeba-le-siege-de-l-union-africaine-espionne-par-les-chinois_5247521_3212.html

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-spies-hacked-the-olympics-and-tried-to-make-it-look-like-north-korea-did-it-us-officials-say/2018/02/24/44b5468e-18f2-11e8-92c9-376b4fe57ff7_story.html?utm_term=.30076f78c8fb




https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/technology/saudi-arabia-hacks-cyberattacks.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/technology/saudi-arabia-hacks-cyberattacks.html



9 “Russian Central Election Commission comes under cyberattack,” RT, March 18,

2018, https://www.rt.com/news/421622-russian-election-under-cyber-attack/.

10 Cambridge Analytica is London-based data analysis and political consulting firm

which worked with Donald Trump’s election campaign team for 2016 US

Presidential Elections.

11 Carole Candwalladr and Emma Graham-Harrison, “Revealed: 50 million

Facebook profiles harvested for Cambridge Analytica in major data breach,” The

Guardian, March 17, 2018,

https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-

influence-us-election.

12 Greg Masters, “Loss from cybercrime exceeded $1.3B in 2016, FBI report,” SC

Magazine, June 26, 2017, https://www.scmagazine.com/loss-from-cybercrime-

exceeded-13b-in-2016-fbi-report/article/671047/.

13 Steve Morgan, “Cybersecurity Ventures predicts cybercrime damages will cost the

world $6 trillion annually by 2021,” Cybersecurity Ventures, October 16, 2017,

https://cybersecurityventures.com/hackerpocalypse-cybercrime-report-2016/.

14 Daniel R. Coats, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence

Community,” DNI, February 13, 2018,

https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---

Unclassified-SSCI.pdf.

15 Jim Garamone, “Cyber Tops List of Threats to U.S., Director of National

Intelligence Says,” US department of Defence, February 13, 2018,

https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1440838/cyber-tops-list-of-threats-to-

us-director-of-national-intelligence-says/.

16 Department of Homeland Security, Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted

and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure (Washington, DC:

Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2009, 5)

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_fin

al_0.pdf.

17 In 1998, Loe Waever formally presented the theory of Securitization for the very

first time in his article titled as “Security the Speech Act: Analyzing the Politics of a

Word”, later Rita Taureck has defined the term Securitization as: The security actor,

confirming that a particular reference object is at risk in its existence, claims the right

to emergency actions to ensure the preservation of the reference object.

18 Ola Hjalmarsson, Securitization of Cyberspace (Sweden: Lund University Press,

2013),

http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=3357990&fileOI

d=3357996.

https://www.rt.com/news/421622-russian-election-under-cyber-attack/

https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-election

https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-election

https://www.scmagazine.com/loss-from-cybercrime-exceeded-13b-in-2016-fbi-report/article/671047/

https://www.scmagazine.com/loss-from-cybercrime-exceeded-13b-in-2016-fbi-report/article/671047/

https://cybersecurityventures.com/hackerpocalypse-cybercrime-report-2016/

https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf

https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf

https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1440838/cyber-tops-list-of-threats-to-us-director-of-national-intelligence-says/

https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1440838/cyber-tops-list-of-threats-to-us-director-of-national-intelligence-says/



http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=3357990&fileOId=3357996

http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=3357990&fileOId=3357996



19 Narmeen Shafqat and Ashraf Masood, “Comparative Analysis of Various National

Cyber Security Strategies,” International Journal of Computer Science and

Information Science 14, no. 1 (January 2016): 129-136,

https://www.academia.edu/21451805/Comparative_Analysis_of_Various_National_

Cyber_Security_Strategies.

20 International Telecommunications Union is United Nations’ specialized agency for

information and communication technologies.

21 International Telecommunication Union, “Global Cybersecurity Index,” 2017,

https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-GCI.01-2017-PDF-E.pdf.

22 Myriam Dunn, “A Comparative Analysis of Cyber Security Initiatives

Worldwide,” International Telecommunication Union, June 2005,

https://www.itu.int/osg/spu/cybersecurity/docs/Background_Paper_Comparative_An

alysis_Cybersecurity_Initiatives_Worldwide.pdf.

23 Martti Lehto, “The Way, Mean, and Ends in Cyber Security Strategy,” in

Proceedings of 12th European Conference on Information Warfare and Security, ed.

Rauno Kuusisto and Erkki Kurkinen (UK: Academic Conferences and Publishing

International ltd., 2013), 182-190.

24 Ian Traynor, “Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia,” The

Guardian, May 17, 2007,

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia.

25 US CERT, “The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,” February 2013,

https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cyberspace_strategy.pdf,

accessed on March 15, 2018.

26 US Department of Defence, “Department of Defence Cyber Strategy,” April 2015,

https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-

strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf, accessed on March

15, 2018.

27 Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, “National Cyber

Security Policy-2013,”

http://164.100.94.102/writereaddata/files/downloads/National_cyber_security_policy

-2013%281%29.pdf, accessed on March 15, 2018.

28 “Amid spying saga, India unveils cyber security policy,” Gadget Now, July 13,

2018, https://www.gadgetsnow.com/enterprise-it/security/Amid-spying-saga-India-

unveils-cyber-security-policy/articleshow/20885499.cms?referral=PM.

29 Observer Research Foundation is Mumbai based think tank, focuses on

international security issues.

https://www.academia.edu/21451805/Comparative_Analysis_of_Various_National_Cyber_Security_Strategies


https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-GCI.01-2017-PDF-E.pdf

https://www.itu.int/osg/spu/cybersecurity/docs/Background_Paper_Comparative_Analysis_Cybersecurity_Initiatives_Worldwide.pdf

https://www.itu.int/osg/spu/cybersecurity/docs/Background_Paper_Comparative_Analysis_Cybersecurity_Initiatives_Worldwide.pdf

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia

https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cyberspace_strategy.pdf

https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf

https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf

http://164.100.94.102/writereaddata/files/downloads/National_cyber_security_policy-2013%281%29.pdf

http://164.100.94.102/writereaddata/files/downloads/National_cyber_security_policy-2013%281%29.pdf

https://www.gadgetsnow.com/enterprise-it/security/Amid-spying-saga-India-unveils-cyber-security-policy/articleshow/20885499.cms?referral=PM

https://www.gadgetsnow.com/enterprise-it/security/Amid-spying-saga-India-unveils-cyber-security-policy/articleshow/20885499.cms?referral=PM



30 Arun Mohan Sukumar, “Upgrading India’s cyber security architecture,” The

Hindu, March 9, 2017, http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/upgrading-

indias-cyber-security-architecture/article8328770.ece.

31 Saikat Datta, “Defending India’s critical information infrastructure: The

Development and role of NCIIPC,” Internet Democracy Project,

https://internetdemocracy.in/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Saikat-Datta-Internet-

Democracy-Project-Defending-Indias-CII.pdf, accessed on March 15, 2018.

32 Kaushik Deka, “The new battlefield is online: Is India Prepared?,” India Today,

September 3, 2017, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/cyber-crime-cyber-attack-

malware-cyber-security/1/1037598.html.

33 “Cyber Coordination Center made operation: IT Ministry,” The Indian Express,

August 9, 2017, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/cyber-coordination-centre-

made-operational-it-mininstry-4789272/.

34 Ibed.

35 “Pakistan, Bangladesh at high risk of cyber-attacks,” Pakistan Today, October 26,

2017, https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/10/26/pakistan-bangladesh-at-high-

risk-of-cyber-attacks/.

36 Jawad Awan and Shahzad Memon, “Threats of Cyber Security and Challenges for

Pakistan,” in Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Cyber Warfare

and Security, ed. Tanya Zlateva and Virginia A. Greiman (Boston: Academia

Conferences and Publishing International Limited, 2016), 425-30.

37 Farooq Baloch, “Cyber Vandalism: Turkish Hackers claims gaining access to

NADRA and FIA servers,” The Express Tribune, December 15, 2012,

https://tribune.com.pk/story/480044/cyber-vandalism-turkish-hacker-claims-gaining-

access-to-nadra-fia-servers/.

38 Aamir Ataa, “NADRA faces serious hacking attacksfrom United States and India,”

ProPakistani, 2015, https://propakistani.pk/2014/11/13/nadra-faces-serious-hacking-

attacks-united-states-india/ or

https://www.express.com.pk/epaper/PoPupwindow.aspx?newsID=1102523545&Issu

e=NP_LHE&Date=20141113.

39 “Cyber-attack on Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) website,” Teleco Alert,

March 31, 2013, https://www.telecoalert.com/cyber-attacks-on-the-election-

commission-of-pakistan-ecp-website/.

40 Shashank Shekhar, “India, Pakistan at war on cyberspace ahead of Independence

Day,” Business Today, August 4, 2017,

https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/india-and-pakistan-at-war-

on-cyber-space-ahead-of-independence-day/story/257753.html.

http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/upgrading-indias-cyber-security-architecture/article8328770.ece

http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/upgrading-indias-cyber-security-architecture/article8328770.ece

https://internetdemocracy.in/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Saikat-Datta-Internet-Democracy-Project-Defending-Indias-CII.pdf

https://internetdemocracy.in/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Saikat-Datta-Internet-Democracy-Project-Defending-Indias-CII.pdf

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/cyber-crime-cyber-attack-malware-cyber-security/1/1037598.html

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/cyber-crime-cyber-attack-malware-cyber-security/1/1037598.html

http://indianexpress.com/article/india/cyber-coordination-centre-made-operational-it-mininstry-4789272/

http://indianexpress.com/article/india/cyber-coordination-centre-made-operational-it-mininstry-4789272/

https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/10/26/pakistan-bangladesh-at-high-risk-of-cyber-attacks/

https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/10/26/pakistan-bangladesh-at-high-risk-of-cyber-attacks/

https://tribune.com.pk/story/480044/cyber-vandalism-turkish-hacker-claims-gaining-access-to-nadra-fia-servers/

https://tribune.com.pk/story/480044/cyber-vandalism-turkish-hacker-claims-gaining-access-to-nadra-fia-servers/

https://propakistani.pk/2014/11/13/nadra-faces-serious-hacking-attacks-united-states-india/

https://propakistani.pk/2014/11/13/nadra-faces-serious-hacking-attacks-united-states-india/

https://www.express.com.pk/epaper/PoPupwindow.aspx?newsID=1102523545&Issue=NP_LHE&Date=20141113

https://www.express.com.pk/epaper/PoPupwindow.aspx?newsID=1102523545&Issue=NP_LHE&Date=20141113

https://www.telecoalert.com/cyber-attacks-on-the-election-commission-of-pakistan-ecp-website/

https://www.telecoalert.com/cyber-attacks-on-the-election-commission-of-pakistan-ecp-website/

https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/india-and-pakistan-at-war-on-cyber-space-ahead-of-independence-day/story/257753.html

https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/india-and-pakistan-at-war-on-cyber-space-ahead-of-independence-day/story/257753.html



41 “Surgical cyber-STRIKE! Hackers take down 30 Pakistan sites to avenge

Kulbhushan Jadhav's death penalty,” Daily Mail, April 24, 2017,

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-4441462/Surgical-cyber-

STRIKE-Hackers-attack-30-Pakistan-sites.html.

42 APP, “Senate Committee proposes 7-point action plan for Cyber Secure Pakistan,”

Dawn, July 8, 2013, https://www.dawn.com/news/1023706; or

Senate of Pakistan, “Senate Report on Pakistan’s first-ever Cyber Security Strategy

Work Plan,” August-September 2013,

http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1378101374_113.pdf.

43 Mateen Haider, “Pakistan formulating cyber security strategy,” Dawn, March 7,

2014, https://www.dawn.com/news/1091640.

44 Senate of Pakistan, “National Cyber Security Council Act, 2014,” April 14, 2014,

http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1397624997_197.pdf.

45 Section 5. (2)(a) of National Cyber Security Council Act, 2014.

46 Section 5. (2)(b) and (c) of National Cyber Security Council Act, 2014.

47 Section 5. (2)(g) of National Cyber Security Council Act, 2014.

48 Section 5. (2)(i) of National Cyber Security Council Act, 2014.

49 Section 5. (2)(j) and (n) of National Cyber Security Council Act, 2014.

50 Section 5. (2)(k) of National Cyber Security Council Act, 2014.

51 Section 5. (2)(l) of National Cyber Security Council Act, 2014.

52 Section 5. (2)(q) of National Cyber Security Council Act, 2014.

53 Section 5. (2)(o) and (p) of National Cyber Security Council Act, 2014.

54 “Anusha urges a comprehensive cyber security policy,” Pakistan Press

Foundation, July 9, 2014, https://www.pakistanpressfoundation.org/anusha-urges-

comprehensive-cyber-security-policy/.

55 “Digital Pakistan Policy,” MoITT, April 2017, http://digitalrightsmonitor.pk/wp-

content/uploads/2017/10/Digital-Pakistan-Policy-2017.pdf, accessed on April 6,

2018.

56 Aamir Aata, “MoIT Releases Digital Pakistan Policy 2017,” ProPakistani, April

2017, https://propakistani.pk/2017/04/08/moit-releases-digital-pakistan-policy-2017/.






http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-4441462/Surgical-cyber-STRIKE-Hackers-attack-30-Pakistan-sites.html

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-4441462/Surgical-cyber-STRIKE-Hackers-attack-30-Pakistan-sites.html


http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1378101374_113.pdf


http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1397624997_197.pdf

https://www.pakistanpressfoundation.org/anusha-urges-comprehensive-cyber-security-policy/

https://www.pakistanpressfoundation.org/anusha-urges-comprehensive-cyber-security-policy/

http://digitalrightsmonitor.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Digital-Pakistan-Policy-2017.pdf

http://digitalrightsmonitor.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Digital-Pakistan-Policy-2017.pdf

https://propakistani.pk/2017/04/08/moit-releases-digital-pakistan-policy-2017/





58 Tracey Caldwell, “The UK's £1.9bn cyber-security spend – getting the priorities

right,” Science Direct, March 2017,

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1361372317300246.

59 “Budget 2018: Government to focus more on improving cybersecurity,” Money

Control, February 1, 2018,

https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/economy/budget-2018-government-

to-focus-more-on-improving-cybersecurity-2495175.html.

60 “Proposed budget of the U.S. government for cyber security in FY 2016-2017 (in

billion U.S. dollars),” Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/675399/us-

government-spending-cyber-security/, accessed on March 16, 2018.






62 “Joint Doctrine: Indian Armed Forces,” Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff

Ministry of Defence, April 2017, http://bharatshakti.in/wp-

content/uploads/2015/09/Joint_Doctrine_Indian_Armed_Forces.pdf.

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1361372317300246

https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/economy/budget-2018-government-to-focus-more-on-improving-cybersecurity-2495175.html

https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/economy/budget-2018-government-to-focus-more-on-improving-cybersecurity-2495175.html

https://www.statista.com/statistics/675399/us-government-spending-cyber-security/

https://www.statista.com/statistics/675399/us-government-spending-cyber-security/



http://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Joint_Doctrine_Indian_Armed_Forces.pdf

http://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Joint_Doctrine_Indian_Armed_Forces.pdf


AFEERA FIRDOUS: Book Review

Ben Buchanan, The Cybersecurity

Dilemma-Hacking, Trust and Fear

Between Nations (London: C.

Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.,

2016) 289.

Ben Buchanan is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Harvard University’s

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He specializes in

relations between cybersecurity and statecraft. Ben has taken the

traditional concept of security dilemma and has given a detailed

account of its application to inter-state relations in the realm of

cyberspace. The book, The Cybersecurity Dilemma-Hacking, Trust

and Fear Between Nations, has eight chapters. Each chapter deals

with a particular aspect of author’s thesis on the subject, and a

conclusion which sums up the discussions in the book. Chapter one

explains the Realist approach of international relations; anarchy,

absolute power, and security. These concepts originated in ancient

Greece, and explain the concepts of threat, misperception and

misinterpretation; and how they lead to security dilemma. This

chapter also discusses the application of a traditional concept

(security dilemma) in a new domain (cyberspace) and sets the tone

for discussion in the subsequent chapters. The author refers to

Michael Herman, a British signals officer and scholar, who for the

first time applied the concept of security dilemma beyond

development and deployment of military capabilities. Ben further

expanded Herman’s idea and applied it to foreign intelligence cyber

operations. Chapter two and three explore the operational

processes of network intrusion and defense. The author has named

these ‘Intrusion Model’ and ‘Network Defense Model’. He raises the

question regarding the broad effects of states intruding into the

networks of other states not just to enhance offensive competences

but also to build their own defenses. The author goes on to

distinguish between the offensive and defensive goals which can

Book Review By

AFEERA FIRDOUS



motivate a state to intrusions. While discussing potential defensive

and offensive network intrusions and many risks attached to them,

he states that the main theme of the book as:

To assure their own cybersecurity, states will sometime

intrude into the strategically important networks of other

states and will threaten – often unintentionally – the

security of those other states, risking escalation and

undermining stability.

Chapter four argues how network intrusion can threaten other

states and create fear among them, leading them to misperception

or misinterpretation of the intent and change the conditions of

conflict. Ben differentiates between two types of network

intrusions; cyber exploitation and cyber-attacks; and explains their

effects on the outlook of states’ policies in different ways. Chapter

five examines the variables of the security dilemma by applying

classic mitigator logic on cyberspace and concludes that

cybersecurity dilemma remains a challenge to conflict mitigation.

Chapter six elucidates the importance of status quo and information

distribution. The author, in this context, states that inequity in

information distribution raises the severity of cybersecurity

dilemma. This chapter also discusses the application of

international law in cyberspace but the author has overlooked the

fact that obedience of international law by states is not obligatory

but voluntary. A discussion on this important factor would have

added value to the examination of the subject. Chapter seven details

the limitations, and objections and the future of cybersecurity

dilemma. The author identifies three objections; first, difficulty of

attribution of the offence; second, no network intrusion reaches the

level of existential threat; and third, cyber capabilities are unevenly

distributed. The chapter concludes that cybersecurity dilemma is

likely to grow more compelling in coming days. Ben states that

cyber threat is not an existential threat for the states, he, however,

has failed to answer the question if an intruder state gets access to



other state’s strategic and critical national infrastructure including

launching codes of nuclear weapons through intrusion or attack

then what kind of response could be expected? In chapter eight, Ben

argues that advancing of bilateral trust between states can avoid

cybersecurity dilemma, but in realist world, achieving bilateral

trust in international relations is nearly impossible; for instance,

NSA’s leaked documents have shown that US has spied upon the e-

mails of its close allies’ leadership; the German Chancellor and the

Mexican President.

While concluding, the author charts out five dangers in which

cybersecurity dilemma can cause substantial damage. First,

cybersecurity has the potential to enhance tension and conflict not

just in an actual situation but also in anticipation of a crisis, which

means an insecure state is more likely to adopt offensive posture

for deterrence. Second, threat prompts insecurity and tends to

escalate tension. Third, the misinterpretation of intruder’s

intention can increase the cybersecurity dilemma. Fourth, the

potential danger is that two pressures - the immediate need for

bettering offensive capability and the need for better defensive

security and resilience – force states into conflicting situations.

Fifth, the cybersecurity dilemma can entice policy makers into

potentially damaging duplicity. The fundamental basis of

cybersecurity dilemma like traditional understanding of the

concept is fear and escalation dynamics: fear that causes the

dilemma and escalation that the dilemma brings about.

One major criticism on the book is that the discussion revolves

around only one actor: the state, although non-state actors are

increasingly becoming important players in network intrusions.

The author also suggests deterrence and mitigation efforts as a

partial way out of the problem, but doesn’t explain how deterrence

will work in cybersecurity domain if the intruder or attacker

happens to be a non-state actor, who is irrational and has little stake

in keeping peace and stability within a state, regionally or beyond?



Secondly, the author’s account of defensive intrusion and

unintentional risks to other states’ security raise compelling

question regarding the criteria against which a state’s intrusion

may be regarded defensive in nature, while the author, himself,

admits that it is a difficult task to discriminate between defensive

and offensive network intrusion. The author also terms defensive-

minded network intrusion as intelligence efforts, not invasions,

which is a critically weak argument.

The study is drawn on the leaked documents of Edward Snowden,

former NSA contractor; case studies of cyber operations in few

previous years, and interviews from former officials and policy

makers. The book maintains that international relations and policy

are germane to cyber world as they are to the physical.

The book is a good read for international relations scholars with a

non-technical background. It gives an inclusive understanding of

cyber operations and how different kinds of cyber intrusions work.

Afeera Firdous is a


99

RIAZ KHOKHAR : Book Review


Dilip Hiro, The Longest August: The Unflinching Rivalry between India and Pakistan (Nation Books: 2015) pp.503

“The Indian fixation on cross-border terrorism paralleled

Pakistan’s insistence on treating Kashmir as the core

problem…India…missed the logical point that terrorism stemmed

from…the Kashmir dispute...the cause had to precede the result”,

writes Dilip Hiro, the author.

The book ‘The Longest August: The Unflinching Rivalry between

India and Pakistan” is divided into 20 chapters, encompassing

Hindu-Muslim/Indo-Pak rivalry since the British rule/Partition to

date. The author’s perspective more often than not supports India’s

stance on Indo-Pak bilateral issues such as terrorism and ‘Kashmir

insurgency’. His repeated comparison of political systems of India

and Pakistan in many ways reflects his preference for Indian

political system.

The book’s title, the Longest August, stems from the communal

bloodbath in August 1947 and the ensuing Indo-Pak rivalry,

including three wars, possibility of nuclear Armageddon, terrorist

activities and fomenting rebellion in the rival state.

Three landmark events, according to the author, precipitated

India’s partition—all due to the Indian Congress: Jinnah’s leaving

Congress after Nehru Report annulled the separation of Muslim

electorates; Congress’ rejection of Jinnah’s proposal for forming

coalition-ministries in Bombay and UP after 1937 elections; and,

Nehru’s acceptance of Cabinet Mission Plan only to change his

stance later on regarding ‘Grouping’ and Jinnah’s subsequent

withdrawal of his earlier acceptance of it.

Book Review By

RIAZ KHOKHAR

100



Comparing Gandhi with Jinnah, the author portrays Gandhi’s

greatness in his tactically innovative political moves to achieve his

objectives: non-cooperation/civil-disobedience movement and

moral coercion through fasting/hunger-strike. It stood in sharp

contrast to Jinnah’s constitutionalism and avoidance of street

politics. However, according to the author, Jinnah, who spurned

Gandhi for mixing religion with politics during the Khilafat

Movement, had presided over a party whose candidates appealed

to Muslims’ religious sentiments in the 1945-46 elections.

Moreover, Jinnah also allegedly resorted to extra-constitutional

methods with reference to the Direct Action Day that resulted in

communal violence in India. It is indeed the author’s deliberate

disregard for the fact that Congress’ hostile policies had compelled

Jinnah to change his tactics.

About the wars between India and Pakistan, the author makes some

contestable remarks. For example, the 1965 war, according to Hiro,

was a failure of Pakistan to change the status-quo in Kashmir. By so

stating, the author ignores the Kashmir dispute as an international

issue and India’s illegitimate claims over it in the face of UN

Resolution for a plebiscite. Moreover, his subscription to the Indian

argument that in 1971 War Pakistan’s Two Nation Theory had

collapsed does not match the fact that Bangladesh did not

reintegrate into India. It became a separate Muslim state. It further

strengthens the Two-Nation Theory. Furthermore, he considers

Pakistan’s support of the Sikh insurgency in the 1980s and terrorist

incidents in India as a tit-for-tat to India’s sabotage activities in

Afghanistan and its state oppression in Kashmir. An unbiased

approach, however, would reveal that Kashmir struggle or Sikh

insurgency is, in fact, largely due to India’s own oppressive policies

in the state. Above all, his support of the much-touted claim that

Pakistan is involved in the terrorist incidents in Afghanistan is

based on outdated information. Latest BBC report about Taliban’s

controlling a major portion of Afghanistan and their self-financing

101



through drug-and-opium-smuggling invalidates the allegation of

Pakistan’s financing them or providing safe haven to them.

What the author also misses to highlight is that Pakistan has been a

victim, and not sponsor, of terrorism. What he accentuates, instead,

is that India is the victim of terrorism and Kashmiri freedom

struggle is an insurgency against the Indian state. He, however, does

mention in the chapter on Afghanistan, the Indian involvement in

provoking secessionist sentiments in Balochistan and perpetrating

terrorism across Pakistan.

As for the solution of the Kashmir dispute, the Shimla agreement,

according to the author, has been a touchstone of all bilateral

dialogues over Kashmir issue since 1972. Of all the available

solutions, in author’s views, Musharraf’s formula stood out

reflecting an adjustment to the contemporary geostrategic

scenario. His four-point agenda stipulated Pakistan’s giving up its

claim to Indian-administered Kashmir if people from both regions

had freedom of movement through open borders, and

recommended a phased withdrawal of troops from both sides of the

LoC. But, the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008 transformed the

foundations of resolution of the Kashmir issue. From then onwards,

India’s primary focus on resolving terrorism issue would override

the Kashmir dispute.

In the last few chapters, the author mentions the Afghanistan

conundrum as another flashpoint between India and Pakistan.

Kautilya’s quotation, “a ruler with the contiguous territory is a rival.

The ruler next to the adjoining is to be deemed a friend” explains

India’s policy regarding Pakistan and Afghanistan, in the author’s

perspective. India’s efforts at building security and economic

partnership with Afghanistan, including development aid and soft

power of its Bollywood movies and soap operas have played a

significant role in attracting popular perception in its favour. Apart

from that, Bush administration’s efforts to coopt Northern Alliance

102



in Karzai’s administration, disregarding its earlier promise with

Musharraf against it, only tilted the balance in India’s favour in

Afghanistan. Added to these factors is the joining of hands by Indian

RAW and Afghan NDS for promoting sabotage and terrorist

activities in Pakistan, as reported by Boston-based Christian Science

Monitor—the author highlighted.

The author labels Indo-Pak competition in Afghanistan as a zero-

sum game. Yet, he alludes towards a gap in Pakistan’s soft

diplomacy in Afghanistan, as Pakistani dramas, student

scholarships and development assistance can effectively help build

a positive imprint on young Afghan minds.

In conclusion, according to the author, the things that unite the

otherwise rival nations are cricket, movies/dramas, people to

people contacts and the bilateral trade. At the end of the last

chapter, the author recommends that in order to end the Longest

August (unflinching rivalry) between the two neighbours,

movement of goods and people can play a pivotal role in bringing

about “prosperity underpinned by peaceful coexistence”.

Dilip Hiro was born in Sindh (province of current Pakistan) during

British Raj and then had moved to India after partition. He received

education in India, Britain and the U.S. and is settled in London since

mid-60s. He is not only an author but also a journalist, commentator

and an expert on Asian geopolitical affairs. He has authored a total

of thirty-four books, the magnum opuses include Inside India Today,

Inside Central Asia, War Without End, and Apocalyptic Realm:

Jihadists in South Asia. He also frequently writes in The Guardian,

New York Times, Washington Post, Yale Global, TomDispatch,

Observer, and The Nation.

The book is well-referenced, written in a narrative form, in an easily

understandable language, and offers a detailed account of Hindu-

Muslims antagonism under British Raj and the ensuing Indo-Pak

rivalry after the Partition. It would be helpful for students, teachers

103



and researchers who are studying or writing on Pak-India

relationship, in the perspective of the fundamental issues

confronting the two states.

Riaz Khokhar is a Research Assistant at CISS


SAMRAN ALI : Book Review

Chris Ogden ed. New South Asian Security: Six Core Relations Underpinning Regional Security (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2016)

New South Asian Security: Six Core Relations Underpinning Regional

Security is an edited volume on South Asian security by Chris Ogden.

Six chapters are written by eminent scholars with an introduction

by the editor. They include discussion of different aspects of

bilateral relations of the South Asian states. Separate chapters cover

the bilateral relations between China-India, Pakistan-Afghanistan,

India-Pakistan, China-Afghanistan, China-Pakistan and India-

Afghanistan. The book’s introduction explains the its approach to

understanding South Asian security problems. Chris Ogden takes a

new approach to understand the security dynamics and challenges

in South Asia. It pursues the constructivists ideas of identity and

norms and eschews comparison with liberal ideas of economic

cooperation, multilateralism and to some extent the realist ideas of

treating ‘states as identical black boxes’. Instead of discussing

specific issues, such as nuclear deterrence, security, terrorism and

external perspectives on these issues, the author takes the region

as ‘co-dependent entity.’ Relations between the regional powers

China, Pakistan, India and Afghanistan are discussed as factors that

impact the regional security. These four countries are further

placed on the rise and fall spectrum i.e. China and India are dubbed

as rising powers and Pakistan and Afghanistan as failing states. It

tries to show through a state focused and state driven approaches,

that ‘security in South Asia is highly inter-connected and co-

dependent in terms of provenance and orientation’ and focuses on

interaction among these four states through the interplay of norms

under political, physical and security dimensions.

Book Review By

SAMRAN ALI



The first chapter, by David Scott discusses the norms, perceptions

and how geo-politics plays out in the China-India relations, finds

norms convergence between the two adversaries as both subscribe

to respect for state sovereignty, principles of peaceful coexistence

as well as global institutions at which states are represented. Both

the states have shown clear intent of cooperating on the issues of

stability of Sea Lines of Communication, climate change and

international economic framework. But China and India have

competing political objectives as well as national psyches driven by

‘Hindutva’ and ‘China Dream’ respectively. Also, at the regional

level, geo-politics comes into play and hence the divergence, be it

the border issue or Pak-China relations. However, Scott’s focus on

India’s security concerns due to its geographical proximity with

China appears exaggerated. He highlights threat posed to India by

Chinese military developments and cooperation with regional

states. The norm of trade is a converging point between India and

China. Both are taking their economic cooperation further. But

presently balance of trade is largely in China’s favor.

The second chapter is on the Pakistan and Afghanistan, which the

author terms cousin rivalry. Michael Semple in this chapter, points

out that there is a ‘far higher degree of convergence in the publicly

articulated norms than two states’ practice.’ Historically, Afghan

policy towards Pakistan is rooted in the contested Durand Line,

Pakhtunistan issue and support to armed groups operating in both

countries. During the initial decades after partition, Pakistan’s

policy towards Afghanistan had been ‘defensive.’ The security,

diplomatic, administrative, political and economic measures by

Pakistan took many decades to tackle the Pakhtunistan issue.

Pakistan shifted from ‘close frontier policy’ to ‘forward policy’ in

dealing with threats from Afghanistan. Semple argues that Afghan

Saur revolution had weakened Afghanistan, while Pakistan grew

both politically and militarily during this period, enabling the later

to influence events in the former. Therefore, the Taliban were ‘least

bad alternative to Pakistan’. He rightly points out India as a



significant element in Pak-Afghan bilateral relations and links

lasting progress in their bilateral relations only when ‘Pakistan sees

no threats from Indo-Afghan relationship.’

The third chapter by Runa Das argues that ‘Pakistan-India’s

historically driven norms have created a political-ideological

context, within which have unfolded the re-construction of

Pakistan-India’s security affairs.’ She divides Indo-Pak relations

into five phases. The first phase marked India and Pakistan as geo-

culturally/politically (Secular vs Islamic) ‘incompatible states’ thus

defined their ‘mutual insecurity profiles.’ Indian Peaceful Nuclear

Explosions (PNE) and later nuclear pursuit by Pakistan, in the

backdrop of 1971 War, dominated and directed the later phases of

India-Pakistan relations. The 1998 nuclear tests by both South

Asian states led to further consolidating their norms of Self/Other

national identities. Post-testing period led expansion of nuclear

weapons and institutionalization of Indo-Pak nuclear doctrines.

9/11 ushered a new phase in Pakistan’s relations with India, which

is termed as ‘no peace no war’. The future directions of Indo-

Pakistan security relations will depend on how both use ‘US-China

cards.’

In fourth chapter, Jingdong Yuan discusses the once limited but now

growing China-Afghan relations. Uncertainty in Afghanistan and

opportunities for development bring both China and Afghanistan

together. China fears militancy from Afghanistan spilling to its

Xinjiang region and threats to its investments which it has made in

Afghanistan in the last few years. The norms of non-interference

and peaceful coexistence dictate the Chinese policy towards

Afghanistan. China has rejected any military options in Afghanistan

and instead focuses on the dialogue and social development. It has

made contacts with several militant groups within Afghanistan, in

author’s opinion, to influence them to join the national

reconciliation process. After a long war and ISAF withdrawal, Kabul

is seeking a ‘foreign policy that balances between major powers but,



sees a greater role for China.’ Similarly, China’s Afghanistan policy

is showing signs of adjustments from ‘caution to greater

involvement.’

Andrew Small in the fifth chapter, points out that there are not

many normative associations between Pakistan-China ties. Both

differ in political systems, international status and cultural mores.

Despite these divergence, their relationship has been resilient,

reliable and consistent. The existence of a common rival in India has

created a ‘bond and pattern of cooperation’ which is itself a

‘powerful norm.’ He goes on to argue that as Beijing is well on the

road to becoming a great military and economic power, it finds in

Pakistan the most ‘trusted partner.’ Historically the Sino-Indian

1962 War and Indo-Pakistani 1965 War played a major role in

cementing this ‘all weather friendship’. India’s war with China made

India wake up to the possibility of a two-front war in future. It also

led Pakistan and China to resolve their border issues in 1963.

During 1971 War China provided military and economic aid to

Pakistan. The other areas of cooperation have been in the field of

the peaceful use of nuclear technology and dealing with threats of

extremism in China’s Xinjiang province. China still relies heavily on

Pakistan for political settlement in Afghanistan and stability in

South Asia.

In the sixth and final chapter, Avinash Paliwal and Harsh V. Pant

search normative sources of Indo-Afghan bilateral relationship.

They identify ‘democracy, tolerance and territorial integrity’ as a

base for stable Indo-Afghan relations. However Indian engagement

in Afghanistan also elicits ‘great game’ analogy which seeks

‘material interests, managing security threats and waging proxy

war against Pakistan.’ Both India and Pakistan inherited British

security legacies along with their borders with China and

Afghanistan respectively. India develop a non-intrusive vision on

Afghanistan, which was opposite to Pakistan’s view on Afghanistan

(discussed in second chapter). In the initial years after its



independence, India supported 'socialist ideologies’ and enjoyed

warm ties with socialist groups in Afghanistan. Today India enjoys

strong relationship with Kabul mainly because it supported the

Northern-Alliance, who have hold on power in Kabul now, during

the Jihad against the Russian Forces. Kabul also seeks Indian

‘political and psychological support’ due to ‘political convergences.’

The authors also mention cultural affinity an area of convergence

between them, but this assertion would not be supported if closely

scrutinized. Afghans have greater affinity with Pakhtuns living in

Pakistan.

In concluding part, it is argued that it is the ‘norm of trade and

development’ that is desired by all regional states including

Afghanistan and Pakistan. But there are ‘more negative strains

permeating their bilateral relations.’ these include border issues

and activities of non-state actors. India and China, in author’s

opinion, ought to determine their own strategies as both are best

placed to promote stability in their neighborhood. Chris proposes a

‘Council of Neighbors’ framework for stabilizing Afghanistan.

Alternatively, SCO can also act as a suitable platform for regional

cooperation.

Although, the authors have tried to cover all aspects in detail, but

few things require more discussion. In first chapter, David Scott

discussion of Indo-US strategic partnership appears superficial.

Without taking into account the deeper implications of US influence

in the region, the discussion of Chinese and Indian security relations

is less fulfilling. In the sixth chapter the Indian role in Afghanistan

is largely discussed under the norms of democracy and non-

interference, ignoring Indian role in supporting insurgents

operating from Afghanistan against Pakistan. As far the labeling

Pakistan as failing state is concerned, the book was written and

researched before 2016, since then much has changed in Pakistan.

It has overcome the challenges of terrorism and instability to a great

extent in the last three years. Overall, the book is a good addition to



literature on bilateral relations between six countries and an

important contribution to understanding norms and identities

factoring these relations. The reader gets the sense of history,

future trajectory, commonalities and differences of their bilateral

relations. The language of the book is academic and scholarly and

sometimes complex.

Samran Ali is a Research Assistant at CISS


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