G.R. No. 103370 June 17, 1996UNITED PLACEMENT INTERNATIONAL, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LEONARDO ARAZAS, LIVY DACILLO and CESAR HERNANDEZ, Facts :

Private respondents, applied for overseas employment before Placementhaus and General Services, private respondents were made to sign two-year employment contracts. Prior to their departure, in December of 1986, for Dammam, Saudi Arabia, private respondents were each provided with a sealed envelope with the instruction that the envelopes were to be opened only if and when required by the authorities to show their employment contracts at the port of destination..After only a five-month stay in Saudi Arabia, or on 19 April 1986, private respondents' employment contracts were pre-terminated, and they were sent back to the Philippines. Private respondents filed with the ("POEA") their complaint for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of bonus and a refund of placement fees against Placementhaus and the United Placement International. Trial ensued. While the case was pending with the POEA, petitioner moved its offices from Suite 450 Padilla de los Reyes Bldg., 232 Juan Luna, Binondo, Manila, to the second floor of the C. Rivilla Bldg., 115 Aguirre St., Legaspi Village, Makati, Metro Manila. The transfer was approved by Cecilia E. Curso, Chief of the Licensing and Evaluation Department of the POEA, on 19 November 1986. On 18 July 1988, the POEA through then Administrator Tomas Achacoso rendered decision in favor of the respondents. The POEA sent a copy of its decision to petitioner by registered mail (Registered Letter No. 2432) at the latter's address of record (Binondo office). The post office sent the registered mail notice on 04 August 1988. Two other notices were sent, one on 11 August 1988 and another on 17 August 1988, to petitioner. On 17 September 1988, since the registered matter still remained unclaimed, the post office returned the mail to the POEA.Petitioner would now have this Court reverse the NLRC on the argument that since the transfer to the new address of petitioner was sanctioned by the POEA itself, the date of service of the decision to the old address should not be considered as the starting point of the ten-day reglementary period for appeal but as of 01 September 1989, or about a year later, when petitioner received the decision "through the initiative of Luz R. Abad." Hence, petitioner asserted, the appeal was timely filed on 11 September 1989.Issue :

WON NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.Ruling :

The argument is bereft of merit. Petitioner's notice of change of address, duly acknowledged by thePOEA Licensing and Evaluation Department, was made in compliance with Section 12, 5 Rule II, Book II, of the 1985 POEA Rules and Regulations. This Book deals with the licensing and regulation of participants in the overseas employment program. It has nothing to do with the adjudication of complaints by overseas employees against recruitment agencies, a matter separately treated in Book VI of the Rules. In the adjudication of such complaints, it is the hearing officer, the government official charged with evaluating and recommending to the POEA Administrator the proper action in adjudicatory cases, who has custody of the records. 6 In the discharge of his functions, the hearing officer acts on the basis of the records before him. Even when a particular matter of interest, like a party's change of address, is furnished a department of the POEA, the hearing officer would quite likely still be incognizant thereof; thus, such as it should be, he must instead be bound by and act on the basis of what appears on record. 7 Notices of processes are also handled by clerks who themselves must be guided by the records of the case. It is incumbent upon, and it behooves, the parties or counsel to themselves make certain that all official communications, either by mail or personally, properly reach them at their correct addresses, 8 a matter they can do by simply making that data of recordPetitioner's asseveration that it has been denied due process is not borne out by the records. Even before the acknowledgment by POEA of the transfer to Makati of petitioner's offices, notices had already been sent to petitioner at its Binondo office for the seven (7) hearing dates. It would appear that petitioner simply ignored the notices. Luz R. Abad herself merely considered the complaint a "nuisance suit, more than anything else." 12 What the law proscribes is lack of opportunity to be heard. 13 That opportunity, the Court is convinced, has sufficiently been accorded to petitioner.G.R. No. L-69018 January 29, 1990ERNESTO S. DIZON, JR. vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SECOND DIVISION, HON. LABOR ARBITER VIRGINIA G. SON, AGUINALDO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, JOSE G. RICAFORT, CONRADO T. CALALANG, EDGAR D. DE CASTRO and BENJAMIN V. ARITAO.Facts :

Petitioner Ernesto S. Dizon, Jr. was an employee of respondent Aguinaldo Development Corporation (ADECOR for short) serving as Assistant to the President. He worked for respondent company for about seventeen (17) years, starting from September 10, 1964 up to the time of his cessation from employment on October 31, 1981. On February 1, 1982, petitioner filed a complaint seeking reinstatement to his former position and charging private respondents with illegal dismissal.petitioner alleges that respondent Ricafort allegedly ordered petitioner to tender his written resignation. At the same time, Ricafort allegedly promised that if the petitioner would resign, he would be paid all his entitlements and privileges, including backwages

and salaries. The averments of petitioner were all denied by private respondents. On the same day, petitioner prepared his letter of resignation stating that, as instructed by Ricafort, petitioner was tendering his resignation from the company effective October 31, 1981. Respondent Ricafort accepted petitioner's resignation in a memorandum dated October 30, 1981. However, said memorandum advised petitioner that "pending completion and/or outcome of the investigations now being conducted regarding. your activities in the field, the issuance of your clearance, if ever warranted, will have to be held in abeyance. On November 4, 1981, petitioner withdrew his resignation. The withdrawal of the resignation was not given consideration; instead, in a memorandum dated November 9, 1981, respondent Aritao referred him to respondent Ricafort's memorandum of October 30, 1981 which accepted his resignation and declared that petitioner was no longer connected with the company. Hence, this appeal.Issue :

WON the resignation of the petitioner was forced to resign, hence he was illegally dismissed.Ruling :

No. Verily, respondent commission cannot be faulted for holding that petitioner's resignation was voluntary. Petitioner himself declared that he resigned on the basis of the alleged commitment of respondent Ricafort to pay him the entitlements and benefits hereinbefore specified. 7 In fact, even conceding that respondent Ricafort asked him to resign, it cannot be denied that petitioner was not forced to draft the two (2) letters of resignation; the contents thereof and the terms therein were formulated personally by him. With petitioner's educational and professional background, it would be absurd to assume that he did not understand the import of his own words and the consequences of his own acts.Additionally, the tenor of the letter withdrawing the resignation likewise reveals that such resignation was not against his will but that he was withdrawing it only because of his alleged desire to "defend himself in connection with the investigations consequent to his request for clearance. Thus, respondent commission was correct in observing that the allegation of involuntariness was a mere afterthought "conceived only after his clearance was withheld and after the substantial entitlements and privileges including unpaid salaries he expected to receive were denied."G.R. No. 98242 May 12, 1993RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI)vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND ELEANOR BARREDOFacts :

Since July 19, 1979 the private respondent Eleanor D. Barredo had been employed as Accounting Clerk at the RCPI branch office in Roxas City since July 19, 1979. In June, 1983, she was extended a permanent appointment.On July 27, 1987, private respondent applied for sick leave of absence duly supported by a medical certificate. Having been advised by her attending physician to rest for a period of from four to five months, she requested an extension of he sick leave of absence on October 26, 1987.On December 12, 1987, she received a letter from Reynaldo Alovera, Net Control Manager of RCPI, instructing her to report for duty. In reply, she explained that she could not as yet report for duty because her physician found her not yet fit to resume working. RCPI reiterated its order, requiring her to report for work. When she failed to comply, her employment was terminated on February 11, 1988.private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. In its position paper, RCPI claimed that Barredo's dismissal was for a valid cause. Since the two (2) medical certificates submitted by her in support of her application for sick leave appeared to have been written by two (2) different persons, the petitioner required her to report for work to enable the company physician to check and examine her. Furthermore, the company physician who was consulted regarding Barredo's alleged ailment opined that the latter's "length of absence due to allergic dermatitis is not in any medical knowledge compatible Petitioner gave Barredo three (3) chances to report and submit herself for medical examination, but she did not comply. Her conduct was considered by petitioner "reprehensible and constitute serious misconduct and/or willful disobedience to lawful orders of her superior as will warrant her termination. Both labor arbiter and the NLRC finds for private respondent. Hence this appeal.Issue :

WON RCPI had complied with the procedural requirements in the dismissal of barredo.Ruling :

No. The pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code mandate, to wit:Sec. 1. Security of tenure and due process. No worker shall be dismissed except for a just or authorized cause provided by law and after due process.Sec. 2. Notice of dismissal. Any who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular act or omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, the notice shall be served at the worker's last known address.Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. The worker may answer the allegations stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.

Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor. (Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code; Emphasis supplied.)

These guidelines mandate that the employer should send the employee two (2) written notices of dismissal before a termination of employment can be legally effected. These are: (1) the notice which apprises the employee of the particular, acts omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. (National Service Corporation vs. NLRC,168 SCRA 122).In the case at bar, RCPI did not comply with the above-stated guidelines in effecting Barredo's dismissal. Barredo was never apprised nor given the chance to explain the charges filed against her. The three (3) notices sent to Barredo to report for work and submit herself for physical examination by RCPI's physician did not constitute "in itself opportunity to be heard.”G.R. No. 108951 March 7, 2000JESUS B. DIAMONON vs.DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT; HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, as the undersecretary of Labor; MANASES 1T. CRUZ, in his capacity as the Med-Arbiter; ATTY. ZOILO DE LA CRUZ, JR., and MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP) and PHILIPPINE AGRICULTURAL COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL WORLER'S UNION (PACIWU)

Facts :Petitioner served as the National Executive Vice President of (NACUSIP) and Vice President for Luzon of the (PACIWU).

Petitioner learned of his removal from the positions he held in both unions in a resolution approved during a meeting of the National Executive Boards of both unions. On April 22, 1991, petitioner sought reconsideration of the resolution on his removal. At the same time, he initiated a complaint before the DOLE against the National President of NACUSIP and PACIWU, private respondent Atty. Zoilo V. de la Cruz, Jr., and the members of the National Executive Boards of NACUSIP and PACIWU questioning the validity of his removal from the positions he held in the two unions. Public respondent Laguesma, acting as the then Undersecretary of DOLE, decided on the case and issued a Resolution declaring his removal from the positions be held. In view of the adverse order. Hence this appeal.Issue :

WON the dismissal of the case of the public respondent is valid pursuant to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.Ruling :

Yes. Generally, an appellate court may only pass upon errors assigned. 25 However, this rule is not without exceptions.26 In the following instances, 27 the Supreme Court ruled that an appellate court is accorded a broad discretionary power to waive the lack of assignment of errors and consider errors not assigned:

(a) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter;(b) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law;(c) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of a justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;(d) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored;(e) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned;(f) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent.

There is no reason why this rule should not apply to administrative bodies as well, like the case before us, for the instant controversy falls squarely under the exceptions to the general rule.In the instant case, not only did petitioner fail to comply with Section 2, Rule VIII, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code as amended 28 but also the record reveals that neither did he exhaust the remedies 29 set forth by the Constitution and by-laws of both unions. In the National Convention of PACIWU and NACUSIP held on August 10 and 11, 1991, respectively, nothing was heard of petitioner's complaint against private respondents on the latter's alleged unauthorized and illegal disbursement of union funds. In fact, what the National Convention resolved was to approve and adopt the resolution of the National Executive Board removing petitioner from the positions he held. 30 His failure to seek recourse before the National Convention on his complaint against private respondents taints his action with prematurity.1âwphi1When the Constitution and by-laws of both unions dictated the remedy for intra-union dispute, such as petitioner's complaint against private respondents for unauthorized or illegal disbursement of unions funds, this should be resorted to before recourse can be made to the appropriate administrative or judicial body, not only to give the grievance machinery or appeals' body of the union the opportunity to decide the matter by itself, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to administrative or judicial bodies. Thus, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention. 31 This rule clearly applies to the instant case. The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative

remedies rests on the presumption that when the administrative body, or grievance machinery, as in this case, is afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the same correctly. 32 Petitioner's premature invocation of public respondent's intervention is fatal to his cause of action. 33