Property Cases 12-13

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-43346 March 20, 1991

MARIO C. RONQUILLO, petitionervs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THEPHILIPPINES, ROSENDO DEL ROSARIO, AMPARO DEL ROSARIO and FLORENCIA DELROSARIO, respondents.*

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.

REGALADO, J .:p

This petition seeks the review of the decision 1rendered by respondent Court of Appeals on September25, 1975 in CA-G.R. No. 32479-R, entitled "Rosendo del Rosario, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus MarioRonquillo, Defendant-Appellant," affirming in totothe judgment of the trial court, and its amendatoryresolution 2dated January 28, 1976 the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of this Court dated September 25,1975 is hereby amended in the sense that the first part of the appealed decision isset aside, except the last portion "declaring the plaintiffs to be the rightful owners of

the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub which is abutting plaintiffs' property," whichwe affirm, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

The following facts are culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals:

It appears that plaintiff Rosendo del Rosario was a registered owner of a parcel ofland known as Lot 34, Block 9, Sulucan Subdivision, situated at Sampaloc, Manilaand covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34797 of the Registry of Deeds ofManila (Exhibit "A"). The other plaintiffs Florencia and Amparo del Rosario weredaughters of said Rosendo del Rosario. Adjoining said lot is a dried-up portion of the

old Estero Calubcub occupied by the defendant since 1945 which is the subjectmatter of the present action.

Plaintiffs claim that long before the year 1930, when T.C.T. No. 34797 over Lot No.34 was issued in the name of Rosendo del Rosario, the latter had been inpossession of said lot including the adjoining dried-up portion of the old EsteroCalubcub having bought the same from Arsenio Arzaga. Sometime in 1935, saidtitled lot was occupied by Isabel Roldan with the tolerance and consent of the plaintiffon condition that the former will make improvements on the adjoining dried-up


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portion of the Estero Calubcub. In the early part of 1945 defendant occupied theeastern portion of said titled lot as well as the dried-up portion of the old EsteroCalubcub which abuts plaintiffs' titled lot. After a relocation survey of the land inquestion sometime in 1960, plaintiffs learned that defendant was occupying a portionof their land and thus demanded defendant to vacate said land when the latterrefused to pay the reasonable rent for its occupancy. However, despite said demand

defendant refused to vacate.

Defendant on the other hand claims that sometime before 1945 he was living with hissister who was then residing or renting plaintiffs' titled lot. In 1945 he built his houseon the disputed dried-up portion of the Estero Calubcub with a small portion thereofon the titled lot of plaintiffs. Later in 1961, said house was destroyed by a fire whichprompted him to rebuild the same. However, this time it was built only on the calledup portion of the old Estero Calubcub without touching any part of plaintiffs titledland. He further claims that said dried-up portion is a land of public domain. 3

Private respondents Rosendo, Amparo and Florencia, all surnamed del Rosario (Del Rosarios),lodged a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila praying, among others, that they bedeclared the rightful owners of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub. Petitioner Mario Ronquillo(Ronquillo) filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the trial court had no

jurisdiction over the case since the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub is public land and, thus,subject to the disposition of the Director of Lands. The Del Rosarios opposed the motion arguing thatsince they are claiming title to the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub as riparian owners, the trialcourt has jurisdiction. The resolution of the motion to dismiss was deferred until after trial on themerits.

Before trial, the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:

1. That the plaintiffs are the registered owners of Lot 34, Block 9, SulucanSubdivision covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34797;

2. That said property of the plaintiffs abuts and is adjacent to the dried-up river bed ofEstero Calubcub Sampaloc, Manila;

3. That defendant Mario Ronquillo has no property around the premises in questionand is only claiming the dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub, whereon beforeOctober 23, 1961, the larger portion of his house was constructed;

4. That before October 23, 1961, a portion of defendant's house stands (sic) on theabove-mentioned lot belonging to the plaintiffs;

5. That the plaintiffs and defendant have both filed with the Bureau of Landsmiscellaneous sales application for the purchase of the abandoned river bed known

as Estero Calubcub and their sales applications, dated August 5, 1958 and October13, 1959, respectively, are still pending action before the Bureau of Lands;

6. That the parties hereby reserve their right to prove such facts as are necessary tosupport their case but not covered by this stipulation of facts. 4

On December 26, 1962, the trial court rendered judgment the decretal portion of which provides:


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WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to deliver to theplaintiffs the portion of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of title No. 34797which is occupied by him and to pay for the use and occupation of said portion ofland at the rate of P 5.00 a month from the date of the filing of the complaint untilsuch time as he surrenders the same to the plaintiffs and declaring plaintiffs to be theowners of the dried-up portion of estero Calubcub which is abutting plaintiffs'

property.

With costs to the defendant.

SO ORDERED. 5

On appeal, respondent court, in affirming the aforequoted decision of the trial court, declared thatsince Estero Calubcub had already dried-up way back in 1930 due to the natural change in thecourse of the waters, under Article 370 of the old Civil Code which it considers applicable to thepresent case, the abandoned river bed belongs to the Del Rosarios as riparian owners.Consequently, respondent court opines, the dried-up river bed is private land and does not form partof the land of the public domain. It stated further that "(e)ven assuming for the sake of argument that

said estero did not change its course but merely dried up or disappeared, said dried-up estero wouldstill belong to the riparian owner," citingits ruling in the case of Pinzon vs. Rama. 6

Upon motion of Ronquillo, respondent court modified its decision by setting aside the first portion ofthe trial court's decision ordering Ronquillo to surrender to the Del Rosarios that portion of landcovered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34797 occupied by the former, based on the former'srepresentation that he had already vacated the same prior to the commencement of this case.However, respondent court upheld its declaration that the Del Rosarios are the rightful owners of thedried-up river bed. Hence, this petition.

On May 17, 1976, this Court issued a resolution 7requiring the Solicitor General to comment on thepetition in behalf of the Director of Lands as an indispensable party in representation of the Republic ofthe Philippines, and who, not having been impleaded, was subsequently considered impleaded as such in

our resolution of September 10, 1976. 8In his Motion to Admit Comment, 9the Solicitor Generalmanifested that pursuant to a request made by this office with the Bureau of Lands to conduct aninvestigation, the Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau sent a communication informing him that therecords of his office "do not show that Mario Ronquillo, Rosendo del Rosario, Amparo del Rosario orFlorencia del Rosario has filed any public land application covering parcels of land situated at EsteroCalubcub Manila as verified by our Records Division.

The position taken by the Director of Lands in his Comment 10filed on September 3, 1978, which wasreiterated in the Reply dated May 4, 1989 and again in the Comment dated August 17, 1989, explicates:

5. We do not see our way clear to subscribe to the ruling of the Honorable Court ofAppeals on this point for Article 370 of the Old Civil Code, insofar as ownership of

abandoned river beds by the owners of riparian lands are concerned, speaks only ofa situation where such river beds were abandonedbecause of a natural change inthe course of the waters. Conversely, we submit that if the abandonment was forsome cause other than the natural change in the course of the waters, Article 370 isnot applicable and the abandoned bed does not lose its character as a property ofpublic dominion not susceptible to private ownership in accordance with Article 502(No. 1) of the New Civil Code. In the present case, the drying up of the bed, ascontended by the petitioner, is clearly caused by human activity and undeniably not


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because of the natural change of the course of the waters (Emphasis in the originaltext).

In his Comment 11dated August 17, 1989, the Director of Lands further adds:

8. Petitioner herein and the private respondents, the del Rosarios, claim to have

pending sales application(s) over the portion of the dried up Estero Calubcub, asstated in pages 4-5, of the Amended Petition.

9. However, as stated in the Reply dated May 4, 1989 of the Director of Lands, allsales application(s) have been rejected by that office because of the objectioninterposed by the Manila City Engineer's Office that they need the dried portion of theestero for drainage purposes.

10. Furthermore, petitioner and private respondents, the del Rosarios having filedsaid sales application(s) are now estopped from claiming title to the Estero Calubcub(by possession for petitioner and by accretion for respondents del Rosarios) becausefor (sic) they have acknowledged that they do not own the land and that the same is

a public land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands (Director of Lands vs.Santiago, 160 SCRA 186, 194).

In a letter dated June 29, 1979 12Florencia del Rosario manifested to this Court that Rosendo, Amparoand Casiano del Rosario have all died, and that she is the only one still alive among the privaterespondents in this case.

In a resolution dated January 20, 1988, 13the Court required petitioner Ronquillo to implead oneBenjamin Diaz pursuant to the former'smanifestation 14that the land adjacent to the dried up river bed has already been sold to the latter, andthe Solicitor General was also required to inquire into the status of the investigation being conducted bythe Bureau of Lands. In compliance therewith, the Solicitor General presented a letter from the Director ofLands to the effect that neither of the parties involved in the present case has filed any public land

application. 15

On April 3, 1989, petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari, 16this time impleading theDevelopment Bank of the Philippines (DBP) which subsequently bought the property adjacent to thedried-up river bed from Benjamin Diaz. In its resolution dated January 10, 1990, 17the Court ordered thatDBP be impleaded as a party respondent.

In a Comment 18filed on May 9, 1990, DBP averred that "[c]onsidering the fact that the petitioner in thiscase claims/asserts no right over the property sold to Diaz/DBP by the del Rosarios; and considering, onthe contrary, that Diaz and DBP claims/asserts (sic) no right (direct or indirect) over the property beingclaimed by Ronquillo (the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub), it follows, therefore, that the petitionerRonquillo has no cause of action against Diaz or DBP. A fortiorifrom the viewpoint of the classicaldefinition of a cause of action, there is no legal justification to implead DBP as one of the respondents inthis petition." DBP thereafter prayed that it be dropped in the case as party respondent.

On September 13, 1990, respondent DBP filed a Manifestation/Compliance 19stating that DBP'sinterest over Transfer Certificate of Title No. 139215 issued in its name (formerly Transfer Certificate ofTitle No. 34797 of the Del Rosarios and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 135170 of Benjamin Diaz) hasbeen transferred to Spouses Victoriano and Pacita A. Tolentino pursuant to a Deed of Sale datedSeptember 11, 1990.


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Petitioner Ronquillo avers that respondent Court of Appeals committed an error of law and grossabuse of discretion, acted arbitrarily and denied petitioner due process of law (a) when it declaredprivate respondents Del Rosarios the rightful owners of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub byunduly relying upon decisional law in the case of Pinzon vs. Rama, ante, which case was decidedentirely on a set of facts different from that obtaining in this case; and (b) when it ignored theundisputed facts in the present case and declared the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub as a

private property.

The main issue posed for resolution in this petition is whether the dried-up portion of EsteroCalubcub being claimed by herein petitioner was caused by a natural change in the course of thewaters; and, corollary thereto, is the issue of the applicability of Article 370 of the old Civil Code.

Respondent court, in affirming the findings of the trial court that there was a natural change in thecourse of Estero Calubcub declared that:

The defendant claims that Article 370 of the old Civil Code is not applicable to theinstant case because said Estero Calubcub did not actually change its course butsimply dried up, hence, the land in dispute is a land of public domain and subject to

the disposition of the Director of Land(s). The contention of defendant is withoutmerit. As mentioned earlier, said estero as shown by the relocation plan (Exhibit "D")did not disappear but merely changed its course by a more southeasternly (sic)direction. As such, "the abandoned river bed belongs to the plaintiffs-appellees andsaid land is private and not public in nature. Hence, further, it is not subject to aHomestead Application by the appellant." (Fabian vs. Paculan CA-G.R. Nos. 21062-63-64-R, Jan. 25 1962). Even assuming for the sake of argument that said estero didnot change its course but merely dried up or disappeared, said dried-up estero wouldstill belong to the riparian owner as held by this Court in the case ofPinzon vs.Rama(CA-G.R. No. 8389, Jan. 8, 1943; 2 O.G. 307). 20

Elementary is the rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Courtof Appeals in a petition for certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to the review of

errors of law, and that said appellate court's finding of fact is conclusive upon this Court. However,there are certain exceptions, such as (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely onspeculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly absurd, mistaken orimpossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the

judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;and (6) when the Court of Appeals in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case and thesame is contrary to the admissions of both appellant andappellee. 21

A careful perusal of the evidence presented by both parties in the case at bar will reveal that thechange in the course of Estero Calubcub was caused, not by natural forces, but due to the dumpingof garbage therein by the people of the surrounding neighborhood. Under the circumstances, a

review of the findings of fact of respondent court thus becomes imperative.

Private respondent Florencia del Rosario, in her testimony, made a categorical statement which ineffect admitted that Estero Calubcub changed its course because of the garbage dumped therein, bythe inhabitants of the locality, thus:

Q When more or less what (sic) the estero fully dried up?


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A By 1960 it is (sic) already dried up except for a little rain that accumulates on thelot when it rains.

Q How or why did the Estero Calubcub dried (sic) up?

A It has been the dumping place of the whole neighborhood. There is no street, they

dumped all the garbage there. It is the dumping place of the whole community, sir. 22

In addition, the relocation plan (Exhibit "D") which also formed the basis of respondent court's ruling,merely reflects the change in the course of Estero Calubcub but it is not clear therefrom as to whatactually brought about such change. There is nothing in the testimony of lone witness Florencia delRosario nor in said relocation plan which would indicate that the change in the course of the esterowas due to the ebb and flow of the waters. On the contrary, the aforequoted testimony of the witnessbelies such fact, while the relocation plan is absolutely silent on the matter. The inescapableconclusion is that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was occasioned, not by a natural changein the course of the waters, but through the active intervention of man.

The foregoing facts and circumstances remove the instant case from the applicability of Article 370

of the old Civil Code which provides:

Art. 370. The beds of rivers, which are abandoned because of a natural change inthe course of the waters, belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout therespective length of each. If the abandoned bed divided tenements belonging todifferent owners the new dividing line shall be equidistant from one and the other.

The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies only ifthere is a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions 23nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificialdrainage systems. 24Considering our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub wasactually caused by the active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case atbar and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.

The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of thepublic domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. That such is the case ismade more evident in the letter, dated April 28, 1989, of the Chief, Legal Division of the Bureau ofLands 25as reported in the Reply of respondent Director of Lands stating that "the alleged applicationfiled by Ronquillo no longer exists in its records as it must have already been disposed of as a rejectedapplication for the reason that other applications "covering Estero Calubcub Sampaloc, Manila for areasother than that contested in the instant case, were all rejected by our office because of the objectioninterposed by the City Engineer's office that they need the same land for drainage purposes".Consequently, since the land is to be used for drainage purposes the same cannot be the subject of amiscellaneous sales application.

Lastly, the fact that petitioner and herein private respondents filed their sales applications with theBureau of Lands covering the subject dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub cannot but be deemed asoutright admissions by them that the same is public land. They are now estopped from claimingotherwise.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from, the remaining effective portion of which declares privaterespondents Del Rosarios as riparian owners of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub is herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE.


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SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.


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Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 77294 December 12, 1988

ANGELICA VIAJAR and CELSO VIAJAR, plaintiffs-appellants,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, LEONOR P. LADRIDO, LOURDES LADRIDO IGNACIO, EUGENIO P.LADRIDO and L P. LADRIDO, defendants-appellees.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

Miraflores Law Offices for respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J .:

This is a petition for review on certiorariof the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 29,1986, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69942 entitled, "ANGELICA VIAJAR, et. al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, versusLEONOR LADRIDO, et. al., Defendants-Appellees," affirming the decision of the Court of FirstInstance (now Regional Trial Court) of Iloilo dated December 10, 1981.

The antecedent facts in the instant case are as follows: The spouses Ricardo Y. Ladrido and LeonorP. Ladrido were the owners of Lot No. 7511 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan situated in barangayCawayan, Pototan, Iloilo. This lot contained an area of 154,267 square meters and was registered inthe names of the spouses under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21940 of the Register of Deeds ofIloilo.

Spouses Rosendo H. Te and Ana Te were also the registered owners of a parcel of land describedin their title as Lot No. 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan.

On September 6, 1973, Rosendo H. Te, with the conformity of Ana Te, sold this lot to Angelica F.Viajar and Celso F. Viajar for P5,000. A Torrens title was later issued in the names of Angelica F.Viajar and Celso F. Viajar.

Later, Angelica F. Viajar had Lot No. 7340 relocated and found out that the property was in thepossession of Ricardo Y. Ladrido. Consequently, she demanded its return but Ladrido refused.

On February 15, 1974, Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar instituted a civil action for recovery ofpossession and damages against Ricardo Y. Ladrido. This case was docketed as Civil Case No.

9660 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. Summoned to plead, defendant Ladrido filed his answerwith a counterclaim. Plaintiffs filed their reply to the answer.

Subsequently, the complaint was amended to implead Rosendo H. Te as another defendant.Plaintiffs sought the annulment of the deed of sale and the restitution of the purchase price withinterest in the event the possession of defendant Ladrido is sustained. Defendant Te filed his answerto the amended complaint and he counter claimed for damages. Plaintiffs answered thecounterclaim.


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During the pendency of the case, plaintiff Celso F. Viajar sold his rights over Lot No. 7340 to hismother and co-plaintiff, Angelica F. Viajar. For this reason, plaintiff Angelica F. Viajar now appears tobe the sole registered owner of this lot.

On May 25, 1978, defendant Ladrido died. He was substituted in the civil action by his wife, LeonorP. Ladrido, and children, namely: Lourdes Ladrido-Ignacio, Eugenio P. Ladrido and Manuel P.

Ladrido, as parties defendants.

The facts admitted by the parties during the pre-trial show that the piece of real property which usedto be Lot No. 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan was located in barangay GuibuanoganPototan, Iloilo; that it consisted of 20,089 square meters; that at the time of the cadastral survey in1926, Lot No. 7511 and Lot No. 7340 were separated by the Suague River; that the area of 11,819square meters of what was Lot No. 7340 has been in the possession of the defendants; that the areaof 14,036 square meters, which was formerly the river bed of the Suague River per cadastral surveyof 1926, has also been in the possession of the defendants; and that the plaintiffs have never beenin actual physical possession of Lot No. 7340.

After trial on the merits, a second amended complaint which included damages was admitted.

The plaintiffs raised the following issues to be resolved:

1. Whether the change in the course of the Suague River was suddenas claimed by the plaintiffs or gradual as contended by thedefendants;

2. Assuming arguendo it was gradual, whether or not the plaintiffs arestill entitled to Lot "B' appearing in Exhibit "4" and to one-half () ofLot "A," also indicated in Exhibit "4;" and

3. Damages (pp. 12-13, Rollo).

On December 10, 1981, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and againstthe plaintiffs:

1. Dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs Angelica F. Viajar and CelsoF. Viajar with costs against them;

2. Declaring defendants Leonor P. Ladrido, Lourdes Ladrido-Ignacio,Eugenio P. Ladrido and Manuel P. Ladrido as owner of the parcel ofland indicated as Lots A and B in the sketch plan (Exhs. 'C' as well as

'4,' '4-B' and '4-C') situated in barangays Cawayan and GuibuanoganPototan, Iloilo, and containing an area of 25,855 square meters, moreor less; and

3. Pronouncing that as owners of the land described in the precedingparagraph, the defendants are entitled to the possession thereof.

Defendants' claim for moral damages and attorney's fees are dismissed.


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SO ORDERED (p. 36, Rollo).

Not satisfied with the decision, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals and assigned thefollowing errors:

I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS AREENTITLED TO LOT B APPEARING IN EXHIBIT "4" AND TO ONE-HALF () OFLOT A IN THE SAID EXHIBIT "4."

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFFS (p.42,Rollo).

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court a quo. Plaintiffs (thepetitioners herein) now come to Us claiming that the Court of Appeals palpably erred in affirming the

decision of the trial court on the ground that the change in the course of the Suague River wasgradual and not sudden.

In the decision appealed from, the Court of Appeals held:

This appeal is not impressed with merit.

Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides that:

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belongthe accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of thecurrent of the waters.

The presumption is that the change in the course of the river was gradual andcaused by accretion and erosion (Martinez Canas vs. Tuason, 5 Phil. 668; PayatasEstate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55; C.H. Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil.133). In the case at bar, the lower court correctly found that the evidence introducedby the plaintiff to show that the change in the course of the Suague River wassudden or that it occurred through avulsion is not clear and convincing.

Contrariwise, the lower court found that:

... the defendants have sufficiently established that for many years after 1926 agradual accretion on the eastern side of Lot No. 7511 took place by action of the

current of the Suague River so that in 1979 an alluvial deposit of 29,912 squaremeters (2.9912 hectares), more or less, had been added to Lot No. 7511. (Exhs. '1'as well as Exhs. 'C' and '4'). Apropos it should be observed that the accretionconsisted of Lot A with an area of 14,036 square meters; Lot B, 11,819 squaremeters; and Lot C, 4,057 square meters. (Exhs. '4-B,' '4-C' and '4-D'). Only Lot C isnot involved in this litigation. (See Pre-trial Order, supra)

The established facts indicate that the eastern boundary of Lot No. 7511 was theSuague River based on the cadastral plan. For a period of more than 40 years


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(before 1940 to 1980) the Suague River overflowed its banks yearly and the propertyof the defendant gradually received deposits of soil from the effects of the current ofthe river. The consequent increase in the area of Lot No. 7511 due to alluvion oraccretion was possessed by the defendants whose tenants plowed and planted thesame with coin and tobacco.

The quondam river bed had been filled by accretion through the years. The land isalready plain and there is no indication on the ground of any abandoned river bed.The river bed is definitely no longer discernible now.

What used to be the old river bed (Lot A) is in level with Lot No. 7511. So are the twoother areas to the East. (Lots B and C) Lots A, B and C are still being cultivated.

Under the law, accretion which the banks or rivers may gradually receive from theeffects of the current of the waters becomes the property of the owners of the landsadjoining the banks. (Art. 366, Old Civil Code; Art. 457, New Civil Code which tookeffect on August 30, 1950 [Lara v. Del Rosario, 94 Phil. 778]. Therefore, theaccretion to Lot No. 7511 which consists of Lots A and B (see Exhs. 'C' and '4')

belongs to the defendants (pp. 34-35, Record on Appeal).

We find no cogent reason to disturb the foregoing finding and conclusion of the lowercourt.

The second assignment of error is a mere offshoot of the first assignment of errorand does not warrant further discussion (pp. 4244, Rollo).

The petition is without merit.

The petitioners contend that the first issue raised during the trial of the case on the merits in theCourt of First Instance, that is, "whether the change in the course of the Suague River was sudden

as claimed by the plaintiffs or gradual as contended by the defendants," was abandoned and neverraised by them in their appeal to the Court of Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals, in holding thatthe appeal is without merit, because of the change of the Suague River was gradual and not sudden,disposed of the appeal on an issue that was never raised and, accordingly, its decision is void. Insupport of its contention, petitioners cite the following authorities:

It is a well-known principle in procedure that courts of justice have no jurisdiction orpower to decide a question not in issue (Lim Toco vs. Go Fay, 80 Phil. 166).

A judgment going outside the issues and purporting to adjudicate something uponwhich the parties were not heard, is not merely irregular, but extra-judicial and invalid( Salvante vs. Cruz, 88 Phil. 236-244; Lazo vs. Republic Surety & Insurance Co.,Inc., 31 SCRA 329, 334).

The pivotal issue in the petitioners' appeal was whether the change in the course of the SuagueRiver was gradual or sudden because the trial court below resolved the same in its decision thussubjecting the same to review by respondent appellate court. By simply abandoning this issue, thepetitioners cannot hope that the affirmance of the decision wherein this issue was resolved makesthe decision of the Court of Appeals void. In effect, the petitioners are expounding a new proceduraltheory that to render a questioned decision void, all that has to be done is to simply abandon onappeal the pivotal issue as resolved by the lower court and when its decision is affirmed on appeal,attack the decision of the appellate court as void on the principle that a court of justice has no


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jurisdiction or power to decide the question not in issue. This is not correct. Even the authorities citedby the petitioners, more specifically the Salvante and Lazo cases, supra, do not support theircontention. They were heard in the trial court and they cannot complain that the proceeding belowwas irregular and hence, invalid.

The trial court found that the change in the course of the Suague River was gradual and this finding

was affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals. We do not find any valid reason to disturb thisfinding of fact.

Article 457 of the New Civil Code (reproduced from Article 366 of the Old), the law applied by thecourtsa quoprovides:

Art. 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong theaccretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

Petitioners contend that this article must be read together with Sections 45 an 46 of Act No. 496which provides:

SEC. 45.1

The obtaining of a decree of registration and the entry of a certificate of titleshall be regarded as an agreement running with the land, and binding upon the applicantand all successors in title that the land shall be and always remain registered land, andsubject to the provisions of this Act and all Acts amendatory thereof.

SEC. 46. 2No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall beacquired by prescription or adverse possession.

As a result, petitioners contend, Article 457 of the New Civil Code must be construed to limit theaccretion mentioned therein as accretion of unregistered land to the riparian owner, and should notextend to registered land. Thus, the lot in question having remained the registered land of thepetitioners, then the private respondents cannot acquire title there in derogation to that of thepetitioners, by accretion, for that will defeat the indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.

The rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owner against thediminution of the area of his registered land through gradual changes in the course of an adjoiningstream is well settled. InPayatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55, We ruled:

The controversy in the present cases seems to be due to the erroneous conceptionthat Art. 366 of the Civil Code does not apply to Torrens registered land. That articleprovides that "any accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive fromthe effects of the current belong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon."

Accretions of that character are natural incidents to land bordering on runningstreams and are not affected by the registration laws. It follows that registration doesnot protect the riparian owner against diminution of the area of his land through

gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream.

In C.N. Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil. 133, We also ruled:

It clearly appearing that the land in question has become part of defendant's estateas a result of accretion, it follows that said land now belongs to him. The fact that theaccretion to his land used to pertain to plaintiffs estate, which is covered by a TorrensCertificate of Title, cannot preclude him (defendant) from being the owner thereof.Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of


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his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretionswhich the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current becomethe property of the owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the Old Civil Code; Art. 457 ofthe New). Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streamsand the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by theRegistration Act.

We find no valid reason to review and abandon the aforecited rulings.

As the private respondents are the owners of the premises in question, no damages are recoverablefrom them.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Gancayco and Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, J., is on leave.


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Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 92161 March 18, 1991

SIMPLICIO BINALAY, PONCIANO GANNABAN, NICANOR MACUTAY, DOMINGO ROSALES,GREGORIO ARGONZA, EUSTAQUIO BAUA, FLORENTINO ROSALES, TEODOROMABBORANG, PATRICIO MABBORANG and FULGENCIO MORA, petitionersvs.GUILLERMO MANALO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Josefin De Alban Law Office for Petitioners.

FELICIANO, J .:p

The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land situated in Tumauini, Isabela having anestimated area of twenty (20) hectares. The western portion of this land bordering on the CagayanRiver has an elevation lower than that of the eastern portion which borders on the national road.Through the years, the western portion would periodically go under the waters of the Cagayan Riveras those waters swelled with the coming of the rains. The submerged portion, however, would re-appear during the dry season from January to August. It would remain under water for the rest of theyear, that is, from September to December during the rainy season.

The ownership of the landholding eventually moved from one person to another. On 9 May 1959,respondent Guillermo Manalo acquired 8.65 hectares thereof from Faustina Taccad, daughter ofJudge Juan Taccad. The land sold was described in the Deed of Absolute Sale 1as follows:

. . . a parcel of agricultural land in Balug, Tumauini, Isabela, containing an area of8.6500 hectares, more or less; bounded on the North by Francisco Forto on the Eastby National Road; on South by Julian Tumolva and on the West by Cagayan River;declared for taxation under Tax Declaration No. 12681 in the name of FaustinaTaccad, and assessed at P 750.00. . . .

Later in 1964, respondent Manalo purchased another 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba who hadearlier acquired the same from Judge Juan Taccad. The second purchase brought the total

acquisition of respondent Manalo to 10.45 hectares. The second piece of property was moreparticularly described as follows:

. . . a piece of agricultural land consisting of tobacco land, and containing an area of18,000 square meters, more or less, bounded on the North by Balug Creek; on theSouth, by Faustina Taccad (now Guillermo R. Manalo); on the East, by a ProvincialRoad; and on the West, by Cagayan River assessed at P 440.00, as tax DeclarationNo. 3152. . . . 2


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During the cadastral survey conducted at Balug, Tumauini, Isabela on 21 October 1969, the two (2)parcels of land belonging to respondent Manalo were surveyed and consolidated into one lot,designated as Lot No. 307, Pls-964. Lot 307 which contains 4.6489 hectares includes: (a) the wholeof the 1.80 hectares acquired from Gregorio Taguba; and (b) 2.8489 hectares out of the 8.65hectares purchased from Faustina Taccad. As the survey was conducted on a rainy month, a portionof the land bought from Faustina Taccad then under water was left unsurveyed and was not included

in Lot 307.

The Sketch Plan 3submitted during the trial of this case and which was identified by respondent Manaloshows that the Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point to form two (2)branchesthe western and the eastern branchesand then unites at the other end, further north, to forma narrow strip of land. The eastern branch of the river cuts through the land of respondent Manalo and isinundated with water only during the rainy season. The bed of the eastern branch is the submerged or theunsurveyed portion of the land belonging to respondent Manalo. For about eight (8) months of the yearwhen the level of water at the point where the Cagayan River forks is at its ordinary depth, river waterdoes not flow into the eastern branch. While this condition persists, the eastern bed is dry and issusceptible to cultivation.

Considering that water flowed through the eastern branch of the Cagayan River when the cadastral

survey was conducted, the elongated strip of land formed by the western and the eastern branchesof the Cagayan River looked very much like an island. This strip of land was surveyed on 12December 1969. 4It was found to have a total area of 22.7209 hectares and was designated as Lot 821and Lot 822. The area of Lot 822 is 10.8122 hectares while Lot 821 has an area of 11.9087 hectares. Lot821 is located directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated from the latter only by the eastern branch of theCagayan River during the rainy season and, during the dry season, by the exposed, dry river bed, being aportion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad. Respondent Manalo claims that Lot 821 also belongs tohim by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the property to which it is adjacent.

Petitioners who are in possession of Lot 821, upon the other hand, insist that they own Lot 821.They occupy the outer edges of Lot 821 along the river banks, i.e., the fertile portions on which theyplant tobacco and other agricultural products. They also cultivate the western strip of the unsurveyedportion during summer. 5This situation compelled respondent Manalo to file a case for forcible entryagainst petitioners on 20 May 1969. The case was dismissed by the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabelafor failure of both parties to appear. On 15 December 1972, respondent Manalo again filed a case forforcible entry against petitioners. The latter case was similarly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by theMunicipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela.

On 24 July 1974, respondent Manalo filed a complaints 6before the then Court of First Instance ofIsabela, Branch 3 for quieting of title, possession and damages against petitioners. He alleged ownershipof the two (2) parcels of land he bought separately from Faustina Taccad and Gregorio Taguba for whichreason he prayed that judgment be entered ordering petitioners to vacate the western strip of theunsurveyed portion. Respondent Manalo likewise prayed that judgment be entered declaring him asowner of Lot 821 on which he had laid his claim during the survey.

Petitioners filed their answer denying the material allegations of the complaint. The case was thenset for trial for failure of the parties to reach an amicable agreement or to enter into a stipulation offacts. 7On 10 November 1982, the trial court rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the Court renders judgmentagainst the defendants and in favor of the plaintiff and orders:


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1. That plaintiff, Guillermo Manalo, is declared the lawful owner of the land inquestion, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularlydescribed in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;

2. That the defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the land inquestion, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly

described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;

3. That the defendants are being restrained from entering the premises of the land inquestion, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularlydescribed in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint; and

4. That there is no pronouncement as to attorney's fees and costs.

SO ORDERED. 8

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court.They filed a motion for reconsideration, without success.

While petitioners insist that Lot 821 is part of an island surrounded by the two (2) branches of theCagayan River, the Court of Appeals found otherwise. The Court of Appeals concurred with thefinding of the trial court that Lot 821 cannot be considered separate and distinct from Lot 307 sincethe eastern branch of the Cagayan River substantially dries up for the most part of the year such thatwhen this happens, Lot 821 becomes physically (i.e., by land) connected with the dried up bedowned by respondent Manalo. Both courts below in effect rejected the assertion of petitioners thatthe depression on the earth's surface which separates Lot 307 and Lot 821 is, during part of theyear, the bed of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.

It is a familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great respect, and thatthey carry even more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 9This is in recognition of the

peculiar advantage on the part of the trial court of being able to observe first-hand the deportment of thewitnesses while testifying. Jurisprudence is likewise settled that the Court of Appeals is the final arbiter ofquestions of fact. 10But whether a conclusion drawn from such findings of facts is correct, is a question oflaw cognizable by this Court. 11

In the instant case, the conclusion reached by both courts below apparently collides with theirfindings that periodically at the onset of and during the rainy season, river water flows through theeastern bed of the Cagayan River. The trial court held:

The Court believes that the land in controversy is of the nature and character ofalluvion (Accretion), for it appears that during the dry season, the body of waterseparating the same land in controversy (Lot No. 821, Pls-964) and the two (2)parcels of land which the plaintiff purchased from Gregorio Taguba and Justina

Taccad Cayaba becomes a marshy land and is only six (6) inches deep and twelve(12) meters in width at its widest in the northern tip (Exhs. "W", "W-l", "W-2", "W-3"and "W-4"), It has been held by our Supreme Court that "the owner of the riparianland which receives the gradual deposits of alluvion, does not have to make anexpress act of possession. The law does not require it, and the deposit created bythe current of the water becomes manifest" (Roxas vs. Tuazon, 6 Phil. 408). 12

The Court of Appeals adhered substantially to the conclusion reached by the trial court, thus:


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As found by the trial court, the disputed property is not an island in the strict sense ofthe word since the eastern portion of the said property claimed by appellants to bepart of the Cagayan River dries up during summer. Admittedly, it is the action of theheavy rains which comes during rainy season especially from September toNovember which increases the water level of the Cagayan river. As the riverbecomes swollen due to heavy rains, the lower portion of the said strip of land

located at its southernmost point would be inundated with water. This is where thewater of the Cagayan river gains its entry. Consequently, if the water level is high thewhole strip of land would be under water.

In Government of the Philippine Islands vs.Colegio de San Jose, it was held that

According to the foregoing definition of the words "ordinary" and"extra-ordinary," the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bayduring the dry season is the ordinary one, and the highest depth theyattain during the extra-ordinary one (sic); inasmuch as the former isthe one which is regular, common, natural, which occurs always ormost of the time during the year, while the latter is uncommon,transcends the general rule, order and measure, and goes beyondthat which is the ordinary depth. If according to the definition given by

Article 74 of the Law of Waters quoted above, the natural bed orbasin of the lakes is the ground covered by their waters when at theirhighest ordinary depth, the natural bed or basin of Laguna de Bay isthe ground covered by its waters when at their highest depth duringthe dry season, that is up to the northeastern boundary of the twoparcels of land in question.

We find the foregoing ruling to be analogous to the case at bar. The highest ordinarylevel of the waters of the Cagayan River is that attained during the dry season whichis confined only on the west side of Lot [821] and Lot [822]. This is the naturalCagayan river itself. The small residual of water between Lot [821] and 307 is part of

the small stream already in existence when the whole of the late Judge JuanTaccad's property was still susceptible to cultivation and uneroded. 13

The Court is unable to agree with the Court of Appeals that Government of the Philippine Islandsvs.Colegio de San Jose 14is applicable to the present case. That case involved Laguna de Bay; sinceLaguna de Bay is a lake, the Court applied the legal provisions governing the ownership and use of lakesand their beds and shores, in order to determine the character and ownership of the disputed property.Specifically, the Court applied the definition of the natural bed or basin of lakes found in Article 74 of theLaw of Waters of 3 August 1866. Upon the other hand, what is involved in the instant case is the easternbed of the Cagayan River.

We believe and so hold that Article 70 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 is the law applicable tothe case at bar:

Art. 70. The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by itswaters during the highest floods. (Emphasis supplied)

We note that Article 70 defines the natural bed or channel of a creek or river as the groundcovered by its waters during the highestfloods. The highest floods in the eastern branch ofthe Cagayan River occur with the annual coming of the rains as the river waters in theironward course cover the entire depressed portion. Though the eastern bed substantially


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dries up for the most part of the year (i.e., from January to August), we cannot ignore theperiodical swelling of the waters ( i.e., from September to December) causing the easternbed to be covered with flowing river waters.

The conclusion of this Court that the depressed portion is a river bed rests upon evidence of record.Firstly, respondent Manalo admitted in open court that the entire area he bought from Gregorio

Taguba was included in Lot 307.15

If the 1.80 hectares purchased from Gregorio Taguba was includedin Lot 307, then the Cagayan River referred to as the western boundary in the Deed of Sale transferringthe land from Gregorio Taguba to respondent Manalo as well as the Deed of Sale signed by FaustinaTaccad, must refer to the dried up bed (during the dry months) or the eastern branch of the river (duringthe rainy months). In the Sketch Plan attached to the records of the case, Lot 307 is separated from thewestern branch of the Cagayan River by a large tract of land which includes not only Lot 821 but alsowhat this Court characterizes as the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.

Secondly, the pictures identified by respondent Manalo during his direct examination depict thedepressed portion as a river bed. The pictures, marked as Exhibits "W" to "W-4", were taken in July1973 or at a time when the eastern bed becomes visible. 16Thus, Exhibit "W-2" which according torespondent Manalo was taken facing the east and Exhibit "W-3" which was taken facing the west bothshow that the visible, dried up portion has a markedly lower elevation than Lot 307 and Lot 821. It has

dike-like slopes on both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are vertical upward and veryprominent. This topographic feature is compatible with the fact that a huge volume of water passesthrough the eastern bed regularly during the rainy season. In addition, petitioner Ponciano Gannabantestified that one had to go down what he called a "cliff" from the surveyed portion of the land ofrespondent Manalo to the depressed portion. The cliff, as related by petitioner Gannaban, has a height ofeight (8) meters. 17

The records do not show when the Cagayan River began to carve its eastern channel on the surfaceof the earth. However, Exhibit "E" 18for the prosecution which was the Declaration of Real Propertystanding in the name of Faustina Taccad indicates that the eastern bed already existed even before thesale to respondent Manalo. The words "old bed" enclosed in parenthesesperhaps written to makelegitimate the claim of private ownership over the submerged portionis an implied admission of theexistence of the river bed. In the Declaration of Real Property made by respondent Manalo, the

depressed portion assumed the name Rio Muerte de Cagayan. Indeed, the steep dike-like slopes oneither side of the eastern bed could have been formed only after a prolonged period of time.

Now, then, pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, respondent Manalo did not acquire privateownership of the bed of the eastern branch of the river even if it was included in the deeds ofabsolute sale executed by Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his favor. These vendors couldnot have validly sold land that constituted property of public dominion. Article 420 of the Civil Codestates:

The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and

bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similarcharacter;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intendedfor some public service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasissupplied)

Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, "rivers" is a composite term which includes: (1)the running waters, (2) the bed, and (3) the banks. 19Manresa, in commenting upon Article 339 of the


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Spanish Civil Code of 1889 from which Article 420 of the Philippine Civil Code was taken, stressed thepublic ownership of river beds:

La naturaleza especial de los rios, en punto a su disfrute general, hace que seanecesario considerar en su relacion de dominio algo mas que sus aguas corrientes.En efecto en todo rio es preciso distinguir1. esta agua corriente; 2. el alveo o cauce,

y 3. las riberas. Ahora bien: son estas dos ultimas cosas siempre de dominio publico,como las aguas?

Realmente no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin ribera;de suerte que al decirel Codigo civil que los rios son de dominio publico, parece que debe ir implicito eldominio publico de aquellos tres elementos que integran el rio. Por otra parte, encuanto a los alveos o cauces tenemos la declaracion del art.407, num 1, dondedice: son de dominion publico. . . los rios y sus cauces naturales; declaracion queconcuerda con lo que dispone el art.34 de la ley de [Aguas], segun el cual, son dedominion publico:1.los alveos o cauces de los arroyosque no se hallencomprendidos en el art. 33, y 2. los alveos o cauces naturales de los rios en laextension que cubran sus aguas en las mayores crecidas ordinarias. 20(Emphasissupplied)

The claim of ownership of respondent Manalo over the submerged portion is bereft of basis even if itwere alleged and proved that the Cagayan River first began to encroach on his property after thepurchase from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad. Article 462 of the Civil Code would then applydivesting, by operation of law, respondent Manalo of private ownership over the new river bed. Theintrusion of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River into his landholding obviously prejudicedrespondent Manalo but this is a common occurrence since estates bordering on rivers are exposedto floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters. That loss is compensatedby,inter alia, the right of accretion acknowledged by Article 457 of the Civil Code. 21It so happenedthat instead of increasing the size of Lot 307, the eastern branch of the Cagayan River had carved achannel on it.

We turn next to the issue of accretion. After examining the records of the case, the Court considersthat there was no evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307 and the bed of theeastern branch of the river. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the CivilCode requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a) that the deposition of soil or sediment begradual and imperceptible; (b) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and(c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the seacoast). 22The Court notes that the parcels of land bought by respondent Manalo border on the easternbranch of the Cagayan River. Any accretion formed by this eastern branch which respondent Manalo mayclaim must be deposited on or attached to Lot 307. As it is, the claimed accretion (Lot 821) lies on thebank of the rivernot adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot 307 across the river.

Assuming (arguendoonly) that the Cagayan River referred to in the Deeds of Sale transferringownership of the land to respondent Manalo is the western branch, the decision of the Court of

Appeals and of the trial court are bare of factual findings to the effect that the land purchased byrespondent Manalo received alluvium from the action of the aver in a slow and gradual manner. Onthe contrary, the decision of the lower court made mention of several floods that caused the land toreappear making it susceptible to cultivation. A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding ishardly the alluvial process contemplated under Article 457 of the Civil Code. It is the slow and hardlyperceptible accumulation of soil deposits that the law grants to the riparian owner.

Besides, it is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares. Lot 821 is the northernportion of the strip of land having a total area of 22.72 hectares. We find it difficult to suppose that


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such a sizable area as Lot 821 resulted from slow accretion to another lot of almost equal size. Thetotal landholding purchased by respondent Manalo is 10.45 hectares (8.65 hectares from FaustinaTaccad and 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba in 1959 and 1964, respectively), in fact evensmaller than Lot 821 which he claims by way of accretion. The cadastral survey showing that Lot821 has an area of 11.91 hectares was conducted in 1969. If respondent Manalo's contention wereaccepted, it would mean that in a span of only ten (10) years, he had more than doubled his

landholding by what the Court of Appeals and the trial court considered as accretion. As alreadynoted, there are steep vertical dike-like slopes separating the depressed portion or river bed and Lot821 and Lot 307. This topography of the land, among other things, precludes a reasonableconclusion that Lot 821 is an increment to the depressed portion by reason of the slow and constantaction of the waters of either the western or the eastern branches of the Cagayan River.

We turn finally to the issue of ownership of Lot 821. Respondent Manalo's claim over Lot 821 restson accretion coupled with alleged prior possession. He alleged that the parcels of land he boughtseparately from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad were formerly owned by Judge Juan Taccadwho was in possession thereof through his (Judge Taccad's) tenants. When ownership wastransferred to him, respondent Manalo took over the cultivation of the property and had it declaredfor taxation purposes in his name. When petitioners forcibly entered into his property, he twiceinstituted the appropriate action before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela. Againstrespondent Manalo's allegation of prior possession, petitioners presented tax declarations standingin their respective names. They claimed lawful, peaceful and adverse possession of Lot 821 since1955.

If respondent Manalo had proved prior possession, it was limited physically to Lot 307 and thedepressed portion or the eastern river bed. The testimony of Dominga Malana who was a tenant forJustina Taccad did not indicate that she was also cultivating Lot 821. In fact, the complaints forforcible entry lodged before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela pertained only to Lot 307and the depressed portion or river bed and not to Lot 821. In the same manner, the tax declarationspresented by petitioners conflict with those of respondent Manalo. Under Article 477 of the CivilCode, the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title must at least have equitable title to or interest in thereal property which is the subject matter of the action. The evidence of record on this point is less

than satisfactory and the Court feels compelled to refrain from determining the ownership andpossession of Lot 821, adjudging neither petitioners nor respondent Manalo as owner(s) thereof.

WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 04892 arehereby SET ASIDE. Respondent Manalo is hereby declared the owner of Lot 307. The regularlysubmerged portion or the eastern bed of the Cagayan River is hereby DECLARED to be property ofpublic dominion. The ownership of Lot 821 shall be determined in an appropriate action that may beinstituted by the interested partiesinter se. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.


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Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 95907 April 8, 1992

JOSE REYNANTE, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. VALENTIN CRUZ, as Presiding Judge,Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch VIII, and the HEIRS OF LEONCIO CARLOS andDOLORES A. CARLOS, and HEIRS OF GORGONIO CARLOS and CONCEPCIONCARLOS, respondents.

PARAS, J .:

This is a petition for review on certiorariwhich seeks the reversal of: a) decision 1of the Court ofAppeals dated February 28, 1990 in CA-G.R. No. 1917 entitled "JOSE REYNANTE versus HON.VALENTIN CRUZ, Judge, RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, and HEIRS OF LEONCIO AND DOLORESCARLOS, et al.", affirming the decision 2of the Regional Trial Courtof Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 8, Third Judicial Region which reversed the decision 3of the Municipal TrialCourt of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch 1, Third Judicial Region in Civil Case No. 1526 entitled "HEIRSOF LEONCIO CARLOS & DOLORES A. CARLOS and HEIRS OF GORGONIO A. CARLOS &CONCEPCION CARLOS versus JOSE REYNANTE: and b) the resolution denying the motion forreconsideration.

The facts as culled from the records of the case are as follows:

More than 50 years ago, petitioner Jose Reynante was taken as tenant by the late Don CosmeCarlos, owner and father-in-law of herein private respondents, over a fishpond located at BarrioLiputan, Meycauayan, Bulacan with an area of 188.711 square meters, more or less and covered byTransfer Certificate of Title No. 25618, Land Registry of Bulacan.

During the tenancy, petitioner Jose Reynante constructed a nipa hut where he and his family livedand took care of the nipa palms (sasahan) he had planted on lots 1 and 2 covering an area of 5,096square meters and 6,011 square meters respectively. These lots are located between the fishpondcovered by TCT No. 25618 and the Liputan (formerly Meycauayan) River. Petitioner harvested andsold said nipa palms without interference and prohibition from anybody. Neither did the late Don

Cosme Carlos question his right to plant the nipa palms near the fishpond or to harvest andappropriate them as his own.

After the death of Don Cosme Carlos, his heirs (private respondents' predecessors-in-interest)entered into a written agreement denominated as "SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NG PAGSASAULING KARAPATAN" dated November 29, 1984 with petitioner Jose Reynante whereby the latter forand in consideration of the sum of P200,000.00 turned over the fishpond he was tenanting to theheirs of Don Cosme Carlos and surrendered all his rights therein as caretaker or "bantay-kasama attagapamahala" (Rollo, p. 77).


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Pursuant to the said written agreement, petitioner surrendered the fishpond and the two huts locatedtherein to private respondents. Private respondents thereafter leased the said fishpond to one Carlosde la Cruz. Petitioner continued to live in the nipa hut constructed by him on lots 1 and 2 and to takecare of the nipa palms he had planted therein.

On February 17, 1988, private respondents formally demanded that the petitioner vacate said

portion since according to them petitioner had already been indemnified for the surrender of hisrights as a tenant. Despite receipt thereof, petitioner refused and failed to relinquish possession oflots 1 and 2.

Hence, on April 22, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint for forcible entry with preliminarymandatory injunction against petitioner alleging that the latter by means of strategy and stealth, tookover the physical, actual and material possession of lots 1 and 2 by residing in one of the kubosorhuts bordering the Liputan River and cutting off and/or disposing of the sasaor nipa palms adjacentthereto.

On January 10, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint and finding thatpetitioner had been in prior possession of lots 1

and 2.

Private respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court and on August 8, 1989 it rendered itsdecision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and againstdefendant and hereby reverses the decision of the Court a quo. Accordingly, thedefendant is ordered to restore possession of that piece of land particularly describedand defined as Lots 1 & 2 of the land survey conducted by Geodetic EngineerRestituto Buan on March 2, 1983, together with the sasaor nipa palms plantedthereon. No pronouncement as to attorney's fees. Each party shall bear theirrespective costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 55; Decision, p. 4).

From said decision, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review (Rollo, p. 30;Annex "A"). On February 28, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portionof which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo, being consistent with law andjurisprudence, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. The instant petition seeking to issue arestraining order is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30; Decision, p. 3).

On November 5, 1990, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner(Rollo, p. 35; Annex "B").

Hence, this petition.

In its resolution dated May 6, 1991, the Second Division of this court gave due course to the petitionand required both parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 93).


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The main issues to be resolved in this case are: a) who between the petitioner and privaterespondents has prior physical possession of lots 1 and 2; and b) whether or not the disputed lotsbelong to private respondents as a result of accretion.

An action for forcible entry is merely a quieting process and actual title to the property is neverdetermined. A party who can provepriorpossession can recover such possession even against the

owner himself. Whatever may be the character of hispriorpossession, if he has in his favor priorityin time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by aperson having a better right by accion publicianaoraccion reivindicatoria(German Management &Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76216, September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 495, 498, 499).On the other hand, if a plaintiff cannot prove prior physical possession, he has no right of action forforcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of the property (Lizo v. Carandang, 73Phil. 469 [1942]).

Hence, the Court of Appeals could not legally restore private respondents' possession over lots 1and 2 simply because petitioner has clearly proven that he hadpriorpossession over lots 1 and 2.

The evidence on record shows that petitioner was in possession of the questioned lots for more than

50 years. It is undisputed that he was the caretaker of the fishpond owned by the late Don CosmeCarlos for more than 50 years and that he constructed a nipa hut adjacent to the fishpond andplanted nipa palms therein. This fact is bolstered by the "SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY" executed byEpifanio Lucero (Records, p. 66), Apolonio D. Morte (Records, p. 101) and Carling Dumalay(Records, p. 103), all of whom are disinterested parties with no motive to falsify that can beattributed to them, except their desire to tell the truth.

Moreover, an ocular inspection was conducted by the trial court dated December 2, 1988 which wasattended by the parties and their respective counsels and the court observed the following:

The Court viewed the location and the distance of the constructed nipa hut and thesubject "sasahan" which appears exists (sic) long ago, planted and stands (sic)adjacent to the fishpond and the dikes which serves (sic) as passage way of water

river of lot 1 and lot 2. During the course of the hearing, both counsel observedmuniment of title embedded on the ground which is located at the inner side of the"pilapil" separating the fishpond from the subject "sasa" plant with a height of 20 to25 feet from water level and during the ocular inspection it was judicially observedthat the controversial premises is beyond the titled property of the plaintiffs butsituated along the Liputan, Meycauayan River it being a part of the public domain.(Rollo, p. 51; Decision, p. 12).

On the other hand, private respondents based their claim of possession over lots 1 and 2 simply onthe written agreement signed by petitioner whereby the latter surrendered his rights over thefishpond.

Evidently, the trial court did not err when it ruled that:

An examination of the document signed by the defendant (Exhibit "B"), shows thatwhat was surrendered to the plaintiffs was the fishpond and not the "sasahan" or theland on which he constructed his hut where he now lives. That is a completelydifferent agreement in which a tenant would return a farm or a fishpond to hislandlord in return for the amount that the landlord would pay to him as a disturbancecompensation. There is nothing that indicates that the tenant was giving othermatters not mentioned in a document like Exhibit "B". Moreover, when the plaintiffs


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leased the fishpond to Mr. Carlos de La Cruz there was no mention that the leaseincluded the hut constructed by the defendant and the nipa palms planted by him(Exhibit "1"), a circumstance that gives the impression that the nipa hut and the nipapalms were not included in the lease to Mr. de la Cruz, which may not belong to theplaintiffs. (Rollo, p. 49; Decision, p. 9).

With regard to the second issue, it must be noted that the disputed lots involved in this caseare not included in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25618 as per verification made by the ForestManagement Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources. That tract of land situatedat Barrio Liputan, Meycauayan, Bulacan containing an area of 1.1107 hectares as described in theplan prepared and surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Restituto Buan for Jose Reynante falls within

Alienable and Disposable Land (for fishpond development) under Project No. 15 per B.F.L.C. MapNo. 3122 dated May 8, 1987 (Rollo, p. 31; Decision, p. 2).

The respondent Court of Appeals ruled that lots 1 and 2 were created by alluvial formation andhence the property of private respondents pursuant to Article 457 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion

which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit begradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (c) thatthe land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. L-61647, October 12, 1984, 132 SCRA 514, cited in Agustin v. Intermediate AppellateCourt, G.R. Nos. 66075-76, July 5, 1990, 187 SCRA 218).

Granting without conceding that lots 1 and 2 were created by alluvial formation and while it is truethat accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current becomethe property of the owner of the banks, such accretion to registered land does not precludeacquisition of the additional area by another person through prescription.

This Court ruled in the case of Ignacio Grande, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al. , G.R. No. L-17652, June 30, 1962, 115 Phil. 521 that:

An accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lotwhich receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece ofland is one thing; registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another.Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed bythe Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land isprovided in the registration law.Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Act does not vest or give titleto the land, but merely confirms and, thereafter, protects the title already possessedby the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtainthis protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws,

wherein certain judicial procedures have beenprovided.

Assuming private respondents had acquired the alluvial deposit (the lot in question), by accretion,still their failure to register said accretion for a period of fifty (50) years subjected said accretion toacquisition through prescription by third persons.

It is undisputed that petitioner has been in possession of the subject lots for more than fifty (50)years and unless private respondents can show a better title over the subject lots, petitioner'spossession over the property must be respected.


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PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated February 28,1990 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan,Bulacan, Branch I, is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.


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Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 95748 November 21, 1996

ANASTACIA VDA. DE AVILES, ET AL., petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and CAMILO AVILES, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J .:

Is the special civil action of Quieting of Title under Rule 64 the proper remedy for settling a boundarydispute? Did the respondent Court 1commit a reversible error when it did not declare the respectiverights of the parties over the disputed property in said action?

These are the key issues raised in this petition to review on certiorarithe Decision 2of the respondentCourt promulgated on September 28, 1990 in CA-G.R. CV No. 18155, which affirmed the decision datedDecember 29, 1987 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, 3Lingayen, Pangasinan, dismissing acomplaint for quieting of title.

The Facts

In an action for quieting of title commenced before the aforementioned trial court, the following facts,

"stripped of unnecessary verbiage", were established by the respondent Court:4

PLAINTIFFS aver that they are the actual possessors of a parcel of land situated inMalawa, Lingayen, Pangasinan, more particularly described as fishpond, cogonal,unirrigated rice and residential land, bounded on the N by Camilo Aviles; on the E byMalawa River, on the S by Anastacio Aviles and on the W by Juana and ApolonioJoaquin, with an area of 18,900 square meters and declared under Tax DeclarationNo. 31446. This property is the share of their father, Eduardo Aviles and brother ofthe defendant, in the estate of their deceased parents, Ireneo Aviles and AnastaciaSalazar.

SINCE 1957, Eduardo Aviles was in actual possession of the afore-described

property. In fact, the latter mortgaged the same with the Rural Bank and PhilippineNational Bank branch in Lingayen. When the property was inspected by a bankrepresentative, Eduardo Aviles, in the presence of the boundary owners, namely,defendant Camilo Aviles, Anastacio Aviles and Juana and Apolonio Joaquin(,)pointed to the inspector the existing earthen dikes as the boundary limits of theproperty and nobody objected. When the real estate mortgage was foreclosed, theproperty was sold at public auction but this was redeemed by plaintiffs' mother andthe land was subsequently transferred and declared in her name.


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ON March 23, 1983, defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over thenorthern portion of the property with an area of approximately 1,200 square metersby constructing a bamboo fence (thereon) and moving the earthen dikes, therebymolesting and disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said portion.

UPON the other hand, defendant Camilo Aviles admitted the agreement of partition

(Exh. "1") executed by him and his brothers, Anastacio and Eduardo. In accordancetherewith, the total area of the property of their parents which they divided is 46,795square meters and the area alloted (sic) to Eduardo Aviles is 16,111 square metersmore or less, to Anastacio Aviles is 16,214 square meters more or less, while thearea alloted to defendant Camilo Aviles is 14,470 square meters more or less. Therespective area(s) alloted to them was agreed and measured before the execution ofthe agreement but he was not present when the measurement was made. Defendantagreed to have a smaller area because his brother Eduardo asked him that hewanted a bigger share because he has several children to support. The portion inlitigation however is part of the share given to him in the agreement of partition. Atpresent, he is only occupying an area of 12,686 square meters which is smaller thanhis actual share of 14,470 square meters. Tax Declarations Nos. 23575, 481 and 379covering his property from 1958 (Exhs. "7", "8" and "9") show that the area of hisproperty is 14,470 square meters. The riceland portion of his land is 13,290 squaremeters, the fishpond portion is 500 square meters and the residential portion is 680square meters, or a total of 14,470 square meters. That the topography of his land isnot the same, hence, the height of his pilapils are likewise not the same.

In its decision dated December 29, 1987, the trial court disposed of the case thus: 5

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Ordering the parties to employ the services of a Land Surveyor of the Bureau ofLands, Region I, San Fernando, La Union, to relocate and determine the extent andthe boundary limit of the land of the defendant on its southern side in order that the

fourteen thousand four hundred seventy (14,470) square meters which is the actualarea given to the defendant be determined;

2. Ordering the complaint dismissed for lack of basis and merits;

3. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendant the sum of two thousand (P2,000.00)pesos as attorney's fees and to further pay the costs of the proceedings;

4. All other claims are denied for lack of basis.

Dissatisfied with the trial court's decision, petitioners appealed to the respondent appellate Court. Inits now-assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part the decision of the trial court,

reasoning that a special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling aboundary dispute, and that petitioners should have instituted an ejectment suit instead. Thedispositive portion of the impugned Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision dated December 29, 1987dismissing the complaint is hereby AFFIRMED but without necessarily agreeing withthe ration d'etre (sic) proferred by the Court a quo. The portion thereof ordering theparties to employ the service of a land surveyor to relocate and determine the extentand boundary limit of the land of the defendant on its southern portion in order that


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the fourteen thousand four hundred seventy (14,470) square meters which is theactual area given to the defendant be determined is hereby REVERSED and SET

ASIDE. Costs against plaintiffs-appellants.

The Issues

Disagreeing with the respondent Court, petitioners now raise the following issues: 6

a. Whether or not the Hon. Court of Appeals is correct when it opined that the . . .complaint for quieting of title instituted by the petitioners against private respondentbefore the court a quois not the proper remedy but rather, it should be a case foreejectment (sic).

b. Whether or not the Hon. Court of Appeals is correct in rendering a decision, nowsubject of the instant petition, without fully determining the respective rights of theherein parties.

Petitioners deem to be "without basis" the respondent Court's holding that quieting of title is not the

proper remedy in the case a quo. They assert that private respondent is occupying the disputed lotbecause he claimed it to be part of his share in the partitioned property of his parents, whereaspetitioners are claiming the said lot as part and parcel of the land allotted to Eduardo Aviles,petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. They contend that they have been occupying the aforesaid landas heirs of Eduardo Aviles in "open, actual, continuous, peaceful, public and adversed (sic)(possession) against the whole world." Further, they argue that, if indeed the disputed lot belongedto private respondent, why then did it take him "almost 26 long years from June 27, 1957 or untilMarch 27, 1983" to assert his ownership; why did he not "assert his ownership" over the propertywhen Eduardo Aviles was still alive; and why did he not take any "action" when the mortgage overthe disputed property was foreclosed? 7

Private respondent corrects the petitioners' claim in regard to the date when he had the bamboofence constructed. He alleges that the petitioners maliciously concocted the story that privaterespondent had purportedly encroached some 1,200 meters on their property when, in fact, "he wasmerely repairing the old bamboo fence existing where it had always been since 1957." 8

The Court's Ruling

First Issue:Quieting of Title Not Proper RemedyFor Settling Boundary Dispute

We agree with respondent Court. The facts presented unmistakably constitute a clear case ofboundary dispute, which is not cognizable in a special civil action to quiet title.

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertaintywith respect to title to real property. 9

The Civil Code authorizes the said remedy in the following language:

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, byreason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which isapparently valid or effective but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or


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unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought toremove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon a title to realproperty or any interest therein.

In fine, to avail of the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that there is an instrument,record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question orshadow upon the owner's title to or interest in real property. Thus, petitioners have whollymisapprehended the import of the foregoing rule by claiming that respondent Court erred in holdingthat there was "no . . . evidence of any muniment of title, proceeding, written contract, . . .", and thatthere were, as a matter of fact, twosuch contracts, viz., (i) the Agreement of Partition executed byprivate respondent and his brothers (including the petitioners' father and predecessor-in-interest), inwhich their respective shares in the inherited property were agreed upon, and (ii) the Deed of Saleevidencing the redemption by petitioner Anastacia Vda. de Aviles of the subject property in aforeclosure sale. However, these documents in no way constitute a cloud or cast a doubt upon thetitle of petitioners. Rather, the uncertainty arises from the parties' failure to situate and fix theboundary between their respective properties.

As correctly held by the respondent Court, "(i)n fact, both plaintiffs and defendant admitted theexistence of the agreement of partition dated June 8, 1957 and in accordance therewith, a fixed areawas allotted (sic) to them and that the only controversy is whether these lands were properlymeasured. There is no adverse claim by the defendant "which is apparently valid, but is, in truth andin fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable" and which constitutes a cloud thereon.

Corollarily, and equally as clear, the construction of the bamboo fence enclosing the disputedproperty and the moving of earthen dikes are not the "clouds" or "doubts" which can be removed inan action for quieting of title.

An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a boundarydispute. The precedent on this matter cited by the respondent Court in its Decision is herewith

reproduced in full: 10

In Ashurst v. McKenzie (1890) 92 Ala. 484, 9 So. 262, where the complainants'predecessor in title and the defendant had, during their occupancy, destroyed andobliterated the boundary line between their adjoining tracts of land, and there wasnow a dispute as to its location, it was held that a bill did not lie to remove a cloud onthe complainants' title. The court said: "There is no allegation or evidence of anymuniment of title, proceeding, written contract, or paper showing any color of title inthe defendant, which could cast a shadow on the title of complainants to any part ofthe land; there is no overlapping of description in the muniments held by either. Theland of complainants and defendant join. The line which separates them is in disputeand is to be determined by evidence aliunde. Each admits that the other has title up

to his line wherever it may be, and the title papers of neither fix its preciselocation. So that there is no paper the existence of which clouds the title of either

party, and nothing could be delivered up and canceled under the decree of the courtundertaking to remove a cloud.

Another similarly instructive precedent reported in the same reference is also quoted below:

In Kilgannon v. Jenkinson (1883) 51 Mich. 240, 16 N.W. 390, the court, dismissing abill to quiet title, said: "The fundamental dispute is about the correct position of the


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line between lots 3 and 7. The case is not one where a complainant in possession ofa specific piece of land, and a defendant out of possession, but claiming some rightor title, are contending as to which one has the better right to that sameparcel; but itis a case where the titles are not opposed, and the basis and existence of all rightand claim depend simply upon where the original line runs. When that is oncesettled, there can remain no semblance of claim or cloud to be passed on , and the

issue on that particular question is one regularly triable at law. . .11

Second Issue:Should Partie's Rights Have Been Declared?

Petitioners also chide the respondent Court (and the trial court) for not declaring the respective rightsof the parties with respect to the land in question, arguing that "when one is disturbed in any form inhis rights of property over an immovable by the unfounded claims of others, he has the right to askfrom the competent courts: . . . that their respective rights be determined . . . ". As support for theirthesis, petitioners cite the ancient case of Bautista vs.Exconde. 12

Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, dealing with actions for declaratory relief, specifies in Section 1

thereof the grounds, conditions precedent or requisites for bringing such petitions.

13

This Court haspreviously held that

Under this rule, only a person who is interested "under a deed, will, contract or otherwritten instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, maybring an action to determine any question of construction or validity arising under theinstrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder." Thismeans that the subject matter must refer to a deed, will, contract or other writteninstrument, or to a statute or ordinance, to warrant

Property Cases 12-13

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