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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0%D11SSIONOFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Reports No. 50-254/80-22; 50-265/80-24

Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 Licenses No. ?R-29; DPR-30

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison CompanyPost Office Box 767Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Name: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unite 1C2

Intpection At: Quad-Cities Site, Cordova, IL

I'spection Conducted: September 1 thru October 17, 1980O

Inspectors: .i' Chrise atimos gf /b vs.

G/Oh/ QS . 6u 'e .

&V / <i.,,,-dApproved by: 'H. L. Sp ard, Chief / d'/

React.r Projects Section 1.

Inspection Gummary

Inspection on September 1 thru October 17, 1980 (Reports No. 50-254/80-22;50-265/80-24)Areas Inspected: Routine, Unannounced Resident Inspection of Licensee Actionon Previous Inspection Findings, Maintenance Observation, Surveillance Obser-vation, Operational Safety Verification, Receipt of New fuel, Preparat ~on for.

Refueling, Refueling Activities, Participation in NRR/ Licensee Meeting, Reviewof Periodic and Special Reports, Licensee Event Report Followup, IE Bulletins,Followup on Headquarters Request, Local Leak Rate Testing, Independent Inspection,Plant Scrams, and Allegation Followup. The inspection involved a total of 282inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors including 58 inspector-hours onsiteduring ff-shifts.Results: Of the 16 areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identifiedin 14 areas; three items of .oncompliance were identified in two areas (infrac-tion - failure to follow procedures, paragraph 8, infraction - failure to followprocedure, paragraph 11, infraction - inaaequate management, paragraph 11) .

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DETAILS

1. Dersons C ontacted

*N. Kalivianakis, SuperintendentT. Tamlyn, Assistant ruperinterdent Operations

*L. Gerner, Assistant Superintendent AdministrativeD. Bax, Assistant Superintendent MaintenanceR. Flessner, Technical Staff SupervisorG. Conschlack, Senior Operating Engineer

*J. Heilman, Quality Assurance, Operations

The inspector also interviewed several other licensee employees,including shift engineers and foreman, reactor operators, Technicalstaff and Quality Control personnel.

* Denotes those present at the exit interview on October 17, 1980.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Outstanding inspection item (50-254/80-12-02; 50-265/80-15-02). The inspector reviewed procedures QGP 2-3, QGA-19 andtraining records of Licensee personnel.

(Closed) Outstanding inspec* ion item (5( -254/80-12-04, 50-265/80-15-04). The inspector reviewed the Licensee's responses datedJuly 14, 1980, and July 18, 1980. No further concerns wereidentified.

The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation will evaluate the adequacyof the Licens. 's responses per a task interface agreement with theoffice of Inspection and Enforcement.

No other concerns were identified.

3. Monthly Maintenance Observation

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and com-ponents listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that theywere conducted in accordance with approved procedures, rege:atoryguides and industry codes or standards and in conformance withtechnical specifications.

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The following items were considered during this review: thelimiting conditions for operatien were met while components orsystems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior toinitiating the work; activities were accomplished using approvedprocedure, and were inspacted as applicable; functional testingand/or calibrGtions were performed prior to returning components orsystems to service; quality control records were maintained;activities were accomplished by qualiCied personr.el; parts andmaterials used were properly cert : fied; radiological controls wereimplemented; and, fire prevention controls were impitz,nted.

Work requests were reviewed to deterr.ine status of outstanding jobsand to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipmentmaintenance whir'. may affect system performance.

The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

WR-007400 - Unit 2, 2A Recirculation M.G. set Field BreakerWR-Q07358 - Unit 2, Nitregen Make-up Valve Motor ReplacedWR-Q07399 Unit 2, 250 Volt Battery Charger

WR-Q01369 - Unit 1, Rebuild Safety ValveWR-Q05043 - Unit 1, Drywell/ Torus Vacuum BreakerMR-Q05818 - Unit 1, Mechanical SnubbersWR-Q07701 - Unit 1, RHR Suction ValveWR-Q07729 - Unit 1, CRD AccumulatorWR-QO3692 - Unit 1, Safety and Relief Valve Monitors

Change Power Supply to be fed from ESS

Following completion of maintenance on the 2A Recirculation M.G.set and the 250 volt Battery Charger, the inspector verified thatthest systems had been returned to service properly.

No items of noncompliarce were identified.

4. Monthly Surveillance observation

The inspector observed technical specifica' ions required surveil-lance testing on the Unit 2 Stop Valve closure and HPCI ValveOperability and verified that testing was performed in accordancewith adequate procedures, that test instrumentatien was calibrated,that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal andrestoration of the affected components were accomplished, that testresults conformed with technical specifications and procedurerequirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual

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directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified duringthe testing were pr( perly reviewed and resolved by appropriatemanagement personnel.

The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activ-ities: Unit 2, Turbine stop valves and Diesel Generator;Unit 1, RCIC Overspeed and Diesel Generator.

No items of noncompliance were i denti fi ed .

~. Operational safety Verification

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicablelogs and conducted discussions with control room operators duringthe month of September, 1980. The inspector verified the operabilityof selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verifiedproper return te service of affected components. Tours of Units 1and 2 reactor buildings and turbine buildings trere conducted toobserve plant equipment c onditions , including pot ential fire hazards,fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenancerequests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.The inspector by observation and direct interview verified thatthe physical security plan was being implemented in accordance withthe station security plan.

The inspector observed plant housekeeping /cleanli ess conditionsand verified implementation of radiation protection controls.Durin" the month of Septeuiber, 1930, the inspector wniked down theaccer.tble portions c; the Unit 1 and 2 SBLC systems to verifyoperability. The inspector 1so witnessed portions of theradioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste ship-ments and barreling.

These reviews and observations were conducted to verify thatfacility operations were in conformance with the requirementsestablished under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and adminis-'.rative procedures.

No ii ems of noncompliance were identified.

6. Receipt of New Fuel

The inspector verified prior to receipt of new fuel thattechnically adequate, approved procedures were availaole coveringthe receipt, inspection, and storage of new fuel; observed receiptinspections and storage of new fuel elements and verified theseactivities were performed in accordance with the licensee's pro-cedures; and, fcilowed up resolutions of deficiencies is foundduring new fuel inspections.

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No items of noncompliance were identified.

7. Preparation for Refueling

The inspector verified that technically adequate procedures wereapproved for receipt , inspection, and storage of new fuel .

The inspector verified that the licensee had submitted a proposedcore reload technical specification change to NRR. The inspectoralso reviewed the licensee's program for overall outage control.Additionally, the inspector witnessed LPRM continuity checks onnew LPRM 's .

No items of noncompliance were identified.

8. Refueling Activities

The inspector verified that prior to the handling of fuel in thecore, all surveillance testing required by Technical Specificationsand licensee's procedures had been completed. The inspectorobserved two shifts of fuel handling operations (fuel unload),Gamma surveys of two fuel assemblies, fuel bundle sampling operations,CRD blade unlatching and CRD blade removal .

On September 19, 1980, during a tour of the Unit I reactorbuilding, the inspector noticed two auxiliary operators isolatingcharging water valves to the hydraulic control units of Unit 1.Further investigation revealed that approximately 20 of 66 HCU'shad been isolated improperly on September 18, 1980. The lineupwas not in accordance with the Licensee 's Temporary Procedure 1377;Control Rod Blade Unlatching, dated August 29, 1980, in that thecharging water isolation valve was not closed ac required by thecrerequisites.

While inquiring into this . natter, the licensee stopped control rodblade movement and corrected the discrepancies prior to continuingblade movement. This is contrary to Technical Specification6.2.A.2. in that detailed written procedures for refueling operationsshall be prepared, approved, and adhered to, and is considered anitem of noncompliance. The inspector verified that good house-keeping was maintained in the refueling area and that staffingduring refueling was in accordance with approved procedures.

Except as described, no other items of noncompliance were identifiedin this area.

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9. NRR/ Licensee Meeting

On October 14, 1980, the Senior Resident Inspector attended ameeting held between the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,General Electric, and the Licensee.

The discussions held dea:t with the indication identified byGeneral Electric during ultrasonic testing of the "A" turbine

section. The exact definition of the indication after NRCconsultants witnessed tests were inconclusive. Based on theseuncer tainties, Commonwealth Edison will be inspecting the "B"

turbine section to ensure that no other similar indications exist.

No further concerns were identified.

10. Review of Licensee's Monthly Performance Report

The inspector reviewed the licensee 's monthly performance reportof Units 1 and 2 for the month of August, 1980.

Areas covered by the report were amendments to Technical Specif-ications, summary of corrective maintenance performed on SafetyRelated Equipment, Licensee Event Reports, Operating DataTabulations, and Unit I refueling information. The report wasreviewed for compliance with Technical Specifications 6.t .A.3.

No items of noncompliance were i denti fi ed.

11. Licensee Event Reports Followup

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel,and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed todetermine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immedi-ate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action toprevent recurrence had been accomplished .* accordance withtechnical speci fic ations.

Unit 1

RO 80-20, dated August 31, 1980, helief Valve 1-203-313 failed toclose during QoS 201-1 during normal unit shutdown. The inspectorwitnessed disassembly of the valve. The Licensee determined thecause to be steam cutting of the pilot valve seat which allowedsteam to leak out of the exhaust port, thus, causing the valve to

remain open.

R0 80-22, dated September 3,1980, while performing HPCISurveillance, A temperature switch was found to trip aboveTechnical Specification limit.

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RO 80-23/03L dated September 10, 1980, two 4h inch fire barrier* penetrations not sealed.

While conducting a tour on September 10, 1980, the inspectordiscovered two 4 inch fire barrier penetrations not sealed inthe ficar between the cable spreading room and the auxiliatyelect ric room. Upon discovery, the inspector notified the licenseeand a fire watch was established. The cause was determined to beconstruction personnel not following the core bore procedurewhich was used to make the penetrations on September 9, 1980.

This is contrary to Technical Speci r cation 3.12.F.2 in that a

fire watch was not established withi a one hour af ter the penetrationswere completed, and it is consi ered an item of noncompliance.f

Prior to the conclusion of this inspection, the licensee had clari-fled the procedure and the conttactors were instructed in its use.

Corrective and preventive actions hase been taken and, therefore,no response to this noncor.7 1ance is required.1

RO 80-24, dated Sept ember 14, 1980, fuel bundle was removed fromcore while the SRM reading was less than 2.3 counts per second.

On September 14, 1980, during the Unit 1 Cycle 5 core unload, fuelbundle LJB429 was removed from the ccre while the SRM in thatquedrant was reading only 2.3 counts per second. This is contraryto lechnical Specification 3.10.B.2. , which requires at least 3couras per second on the SRM during core alterations except whenthere are no mot e than two f uel assemblies in that quadrant andis considered an item of noncompliance. Assembly LJB429 was oneof 3 bundles remaining in the northwest quadrant at the time itwas removed, and was diagonally adjacent to two assemblies aroundthe SRM.

Technical Specification 3.10.B.2. had recently been changed to allowremoval of the last two assemblies in a quadrant with less than 3counts per second on the SRM. The change had been approved by theNRC, but only verbal approval had been received at the station atthe tbne of the core unload. To prevent future occurrences, thelicensee will not act on verbal approval of Technical Specificationsto the extent practical.

As the northwest quadrant was being unloaded, the Nuclear Engineerrealized that none of the shift personnel had been informed of theTechnical Specifiest ion change nor the verbal approved. The ShiftEngineer placed a talephone call to the Operating Engineer and theOperating Engineer explained the change with its limitations to theShift Engineer and the Nuclear Engineer. The Shift Engineer thenrelayed the explanation to the Reactor Operator, also by telephone.

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'It was this explanation which was misunderstood by the ReactorOperator, who then allowed tFe remova' of the fuel bundl- whichhe thought was permissible under the changed Technical specification.The error was realized before the unloading of the next quadrantwas begun, and the core was unloaded with no further complications

Unit 2

R0 80-18/OlT, dated August 29, 1930, HPCI motorgear unit would notcome off the high speed stop. While performing HPCI operabilitytest, QDS 2300-2, it as discovered that the HPCI motorgear unitwould not come off the high speed stop. If HPCI had been needed itwould have been available to supply water to the reactor, although

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in excess of the desired flow rate of 5600 gpm. All other redundantECCS were operable during this event. A failed component in theflow controller causes it to fail in the high position.

The controller was replaced with a like controller from unit one.The HPCI system was subsequently tested satisfactorily. The originalcontroller will be repaired and then be returned to the system.

R0 80-19, dated August 29, 1980, "A" recirculation pump motorgenerator field breaker opened. The cause was the failure of thecontrol power transformer. The defective transformer was replacedand pump operation resumed within technical specification limits.

RC 80-20, dated Augtst 28, 1980, Nitrogen make-up valve would notclose during Suppression Chamber to drywell separation test.

Except as described, no other items of noncompliance vere identified.

12. IE Bulletin Followup

For the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that thewritten response was within the time per.i od stated in the bulletin,that the written response included the information required to bereported, that the written response included adequate correctiveaction commitments bar;d on information presentation in the bulle-tin and the licensee's response, that licensee management forwardedcopies of the written response to the appropriate onsite managementrepresentatives, that information discussed in the licensee'swritten response was accurate, and that corrective act on taken bythe licensee was as described in the written response.

IEB 80-17 supplement 3, dated August 22, 1980, Failure of controlrods to insert during a scram at a BWR.

The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation will evaluate the adequacyof the licensce 's responses.

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IEB 80-19 revision 1, dated July 31, 1980, Failures of mercury-wetted Matrix relays in reactor protective system of operatingnuclear power plants designed by combustion engineering. Theinspector verified that the licensee does not utilize this typeof relays on Reactor Protective Systems.

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IEB 80-20, dated July 31, 1980, Failures of Westinghouse Type W-2spring return to neutral control switches. The inspector verifiedthat these switches are not utilized by the licensee.

13. Follow-up on Headquarters Request

The Licensee in a letter dated December 14, 1979, L. Peoples toDenton committed to the interim staff requirements f ar purge andventing operations as described in NUREG 0660 Item II E.4.

The inspector verified that Licensee procedures in existence limitpurge and vent operations.

Also affected valves were limited to 50 of travel to ensure closureand the Licensee initiated a program to qualify valve operation.

Final valve qualification analysis was forwarded to NRC, letterdated August 22, 1980, Janecek to Eisenhut. Based on the analysisthe Licensee rec aved the valve stroke limitations but will continueto fe low procedures to limit purge and vent operations.l

No further concerns were identified.

14. Local Leak Rate Testing

The inspector observed the performance of Local Leak Rate Testingon two Main Steam Isolation Valves and Main Steam Line Drain V'lves.Procedures and valve line-up sheets were reviewed for adequacy and compliancewith Technical Specifications. Test equipnent used was verified forcalibration and traceability to national standards .

The following Procedures were reviewed:

QTS- 100 - 1R4: LLRT Pressure Decay MethodQTS- 100 - 3R4: Main Steam Isolation Valve LLRT

QT$- 100 - 4R3: Main Steam Line Drain Valve LLRT

The following Test Equipment was verified:

Leise Gauge 0 - 100 psig SN#216, Calibrated 9/3/80Heise Gauge 0 - 100 psig SN#217, Calibrated 9/2/80

No items of noncompliance were identified.

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15. Independent Inspection

sa. Training for New Fuel Inspection

on July 29, 1980, the inspector attended a General Electriclecture on new fuel inspection. The inspector observed thecertification of three new employees and the re-certification ofanother employee on new fuel inspection.

b. Testing During the Outage

lue inspector observed the following inspections, tests, andoperations on Unit 1:

(1) TV inspections of Feedwater Spargers, Core Spray Spargers,Jet Pump and Reactor Internals.

(2) Visual inspections of Core Spray piping internal to theDrywell.

(3) Ultrasonic testing of Core Spray piping, Core Spray Safe-endrand Feedwater Safe-enda.

(4) Local Leak Rate testing of the Outboard Main Steam IsolationValves.

(5) Ultrasonic testing of Jet Pump Beam Bolts.(6) Ultrasonic Baseline inspection of Core Spray Piping.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

16. Plant Scrans

a. Following the plant scram on August 31, 1980, of Unit 1, theinspector ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systemsby document review and diacussions with licensee personnel concern-ing plant parameters, emergency system status and reacter coolantch emis try. The inspector verified the escablishment of propercommunications and reviewed the corrective actions taken by thelicensee.

The manual scram resulted fron an electromatic relief valve failingopen during testing. The unit was shutting down for a refuelingoutage during the test.

All systems responded as expected as the unit was placed in asafe shutdown condition.

b. Following the manual scram on October 5,1980, of Unit 2, theinspector ascertained the status mf the reactor and safety systemsby document review and discussions 3with licensee personnel concern-ing plant par am et e rs , emergency system status and reactor coolantchemistry. The inspector verified the establishment of propercommunications and reviewed the corrective actions taken by thelicensee.

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s The manual scram was initiated as a precautionary measurebecause of the intermittent local fire in the drywell. Thecause of the fire was the splattering of oil from a MSIV actuatoronto hot piping while MSIV timing adjustments were beingaccomplished.

All systems responded as expected and the unit was returned toservice on October 6, 1980.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

17. Allecation Followup

On September 15,1980, at 7: 10 P.M., the Washington HeadquartersDuty Officer received an ancnymous phone call regarding improperradiation controls at quad Cities, specifically in the SuppressionChamber work area.

The senior resident inspector was notified of these allegationson September 16, 1980, and immediately investigated the allegations.The inspector determined that during work in the Suppression Chamberarea some articles of clothing were lost due to contamination andthat some personne: were required to shower to remove contaminationfrom themselves.

The inspector did not find any evidence of improper radiationcontrols in this area. Also, no unusual instances of high

exposure or contamination were identified.

The inspector has no further concerns in regards to this matter.

18. Exit Intervie"

The inspector met with licensee representativea (dencted inParagraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of theinspection on October 17, 1980, and summarized the scope andfindings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledgedthe inspectors comments.

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