or nearh' thirq, years during the ColdW-ar. the Foreign Office,s InformationResearch Department (lRD) waged a

\'lgorous co\-ert propaganda campaignaqainsr Comnunism across the world usingjournalists, politicians, academics and trade

unionists. Famous names like GeorgeOmell, Denis Healey, Stephen Spender,Bertland Russell and Guy Burgess helped orbacked the work of IRD.

Set up under the Labour Government in19,18 and clandestinely financed from theSecret Intelligence Service budget, IRD was

a large organization with close links to MI6- with which it shared many personnel.Parliament, had it known of the truepurpose of IRD's existence, may well have

rejected an anti-Con.mlunist propaganda

offensive, but it was simply not informed.Using a vast array of techniques to

in0uencc world and domestic opinion.IRD's activities mirrored and

complemented similar CIA covertpropaganda operations. Its influenceextended across the world and took innewspapers, magazines, news agencies, bookpublishing, academia and radio stations.

IRD also influenced the BBC's and

Reuterr' output of news stories.

Here for the first time are the 'spin

doctors', 'rebuttal units' and 'lobbyists' thatforged new ways of manipulating the medialong before New Labour came to power.

Using the old-boy netlvork IRD placed

rts people in many parts of the British mediaand academic world. On the home frontIRD was deeply involved in British politics,where it sought to bolster anti-Communistsagainst those less enthusiastic for the ColdWar. the Atlantic Alliance and nucleardeterrence. Internationally it conductedoperations in the Middle and Far East and inthe Commonwealth together with specific

campaigns in Greece, Malaya, against Nasser

during the Suez Crisis and Sukarno inIndonesia.

Britain\ Setret Propaganda War is the firstbook to be rvritten about IRD and makes

some irnportant revelations aboutgovernment-sponsored Cold Warpropaganda. During the course of thei.r

research the authors have consulted

.ot1ti nile (1 on b ack Jlap

d2s.00

continued from front Jlap

documentary material in both public andprivate archives and have interviewed a

substantial number of those who took part.They reveal how some journalists movedeflortlessly berween MI6, IRD and nationalnewspapers. There is also evidence of IRD'shidden hand in domestic British politics,undermining the left and assisting Britain'sentry into the Common Market. In theirconclusion the authors discuss the impact ofIRD, both domestica\ and internationally,and raise significant questions about themorality of covert propaganda in a democracy.

PAUL LASHMAR is an award winninginvestigative journalist, currently with theIndependent, formerly with the Obseruer and'World in Action'. He began his career injournalism through a story revealing theexistence of IRD (the Obseruer,Jarutary 1978).Paul produced several BBC 'Timewatch'documentary programmes and is the author ofSpy Flighx oJ the Cold War (Srtton Publishing1996). He is married and lives in London.

JAMES OLIVER is a historian, freelancetelevision researcher and journalist. He has

worked on a number of invesrigarions, currentaffairs and historical programmes for Channel 4

tlevision and the BBC. In 1995 he was

awarded an MA with distinction in the Historyof Propaganda by the Universiry of Kenr atCanterbury. He lives in London.

Ako auailable froffi Sutton Publishing

SPY FLIGHTS OF THE COLD WARPaul Lashmar2 40pp, illustrated, hardbackISBN 0 7509 1970 1

SUTTON PUBLISHING LIMITEDPHOENIX MILL . STROUD . GLOUCESTERSHIRI

Printed in Great Britain

lsBN 0-7509-1668-0

l|[l[[ilJllilffi[[Lll

BTTnIN,S

SECMPnoPAGANDA

R

BTTnIN,S

SECMPRoPAGANDA

RPawl Lashmar t James Oliuer

First published in the United Kingdom in 199g bySutton Publishing Limited . phoenlx MillThrupp .Stroud. Gioucestershire . GL5 2BU

Copyright O Paul Lashmar andJames Oliver, 199g

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrievalsystem, or transmitred, in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical,photocopving, recording or otheru,ise. without the prior permission of the publisherand copvright holders.

Paul Lashmar and James oliver have asserted the moral right to be identified as theauthors of this work.

British Library Cataloguing in publication DataA catalogue record for this book is availabie from the British Library

ISBN 0 7509 166s ^

'-3 t-.*i rLt

AIAN SUTToNTM and SUTToNTM are thetrade marks of Sutton publishing Limited@"

Typeset in 10/12pt BemboTypesetting and origination bySutton Publishing LimitedPrinted in Great Britain byMPG, Bodmin, Comwall.

A)aJ.Vw

ContentsList of Plates

AbbreviationsAcknowledgements

Introduction

1. Indonesia: Prelude to Slaughter

2. 'Lies and Treachery,: the Ongins of IRD

3. Origins of the Cold War

4. A Crusade Begins

5. Korea: a Hot'W'ar in a Coid War

6. Offensive: into the 1950s

7. Nothing but the Truth: IRD and the BBC

tt. The Medium is the Message: IRD ancl MI6

9. Agencies of Change: the News Agency Nenvork

10. Imperial Adventures: IRD and the Colonies

11. Spreading the Word: IRD publishes

12. Internai Affairs: IRD,s Domestic Campaigns

13. IRD's Fellow Travellers

v11

ixxi

xiii

1

11

21

29

39

49

57

67

77

83

95

105

t17

CONTENTS

14. A Mirror Image: the CIA

15. The Fat Years: the 1960s

16. Indian Summer: IRD and the EEC

17. Painting it Red: IRD and Northern Ireland

18. The Fall

Conclusions

AppendixNotesBibliographyIndex

125

137

145

153

163

175

179

187

209215

List of PlatesBetween pages 112 and 113

1. Christopher Mayhew2. John Cloake, early recruit to IRD3. Norman Reddaway, one of IRD's most influential figures4. Lenin and Stalin5. 'Winston Churchiil6. Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker, SOE veteran7 " Kim Il Sung8. Michael Ivens, head of Aims of Industry9. John Horner, Fire Brigades lJnion

10. Nikita Khrushchev11. President Sukarno12. Gen Soeharto

13. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan14. Foreign Secretary David O-nven

15. Hilary'W. King, former Ambassador to Guinea16. Roland Challis, BBC correspondent

AbbreuiationsArnerican f-onrrniitce on UnitedEurope.\rrr.,lg rr,r.,ic,l l-.riJrJ... frnL L nrorlCvprot C)onrnrunist PrnrArub Nes s Aqenevljritish I riornration Sen,ices

lnclonesirn Irrtclli gence .t*encvCon[ress for Culturrl Freedorr(louncil tbr Fore isn RelatiorsCentrrl lntelliqence Agencv(ianrpainu lor Nuclear DisarmamentCcnurl C)fllce of Inlbmrarion(.,\lirtrunt\( l,.rrr' ul (,r,.rr IlrirnirrConftrcnce on Securin, rrrd(loopentiorr in Ilurope.Ecor:orrric and Soi:ial Courrcil (UN)tttropean L.,r11q'1.11.' ( unrllltliqElectrl I-{ouse

I ur.,1,.rn Lr'rgLr,,li,r I conorrrr.( )oopcrations

Naticxral orqrnizirtion oiCvpriot fightenEiectncal Trrdes UnionFire Brigrdes UirrouForcisn rnd L--onrmorrrvealth O{liceFreld Iv{arshrl

Foreisn L)iilceForurn World Fcatures(,,,1'q16111qn1 (,)ilIllUOtaitlOnr

Heaclqtiarters' firistav Siegliied IJins'Hr-r Majestl's Gor.e nnrentInternafionai Federatiort rtt'TradesUniolsInternational Neri,s Rights andRovaltiesInfbmiation Policl l)eparmrentIrish l1epublicm ArnrvInlonnaiion Il-e-.errch l)enartnrent

ISCKOSTRAI)LSE

NlCP\1ENA\4EIiINlI5MI6MIRMOIA4PAJA

NAFENNASAKOM

N1]CNCLNGOl\-tC.RA

NUMOIDOSS

IJKIPOLAI)

POWPPS

PWERFERtASRIORLRNSROKRSIASEA

SEATO

ACUE

.{}.u,\KL,I-,\NABIS

BPIC(]FCFRCIA(--Nl)(,OICPGU(-SCE

ECOSOCEECEHELE(]

EOKAETLJ

FI]UF(]OFl\4

Fa)

FWF(;CHQ

C;SI

I-IMC}

IFTU

INRAR

iPl)IRAIlli)

lnstitute tbr the Study of ConflictIndonesian Arrny's Strategic RescrveLonCorr School of Econornic:\lalrvan Conununist ParrvN{rddle Eest Nervs Asencr.Nlinistn' oiEcononric WarfareN1llitan Intelhgence (Stare Securiqr)Milirarl Intelligence (Espionage)a rcsearch branch of the War Ot1iceMinistrv of IntomationMalavan People's Anti-Japanese AmryNear and Far East Nervs LtdUni.ed ideologrc. oi lndor:esir:natiorrali.nt. rcligron :nd CotmunisrrrN:tional Broadcasting CompanvNon-Communist LeltNorr.Sot r.nrnicntal organizarionNorthern Ireland Civil RightsAssociation

National Union of Mineu'orkers()verseas Information DepartmentO{Ece of Special Senices (USA)Indonesian Communist Parn.Political advrser to the Conrmander-in-Chiet. Far East

Prisoner of WarI'olicy Planning StaffPolitical Warfare ExecLltiveRadio Free EuropeR,rJro in rh,.Antericrn SctrorRegional Infomation OtlicerRadio LibertyResional News Sen'iceRepubJic of KoreaRoval Societv of lntemational Afi:lairsSouth-East AsiaSouth-East Asian TrearyC)rganizations

ABB]\EVIATIONS

SHATF

SIS

SO1

SOE

SS

SSCA,l

TASS

TUC

Suprerne Headquarters AlliedExpeditionaru ForceSecret Inrelligence Seruice (MI6)Special Operation (1)

Specral Operations ExecutiveSr/; r r t:,, arfi,1

Socretr- oi Socialist Clergl ancllvlinisrers

Soviet neu's sen rce

Trades Union Congress

United NationsUnited Nations Commission for theljnification and Rehabilitation ofKoreaUnited Nations Educational,S.icnrifi c and Cuirurul OrganizrtionUnircd Srates Intomation ScruicesVoice of ArnericaWorld Feature Senices\1 orld Fcderarion oil rade Unions

UNUNCURK

UNESCO

USIS

VOAWFS\\'FTU

AJ-".""

AcknowledgementsThis book couid never have happened without the help of Richard Fletcher. His workon IRD was the inspiration, and -"vithout his voluminous files there would have been nobook.

In addition we should like to thank Richard Ardrich, Nick Anning, Brian Brivati,Duncan campbell, Susan L. carruthers. Marv carson, David Chipp, Mark curtis,Phillip Deery, Steve Dorrill, Gen Sir Anthony Farrar-Hock1.y, errii Kelry, DianneKirby, David Leigh, Scott Lucas, Tom Mccarthy, Katherine Murray, Greg Neale,Michael Nelson, Richard Norton Taylor, Richard oliver, Hugh o,Shaughnessy,Robin Ramsay, Gary l). Rarvnsley, Andrew Roth, John Savile, Ralesh Sharma, TonyShaw, Sue Stew'ard, Andy weir, Hugh wilford, and the many others who assisted us inone wav or another.

In the United States, thanks go to Scott Armstrong, John Jenks, Kathy Kadane, RalphMcGhee and Lou Woif

We also appreciated those who gave us time for interviews on the record, includingSir Richard tsody, Roland challis, John cloake, Brian crozier, col Dodds-parker,Fred Emery, Michael Ivens, Hugh Lunghi, Lord Mayhew, Lord Owen, NormanReddarvay, Geoffrey Tucker, Hunrer 'wade, colin wariace, J.H.A. watson, Fayweldon, Ernest 'wistrich,

Sir oliver wright, and those former members of the IRDwho gave us oIl-the-record interviews.

We should aiso like to thank phillip Whitehead of Brook-Lapping.

IntroductionIn early 1972, kichatd Fletcher noticed an odd advertisement in the Guarilianthat raisedhis suspicions. Fietcher, a long-standing Labour party activist and occasionalinvestigative journalist, 'uvas e,gaged at the time in a major inquiry for the sunday Timesinto the cIA's (central I,teliigence Agency) subversion of the British Labour\'lovement. This inquiry revealed that the CIA had extensively funded Britishpoliticians and trade unionists of a 'rnoderate' and anti-communist stance and hadheiped overthrow leftist leaders in British dependencies. Flercher's research had alsorevealed that the CIA had covertly funded anti-Communist publishing. The Cuardianadvert, Fletcher had noticed, was for a bibliography, Bool<s oi communisla, written byone R.N. carew Hunt of St Antony's college, oxford. Fletcher was well aware of StAntony's close links with US and British intelligence. .I also knew that it was nottinancially viable to publish books on such a boring subject as Comrnunism. I suspectedrhe book rvas subsidized in some way,, he said.

As part of their cIA investigation, one of Fletcher's teamwent to companies Houseand checked out the accounrs of the book's obscure publisher, Ampersand Ltd. Theseshowed that the company had been set up in 1946 by one Leslie sh..idr.r, .a pubricrelations consultant'. on the surface, everything indicated an ordinary small publishinghouse, but the accounts had some odd features. There appeared to be little businessactiviry - the company had few expenses in the way of posiage or telephone calls. Moresrgnificantly, it seemed to make negrigrbre profit from ,d.r.

-cortr, ho*.rr.r, were mer

exactly by an unidentified donor. 'It looked to me as though ir was another cIApublishing front,' said Fletcher. He put any further investigai-ion on the backbumerrIhile he concentrated on other stories. It was not urrt1l 1976 that events led him to look.rr Ampersand again.

In London in the mid-1970s British intelligence was shaken to the core by thetntensiry of the light being shone on its Atlantic cousins. In November 1976 the LabourHome Secretary, Merlyn Rees, announced that on the advice of his securiry advisers heintended to deport nvo Britain-based Americans who had been active in bringing theclA to account. one rvas Phillip Agee, a former cIA ofEcer whose revelatory book,Inside the company, had become a bestselier. The other, Mark Hosenball, was an.\merican joumalist w,ho was working for the Euening Standard.

Rees claimed that these men posed 'a darger to national security,, without grving

INTRODUCTION

details. Support for the two men rvas mobilized from the radical left, stiil vibrant fromthe heady days of 1968. A ca,rpaisn r,vas launched to stop the deportations. Thecampaigners set out to pubiicize evidence of the CIA's rnalevolent involvement in thedomestic politics of many countries friendly to the US. Richard Fletcher was a founderof the Agree Hosenball campaign. An ad hoc group ofjournalists and students assembledround him to help him to reveal more of rhe hidden actrr-ities of the CIA.

Fletcher asked Richard Olir-er. at rhe tilne a research assistant at North LondonPolvtechnic. to folios' up the le:rd on the rnr-scerious anti-Communist publisherAmpersaud. The assut-n;.tion u'as thlr the conlpanv s tbunder. Leslie Sheridan, vr-asrvorking as a tiont tor the A'nericans - either the clA or some other Iinkedorganization. Oliver set out to St Marun's Lane Reference Library, near LeicesterSquare. to find cut more about the company and its directors. A few hours later,Fletcher received an excired phone call from oliver: ,lr must be Brirish!, He hadunearthed Leslie Sheridan's obituary tn The Times.l Although cautiously written, theobituary revealed that Sheridan had worked for the British warrime propagandaorganization the Political Wadare Executive (PWE) 'It was fascinating to watch thesureness of his professional approach on a subject like propaganda', the obituary said.After the war, it continued, Sheridan had 'carved himself a new career in the diltrcultfield of public relations and later in an advisory capacity to the Foreign office,. Inaddition, Fletcher and Oliver discovered that another of the directors of Ampersand wasa wartime MI5 officer; this had ro mean that the company was a British, not anAmerican, front.

Next Fletcher located and contacted Sheridan's u,idorv, caroline. Although guarded,she told hinl that a Foreign O{hce section ca1led the Information Research Department(lRD) rvas central to her husband's work. She suggested that Fletcher should talk to aformer colleague of Leslie Sheridan's called Adelaide Maturin. She did not mention thatMaturin lvas Sheridan's previous wife or that Maturin had become an MI6 career oflicerafter the war. (Jnsurprisingiy, Maturin, now retired to the counrry, declined to talk withFletcher.

Fletcher's team, though, had been back to Companies FIouse and noticed thatAmpersand rvas linked to a range of other odd companies through its solicitor, VictorCannon-Brookes. Over the next months the team unravelled a vast array of interlockingcompanies and establishment directors for a range of publishing and news .g".r.ycompanies. Interviews with rvell-placed inteliigence sources had by now revealed thatthe Foreign OIfice's IRD was a secret anti-Communist propaganda organization, closeiylinked to MI6 and with a wide web of joumalist contac;. The indlviduai companiespieced together at cornpanies House were part of a global network of mediaorganizations jointly run by IRD and MI6 over a thirry-year period. Bolstered by agrowing piie of hard evidence, the team took its discoveries to the Obseruer, where theywere published early rn 1,978 as 'How the Foreign oIIice .waged

Secret propagandawar', byiined Richard Fletcher, Phil Keliy, paul Lashmar, Tony Smart and RichardOliver.z The in-house reporter was George Brock.3

A day eariier a Cuardian article by investigative reporrer David Leigh reveaied thatForeign Secrerarv David owen had closed down IRD a few months before forunspecified reasons.4 Leigh had been tipped offabout IRD by a Foreign o{fice insider.

INTROD UCT I ON

Since those first revelations \rv'ere published, further details of IRD's activities havegradually trickled out in the media over the last rlvenry years. Every year or tlvo anotherarticle has popped up in rhe press reveaiing some new facet of IRD. Many featuredGeorge orwell's curious relationship r.vith the department. Strangely, interest in IRDhas grown rather than declined. This is, in part, a reflection of widening appreciation ofthe enormous impact that its covert operations had over the years.

The genesis of this book lies in one of those strange moments of synchroniciry. Oneof Fletcher's researchers, Paul Lashmar, joined the obseruer after the story appeared.Sporadicallv, he kept up his interest in IRD, with occasional articles in the paper as newmaterial became available. In 1995 he r,vas called by another of Fletcher's old researchers,Richard Oliver, rn'ho told him that his nephew, James, was writing a postgraduate thesison IRD. Lashmar had taken on the IRD archive from Richard Fletcher and JamesOliver rvas able to exanune twenry ,vears of collected evidence. In 7996 Paul LashmarandJames Oliver decided to join forces to u,rite this hisrorv of IRD.

Both authors feel that the historr of IRD provides important historical insights intopostwar Britain and the narure of the Cold War - a conflict in which almost everylnove was made r'vith one eve to its propaganda value. IRD also raises serious questionsregarding inforrnation, secrecy, the intelligence senices and the democratic srate - notleast because of the abiiity to manipulate public and political opinion which skilfulpropaganda work can provide.

In 1978 a Fleet Street editor remarked dismissively to Lashmar, 'oh, everyone knewabout IRD.' What he meant was that the Fleet Street establishment knew about IRDand were happv to keep the rnatter quiet. As the editor of another liberal broadsheetrernarked, 'They are our fiiends.' Simiiarly, many ex-IRD staffsay that it was not secret;it was reGrred to in the Foreign Oflice List. However, its function was neuer disclosed inthe that list or in any other open material. Also, neither the British public, who paid forit. nor Parliament, to whom it was in theory accountable, knew about it. That, to us, issecret.

Even the former IRD staffers admit that it was considered to be a 'hush-hush'department from its inception. Ironically, despite that designation, rhe Soviets knew ofthe existence of IRD within weeks of irs creation in 1948 through Guy Burgess, thetraitor, from that same British establishment. The cosy relationship between the Foreignofilce, Fleet Street and Broadcasting House (marred only by the Suez crisis) was onlybroken by a nerv generation ofjournalists, unconstrained by the assumptions set duringthe Second World War, who did not believe that the agenda of the British State andjournalists should be synonvmous.

Secrecy has continued to prevent the full disclosure of IRD activities. For many yearsthe public's right to know u,as restricted as IRD's records which should have been madepublic rvere rvithheld pasr rhe thirqr-year period. while some former Foreign o{ficeo{Ecials have maintained that the IRD had nothing to do with rhe secret services, IRDfiles have been treated as though they were those of an intelligence organization. Someearly anodyne briefing documents were released in the late 1970s, but the rest onlybegan to be released from 1995.

At the time of goine to press, the documenrs for 7950-2 had just been released.However, at least 10 per cent of those documents remain withheld. Several people have

INTIIODUCTION

stlfieested that this book is prelnature and that it rvould be better to r,",ait until all of theII\D papers have been released. Extended retention of documents aside. at the currentrate of re'lease. the documents covering IRD's i977 closure rvil1 not appear until 2020.By then the shenanigans of the Cold \{,iarriors u,ill look venr srrange indeed. 'We

Geithat there are solne ven inrportant lessons to be learned norv. In the absence of fulidocumentation. u'e have lillen back on the journalist's tool and interviewed as many ofthose' u'ho look oart itr thc events as u'e cou1d. C)ral histon' is still under.rated in the(JK. r'et it is a cenrrrl too1. esl.eciallr' s'}ren jt leads to. ancl can be confirmed by,docunrentan' nrater iirl.

As stltdents oipropaganda rl'i1l knos-. the sul-rject is catc.qonzed bv shades fror-n whitethrotlgh ntvriad gre\-s to black. \I,'e have nor entered into the finer elements of debateabout calibrarion. For our Purposcs. s'hrtt-. propaganda is attributecl and accuratematerial. ri-hile black propaganda is untrue and deliberately misleading in its source.An'thing else iits into van.ing shades of grey. iRD propaganda \vas never r,vhite andrarelv black. but spanned a range ofgreys.

The're are sorne thir-rgs that this book does not try to do. lt is not a historv of Sovietforeign policy n.rachinations or propaganda. This has been dealt with extensivelyelseu'here, l1ot least of all in IRI)'s orvn publications. The reader can be assured that r.vefullv undcrstand that the Soviets \trrere no anlatellrs at propaganda and agitation, ancl,throughout the pcriod \{,'e cover, exploited every opening provided by tsritish policy totheir advantaee. Equally, this book is not a history of CIA culttrral irrtervention, but wehave attempted to provide enough background conrext to shorv hor.v the British andAtnerican operatiol)s paralleled and n-rirrored c-ach other. It is also not a history ofpsychological u'afare. The niilitarv application of propagancla did, during various crises,dovetari rvith II\D operations. Nevertheless. rt is a sr.parate disciplinc- that has been thesubject ofa number ofgood books.

We believe that IRI) is relevar-rt to several areas of historical research and enquiry.Not onlv should IRI) interest those investigating the oriqins of, and Britarn's role in theCold War, but also historians studying the development of the postwar Anglo-Americanrelationship. Perhaps nrore importantly, IRD is revealing ro historians of posrwar Britishpropaganda and its inlluence on posr\\rar Ilritish history. Given IRD's covertintervention into British politics, its activities and influence provide a new dimension tothose investigating rhe development of politics during the cold 'war * specifically, torvhat degree IRI) influer.rced the development of the British Left during this period.

Finally, u'e believe that the history of Il\D provides an important historical insightinto the developnrcnt of techniques used by governments to persuade the people theyrepresent. Here are the early spin cloctors, lobbyists, tight controls on information, andthe use of rebuttal units that have become familiar to f, ne\v generation with the electionof the Ner'v Labour qovernment. The context may have changed, but rhe merhodsrernain essentially the sarne.

C]HAPTER ONE

Indonesia: Prelude toSlaughter

The F:il East in thc rnid-l960s ma,v seem a strange place to begin a book on BritishCold War propagarda. Flor-cver, everrts in Indonesia sl-rorru' how far the hand of theBritish govc'rnment's secret anti*(lomuunist propagandists * the Foreign Office'slntonn:rtion Rescarch l)elraltment - had extended rvithin twenty years of its discreetiornretion. Indonesia also rer.eals hor,r- hiehh-.'ilective IRD's covert operations r.vere andi:lu- closelv it rvorkecl rvith Britain's secret senice. ]VII6.

While rescarchinq this book rve uncovered evidence that the British government)c'crLrtly hc-lpecl overthrorv President Sukarno ol Indonesia, assisting the rise of GeneralSoeharto. the pro-Wcstern ieader u,ho ruled from 1965 untii 1998, into power. As a

r!-sult of Sukarno's overthrow some 500,000 Indonesians - suspected Comnrunists -rierc kil1ed. Ten years later in i975 Soeharto's regime invaded East Tinror andploceedecl to kill a third of the popr-rlation.r Soeharto's reign was one of the most blutal.rnd corrupt in re ccnt South-East Asian historl . Nevertheless, the operation to bring himro power rvas consiclered a success bv the Foreign O{Iice as Soeharto remained fimrlyanti-Communist and lavoured British conrpanies and arms suppliers.

British intelligence agencies ar:d propaganda specialists carried out covert operationsto subvert the Indonesirn President irom at least 1963 to 1966. The extent of Britishtnvolvement in the fa11 of the nationalist leader in 1966, one of the nrost importantnon-aligned 'Ihird Worlci leaders of the tirne, has never been revealed before. TheBritish Foreign Ofhce's rnandarins r,vere furious at Indonesian etTorts to destabilize theBritish-backed Malaysian Fcderltion through Sukarno's policy of Konfrontasi. Plans

u'ere made by MI6 and Britisir Special Forces to take the war to Sukarno andr:ndennine his resirne"

In early 1965 a special unit of the IRD was sent out to Singapore to join MI6 and

-\mry Ps,vchologicai Warlare of1lcers rvho rvere already conducting anti-Sukarno black

f.ropaganda operations. The II{D had bec'n set up in 1948 as a 'hush-hush', anti-Cornmunist propaganda department. Ilv the 1960s it employed some 400 people at itsThamersside hc'adq,.tarters and around the rvorld.

As Sukarno's future hulrg in the balance in late 1965, follorving a failed dissident armyoificers'coup and a viciou'.rrmv Lounter-coup backed by the CIA, Britain sent a

Foreisn OfEce propaganda specialist rvith d100,000'to do anything I could do to get

rid ot-SLrkrrrro'. Mcar:uhile. MI6 rvas runnrng its orvn covcrr operations. assistirrg anti-Sukanro eiernents in the Indonesiarr miiitary. By 1963 Sukarno had become a thorn in

BRITAIN'S SECRET Pl\OPAGANDA 'WAR

the side of both the British and the Americans. They believed there was a reai dangerthat Indonesia - considered a vital strategic country - rvouid fall into the hands ofCommunists.

Hou'ever, the consequences olthe nse of Soeharto for the people of Indonesia weregrave' In one of the l'orst u'holesale slaughters in recenr hisiory, the IndonesianCommunist Parw. PKI' rr'as phvsicallv ehnrinated in the massacres which accompaniedSoeharto's seizure of pos-er. An Alnnesn' International report compared the massacresin Indonesia rvith those carried ont br- po1 por and the Khrrre. RoLg. in cambodia adecade later. 'The qovemnlent-rnstigarcd killings rn In,Jonesia in 1965 . . rank amongthe most r-nassr'e

'iolations of hnmirn rights since the Second world war. Aconsen'ative esrinure oithe nr,rnrber of people k-rlled in Indonesia is 500,000.'2

The tremors of this interventron conrrnue. o'er the last decade, Britain'srelationship u'ith President Soeharto's reginre has been one of the most vexed issues offoreign policv. on the one hand, Indonesia has been one of the most importantmarkets in the r'vorld for British arms manufacturers. But, on the other, the use ofthose arms for internal repression, both in Indonesia itself and in East Timor, hasprovoked much criticism. The story of Indonesia, one of many, begins to explain whyIRD was so important ro post\\,ar British history.

Indonesia had not even been a colonv of Britain or the United States. The Dutch hadrun the counrry untii the Second \)vorld 'war rvhen the islands were occupied by theJapanese. The colony produced vast profits for the Netherlands, rvhich were estimatedin 1940 to give the Dutch a return of g100 million per vear. The country was importanrecorrornically and strategically, and in 1952 the USA noted that if Indonesia fell out of'Western

influence, neighbours such as Malaya might follorv, resulting in the loss of the'principal r'vorid source of natural rubber and tin and a proclucer of pJtroleum and otherstrategicaliy important commodities,.3

The Japanese occupation, rvhich to the Indonesians amounted to another period ofcolonial rule. succeeded in revitalizinE the nationalist moverlent which, after the war,declared independence and assumed po\\,-er. The most prominent of rhese nationalistleaders was Ahmed Sukarno u''ho had fbunded the Partai Nasional Indonesia in 1927and had been banished to internal exile by the Dutch in 1931 in a then successfulattempt to emasculate the divided nationalist tnovemerlt.

Indonesia gained its independence from the Netherlands in 1949, less because of thestrength of Indonesian nationaiism than because of the weakness of the Dutch and thevie'"v taken in Washington that Indonesia was not on the anti-Communist front line andDutch troops could be better employed in defending'Western Europe.

Nevertheless, Indonesia was important both economically and strategically to bothBritain and the US. Britain had substantial interests in Indonesia including a zl0 per centstake in Royal Dutch Shell, rvhich controlled three-quarters of oil production beforethe V"'ar. and investments totalling some d100 nrillion.+ By 1959, Britain's investmentsin Indonesia rvere in the region of {300 million.s Strategicaily, the Straits of Malaccarvere considered vital to British and American interests, especially as a route for

INDONESIA: PRELUDE To SLAUGHTER

'' '"r-'irips. A Foreign Office report of December 19.15 statecl, in reference to Indonesia,::r'it: 'ir is of great inrportance to the British Commonlealth that these islands should be,.irder thc- control of a friendly power.,6

The US also had substantial comtnercial interests in Indonesia ancl serious concerns''ror'rt the in'rpact of the leftist naturc of the Indonesian governmenr on regionai stabiliry.I:' 1952 the United States noted the danger that if Indonesia fell out of the Western':here'of influetrce. other neighbours, such as Malaya, might follow and that this could':'rd to the loss of the principal u,orld source of natural rubber and tin as rvell as a major:roclucer of petroleum and other stretegicaily important commodities.T

Ahmc'd Sukarno r'vas declared Indonesia's first president in 19115 during the struggle:or independencc. western concern regarding Sukarno's regime grerv with the strengthrf the hrdonesian communist party, the pKI. rvhich by 196! haJa membership of o,re.1tt n,i11ion - the lareest Clonununrst Party in the non-Communist rvorld. Concerns'r-ere intensified by Sukarno's internal and external policies, r,vhich included theirationalization of 'western assets and a governmental role for the pKI. And in 1955,Sukarno held the Bandung conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, increasingsuspicion in both Britain and the USA.

Against this background covert LJS inten,entron in Indonesia started as early as 195gu'hen the cIA supported a rebellion against Sukarno in Sumarra. According to cIAIeteran, victor Marchetti, and John Marks, an ex-intelligence analyst in the StateDepartment: 'contrary to denials by president Eisenhower and Secretary of StateDulles, the CIA gave direct assistance to rebei groups located on the isiand of Sumatra.^\qency B-26s even carned out bombing missions in support of the insurgents. on May18, 1958, the Indonesians shor down one of these B-26s and captured the pilot, an-tmerican named Allen Pope. Although uS government officials claimed that pope wasa "soldier of fortune", he was in fact an emproyee of the clA*owned proprietarycompany, Civil Air Transport.'s

Importantlv, British antipathy to Sukarno was already such that, according toSecretary of State Dulles's private memorandum, the British Foreign Secretary SelwynLloyd had encouraged the Americans to support the anti-Sukarno rebels. The primeMinister then ordered MI6 to assist the cIA operations. However, the clA_backedanti-Sukarno rebellion was crushed by loyal Indonesian army units and onlysucceeded in exacerbating the political and economic situation. As a BBCntemorandum obsen,ed, 'President Sukarno and his semi-military regime look to aneconomic solution to quell regionalism and to check Communism, but the rebellionin itself hampers reconstruction. Thus the Government regards with admirationchina's rapid economic progress. From president downwards, ministers and civilservants speak of the need to imitate cornmunist techniques while rejecting thepolitical ideology.'e

As a consequence the PKI continued to gain influence. one of the symptoms of theincreasins strength of the PKI was Sukarno's creation of NASAKoM (an acronym forthe united ideologies of Indonesia; nationarism, religion and communism) in 196l,byrvhich Sukarno hoped to preserve 'national unity' and give the pKI formalrepresentation in the government. Sukarno's srrate€Jy was divide and rule. By playing oIFthe PKI against the armed forces, he hoped to dilute and curb the power of each of the

BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

two main politicai forces.r. By 1965, to balance the amry's growing power, Sukarnoaligned himself more closeiy with the pKI.

Writer and human rights activist Carrnel Budiardjorr (who was living in Indonesia atthe time) said 'For the US, Britain and other'westem powers, Indonesia appeared to beon a headlong slide to the left . . . the pKI, rvith a membership of three ,,,ilrior, enjoyedthe political support of organizations rvhose joint membership probably exceeded fifteenmilIion.'1r

Follorving the rebellion's deibat, the US adopted a longer rern srrategy-. The emphasisbecame trainins and aid ior rhe Indonesian amrv. The 1r,.o.r' r.vas that the nationalistarm,v 61ite could provide an effective barrier to Communist subversion, a successfulpolic1' used sonle vears later in Chi,le.

The first indicatron of deliberate British involvemenr in Westem attemprs to removeSukarro appears in a CIA memoranclum ofJune 1962. According to this memorandum,Pri,re Minister Macmillan and president Kennedy, at a *e.ti]ng in Aprit, agreed to'liquidate President Sukarno, depending on the situation

".rd ,vailable opportunities.,

The CIA otTicer noted: 'it is not clear to me whether murder or ouerthrowis intended bythe word liquidate.'t: A senior MI6 olficer ar the rime later denied knowledge of thediscussion and aiso denied that the word 'liquidate' meant assassinarion. F{e was alsoreported as saying, 'However, they might well have discussed the best way of getting ridof the awkward fellorv.'1a

Hostility to Sukarno was intensilled by Indonesian objections to the MalaysianFederation. Malaya had been granted independence in i955 under a pro-tsritishgovernment. Britain retained its neighbouring dependencies of Singapore, Sarawak andSabah, the latter tIVo neighbouring Indonesian Kalimantan on the island of Bomeo. InMay 1961 the Malaysian leader, rhe Tunku, declared his aim to creare a MalaysianFederation including Singapore, Sarawak and Sebah. The British supported the project,as did the uS. Sukarno complained the pro.iect was ,a neo-coloniai plot,, pointing outthat the Federation was a project for Malayan expansionism and continuing Britishinfluence in the region, a,d in 1963 his objeciions crystariized in his poricy ofKonfrontasi, a breaking off of all relations with Malavsia, soon coupieci with low-levelmilitary intervention. As Hunter wade, the New Zearand commissioner for Singaporeand British Borneo, recalled: 'He was trying to stop Malaysia from being formed. Hesaid that no rearrangement should be made in that area r,,,ithout his agreemenr, not jusrwithout his being informed. He insisted he shourd be parry to it. ala, of course, rheMalavsians and the Brits said, like helil 'We and the Australians didn,t make any noises,but it was obvious thar we were following the same policy. we,d all decided thatMalaysia was the oniy solution . . . and so it had to go ahead.,ri A p.ot.".t"d border waralong the 700-mile front in Borneo started in which specialist fo.ces played a major role,including the SAS and the young Major Peter de la Billidre who was larer ro leadtsritain's Gulf War army. Secret cross-border raids were initiated to force theIndonesians back from their forward jungle bases as British troops and the Gurkhaswere joined by special forces from Australia and New zealand. According to TonyGeraghty, special forces historian: 'slowly but surely, toward the end of 1965 theIndonesians were forced to abandon their front-rine bases. Nothing had been saidpublicly by either the British or the Indonesians about the ,,claret,, operarions, but

INDONESIA: PRELUDE TO SLAUGHTER

ri'irhin Indonesia Sukarno rvas rapidiy becoming discredited among his military;611n1x1xlg15. '16

Docunrents recently released at the public Record Office shorv that in 1964 tsitain]nd Australia planned extensive bombing raids over Indonesia ifJakarta had stepped uplts confrontation. At this point even more ambitious plans were being deveiop.a-Oy tt.Bntish: 'The British were making plans to undermine the regrme by spreading theguerrilla war to other parrs of Indonesia including, if it were expedient, Sumatra andl;rva. Plans for these operations embraced such external Intelligence agencies as MI6 asu-ell as the SAS.'1;

Getting rid of Sukarno was not only a Western concern. Konfrontasi and Sukarno'striendly policy towards the PKI caused increasing worry in the Indonesian army. HunterWade' sometime Nerv Zealand High Cornmissioner for the Malaysian Federation, says:'Soeharto and most of his senior orlicers were rooking for ways in which they couldropple sukarno, or ease hirn out. He was very much in their way at that stage. They didhave to proceed very cautiouslv, that r,,,as rvhy it q,as a long time before the arrny Gltable to move'' According to BBC cor-respondent Roland Challis: 'sukarno must havebeen a supremely annoying person fbr them in many wavs. you knorv, flying, flittinghere and there, in and out, making these -,vondertul speeches of his, which probably hadnothing whatsoever to do with the realities that the-v were trying to deal with. So it,snot particularly surprising . . . you w-ould get army people saying, look, this old fooi ispast his ti,e. You know, he's going gaga, he's in bed with 700 wives. And of course,one rn'ould get rid olhip.'ta

Chailis continued: 'It is not dilhcult in that sort of situation for the manipulators tocome in, rvhether they be chinese, American, British, or whatever, and to try to - andperhaps succeed in sometimes exploiting that sort of situation.,

According to Foreign Olhce sources the decision ro get rid of Sukarno had beentaken by Macrnillan's consen'ative government and carried through during wilson,si964 Labour governmenr. The Foreign office had worked in conjunction with itsAmerican counterparts on a plan to oust the turbuient Sukarno. According to sourcesrve have spoken with, a coverr operation and psychological warfare straregy rvas pur inplace. MI6 plans were approved by the secrer serwice chief Sir Dick 'VThiie

- the onlyman to head both MI5 and MI6 and a veteran of the wartime Double cross system.The operation was controlled from Phoenix Park in Singapore, the British headquartersin the region. Initiaily in charge was Desmond parkinson, a former wartime po'w andliG MI6 oflicer. One of MI6's Far East specialists he was based in Singapore berween1963 and 1965 before returning; to century House ro become a head of section.Around him gathered an impressive ber,y of MI6 ofiicers including former SoE heroHubert 'T..n' o'Bryan Tear. In addition, MI6 kept close links with key elements inthe Indonesian army through the British Embassy inJakarta. Officers constantly travelledback and forth berween Singapore andJakarta to handle the increasingly tense situation.

A senior IRD expert was discreetly senr our to Singapore Iiom the Foreigr office tohead a smail team from IRD working out of Phoenix Park, and was senr there to reinforcethe work alreadv belng done by MI6 and the miiitary psychological warfare experrs.

The opportuniry to isolate Sukarno ancl the PKI came in late 1965 when an allegedPKI coup attempt was the pretext for the army to sideiine Sukamo and eradicate the

BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

PKI. on the night olsepte,rber 30/1 ocrober 1965 a dissident group of left-wingamry otlicers launched a coup against the army high command whom they accused oiplotting with the CIA against Sukarno. Six key army generals were killed and a numberof strategic points in the capitai ,uvere seized.

But the (Jntung coup! as it became knorvn, r.vas to be short-lived and unsuccessful.General Soeharto. cor.mander of KoSTRAD, the army's srraregic reserve, who hadsurprrsinglv not been targeted, su-iftlv organized suppression. Hours before the kidnapsquad had ser our, one Colonel Latief, a member of the Untung group rvho had been$'orking u'ith Soeharto's forces over the previous dar:, r.isited his chief at the militaryhospital n'here Soeharto was r-isiting hrs son. In hrs rrial in 1976. Latief said that he had-uvarned Soeharto of the imminent actton. If he did, Soeharto took no action ro forestallit and save his cornrades.le Who exactly instigated the coup and for what purposes willprobably remain a matter of speculation. However, wrthin days it was crushed and thearmv \\'as firmly in control. Soeharto accused the pKI of being behind the uprising andset about suppressing them in its the aftermath.

A hint of British involvement, or at reast knowledge of army plans to overthrowSukarno, ernerged in 1965. Indonesian intelligence obtained a cable from Sir AndrewGilchrist, the British Ambassador in Jakarta, to the Foreign office, hinting that theBritish were aware of Indonesian army intentions. The crucial sentence reads: 'It wouldbe as lvell to emphasise ollce more to our iocal friends in the army that the strictestcaution' discipline and co-ordination are essential to the success of the enterprise.'20 Atthe time this rvas dismissed by the ar,1v as a forgery produced by the Indonesianintelligence agenc\', the BPI. But r.,ears later, accorcling to Budiaia;o, si. AndrewGilchrist \vrote ro an Indian academic confirming its authenticiry.zr

Imnrechatell' fbllorving the atternpted coup Britain set about exploiting the situationto bring an end to Sukarno and Konliontasr because it rvas possibie that Sukamo mightjust have been able ro reasserr his control. Gilchrist .,rr, ,o, happy with the Britishpropaganda operation. Back in London, he visited Foreign OfIice mandarin Joe Garner(Later Baron Garner and head of HM Diplomatic Service) and discussed the IRD andMI6 operations against Sukarno. Garner was convinced that action was needed and atGilchrist's suggestion, agreed to send Nonnan Reddarvay out ro singapore to bolsterthe propaganda operation. Reddaway arrived in Singapore immediately foilowing theattenlpted coup in october 1965. He was pur in charge of the IRD operation workingside by side with his MI6 counterparts. They had adjacent otlices at phoenix park.

Reddarvay had, in fact, been given d100,000 by Joe Gamer at the Foreign ofiiceand the brief, 'to do anything I could do to get rid of Sukarno,. This includedmanipuiating local and international media to follow an anti-sukarno 1ine.22 Accordingto Reddaway: 'Gilchrist had been supplying me in Singapore with about four top secrettelegrams a r'veek about the shortcomings of Sukarno and the immorality ofconfrontation - what they were doing in Bomeo and so on. And it was up to n1e todecide what to do with rhese things.,z3

As a means of getting this information out to the world from non-governmentsources, Reddaway used the press, including The Times and the Daily Mail, butconcentrated on Roland Challis: '.What I decided to <1o was to forn a good relationshipr'vith the most suitabie customer who was a very bright BBC overias Service man

INDONESIA: PRELUDE TO SLAUGHTER

called Roiand Chal1is. And so Roland Chailis u.as otfered, in effect, what had come outof Jakarta in the morning. By lunch time it ."vas off to London and in the evening itcarne pouring back into the region.':a According to Challis: 'I got out there just beforeNorrlan Reddarvav, and he approached me at a receprion in point of fact. Coming upand saying, "We1l you and I are going to be seeing quite a lot of each other." And itwas very clear that he had already spoken to orher BBC peopie before he came out. Imc-an. he came out and he made a beeline for me.'But Challis was unaware ofRedda"vay's real mission or IRD. 'As far as I was concerned he rvas sirnply a ForeignOfiice bloke, you know, concerned rvith Malaysia and its relationship with Indonesia.'2s

Although not the most listened to radio station in the area, the BBC was undoubtedlyeffective. According to Challis: 'It u.,as the Engiish language broadcasting . . . that reallycounted most.

.We had a Nlalay ser-vice at rhat rime I would say that the first

influence u'as undoubtedly Radio Australia. Possibiy followed by Peking Radio and co-equai rvith the BBC. The Voice of America was always there, but in all honesry I don'tthink people listened to it very much.'16

In Indonesia, Soeharto and the arm1. began moving against Sukarno. As CarmelBudiard-io, r'vho was irnprisoned for several vears ioilorving the coup attempt, recalled:'Follow-ing the events of 1 October 1965, the arm,v began to discredit him, claiming thathe had been "involved" in the coup atternpt v,hich, they had initially said, was aimed atdeposing Sukarno.'

Behind the scenes the propagandists at Phoenix Park were also getting down to work.On 5 October, Alec Adarns, Political Adviser to the Commander-in-Chiee Far East,

rvho had worked in the rvartime Ministry of Information, advised the Foreign OfEce:'We should have no hesitation in doing u,hat rve can surreptitiously to blacken the PKIin the eyes of the army and the people of Indonesia.' The Foreign O{fice agreed andsuggested some 'suitable propaganda themes' such as PKI atrocities and Chineseintervention. On 9 October, Adams reported that, 'arrangements for distribution ofcertain unattributable material' had been made.27

Tr,,,,o days previously, on 7 October, IRD had produced a background briefing on theIndonesian situation, r,vhich argued that, 'The extent to which the Communist Parry ofIndonesia (PKI) r,vas itrplicated in the attempted coup in Jakarta on Septernber 30, is

gradually emerging'.28 iRD suggested that the composition of Colonel untung'sIndonesian Revolutionary Council provided evidence of PKI involvement. Theevidence itself rvas somervhat corltorted: 'Tire council of forry-five members was chosenso as to give it an appearance of being based on "NASAI{OM" . . . Only five knownPKI members u,'ere included, and these were low-ranking - an even more convincingfaqade. The Council is not one rvhich anyone except a Communist would havechosen.'re IRD also pointed to a statenlent made by Soeharto suggesting PKIresponsibiliry for the murder of the generals and the fact that the main Cathoiic andMuslirn parties both assumed PKI invoivement. Essentiall1,, IRD backed the army'sversion ofevents.

Coincidence or not, on 10 October the Sunday Telegraph reported: ''Westernintelligence experts have uncovered startling inforrnation r,vhich appears firmly toimplicate President Sukarno in a gigantic double-cross'. The article claimed that thechronologv of events reveaied Sr-rkarno's advance kno*'ledge of the coup attempt and

I]RITAIN'S SECI\ET i'ROPACANDA V/AR

the fuil compliciry of the PKI. This therne continued to clog Sukarno as he atterlpted topreserve his por'ver and to preverrt an all-out bloodb:rth, and rvas a major factor in hiseYentual dorvnfall. It u'as aiso a ston'rvhich IRD papers sho.uv the llritish rvere anxiousto promote.

Over the u'inter artd earlr- spring. as the nrassacres in Indonesra continued, Sukarnoand the arniv presided o\-er the colrntn' in an une.rsv coalirion. Br-rt rhe political balancebetrveen the armt'. the PKI and Sr-rkarno h:rd been upsr'r and although Sukarno wasstrtggling to rnaitlratn :rtd rcasserr his lurhorin' rhe annv u'as cie:rrly gaining the upperhand. A s\-ntpront of Suk.rr.no'. lor. 6ri po,r.. ,.,.: that his eilorts to bring a halt to thekiliings and prest'n-e th.'PKI as e balance ro rhe lrml t-ere unsuccessti-rl.i,,

The Britrsh continued to exploit thc srtuation rvith Norman Reddaway receivingintellisence lbl exploitarion fronr Gilchnst in -fakarta via Stanlev Budd, the IRD man inthe Mal:rlsian capital, Kuaia Lunrpur. But Lord Heale,v, rhen Defence Minister. becameau-are of sorne IRD black operations and he rvas not happy: 'They began ro put outfalse infornration and I came to mv horror across an incident u,here IRD had forgeddoctunents to be put oti the bodies of Indonesian soldiels. These were tlesigned to give:the impression that the Inclonesians rvere adopting a position that rvas very much morehostile to Britain than in fact it u,as. i tackled Norman Reddarvay and said that this wasahsolutely diseracefui and nrust srop.'-r Healey's inrervention clid not stop theoperations.

Reddau''ay blar.nes MI6 and nrilitarr, psychologrcal warriors for the less efTective blackpropaganda opc'rations: "W-e made a cornplete nonsense of rvhat you might call theinfluencing of opinion because u.e let all the protessionals in - the black propagandistsand the secret sen'icc'. Thel'devised cireaclfui things out of Phoenix Park in Singapore -floating bottlc-s dorvn the river in Sararvak rvith nressaqes saving horv arvfril Sukarnorvas'' Some of the pro-iects verged on the luclicrous. Reddau-av continues,'Then thereu':rs another idea of having a shipload of antr-Sukarno inrellecruals broadcasting from aste.rner. oh i,es, and landing a rubber boat on the sor-rth side of Javr when the moonr.vas dark so people u'ould conclude the Chinese \vere influencing Sukarno.,32

Although others were invoived in rhe propaganda otlensrve, Nomran Recldaway wasat its heart and according to Challis, the most efi-ecrive ancl ubiquitous. 'One rventzrround talking to enyone one could and you listened ro see ho,nv they differed from oneanother. but Nornlan was the most urbane and the nrost persuasive and the mostfrequently present.'

one of the main rhemes pursued by IRD r.vas rhe threat posed b,v the pKI and'Chinese Conrmunists'. Nervspaper reports continually emphasized the danger of thePKI. Drarving upon their experience in Malaya in the 1950s, the British appear to havep1a1'ed the ethnic card by enrphasizing the Chinese nature of the Communist threat.Roland Chailis savs:

C)ne of the lnore successful things u'hich the'W'est u,ished on to the non-Colrmunistpoliticians in Indonesia rvas managing to transfer the r,r,hole idea of 6ommunism onto the Chinese nrinoriw in Indonesia. It turned it into an ethnic thing. It is a terriblething to have done actua11y, I mean in the w'av of inciting the Irrdonesians to rise andslaushter Chinese people it was forcccl into that franrervork. The Indonesians

iNI)ONESIA: PRELUDE To SLAUGHTEII

r.verc given the idea that it rvasComnrunists. I'd be verv surprisedIJritish canrp rhat u,as puttins rhar l

these r,vicked Chinese rru.ho u,ere actualiv theif it lvasn't IRD * it u,as cerrainly someone in rhe

idea out..r3

Runrours about the state of Sukarno's health r,vere spreading like rtiidfire, as TerencePrittie of the Cuartlinn noted in a report on 2 October 1965:

A11 reports from lndonesla seem to be coloured by speculation and there has been lit-tle rc'iiable ,er,vs fro.m there for a rong time past. Thus, ,authentic, reporrs xboutIrresident Sukar,o's health have bee, le:gion. He has been stated at various rimes rohave had one or both kidneys removed, io h.r,. serious heart trouble, to be sulleringfrom abdominal complaints and venereal disease, to ha-re clropsy and be losing the useof one fbor, and to have cataract and to be losine the right of or.

"y".At clhristmas his feet were reporrecl to be in s,ch-a conditio, that he could nolonger rvear shoes' Shortlv atter this report the President p".tb.rrred rvith some agiliryon the dance floor at a Government brl.:*

Accordinq to carrner Budiardjo, the question oi sukar.o,s hearth rr",as extremervsensitive: 'Farlv in Ausust, Sukarno sultlied a relapse from a kidney .;";il;.;;ibeen troubling hinr for vears. This raised the politicar ,trk., ., fears that another,perhaps fatal' relapse made the question of the presidential succession extremely rc!1fs.,35But it was the involvement of sukarno witi, the attemptecl coup and the pKI in thetirllorvi,g bloodv monrhs that rvas to be the British trump card. Accordi,g toReddar'vay: 'The cornr,unist reader, Aidit, r.vent on the run and Sukarno, being a greatpolitician' lvent to the front of the palace and said that communist leader Aidit nru-st behunted dor,vn and brought to .lustice. Fronr the side door of the parace he r,r.as dealingrvith hjm everv day by courier.,'we have establisheci thrt this information r.r,as reveaied bv the signal intelligence ofBritain's GCHQ' Thc Indonesia,s did not have a clue about radio silence and thisdouble dealing rvas picked up by GCHe. The British ha<i its main eavesdropping basein Ho's Kong tr.rned i'ro events in rndt.esra. In addition a special GCHe unit wasoperating from singapore. The GCHe chief in rhe area *", Bri"r, To,ey rater to headthe entire r:avesdropping organization. According to Reddar.vay: .The story of Sukamo,sdupliciw came out as a rraveller,s tale b1, r r".i,r r*.;;;;;, r.'n,r"ri."r, in HongKongl Ancl of course, being enormorrri n.r,rr*orthy this \vas pur into the prumbingand everybody wanted it an over the world. And it was arl over the rvorrd in no timeflat a,d back into Indonesia.'36 Meanrvhile MI6 was aiding its contacts in the army andadvising thc-m of Sukarno's every nlove. Eavesdroppinj and other intelrigence wassa,itized to kcep Soeharto an<i his coileagues one step arread ofsukarno.In 1990 ir was revcared by American investigative journarists that as rnany as 5,000natres of suspected senior members of the pKI had Leen supplied to the Indonesiana,ny b1' the cIA. In effect ir was a hit-list which helped the army in its bloody task ofph,vsically eradicati,g the pKI: US Embassy ofrciars fonowed the progress by checkingoff names as reports arrivecl of inclividual *,r..1.., and arests. As information came introm Soeharto's headquarters, trre ofiiciars r,vere able to track tt

" ,t."ay erimination of

10 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA'WAR

the PKI's political appararus. Embassv official Robert J. Martens commented: ,Theyprobably killed a lot of people, and I probably have a rot of brood on my hands, butthat's not all bad. There's a time when you have to strike hard at a decisive moment.'37

Discrediting Sukamo rvas of fundamental importance. Sukamo remained a respectedand popular leader against rvhom Soeharto could not nrove openly until the conditionswere right. In the spring of 1966 they rvere. The constant barrage of bad internationalcoverage arlci Sukarno's plurnmeting political position fatally undermined him. On 10March 1966. Sukarno rvas lbrced to sign or-er his po\\'ers to General Soeharto. The pKlr'vas eliminated as a signiticant tbrce and a pro-Western military dictarorship firmlyestablished. It u-as not long before Soeharto quietiv ended the inactive policy ofKonfrontasi, resulting in a su-i1t impror-ement in Anglo-Indonesian relations whichcontinue to be close to this day. Sukarno rvas allou.ed to retain his official title ofPresident-tbr Life until 1967. He was to die in 1970 under house arrest.

Roland challis believes that the British played a major role in Sukamo,s downfall:

You kno'uv, unless you do what the Americans did in chile - go in and actually mur-der the boss - leaders are only brought down by their own people. And I think theBritish played a very major roie in encouraging the Indonesian people to bring downSukarno, to persuade some military leaders that the moment was coming when theywere going to have to deal with the post-sukarno era.

I think rhe situation was well analysed, it was well managed, in the sense that itdidn't look like manipulaticn and didn't even involve very much in the way of whatnowadays we'd call sort of,, you knorv, inten,entionl It rvas the manipuiation of ideas,it was pure politics. And actually, it rvas beautifullv done in my opinion.3'

According to chailis, the key figure rvas rhe man from IRD, Norman Reddaway: .Ithink he was a very key figure, undoubtedly. I mean I don't know who ail the otherpeople invol'ed were of course. I am, myself, not conscious of there having beenanyone else who was so fully and meticulousl,v. so intelligently engaged with the wholething.'

CHAPTER TWO

'Lies and Ti,eachery':the Origins oflRD

The origins of Britain's Cold war propaganda iay in the Second -wortd .w.ar. It wasduring this conflict that the British r,"r. r.ii compelled to nlaster the manipulative arts ofpropaganda. From small beg;inningp there rapidlv grew a huge effort to win the heartsrnd mi,ds of friends and lbes alike. Lesso,s would Le quickliearned and not forgotren.\4any of the key figures that u,-ere to direct coverr propaganda for the forry years of theCold rTar were to learn their trade pitted against ,tr. a"i, powers, themselves noslouches at propaSlanda. The antecedenls r,,'ere much older. Anti-Sovietism had been aForeign otlice objective since the Revorution. The British were nor newcomers topropaganda but the Second World War had introduced a new professionalism and newmethods.The Second world war had srarted with a propaganda rie. The pretext for theinvasion of Poland orr 1 Septernber 1939 was an artack by polish sordiers on aclandestine Gerrnan radio station over the border at Gleiwitz inside German Silesia. Thebodies of the dead Polish soldiers were displayed ro the international press and used to

-iusti$, Hitler's vicrorious invasion of poland to Germany and the *orld, br, the polishsoldiers were not what they seemed. In fact they were the unfortunate inmates ofGerman concentration camps who had agreed to take part in a mock attack on the radiostation, in the vain hope of preserving their rives. As historian M.R.D. Foot noted, ,byan historic irony, the Nazis started wiih a subterfuge a war in which subterfuges were tobe used with deadly effect against them,.1

However, when Britain declared war on Germany forowing the invasion of porand,it was iIl*prepared lbr the propaganda war that was about to forlow. At the end of theFirst world war Britain had virtuany dismantled the rarge and effective propagandamachinery that it had built up after 191r.Be*,veen the wars, British propaganda had, onthe whole. been left in the hands of freerance anti-commu"irr rrrJ irir_i"uo.r. businessorganizations, as organized propaganda by the government was rargely abandoned.2Until 1938, when the BBC began broadcasting in foreign ranguages - ib.rrt.d responseto the flood of radio propaganda frorn the Eu.opea. Jictatorships3 - the onlyorganizations active in the propaganda field overseas were rhe Travel and IndustrialDevelopment Association and the British Council, charged with selling the British wayof life abroad.a rhis *rt .,: change ciramaticaly h 1939. As historian ihilip taylor has*'ritten, the Second world 'war

set off'what was to become the most vociferous war of$'ords yet waged by belligerent power5'.s In order to wage that war, allies and enemies

t: I]1\ITAIN'S SEC]t{ET PROPAGANDA WAR

aiike r','erc t'o creare hugc organizations cledicated to nraintaining their orvn rnorale,urrdelnining :rrrr1 rnisicrrt-hns thcir enr'ilries and articulating their policies

IJv latc sl'rrng 19+i). Hitler's apparentlr.unstoppable armies -*.ere already in the Low(lrlutrcrics;tttcl the situation in Francc r.r,as deterioraring. On 27 Mav the chiefs of staff,iri I joint p.1pr.'1'on hon i]ritain cou1c1 take the u'ar to Genrran-v, intbrmed Churchill that'thc orrlr'othtr mtthoi-l oiblineing about the dountall of Germany is by stimuiating thert:,.:cls oi revolt litl-rin rhe conqur-rc.l ren'itorie-q'.f on 19 Juiv, the same da1, as Hitlertolcj thc Rcrchst.ig ih.it iJrrt;rin's c-leteat s'as ar hand. Churchill authorized the creation ofa nen' organiz.ltiotl t(i t.rke tire s'ar to lhe (lcn'nans. As histonan Ted Cookridge \\,rote,'A tcu- slrokcs oi .r pen. ant-l a bociv s'.rs crea[ed "to coordinate all action by way ofsubr-r.r'sion rnrl s:ibot:rqc rrgainst the encnn, overseas Or. as the pnme Minister put it,"to set Europe abl:ize".'- The net.orqanizarion. named the Special operationsErecutive. (SOE). u'as otfrcraliv established under the Minister of Economic-Wafare,I)r Huqh i)alton.t rhe Ministrv of Economic warfare (MEw) became known inwiritehall :rs the 'Ministry of lJngenrlernanlv warfhre', a sobriquet conceived and:rpplied by winston churchill.e one of Dalton's assistants at MEw was christopherIr,lavherv. then a '5-vcar-old oxtbrd turor, rvho rvas assigned to help to organize theS()E trarrring schools l-.efore sen'ing rvith special Forces in North Africa, France and(lr-rntant-. 1'r

'lire SOE's urain concenr over rhe fbllorving years, and its ruison d,etre, was its workrvith the resisra,ce lrroriirs that sprl.g up .cross Europe a,d the Far East. Indeecl, as theofliciai histonan ot'thc SOE, M.R.D. Foor, wrote, 'SoE rvas a rvorld-r,vide body.l-herc u-as no coltincnt. rhere rvas h.irdlv anv country, ll,here it did not do-.onrething.'rr ()peratior:s included sLlpporting Tito's partisans in yugoslavia; suppiying,It sreet cost. thc \I/arsan'uprising;rr antl sup-.porting A,laiavan and Burmese Resistance tothe Japanesc. In Polar-rd alo,e. 600 tons of equipme,t ancl some 31g people werecir<>ppecl into hostile elremy territorw. 1-r In 1912, the SOE u.as also responsibie for theassassinariori oiSS ieader Himnrler's depuw. Reinhard Hevdrich.r+

The SOE's propagar-rda arm was made up of a fusion of recently create<i departments;a Foreign C)fiice propaganda organization called EHt a research branch of the War()fiice , the MIR, and section D of MI6,. Section D (tbr Destruction) hacl been set up inM:rrch 19JB'to utvestisatc ever-v- possibiliry of attackrng potential enemies by meansothcr th:rn tl-re operations of irilitarl. Ibrcr-s'.15 Like the MIR, Section D had beeninvestigatine lxethods oiindustrial sabotase and guerrilla warfare.16 It had also built up atlt:tu'ork of agcnts around the u'orld under the direction of an ex-Fleet Street journalistcallecl Leslic Sheridan. Startine in the Balkans and using his widespread contacts withFIeet Street journaiists and foreign correspondents, Sheridan built up a network ofaqents that. b1, 19,11, covered the principal neutral capitals of the worid. Most notably,Sheridan rc-cruircd one Krm Philby to MI6 in 19,{0.

Many of Sheridan's agenrs were transferred to the SoE, w-here they came underurilit:rry orders as cornnrissioned oflicers. Sheridan, who had the important position ofioint personal assistant to the SoE head, Sir Charles Hambro,rT had the rank ofcolouel.LS His agents rvere rtsually practisingjournalists and were required to'work theircover'. 'i-heir first job r,r,as to place pro-British and anti-Nazi propaganda in the localprc'ss and later, as strategic deception developed into a fine art, to floar carefully planned

.LIES AND TREACHERY,: THE oRIGINS oF iRD 1J

runlours - the so-called 'sibs' - that rvould eventually reach and misiead the Axisro\\:ers. As cover, some of these journaiists were placed as foreign correspondents ofleadrng Fleet Street papers, such as the Daily r,rirror and. th" noily,,1,{ai1. others were:ccredited to what rvas osterrsibiy a cornmerciri ,re*,s agency, B.rtrno,r, Ltd, rvhich haciotilces in Norlblk srreet, oIFthe Strand. Registered in october 19.10, tsntanova _ rhenanre of r'r'hich Sheridan took pri<ie in having in'enteci - was s!-t up by MI6 and soonatter came r-rnder the control otthe SOE.

The first major task for SoE's propaganda arm was in the Unitec States. Until thenriddle of 19'10, thc- positio, of the US media was strongly isolationist. ,rhe

SoE,sobjective - rvith Roosevelt's secret aqreernent - \r.as to bring thc US into the rvarasainst Gerrnant'. In the fourteen months follow,ing the establishment of the SOE thereu-as a tna-jor shift in America tou'ards support tor Britain ancl intervention. and ,in thisturn-about SoE pia-ved a hidden but major part.'rs Churchill's personal representative inrhe US rvas william Stephenson ('Intrepitl' or the 'euiet Canaclian,;,2,r u.ho hacl directitccess to Roosevelt thror'rgh his Americarr countcrpart, \Villianr Donovan (later head ofrhe American Of1lce ol Stratesic Serviccs. rhe eqr_rivalent to tire SOE). As a Ilritishrntelligence representarive in Nerv york, Stepherrsol, p..rr,rded the Nerv york_basedOverseas News Agencvll to provide cover tor llritish agerrts abroacl and to cooperate*'ith Britanova's Neu'york ofEce in pracing propananda in the US press.r2

originaliy the SoE Vu'as to have had overali conrrol of coverr p.op.grrr,l. u.hile overtpropaganda remained in the hands of rhe neu,' Ministry oi trirolmation (MoI).Hor'vever, as a result o1-atternpts by Alfred Duffcooper - the minister in charge of theMOI, u'ith a remit covering ilomestic p.opagrnda as r,verl as propaganda aimed atneutral countries to secure control orsor (SoE's propaganda r"irrg;, it rvas <lecided toset up a separate organization for propagancla to enemy ancl occupied countries. Thus,Sol lvas detached from SoE to become an independelrt entity, ihe poiitical warlareExccutivc IPWEr' nrn br l director-ge ner;l undcr Forcigrr oflice .uper-vision.

in 1941. Robert llruce Lockhart had been appointed I)eputv L]nder-Secretary ofState in the Foreign oftlce to coordinate the various organizations engaged i,propaganda. He later cornprained that, 'For twelve months ,h"

"r..gy of our rvholepropaganda effort, which shourd have been directed against th"..,"rrr,rrihas iargelv beendissipated in interdeparttnental intrigues and stri6.'23 The result was somewhat co,fused.As M.R.D. Foot has noted, 'The main contencling ciepartmenrs, the FO, MEw, MoIand soE""vere each to be allor,ved some sav in r.vhat ihe policies of pwE were ro be;the Foreign ofllce rvas allorved overan.,rr-,,.o1.'rr Nevertheless, despite the messy narureof the arrangements, eariy in l()42, as Sir Robert Bruce I_ockharr later recalled, ,-wervere given a ne*, charter ancl trvo Ministers: Mr Eden for policy and Mr Bracken foradrninistration. I'nyself rvas appointed Director-Generai . . .i, *,"r, lJreat lmprovemenr;rnd, with some initial creaks, the machine workL,d.,2r

The P\VE carricd the propaganda u,ar to th<.- enemv ancl neutrals using whatevertruths or lies and t'nethocls r.r'ere thought necessarv. These included disinfornratio,planted in neutrai countries, covert radio stations ancl the running of disinformationasents As Bruce Lockhart recalled: 'During the first two years uf th. w.., rnhen we\\.ere on the defensive, our acrivities wcre confirred rnainly to broadcasting an6 thedisserrrirtation of lcaflets. l)roadcasting in every appropriate lalrsuage genr on by night

BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

and by dav except for the hour or fwo required for maintenance of the transmitters.Leaflets were distributed b1, the Royal Air Force and by balloons and, long before theend of the War, reached a high standard of ingenuity and producrion.'26

Intelligence rnaterial rvas provided mainly by the Foreign oIIice, but eventually a

Central Intelligence Directorate rvas founded. A section rvas also established to conductfonvard planning and to analvse the effect ofthe propaganda being pur out.27

Under Bruce Lockhart, Rex Leeper took control of 'country headquarters', thecodename lor'Wobum Abbev rvhere the PWE's most secret activiries were organized:bv 19'11 it rvas housing some -158 propagandists. 'Wobum political warriors came mainlyirom the universities and Fleet Street, and included turure Labour Parfy leaders PatrickGordon Walker and Richard Crossman.lE

A highlv secret group $ias ser up under Sefton Deimer at 'Wobum Abbey. Delmerhad been a journaiist for the Daily Express before the Second world war. He hadfollowed Hitler's rise to power and 'was personally acquainted with Gciering, Goebbels,Hess, Himm]er and many other Nazi leaders'.2e During the first year of the war Delmerworked for MI6 and the BBC. However, in 1941 he was recruited to run a

psychological warfare operarion on behalf of the P!fE. He ser up a series of blackpropaganda radio stations, including Soldartensender Calais. It broadcast its programrnesfrom England while giving the impression that it was, in fact, a German army radiostation.

One of Delmer's most Amous creations was'Gustav Siegfried Eins'(GS1). Delmerinvented a tough Prussian called 'Der Chefl, who posed as a patriot disgusted by thecorruption and depraviw that apparently existed under the Nazi government and thatwas described in great. sometimes pornographic. detail. So well was the origin of thebroadcasts disguised, that even the American diplomats in Berlin began basing theirdispatches on Der Chefs broadcasts, reporting thar there had been an appreciable risein Armv hostility to the Nazi Parn'. evidenced b,v a new anti-Nazi radio station beingrun by a mysterious German oflcer. Evidence of German opposition to the Nazis wasin danger of strengthening the Americans' opposirion ro entry into the war, soRoosevelt rvas informed of the deception, apparentlv to his great amusement.3o Thepurpose of GS1 v!'as, as author Charles Cruickshank noted, 'purely subversive . . tostimulate distrust of the Nazis, the SS, and the administration in general. It also soughtby rumour and insinuation ro srir up friction between the Nazi Party and theWehrmacht.'31

The potential success of rumours was startlingly illustrated during the first months ofthe war. In the rvinter and spring of 1939/40, the Gerrnans, possibly under Goebbels'direct orders, had spread the r-umour that they had iarge and highly organized 'fifthcolumns' of secret supporters all over'Western Europe. 'Though in fact this fifth columnhad hardly anv real existence, the belief that it was there had a pou.erful influence,stimulating panic among millions of civilians, and so creating in rear areas a state ofconfusion ideal for an opposing Blitzkrieg attack.'32 In Britain it was widely believed andhad comical side-effects. with the Horne Guard arresting anyone of a possibly foreignbackground.

False rumours, or 'sibs', were a propaganda technique that became widely used by theIlritish secret services, MI6 and the SoE. Sibs - from the Latin sibillare, to whisper -

.LIES AND TREACHERY,: THE oRIGINS oF IRD 15

u'ere disseminated r'r'idery, rerying on the human weakness for passing on bad news.They had to be credible enough to appear true, but ararming "rro.rgr,

to excite attentionand the need to tell someone else. The effectiveness of nrmours was often tested athome before being put into circulation on rhe conrinent, tried out in London clubs byenthusiastic propagandists ro gauge effect.33Charies cruickshank recorded that the fonnation of sibs was a serious business: .An

lJnderground Propaganda committee met at 'w.oburn to examine whispers putfbrward by the Joint Intelligence committee, the Foreign office, the ServiceDepartmenrs, and P'wE Regionai Directors, and to .....rgJ for those which wereapproved to be put inro their final shape.':+ once approved, the mmours would be senton to MI6, SOE and pWE agents for disseminarion overseas.

Sometimes sibs were used to provide cover for orher operations. Gg, or .christ theKing', was another black radio operation run by Sefton Deimer on which talks r,",eregrven by one 'Father Andreas'. According to Delmer, the broadcasts opened with a fewmi_nutes of contemplative music, follor,ved by a brief serwice and rr.o.. -rri. before thetaik began. Delmer recalled, 'He denounced the Nazi attack on the German sense offamily' the parry's contempt for all human and moral 1arv. His material for these talkswas I}ctual and accurate. It contained no in'entions, rlo rumours..35-what made it ablack operation, in Delmer's opinion, was the fact that the source of the broadcasts wasdisguised. Indeed, according to Dermer, 'I asked my friends in SoE. and oSS to havetheir rumour agents in the neutral capitals spread it around that this ,,Christ the King,,radio was a "black" station secretly op..rr"Jby the vatican radio! That rumour caughton remarkably'"vell, and very soon it rvas rravering from mouth to mouth, not onry inSwitzerland, where the Father had a great following. but in Germany and Austria aswell. It u'as superb "evidence" of the pope's condemnation of the Nazi regime.,3o

..The number of sibs put out during the war ran into the thousands, and the p-w-E wasstiil being condemned for spreading them by the Vatican as late as 197g.37 All sibs werefiled and numbered for reference. A particularly imaginative exampre was sib k/669,

designed to cause fear and .respondency in the Gerrrran army on th. E"rt.., Front. AsThe Times reported, this 'attributed to a Swiss doctor the statement that 200 Germansoldiers had to be castrated due to the severiry of the Russian winter. This one found itsway into an American news agency's service under the heading ,.The

eunuchs of theEastern Front".'38 other rumours put out to deceive th"..r."-y, governments andpublic alike included a story that attributed the RAF,s Dambusters success ro aninternational organization of foreign saboreurs. According to the rumour, the RAF raidstvere merely a cover.3e

According to SoE veteran and rater conservative Mp, Sir Douglas Dodds-parker,sibs.were also a highlv eflective means of combating collaboration. He recalled that, ,If*'e knew a cerrain individual had been collaborating, then rve would put that out withsome source locally who lvould not say, "I heard it on some radio station over inEngiand." It would appear locally as if from some local source. And that was muchbetter dran having it put out on rhe radio outside. And this worked quite effectively.,aoover the last rwo years of the Second worid'w'ar, the burk of the pw.E,s work wasconcerned with the big military operations, the biggest of which uzas operarionoverlord - the invasion of Europe. Indeed, in the months 1eading up to D-day, the

16 BIIITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA'WAR

I']WE had been engaged in a massiye campaign of strategic deception. Because theectiviiies of the PWE and the SoE were so cioselr, rvatched by the Germans, it wascorrflclentlv belicved th:rt thcr. could be used to decerve them. Intensified activity in onearca, or courltt:r', could be used to nislead the Germans as to u,'here the invasion wouldtake place.ai For eratnple. Operation Bodvguard u'as designed to draw atrcntiop awavirorn Normatldr-. to the Pas de Calais (Operation Fortitude) and the Balkans (OperationZeppehrr) Increa-sed rcrivin'. such as sabotaqe and atracks on troops, would suggest a

possibl.' lanclinq :rntl tie clos'n (lerrnrn troops au'av tlom the actual landing 21sx.+2

C)peratrons to cotttuse the enc'rlr' .ontinrled once the inr.asion had taken piace. Forexarrrple. durinq thc- rlrst s-eeks of the inlrisiort. Sttltlarterrsettder Cdldis took advantage ofthe bre.rkciou'tt in Gertn;rtt conlnunic:rrions to issue its orvn situation reports, based onLrp-to-datc- rntbrrnarion irom Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force(SHAEF: A: l)clnrer recallcd. 'our reports \\'erc accurare too - ninery-nine times ourof a hundrecl. The hundredth time came when we put in some false information at therc'quest oi the tactical deception experts to mislead our trusting clients and send themheadlong ir-rro a trap.'al In fact, thel' were so accurate that John Kimche, a German-spcaking reporter at the Ept'ninll Standard, who had found out that the reports werebased on advance infbrmation, used Soldartensender Calais as an unattributed source forhis:rrticles.rl

After C)verlord, Bruce Lockhart recalled, much of the PWE's rvork was intended totlraint:rin contact rvith the popuiations of the countries to be liberated. 'Our planningbcgan in ()ctober 19-13 and in prepararion u,e initiarerl the Voice of SHAEF on rheBllc. The broadcasts. u,hich had to be approved bv SHATF, were senr out in French,Flerrush. L)utch. Darrish and Nonleqian ro enable General Eisenhovu,er to give his directinstructrons to the cir''il popr-rlation on the coast of 'western Europe and, doubtless, toke'ep the enelrv guessine about his inrentions.'-3 As Cmickshank noted, 'It is impossiblein a ferv pa€ies to describe all rhat PWE drd rn conneclion rvith Operation Overlord.'a6In the u'eeks leadrng L1p to rhe invasion of Europe the need to procluce propaganda inadvance had necessitated the strict rsolatton of the teams of writers, translators andprinters needed to do the job. The' rvork u.as on an enornous scale. In the days beforeD-c'lay, nvo printing presses, under militan' zuard, produced some 32 million leaflets.a7

The PWE could even claim the distinction of having broadcast the first news of thelarrdings through solLlartcnstrtder C,tlais. 'With advance rvarning that the invasion wasinrminent, Sefton l)elnrer \l'as prepared for lr.hen the German news agency put thestory out on thc air. As soon as the nervs came through, Delrner explained to Hans(lutntann - the chief nelr.s u,riter - rvhom they had invited to dinner to keep him onh:rrrd. thri thei rreciicd sorne broatlca,t. rr'ritte,,. just to bc prcpared in the event of anAllied irrvrsion. Delmer recalled his conversation rvith Hans Guttman: 'The object willbc to sugeest . " . that their line has been breached, that they are cur off and that theynriqltt as rvell give up. 'We don'r wanr to say rhat of course. A11 r,ve do is give thern apicture of the situatiol fror.n u'l-rich they can draw their orvn conclusions.' A fullycornprehenclinu and, by nor,,,, delighted Gurmann set ro work. The tinai reports wereu'ritten, Delmer.lvrote later,'to fit in with the Allied deception plan which was tomislead the Gelntans into the belief that the invaders r,vere striking at the mouth of theSeine arrd at Calais'-a8

LIES AND TREACHERY THE ORIGINS OF IRD 17

Recently released SoE files at the pubric Record ofiice are beginning to shor,v rhetull extent of black propaganda operations against the Germans. The blackestpropaganda, headed'Adults Only'in the files, w'as about sexualpeccadilloes of the lrostsenior Nazis. SS chief Heinrich Himmler was portrayed as the protector of a grouprvhich carried out regular 'cuit' orgies. Other leaflets claimed Nazi party leader Christianweber acted as a croupier at a parry r."'here a naked grrl ,rrr, ,t."p'p.d on to a roulette'\'heel' The girl was then spun and sexually abused by whichever German official shestopped in front of SoE even put Him,rler's head on forged stamps ro encouragerumours that he rvas plotting against Hitler.

The propaganda themes developed by the PW'E had one common thread: whatever*'or-rld bring victory cioser by 'weakening the enemy's appetite for war, by hindering hisabilirv to fight, or by susraining the occupied counrries, will to resist.,ae However, themeans to achieve this airn werc nran). and varied. pwE used outright lies anddisinformatio,, but it did not onry produce black propaganda. By far the burk of itsmaterial was 'uvhat are described as white and grey propaganda. As cruickshank noted,tn 1942 a director of prorluction

'nas appointed, 'rvho was put in charge of the printing

of PWE's mass-produced r.vhite p.oprgrrrd, - rnrrlions of leatrets, ,r1iJirt.r." periodicalsand new-spapers, for rvhich the British government could openl,v accepr respo,sibility.,soPart of the PWE's remit rvas riaising n'ith the BBC's overie., ,.*r."r, which, rike thedomestic BBC, refused any involvement in black propaganda. Nevertheress, BruceLockhart recalled, 'I moved into Bush House in the same block as the BBC. we made anew agreenlent with the Governors of the BBC, which gave us full politicai controlover our foreign broadcasts.'5r

The Ministry of Information (MoI) had been set up in 1939 and was responsible forgovernment propaganda into Britain and neutral countries. Initially under LordMacmillan, effective propaganda policy had been disturbed by the rapid succession ofnrinisters given responsibiiity, one after the other. Macmillan was followed shortly afterby Sir John Reith, founder of the Btsc, and DuIr cooper, whose failure to reachagreement with Hugh Dalton, the Minister for Economic 'warfare, led to theappointment of Brendan Bracken at churchill's own instigation. The MoI,s principaltask was to generate propaganda aimed at the British p.opl.. Its mission was to lift andnlaintain morale and deal with the mass media, including the BBC. Its responsibilitiesincluded government information policy, press conferences, pubricity campaigns andcerrsorship. The importance of censorship had been .".ogrir.d in a 1939 RoyalInstitute of International Affairs enquiry into broadcastirrg ,ri propaganda considereduseful to the planners in the MoI. The RIIA, in a rist of !.r.."i ideasl corcruded that,'The best propaga,da is the silent murder of the opposirion nervs * censorship.,:z

Other ground rules presented in this documenr, which helped 'to lay the foundarions ofthe basic principles of Britain's wartilne propaganda',s3 inclujed: ,As regards the masses ofpeople, appeal to their instincts and not to thei, reason . . . Uncier censorship conditionsrunlour assumes gigantic proportions. Hence whispering campaigr-rs . . . The highest art i.propaganda is to maintain the appearance of impartialif r,vhiie r"..r.irrg the wholeheartedadoption of the vrerv propagated. . . . we ,r.rrt ,"r..h Hitrer's ,p.".i", for propagandapoin15.';+ can the postwar popurariry of the royal famiiy be ,.r."d ,o recommendationnumber 31: 'The glorificatron of the Royal Family is an importanr matter,?ss

)

18 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA'WAR

Initially, the MOI was faced with maintaining that morale in the context of repeatedenemy victories by seizing on what few successes there were, and transforming neardisaster, like at Dunkirk, into a victory of sorts. When Churchill gave his broadcast tothe nation, Dunkirk was transformed into Britain's 'finest hour'.

Arguably, it was the overt side of British propaganda that had the greatest and mostlasting effect. During the early squabbles over rhe control of propaganda, Rex Leeper-in an attack on the MOI's insistence that it should maintain controi over all overtpropaganda and assertion that this was separare from coverr subversive propaganda -u,rote in exasperation, 'lt is fantastic for the Ministry of Information to interpretsubversive propaganda as merely covert or underground propaganda. The mostformidable instrument for propaganda toda.v is broadcasting and the facilities oflered bythe BBC are far and away, our most potenr merhod of employing that instrument.'s6

The BBC was the principal means of reaching both occupied and neutral Europewith propaganda. During the course of the war, it became an extremely effectiveweapon of propaganda. The war saw the emergence of a special link benveen the BBCand the British people - indeed, between the BBC and the peoples of the occupiedEuropean Continent.sT However, despite its nominal independence, during the war theBBC became an instrument of state information policy, 'guided' by the MOI and thePW'E in all of its activities. As historian Philip Schlesinger has argued, 'from the point ofview of the control of sensitive "material", it mattered little whether the BBC wasofficially controlled or formally independent. . . . The BBC saw itself as part of the wareffort, and hence the question of its pulling in a very different direction from thatdeemed officially desirable did not arise.' Indeed, such was the understandableidentification between the BBC and the propagandists that A.P. Ryan, the top wartimenews executive and special adviser to the BBC, was convinced that the BBC 'shouldsupplement the army, nar,y and the air force as "a fourth arm in this war".'58

(Jnder the guidance of the MOI and the P'WE, the BBC's objective during the earlypart of the war, as Germany marched from one victory to the next, was to attract anaudience for its broadcasts in Europe through reliable and accurate news, no matter howuncomfortable the facts were. Efforts to shape BBC broadcasts by the propagandistsoften led to conflict with BBC ofEcials. Richard Crossman, working in the P'W'E,recalled that, 'meetings bet'uveen the PWE and the ofiicials of the BBC took the form oflong bitter fights. Quite properly, the BBC of{icials were determined to do nothingbeyond reporting the straight news. . . Our job was to inject the highest percentage ofpropaganda content we could into the news service of the BBC . . struggling tocorrupt the BBC for the pu{pose of winning the war!'se

Nevertheless, historian M.R.D. Foot recognized that: 'This anxiery always strictly totell the truth, however unpalatable the truth might be to a patriotic ear, turned outbefore long to have been a devastatingly effective stroke in psychological wafare. As theBBC always stated the facts, so far as they were known in London, and German- andItalian-controlled broadcasts continued their pre-war habits of boasting, exaggerarion,and propaganda, those who were able to hear both sides were quickly able to concludewhich was the more reliable.'60 Flowever, as Cruickshank pointed our, 'Although openbroadcasting was confined to the truth, on the ground that honesry is the best policy, itdid not necessarily have to be the whole truth. While the white broadcasters were

.LIES AND TREACHERY,: THE ORIGINS OF IRD

required to promote the current approved propaganda themes no less than were theirblack brethren, some truths would support them better than others, and some werebetter left untold.'61

Nevertheiess, the strength of the BBC was that it inspired trust. For example, withregard to the Colporation's broadcasts to occupied France, 'Britain's military reverseswere reported with complete frankness and no effort was made to hide the gravity ofher situation. This honesty in adversiry much impressed the BBC's French audience,and went some way to restore French confidence in Britain - which had been seriouslyshaken by Vichy and German propaganda that the British troops had left the French inthe lurch at the time of Dunkirk.'62 Such was its success in establishing a reputation forreliabiJiry that, by the end of the war, the BBC 'was regarded by the vast majoriry oflisteners not as an instrument of propaganda but as the purveyor of an objective newsservice run by people anxious to disseminate the truth. . . . This of course made it a

first-class instrument of propaganda.'63 As George Orwell noted, 'The BBC as far as itsnews goes has gained enonnous prestige since about 1940. . . . "I heard it on the radio"is now almost equivalent to "I know it must be tme".'64

According to historian Philip Taylor, 'the basic principles of Britain's wartimepropaganda [were] encapsulated in Sir John Reith's maxim that "news is theshocktroops of propaganda" and the Ministry's general view that it rvas more effectiveto tel1 the truth, nothing but the truth, and as far as possible, the whole rruth.'6s Wharthe propagandists iearned was that propaganda was most effective if it was based onaccurate factual information. Spin, to use the modem term, there was, but if outrightdisinformation was to be used it was most effective when used sparingly, dropped intootherwise accurate and reliable information sources. Bruce Lockhart noted, 'The creditthat the propagandist enjoys both with the enemy and in enemy-occupied territory is indirect proportion to the accuracy of his information.'66 Crossman, for one, wasconvinced that black propaganda was less effective than its practitioners sometimesclaimed. 'Although we found the left-hand activities enormous fun, although a vastamount of talent went into them, although I am sure they entertained the Gestapo, Ihave grave doubts whether black propaganda had an eflect in any way commensuratewith that of straightforward propaganda from enemy to enemy.'67 Dodds-Parkerrecal1ed, 'I've always found, as a principle, that truth is much more valuable ande{fective than trying to concoct a lot of falsities and black propaganda. Sooner or laterpeople find out and they never trust you.'68

The lessons learned were to be applied far sooner than anyone expected.

CHAPTER THREE

Origins of the Cold WarIn late September 7947, a brooding Stalin was on holiday in Georgia with his depury,Molotov. During the day they would rest in the sun and drink the robust local wine. Inthe evening, Stalin would read coded cables sent over a special radio from SzklarskaPremba in southern Sudetenland. The names of the correspondents were aliases. Thefirst cable from 'Sergeev and Borisov' was addressed to 'Comrade Filippov', one ofStalin's favoured codenames. The senders were Andrei Zhdanov and Georgi Malenkov,rwo of Stalin's senior officials, who had been assigned a top-secret task by Stalin. Theyreported, 'Tonight, September 22, the conference began its u,ork.'

What took place in that six-day conGrence of rhe nine Communist powers was thecreation of the Informational Bureau of Communist Parties, the Cominform. On thelast day they sent 'Comrade Filippov' another message: 'Tomorrow, the moming of the29th, we will flying to Moscow. On all documents of the conference we will reportpersonally.'1

On their arrival, Stalin appointed Zhdanov head of the Cominform and heannounced its existence to the world in October 1,947. lts creation signalled thebeginning of a new and tough policy consolidating the Soviet sphere of influence,especially in Eastern Europe. [t sealed the beginning of a period of total Sovietdominance in the countries that it now controlled.2

The Cominforrn was not a debating chamber but a tool of the Soviets. Anybody whomisunderstood this was in for a rude shock. According to two modern Russianhistorians, Vladislav Zttbok and Constantine Pleshakov:

Co-ordination among 'fraternal' parties in the Cominforrn guaranteed Soviet domi-nation much better than any system of bilateral state treaties, and at the same timedispelled negative associations with traditional imperialist practices, such as the domi-nation of Poland by Czarist Russia in the nineteenth century. But at the same timeStaiin did not want the Cominform to be in any way an ideological headquarters ofthe revoiutionary movement. The Yugoslav Cornmunists tried to perceive it as suchand were unceremoniously expelled from the Cominform inJune 1948.3

Stalin had disbanded the Comintern h 1943 under pressure from his new allies,Britain and America. The Comintern coordinated the work of all of the world'sCommunist parties and was founded by Lenin as the Third International. From itsinception the Comintem was the great Communist bogeyman to the

.West, literally, the

global conspiracy made incarnate. Roosevelt demanded its dissolution as a condition ofsupplying war material during the Second World War. The Comintem had dispensed

22 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA'WAR

'Moscow Gold' to its comrades abroad and dictated their policies. 'While some of that

work was clandestine, it rarely involved itself in espionage, leaving that to other organsof state. This organization had been devoted to spreading the Communist dogma andinfluence across the world, principally by the use of propaganda and agitation. However,even after dissolution, the key elements of the organization remained intact from thecore staff in Moscorv, a nerr.vork of agents and svmpathizers linked up with Sovietintelligence and spread over Eurasia.r Many u.ere emploved in the new cominform.

The main purpose of the nerv cominform rvas to extend the work of theinternational Communist parties. It created peace organizations and other Communist'fronts' to put pressure on the'Western po\vers through public opinion to decolonializeand make 'real' peace rvith the Soviet bloc on, u.hat u-ere considered to be, Sovietterms. These fronts were designed to be inclusive of traditionally activist groups andincluded the

.World Federation of Trade unions, the Intemational Ljnion of Students,

the International Organisation of Journalists and the World Federation of DemocraticLawyers. These organizations were to prove successful, picking up many members andholding many conferences ourside the Soviet bloc. The cominform published a

fortnightly jorrnal, For Lasting Peace, Jor a people's Democracy, in numerous languages.The World Peace Movement was considered to be the most effective of the fronts by

both the East and the .W'est. It held large international conferences for a number of

years. The Foreign office argued that the world peace Movemenr was, 'in eflect . . .

merelv another insrrumenr of Soviet policy'. Many people felt that the Soviets hadh5acked the word 'peace' and used it to imply Soviet fraternity, compared withAmerican and British aggression. Britain was already under increasing pressure to retreatfrom the Empire and, faced with Communist victories in Westem European elections,British o{Ecials began to argue that it was time to go onto the offensive. As DenisHealey pointed out in his autobiography, 'Britain, nor America, was rhe first target ofSoviet hostility, because it was British troops which srood on the frontiers of Sovietpower in Greece, Trieste and Persia, while the United States was trying to disengagefrom its wartime positions all over the Worid as fast as possible.' For example, on g June1946, Moscow Radio told its listeners in Norway, 'This iittle country [Britain] wenr towar because it and its fascist reactionary leaders love war and thrive on war. The attackon Hitlerite Germany was purely incidental.'5

The defeat of the Axis in 1945 left a radically aitered political map of the world.'W'hereas before the war the Soviet lJnion had been isolated and confined effectively toEastem Europe, its power now reached beyond Berlin and its influence was more globalthan ever. The Soviet victory in the 'Great Patriotic War' had made Communism looklike it could organize an effective sociery capable of industrialization on a huge scale.The fact that it had been at the forefront of the war against the fascists, the Communist'smortal enemies, lent Communism an enoffnous influence and credibiliry. If it had takenthe German invasion of Russia to engage the Soviets in what they had previously calledan 'imperialist war', it was the Communist parties across Europe that had often been atthe forefront of the resistance to Nazi occupation and, foilowing the end of hostiiities,Communist Party membership mushroomed.

The Foreign office, looking our across a shaken and disturbed Empire, saw a darkhorizon. As Lord Mayhew, then a Labour Mp and junior minister at the Foreign office,

ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR 23

recailed, 'the communisrs were threatening to take power in paris and Rome, andBerlin, Germany and so on, we *.." ,...i"bly worried even about the influence ofcommunism in west Germany, and those were the priority countries. Then there wasrhe question of the commonwealth, we were delperateiy worried that once theybecame independent they'd become easy meat for some of these communists.,6Britain, too' had undergone a radical political transformation. The 1g45 election hadbrought in a Labour government by a randslide on a socialist mandate. A war-wearynation wanred hope through an idealistic and a more egalitarian sociery. Althoughchurchili had proved a historic and great war leader, hrs parry had been brushed asidewhen it came to peace. In'tially the Labour government had hopes of a new relationshiprvith the Soviet lJnion. euite quickly ,rrJh hop., *".. ,.pi...d by suspicion. TheBritish State, and even more so, the United States, perceived a Soviet and communist

threat in Europe and the Empire very quickly.The day the war ended Britain was already confronting Communism. British forceswere already six months into intervention against the Left in Greece; the politicalsituations in Italy had been organized for rwo years to rimit the power of the Left; andrvhile everyone thought that the Labour government u,ould move against France, Bevinrefused any serious action.As early as 1'946 the British cabinet had been receiving alarming intelligence repoftson the dangers of Soviet military intervention in Europe. 'wesrem pubric opinion beganto be alerted to the Soviet 'threat' by leading politicians. on 5 March 1946, winstonChurchill made the famous speech at Fulton] Missouri, in which he spoke of an ,Iron

Curtain' descending across Europe.

_ In America, despite the inclination to disengage following the Second

.world .war,the mood towards the communists was hardening and therre was pressure for a moreaggressive poiicy on the Soviet [Jnion. ln 7947, after much consultarion with the StateDepartment, the US president unveiled .the Truman Doctrine,: the US would assist anynation to deal with internal or extemal communist aggression, and wourd begin bygrving aid to Greece and Turkey.

The establishment of cominform was seen by many commentators in the .west

asa naked statement of communist aggressive intent. A more sophisticated analysismay have considered whether it was a reaction to a complex international situationand reflected Stalin's notorious sense of insecurity, which extended from thepersonal to the international. As relations deteriorated, the Soviets used agitationand propaganda to good effect, particularly railing against Imperial Britain, thentrying to control the disintegration of the Empire. tvtayhew,s then deputy, NormanReddaway, recalled that, 'the Russians [had] a huge opinion influencing machine,rvith three members of the politb,r.o .o.."..red with information and propaganda,beating our Ernest Bevin and Hector McNeil and Mayhew round the head at theUN, [there was a] deluge of propaganda through front organizarions, radios andlocal Communist parties.,T

The Foreig' Secretary, the man who set the tone towards the Soviet (Jnion, wasEmest Bevin, one of the few memben of Attlee's govemment who had broken throughthe class divide' Bevin was the ilregitimate son of a Somerset woman who earned herliving as a domestic seryant and vinage midwife. She had died when he was onlv seven

BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA'WAR

years old. He left school at eleven, worked as a farm boy and then went to Bristol,rn'here he worked as a drayman until he was trvenq/-nine, when he joined the docker'sunion as an organizer. The 6,1-vear-o1d Bevin had expected to be made Chancellorinstead he found himself at the Foreign office. According to Denis Healey, 'Thoughshort of stature, he u'as built like a battie tank, rvith the rolling gait and thick stumpyfingers rvpical of a stevedore. S1ou. and sotl of speech in private, he could roar like anysucking dove at a pubiic rneeting. He had shorvn a ruthless ambition in getting to thetop of hrs union and could be brurailv arroqanr in debate.'8 Bevin had dealt withCommunists in rhe tracie unions lbr thirn'r'ears and \\'as svmpathetic to Foreign O{Ececoncerns about dangers presented br- Soviet Communism. Bevin,s anti-Communistscepricism had been reinforced by rhe Soviet shorv trials of 1936-8.

The Foreign Ollce's orvn inherent anti-Sovietism had had a brief respite during theu'ar. but it soon returned in fu1l flood. In September 1946, Thomas Brimelow, who hadbeen the head of the consular Service in Moscorv {rom 1942 to 1945 and wasafterwards in the Northem Department, wrote on the hard line posture already beingtaken by the American public against the Soviets:

In Great Britain a general realisation of the pattern of Soviet policy will come aboutslorvly, and while it is fonning every allorvance will be made to the Russiarrs andnorle to the Foreign oflce. The result of this will be a split in public opinionbetween those who blame the Russians and those who blame the Foreign Secretary.If rve are to keep this split to the smallest possible proportions - and this we must doif we are to reduce the effectiveness of Communist propaganda inside this country-we shall have to shor.v patience, forbearance and a strict correctness in all our dealingsrvith.the Russians. 'We cannot aflord to be in the u'rong.e

In the ciimate of increasing tension within the Soviet lJnion, there grew the beliefr.vithin the government and the Foreign Ot1ice that there was a need to counter Sovietpropaganda, especially as the Cominform would undoubtedly professionalize andexpand Soviet output. The British had no professional equivalent. The propagandadepartments of the Second world 'v/ar

- MoI and the p'wE - had been closed down atthe end of the war. Although the British govemmenr had the Foreign oflice's NewsDepartment and the successor to the MOI, the Central Oflice of Information, it had noor:ganized capabiliry for in-depth research for high-impacr, overt and covert propaganda.Horvever, Britain's postwar economic and military deciine virtually ensured thatpropaganda would become an imporrant weapon, hecause it was one of the few meansby which the government could respond to the perceived Soviet threat and attempt tomaintain Britain's status in the world at minimal expense.

Bevin's two junior ministers were Hector McNeil and christopher Mayhew.According to Healey, Mayher,v was one of the few people on rhe Left at oxford in hisgeneratioll who never joined the Cornmunist Parry. 'Chris himself was something of aboy-scout, seeing issues always in black and white. This made him one of the best ear$television presenters.'l0 It also made him an exceilent propagandist. Mayhew was theeminente grise behind the formation of the Foreign OfIice's anti-Cornmunist organization.A ta11, thin inrellectual w-irh ambition and a cause, Mayhew had been convinced of the

OI{IGINS OF THE COLD 'V/AR

rlecd for such a department and strategl,- by his experiences at the United Nations,rvhere the Russians u'ere conducting a hard-hitting propaganda ofrensive, aimed inparticular against Britain.rl According to Norman Reddaway, at the time Mayheu,,sparliantentaw Private Secretary,

It was a reaction to a situation i.vhich identified itself sharply at the United Nations inOc-tober i947 where Bevin was belaboured by Molotov and Vishinski with anabsolute torrent of well-researched information, misinfbrmation, and disinformation,obviously tl.re product of a very large machine for influencing opinion. when Bevinfound himself belaboured, he said he was not going ro pur up u,ith this and askedMayhew to do sornething about it. He [Mayhew] had the wit to realise that, if rververe going to -qtand tlp to this sort of blast, you had to have some kind of organiza-tion r'vhich rvould do research in depth and then find ways of marketing it.r:

Like many of the of the Foreign OtEce rnandarins, Mayherv rapid11. became a Cold'Warrior - profoundlv sr.ispicious of the intentions of the Soviet L]nion. He rvas firmlyon the right of the Labour Par-n- and \\'as unsvmpathetic to the Soviet union. Suspicionof the Soviet (Jtrion rvas not universal in Bntain. It has to be renrembered that, at theend of the Second Worlcl 'War. there \^,,as still an admiration in much of the populationfor 'Uncle Joe' Stalin and the Red Armv. Class war was at irs height ancl many Britishpeople fblt that comrnunism, for all of its faults, might be better than the brutalcapitalism that they had experienced in the years leading up the war. Within the LabourPartv. ditlerences in attitude towards the Soviet lJnion emergecl publicly, both inparJiament and in the Trade ljnion Congress. Writing to the Prime Minister 6n29 October 19'16, a group of Labour MPs argued that British socialist policies couldbridge antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union and encourageSoviet extension. They deplored the 'anti-red' virus, opposed allying tsritain with'Arnerican Imperialism' and foresarv the lJnited Nations as the principal futureinstmrnent of international securiry. In November, during a debate on foreign policy,the dernand for a 'socialist aiternative' to existing policies was popularly made and oneof Revin's fiercest critics, Richard crossman, made a vigorous attack on thegovernment's 'drilt into the American camp'. By the middle of 1947 the risk of a split inthe Labour Parry and its implications was being seriousiy discussed.l3

This mood of antagonism towards American-sryle capitaiism is a-lmost unimaginabletoday. How-ever, the enrinent historian AJ.p. Taylor, for example, considered thatnobodv in Europe believed in the American \vay of life - that is in privare enterprise.George on,'e11, r.vho as we shall see \\,as no communist, dismissed capitalism as a failedsystem.1l Key members of the cabiner, r.vho tended to be more right-wing than many oftheir backbench comrades, were anxious that all of this left-wing talk would stop theAmericans providing more aid. Britain had been financially devastated by the war andthe Americans rvorrlrl rot be happy about assisting their ally if their aid was going tofund n eo-C onimnnist policies like nationali zation.

Press and pubiic surveys carried out in the sumnler of 1947 by the British Embassy inwashington revealed rhat avowed anti-communism wouid be the main issueinfluencing American support.ls The Foreign Othce had startecl campaigning early for

25

26 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA'WAR

the control of any govemment anti-Communist propaganda organization. As early as

Aprrl 1946, christopher 'warner, an under-secrerary at the Foreign o{Ece, was callingfor an attack on and exposure of international communism through a propagandacampaign in response to an apparent Soviet determination to achieve their ends by anymeans short of rvar.15 In the same vear, Foreign Ot1ice ottrcials persuaded Bevin to agreeto offensive propaganda operations against Communism in Iran. The Soviet Union hadestablished a nes' republic in northern Iran - just about the only actual case of a

Kremlin '1and grab' outside its sphere of influence ibllou-ing the Second world 'war.

The Foreign Ot-ilce s'as alreadv making intormal use of its media contacts. TheRussia Conrnrittee noted rn late 19-16 that a'considerable amount of material based onoificial sources' was getting into the press. such as the Canadian blue book on trials ofSoviet spies.l; A11 heads of the Foreign OfEce political departments were instructed tofind rvays to make 'subtler use of our publiciry machine', to ensure the publication ofanti-Soviet material, to leak information to friendly diplomatic correspondents or toinspire questions that the Foreign Ollice could pretend that it did not want to answer.18

As early as January 7947 the British Foreign Office called its heads of missions inEastem Europe to a meeting in London, with ministers and ieading officials, to developa concerted response to the Soviet union.le Bevin had resisted a formal organization.His initial reluctance seems to have been, in part, base on the feeling that 'the puttingover of positive results of British attitude will be a better corrective'.20 After holding outagainst adopting such a policy fbr some time, Bevin was finally convinced by the linkingof the civil seryants' plans for a propaganda offensive rvith christopher Mayhew's planfor a 'Third Force' catnpaign. Mayherv had tied up rvith the Foreign O{fice behind-the-scenes campaign. While manv Foreign OfEce mandarins felt i1l at ease with the LabourParty, thev felt comfortable u,ith Ma.vherv, a narural social democrat, and his boss,Bevin. Bevin was to reject complaints that there rvere roo many public school men atthe Foreign ofiice, saying, 'I am nor one of those u-ho decry Eton and Harrow. I wasvery glad of them in the Battle of Britain.'

Mayhew, in the course of discussions rvithin the Foreign Ofiice during the remainderof the year, drafted a paper that in irs final form, rvas accepted by the cabinet in January1948 and was to become the genesis of IRD.21 Mayherv's paper, presented by Bevin,commented, 'If we are to give a moral lead to the forces of anti-Communism in Europeand Asia, we must be prepared to pass over to the offensive and not to leave the initiariveto the enemy, but to make them defend themselves.' This would be achieved through a

propaganda offensive based on 'the vital ideas of British social democracy and 'W'estern

civilisation' and could be carried out by a small section in the Foreign Oftice, establishedfor that purpose, which could undertake the necessary research and dissemination ofinformation and anti-Communist propaganda 'through our Missions and informationservices abroad.'The cooperation of the BBC would also be sought. In addition,'ouranti-Communist publiciry material should aiso be available to Ministers for use, whenconvenient, in their public speeches; and also to British delegations to conferences and -on an informal basis - to Labour Paffy and Trades Union delegations.'22

Mayhew and Bevin beiieved that a straightforward anti-communist propagandaoperation would not be acceptable to some of the more left-wing members of thecabinet, especially Aneurin Bevan, who were intermittently sympathetic to the Soviet

-

ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR

Union and often more critical of the United States. So Mayhew had added to the purelyanti-Communist propaganda campaign suggested by the Foreign Office civil seryantsthe concept of a 'Third Force' propaganda campaign. He had presented the idea toBevin in a confidential paper in October 1947, stressing that the campaign would attackcapitalisrn as n'ell as Comrnunism and promote the Social Democratic values associatedwith the Labour government.23

The original idea of a 'Third Force'was developed by G.D.H. cole in 1,946 as aleft-wing alternative to the close relationship with the United Srates, ro which Britain wasdrifting in reaction to a deterioration of relations with the USSR. According to Cole,Britain should cast itself as the leader of 'W'estem Europe and lead it towards a liberalsocialist future independent of both the USSR and the United States - in effect, adopt aneutral position.:'r

However, according to christopher Mayhew, the purpose of casting the anti-Comrnunist propaganda offensive in terms of the 'Third Force, was purely tactical - acover designed to undermine a1ly left-wing opposition, should IRD and the nature ofits operations come to light. As Mayhew explained:

I thought it rvas necessary to present this rvhole campaign in a positive way, in a waywhich Dick crossman and Michael Foot would find hard to oppose. And they werecalling for a Third Force . . . so I recommended in the original paper I put to Bevinthat r.r,e call it a Third Force propaganda campaign. 'w'e were going to campaign forSocial Democracy, and on that basis Emest Bevin accepted my first draft. we onlydealt u'ith the Third Force idea frankly, or at least I did, because I was parliamentaryunder-Secretary and I didn't want Bevin to be defeated and humiliated inside theLabour Party.25

The cabinet agreed that the British government would be more forthright inattacking the Soviet (Jnion in pubiic - particularly at the (Jnited Nations - and that thead hoc activities of the previous two years would be combined within a secretCommunist Information Department, shortly to be given the anodyne cover title of theInformation Research l)epartment. The formation of IRD was approved by the cabineton 4January 1948 to 'check the inroads of Communism by taking the offensive againstit and to give the lead to our friends abroad and help them in the anti-Communiststruggle'. IRD studied 'communist principles, policy, tacrics, and propaganda' anddevised 'publicity designed to expose the realities of communism and the lyingCommunist propaganda.'26

There have been suggestions that the Foreign Oflice simply hijacked the new anti-Communist organization and that Mayhew's claim that the 'Third Force' concept was alater device to cover his ernbarrassment. This seems unlikely. A report from'WaldemarJ. Gallman, minister ar the American Embassy in London, to George Marshall inWashington would seem to supporr Mayhew,s claims:

Foreign Olfice olEcials directly charged with Soviet affairs have recently andrepeatedly indicated that while there is no change in substance to l;nited Kingdompolicy towards Russia, every move must be carefully considered and planned from

27

28 tsRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

the point of view of protecting Bevin from Labour parry rebels . . . in light of Labourrebellion, Bevin and Foreign Office now take greater pains to avoid creatingimpression he is gangrng up with the United States against Russia.'27

Parliament, *hi.h -ry have rejected an anti-Comrnunist propaganda offensive, was

therefore not informed and, as IRD was in part funded through the Secret Vote, bywhich Parliament votes funds for MI5 and MI6 u.ithout scrutiny, nor could it exercise

any scrutiny over IRD operations. From the start, IRD had close links with the Secret

Intelligence Sen'ice (SIS, also knorvn as MI6). IRD also made use of the inteiligencecoming into MI6. rvhich rvas sanitized for any torm of distribution. In particular, IRDworked closely rvith the anti-Soviet Section IX of the Secret Service, which had beenreiaunched in 1914 under the control of Kim Philby.zs

The economic support provided by Marshall Aid enabled Bevin to initiate an

offensive policy against Communism, without which Britain could simply not havebeen sustained. As Christopher Mayhew commented in a speech at Chatham House in

June 1950, 'from the middle of 1947 onwards, decisions were taken towards uniting thefree world, at the expense of widening the gap with the Comrnunist world. I would say

that the turning point was Mr Marshall's Harvard speech in June 1947. Frcm then onour immediate objective changed, from "one world", "to one free world".' Once giventhe go-ahead to establish IRD and launch the anti-Communist propaganda campaign,Foreign Office o{ficials were faced with the practical tasks of organizing the newdepartment and developing the methods that it would use. The responsibiliry of settingup IRD was given to Ivone Kirkpatrick, Assistant under-Secretary in charge of ForeignOflice information, and one of those ofiicials who had been calling for a propaganda

offensive since 1946.

CHAPTER FOUR

A Crusade BeginsThe new Foreign oltrce department scored its first major success with a revealing mediacampaign on Soviet rabour,camps. Mayhew launched this offensive in october 194g atthe United Nations, arready a ;irar inrernrtio.r"r forum and one that IRD sought toinfluence. Mayhew said, 'It was decided that Soviet slave labour camps wourd be thefirst line of counter-attack. So one of the first iobs of IRD lvas to collect everything thatwas known about these camps and when the Rrrrir.r, made a ,oouy r..a*ant attack onBritain over our coronial policies and our undemocratic rvays, I retaliated with anattack on their srave labour in a rong speech inro u,hich was pur everything that wasthen known about the Stalinist ,y.rrrrrly *a i.Uor. camp svstem.,1

According to Norman.Reddaway, i'tryh.* drrg rp. great deal of the gulag materia-lhimself, 'and he found rhat sirov, the head of ,[. kci, rrra J"pon.a a good manythousand Estonians who didn_'t like being raken over by the so,rr.t, and had dumpedthem in (Jzbekistan, where a lot of them"sul "1..

This sort of thing, Soviet imperialismand what went on in the gurags, what the workers paradise ;;;;.,:il about, what washappening in the collectivisation of agriculture with a lot of people starving. AII this wasvery valuable information and much i'ppreciated by the seriour.l.*."J^r.,,The opponunity was taken to .o..rir.. Soviet rabour camps with Nazi concentrationcamps' Equating communism with Nazism was to b..o-. a key IRD theme. As amemo explained' 'In order to get the idea across to the public it is essential to build upthe names of one or fwo *.ri-krro*, .".rrf, ,rrtit they are as familiar as Dachau orBelsen. Karaganda the remote coar mining region in centrar Asia which is workedalmost entirely by forced labour, i, .orrid"i"d the most p-Jrirg-".me to use in thiscontext. It is, moreover, the name most familiar to the Russia., prrb"li..;The labour camp theme was given a further boost by,h. dir.;;;; of the text of theSoviet corrective Labour codex outlining the rules by which the rabou. camps operated.The codex book had been bought by H'ugh Lunghi, head of IRD,s Soviet Desk, foundin a 'commission' - foreign .*."rr.y uo"oo,rrop in- Moscow - during a visit. Lunghirealized that these totalitarian ruies couid u. .riitir"a to emphasize the iniquities of theSoviet labour camp sysrem. The codex was transrated and divurged during theEconomic and Sociar council (Ecosoc) of the united Nations *..ri.rg in Geneva inAugust 1949. Exposure given to this document in Britain was foflowed by a successfurworldwide publiciry campaign. Articles prepared in IRD or drawing on its basic paperswere published rn some fifry countries, and^led to a continuing debate on Soviet labourcamps.3

Fiies on the labour codex of the period show that IRD was anxious that they shourdbe seen to be factuar, but IRD had arready devrsed methods of placing more sensational

30 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

material through covert contacts in the media: ''We should not attempt to put out therough with the smooth. IRD material handled by British Information Services shouldbe closely argued and calm (as usual), and blood curiing "building the Siberian pyramidsout of human bones" stuff should be put out through subterranean channels.'a An IRDassessment was ven' pieased r.vith the resuit of the codex publiciry: ''Without exceptionevery British nationai paper gave coverage to this storv, three of them (the Telegraph,

Herald and,14izor) leading the paper t-ith it and the Cuardian grving full prominence. . . .

The BBC, t'ho made special arrangements! did us proud.' There followed a long list ofintemational media that picked the ston' up.5 At the Public Record Office these are

four fi1es packed full of cutcings on the codex from regional ne\,,spapers collected byBritish Embass.v o{Ecials around the u.orld.6

The nerv department had been given offices at Carlton House Terrace at theAdmiralry Arch end of the Mall. Built in around 1830 by John Nash, these are tr,vo

sumptuous terraces; Gladstone, Lord Curzon and Palmerston once lived there. One ofthe terrace buildings was well known to generations of recruits to the intelligence services

as the place where they were interviewed for their suitabiliry for 'govemment service'. Ithad suffered considerable bomb damage during the Second tr/orld 'W'ar and had just beenpatched up as IRD moved in. The offices of the new 'hush-hush' Foreign Officedepartment were at numbers 12 and 17 Carlton House Terrace. They had beenrequisitioned during the war. A member of the IRD staff the Honourable BarbaraMiller, daughter of the Liberal politician Lord Buckmaster, remembered as a grrl going todances at number 18, which then belonged to Lord Astor; IRD also took it over later.

Internal communication between the two parts of the department was rather like a

carwalk in an airship, ',vhich traversed the intervening upper regions of what later became

Crockford's gambling ciub. Up until the end of Foreign Office occupation, theminuscuie li{i in one house bore a small plate indicating 'Her Ladyship's Bedroom' and

number 18 retained some fine malachite panels as well as a spacious, if somewhat seedy,

bathroorn.T Although lacking longed-for amenities such as reliable heating, there was hotwater, a facility that was made full use of by some of the poorly paid rypists, one ofwhom recalled that 'They kept iots of files in the bathrooms, but the baths were stillthere and there was hot water so you . . . just used to sort of lock the door and have a

bath amongst the fiies. Because you couldn't really afford hot water.'8 Another memberof stafi, Hugh Lunghi, recalled the building: 'Terrible conditions - garrets, and we had tobring in our own kettles - but the vier,vs were nice, looking across to Admiralry Arch and

Horse Guards Parade. Xfe saw the funeral of George V from this advantageous position.'e

By late February 1948, IRD's first head, Mr (later Sir) Ralph (pronounced Rif)Murray, an assistant and one expert had been appointed, and a starting budget had beenagreed with the Treasury.1o Murray was also in charge of the other Foreign OIEcepublicity departments, including the Information Policy Department (IPD). Thedifference berlveen the two departments was set out as follows: IRD rvas responsible for'negative' anti-Communist covert propaganda and the IPD for 'positive' propagandaabout the British way of life.

A CRUSADE BEGINS 31

According to the Foreign ofiice history of the origrns of IRD, ,The need ro recruitspecialist staIf, free from the limitations of civil se*ice pay and conditions, was one ofthe considerations which red Murray to suggest, in September r94g, that part of thecosts of the unit should be transferred to the Secret Vote. In addition, the move to theSecret vote would enable a more flexible use of money, and avoid the unwelcomescrutiny of operations which might require covert or semi-covert means of execution.,11conveniently, this hidden funding would help to avoid parliamentary scrutinv. By theend of 1948 it had been agreed that di00,000 would be allocated from the 1g4g-50Secret Vote to cover the operational costs of the unit. By 1g50, funds from the Secretvote for just one of the 'operations which courd not possibly be acknowredged byH.M.G.' were estimared to be in the region of d20,o0o fo, th" coming year.12

A vicar's son, Ralph Murray had reft oxford and joined the BBi in the 1930s. In1939 hejoined the Foreign of1ice'by the back door,and was rater assigned to thePWE. Many of the techniques used by IRD were inherited from the pwE/SoE, aswere a number of the first recruits. Murray was, according to an admiring deputy, .Aman of great drive, with an almost Churchillian technique of bombarding his heads ofdepartment with minutes on every imaeinabre subject ,bort, ,, the expert, he usualryknew a good deal more than his suborJinates. I found thar under his direction all theInformation Departments in the Foreign oliice r,vere working at high pitch and with anew sense of purpose.'t3

^ one of the first peopie whom Murray recruited to IRD was col Leslie Sheridan, the

former SoE psychoiogical warrior, known to ali as 'Sherry,. F{e was to be the dynamicforce of IRD for fifteen years. Sheridan was, according to those who knew him, .a realbehind the scenes operator - but with more enthusiasm than intellect'.ra He was alwaysinventing some new scheme or firing oIr letters in the office. He would gather up hiscoat and hat and dart out for the continuous succession of meetings and discrete luncheswith journalists and opinion makers at their London clubs. The i.rJ po*., behind thethrone, though, was Sheridan's wife. During the war, Sheridan married the remarkableSoE secretary, Adeiaide Maturin. professionarly she had proved highly capable, and onthe SOE's demise she had became an MI6 officer whose duties dovetailed into IRD.Highly intelligent, attractive and taciturn, Adelaide had natural authoriry. capable ofgreat attention to detail, she was considered to be a natural manager of MI6,s large,delicate long-term'front' operations.

In the hiatus that followed the Second World'War, Sheridan also remained attachedto MI6' According to Colin Wintle, another former SOE man, he and Sheridan starteda new business as public relations consultants from an office at 47 Essex Street off theStrand in 1946.1' with the rapid onset of the cold war, Sheridan found MI6 calling onmore and more of his tirne to ser up covert media operations. 'when Murray broughtSheridan into IRD, he gave him a free rein, described him as ,our import from theworid of professional publiciry', and put him in charge of the editorial section withcolin Maclaren as his depug,. Sheridan used as a 'cover' his work as public rerationsconsultant.

John cloake arrived in the department only months after it had started to function.cloake, who would later become British Ambassador to Bulgaria, recalled: .It was myvery first job. I started in August 194g and I was sent along to this curious department,

)2 RIIITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA 'WAR

n,hich had been, b-v that time, going for a fer.v months. 'When I arrived, Ralph

Murray . . greeted me and said he'd have to rush ofl to a meeting, took me in tomeet the Assistant. u.ho at that time rl'as Milo Talbot, rvho said "Well for the

molnent, in tlct Vou're going to be sharing this otEce r.r,ith me." Sat me down at the

desk opposite him and statted to teach lrre everything he kneu'.'16 In the summer of

19,+8, IRD wls still a snrall departmerrt and at an eariv stage in its organizational

development. Cloake remenrbered that. rvhen he arrtved:

There s.;rs Ralph lv{urlav and the Assistant. N4r'seli as - quote - the third room,

u.hich n'reant that a1l the incotnrng papers came to me and I farmed them out as nec-

essrn-. There wils an intelligence section of tbur, of s,hich Cecii Parrott u'-as the

senior, and he u'as dealing u'ith Eastern Europe, there rvas Robert Conquest, also

dealing rvith Eastern Europe, Jack tsrimme11, on the Soviet lJnion and Catherine

Illingslvorth on South East Asia and the Far East. There was t'hat rvas called an edi-

torial section, r,vhich was putting out material, and that was two - Colin Maclaren

ancl }losemary Allott. We had . . . a reference section with a card index and newspa-

per archive and . . . our usual Foreign Ot1ice regrstry, i,r''hich actually looked after our

departmerrtal papers, Two shorthand rypists and that was the entire strength of the

department when I first joined it.17

The daily routine, as cloake recalled, began with 'a morning meeting'. Murray

rvould gather together a group to plan the dav's work. 'With the department so small at

the beginning, more or less everybody rvould attend, 'but after that at least heads of

sectiol'rs; discussing rvork and r,vhat we wouid do. And if it rvas agreed that some paper

should be rvritten or article should be r,"'ritten, or whatever, then probabiy the raw

material, as it $,ere, I,vould come across from the intelligence peopie, lvho r.vould also be

digging stuff out from the reference section, and then it r,r,ould go to editorial who

would u,rite it up and put it out.'18

Unlike Cloake, r.vho had served with the Royal Engineers at the end of the war

before reading history at Cambridge, a number of the early staff already had

experience of information work. Both Murray and Leslie Sheridan had backgrounds

in journalism and propaganda. The head of the intelligence section, Cecil Parrott,

later British Ambassador to Prague, had also served several years as an information

oftlcer. Parrott r.vas Information Ofllcer and First Secretary in Prague from 1945,

setting up and running the inforrnation service from scratch. His experience

highlightecl the importance given to infornration r'vork following the war. Parrott

recalle.l that: 'My Information Department rapidly expanded. I came with one

assistant and soon had three fernale secretaries and a langualie expert who translated

the nervspapers for the Ambassador and the senior staff. A good while later I

acquired several higher-powered helpers: an Assistant Inforrnation Otficer and Press,

Film and Broadcasting Officers.'1e Parrott joined IRD in 1948 but, in his

autobiography, he cliscreetly limits his cornment on the one year period he spent

there to a reference to 'a preiiminary run in one of the Infbrmation Departments of

the Foreign Otfrce'.20It r,vas decided by cornmittee that the nerv department w-as to disseminate two

A CRUSADE BEGINS

categories of information. Murray described it in a memo: 'Category A is secret andconfidentiai objective studies re Soviet policies ancl machinations which are designed forhigh-level conslrnption by heads of states, Cabinet members, ercerera. None of thismaterial publishable or quotable lbr obvious reasons.' Category A material was 'derivedfrom diplomatic and intelligence soLlrces. It is entirely distinct from that u,hich nright beutilised in the secret propaganda campaien'. 'Category B is less highly-classifiedinformation suitable for carefui dissemination by staff of British missions to suitablecontacts (e.g. editors, professors, scientists, labour leaders etcetera) rvho can use it asfactual background material in their general rvork r,vithout attribution. Successfulcategory B operatrons depend upon activity British represenratives in variouscountries.'21

One of the first tasks of Murray and the ser-rior Foreign Office mandarins was to serout the ideological messalJe that the Foreign Otilce should disseminate. In keeping withthe politics of the government in power, the Foreign Ot1ice was allowed ro advocatethe merits of socielisnr. Ilevin indicated his prelbrred approach in a cabinet meering:''We cannot hope successfuliv to repel Conununrsm onlv bv disparaging it on materialgrounds, and must add a positir.e to Denrocratrc anci Christian principles, rememberingthe strength of Clhristian sentiment in Europe. 'We nrusr pur tbrward a positive rivalideologv. 'We nlust stand on the broad principie of Social Democracy rvhich, in t1ct, hasits basis in the value of civil liberry and human rights.,

Foreign Oillce otJicials no nrore seriously promoted Socialism as an alternative toCommunisnl than they were to pronlpt a 'Third Force' agenda. Historian Dianne Kirbysuggested that 'b,v r.,irtue of their background, upbringing and education, Foreign officeotficials were Poor publicists for socialist ideais which is why successive Labour ParqrconGrences betu'een 19'16 and 19.18 w-itnessed resolutions for the democratisation of theForeign Service and the replacement of those in high diplomatic posts.'?2 The landslideLabour victorv had changed the political landscape and IRD was to employ a number ofleft-of-centre journalisrs as rvell as propagate anti-Communist writings by famous left-wingers. C)n the occasions when a comparison rvith the Soviet way of life u,as needed,it was the virrues of the Brirish rvay of lile that were emphasized. IRD, particulariy,picked up on religions themes, taking evcry opporruniry to contrast the

.West and its

religious tolerance rvith the atheist Comnrunism - ' religion r,vithout a God.' Bevin andIRD enlisted the help of nrany leading religious figures in their carnpaigns, evenQ25holi,-q.l.r

High-levcl conlerences rvere held at the Foreign OtIce to develop the themes thatrrcre to underpin its propaganda. The first bie idea r.vas the equation that Communism= Recl Fascism. T'he files shou, that a rvhole iist of equivalenrs rvere worked up - forexample Stalin = Hitle'r, tseria = Hrmnrler ancl, of course, Soviet Labour camp = NaziConcentration camp. Ar one point. Murray suggested popularizing the expression'comnrunazi', but it never took ofl2a

M;ryher.v rvas in overall political charge of the operation. At that time the ForeignOflice, Colonial Otlice and Commonwealth Relations Ottrce were sti11 separate. Withregard to the colonies, the directing arm of British propaganda was the Colonial OfliciaiInfornration Policv Cornmittee, headed by Mayhew and patrick Gordon-'walker, thecornnronu'ealth Secretary. Gordon-Walker had risen in the Labour partv after

))

i1 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

campaigning against the 1936 Munich agreement as a young Oxford don. During thewar he had been a member of the P'WE. Besides overseeing much of IRD's output, thecommittee worked up another theme that rvas to dominate IRD's output, equating any

anti-British sentiment in the colonies with Mosco'w-inspired Communism. This was

developed in documents like 'Stalin on Marxism and the National and ColonialQuestions', r.vhich rvere distributed to British posts in the colonies and also to 'emergingcountries' like lndonesia.

According to the Foreign Office's IRD historv. 'Both the Colonial and

Commonrvealth Relations O{hces had an interest in countering Soviet propaganda,r,vhich consistentlv attacked Britain's colonial record, misrepresenting both policy and

conditions rvithin British controlled territories, rvhile distracting attention from Sovietbehaviour in the backrvard areas of the former Tsarist empire.'2s It did not point outthat at this time Britain was tenaciously hanging on to whatever parts of the Empire itcould, or at least trying to hand the countries over to those deemed suitable.Furthermore, it was a grft to the Soviets who were able to highlight British excesses inthe colonies in their propaganda.

There is a defining moment that reveals the ascendancy of the Cold'War propagandists

of IRD over the more considered views of other Foreign O{Ece officials. Early on,Mayhew and Murray asked for a paper on Anglo-Soviet relations since 1939. This was tobe an IRD briefing paper. The paper was written by the Foreign Office ResearchDepartment in a rather scholarly style.26 It concluded that Soviet policy could beunderstood as a search for security. Both this conclusion and the non-journalistic sryle

incured Mayhew's derision. It was sent back with strict instructions for revision, and thesecond version appears to be in an entirely different hand. The second paper, thirty-fivepages long, took almost the opposite view of the first. It began, 'The Soviet lJnion is notmerely a State among other States. It is the vehicle of an aggressive ideology. It was

dedicated by Lenin and has been repeatedly rededicated by his successors to its task ofreshaping the rvorld to a Marxist pattem.' The second paper specifically repudiated theanalysis of the original: 'Apologists for the Soviet (Jnion attempt to explain herexpansionist tendencies as a "search for securiry", a natural desire to convert a formersphere of 'Western influence into a Russian cordon sanitaire against the 'West. Thesuperficiality of this vieu, is obvious to all who have read the basic works of Marxist-Leninist ideology.'z; The paper continued to outline a Soviet lJnion that only cooperatedwith other nations if it might further the triumph of Communism on a world scale. Itstated that the vu'artime alliance with the 'West was a necessary evil to Soviet leaders; thatthe Cominform had been the ceremonial reinstatement of the Comintem, and that thedominant feature of Soviet domestic and foreign policy since the end of the war had

been the vehement reassertion of uncompromising Marxist-Leninist orthodoxT. Murraymade a sulprisingly apposite, if waspish, comment in the covering note: 'I take it thatscholarship goes ahead and issues, and propaganda does a rehash: but that scholarship's

version does not get sent to MPs etc, and propaganda's does. I have taken the liberry ofdetaching Mr Mayhew-'s requirements so we may work to them.'28

The Foreign Office Research Department \tu'as not geared, either ideologicaliy orpractically, to supply the new department, and IRD realized that it needed its ownresearch team. By 1949 'lt had become quickly evident that a department confined to

A CRUSADE BEGINS

the administrative role of servicing and distributing material produced by other peopleu,ould achieve nothing and, further that IRD would have to do most of its ownresearch, the main aim being to rely on Communist sources to provide proof of whatwas happening in countries under Communist control.'2e An intelligence section was setup and, as John Cloake says, its founder members included Cecil Parrott, Jack Brimme1l,Robert conquest, former Information Secretary in Sofia, and Harold Machen, formerlyVice-Consul in Seoul. Their job was to collate information from all sources and to fill inthe gaps.

Much of IRD initial output concemed the workings of Comrnunism in the Sovietsphere of influence. Important to this u,ork was the Foreign Oflice's assessment ofSoviet capabilities and intentions. Foreign Othce sovietologists like R. Carew Hunt, liketheir American counterparts, believed that the Soviet lJnion was bent on worlddomination, and this became an underlying theme. Carew Hunt and his colleaguespointed to Marxist first principles. The sovietologist believed that the essence ofMarxism's original foreign policy doctrine was very simple: world revolution. Marx andEngels' Communist l,IaniJesto (18,18) had announced rhat:

The working men have no counrry. National diflerences and antagonismsberween peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development ofthe bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the w-orld market, to uniformiry in themodel of production and in the conditions of life thereto. . . . The supremacy of theproletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. lJnited action, of the leading civilisedcountries as least, is one of the first conditions of the emancipation of the proletariat.

These beliefs r,vere further hardened by the Soviet-engineered takeover of theCzechoslovakian government in Februarv 1948, one of the first of a number of actionsreflecting a new harder line policy in Moscow. IRD's Cecil Parrott, a fluent Czechspeaker, had been stationed in the Prague Embassy during the coup. Returning toBritain to join IRD, he brought back a chiliing accounr of the episode.

Regardless of any evidence to the contrary, the idea that the Soviet and Communistsystems' hidden agenda was world revolution was rhe abiding gospel of IRD throughoutits 1iG. Without that premise, IRD had no legitimate raison d'6tre. The mounting tensiongave IRD a busy first year, recruiting many East European 6migr6s to irs ranks. ln 1948it produced twenty-two briefing papers on different aspects of Stalinism which werecirculated not only to British diplomats abroad but also to selecte{ joumalists, poJiticiansand trade unionists at home.30 Much of the British media were becoming increasinglyanti-Soviet in stance.

In his analysis of the influence of IRD on the British media's attitude to the ColdWar, historian Tony Shaw said that Czechoslovakia was a turning point for manyBritish newspapers, including the Daily Mail, the News of the World and the SundayCraphic, bringrng them four square against the Soviet lJnion:

If the roots of the press's reaction to the Czech coup are to found in individual edito-rial offices, govemment propaganda also played its part by framing how the crisis wasperceived by newspapers. This worked in a variery of ways. Foreign OfEce informa-

35

36 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

tion officials briefed journalists on the many analogies between 'Hitlerite' and

Communist systems, and used Czechoslovakia as evidence of the imperialist nature ofRussian Foreign Policy. The IRD issued material of a more hard-hitting nature doc-

umenting the manv real shortcomings in Soviet and east European sociery, with a

particular focus on the Stalinist Terror. The department also highlighted the increas-

inglv prevalent fear of subversion in Britain, of trade unions being captured by anti-

democratic conspirators u.ho rvould use industrial power to undermine the state.31

Fomrer IRD officials marntain rhat thev dealt rvith onlv accurate, factual material and

that the depanment's reputation rvas based on its accuracy. This lvas certainly the way

that IRD was presented: 'No other government except that of the United States ofAmerica - and the1, less intensively - and probably no unofficial organization supplies a

constant stream of carefully checked factual anti-Communist material. As a

consequence, journalists, writers, speakers and organizations all over the world welcome

this material and use it freeiy'.Norman Reddar,vay said that an IRD slogan was, 'Anything but the truth is too hot

to handle'.32 British propaganda in the Second World'War was efl-ective because - apart

from a relatively minor area of black propaganda - it consciously tried to adhere to the

rruth. Based on sound practical considerations, former IRD insiders say that theirenrphasis on the mobilization of truth - grey, rather than black propaganda - was more

etlective as a means of influencing public opinion. Not only was it likely to be far more

effective in the long term, but the concentration on factuai reports and in-depthresearch eased access to the 'free' media and enhanced IRD's credibility with its clients.

Factual evidence would be mobilized in order to back the argument that the briefing or

publication was attempting to make, 'grey' propaganda or 'the truth imparted with a

certain spin'.33

When asked what he believed to be the most important ingredient of effective

propaganda, Lord Mayhew explained that he thought it was the selection of facts: 'It's

quite extraordinary how if you select the facts you want, you can make a very powerful

case, and certainly, all the propaganda ['ve done has not been distorting facts orinventing them but selecting them. The policy of IRD was not to lie or distort Acts, but

to select the facts that proved our case that Bolshevism was no good and plug them.'34

One of the formats in which IRD presented its factual material was in a series ofpamphlets. The themes of these Information Reports were, at least in the first few years, a1l

anri-Communist and examined such topics as Forced Labour in the USSR: the Facts, The

Communist Peace Ofensiue and Russian Imperialism and Asian Nationalism. Sabotage of Peace,

dated August 1949, illustrates how the USSR had systematically refused to work inharmony with other nations following the end of the Second

'World War, despite 'the

great concessions made by Allied statesmen in the interests of co-operation for worldpeace'. An attached nore marked 'Confidentiaf indicated that the material was primarily

for the use of 'His Majesty's Missions and Information Officers in particular' and

explained how the material could be used:

The infonnation contained in this paper is, as far as it is possible to ascertain, factual

and objective. The paper may, therefore, be used freely as a reference paper, but

"i

,I

lt

i

tl

i:

A CRUSADE BEGINS

neither copies of it nor the material contained in it shouid be distributed ofEciallywithout the sanction of the Head of Mission. lt and/or the material in the paper,horvever, may be distributed unoftrcially in whatever quarters seem useful so long as

it can be assured that there will be no public attribution of material or of the paper toa British source.

In the first year, attempts to obtain specialized anti-Communist articles throughexisting channels, mainly the central office of Information (col), did not proveparticularly fruitful. Outside the Foreign Office other means of finding contributorswere advanced. George orweil was approached and, as we shall see, suggested thenames of a number of journalists. IRD approached and obtained articles from writers,including Harold Laski (a cotnparison of British and Russian Trade lJnionism), LeonardSchapiro ('Communists' (Jtopian vision fades') and Richard Crossman (a reassessment ofthe Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939).

Documents also show that the left-wing magaztne Tribune, published by members ofthe Labour Party, u,as supplied to Foreign otEce posts abroad for use in anti-communist propaganda. Ralph Murray defined the goal of the department as 'work inweaning people arvay from communism.' By exporring rhe Tribtme, Murray saw anopportuniry to release propaganda discreetly. He hoped ro turn many of its left-of-centre articles to'this department's purposes'by the'resolute exposure of Communism'.

IRD supplied briefs to minisrers, British delegates ro rhe United Nations andMembers of Parliament, sent material to the COI for distribution through its newsagency, the London Press Service, and sent propaganda articles to foreign posts. withsuch a variery of means, and a giobal nerwork of targets, IRD was both highly ambitiousand considered a highly successful department.

In the first year, France and Italy r.vere identified as prioriry targets, in view of thepossible Communist success in the elections of April 1948.Ita\y was considered a successfor IRD, which had placed a great deal of material in the Italian press. France was quiteanother matter. The French 'mindset' had always proved problematic for the British,and IRD had little sllccess. Meanwhile, the Middle Eastern effort was concentrated inEgypt, and, in South-East Asia, in Malaya and Burma. By the end of the year, Mayhewwas pleased: 'There is no doubt that this work has achieved a remarkable measure ofsuccess. The material based on our output appears in the press of anti-Communistcountries all over the world.'Ten months later, by october 1,949,Mayhew concludedthat 'IRD has had an impact out of all proportion to its size and cost'.3s

If IRD was a 'hush-hush' department, the Soviets had a total picture of its operationwithin weeks of its inception. Guy Burgess, one of the Cambridge ring of Soviet spies,had been working as privatb secretary for Foreign o{Ece minister Hector McNeil.Burgess's infamous behaviour as a drunk and degenerate had once again got him intotrouble but according to 'old boys rules' he was not ro be fired. His bosses looked forsomewhere to put him and assigned him to IRD. His rrial period there lasted only threemonths, because his behaviour deteriorated rather than improved. Reluctantly, Mayhew{ired him. However, unknown to Mayhew, the damage had already been done. Burgesshad gone to the Middle East on holiday in January making detours in order to briefofficials in various British embassies about the new department's work. But his real

37

BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA \MAR

objectives were to evade the English winter and to confer with his co-conspirator, KimPhilby, who was in Istanbul. Burgess passed documentary evidence to his Soviet control,showing what the ne'uv department did and who ran it.36 Moscow knew about IRDr'vithin a matter of weeks. However, it was to remain a secret from the British pubiic foranother thirfy years.

CHAPTER FIVE

Korea: a Hot War in aCold [4/ar

In the years immediately after the Second-world'war, South-East Asia underwentmassive change. India and Pakisran had bloodily divided and achieved theirindependence. china had fa11en into the hands of Mao Zhedong's communists,displacing the corrupt Kuonrintang to the island of Fonnosa. Many other countries inthe area found burgeoning Communist parties in their midst. Britain, desperately shortof revenue after the war, \vas trying to hang on to its remaining colonies for as long as

possible, or, as in the case of Maiaya, to make sure that control was handed over to pro-'Western leaders. South-East Asia was the most important and immediate target forIRD's propaganda outside Europe.

It was in this region that Anglo-American cooperation in combating Comrnunismwas to undergo its first trial by fire. The British, through IRD, were the first ro go onthe propaganda offensive against the 'red menace'; when it came to undercover work,they were still more experienced than their American partners. During the SecondWorld'War, and for at least the first five years after, both in psychological warfare and incovert operations, the Americans learned everything from the British. As the Cold'Waremerged, the Americans took a little longer to get their act together. As elsewhere, the'special relationship' was operating and the British kept the Americans reasonably wellinformed of their acrivities.

In November 1,948 the State Department circuiated its missions abroad, allowingthem to cooperate with British 'information services' provided that this was kept secretand that nothing was done that would give a public impression ofjoint activiry. It alsoasked missions to report on British information activities locally, and to state what stepsthey had taken towards joint 1iaison.1 The replies received, which can be seen at the USNational Archives, documenr growing cooperation all round the world. The reportsfrom lndia are particularly revealing.2 Loy Henderson, (JS Ambassador in New Delhi,reported that the British High Commission was 'about to launch [a] highly confidenriaianti-communist propaganda program in India and has been instructed by London towork closely with us'. J.S.H. Shattock of the British High Commission had reported onthe 'anti-communist propaganda' being prepared by a 'special research committee' inLondon, which would be distributed in rwo main ways. Referring to IRD's category Amaterial: 'In the first piace a cerrain amount of this high grade material can be slippedinto the otherwise innocuous . . . British Information Service material disseminated . . .

throughout India. A good deal of material would probably be published in this way

10 BRITAIN'S SECRET PRC)PAGANDA WAR

without attracring r.indesirable attenrion to the UK Government.' \Irith regard to

category B material: 'ln the second place and much more importantly the UK otlice

fblt tirat a very carefully selected group ol conpleteiy reliable and trustrvorthy contacts

could be built up over a period of tinre. These could be clrawn {i'oilr r-arious groups,

reliable correspondents ani editors, British and Indian merchant missionaries arld others'

Information girr.r, ao thern could then be r-rsed at their discretion and of course with fuil

Protection to the Government 'jThe r.eport conrinued that considerable time lnd effort had gone into planning the

prog..,-,rrrr" and that, in ad<lition to Nerv l)elhi, personnel had been selected in uK

branch ollices in 'Madras, Calcutta ancl Bombay rvho rvili work with the initial group of

2:l co.tacts.' It rvas aiso suggested thar contacts in A11 lndia Radio were being developed'

Tire Americans conceded tir"t tt. British progralnme went much further than anything

that they hail started, and rather naively they asked the British if they intended to teil the

sovernment of India rvhat thev r'vere cloing: to this inquiry they were given an

imbiguous repiy.a On receiving a copy of this report in London' US Ambassador Lewis

Dortlr, asked the Foreign Otfice for more information on IRD' Under-Secretary

Denlng. responsible for South-East Asia, told Douglas that IRD: 'originated last

December u,hen Bevin submitted British Cabinet memo re: efTect on SEA of(lommunist successes China . reconlmended SEA countries should get together to

combat Soviet menace. vier.v was expressed that r'vith due caution the uK might usefuliy

artenlpt be coorclinating factor in stimulating in each country creation adequate police

forces, inteilig.rr." ,g"rr.ies, and legal porvers to deal with Communists'' Dening said

that there was nothing sinisrer about IRD material, which was purely factuai but that it

hac1, ,provecl surprisingly popular among westem union governllents as anti-communist

,o,rr.. -rr.rial . . . Idea using loca1 contacts is based on theory that oniy Easterner can

convince Easterner. Clontacts selectecl are men of standing and influence knou'n to be

already rvell-disposed tow'ards West and anti-Communist''s

c)n 9 May 194u, Ambassador Henderson in New Delhi received the following

personal cable from George Kennan, the State Department's chief cold war strategist

and head of its Policy Planning Staff (PPS):

TopSecret...NoStencii*NoDistdbution'UR469,Lpt27'ofdeepinterest'You will recall discussion possible special projects you had shortly before your

departure r,virh tu,o AMER tffi.i.t, one of rvhom saw you off (Jnion Station' Most

heipful if you would pursue this matter with appropriate BRIT REPS New Delhi

\vith vierv obtaining .o*pl.t. info ancl submit report addressed me indicating

hou, besr US GoVi might tie in with BRIT Plans or arrange parallel program'6

About a year earlier the US National Security Council had accepted a proposal that

unvouchered funds should be used by the State Department to support the covert

utilization of native anti-Communist elements in Eurasia, in countries still outside the

Iron Curtain.T This was an early step towards the massive 'covert action', which was

soon to be taken over, expanded and frrnded by the CIA'

A later dispatch from Ambassador Henclerson to washington confirmed that Sir

Archibaid N,ve, British Ambassador, was proposing to show some Category A

KOREA: A HOT WAR IN A COLD WAR

material to Nehru to see how he reacted.8 Indian relations with the Soviets ',vereinitially lukewarm after partition because of Soviet hostility towards Asiannationalism, which had been all too apparent at the nineteen-nation conference inDelhi to consider the Indonesian question. Nye reported that he discussed an

exchange of information and comment on the realities of Communism with PanditNehru, and had rnet r'vith 'a very friendly response', although Nehru felt that India'sreciprocation rvorrld be on a limited scale owing to the smaliness and inexperience ofits Centrai Intelligence Bureau.e

For the British, the Malaya emergency was turning South-East Asia into a prioriryarea and an IRD satellite office was to be set up. In January 1949 the US Embassy inSingapore sent Washington the following extract from a letter by Ralph Murray, to the

British Embassy in Singapore:

As you kno'uv rve are proposing to set up a Regional Information Ollice there, cover-ing all South-East Asia, rvhich rvill take care of our material: re-writing it for localconsumption and pr.rtting it through the vanous media such as the press, broadcasting,etc. The Commissioner General attaches considerable importance to the project,rvhich has become even more necessan' no\\: that the Communists look like becom-ing the masters of at least most of China. Could vou perhaps find out informally whatsort of Infomation Research Department work the United States authorities proposeto do irr Singapore? We shall keep them in the picture locally about our own activi-ties and rve shall hope to be able to arrange that our respective operations comple-ment one another.li)

IRD became an important part of the organization buiit up by the British at PhoenixPark in Singapore to corlrlter Communist insurgency in the area.ll J.B. Smith, a CIAIiaison officer at Phoenix Park in the early 1950s, reported that IRD was running a jointoperation rvith MI6, represented at that time by Maurice Oldfieid assisted by Fergpe

Dempster. Oldfield was iater to become director of the Secret Service.12

Il\D's Singapore otlice vu,as already in place when, on 25 June 1950, the CommunistArnry of North Korea launched an invasion of South Korea. Kim Il Sung's troopscrossed the 38th Parallel and swept deep into the south. the start of a gruelling conflictthat was to last for more than three years. The Korean 'War was to be the major hot warof the Coid 'War. Foreign O{lice documents from the period show that oflicials did notrea1ly believe that this,,vas Stalin's first step towards rnar with the West. However, the

underlying tone of IRD's output was in line with its Cold 'Warrior role and raised

suspicions that the Kremlin's aim was world donrination.Korea was in the American sphere of influence. The Japanese had occupied Korea

throughout the Second Worid War until it was liberated by American forces rn 1945.

As part of the three-power posr\,var agreements, the country was divided into rvvo at the

38th Parallel. The Soviet Union took control of the north and the United States controlof the south. By further agreement. both sides '"vithdrew militarily in 1948, leavingeffectiveiy puppet regimes in place. Domestic tensions between the north and southgrerv and it was only a matter of time before one side began a civil war. How-ever, the

north's invasion took the south and the United States by surprise. The State

BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

Department's expert on Korea, U. Alexis Johnson, for example, was hoiidaying on Sky

Ridge, 100 miles from Washington, with his children, when the invasion took place. Apark ranger was sent out to find him and ask him to return to 'W'ashington

immediately.l3The Americans then reacted very swiftly in condemning the invasion and in

gathering a rag and tail unit of US military reinforcements from the Japan garrison.

The British government fell in behind the Truman administration. In a hastilyconvened session, the United Nations condemned the invasion and began toassemble a task force to assist beleaguered South Korea. While the major constituentof the UN task force rvas American, some thirry-two other countries sent troops tofight against the north. The British were to send soldiers, aircraft and ships as theircontribution.

Only recently has the paft the secret British propaganda operation played in pullingthe world behind the West begun to be appreciated. The perception that this was a

Kremlin-instigated invasion by a puppet regime permeated 'Western thinking. TheBritish Joint Intelligence Committee informed the chiefs of staff: 'If the forces of the

IJN were to fail to stem the drive of militant Communism in Korea it would be a majordefeat for the 'W'estem Powers, and would shatter the faith of the free countries of the

Far East and South-East Asia in the abiliry of the 'Westem Porvers and United Nationsto defend them from Russian domination. Repercussions would, in fact, be Glt in otherparts of the world, notably'Western Germany.'

The British government, however, took a more measured tone than the UnitedStates. It had the Tmman administration remove from the June 1950 UN resolution,

the attribution of the North Korean invasion to 'centrally directed CommunistimperiaLism', on the grounds that it presented an inflammatory challenge to Moscow.

IRD, too, reacted quickly and began an extensive campaign on the Korean'W'ar,both at home and abroad. On 4 July 1950, head of IRD Ralph Murray wamed the

Lord President's office, responsible for the coordination of the government'sinformation services, of 'the considerable danger' in allowing 'the great efforts [alreadybeing] made by Soviet and Communist Propaganda about Korea' to go unanswered.

Murray suggested counterattack against Communist claims. The Communists had

claimed that the north had merely responded to an attack from the south. Murray saw

this as 'the wolf accusing the lamb as usual'. The Communists also claimed that the

IJN's inter-vention on behalf of South Korea was invalidated because of the corrupt and

unpopular regime of Syngman Rhee's government.llFifty years on, we can now be certain that the north did instigate the invasion.

However, Rhee's regime was undoubtedly corrupt, repressive and unpopular. It was not

as unpopular, though, as Kim I1 Sung's regime. More the wolf accusing the fox than the

lamb. According to journalist Andy Roth, who was in Korea in 1.949, the members ofthe South Korean government made no bones about their desire to attack the northwhen they were militarily stronger.l5 At the time Murray said that allegations against the

south should be seen as a 'particularly dangerous red herring', and suggested that theyshould be refuted by reGrence to the 750,000 Korean refugees who had fled south ofthe 38th Parallel since 1948. IRD material proselytizing these themes was passed on tothe BBC and used.16 Pubiic opinion in Britain was in favour of the government's

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A HOT 'WAR IN A COLD 'WAR

inten'ention in the summer of 1950, but it was by no means unanimous. In a recent

paper, historian Tony Shaw noted that: 'From August 1950 onwards, Attlee's cabinet

found itself on the sharp end of a steady stream of criticism from trade unions fearful ofan American induced third world war and demanding withdrawal of all British forces.

In the run up to the Labour Parry conference in October 1950, Denis Healey, the

party's lnternational Secretary and main link with IRD, received fifry-one resolutions

from local associations relating to Korea, only six of which fu1ly supported the

leadership's policy.'trThe International Department sought to quell such criticism and bring the Labour

movement behind the government. It dealt with the Korean 'War in the l-abour Party

Tatking Points, a regular factual booklet given or sold to many people and groups in the

Labour movement. These provided simple, supportive explanations of Britain'sinvolvement in the war. On 22 July, under the heading ''Who Stands for Peace?' it tookto task the British Peace Committee's petition against I.JN intervention. It said, 'TheBritish Peace Comrnittee is stepping up its campaign. People everywhere are being

asked to sign the "Peace Petition". But rvhat is behind the petition? . . . right from the

beginning the "Peace Campaign" w-as a fraud, run on Russian instructions.' Thisdenouncement of Talking Polrrs incurred the rvrath of the British Communist Parry's

Daily Worker, which sent a list of nit-picking factual inaccuracies in the article.

IRD helped the Labour Parry's International Department to counter criticism and

gather support for the UN line. As Tony Shaw observed:

The material locused on four themes: Kim I1 Sung's preparations for aggression

against South Korea; the lawful status of the South Korean government, based on

elections; Moscorv's involvement in the NKPA invasion and North Korea's growing

satellite status; and how the collectivisation ofland captured by the invading forces inthe South was disadvantageous to the peasantry. The IRD also passed onto the

Labour Party pamphlets produced by the Central OIfice of Information and the

United States Information Services (USIS) detailing, amongst other things, the

humanitarian aspects of the UN's activities in Korea. These were combined withinformation designed to deter industrial sabotage, much of which formed part of a

broadcast on strikes delivered by George Isaacs, Minister of Labour in late September

1950.18

On 21 August, the assistant head of IRD, Peter Wilkinson, sent a large dossier' 'Here

is the material on Korea which Adam .Watson promised to Denis Healey.' The dossier

contains a collection of statements monitored from the North Korean radio, press and

political decrees showing that 'Preparations for aggression on North Korea against the

Republic of South Korea can effectively be traced back to the formation of the National

Front in June 1949.' It also cited 'evidence of Russian assistance'. For example,'Pyongyang on the 7th January 1950, gave details of the successful results achieved by

the agricultural research stations in cross breeding indigenous Korean seed with Russian

varieties donated by the Soviet lJnion.' The material may have been accurate, but inclassic IRD 'spin doctor' sryle, it makes no reference to the South Korean govemment

actions and policies. 1e

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4,t BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPACANDA 'WAR

Rhee's rcgime was not easy to defend, and those suggesting that the Korean .War

might beconre more complicated than just a fight benveen good and evil gave IRD a

major headache. In August 1950, Alan'W'innington, a correspondent of the Communist

Daily Worker who was covering the war rvith the North Korean Army, reported the

discovery of m:rss graves near Taejon containing the corpses of more than 700 men and

wolnen executed br- the South Korean Police. Further stories of atrocities committed by

Rhee's forces began to emerge in the rnedia. Moscow's English ianguage Souiet Weekly

published photographs of alleged victims of atrocities. In November 1950, these

allegations were to rurn into one of the nastiest confrontations in the British media,

raising profound questions of w-hether the dury of press was jingoistic support of the

goyernlnent or reporting the tmth as it found it. James Cameron. the ieftist reporter,

fi1"d r r,ory lbr the Picture Post, reporting Rhee's dictatorial ways and implying that the

Americans were condoning the regime's excesses. The proprietor of the Picture Post

banned the article and the magazine's legendary and long-standing editor Tom

Hopkinson was t-ired. The Daity Worker then printed a leaked copy of Cameron's

banned piece over its front page.20 The cabinet considered prosecuting the Daily Wotker

fbr treason and introducing press laws banning journaiism that gave'aid and comfort to

the enemy'. Ministers discussed the matter. They dropped these proposals when itbecame clear that many of the allegations were true and that taking the reporters to

court rvould just make matters worse.'Ihe governrnent was anxious to nip any further criticism in the bud in case such

allegations \\-ert: to underrnine popular support from the public. IRD provided

confidential briefing notes for MPs' speeches, explaining that South Korean atrocities

u,ere just revenge for northern ones, and making it clear that one had to understand that

the peoples of the Far East had a historical tendency to barbarity. Straying sorne way

from its claims of the 'truth w-il1 prevail', IRD ordered the redubbing of a Chinese

propaganda film shor,ving alleged American brutaliry in Korea, so that it instead appeared

to shorv the barbaritv of Kim 11 Sung's soldiers.2l The Foreign Office's News

I)epartment showed a number of newspapers in confidence a report written for the UNCommission for the lJnification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), which

emphasized that the \,'ar enabled the resolution of personal feuds. Overall, as Tony

Shaw has pointeri out, 'Eclitors tended to accept the Government line that the real issue

was not the nature of the Rhee regime, but the need to resist aggression''22

The Britjsh governnlent founcl itself trying to calm the wilder inclination of the

Americans. Indeed, the Trurnan administration was itself trying to suppress the even

r,vilder aspirations of the American military. General MacArthur had put into place plans

to use aromic weapons against the Communists. Nine 'silver-plated' B-29s capable of

carrving atomic bombs lvere moved to a base within striking range of North Korea and

China. One plan \\,as to use A-bombs to create a 10 mile'radioactive'cordon sanitaire

across the north. Trunlan's ructions .,,n'ith MacArthur were to lead to the general's

<lismissa1. The decision to push beyond the 38th Parallel was to prove controversial.

MacArthur's success and desire to teach the Communists a lesson seem to have

ovenvhehnecl the UN's poiiticai sense. It was one thing to restore the status quo, but to

push on tou'ards the Chinese border was quite another. China shared key hydroelectric

starions inside North Korea. It was also worried about a possible American-backed

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A HOT WAR IN A COLD WAR

mainland landing from the defeated Nationalist Chinese who had retreated to the island

of Taiwan. The Chinese issued warnings through the Indian Ambassador that theywould have to react if MacArthur drove on towards their borders. The wamings wereignored and the Chinese reacted by sending in their army. 'What had started essentially

as a civii \trrar \\''as teetering on the brink of the Third 'World \Var. Forty years laterHealey was to say in his autobiography that 'Washington ignored China's warnings that

it r.vould not stand idlv bv if MacArthur crossed the thirty-eighth parallel. He did cross

it, and the Chinese then entered Korea. So a war that might have ended with the

successful landing at In'chon, six months after it began, lasted four more disastrous

years.'23

Throughout these years, Korea was a propaganda battlefield. The north's ill-treatmentof POWs became a cause cilibrc. In fact, issues surrounding POWs came to dominate the

war, being central to nlany of the key controversies. Disagreements about therepatriation of Comrnunist PO'Ws probably delayed the end of the conflict bv a year ormore. In the {irst fer,v months of hostilities the North Koreans treated PO'Ws from the

Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United Nations appal1inglv. 'Pak's Palace' inPyongyang, an interrogation centre mn b,v a pafticularh- vicious North Korean officer,became notorious. Many died on torced marches to POW camps near the Yalu. As theUN forces pursued the northern forces, photographs began to tloocl the press of UNPO\Vs shot on the roadside with their wrists tied behind their backs. The Chinese and

Soviets were alarrned by this, not least because a dead POW rn as of no intelligence orpositive propaganda value. By the end of 1950 the Chinese took over the running ofmost PO.W camps. They conducted interrogations of POWs and passed any intelligenceon to Soviet advisers. The Chinese treatment was far better than that meted out by the

North Koreans. (Jnless an individual tried to escape or breached disciplinary rules, the

Chinese r,vere rarely brutal. However, stories of systematic oriental brutaiiry were tocontinue past the end of the war to the extent that they became a popular myth.

The battle over PO'Ws became ideologicai and r,vas fought rnith propaganda weapons.

The Chinese set up education sessions to explain the evils of capitalism. They had some

success. Manv British PO"Ws were conscripts and had Socialist leanings. Americantroops captured early on were noted for their low morale. A number became involvedin Communist peace initiatives, signing petitions for peace, rvriting horne about theirgood treatment and condernning the West's role in the war. At the end of the war,

some twenty-one American and one British soldier declined to be repatriated. Hundreds

of others who had sympathy with their captors did return. To explain this'treason', the

idea of brainu,-ashing was seized upon and used to excuse the POWs' behaviour. Theterm brainwashing is usually attributed to an American journalist, and alleged CIAagent, Edward Hunter, in 1950. An article, originally published in the Miaml Neps

headlined "'Brainwashing" Tactics Force Chinese into Ranks of Communist Parry.'

The idea that UN POWs were brainwashed into becoming Communist stooges thus

became commonplace.2a At its most populist, it was taken up by Holl1'wood and used inchilling Cold War films like The Manchurian Cattdidate.

The Communist propagandists also stole the marcir on the West'uvith their concerted

germ wadare allegations. In spring 1.952 they began to allege that the United States was

dropping genn rvafare bombs in North Korea and China.'Worse still a number of US

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16 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

Air Force POWs confessed to being involved in germ wafare attacks; these includedtwo senior officers, Col Frank Schwable and Coi Bud Mahurin. The Chinese publishedtwenry-fwo confessions in the English language magazine the People's Daily. Lllof thosewho confessed retracted their allegations after repatriation, stating that they had beenmade under duress. A comrnittee of intemational observers was invited by the Chineseto conduct an investigation. This included a highly regarded Cambridge scientist. Itconcluded that germ u'arfare had taken p1ace.

Comrnunist claims and American denials became ver anorher battle in the propagandaw'ar.25 These issues became primarilv US versus Communist in tone. The returningBritish POWs roused less curiosin in England. The Minister of Defence's 1955 'White

Paper on the Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea concluded that, of 979British returnee POWs, the otlicers and senior NCOs 'remained almost completelyunaflected by Communist propaganda'. Among the other ranks rwo-thirds .remained

virtually unaffected' but most of the remainder 'absorbed sufficient indoctrination to beclassed as Communist sympathisers . . . A small minority - about 40 altogether - retumedhome as convinced Communists.'26 There is a set of interesting documents in the PublicRecord Office which comprises the assessments of AI9 (Army intelligence unit) of theretuming PO'Ws, giving each a shade of grey between white and black to represent theirCommunist sympathy and their level of collaboration with their captors.2T

IRD's main concem was the representation of the Communist threat throughout thervorld. For the Korean War, IRD reinforced its contingent in the Regional InformationOthce in Singapore. Its task was to get as much pro-'Western propaganda into the localmedia as possible, not least because the Korean situation was making Britain's anti-insurgency campaign in Malaya much more diIEcult.28 IRD also worked hard alongsidethe Americans in India. The Indians, underJeherwalal Nehru, had, from IRD's point ofview, taken an increasingly unhelpful neutral stance in the Cold'W'ar, so much so thatsenior Indian generals were able to act as neutral intermediaries over difficult PO'Wquestions during the Korean War.

Such was the anxiery about the situation that the British and Americans met in lateJuly 1950 about the coordination of propaganda to avoid different presentation. IRDo{Ecial Adam'W'atson, who had already gained experience in the British presentation ofthe Malayan emergency, was sent to liaise with'Washington. The British benefited fromthis arrangement. Tony Shaw has shown that IRD published a range of unattributedAmerican material, including some based on US Army Military Intelligence, oudining,for instance, the discovery of Communist intelligence schools in occupied north Korea(complete with interrogation tools) and the exisrence of serious divisions within Kim IlSung's cabinet. An extensive report produced by the State Department's office ofIntelligence Research,'North Korea: a case Study of a Soviet Satellite,'was put out byIRD 'as part of series designed to impress upon the educated sections of Asian opinionthe seductive yet repressive nature of Moscow's "own brand of imperialism"'.2e

With such close cooperation with the Americans, IRD found itself involved in thegerm warfare allegations. It had begun to pick up peking TASS reports of the USpoisoning of wells and spreading of typhus and smailpox bacteria in North Korea inMarch 1951. Then, in spring 1952, the communisrs launched their allegations of agerm wafare campaign by the United states. IRD counterattacked by implying rhat

A HOT 'WAR IN A COLD 'WAR

disease was rife because of the Communist's poor system of government and that theirpoor sanitation and medical facilities were responsible for infection. More effective u,as

the publicizing of the [JN's requests for an impartial investigation of biological andchemical warfare claims. The Communists refused, instead inviting an internationalgroup of scientists to investigate. The members of the International ScientificCommission, while having some respectable figures including Dr Joseph Needham ofCambridge Universiry, was flawed by the inclusion of Soviet placemen.

The success of the Communist media in setting the agenda shook the West and, inparticuiar, the American information specialists. A period of reassessment followed and a

new policy document was issued that was to apply to all anti-Comrnunist propagandaand not just that involved in the Korean 'War. Adam 'Watson, IRD's man inW.ashington, telegrammed back to the Foreign Office the key points of the newcampaign in which the Americans hoped the British would participate. The 'Campaignof Truth'would consist of four elements:

1. exposing to the rvorld, directly and indirectly, the truly reactionary, vicious andphony nature of Kremlin Comrnunism;

2. building up a spirit of uniry, spunk, determination and confidence in all nations ofthe free worldl

3. inculcating in other peoples a readiness and desire to cooperate with America bydisproving Soviet lies about us and by making clear that we are a resolute, strongand honest nation whose moral strengh and physical strength can be counted on;

4. building, behind the Iron Curtain, psychological obstacles to further Kremlinaggression.3(l

Adam'Watson confirmed IRD's involvement in the Korean'W'ar, but questioned theeffectiveness of the campaign. 'I never thought our operations in Asia were as good as

they should have been. But the slogan was, "Communism is the enemy of Asiannationalism" - that was one of Ralph Murray's. He insisted in getting that phraseeverywhere. All over Asia.'31 The wider implications were significant. According tohistorian Susan L. Carruthers, 'The Korean 'War, more broadly, also reinforced a

growing belief especially in America, that the Cold War was uniquely a psychologicalcontest. Winning meant not only keeping one's own side absolutely convinced of itsmoral and material superioriry but aiso attracting converts for a "campaign of trut[".':z

Korea had been the spur to massive rearmament in both the US and the UK. Tokeep a positive tone of any media coverage of such massive expenditure, IRDcoordinated a special briefing group on rearnament chaired by the Russia Comrnittee'shead, Sir Pierson Dixon. The comrnittee's documents show that IRD was concerned toget the public behind the 'd4,700m 3-year defence prograrnme' before it started to biteinto the pockets of the taxpayer.33 As Shaw has observed, it was part of IRD's job toconvert a general awareness of the Russian menace into'a more acute fear'. An exampleof IRD materia-l in this regard was a sixfy-nine-page pamphlet drafted by John Peck.Entitled 'The British Defence Programme', it was distributed to 'educated' opinionformers like the BBC. 'In measured but powerful tones, the pamphlet portrayed the free

"vorld under siege, with Korea the latest in a series of examples of Soviet attempts to

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li,t8 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA 'WAR

expand its client base. However, the reader rvas left in no doubt about the innate

u,eaknesses lvithin the Soviet system.'3'+ As Tony Shau'has commented:

Korea certainiy bore out the vaiue to the British goYernment of a propaganda depart-

nrenr s.hose prioriw rvas anti-Communism. The IRD's abiiiw to devise and dissemi-

nate nrarenal demonisinq rhe monolithic Soviet bloc in various forms to suit different

:rudiences shori-ed subtle.w and irnaginatron. (lt also contrasted rvith the Communists'

or-erlr. crlde and ultillratch' coLlnter-productive tendencies). The non-attributable (or

'qr.er-') nature of its outpur added to the public's impression that politicians were

reflectinq oprnion rather than seeking to lead it.'15

If Britain's smaller rrulitan contribution to the Korean 'War brought criticism from the

United States, u,hich consrituted the bulk of the UN forces, the British propaganda

services were considered to have performed exceptionally.

Armistice negotiatiolls stuck on the question of the repatriation of Communist

POWs. It transpirecl that many of the North Koreans did not want to return to a

homeland run bv a rnan who \vas to prove to be the world's longest-standing StaLinist

1eader.36 The Communists insisted that they should be returned. Stalin had no interest in

a srvift resolution to the rvar, as it r,vas Chinese casualties that were sapping 'Western

military srrength. lt u,as not until Stalin's death in March 1953 that the matter could be

resolved in a ceasefire.

CHAPTER SIX

Olliensiue: into the 1950sBy the early 1950s the IRD's London headquarters staffhad grown to more than fifry.The department in Carlton FIouse Terrace had been reorganized on the Second World'War Political'lVarfare Executive (PwE) model into a series of geographical'desks'. onemember of staff,, Fay weldon, recalled that on each desk, 'There were probably aboutsix of us. The "desks" just meant it was a couple of rooms. one would have the boss init, files and a secretary, and the other one would have about three girls, one of whichwould be me.'l Hugh Lunghi, a Russian speaker r,vho, as a wartime Army officer, hadserved with the Military Mission in Moscorn, \&,as an early recruit: 'I u,ent in and set upSoviet and East European Desk. I recruited several Russian speakers I knew fromoxford - they applied for jobs and I took them on. Fred Stacey rook over the EastEuropean desk.'2

rn 1952, Fay .weldon,

later a novelist and dramatist, was a fresh-faced and by her ownaccount, somewhat naive 27-year-o1d. Despite the fact that her uncle was the LabourMP Michael Stewart (later Foreign Secretary), weldon's knowledge of intemationalpolitics was almost non-existent. She was one of a group of well-bred, well-educatedgirls recruited into Whitehall. As Weldon recalled:

There we were, fresh out of various universities, landed in London, no jobs otherthan waitressing in ca{bs. It was so unusual for girls to have degrees in those days. Butin the employment exchange in Great Marlborough Street there was one reallyremarkable woman who took it upon herself to filter us through into various jobs inwhich we would be able to use our intelligence and an ability to get things our of ourheads onto bits of paper, which was really all we had.3

one of the employers that was able to offer qualified women the opportuniry to putthings down on paper was IRD, where'w'eldon soon found herself 'A group of us weretaken on by IRD, by the Foreign o{fice as temporary assistanr clerks. And we were paidsix pounds a week. And we were pur into various desks. I was put on the Polish desk.My friends did rather better than me and got put on the Soviet desk, which was alwaysmuch more fun.'a

By this time many of the desks had their own room, with facilities for the storage ofsensitive material. As Weldon recalled:

In every room there was a Top Secret cupboard and a Secret cupboard. And our TopSecret cupboard was usually empry and so we never locked it. Anything Top Secretwe put in next door's cupboard. And we used to keep our hats and umbrellas in the

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50 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA'WAR

Top Secret cupboard. But one night securiry made a spot check and we came back

and this metal cupboard, this wardrobe thing, was sealed up with red ribbon and seal-

ing wax. A terrible sort of draconian punishment. And we all had to go down and

admit our contrition and our sin and be threatened with expulsion, but it never hap-

pened in the end. It rvas sort of very mysterious.5

New members of stalf rvere vetted, although the loyalry of English girls from public

schools appeared to be assumed. And, although not ordered not to talk about the work,

staffrvere told to be discreet.

By the time Weldon arrived ar Carlton House Terrace the need for staffproficientin foreign ianguages and with detailed locai knowledge of Eastern Europe, inparticular, had led Murray to bring in a number of 6migr6s, often dispossessed by the

Soviet occupation of their countries. Owing to their lack of British nationaliry, and

because it would have been inappropriate to make them sit the Foreign Office entry

exam, they were paid for on the Secret Vote. Thus the staff of IRD became,

according to Weldon, 'a mixture of . . . straight Foreign OIfice people who were very

good and of 6migr6s who had been called in to run the desks, partly out of politeness

I imagine, and partly because they knew the country.'6 Lunghi also recalled these

often larger-than-life characters: ''We had lots of 6migr6s. There was one, Mrs

Tcherniavina, a remarkable Russian woman. I was in touch with her for years. She

had been a curator at the Hermitage. She had escaped from Russia with her husband

in the late 1930s. She was left with a young son. She was great character - invited us

to her home - in Collet Gardens, Barons Court. She was a translator. You used these

people to advise one about their country.'Lunghi said that the editor of IRD regular

newsletter to their diverse outlets, The InterpreteT, w^s also an 6rnigt6, ZinaKorentchevskaya.

The 6migr6 influx gave IRD a di{ferent tone from the rest of the Foreign Ofiice,

bringrng a more emotional anti-Communist set of values into play. 'Weldon recalled,

'There was a lot of anti-Communist paranoia and the people who were in charge of the

desks usually . . . were the sort of Polish who ought really to be riding white horses into

battle. But then somehow there they were, washed up in this very strange place. And

they were always out drinking and we girls, as we learnt the way of the world, you did

all the work, kept the place running and got none of the credit.'7

IRD staff, though, felt a sense of urgency about their work. Lunghi said, 'You have

to realise the extent of Communist propaganda at the time. The Souiet Weekly in the

English Language was in every common room in the country. My desk had a lot to do

then. There were masses of anti-Western propaganda in the Soviet press. The

Cominform was putting out a lot of material.' These were the years of perceived'maximum danger' where the'West was convinced that a Soviet attack was imminent.

New information from the archive of the former Soviet lJnion shows that the threat

at the time was iimited. The international situation was exacerbated by the 'W'est's

support for rebuilding an independent Germany.'With Hitler fresh in minds, the USSR

saw this as a threat. But the Foreign Office's, and for that matter the Britishgovernment's, warnings of an imminent Soviet threat were based on a majorunderestimation of the rrue extent of war damage and casualties in the Soviet (Jnion.

OFFENSIVE: INTO THE 1950S

The Cold'Warrior and IRD associate Denis Healey admitted in his autobiographythat he got it wrong: 'Like most'Westem observers at this time, I believed that Stalin'sbehaviour showed he rvas bent on the military conquest of 'W'estern Europe. I nowthink we were all mistaken, We took seriously some of the Leninist rhetoric pouringout from Moscow, as the Russians took too seriouslv some of the anti-Communistrhetoric favoured by American politicians.' This may be an avuncular admission, but it is

cold comfort for the major policy errors that followed those misjudgements. Healey was

plugged into the intelligence and IRD machinery that poured out the minutiae ofeveryday 1iG under Russian Communism, yet they did not find out the true extent ofSoviet destruction during the Second World War. We now know that the Soviet(Jnion lost more than 27 million people and at least a quarter of its industry.

The main activiqv on the various desks at Carlton House Terrace was the productionof briefing papers, most of r'vhich, in the early 1950s, dealt with the Eastern bloc and themvriad failures of the Communist system. 'W'eldon recalled, 'I remember writing a

report on housing, Polish housing. And ,vou kneu'rvhat your function was, which wasto tell the bad neu,'s; thev didn't want ro knorv the good news. The good news, itseemed to me, was that there rvas the most amazing iot of stuff going on in Poland as

they tried to rebuild it, open schools, build factories, all the rest of it.'To achieve thisenorrnous reconstruction, Polish carpenters had to use fresh, unseasoned wood. This initself became a propaganda point. 'A11 you were meant to talk about was the way thedoor frames didn't fit the doors, which they probably didn't.

.Which was why I started

writing fiction in the end, because it seemed so much more accurate than anythingwritten by someone like me.'8 Or as Lunghi put it; ''We were responsible for gettingfacts with a rwist - a nvist in the best sense.'e

Once the background papers had gone out, the writers at IRD would sometimesnotice their pieces surface in the press. Lunghi recalled, 'We didn't mind if our stuffappeared word for word in the papers. \Ve thought at least we were getting it in.'10

Weldon also recalled identifying IRD material in the press: 'Little bits of '"vhat you'dsaid would appear except that they rvould have the spin on it . . in whicheverything that came out of those worlds was bad. There was no room forambiguity.'tt

Slanted as it was, the material was factual and detailed, and it often provided journalistswith infor:rnation that they might otherwise have been unable to acquire. For example,IRD produced a loose-leaf folder of continually updated biographical sketches - a kind ofWho's Wro in the Eastern bloc - which journalists found extremely useful. It detailed thesubject's career up to date, but also often inciuded a little extra. For example, an IRDpaper written in December 1955, reporting on the second Congress of the RomanianWorkers Party, included brief biographies of the four main speakers. These included one'N. Ceausescu', r,r,ho was later to become Rumania's iron-fisted and megalornaniacdictator for three decades. IRD characterized Ceausescu in the following (perhaps inretrospect too mild) terms: 'Ceausescu is reportediy a short, fat young man with blackcrinkly hair and unpleasant features, a pushing, ruthless and objectionable type, who is

said to be thoroughly disliked by everybody, including his feliow Communists. A major-general (political) and a member of the Central Committee at 30, he is obviously a risingstar of the youngest generation of Communists.'12

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The scale of IRD's operation is reflected in files at the Public Record Office which

show its activiry reaching just about every country in the world by one method or

another. In themselves the contents of the files are sometimes dull reading, but what

they indicate is the placing of IRD material in the media of hundreds of countries: the

reports came from regional information o{Ecers in every country in Latin America,

Scandinavia, the Far East and the Commonu.ealth. Topics dealt with ranged from

material on Poland's prepararion for its first post-Stalinist election h 7957 to papers on

Soviet 'Proletarian Intemationalism', an assessment which concluded that: 'Any hopes

harboured abroad thar the Soviet Union rvas ceasing to direct the work of foreign

Communist Parties have been dashed. As under Stalin, interference in the internal affairs

of other countries ts knou,n by the euphemism of "proletarian internationalism."'13

Each desk w'as charged .,vith conducting in-depth research and the compilation ofmaterial for distribution under the direction of 'political ofiicers'. 'W'hile eventually the

research desks would cover Africa, China and Latin America as well as the Soviet ljnionand Europe a notable exception rvas the United States, confirming that a 'Third Force'

expos6 of the evils of laksez-;faire capitalism was never a factor under consideration on a

practical level. The size of the desks varied over time in response to politicaldevelopments and the dernands of those for whom the propaganda was being produced.

In addition there was a desk dealing specifically with Soviet fronts and organizations,

owing to the international nature of their activities. It was known as the English desk

because many of these fronts operated in Britain itself.

Most of rhe sources used for the compilation of IRD material were open. One

extremely important fund of information was the BBC monitoring service at

Caversham, near Reading. -Weldon recalled, 'Our business was to monitor the radio

broadcasts and newspapers. And they would all be translated for us, and we would put

them in files and every now and then'uvrite reports.'Other sources included the

diplomatic correspondence, which could sometimes be passed on directiy to interested

journalists, and anyone who had recent and direct knowledge of the Eastern bloc.

Weldon recalled: 'I went through the statements of all the people who had escaped from

behind the Iron Curtain, as it was then called, and who jumped ship or who sought

sanctuary. And they would all be brought in to make statements, give accounts ofeverything they knew. Any defectors were just interrogated, everything they said was all

marked down.'Material gathered from all sources would be stored in a massive card index system.

''We had a sort of card index so if there was a change of govemment or if anything

happened, you know. Everybody we knew had a card and you knew who they were,

where they were coming from, all about it. . . . And probably it was very effective in

{:act.'la

MI6 o{ficers around the world fed information into IRD via their headquarters at

Century House. In addition, local MI6 ofiicers kept IRD regional oflicers informed.

Mayhew's Category A material, to be fed to high-level opinion makers, was often

sanitized material from MI6, and this is what made IRD so valuable to selected

joumalists in the media. When the Iron Curtain came down, the 'lVest had few ways ofgetting information from rvithin the Soviet (Jnion. Travel was restricted for foreigners,

and the Soviets were very effective at identifring and breaking up spy rings. The main

OFFENSIVE: INTO THE 1950S

source of information was discreet operations run by both British and Americanintelligence. The technique was simple: debrief all returning refugees and PO'W's. It was

this military programme, known to the Americans as PROJECT WRINGER, thatprovided the bulk of intelligence for strategic planning. WRINGER employed 1,300

specially trained military and civilian personnel in Germany, Austria and Japan whoquestioned thousands ofrepatriated prisoners from the Soviet [Jnion. Begun by thejointservice Far East Comrnand in December 1946, it had so expanded its scope by 1951 that

the US gleaned most of its strategic intelligence from it.Refugees couid tel1 a great deal about conditions in the Soviet union and behind the

Iron Curtain. Indeed, arrangements were made by IRD for access to defectors from the

Eastern bloc being held by military intelligence. On 18 January 1951, Murray was

informed that there was no objection to a small IRD team operating under the Chief ofInteiligence Division in West Gemrany.l5 Interviews would be granted on conditionthat they were subjected for clearance and 'In no circumstances will any facilities tointerview a defector in the care of Intelligence Division be granted to any journalist etc.

r.vho is not sponsored by the Information Research Department of the Foreign Ottrce.'16

In addition, the Foreign O{Ece alreadv operated as a huge coilator of intelligencefrom many different sources - MI6, their own diplomats, newspapers and periodicals

from the country in question, and radio transmissions picked up u'ith the BBC/FOmonitoring unit at Caversham.

Masses of material from ordinary diplomats was also fed into IRD. One eariy IRDfile shows a request to field diplomats for examples of standard text books used inelementary and secondary schools in,/under Communist domination. On 11 January1949, IRD sent the following telegram to posts in Prague, Belgrade, Bucharest,'Warsaw, Budapest and Sofia: ''W'e are making a study (for publicity purposes) ofstandard text books used in elementary and secondary schools in countries underCommunist domination. Can you procure as many examples as possible?'

Sir Oliver Wright, who says his Foreign Office career was otherwise conventional,worked for IRD in Berlin between 1954 and 1956 screening refugees from Eastern

Europe for information and running a small research section on behalf of IRD. Hewould also search for material that might interest IRD while stationed in Bucharest and

Berlin.The Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 damaged the international image of

Communism more than any other event in that decade. [t provided anti-Cornmunistpropagandists rvith a golden opportuniry to deride Soviet pretensions of being the

bringers of peace to the world. On26 October 1956, Krushchev informed the Soviet

presidium that disturbing reporrs were arriving from Budapest and that 'the situation inHungary is extremely serious.'l7 Eight months earlier, at the Party Congress of the

Communist Party of the Soviet (Jnion, Krushchev had made his secret speech

denouncing Stalin and had postulated three new ideological points, offering, so itseemed, an entirely new Soviet approach to the Cold'W'ar. First, he had accepted,

through his criticisms of Stalin, that the Communist system was fallible. Second, he

advanced the theory that Communism's victory didn't need to'come about throughinevitable conflict with capitalism and that it could be secured through peacefulcoexistence with capitalism. Last. he suggested that there was not only one path to

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51 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

Communism and that national Communist parties could adapt themselves to localconditions. This last point u,as particuiarly important as it suggested that the SovietlJnion wouid accept a measure of independence in the countries in the Eastern bloc. Ina background paper on the subject, IRD dismissed the announcement's significance and

pointed out iiiat'The phrase "different roads to Socialisrn" does not in any

circumstances mean that the Cornmunist Parry r'vill not be in command' and concluded

that'it is difEcult to take seriously the Soviet leaders' atTirmed belief in the principle that"questions . . . of difference in concrete fomrs of Socralist development are the exclusive

concem ofthe peoples ofthe respective countries."'18Nevertheless, the neu'princrple \\,'as soon put to the test in Poland, where the death

of the Comrr.unrst Parn' leader, Boieslaw Beirut, had led to the release of politicalprisoners and the removal of Stalinists from the Communist government. The Poles also

made sure that the contents of Krushchev's secret speech reached the West, apparently

in an attempt to prevent Soviet intervention. Then, during a wave of strikes and anti-Soviet riots in Poznan, the Poles set about electing Wladyslav Gomulka, a victim ofStalin's anti-Titoist purges, and in Soviet eyes an unreliable ally. However, despite flyingto 'Warsaw, attempting to bul1y Gomulka and being refused entry to the Polish parryplenum electing Gomulka, which he demanded, Krushchev backed down. As historian

John Lewis Gaddis noted in his recent reassessment of the Cold 'War, 'Howevergraceless the process may have been, a Kremlin leader had for the t-irst timecompromised with another state on who its leader was to be.'1e

Developments rn Hungary took a far more serious turn and eiicited a far more serious

response. In July, Krushchev had already authorized the replacement of the unpopularCommunist leader of Hungary, Mathias Rakosi. As had been the case in Poland, Rakosiwas identified with past injustices. In October the IRD reported that 'The Hungarianpress, no longer stopping short at condemning the "era of Rakosi", is beginning toattack Rakosi directly and opinion, even in some Communist circles, will not be

convinced that the regime intends to remedy past abuses unless those responsible forthem are punished.'2ir

The situation in Hungary swiftiy deteriorated and Krushchev reluctantly ordered the

Red Army into Budapest to 'restore order'. But this intervention inflamed the situationfurther and the Red Army was met by a population armed with stones, grenades and

Molotov cocktails, plus Hungarian securiry forces that looked increasingly unreliable. As

a resuit, the new Hungarian leader, Imre Nagy, who led the liberalizing wing of the

Communist parry, was reappointed in an attempt to bring into government the main

opposition figure. Nagy rvas able to negotiate the withdrawal of Soviet troops formBudapest on 28 October.

Flowever, as historian'W. Scott Lucas noted, 'When the protesters, encouraged bybroadcasts from the CIA's Radio Free Europe, made new demands, includingHungary's withdrawal from the

.Warsaw Pact, the Soviet leadership ordered Soviet tanks

to crush the uprising in Budapest.'21 Krushchev, facing the disintegration of Sovietcontrol over Eastern Europe and Soviet pre-eminence in the international Communistmovement, which China was challenging, had decided to act.

'At 12.73 a.m. on Sunday, November 4, 1956, Moscow Radio made the followingannouncement: "The Hungarian counter-revolution has been crushed."' So started an

OFFENSIVE: INTO THE 1950S

IRD paper brought out immediately after the invasion, which made the historical linkwith czar Nicholas's crushing of the Hungarian revolution of 1848. A further paper byIRD, which kept the news agencies informed with news from Hungary throughout thecrisis, analysed the situation in the following terms, confirming IRD's reading of therwentieth Parry Congress:

Faced with the prospect of part of their empire choosing freedom and independence,the Soviet leaders have abandoned the principles of coeistence and all pretence oflegaiiry. . . . It is now clear that in repudiating Stalinism, Krushchev has not aban-doned the primacy of the Soviet raison d'6tat. The basic contradictions between theintemational pretensions of Communism and the national and imperialist self-interestof the Soviet lJnion has not been resolved. communism as an ideology capable ofattracting by its superior merits, on which Krushchev based the doctrine of coexis-tence, is patently bankrupt. . . . The Soviet leaders have lost the battle of ideas. Theireventual retreat is certain.2z

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CHAPTER SEVEN

A/o thing but the T\uth:/RD and the BBC

The air'waves were to prove perhaps the most important battleground of the Cold 'War.

Throughout those forry years, the West broadcast consistently into Communist bloccountries using powerful radio transmitters. The Soviet ieadership rvas painfully awarethat such a different perspective on rvorld events could potentially undermine itscredibiliry. Radio was the oniv rnedia that could not be banned or intercepted at theborder and the Soviets had to jam .Western

broadcasts, a srraregv that was bothexpensive and only partially successful. Historian Michael Nelson, a former Reurerscorrespondent and executive, has said, 'I believe that Westem broadcasting to the Sovietunion and Eastern Europe, in which the BBC External Services played one of theleading roles, .uvas one of the most important developments of the Cold War. It was

important because of its role in bringng down the most pervasive political movement ofthe century.' He added, 'The weapons used in the propaganda war were the same onboth sides, with one difference. Both broadcast to the world; but the Comrnunist hadfew listeners. The diflerence was that the weapon of defense the Russians used wasjamming; the r.veapon of defense the West used was free communication.'1

The three principal 'Westem broadcasters into the Communist bloc were the BBC,Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberry (RFE/RL) and the Voice of America (VOA). TheRFE and the RL rvere founded by the CIA as surrogate domestic broadcasters, with a

similar tone to that of local radio stations in the targeted countries. The RFE was aimedat Eastern European countries and the RL at Russia. The VOA was funded by the StateDepartment. Other important'Western broadcasters to the Communist bloc includedVatican Radio, Radio Canada International, Radio France Internationale, DeutscheWelle and Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) Berlin. ", ., ,- .-'

Given that American propaganda was funded and run directly by the USgovernment, why did the British government not set up a separate propagandabroadcasting service? The answer is that it neither needed nor wanted to, because theBBC performed this mission so rvell. The BBC depended on the government to set its

licence Ge and the External Services were funded directly by the Foreign O{Ece.During this period the BBC and the govemment presented publicly an arms-lengh

relationship, but behind closed doors they often worked hand in hand. 'When in 7946

the BBC showed signs of editorial freedom, a number of politicians suggested that itmight need more direction.2 The resulting inquiry and

.White Paper publicly

emphasized the BBC's independence and Bevin expressed this view to the cabinet on

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58 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA'WAR

30 April. This was seen as particularly important owing to the BBC's international

reput;don for honesty and accuracy built up during the Second'World 'War, when it

had been allowed to maintain notional, if not real, independence from government

control. Less u'idel,v noted is the fact that the White Paper also required the extemal

services to accept information from the Foreign OIEce regarding conditions in, and

otlicial policies to."rrdr, targeted areas: 'the Foreign Office is also able to determine the

lrngrrg., the BBC broadcasts, rvhich geographical areas they will broadcast to, and for

hoiv long'.: In a crisis. or u-hen broadcasting about a sensitive issue, the Overseas

Service was obiiged under a fonnula draI,n up by Cabinet Secretary Norman Brook to

consult the Foreign Ot1rce.r Norman Reddarvay said:

well the Norman Brook formula was a very wise one - NOrman Brook was a very

wise man and he said that the Overseas Services should consult the Foreign Ofiice on

matrers of foreign affairs so that their programmes could be drawn up in the national

interest. Well that is a jolly good phrase. That was the Norman Brook formula, and

what it said in fact rvas that if the Overseas Services wanted to be talking about - say

the Soviet lJnion and the Communist offensive and so on - then they should consult

the research people in the Foreign Oftrce. And they did's

Exactiy how close the BBC and the Foreign O{Ece were can best be seen from

recently released documents. In-September 1.946 the head of the BBC's European

Service, Gen Sir Ian Jacob, approached the Foreign OIfice for guidance on the attitude

to be adopted to Russia and Communism. The response was an invitation to attend the

Russia Committee, which set the agenda on dealing with the Soviet tJnion and

Communism. They even changed the meeting day from Tuesdays to Thursdays to suit

Jacob's diary. The active participation ofJacob, a senior ex-military man, who had

,..".rtly turned down the job as head of MI6, in the Russia Committee ensured that he

was fully briefed on govemment policy. The MI6 representadve on the committee was

Kim Philby.6

Jacob was, by all accounts. a shy, scholarly man who could show independence on

occasion. Often, as revealed by the Russia Committee minutes, he was more agglessive

in his desire to use anti-Communist propaganda than his Foreign Office colleagues' One

minute noted: 'General Jacob had raised the question of the general line our relations

with the Soviet lJnion which was being taken in the European Service of the BBC' He

had inquired whether we were not being too indulgent, and whether we should not

make a more vigorous reply in out broadcasts to Russian propaganda against us, by

carrying more anti-Communist material.'7 tn early 1,947 it wasJacob who wrote to the

head of the Foreign otfice's Northern Departrfent, the Hon. Robin Hankey,

suggesting fortnightly meetings between ''winther, the head of my Scandinavian

R.gro.r, and his opposite number in the Foreign O{Ece.'Jacob noted, ''We have this

arrangement in all our other regions and it is very valuable''S

Strictures over the independence ofjoumalism in the BBC had understandably been

eroded during wartime and were slow to recover during the Cold War. The closeness

benveen the Foreign OIfice and the BBC was as informal as it was formal. Many of the

executives of the BBC had gone to the same public schools, and inevitably Oxbridge'

IRD AND THE BBC

with their Foreign OIEce colleagues. Both were part of the establishment, attending thesame gentlemen's clubs and having an implicit understanding of what constituted thenalional interesi. Like IRD head, Ralph Murray, some had worked for the BBC before

.loining the Foreign OIfice. When the head of IRD's Soviet Desk, Hugh Lunghi, left in1954. he \\rent to the'Communist affairs'desk at the BBC's External Services in BushHouse, r.vhere he worked with Denis Healey's prot6g6, Walter Kolarz.

One has to remember that this was the BBC that had MI5 vet its stafffor 'subversives'

fronr the 1930s until the practice was revealed in 1985. This eliminated some of themore interesting thinkers from the airwaves. Sometimes MI5 just cocked up on its

vetting, seriously danraging individuals lives and careers without the victims knowingwhy. To show how erratic the process could be, it is worth noting that Hugh CarletonGreene, later Director General of the BBC, had failed his vetting when joining as head

of their German Serwice. 'l was vetted in 1940. MI5 thought I was a Communist, but itturned out to be a mistake.'e Greene rvas fortunate in being well connected and hisfriends cleared up the nlisllnderstanding.l(iBy and large, during the Second'World Warthe vetting rules rvere relaxed and left-rving broadcasters were employed for the iduration. But during the Cold "War, vetting expanded. Hugh Greene recalled onevictim in the External Ser-vices w-hile he u'as controller of Broadcasting in the GermanZone: 'He wasn't a security risk at all. It turned out that he had r.vorked for MI6, therival secret service, and there had been an internal quarrel.' Gen Sir Ian Jacob laterconfirmed, 'I rvas shown lists of Communists in the BBC. It was handled by thecontroller of Administration. A relative of mine was actually on the list because he had a

Communist wife.'l1 Hundreds were kept out of the BBC in this underhand way.According to the Foreign OfEce's own history of IRD, 'high-levei links' were

quickly established between the new IRD and the BBC, recognized as the pre-eminentchannel for publicizing HMG's policies\to the Soviet satellite countries. In February1948, IRD's head, Ralph Murray, deciared his belief that 'the BBC might be geared

into the new policy much more than it is at present', and then listed a scale ofbroadcasting 'target priorities'. This was, he admitted, 'very thorny ground', but thenew publiciry policy none the less required IRD to induce the BBC, by persuasion ifpossible, to undertake 'such programme development that nright help us'.12 Murray was

correct in his optimism. His priority list was approved at a meeting on 27 Februarybenveen him, his boss (Christopher'Warner) and the BBC's Sir IanJacob.

Reading through the correspondence befween the Foreign Ofhce and the BBC heldat the BtsC archive at Caversham, near Reading, the authors were forcibly struck by theintimacy and frequency of contact at the most senior level. The Overseas Service, inparticular, was bombarded with information and suggestions, and instructed as to theneeds of British foreign policy and the desired content of programming on a regularbasis. Despite frequent and vocal defences of theoretical independence and whateverjunior BBC statf might have believed, programming was developed in close consultationwith the Foreign O{fice and its information departments. It would take a major schism -Suez - rvithin the political class, the BBC itself, and the wider public to provoke a

significant challenge to the cosy relationship.r To prevent dangerous deviations, IRD kept a close watch on the BBC's political

content and was not afraid to intervene behind the scenes in that peculiarly English way.

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On 17 February 1,948, Sir Maurice Peterson, the British Ambassador in Moscow, wrote

a menlo to lRf)'s super-vising under-Secretary, Christopher 'Wamer, complaining of a

broadcast by a Mrs Watts that was 'Communist inspired drivel'. Mrs 'W'atts was,

apparenrly, 'Olga Schwartz, rvho is a British subject, resident in the USSR since 1936,

teaching at the Moscorv Institute of Foreign Languages. We know very little about

her. . . . However, her talk as reported here is so phoney that one wonders how to the

BBC allou,ed themselves to be led up the garden path by her.' Further correspondence

then took place betu,een IRD and Jacob's o{ilce. 'Warner suggested that the BBC'should in future get their Russian experts to check their reliabiliry of speakers on Russia

before thev are allou-ed to come on the air.' On i0 March, 'Wamer received a letter

from the director of spoken prograrrunes concemed, a Mr G.R. Bames who said, Jacobhas shorvn me your letter of the 6th March. \X/e have received a protest about this talk

and we can only say we regret that it was broadcast.'l3

A similar complaint was made regarding a news item broadcast on the Eastem European

Service it 1952. On 21 May, the Foreign Office's R.H.K. Marett wrote to R. McCall at

the BBC regarding a news item on 25 April: 'It was not, we undentand, considered to be

of sufficient news value to be broadcast on the Home Service of the BBC. We are a bitpuzzled by the use of this item - so favourable to the Comrnunists and discouraging to our

friends'. The item in question, which had been aired again on the same day, was a news

reporr on an Italian Jesuit Priest who had left his order to join the Italian Communist

Parry. An interview with Father Tondi had appeared in the Communist paper Il Paese. lnthe second broadcast, the BBC reported that 'A Vatican semi-official source said today that

Father Tondi had been under medical care for some time.' According to a written note on

Marett's letter, the issue was 'Dealt with verbally.'1a

It would not be fair to suggest that the BBC never exercised editorial control against

the wishes of the Foreign Ofiice. However, this episode reveals the constant tensions

existed betrveen the BBC and government in a1l forms. The BBC's external

broadcasting sraff knew that the Foreign O{lice was watching for the slightest slip and

the Foreign Oflice monitoring of the BBC output was to continue. In April 1948,

embassies in Communist and satellite countries were commissioned to monitor BBC

broadcasts in locai languages. One of the main conclusions of the exercise was that news

emanating from Comm.unist sources, 'often found to be inaccurate', should not be

broadcast without explanatory or corrective comment unless there was no danger ofmisunderstanding.l5 According to the Foreign O{Ece History Notes on IRD, 'The

results of the survey were discussed with Sir Ian Jacob by Mayhew and Warner, and

Posts informed.' Agreement was reached on a number of improvements, such as that

programmes including press summaries shouid make clear when these represented

minoriry views, as in the case of the Daily Worker. On the other hand, the BBC rejected

that more time should be spent correcting misrepresentations of the HMG's policies, on

the grounds that this would surrender the initiative to the Communists.l6

Through Jacob it was arranged for the controller of Overseas Services to be supplied

with IRD Category A confidential brie{1, along with the editor of European Services.

Jacob thought that they would find these papers 'very useful as background information

for speakers, and as private material for drawing for comparisons and the refutation ofglaring mis-statements.' r 7

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'iilI1

IRD AND THE BBC

The BBC assisted IRD by monitoring foreign broadcasts, for example in Uzbek, inwhich the departrnent was interested. In return, much of the work of British diplomaticinformation o{ficers, particularly in Eastern Europe, appears to have been the supply ofmaterial for the BBC Overseas Service, as well as for the Foreign Office. Incorrespondence with the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Maj Kenneth YoungerMP, the head of the British Legation in Budapest, Sir G.A. Wallinger, noted that'Morethan half the work of the Information OfEcer during this quarter has consisted ofbriefing the Hungarian Service of the BBC and collecting information for Chanceryvolunteered by visitors to the Information Office.'18

IRD provided stories for the BBC and brought publications such as ex-ComrnunistRuth Fischer's Stalin and the Cerman Communist Party to the BBC's notice.le At the endof the first year of IRD's existence, Jacob gave wholehearted support for thedepartment's work. Advising on tactics at the United Nations he said that IRD's task

was to whittle away the effect of Soviet tactics by the constant exposure of the fallacy ofSoviet theory.2tr

Over the next three decades, IRD material poured into the BBC, and was directedto news desks, talks writers and different specialist correspondents. IRD providedbackground briefings, analysis, articles and suggested speakers. In addition, IRDspecialists were avaiiable for consultation. Significantly, IRD soon boasted of itsinfluence: 'the British Broadcasting Corporation Overseas Service is obviously a mostimportant vehicle for anti-Communist publiciry. We have the most cordial relationsand daily contacts with those running this service at all levels and supply them withguidance and material which they make excellent use in their news bulletins, talks and

commentaries'.The material supplied by IRD was not, however, without its problems. [n a

memorandum to the controller of BBC European Services, Tangye Lean, the RussianProgramme Organiser, Mr D.M. Graham, whiie noting the usefulness of an IRD paperon the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact, noted that, 'Its usefulness would be still further increased

if experience had not shown that it is necessary to verifii all dates and quotations.'Having given a number of examples, Graham concluded with some encouraging wordfor the IRD researchers, 'If the Information Research Department could establish a

reputation for super-human reliabiliry, much more of their work would be brought tothe attention of our audience.'21

The main target of IRD activity remained the Communist bloc. It is worthremernbering that, at this time, the BBC was largely a radio broadcaster. Television,which was suspended during the Second World .War,

was still in its infancy. Theideological war translated to a radio war. In 7949 the BBC broadcast for 687 hours perweek compared with the USSR's 434 and the US's 214. In i950 the BBC was

broadcasting for 643, the USSR was up to 533 and the US was rp to 497.22 TheRussians were very sensitive to the power of broadcasting. From 3 February 1948 theystarted a massive jamming operation against foreign broadcasts.

The radio battle was to continue for the length of the Cold War. Historian MichaelNelson told a remarkable story of Soviet incompetence: 'Despite the billions of dollanspent on jamming, it was the Soviet state that saw to it that its citizens had cheap short-wave radios which they could use to listen to 'W'estem Propaganda.'

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Shortly before Stalin's death, on 17 February 1953, the USSR Council of Ministers

proposed that the Ministry of Communications and Industry should stop from 1954 the

production of receivers capable of picking up western broadcasts. However, by 1954 the

production of such short-rvave receivers had dramatically increased to 4 million aye^r.

The ministry had simplv forgotten to effect the order. 'Thus our technical measures

directed against hostile radio broadcast rvere brought to nothing by the mass production

of short-rvar,e receivers'. said a later report in the Central Committee archives. 'It is

enough to point out that at present, up to 85 per cent of short-r'vave receivers are

located in the European part of the USSR. rvhere our own short-wave broadcast cannot

be heard and s-here it possible to listen onlv to hostile radio.'23

The BBC r.r-as ro be one of iRD's best customers. It was quite willing to 8o to what,

according to Hugh Greene, u,as known to many as an anti-Communist propaganda

department for its background information on highly sensitive issues.24 Lord Mayhew

confirmed this: 'I should think they were our best customer, very likely. Because, you

see, they were not inhibited by the thought of using taxpayers money to change

political opinion in Britain, this was the Overseas Serwice. I don't think thev used it at

home, I'm not sure they ought to have used it at home, but they used it abroad and that

was fine.'25

The BBC was able to acquire sensitive material through IRD, including GCHQmaterial when it was capable of being sanitized to disguise its origin. Charles 'Wheeler,

the veteran BBC correspondent, was appointed to BBC External Services in Berlin in

1949. He was regularlv visited by an IRD man based in the city who would turn up at

his otlice armed with cyciosryled sheets of information. 'W.heeler was not allowed to

look at them, but the IRD man paraphrased the contents. They were mostly 'gossipy

new items' about East Germany, which Wheeler sent to the German Service of the

BBC. 'I used to get regular visits from the Information Research Department. Peter

Seckleman used to come and see me with snippets which I think were taken from

intercepts from the Berlin Tunnel,' said Wheeler. This was the 600-yard tunnel dug by

MI6 and the CIA beneath the city's Soviet zone. It connected with the tunnel through

which the Soviet's main telephone lines ran. GCHQ experts monitored the telephone

lines and reported anv interesting material. 'I would pass anything interesting back to the

German Service in London. It was all done on the old boy's basis. There was a quid pro

quo: I handed material over to IRD and they gave me stuffback. . Remember this

was the height of the Cold'W'ar.'26Hugh Greene, head of the Eastern European Services behveen 1949 and 1950, said

that he regarded IRD as 'just another source of factual information from which one

could select'.27 Anatole Goldberg, chief commentator for the East European Services ofthe BBC, knew about IRD from the begnning. He recalled that his contacts with the

department were personal and that he maintained very good relations with various IRDrepresenratives, particularly Mr Heath-Mason. He found the department helpful in that

it had 'documentary facts, and the Government's view on a particular issue - it was

useful with sensible people.' His contacts with IRD were in the 1950s.28 Throughout

the IRD years, rhe Foreign Otlice placed its disguised material and brought pressure to

bear on the BBC when its people broadcast items that the government objected to. In1956, this close and effective relationship was to be sorely tested.

IRD AND THE BBC

The Suez Crisis was to cause a rocky patch in many establishment relationships, andthe common law marriage of the BBC and the govemment came under serious strain.At the time the BBC was broadcasting only one-and-half hours a week in Arabic, butBritain's declining relationship with Egypt permeated the Corporation's broadcasts bothat home and to the rest of world.

British troops had fint occupied Egypt in 1882. The canal, rvhich was built a few years

before, had rapidly become a major strategic asset for maintaining the Empire and theBritish moved in to protect this vital lifeLine to the far-flung colonies. The canal had

dominated British deGnce strategy in the Middle East during the Second World War.After 1945 the occupying forces remained, and this caused increasing resentment in an

Egypt that was imrnersed in major domestic political upheavals. In July 1952 a group ofofficers, including Gamel Abdul Nasser, overthrew King Farouk. British relations with theEgyptian people went rapidly downhill and the British found their presence challenged bythe new nationalist and assertive President Nasser, who Glt they should not be in Suez.

Nasser found the 'West generally suspicious, at best unhelpful and often hostile.However, he 'uvas not to be intimidated, and rvith popular support he placed increasingpressure on the British until they agreed to ',vithdrarv their troops from the canal zone inJune 1956. Tensions ben'veen the 'West and Nasser mounted. Nasser was refused the.W'estern

arns that Egypt felt it needed to defend itself against the growing power of theIsraelis. This pushed Nasser into the arms of the Soviets, who were ever arxious toexploit these kinds of diplomatic splits. In early 1956, Krushchev agreed to supply arms

to the Egyptians (using the Czechs as the conduit) and to help to build the Aswan Damin a deal worth $1,200 million.

In July 1956, Nasser nationaiized the Suez Canal Company, much to fury of theBritish and the French, who began to threaten the Egyptian government. Nasserremained defiant. Without American suppolt, the British and French hatched a plot. InNovember 1956 the Israeli Arnry launched an attack on Egypt as a pretext for theBritish and French to intervene to 'separate the combatants'. Their forces invaded thecanal area. The result was worldwide condemnation and even dissent within the rulingTory Parry. Eventually, Eden resigned and his place was taken by Harold Macmillan.The British rvithdrew from Egypt in one of the last great fiascos of the empire. iil;ii:1 ,-ii;i

IRD was once again at the centre of events and the BBC was expected to follow suit.Foreign Ollice ofiicials clearly expected government policy to be explicitly supported.As early as March 1951, Christopher'Kit'Barclay, then in the Foreign Oftce'sInformation Policy Department,2e wrote to the BBC's Gordon Waterfield, expressingBevin's concern that '\ /hat we, the British, are doing for under-developed countries inthe economic and social sphere, and particularly in the Middle East, is not su{ficientlyknown'.30 The letter was copied to the Deputy Director of Overseas Service, J.H.Clark, by R. Scrivenor at 17 Carlton House Terrace, indicating IRD's interest. In reply,Clark told Scrivenor, 'we shall be glad to ensure that appropriate attention is given in allour External Services to British encouragement of development in the Middle East'.31

Later that year, Barclay wrote again to 'Waterfield, this time with a more specificsuggestion: 'We have decided that we should now start taking a rather more directpublicity line for the benefit of the Sudanese about Independence with a view todiscouraging them from thinking that any form of link with Egypt would be in their

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61 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROI]AGANDA'WAR

interests.' Barclay discreetly suggested that 'You may like to consider whether you can

help with a general talk or two about independence on the Arabic Service, without ofcourse indicating that these lectures are in any way directed at the Sudan. . . . The so-

called autonomous republics in the USSR and the satellite countries should provideexamples.'l:

One example of horr, material rvas passed to and used by the BBC in the build up tothe crisis r,vas given bv Norman Reddau.a,v: 'The BBC Domestic Serwice talks person, a

very bright ladv called Grace 'Wvndham

Go1die.33 rang me up and said "'We don't really

knorv very much about this tellorv Nasser. Who is he and didn't he u'rite a book? Doyou have anvbodv rvho could do me a quick summar.v of this?" 'We had some

extremely able ex-joumalists and a perfectly honest sumnury went offthe next day.'3a

Nasser, too, \'as ar,vare of the advantages of radio services that broadcast in accordance

rvith government policy. He had initiated a very e{ficient Arabic radio service, Voice ofthe Arabs, in the early 1950s, broadcasting to a range of Arab and African countries.

This service contained a great deai of anti-British and anti-Western commentary.According to Gordon Waterfield, then head of the Eastern Service, the BBC was

encouraged to respond with anti-Nasser propaganda as early as 1953. 'The BBC was

attacked by the Foreign Ofiice for not ansrvering in the same terms. The BBC refused as

it would have lost trust in our accuracy. All the Arab staff came to see me at the start ofthe intervention and said they would only stay if the BBC continued with objectivereporting'.3s

In the months ieading up to Suez, the BBC found itself under increasing pressure toplace the situation firmlv in a Cold"W'ar context. The IRD line was run that Nasser was

becoming a Soviet dupe - the favoured all-purpose propaganda line for anti-colonialleaders. This was increasinglv hard for the BBC's Middie East specialists to take as theywere only too aware of the complexities of Nasser's position and that much of the

politics involved vu,as loca1 or Arab rather than Cold War. Nevertheless, senior BBCo{Ecials were stil1 standing shoulder to shoulder with the government's increasingly

dilficult position. In 1956, Hugh Greene, by then the controller of Overseas Services ofthe BBC, joined the secret Egypt Committee, formed to determine anti-Nasserpropaganda.36 The pre-meeting briefing papers for 72 October 1956 set out the

objectives: 'In the long term, we aim to get rid of Colonel Nasser. In the short-term,we must prepare the Arab World, the rest of the \Vor1d, for negotiations with him - the

result which must be presented as a success for us.'37 A minute frorn a later meeting ofthe committee, with Greene's successor Donald Stephenson, shows cracks beginning to

appear in the parry- line: 'The BBC would always work on the assumption that the

Govemment u,'as right; but it needed to give a fair reflection of public opinion and to

be beiieved by its listeners.'38

When the British and French military finally inten'ened, the cracks widened into a

split. Senior BBC editors tried to keep the output pro-British govemment, but many

BBC commentators and journalists were appalied by Eden's intervention and refused totoe the govemment line in their broadcasts. This in turn led to a backlash against the

BBC. One of the sorest wounds came when Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell's response toEden's speech of 3 November was broadcast. He accused British troops of being the

aggressors, called for the Prime Minister's resignation and oflered support to any

IRD AND THE BBC

Conservative successor who complied with IJN resolutions. The broadcast arousedcontroversy at home and in the Mediterranean, where servicemen listened to the BBCWorld Service. Eden thought that the BBC shouid never have broadcast the speech and

the government renewed its pressure on the Coryoration.An ad hoc comnrittee on overseas broadcasting, with Lord Prir,y Seal Butler as

chairman, had already recornmended that a Foreign Office liaison oIEcer should workwith the BBC because'the viervs of HMG on specific issues of major importance oftenreceive insufiicient emphasis in broadcasts to other countries'. It was an eiegant ForeignOfEce euphemism for censorship. Press Secretary William Clark claimed that Eden'instructed the Lord Chancellor to prepare an instrument which would take over theBBC (Overseas Service) altogether and subject it wholly to the will of the Govemment'.This assertion cannot be corroborated. Nevertheless, govemment intervention can be

seen. IRD's supervising lJnder-Secretary, Peter Grey, told the BBC: 'it was not thenational interest to include in the Arabic Ser-vices news bulletins virtually identical withthose now appearing in the Home Ser-vice'. The Corporation rvas instructed not tobroadcast news bulletins on the Arabic Senice in the near future.le

Follot'ing the fiasco, a liaison ot'ilcer from the Foreign OIEce to the BBC was

appointed to re-establish government ascendancv and control over the Corporation.This was J.L.B. Titchener, better knorvn as 'Titchener of Tartoum'. Titchener r.vas able

to demonstrate within a year that the BBC rvas back under government control and

IRD was setting the line; he wrote, that 'much of the material and a great deal of thebackground for the BBC's broadcasts to the Soviet (Jnion, the satellites and Chinareaches the BBC from this department. The liaison in this respect is both close and

constant.'40

The BBC's painful involvement in Suez was only part of the anti-Nasser propaganda

story. The British governrnent had carefully placed other media weapons to attackNasser, albeit again with mixed results.

65

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CHAPTER EIGHT

The Medium is theMessage: /RD and MI5

According to Fay Weldon, the arrival of mysterious MI6 visitors to the IRD's CarltonHouse Terrace otlices rvould generate a thrill of excitement, particularly among some ofthe younger Gmale staIilEvery norv and then rhe spies would come uy ana wouldcome down the cor-ridor and there r'vould be a sort of_fi-cson of excitement. There wereglass doors and we rvere toid ro turn our backs. Somebody would come along thecorridor and say "Turn your backs. To the u,a11" and you rvould turn so this personcould rvalk down these corridors unseen. Except we always peeked! Kind oi goodlooking they were. But rhat was the sort of Bondish brt.,1

The reiationship between IRD and the intelligence services MI5, MI6 and GCHe isperhaps the most controversial area in rhe history of IRD. unlike Fay weldon, many, ifnot all, old IRD hands play down contact with the secret services. Close involvementwith a proactive intelligence service impiies IRD's engagement in darker activities thanthe Foreign olhce has so far cared to admit publicly. However, throughout IRD,s life6lite oflicers had very close relations with MI6 and MI5, and the department was, inpart, a secret service itself.

One of the best kept IRD secrets was the existence of a special unit - the action desk -which coordinated IRD's 'dirty tricks' operations. Only senior staff and those involvedrvere in the 'need to know'. The existence of covert activiry blurring the distinctionbetween IRD and MI6 was confirmed by several insiders including iord owen, theformer Labour Foreign Secretary 0976-8).2'This unit also planted sanitised espionageinformation gained by MI6 into the media,' said one MI6 source. In addition, various adhoc arrangements were made for specific countries and operations, in coordination withMI5 or MI6, as needed. In the compartmentalized IRD, these arrangements were notknor.vn to the majoriry of low-level stafi, who spent their time -.r"ly monitoring theforeign media and preparing briefing papers. A sense of the 'spooky' side of IRD wasrevealed by a forrner CIA oflicer from the period, who said that IRD was represented atmeetings betrveen MI6 and the clA for most of its life.3 IRD was also frequentlyrepresented on high-level Foreign ofhce and intelligence committees.

The closeness of these links is also demonstrated by the fact rhat many IRD staffwere, at one time or another, also MI6 or MI5 officers. John ogilvy Rennie, the IRDhead during Suez, was later to head MI6.a IRD's head in the late 1960s, Nigel clive,had been a senior MI6 man from the time of the Second world war but most notablywas MI6's political officer during Suez. Former IRD employee Brian crozier, a

68 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA \vAR

well-known colxmentator on 'Western intelligence serwices, has also spoken of theinterchangeability of IRD and MI6 people. In addition IRD aiso took on a number ofMI5 people. The legendan' and glarnorous MI5 otlicer, Ann Elwell, was married toallother MI5 otlicer, Charles E1u,ell. She joined IRD in 1955 and made several trips tothe Middle East. her allotred rerritorv. She sta_ved r.r'ith IRD for t'nvenry years.s

Initiallv IRD's terrns ol ret-erence forbade subversive propaganda in or to theCommunist-controlled countries. especiallv an)'thing that u'ould instigate military acts

or sabotage. 'Wartime operations had shou-n that it rvas dangerous and rvasteful toencourage anv premature re\rstln.e aqainst occupving forces.6 The British cabinet didnot want plor,oke anti-Communists inside the Sor-iet bloc into futile acts of resistance

that the British s-ould not realistically be able to support. However, as the Cold'Warprogressed. the cabinet began to support very specific acts ro undermine Communistregimes. The restrictions on exciting subversion were lifted at a cabinet meeting of19 December 1949, provided that such operations were approved by a minister.T Thesechanges left IRD free to help MI6 with its work, most immediately in aiding thelanding of Albanian guerrillas to overthrow the Communist regime.

The policies of 'containment' advocated by the 'W'estern powers actually involved a

covert ro1l-back policy. What neither IRD nor anyone else in the West mentioned(although it u,'as extensively covered in the Communist newspapers so avidly pouredover by IRD researchers) was that from 1949, the West began supporting the non-Communist partisan annies still operating against the Soviet (Jnion. Arms and agents

were poured in behind the East European borders by unmarked planes and boats run bythe CIA, MI6 and French intelligence. The Soviets were engaged in full-scaleengagements with these units in the Ukraine and Baltic States, and also experiencedconstant sabotage and attacks from smaller units across a wider area.

In late 1946, MI6 had set up the Special Operations Branch and Political ActionGroup. These rvere revamped, SOE-style units that were aided by the Royal Nary and

Royal Air Force in operations in the Baltic, lJkraine and other countries. They puthundreds of agents into the Eastern bloc and supported the anti-Communist partisansrvho fought small-scale wars with the Soviets until they were eventually suppressed oneby one. Agent drops in support of these partisans, many of which resulted in capture,continued until 195,1. The Soviets knew that the British had been behind the abortivelanding of Albanian parrisans to attempt a coup rn 7949. The British public did not.Withholding this kind of inforrnation gave a deliberately lop-sided view of the CoidWar and Soviet claims of 'Westem aggression.

Like IRD, MI6 u'as under Foreign Office control, although in its case the tightness ofthat control waxed and rnaned over the years. From 1950 the norn, unchained IRD was

able to comple'ment MI6's SOE-sryle operations as a smaller version of the old PWE.SThe details of IRD's support of MI6's operation against Albania, and then theoverthrow of President Mossadeq's government in Iran in 1953, remain secret.However, the Suez Crisis provides a textbook case of IRD involvement in covertoperations. While the files are not yet pubiicly released, a great deal of information has

become available. Suez reveaied how IRD's media assets could be used in a Britishintervention, even if the result in this case, and the actual handling of the affair, was a

d6bicle that severely damaged British prestige across the world.

Htxt

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IRD AND MI6

The British had retained a formidable covert propaganda presence in the Middle Eastafter the Second World War and were conscious of the strategic importance of theregion especially in tenns of oil and the canal. The radio station, sharq al Adna, was theprimary British propaganda weapon in the region during the Suez crisis. A wartimeasset taken over by MI6, in 1948 it had transferred from war-torn Palestine to therelative safery of Cyprus. The station was based in a collection of Nissen huts on a

scrubby slope near the village of Polymedia. It boasted the most powerful medium-wavetransmitter in the Middle East. After a visit to the region in 7949 to establish the extentof pro-British news, IRD's supervising under-Secretary, Christopher 'Warner, wrote,'Our posts agree that the BBC are good and on political material Sharq al Adna st1ll,

better. It is the general view that the Sharq transmitter is the most listened to after localbroadcasts. The sets are in cafes and therefore broadcasting penetrates to the viliages.'eWamer may have been overestimating Sharq al Adna's appeal. At any rate, by late 1951IRD's Christopher Barclay was infbrming Gordon Waterfield that the BBC hadovertaken Sharq al Adna in popularity.ro Nevertheless, Sharq al Adna was a majorregional broadcaster and during the mid-1950s. the station - also knorvn by the Britishnatne Near East Arab Broadcasting Station - had become a major medium for thedissemination of IRD's subtle pro-British propaganda. For this role it was, at leastinitially, extremely valuable. In 1951, Barclav couid report that'in critical times whenpeople believe that the Egyptian Governmenr is censoring news, pracrically everyonelistens in to either the BBC or Sharcl al Adna or both.'11

The director of the radio station was Ralph Poston, who had previously been theeditor of the Royal Institute for International AIIairs rragazine, the World Today, whichhe made a conduit for IRD material. Richard Beeston, a British journalist, worked forthe station in the mid-1950s. The station's success, he said, was 'due in part to a first-class drama and music programme supplied by the station's largely Palestinian Arabstaff'. It was a considerable enterprise and something of a sinecure for the British staff.'The 150 or so Arabs on the sta{f were respectable, sober, hard-working group, mostlymarried with children. The smal1 expatriate staff of administrators, technicians andjournalists were a racier iot altogether, whose goings on constantly arnazed their Arabcolleagues.'l2 On the face of rt, Sharq al Adna appeared to be a normal commercialstation and made money. According to Beeston, this was something of a headache forMI6 as it did not have an administrative mechanism for dealing with profits.

Documents also sho'uv that IRD, following in the footprinrs of rhe SOE, had made theMiddle East a priority for covert propaganda operations. Besides radio, other techniqueswere used, such as putting out'sibs'to sow the seeds of distrust against the Russians, whowere emerging as rivals in the region. Internal Foreign Office correspondence from 1949shows some of the suggestions, including blaming the Russians for forging currency.Information OiEcer Mr T.E. Evans in Beirut liked the idea, 'There's are always a lot offorged currency round here,' he observed. Anthony Haigh, regional information ofiicerin Cairo, suggested spreading a rumour that 'The Russians are using Zionists tocreate intemational disorder in the Middle East.'John Cloake in London advised, 'Eachpost must decide on the advisabiiiry of rumours in its own territory.'t:

As the Suez Crisis worsened during 1956, the British government put inro place a

number of covert operations against Nasser and hiS regime. Many centred on the

59

70 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA .wAR

British-owned companv the Arab Ner,vs Agency (ANA). From its head oflice on thefirst floor of the Immoblia Building in Sharia Sherif Pasha in the heart of Cairo, theANA serviced a vast section of the rledia in the region. The agencv was run byjournalist Tom Litde. a Middle East specialist rvho had joined during the war.1+ JanMorris, later a famous travel t"riter, had u.orked tor the ANA after the Second World'War: 'This \yas never borrng. The nervs rvas ftr1l of dranra. The rr.ar in Palestine was at

its height, at1]ils s'ithin Eslpr ..-ere rich in intrisue. menace and corruption, and ourcorrespondents in the renlorer Arab parts tlooded us s.ith piquant intelligence -man'ellous callreos of de:crt cilnre. courr conspiracr', religious polemic or family teud.'15

The ANA provided a convenient b:rse tor Britrsh anti-Nasser undercover operationsduring Suez. The ntemoirs of Sehvyn L1ovd, the tbrmer Conservative ForeignSecretary, record that, as the Suez Crrsis r,vorsened in the summer of 1956, the tsritishcabinet's pian for toppling Nasser called for several months of psychological r,varfare tobe follorved by rnilitary intervention if this did not r.vork.16 In Cairo, temporaryadditions to the large staff at the ANA otfice included Sefton Delmer, who had beenin charge of British black propaganda during the Second 'World War, and WilliamStevenson, biographer of 'lntrepid', whose assistant he had been in the SOE. Delmerwas now working for the Daily Express which supported his secondment back into'secret government work'. Delmer and Stevenson's propaganda objective was toequate Nasser with Hitler, rvhich was Eden's view. In this they had more success inLondon * notably with Delmer's own paper, the Daily Express - than in the MiddleEast.

These and other activities resulted in the arrest by the Egyptian authorities in August1956 of thirry people including four Britons. A11 were accused of being members of a

spy ring, of which James Sr,vinburn, secretary of the ANA, was said to be the head.17

Two officials of the British Embassy were expelled. At the time of the arrests, SeftonDelmer, 'William

Stevenson, Ann Sharpley of the Euening Standard and Eileen Travis, an

American working for the Daily Mail, were also expelled.ts According to ReutersrePorts of the later trial, Swinburn confessed, for which he received a lighter five-yearsentence. Another Briton was sentenced in his absence to ten years, and a Maltesebusinessman, JamesZarb, who had served with the SOE in Yugoslavia during the war,was also given ten years by the court. One Egyptian was executed, his son, an Armycaptain, was given a life sentence and a number of other Egyptians were given longsentences. Several other Britons were acquitted.

The ANA spy ring was part of a much larger MI6 operation. From March 1956,British intelligence, through Julian Amery, the Conservative MP and fomrer wartimeSOE officer, had made contact r,vith a group of rebel Egyptian oflicers outside Egypt. Ifthe British government overthrew Nasser, these officers were prepared to take power.George Young, the depury director of MI6 responsible for Middle East operations, andhis colleagues were discussing the destablization of Nasser with various dissident groups.They even discussed the possibility of assassinating him, an idea that would have appalledcalmer heads at the Foreign Ofhce had they known. The Foreign Oflice consensus was

that Nasser was popular and an attempt to remove him could misfire, especially as therewas no obvious pro-'W'estern successor with sufficient presence. As the crisis mountedthrough September, MI6 developed further assassination schemes. One was a plan to

IRD AND MI6

inject nerve gas into the Eglptian leader's ofice. The scheme was allegedly approved byEden before he suspended it in preference for military intervention.

'With the decision taken for a British and French military campaign the principaldirect 'psychwar' tools available to the British for anti-Nasser propaganda were powerfulradio stations, including sharq al Adna. Newer and more powerful transmitters wereconsidered for British stations in Libya, Aden and Kuwait. The lraqis, after persistentefforts by the Foreign Office, erecred a rransmitter in September 1956, which was morepowerful than any Egyptian station. A British ner'ffork of radio stations in the MiddleEast broadcast 'Actual stories' supporting Britain's case over Suez. British and French'black' stations started broadcasting disinformation into Egypt from 28 July. A 'FreeEgvptian' station, transmitted from France and operated at a frequency close to Egypt'sVoice of the Arabs radio, while the British conducted radio operations from Libya,Cyprus and Aden. The Israelis detected a mobile station, with an Iraqi announcer,calling for the assassination of Nasser and transmitting coded messages.le

Disinformation was not limited to the radio. In another British 'psychwar' operation,a forged pamphlet was attributed to the 'Government of Egypt InformationDepartment' and sent to oil companies in Egvpt. The document suggested that Nasserwould ef[ectively take over Middle Eastem oi1.20 The 'psychrvar' operations were run byLt Col Bernard Fergusson, a man wrth no previous experience in psychological wadare.A Black

.Watch ofiicer, he had been a highly regarded Chindit leader in Burma during

the Second Worid 'W.ar. Afterwards he had been sent to Palestine as part of the counter-insurgency operation, which went awfully wrong when a former SOE officer wasarrested as part of a British team charged with killing Zionist guerrillas. At Suez it srartedgoing wrong, too. The RAF flew operations to drop propaganda leaflets on rheEgyptian population. The problem was that the 'leaflet bombs' were designed toexplode at 1,000 ft, using an altitude fuse, and scatter paper over a wide area. However,because of barometric dilltrences in Egypt, the bombs exploded at just 6 ft causingdeath or injury to any Egyptian in the vicinity - a real own goal.

The main British anti-Nasser propaganda war was fought, both in the Middle Eastand across the world, by IRD working closely in conjunction wirh MI6. IRD wasinvolved in every stage of the crisis. The political adviser to the British SupremeCommander, Gen Sir Charles Keighley, was Ralph Murray, the former head of IRD.IRD's current boss, John Rennie, and his depury, Norman Reddaway, told Eden's press

secretary, William Clark, of their desire for more 'black' propaganda from British radiostations.2l

Another figure who was to later head IRD was Nigel Clive, a secret service careerolllcer who was MI6's political adviser during the crisis. Clive and the deputy directorof N{I6, George Young, had convinced Eden of the serious threat that Nasser posed toBritish interests. In April 1956 they set out to do the same with rhe Americans.According to a CIA cable from London, they were told that:

Nasser's aims are total destruction of Israel; Eglptian domination of all Arab govern-ments and elimination of all 'W'estem positions in the Arab area; material extension ofEgyptian influence in North Africa, particularly Libya. In order to realise his ambi-tions, Nasser has accepted full-scale collaboration with the Soviets, and is prepared to

72 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

allow the Soviets u,.hatever role in thetheir support. Nasser is now taking theSyria, Libya, and French Nonh Atrica.and-out Soviet instmment.

area thev desire in order to assure himself ofinitiative for extension of Soviet influence inEg1'pt must therefore be regarded as an out-

Youns and Clir.e proposed the overthro'"v of the Svrian govemment and King Saud ofSaudi Arabia, plus operations asainsr Eg)'pt.,,

Peter Grer'. iRD's supen'isinq Under-Secretan'. rvas closely involved in setting theForeign Otfice public position on Suez. In March 1956 IRD's Sydney Hebblethwaite,part of rhe British Psvcholoqical 'Warfare Cornmittee set up for Suez, urged BritishInfomatron o*icers rn the Mrddle East to use 'their best endeavours to cultivate theappropnate kev personalities of small broadcast stations in their countries so as to ensurerhat through such triendly contacts, anti-British criticism is reduced and a little morespace be given to objective news about Britain'. During the crisis, IRD's Middle East

desk became the centre for coordinating pro-British propaganda to a range of mediaoutlets. This desk also serwiced a variery of internal and external committees hastilybrought together to support govemment policy.::

The Arab Nens Agency, which was so convenient for MI6 operations, was in factsecretly funded by the British governrnent. It was the first of a string of secret Britishgovernment new agency fronts. On 23 January 1945, the United States Office ofStrategic Services (OSS) fi1ed a revealing source repofi on rhe ANA:

This is a 100 per cent British Agencl, rvhich is Arab in name only, is a direct offlhootof the short-iived and norv defunct Baikans News Agency, which was set up shortlyafter the present war, \vas started bv the London Daily Telegraph organtzation.

W.hen the Germans successfullv invaded the Balkans the whole staff and outfitwere evacuated to Egypt and formed the nucieus of the Arab News Agency. It startedvery modestly brrt soon mushroomed into a very elaborate organization, withextensive otlices in Cairo, contiguous to the Military Censor's ofiices where Abd Ei-Rahnran Nasr, a journalist on the staff of Al-Ahram, was sumptuously enthroned inthe managerial chair. Mr Mallet, who later took up the post of Director of thePubliciry Section of the British Embassv in Cairo, was however the reai backstagestring puller. After his departure he rvas replaced by a Mr Barnes.

Abd El-Rahman Nasr, was successively sent to Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus,Baghdad, and Djeddah to open branches for the agency. His name and services wereaiso used to interview Arab personaiities in the middle East, in order to give Arabcolour to the ner,vs and agency.2a

The ANA continued after the Second Worid 'War and was one of a global nerworkof news agencies run by MI6, aided by IRD. Its pulpose was to keep a British voice inmany parts of the r'vorld during the Cold 'War, to disseminate IRD grey propagandaand, if necessary, to srlpport a range of MI6 operations fromblack propaganda to givingworking cover to MI6 agents. The ANA had initially built up a good reputarion withthe Middle East media for its news and Gature reports. In an early form of informationtechnology, it provided the Middle East's first ever Arabic language telerype service.

IRD AND MI6

According to Gordon Waterfield, BBC executive and friend of Little's, in the yearsleading up to Suez, 'ANA was influential trying to do what the BBC did - grve factualinformation - and succeeded. Arabs had been misgovemed for so long that they hadceased to trlrst their own people.'25 Again it was a considerable enterprise. 'There are 35ANA staff members in Egypt and 59 in other countries. Of the 76 stationed in Arabworld, 5 are British and71. Arabs, of rn'hom 65 are Moslems. The registered office ofANA is in London.'26 Richard Fietcher, the investigative joumalist v",ho first publiclyrevealed these news agency 'fronts', said, 'ANA operated the most comprehensiveservice in English and Arabic available in the Middle East with branch olfices inDamascus, Beirut, Baghdad, Jerusalem and Amman, and representatives in some 15

other cities, including Paris and New York. k was taken by nearly every Arabicnewspaper, as well as Sharq al Adna, All-India Radio and the BBC.' Tom McFadden,an Anrerican diploniat writing in Journalism Quarterly in 1953, said that the ANAcharged very little for its sen'ice and frequently gave it away without charge.

It employed local staff, and some were thll-time and long-standing. During the longbuild-up to Suez ANA avoided blatant anti-Nasser material, r.vhich would have resultedin its closure. Nevetheless. among other nervs. a stream of IRD Cold War articles werechannelled through the ANA. These were maini-v designed to provoke suspicions aboutthe growing Soviet involvement in the Middle East.

Like the rest of the British government's Suez operarions, nor everyrhing went quiteto plan at the ANA. According to Bob Pety, one of the ANA staff, Tom Little and hisCairo team were not in favour of Anthony Eden's military intervention and thoughtthat the British cabinet was misreading Nasser. This stance must have been prery clearto the Egyptians as Little managed to retain a friendship with Nasser throughout these

difiicult times. This was, at least in part, so that Nasser had a sympathetic ear to conveyhis views back to Whitehail. The ANA did not provide quite the service that theForeign Oflice had hoped: 'Hadden Knight was in charge of news from the Londonside. He was very pro the Foreign OIfice during Suez. Tom Little spiked his attempts toplant neu's. Little sent him a telegram saying we weren't children.'27

Things did not go well at Sharq al Adna either. Arabic propaganda has its own distinctproblerris. Gordon Waterfield remarked, 'Once a foreign starion starts to abuse anythingArab, they close their ranks.' As the crisis developed, the station's British director was toldto shift his white propaganda into the realms of grey through to black propaganda.2s Then,as D-Day for Operation Musketeer arrived, he was told to change the name of the stationto The Voice of Britain. Grasping exactly what was about to happen, the director of thestation went on air and wamed the Egyptian audience that it would shortly be hearing Lies

and might experience bombing. It was not to believe the lies and must endure the bombs;these acts were not those of Englishmen who knew Arabia and cared for Arab people. Hewas promptly arrested by the British military for his trouble.2e The director was broughtback to England and removed from any public platform. Several of Sharq al Adna's staffjoined Nasser's Cairo Radio. After Suez, Sir Donald Maitland was brought in from theForeign Office to run the station unril it was finally closed down. But IRD operationsagainst Nasser did not stop with the failures of 1956. ln 1.964,IRD set up, in liaison withmajor oil companies, a radio station called The Voice of the Coast. This was situated inthe compound of the Trucial Oman Scouts in Dubai.3o

BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

Suez also made it much harder to capitalize on the Soviet invasion of Hungary. Theinvasion revealed the contradiction between Communism's international pretensionsand nationalist and imperialist self-interest, but much the same could have been said ofBritain and its Suez adventure. Indeed. although rhe brutal suppression of thedemocracy movement in Hungarv offered the perfect opportuniry for a propagandaoffensive against the USSR and Communists in general, the ultimately disastrousattempt bv Eden's govemmenr to regain control of the Suez Canal and remove Nasserseriouslv undemlned Bntish attemprs to claim thc moral high ground. Denis Heaieysaid in the House of Commons:

On the morning of 30th October the Sovret Govemment made an ofiicial statementof its readiness to rvithdraw its troops from Hungary and to seek in conversationsrvith the Govemments of the East European States a new basis for the reiationshipberween them and the Soviet LJnion. Twenty-four hours later Soviet policy changed.Did anything happen berr,veen the first event and the second which influenced thatchange in Soviet policy? I put it no higher than to say that it is impossible for anyHon. or Right Hon. Member to maintain that there is no connection benveen thesomersault in Soviet policy berween Tuesday and Wednesday moming and the actionof Her Majesry's Government.3l

In a speech at the Albert Hall on 6 November, Hugh Gaitskell made a similar point: 'Ifwhat happened on Tuesday last, if the ultimatum and invasion of Egypt, the resort tothe law of the jungie, had the slightest influence on the Russian decision to send intanks and bombers to crush the movement for democracy in Hungary, then it is

something for which rve should never lbrgive ourselves.' He went on to state thatBritain had no moral right to condemn Russian aggression 'because we have been guilryof aggression too.32 The head of the CIA, Allen Dulles, saw it in a similar light. 'Howcan anything be done about the Russians,'he asked his brother, Secretary of StateJohnFoster Dulles, 'when our own allies are guilry of exactly similar acts of aggression?'33

The Suez Crisis was an ill-considered venture that tore apart the consensus of the Britishestablishment. Nevertheless, it illustrates the propaganda resources that Britain could atthat stage muster in a full-scale military operation. However, it also reveals that noamount ofpropaganda can change opinion on a foolhardy venture.

Suez remains a small glimpse of IRD's wider operations in support of MI6 during theCold War. It is hard to discover the mechanisms by which IRD, MI6 and otherpsychological warllre departments worked in support of covert operations like theattempt to overthrow Enver Hoxha in Albania in 1950 or the successful overthrow ofMossadeq in Iran in 1953. Even with the gradual release of IRD files, it is unlikely thatthose that cover the MI6/IRD inteface will be made public in the foreseeable future.To estimate British covert media capabilities in these dark areas, one has to piecetogether information from not always reliable sources. One example comes from KimPhilby's interview in the Estonian periodical Kodumaa,long after his defection. ln 7946,Ml6 had set up a Speciai Polirical Actions departmenr to organize covert operations.Philby said that in 1953 a cabinet committee,'the Committee ro Fight againstCommunism', was set up under Gladwyn Jebb to wage the Cold War. This was later

IRD AND MI6

replaced by the Psychologrcal'Warfare Consultations Committee, known as the Dodds-Parker committee. col Douglas Dodds-parker, rhen parliamentary lJnder-Secretary atthe Foreign otlce, was responsible for liaison with MI6.3+ There must have been aliaison and policy body. Dodds-Parker denies such a role, but he is still covered bv theOIEcial Secrers Act.

Philby goes on to assert that MI6 had penetrated the 'English mass media on a widescale. . . Paid British agents work in scores with editorial staf6 of provincial andLondon newspapers. These papers include such widely read publications as the DailyTelegraph, the sunday Times, Daily Mirror, Financial Times, the obseruer and many othersjPhilby made no mention of IRD, and it is not clear whether he included IRD 'assets' inthe media or he was just referring to (but perhaps exaggerating) the number ofjournalists that were close to MI6.3s If large numbers of British joumalists were also onMI6's pavroll, this would be one of the last grear secrets of the cold'war.

MI6 remains the most glamorous inteliigence service, with its aura of 'cloak-and-dagger' acrivity. what is not generaily appreciated is the importance of covertpropaganda and cultural activities to the intelligence sen-ices. As we u.,ill see, during theCold War the CIA organized a secret and vast anti-Communist operation in the media,trade unions, education, military and many orher insritutions in foreign countriesthroughout the world. The difference with the British was rhar they had fi,!.o separateagencies: MI6 to handle the 'cloak-and-dagger' stuff and IRD to do the propagandawork' As we have seen, they frequen',\ shared resources and personnel.

75

CHAPTER NINE

Agrncies of Change: the

I\ews Agrncy A/etworkIRD's relationship with MI6 extended far into a shadowy world of media ownershipand manipulation. MI6 built a global nenvork of news agencies, which were used todisseminate IRD Cold War output alongside routine news. In the late 1990s there arenow just a handful of vast intemational computerized nervs agencies dominating theworld media; with the instantaneous nature of television communications, it is hard toremember that there was once a plethora of such agencies competing to bring newsacross the world. Then a string of apparently independent agencies could supplyhundreds of newspapers, periodicals, radio stations and a growing number of TV outlets,especially if their prices were set artificially low. The importance of these agencies to an

organization iike IRD is explained by Norman Reddaway: 'A news agency man will gethold of the facts from a source he regards as reliable and will put it into the plumbing ofthe news machine, and it will be all over the world in no time flat.'l As we have seen,

these media assets, secretly owned by the British government, also enabled IRD to becalled in to assist psychological warfare operations in times of crisis or in support ofBritish undercover operations. According to former IRD sources, the agencies wereused as cover for MI6 spies working undercover across the world. For much of the ColdWar, the news agencies discreetly did their work in routine manner. Much of the newsthey covered was obtained by local staff and was unremarkable, except that it tended toreflect a British view of events. The hidden agenda was for them to feed a steady streamof IRD-generated articles and Cold War propaganda into their output. They shared a

London o{Ece so that IRD material could be fed centrally and discreetly into all of theagencies.

The origrnal Second World'War agencies included Britanova Ltd, and the Arab NewsAgency (ANA) and Globe News Agency in Calcutta, which were set up by LeslieSheridan on behalf of the SOE berween 7940 and 1943. From the war unril well into the1950s, these agencies were generally thought by outsiders to be independent, run by theLondon-based Hulton Press, a large Fleet Street media empire owned by Edward Hulton.Hulton had merely allowed himself and his company to provide cover for MI6. Annuaireports at Companies House, London, show that, in 1948, Hulton and the other wartimedirectors resigned from Britanova and the ANA to be replaced by a new set offigureheads. Over the next thirfy years a host ofjournalists and major establishmentfigures, many with Foreign Oflice connections, appeared as directors. These includedTom Clarke, a joumalist;2 Maurice Macmillan, the pubiisher, Conservative MP and son of

78 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA \vAR

the British Prime Minister; and the Hon. A-lan v. Hare, son of the Earl of Listowel, whoworked for the Foreign Office (1947-61) and was later chairman of the Financial Times.

It is clear from the company returns, interlocking directorships and personnel, officeaddresses and entries in press directories at the time, that all of these firms were run,behind the scenes as a single operation, together with a number of companies registeredoverseas: Globe Agencv Ltd (lndia), Star Nervs Agencv Ltd (Pakistan) and later AfricaFeatures (Kenva). Some of these companies acted as local bureaux for rhe Londonagencies; Globe u'as an Indian-based company of rvhich Tom Clarke was a director;Star u-as registered in Pakistan. Thus it can be seen thar, with one director in theForeign Office, a company secretarv from the Secret Service together with ample funds,and the journalistic experience of Tom Clarke and the colleagues he had recruited, thisgroup of companies was in an ideal position to assist the secret propaganda campaign.

The agency operation was adapted for the cold war by the holy trio of col LeslieSheridan, Adelaide Maturin and victor cannon Brookes. 'with the new directors, in1948 Victor Cannon Brookes took over responsibiliry for filing the companies'annualreturns and Adelaide Maturin continued as the registered secretary of both agencies.Victor Cannon Brookes had been in the SOE during the Second'World 'War

as privatesecretary to Lord Selboume. After the war he set up in private practice as a solicitor,where he was to run the legal side of a network of MI6/IRD front companies for morethan thirry years. At the end of the war, nearly all of the SoE's office workers hadretumed to civilian life, but Adelaide Maturin remained in govemment service and wasappointed a career officer in the Secret Service, a post in which she continued until herretirement tn 1970.3 According to former ANA staffer Bob Pery, Maturin was incharge of the money, spent time in the agency's London o{Ece and had to be consultedover any expenditure.a As we will see she in e{fect became the managing director of a

chain of new agencies that at their height employed some 600 staff located across theworld. Benveen 1948 ar,d 1952, cannon Brookes, on behalf of his secret employers,launched three further news agencies: Near and Far East News Ltd (NAFEN), NAFEN(Asia) Ltd and Arab News Agency (cairo) Ltd. Adelaide Maturin was registered as

company secretary in each case.5 The 'footprint' of these agencies corresponded withthe areas that the Foreign OIEce felt were at most risk of succumbing to Communistinfluence. The Near and Far East News Agency was based in Istanbul. contemporaryannual reports state, 'the main activiry of the company is the purchase of news andfeature articles for resale throughout the world'. That a sizeable staff was employed is

indicated by a substantial wage bill, for which provision was made in the balance sheets.The MI6 front news agency presence in Asia was enornous. NAFEN (Asia) Ltd, the

successor to the Globe News Agency Ltd, was based in calcutta, with bureaux in NewDelhi, Bombay, calcutta and Madras, with correspondents and stringers throughoutIndia and the principal cities of South-East Asia, the Far East, Middle East and Africa.6 Ithad 100 employees and issued news in English, Urdu, Hindi, Marathi, Tamil andMalaysian. It was a main supplier of news to A-ll India Radio. The Star News Agencyhad been set up in Pakistan in 1948 after partition and was 'mainly concemed with thedistribution of foreign news and news of Moslem interest'. It supplied Pakistan Radioand published in English and lJrdu. It was based in the Hassanali Mamooji Building inKarachi with sub-oIlices in other major cities. The secret subsidies of these agencies

I

THE NEWS AGENCY NETWORK

made it hard for competitors and enabled them to get their material placed extensivelyin media across the world.

There were problems. After the British/French invasion of Suez, in 1956, the ANA'sCairo offlce was closed down and much of its former coverage taken over by Nasser'sMiddle East News Agency (MENa;.2 rhe ANA, however, moved to Beirut andcontinued in existence, u'ith staff in London, cairo, Amman, Damascus and otherMiddle East capitals.8 Various British news operations worked out of the same Beirutbuilding, including the obseruer, whose correspondent and former KGB mole in MI6,Kim Philbv, worked there until he fled to the Soviet L]nion in 1963. It is hard tobelieve that he did not keep his Soviet masters up to date on this aspect of Britishactivities. The ANA operated in the Gulf, rvell into the 1960s.

The operations of these subsidized fronts made business extremely difticult for thegenuine British-based news agency, Reurers. Now one of the biggest business andinformation providers in the world, it has always claimed to be entirely independent ofthe British government, but behind the scenes Reuters has always had an important rolein advancing British interesrs. In the last century it had a near monopoly - in associationwith Havas (French) and Wolff(German) - of the production and flow of inremationalnews. Britain owned most of the rvorld's telegraph cable nenvork, rvhich was laid andmaintained under the protection of the Royal Nar,l. After the Second world war,christopher chancellor, then general manager, travelled the world, proclaimingReuters' independence from the British government. In realiry, Reuters had got intobed with the British govemment in return for payment on a number of occasions. [Jpagainst the subsidized ANA, Reuters had made hear,y losses in the Middle East until itnegotiated a secret agreement with the Foreign O11ice. However, Chancellor allowed itsregional service in the Middle Easr to be resold by what the CIA would call a'proprietary' of the British government. under this agreement, Reuters was paid aninitiai d28,000 per year and the ANA became sole distributor for Reuters in the MiddleEast from 1954. Reuters was also able to use ANA stafffor the collection of news andwas effectively given free distribution in the region. In the mid-1950s, press directoriesrecorded that the ANA 'supplies a news and feature service to newspapers in the ArabMiddle East and distributes a Reuter Service throughout this area'.

The Ml6-subsidized agencies and Reurers were to snuggle up close. In the mid-1960s, all of the agencies had as their London oIEce, St Brides House, 10-11 SalisburySquare, then largely occupied by Reuters and backing onro the Reuters building at85 Fleet Street. At this time there appeared to be a new bursr of lRD-orchestratedactivity, with three new companies being launched by cannon Brookes: RegionalNews Services (Mid East) Ltd and the RNS (Latin America) Ltd (St Bride's House,capitai d50,000 and d40,000) and International News Rights and Royalties Ltd (118Fleet Street, capttal d40,000). Alongside Tom Little,e Gordon waterfield head of theBBC's Arabic Senice, joined the RNS (Mid-EasQ.to RNS (Mid East) took over thefunctions and coverage of ANA, including the Reuters service in both English andArabic. By 1964 this had expanded to include broadcasting and rv, with coverageextended to Iran and Somalia.ll

IRD was also subsidizing Reuters to distribute news with its inherent anglophileperspective in Latin America. The accounts of the RNS (Latin America) showed

79

80 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

payments of d25,000 for both 1966 ard 7967 for'News Agency Subscription'. Reuters

was under considerable pressure from the Foreign O{Ece to increase its Latin Americancoverage, yet it rvas losing about d80,000 per annum on the regional service. The RNS(Latin America) was just a means to launder Secret Vote money to Reuters.

In the late 1960s in a cost-cutting exercise, the Foreign O{fice paid Reuters to take

over RNS (l\{id EasQ operations. Tom Little opposed the deal. Gordon Waterfield said

that, as a result. Little ll,as excluded from the negotiations: 'the FO got a bad deal. TomLittle did not tmst Reuters to keep up the excellent ner\,vork he had built up.'tz 11rit

takeover \{as negotiated for Reuters by executive Gerald Long. When he became

general manager of Reuters in 1963, he decided to terminate the agreement and byJuly1969 Reuters had resumed its independent Middle East operations. FIe was aware of the

use of the agencies to subsidize Reuters. 'I rvouldn't pretend that I liked the originalarrangement. I didn't. But business is business,' he said. ln 7969, Long negotiated the

deal where the Foreign Ofiice paid Reuters to take some of the news agencies over. Hesaid that it was to save the Foreign Office money: 'I think these activities are extremelydangerous, although I don't say that of these particular people. I think that everythingthat government does it should do openly.'t: In a similar but much smaller-scale move,

IRD also attempted to buy the Obseruer's Foreign News Service for redistribution on a

similar basis.ra Former overseas correspondents now in London say that it was commonknowledge that IRD would subsidize Third World newspapers that wished to subscribe

to British news agencies.ls

Meanrvhile the IRD agencies had kept up their work, changing titles from time totime. Tom Clarke became majority shareholder in Britanova in 1955, taking over the

4,500 {1 shares of the then Foreign Office o{Iicial, the Hon. Alan Hare:Britanovawasdissolved in 1965. In the 1950s, chairman and London editor of the group of companies

(including Star of Pakistan) were Tom Clarke and Peter Hadden Knight respectively.

Clarke died in 1957 and was replaced by Tom Little, the former ANA journalist.

The two Near and Far East News companies continued in existence. NAFENincreased its capital tn 7970, bringing to 21,500 the shareholdings of both MauriceMacmillan and Lord Hillingdon. Hillingdon (C.H. Mill, was a member of the familythat had long been associated with Glyn Mills, the bankers. Other directors werejournalists Norman Morris and'William Loving; Conservative MP and former MI6oflicer Cranley Onslow,16 noted for 'His fiery anti-Communism, which sometimes

smacks of McCarthyism',l7 and R.P.T. Gibson, now Lord Gibson, chairman of the

huge publishing group Pearson Longman Ltd from 1967. Labow MP and News of the

World's'The Voice of Reason' 'W'oodrow 'Wyatt, was a shareholder from 1,952. As

about the time of the split with Reuters, all of the news agencies changed theirregistered address to Buchanan F{ouse, 24/30 Holborn WC1, a tall austere Victorianbuilding, just yards from the home of Mirror Newspap ers. ln 1972 the soliciton firm ofCannon Brookes and Odgers also moved to Buchanan House.

In the late 1960s, lntemationai News Rights and Royalties (INRAR) then became

the central operating company.l8 Its first directors were the Hon. Alan Hare, now at the

Financial Times, and Torn Little (chairrnan),1e with 1,000 shares each. Controlling shares,

however, r,vere held by nominee companies, which prevent the real source of funds

from being pubiiciy identified.:tt In March 1969, Alan Hare resigned as director and

ilrI

I

II

I

i

i

li.

THE NEWS AGENCY NET'WORK

shareholder and his place was taken by James Holburn to whom 3,500 shares weretransferred. Holburn, had joined The Times in 1934 and was chief correspondent,Middle East (1952-5), returning to his native Scotland as editor of the G/asgow Herald(1955-65). He later said that his directorship was purely nominal, having been arrangedby Tom Little, whom he understood'liaised with a department of the Foreign Ofiice'.He seemed to be unaware that 3,500 shares had been registered in his name and statedcategorically that he had never put up the money to purchase them.21 Some of thoseinvolved with the news agencies were fully aware of their task as MI6 frontmen. Otherssay that they had no idea. After the closure of IRD, Alan Hare was asked about hisinvolvement. Hare, a reserved Etonian who had served with the SoE in the Balkans,said that he did not know that there was Foreign Office backing for the agencies andthat he joined them as an ordinary commercial director and paid for his own sizeableshareholdings. Another co-director, Maurice Macmillan, a friend of Hare, said, ,I wasfully aware that what we were doing was consonant r,vith government policy, I didn,texpect to make money: it was a do-gooder purpose. Putting across the British point ofview - that was the purpose of the operation.' He said that he could not rememberwhether he paid for any of the shares that he held as director. Another shareholder, LordGibson, said that he did not wish to cofiunenr about his role in the nev. agencies.22

In the last wave of IRD fronts in 1971, victor cannon Brookes registered a newcompany called World Feature Services Ltd (-WFS) with the same address (BuchananHouse) and personnel as the other agencies. At about the same time, INRAR ceasedtrading. The new agency moved to offices in Lambeth,23 with shareholders listed as

Derek charles, a journalist; and rom Neil, chairman, a former colonial civil servantwho rose to be chief British official in Kenya at the time of independence in 1963.2a Hethen became director of the Thomson Foundation. In 1968 INRAR had bought thirry-five out of ninery d1 shares in a Kenya company called Africa Features, of whichJamesHolburn was a director. Three years later, Africa Features was registered as a Britishcompany by Victor Cannon Brookes at the same address as WFS. Its first directors wereHolburn; Sir Kenneth Granville Bradley, a colonial civil servant; and John collier, a

British journalist in Kenya. Collier, the managing director of Africa Features, was anassistant editor with Visnews, 'the world's leading supplier of TV news film' (from theBBC, NBC and theJapanese NHK network), before he retumed to Nairobi in 1966'tostart Africa Features service'.2s Majoriry shareholder in Africa Features was SeventhNominees Ltd, a nominee company controlled by cannon Brookes. Holburn andBradley resigned in July 1,975 and were replaced by Derek charles and rom Neil.Africa Features and wFS were then housed in the same oIEce with shared stafl andwith Neii as chairman of both companies.

By the end of the 1970s the end was nigh for smaller news agencies. A fewintemational agencies geared up to provide financial material for the burgeoning globalmarkets. This cash subsidized the news side of the operations. Even with a Secret Votesubsidy, small agencies could not compete. By the early 1980s they had all gone. Howmuch did the Bntish taxpayer subsidize these agencies? Losses after the 1966 CompaniesAct came into force amount to more than d100,000 for the extant British-registeredagencies. However, these accounts also reveal that much larger sums were spent - onoccasion up to nearly d50,000 in one year - suggesting that direct annual subventions

81

82 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

could have been made to help these companies balance their books. This, together withthe fact that the agencies' activities seemed to have begun to run down by 1967 whiletheir period of operation spanned more than thirry years, suggests that total expenditure

must have been enormous. Who put up this iarge sum of money? They must have been

subsidized by MI6's part of the Secret Vote.The domination of nervs agencies rvas important in the kind of news the rest of the

'uvorld received. In his book Tre lledia are American,26 Jeremy Tunstall described the

continuing control of the florv of nervs befr,r.een the countries of the world by a handful

of Anglo-American instirutions. He set the current situation in the context of social,

economic, political and technological developments over the last century. D.R.Mankekar, the chairman of the Non-Aligned News Agencies Pool, a former editor ofthe Times o;f India and ex-employee of the 'Westem news agencies in India, described the

result of Western power over intemational news flow as 'One-'Way Free Flow'.27 Thisinvolved non-aligned countries of Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin Americareceiving news about the rest of the world through agencies of the advanced Westemcountries, which are not, to put it mildly, primarily concemed in furthering the interests

of the mass of Third World peop1e.28

CHAPTER TEN

I*perial Aduentures:/RD and the Colonies

In 1955, Greek Cypriot guerillas, led by a neo-fascisr Greek called Col George Grivas,started a violent campaign to force Britain to grant its colony, cyprus, the right to self-determination and union with Greece - Enosis. A year after the .atprign hal begun, inJune 1956, John Peck, ex-head of IRD, rvas in washington .rro.ki.rg as the head ofBritish Information Services. In a confidential communication rvith the British Embassyin Nicosia, cyprus, Peck made a request lbr informatron. He demanded ,Anything oncommunism and its power, motives in supporting Enosis and future prospects.,l peckwas facing a debate in the United Nations on the question of cyprus,s right to self:deterrnination and Enosis, or unification, with Greece. The debate had been agreed atthe behest of the Greek government and against trenchant British opposition. An oldIRD hand, Peck wanted ro play the 'red' card - ro imply the loss of Cyprus ro Greecethrough Enosis would be a victory for the communist broc. In the zero-sum game andtrvo-dimensional framework of relations that the cold war had become, a victory foranything that one side in theory supported could only be a loss for the other side. peckconceded that, in view of the right-wing anti-communist government in Greece, thecommunists had everything to lose from unification with Greece. In spite of that, hehad been making the argument that the communists stood to gain as a .esult. Amongother things, he had been suggesting rhat, 'if cyprus went on the Greek econo-y, itsprosperity would promptly vanish and the communists could then become so srrongthat they could successfully control the island against the interests of Greece andNATO'.

If the arguments that Peck was propagating in the US on behalf of a Britishgovernment intent on preventing Cypriot independence or Enosis with Greece, seemeda little far-fetched, he recognized it. In the same communication he wrote, .onrereading the above, it occurs to me that you may Gel thac some of the argumenrs forwhich I am seeking supponing evidence go a little far for a Government InformationService. In fact, of course, we usually conform strictly to our policy directives in ouro{Ecial materiai, but in informal arguments and o{I-the-record discussions one canachieve a great deal by unot1icial comment and suggestion.,2

As far as the unofiicial element of British propaganda is concerned, the way IRDattempted to shape international and domestic perceptions of Britain's colonial strugglesduring the Cold War vividly illustrates how facts were mobilized in support of Britishforeign policy. Evidence of communist invorvement was presented to grear effect by

84 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

IRD, but this was nevertheless often criticized as being a distortion of realiry, even

within Whitehail.

If one theme can characterize the period of British history in which IRD existed,

aparr from the Cold'War - IRD's ralsor d'etre, it rvas the British withdrawal from the

empire.3 The Second World 'War had left the British empire in a radically changed

international context. Not onlv rras it fast becoming clear that the war had brought

about a radical shitt in the balance of intemational power to the detriment of Britain,

but Britain a1so, for the first time, found itself committed to the dismantling of itsemprre.+ Aithough it had imperial possessions stretching around the globe from Hong

Kong to the Falkland Islands, Britain was, bankrupt and in desperate need of the

resources rhat many of its colonial holdings could provide. Following the Second World

War the colonies were exploited by Britain on an unprecedented scale. According to

historian David Fieldhouse, befween1946 and 1951,'one way or another, the colonies

were lent or given some d40 million by Britain but were forced to lend or tie up inLondon about d250 mil1ion. This was disinvestment on the grand scale'.5 And as

historians PJ. Hopkins and A.G. Cain have pointed out, 'Far from being abandoned

after 7947, the empire was repositioned in Africa, Malaya, and, informally, the Middle

East. These regions were sources of vital supplies; they contributed to the hard currency

pool through dollar earnings; and they were ail directly or indirectly under British

control.'6 Consequently, once elected, the Labour Party took up the burden of the

empire with the enthusiasm of the converted evangelist, despite its often and long-

proclaimed opposition to irnperialism.T

Given the economic plight in which Britain found itseif at the end of the Second

World 'War, it was no coincidence that the areas of the empire with the greatest

economic value were those where Britain's determination to maintain control was most

obvious. Two such areas were Malaya and Kenya, where, as Cain and Hopkins noted,

'coercion tended to be the first resort of policy. The bogey of Communism was

invoked, where it was nor already present, and this surfaced in the early stages of the

Cold War to legitimise the use of force.'s Almost immediately after the department's

establishment, IRD became involved in the Malayan Emergency, where a largely

Chinese Communist guerrilla army was present, having initiated a guerrilla war for

independence from the British in 1948. IRD's job was to ensure that this was

understood in the correct framework, as a battle against the worldwide Communism

and an attempt by the Chinese Communist minoriry (40 per cent of the population) to

impose Communism on the Malay majoriry.The Chinese communiry had origtnally been encouraged by the British to settle on

the Malay peninsula owing to the lack of native labour. Its numbers had swollen during

the nineteenth century after the discovery of tin in the inhospitable Malay interior, and

it grew to even greater numbers with the development of the rubber plantations in the

late nineteenth and early r\rventieth centuries. By the end of the Second'World'War, the

immigrant communirv almost equalled the Malay population. Indeed, as Brian Lapping

wrote in his history, End of Empire,'A Maiay walking down the main street of Kuala

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Lumpur, the administrative centre of the Federated States, or any other Malay town,saw shops and banks entirely domjnated by Chinese. The same was true of tin mines, ofthe few factories and even some of the rubber estates.'e

During the Second World 'War, resistance to the Japanese occupation of Malaya hadbeen spearheaded by the largely Chinese and Communist Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Armv (MPAJA), with the support of the British. Following the end of the war,the MPAJA expected to play a significant role in the development of posrwar Malaya.Although an insurrectionary strategy was considered at the end of the war, the MPAJAwas disbanded and the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) reverted to its pre-war policyof building its strength and authoriry through front organizations. In hindsight, anychance that the MCP might have had for a successful insurrection was missed.1o Butwhen the MCP's strategy faiied in the face of British determination to hold on to thecolony, a disillusioned MCP embarked on its badly organized and poorly judgedrebellion. As historian Michael Stenson noted:

The essential factor in the growrng support for revolt . . was the manifest failure ofthe main open fronts to obtain significant concessions or to extend their support afterMarch 1947. Lnd in addition, the British refused demands for any form of democrat-ic representation (upon w-hich the rvhole logc of the MCP's posrwar united-front-from-above policy was based) and extended everrnore restricrive control over tradeunion activity and eventually completely destroyed the Pan-Malayan Federation ofTrade (Jnions.'11

The Malayan emergency was Britain's longest colonial conflict after the Second World'War. At its core was the vast wealth provided to Britain from Malaya's natural resources,especially rubber plantations - mainly run by British owners. The prolonged conflictwith the MCP started in 1948 and lasted until 1960 and it was one of the first majorchallenges to face IRD. The MCP was to prove to be a dangerous and ruthless enemy,emerging from the jungle to kill rubber plantation and tin mine managers andpoiicemen. In 1951 MCP guerrillas killed 504 members of the securiry forces and some533 civilians. For some time the future of Malaya seemed to hang in the balance. By thetime of Gen Sir Gerald Templer's arrival in 1952 as the new High Commissioner, 5,000guerrillas were fying down a huge force of British and Commonwealth troops, whichreached a peak of a quarter of a million.12

The emergency, combined with the threat posed by Nationalist and Communistagitation elsewhere in South-East Asia, led to the establishment of IRD regional ofiiceat Phoenix Park in Singapore tn 7949, as part of the OfEce of the Commissioner-General for Britain in South-East Asia. A secret briefing on the work, carried out by theRegional Information Officer described its main areas of interest as 'Singapore, theFederation of Malaya, Hong Kong, British possessions in Bomeo, Indonesia, the formerIndo-Chinese States, Burma, Thailand and the Philippines.'13 The same paper stated that'the Regional Information Officer's duties are to plan the production of positive andIRD materiai, produce it and suppiy it to the information officers of all the territoriesconcemed. In practice, however, the spread and influence of Chinese Communism inthe region has greatly increased the importance of the IRD work.'1a Such was the

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importance of the work of the RIO that, when, in 1951, economy cuts were made to

the Singapore otlice, IRD drew on the Secret Vote money to make up the difference.l5

In this early period. IRD's role rl,'as not limited to persuading the public, but often

included convincing other parts of the British government to take the Communist

threat seriouslv. John Cloake, rvho u.as responsible for liaison with the Colonial OIiice,

recalled that 'One exercise I do remember rvas trying to wake the Colonial O{Iice up,

who r.vere a\yare that there u'ere some Communists in Malaya, but at that time ' . . itrvas hard enoush to get them to concentrate on that, 1et alone anyone else in the

colonrai s-orld. . . . That \\'as one exercise rve drd.'16

Br'1951r. evenrs and IRD had apparently succeeded and the Coionial O{Ece was

eager to perceir-e the MCP as 'part of the Kremlin's world-rvide campaign against the'Wesrem pou,ers'. In 1950 a paper on colonial problems and policies outlined the viewfrom the CO:

A11 available evidence shows that the MCP though small, is a well organised and

orthodox Communist parry implementing an impeccably Stalinist policy. Evidence ofdirect links r.vith Moscow and Peking is, not surprisingly, lacking; but unnamed dele-

gates from Malaya attended the Conference of the World Federation of Trade

IJnions held in Peking last November. These delegates undoubtedly brought back to

Malaya advice and instructions based on the war experience of the People's

Liberation Army of China.17

The importance of presenting the emergency as part of worldwide Communistaggression was cleariv recognized by IRD official Adam Watson, not least for the

purpose of ensuring US support for British policv:

It seems very dangerous to pretend that the troubles in Malaya are not caused by

Communism but only by a kind of iocal banditry. As we saw in Greece, where the

Greek Government were for long anxious to describe the Communists only as ban-

ditry, international public opinion in the United States . . . and elsewhere is inclined

to that the line that when wholesale miiitary operations are required to suppress mere

internal unrest, it is in some way due to bad government. This is especially so in a

colony; and instead of receiving sympathy and support from American public opinionin our praiseworthy struggle to combat the well-known international Communist

menace, we shall merely be regarded as a bad colonial power coping withrebellions.'18

Another target of IRD's pro-colonial anti-Communist propaganda was the Labour

Parry, many members of which were inclined to object to their government's apparently

imperial policy. As early as August 1948, Bevin and the Secretary of State at the

Colonial Ofhce, Arthur Creech Jones, were alarmed enough to demand material for a

counterattack on Communist propaganda in Britain.le Material to counter hostile

complaints from trade unions and labour groups and to rebutt Communist propaganda

was passed to Denis Healey at the Labour Parry's International Department.

While Britain's economic dependence on the empire had increased, colonial

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IRD AND THE COLONIES

exploitation could not be easily squared with support for the United States's new worldorder, or the Labour Party's committment to decolonization. Flowever, with thebegrnning of the Cold 'W'ar, American attitudes softened towards British colonialism andthe British Empire was transformed into 'a bulwark against the Communist menace.'2oIndeed, according to cain and Hopkins, 'washington was persuaded, by a mixture ofselGinduced anxiery and skilful British diplomacy, that a friendly empire spanning theglobe would be a useful ally in containing the threat to what was becoming known as

the Free world. . . . Liquidation was not on the agenda: the empire was to be given a

shot in the arm rather than a shot in the head.'21

Not least to ensure the support of the United States, it became essential thatchallenges to British colonial rule shouid be understood within the right framework -that of a substantial Soviet and Communist threat rather than legitimate nationalistdemands for an end to colonial rule. It is clear that IRD made a substantial contributionto the fact that the long retreat from the empire was largely understood within that Cold'War frame'uvork of Soviet intrigue and expansion. In some respects this was not toodiIficult. Not only did the Soviet union profess its support for movements of nationalliberation, but many Nationalist movements seemed at best neutral and at worsepenetrated by Communists. Brian Lapping, h End of Empire, noted:

Throughout the British Empire's declining years the great threat to its survival waswidely thought to be the international Communist movement. 'White

settlers ontheir farms in $enya and Rhodesia, Nayasaland and ranganyika, white o{Ecials inCyprus and Aden, the Gold Coast and British Guiana, declared whenever thingswent badly wrong that there was i red under the bed. A nationalist leader had only toshow a mild interest in Marx or Moscow to be at once branded a Communist. Britishnewspapers like the Daily Express and the Daily Telegrapft continued to declare, yearin year out, that the Empire was under siege by Communists.22

Flowever, presenting colonial problems in the context of the cold 'war, or playingthe 'red' card, sometimes met with objections. The Mau Mau insurgency in Kenyaraised just such problems and caused difiicult quesiions to be asked. In the summer of1952, reports of an African underground organization called the Mau Mau began tor6ach Britain. After the emergency was declared in october, the question of how topresent the colonial insurgency through propaganda was raised and led to an ongoingdispute between IRD and the colonial office. Althougt5-IRD searched for a

communist angle on the Mau Mau, the evidence was not promising. Indeed, pressarticles claiming a communist connection had prompted the Foreign officeInformation Policy Department and Colonial Oflice to assert publicly, in a press releaseput out through the British Information Service, that 'there is no evidence that eitherMau Mau or its policy is in any way inspired or directed by Communists'.23 In fact as

the press release indicated, the Mau Mau insurgency was entirely indigenous.Nevertheless, IRD vigorously pursued attempts to have an intei, or intelligence briefing,on the Communist connection with the Mau Mau. This met with stiff resistance fromthe Colonial O{Ece. While IRD argued that the attributable briefing paper shouldcontain 'possibilities and presumptions,' officials at the Colonial Office were less eagei to

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wander into the realms of the unknown. In 1953, in response to an IRD attempt to base

an intel on an unsubstantiated article in Li;fe, Dixon Barton of the Colonial Officecomplained, 'I am afraid I cannot force myself into proving what I do not believe . . '

and I thought all this had been thrashed out with the FO's IRD some time ago. As Ihave said, that FO Department gets the summary of Intelligence every month; they can

be reminded of that and be. vet again, told that when we have anything approaching"evidence" oi Communism being behind Mau Mau we will make a point of telling

them.'2a

Historian Susan Carmthers, who has studied the limited papers available that cast light

on rhe role played bv IRD in colonial conflicts, found that the case of Kenya suggested

'that the IRD rvas rather keener to detect the hidden hand of Communism than many

of its Colonial Ollice opposite numbers.'2s Carnrthers argues that, while the Colonial

Office took the possibility of Communist involvement seriously, without tangible

evidence it was not eager to postulate the Kremlin conspiracy theory. However, as

Carmthers noted:

Such scruples exercised the Foreign Oflice Information Research Department rather

less. . . . The IRD's very raison d'Atre . .. predisposed it towards regarding Communismas more pervasive than did other departments. Moreover, the nature of its work, and the

unartributable character of much of its output, doubtless inclined the IRD to be more

creative with the facts than colleagues in the Colonial Ofhce. Consequently frictionarose berween members of the CO Information Department and the IRD over how tohandle the question of Communism and Mau Mau.26

An even more intractable problem than the Mau Mau in the 1950s was the guerrilla

war waged against the British in the last European colony, Cyprus. Like Malaya and

Kenya, Cyprus was an asset that British govemments were reluctant to relinquish. As inthe t'uvo former cases, IRD was required to play its part in the propaganda war.

The international importance of Cyprus for thousands of years has rested on itsperceived strategic value. Set in the eastern Mediterranean, at a great trading crossroads

and on the edge of the Middle East, Cyprus has consistently been seen as a vitalstronghold. Occupied at various times by the Egyptians, Rome, Venice and the ',-i r.Ottoman Empire, the island was obtained by Benjallx-q Djsraeli in 1878 in exchange forsecurity from Britain for the crumbling Ottoman Empire against Russian

encroachments. Despite its rulers of various nationalities, Cyprus had consistently

maintained a Greek identity over the centuries. Cypriot fighters supported the Greek

revolution against the Ottomans in 1821, and the island's incorporation into Greece had

been a long-term aspiration for both mainland Greeks and the majority of Greek

Cypriots, who made up roughly 80 per cent of the Cypriot population. Despite the

occupation by Britain, the Greek Cypriots had good reason to believe that Enosis was

no idle fantasy. Again and again they could point to British promises that Cyprus wouldjoin Greece rather than revert to Turkish rule.27 During the First 'lVorld War, Sir

Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, went as far as to o{fer Cyprus to Greece inorder to pursue that very objective, the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire against

which Britain was now at war. Were it not for the Greek king's belief, in 1915, that the

IRD AND THE COLONIES

Axis would win and that rnore was ro be gained through friendship with Germany,Cyprus may have passed into Greek hands. However, when Greece did join the Britishin 1917 , the ofler was not repeated.

During the Second World'War, when Britain and Greece, aione in Europe, resistedFascism, the British Ambassador, Sir Michael Palairet, recommended that the islandshould pass to Gteece to cement the alliance. However, despite support from theMiddle East department of the Foreign ofhce, the proposal was blocked by pro-Turkisho{ficials, who had vain hopes of a pro-British policy from Ankara.28

At the end of the war the issue was once again raised, this time by the BritishAmbassador to Athens, Sir Reginald Leeper. F{owever, as SOE veteran and Torypolitician C.M. 'Woodhouse

recalled in a letter to journalist Christopher Hitchens,although 'Bevin and the Foreign were favourably disposed . . . the Colonial Ofiice andthe Chiefs of Staff strongly objected. Bevin had been in oflice only for a Gwweeks, and he did not feel confident enough to force it through cabinet. So that wasthat.'2e As Hitchens pointed out, 'From then on, C,vprus was ruied to be a matter inwhich Greece had no right even to be consulted.'li' Horvever, rhis policy did not takeaccount of either Greek nationaiists or the Cypriots, rvho, like inhabitants of Britishcolonies around the rvorld, rvere becoming increasinglv restive and strident in theirdemands.

Indeed, unknown to the British, Archbishop Makarios III, the recognized politicalleader of Greek cypriots, had rn 7952 become the head of a revolutionary committeecommitted to Enosis. The comrnittee, which met in Athens, had recruited as a militaryorganizer Coi George Grivas. Grivas, a Cypriot by birth who had served in the GreekArmy since 1915, had spent the Second Worid'War eliminating Communists withweapons supplied by the German occupation forces and had a reputation for extremeright-wing politics, chauvinism, ruthlessness and violence. Nevertheless, Makarios wasconvinced that Grivas was the right man for the job of leading a secret army to applypressure on the British to leave.

Then what had been a discreet British rejection of Greek and Cypriot aspirations wasmade public on 28July 1954. Henry Hopkinson, Minister of State at the colonial office,made an announcement regarding the nerv constitution for cyprus. owing to possiblerevolt by Conser-vative MPs over the prospective withdrawal of British troops from theSuez Canal, Hopkinson had been instructed to bolster support by making it clear thatfrorn Cyprus, the new British Middie Eastern headquarteis, there would be nowithdrawal. The new constitution was not to be a step on the way to self-determination.In answer to a question on the ultimate aim - dominion status or self-determination -Hopkinson stated that 'It has always been undentood and agreed that there are certainterritories in the Commonr'vealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, cannever expect to be fully independent. I think the Right Hon. Gendeman will agree thatthere are some territories rvhich cannot expect ro be that.'31 As Lapping noted, 'TheGreek Govemment had kept trying to settle the issue by talking to Britain, had kept tryingto restrain Makarios and Grivas. But 28July 195a was the last straw: the British were notonly refusing to talk, they were being publicly insulting as well.'32

With an Llnwanted international debate on the Cyprus crisis looming at the UN, theBritish were faced with the distinct danger that the Americans, and the rest of

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international opinion, might side with Greece and accept that Cyprus was an issue of self-determination. To prevent that, the British delegation sought to place the Cyprus questionwithin the overall context of the Cold 'War

and thereby ensure American support. Thedeiegation contacted Whitehall for the evidence to back up their assertions. Adam'Watson, now in Washington, sent a telegram to IRD on 13 August 7954. His secretmessage read: 'lJnited Kingdom Delegation Neu, York have asked me for any IRDmaterial shor.ving nature of Communist activiry and aims in Cyprus, which might besuitable for quotation in prospective United Nations debate. Many delegations willhesitate to vote for something rvhich can be shown to resemble the Communist parryline.'33 Three davs later, on 16 August, Donald Hopson, assistant head of IRD, outlinedIRD's response in a note to D. 'V/illiams at the Colonial Office. 'Watson suggested a replythat detailed 'the extent of Communists in the Clpriot political parties with details abouttheir activities, and also one or ttvo annexes dealing with the propaganda put out byMoscow, the Greek Communists and the Communist Intemational organizations.'3a

The need to divert attention from the fact that Britain was occupying a country inwhich the majoriry of inhabitants wanted self-determination was clear\ recognized bythe British UN delegation, a telegram from which suggested:

it seems to me that, in putring over our case ro American public opinion, more emphasis

could be laid on nvo points: the Communist danger and the Island's strategic value. Asseen fiom here, the argument about Communist danger will carry most weight with theAmerican opinion. I hope therefore, that we may be sent as soon as possible material onthe Communist Party in Cyprus, its origin, size, strength in the Trade lJnions, pro-grarrune, links with Communist countries, the action taken against it, extent of coopera-tion berween it and nationalist advocates of Enosis etc. It would be particularly usefirl ifwe could insinuate that the issue of Enosis has been gradually exploited and blown up bythe Communists, both in Cyprus and Greece, as a Cold War gambit, until the GreekGovemment Glt obliged to come forward themselves as its public champion.35

The report, which was compiled by IRD for the delegation, followed this advice andaimed to ensure that the problem was understood within'the context of the Cold.Warand the Communist threat. The IRD briefing stated that 'the real purpose ofCommunist policy on Cyprus is to exploit the Enosis issue with a view to creatingdi{ficulties in the fulfilment of the strategic arrangements of the free world in the MiddleEast, and breaking the ties of friendship and strategy which bind the United Kingdomwith Greece and Turkey. Cypriot Communists have egged on the Church andNationalists in Cyprus to pursue the Enosis issue, and Greek Comrnunists have similarlyegged on the present Greek Government.'36

This argument \.as, according to the UK delegation, extremely successful. Indeed,the Greeks had attempted to play the British at their own game, trying to make themost of American anti-Communism to ensure support for their position. On26 Augustthe UK delegation inforrned the Foreign Ofiice that:

It looks as if the Greek Delegation have been worried by the amount of space givenby American journalists to that part of our guidance on the Cyprus question which

IRD AND THE COLONIES

dealt with communism. They, therefore, attempted to turn the tables on us by sug-gesting that we were the ones who were collaborating with the Communists on theIsland' You will see that Mr Palamos alleged that the Administration of Cyprus hadbeen using the Communists to break up the 'national front' for Enosis and to discred-it it abroad.

Nevertheless, 'W.B. Hesmondhalgh of the UK delegation concluded that 'Mr palamos'arguments did not impress the correspondents and we have had little dilficulty in dealingwith them. It does, however, seem that this theme of communist backing for Enosilwith its attendant dangers, is paying dividends and shouid be exproited.':z

However, the adoption of this iine was not without opposition within Whitehall,where otlicials could not but perceive real difficulties with the Communist angle onCyprus. IRD's input was just one out of a number from departments concerned withthe propaganda line to be taken. Historian Susan Carruthers wrote:

The Colonial O{fice Information Department (COID) was the principle source andco-ordinator of publiciw in Britain on Cvprus. . . . The international dimension ofthe problem aiso necessitated the involvement of several Foreign Otlice departments:the Information Policy Department (IpD), Southem Depanment and United NationsDepartment all fed policy and advice to the Colonial OtEce, lvhile InformationResearch Department advised on the communist aspect of the cyprus Emergencyand the propaganda mileage that could be gained from exploiting it.38

In response to the UK delegation's argument for concentration on Communism andstrategic considerations, an oflicial in the Department of Defence minuted: 'The factthat the American public likes to see Communists behind every trouble in the worlddoes not mean that we must gratify their taste at the expense of truth or wise poiicy.The Enosis problem existed before Communism and would continue without it. Thepresent appeal to the UN does not, so far as I knolv, owe more than a part of itsorigin to communist meddiing.' The official pointed out rhat the propaganda lineopened Britain to two logical comebacks from the American public. why hadBritain not been tougher with the communists in cyprus? And why not remove thegrievance that the Communists were exploiting23r A fellow official minuted inresponse, 'I have never felt that logic was a vital element in the American attitude toCommunism.'10

'While the British government was able to deal with Enosis on a political level at theUN, in cyprus, EOKA initiated a guerrilla war against the British. on 1 April 1955,EOKA expioded sixteen bombs around the island. EOKA was soon carrying out raidson police stations and targeting British oIEcials, including the governor, Sir RobertArmitage, and British Army bases, wounding numerous British soldiers. As rhecampaign developed, it became clear that the majority of Greek Cypriots were backingEOKA. Negotiations to end the fighting between Makarios and the new governor,Field Marshal Sir John Harding, broke down. Suspecting, correctly, Makarios'sinvolvement in EOKA, the British arrested him and deported him to the Seychelles.The decision caused an uproar. As Brian Lapping noted:

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The Archbishop of Canterbury said . . . that the action made Christians everywherefeel shocked and uneasy. The Greek Government . . . condemned the deportation as

an uncivilised act of violence. . The United States Government pointedlyannounced that it favoured the continuation of negotiations in Cyprus. And inBritain Labour Parry Leaders who had piayed down the Cyprus issue during theHarding-Makarios talks were roused by the deportation to outraged opposition.al

This became a constant worry for IRD officials. Doubts and criticisms expressed byLabour MPs about the conduct of British rroops, govemment foreign policy and theCommunist threat could seriously undermine the work being done by IRD inpresenting a coherent and consistent propaganda line. For example, in 1956, John Peckin the United States, trying to get across the British government's line on Cyprus,complained that 'Our efforts are . . . being largely undermined by what appears fromhere to be the purely adolescent attitude of Her Majesry's Opposition to this question ofself-determination . . . this letter is a plea that a special effort might be nrade to try to getsome rational and realistic views propagated in England on this specific issue of self-determination.'a2

The response of leading members of the Labour opposition to Hopkinson's speechhad been uproar and demands for an emergency debate. Lapping noted:

This was 1954: India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon and Palestine were independent; theSudan and Gold Coast were close to it; the principle that Britain's purpose in runningthe Empire was to advance subject peoples to self-rule had been published by the LabourGovemment in a white paper in 1948 and accepted, though without enthusiasm, bytheir post-1951 Conservative successors. Many Labour MPs believed that Hopkinson'swords revealed that the Conservatives were about to back away from this consensus.43

Over the following years, Barbara Castle, in particular, continued to campaign forseildetermination for Cyprus, inadvertently making it far harder for the government'spropaganda machinery to present a clear line. Indeed, as far as the senior civil servants incharge of propaganda were concemed, 'the attitude of the Opposition constitutes thegreatest weakness in the presentation of our Cyprus policy in the USA and abroadgenerally.'44

There is some evidence that Peck's request did not fall on deaf ears and that IRD'smedia contacts were put to good use. In an article in the Neru Statesman in 1957, Castlecomplained that'the Foreign Office has "moved in" on the Greek service of the BBC'.Castle cited the fact that Labour MP Francis Noel-Baker, a noted expert on Cyprus andGreece rvho had reported Liberal and Labour Party resolutions critical of thegovernment's handling of the crisis, had been dropped by the BBC for being too'partial'. Preparation of the service's daiiy and weekly press summaries had been takenout of the hands of the Greek staffand all scripts were being sent to the Foreign Ofiice.The e{Iect of all of this, according to Castle, was beginning to show:

On 22 March the weekly press in this country commented extensively on Lennox-Boyd's [Secretary of State, Colonial Ofice] announcement of new proposals, follow-

IRD AND THE COLONIES

ing EOKA's truce oIfer. The Spectator commented at the greatest length in an excori-ating attack on the government . . in which Lennox-Boyd's proposals were dis-missed as 'obviousiy quite inadequate'. The New Statesman ran a scathing noteBut pride of place in the Greek service's weekly press review was given to a placidlittle pro-government note in The Economist rendered almost word for word.a5

In April 1957, the new British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, decided to release

Makarios, but by 1958 the situation in Cyprus was becoming ever more violent. WhileGrivas tumed EOKA against the Cypriot Communist Parry (AKEL), left-wingers and

trade unionists, fighting broke out befi,veen Greek and Turkish Cypriots, both secretly

supported by their mainland governments. In retum for Cypriot independence fromBritain in 1960, Makarios abandoned Enosis with Greece. However, three years later

the British were back, this time not as colonial occupiers but as a force attempting tokeep the peace between the warring Greek and Turkish Cypriot comrnunities.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

Spreading the Word:/RD Publishes

George orwell's reputarion as a left-wing icon took a body-blow from which it maynever recover when it was revealed in 7996 that he had cooperated closely with IRD'scold 'warriors,

even offering his own blacklist of eighty-six communist 'fellowtravellers'.1 As the Daily Telegrapft noted, 'To some, it rvas as if winston Smith hadwillingly cooperated with the Thought Police in 1984.'1 IRD was then taking the firststeps in building a major covert publishing operation that rvas to last nearly thirry years,and its involvement with Orwell was a reflection of the importance that it placed an thepower of the book as a propaganda tool. As a CIA ofiicer was later to remark to a (JScongressional committee, a book is always the most influential form of propaganda inthe long run, even if apparently no one reads it, like Marx's Kapital.

During the cold 'war years, orwell's novels, Animal Farm (published in 1944) and1984 (ptblished in 1950), with their compelling anti-totalitarian messages, were widelyread. These short, and very direct books, were to be used as the most prominentwarning against the evils of Communism. Terms like 'Big Brother is watching' and 'theThought Police', or even 'orwellian' entered popular culrure. The simple story linesand chilling morals made them an accessible choice for a wide audience. Both bookswere widely taken up by anti-Communists as metaphors for the evils of the Communistsystem. For IRD, parr of their attraction was that they did not directly mentionCommunism, so they could not be dismissed out of hand as propaganda.

Although an old Etonian, orwell's credentials as a left-winger, including serviceagainst Franco in the Spanish Civil 'War, gave the books even greater credibiliry. IRDofficials looked at a number of international figures with left leanings who might be usedin their anti-Communist crusade. orwell, Arthur Koestler, AJ.p. Taylor and BertrandRussell were among those discussed. 'Wherever possible, feelen were put out towardsthese figures. Foreign Office ofEcials were well placed on the social circuits of the time tomake discreet contacr. orwell, for instance, was friendly with Mn celia Kirwan an IRDofficer. Kirwan, n6e Paget, and her sister were 'noted beauties' who, in pre-war Londonsociery had apparently been the most photographed d6butantes of their year. CeJia hadbeen at boarding school and then a Swiss pensionnat de jeunes filles on the shores of LakeGeneva. She had first met Orwell at Christmas 1.945 at the house of her brother-in-1aw,Arthur Koestier. Kirwan was an assistant editor of Polemic, a magazine of contemporaryideas, and orwell was so entranced that he proposed marriage in 1946. She politelyrejected his o{fer of marriage, or least an affair, but they remained close friends.

t6 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA'WAR

By 1949 Mrs Kirwan had been recruited to IRD. She was later to say of thelepartment, 'You had to be above board to be working on the unit. But at the time'ou weren't supposed to sav rvhat it u'as ali about. I think the work we were doing was

good thing because people rvere misinforrned about Comtnunism in those days in a

rig v,,ay. And it u,as about time they got the record right.'3 The names of both Orwellnd Mrs Kinvan's brother-in-1au'had come up as possible IRD assets. Koestler, another

najor rvriter and tbnlrer Communist, had aiso rvritten brilliantly on anti-totalitarianhemes, most notablv his book Darkness ar ,\bori. At the behest of her departmental

read. Mrs Kirrvan \\'ent to visit the no',r' terminaliv sick Oru,'el1 on a number ofrccasions at a sanatorium in Cranham. She encouraged his cooperation and this he

eadilv provided.Docunrents released from 1996 reveal that IRD made great efforts to maximize the

nremational political impact of George Or-well's work.a It was anxious to distribute the

rooks rvherever they were not readily availabie. In a memo, the IRD's Ernest Main toldl-alph Murray that he had been 'taken with the relevance of Orwell's fairy story' in4nimal Farm:'Translation into other languages might be considered if this has not been

lone already. The idea is particularly good for Arabic in view of the fact that both pigs

rnd dogs are unclean anjmals to Moslems.' One file discusses copyright clearance for4nimal Fann for proposed distribution in Egypt. On 4 April 1949, IRD official Adam

W'atson wrote: 'I think Animal Farm has been done in a trumber of languages - eveni)olish. Has it ever been done in Arabic? In any case, the more the merrier. Whateverloes transpire, Kirwan might keep Mr Or-well in the picture.' Ralph Murray wanted to

relp to get Animal Fana released in Russia.s He requested assistance in raising 2,000

narks for the purpose of the publication in the Russian language version. On 24 June1949, IRD contacted Oru.ell on behalf of the social and political review Possev. IRDnformed Orwell of the journal's efforts to publish his'remarkable satire'in the Russian

ianguage. Posserr's Mr V. Puachev then approached Orr'vell to ask for advice on potential:nvestors."vho might be interested in publishing Animal Farm in book form forlistribution in the USSR. Puachev concluded: 'We ask you please not to think that this

ietter has been sent to you with any mercenary motives, but exclusively in the interests

rf the cause of combating Bolshevism, which cause your book serves so brilliantly.' On18July 1949, Kirwan informedJack Brimmell, 'lf Animal Farm does get through to the

USSR as Posserr claims it would, I am sure it would be most e{fective in a very good

:ause.' In addition to pians to publish Animal Farm, lkD had high hopes for the new

oook, 1984. On 4 November, Kirwan told Charles Thayer, the director of Voice ofAmerica broadcasts in 'W'ashington, that IRD was translating 1984 into Italian, French,

Swedish, Dutch, Danish, German, Spanish, Norwegian, Polish, Ukrainian, Portuguese,

Persian, Telegu, Japanese, Korean, Hebrew, Bengali and Gujerati.6

During a visit to Cranham. Mrs Kirwan asked Orwell's advice on another matter.

IRD was looking for a publisher to 'front' a series of IRD-sponsored anti-Communistbooks. It had in mind a publishing house with known left-wing a{filiations to help todisguise the motivations for these books. Orwe11 had told Kirwan that Victor Goilancz,

one of the best known leIt-u'ing publishers, was too preoccupied with the question ofPalestinian dispossession in the wake of the creation of the state of Israel, so 'Orwellsuggested that it might be a good plan to allow him to get these Arab iefugees out of his

SPREADING THE WOI{D: IRD PUBT,ISHES

system before trying to interest him in our plan. However according to Orwell becausehis books always seii very well, are well displayed and given the widest publicity,Goilancz rvas "undoubtedly" the best person to publish a series of books that bore theimprimatur but not the imprint of IRD.' Orwell told Kirwan that, had he been in betterhealth, he would have been 'very willing' ro act as an intermediary bef\,veen IRD andGollancz. However, he wouid'try to think of someone else'to perform this role.7

Kirwan also asked Orwell to think of some writers who might produce articles forIRD. According to the files, he expressed his wholehearted and enthusiastic approval ofthe department's aims and, although too i1l to write anything himself, he suggested someother names, inciuding Darcy Gillie, the Paris correspondent for the Cuardian, FranzBorkenau, who wrote for the ()bsen,er and the critic Gleb Struve.8 What Orwell thenwrote to Kirwan was, forry-five years later, to provoke a re-evaluation of his role as oneof Britain's most erninent left-wing thinkers: 'l could also, if it is of any value, give youa list of journalists and writers who in my opinion are crypto-Communists, fellow-travellers or inclined that way & shouid not be trusted as propagandists. But for that Ishall have to send for a notebook which I have at home, & if I do grve you such a list itis strictly confidential, as I imagine it is libellous to describe somebody as a fellow-traveller.'e

Or-well did identifi, those whom he believed rvere Communist sympathizers. The filesshow that he had named a navai officer, one Cdr Young, as a member of theCommunist Parry, in his previous meeting r,vith Kirwan. IRD historian John Savilepoints out that Edgar Young never made any secret of his pro-Soviet and pro-Communist Parry attitudes and was certainly interested in a list of crypto-Communists.Kirwan wrote to Or-wel1 on 30 April 7949:'Dear George, Thanks so much for helpfulsuggestion. Mv department \.vere very interested in seeing them . . . they have asked meto say they rvould be very grateful if you rvould let us look at your list of fellow-travelling and crypto-journalists: lve would treat it with the utmost discretion. Yoursever, Celia.' The IRD wanted details as well as names. 'I hope the list gives reasons inevery case,' stated IRD oiliciai Adam 'Watson. Indeed, the notebook was sent to thedepartment and u,as copied and retumed. It contained the names of 130 writers listingtheir jobs, and including notes by Orwell. For a long time the only insight into who was

on the list had been given by Bernard Crick, Orweli's biographer. Crick had seen theoriginal notebook of suspects and wrore that, 'Many were plausible, a few were far-fetched and unlikely', he said.lo

But in June 1998 the Daily Telegraph ran a story announcing that Onvell's origrnal listof 130 'crypto-Communists' was to be made public, with the exception of some threedozen still living. Those identi{ied by Orwell included Charlie Chaplin, J.B. Priestleyand George Bernard Shaw, as rvell as politicians and Labour MPs such as Tom Dribergand Richard Crossman. Priestiey's qualification as an 'FT', or Feilow Traveller, appears

to have been that he u,'as 'very anti-American' and 'makes huge sums of money inUSSR', u,hile Sharv was 'reliably pro-Russian on all major issues'.11 It must have beenperGctly obvious to Ot.well that he was handing the names, in effect, to the SecurityService, MI5, with whom IRD obviously had clear links.

Surprising as Orwell's behaviour was, ir is clear that, unlike many of hiscontemporaries, hd 'uvas cynical towards the Soviet (Jnion. As Australian historian Phillip

97

)8 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

)eery has pointed out, 'Orwell's opposition to Soviet totalitarianism predated the ColdW'ar. Its genesis lay in the Spanish Civil War. It was there that he witnessed at first handrow Stalinists and NKVD agents brutally trampled the tender shoots of libertarian,ocialism and how they deliberately falsified history.' ln 1947 Orwell wrote that, inipain,'I understood, more clearly than ever, the negative influence of the Soviet mythrpon the western Socialist movement. Indeed in my opinion, nothing has

rontributed so much to the corruption of the origrnal idea of Socialism as the belief that

Russia is a Socialist country. . . . And so for the past ten years I have been convincedhat the Destruction of the Soviet mvth was essential if we want to revive the Socialist

novement.'11When the IRD file was revealed in rhe Cuardian rt 7996, it caused a great furore. A

'brmer leader of the Labour Parry and a close friend of Orwell, Michael Foot found the

rffer of the blacklist'arnazing'. Tony Benn was saddened to learn that Orwell'gave in':o the pressure of the intelligence services. For many years after his death some in the

ieft had often argued that Orwell had never meant Animal Farm or 1984 as anti-Sovietparables and claimed that the books had been hijacked by Cold War Warriors of the

right. These fi1es show that this was not the case.

Orwell's works were among the many sought by IRD. From its inception, the

Jepartment had recognized the importance of the book in getting across its anti-Communist message. It discreetly sought ways to get anti-Communist books into printrnd to ensure their wide distribution. Mayhew's first paper had called for an anti-Communist textbook to be produced, and he later stressed the need to attack'Communist theory and practics'.t3 In December 1948, the Foreign Office published

internaliy a red-covered paperback, The Theory and Practice o;f Communisnr, with no:rttribution, which rvas handed out to diplomats and selected journalists.la In January1950 the first public edition r,vas printed by an obscure publisher called Geoffrey Bles, butit was later to go into many editions as a Penguin paperback. The book was to provevery influentiai in setting views towards the Soviet (Jnion. It is on the reading lists and

shelves of universities around the world to this day. The author was R.N. Carew Hunt:described as a Foreign Office ofiicial, Robert Carew Hunt was actually an officer of MI6.Born in 1890 the eldest son of Canon Carew Hunt of Christ Church, Oxford, he had

been educated at Bradfield College and Merton College, Oxford. In the First World'Warhe served as an officer in the Ox{ordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry. ln 1979

he joined the Foreign O{Ece. He had been part of Section IX (the anti-Soviet Desk),

which had been set up with Kim Philby as its chief late in the Second World'War.1sCarew Hunt had academic aspirations and was considered to be one of the Foreign

Office's leading Sovietologists, specializing in the intricacies of Marxist-Leninistdoctrine. He was an intelligence o{ficer, publishing while still in post, and his bookreveals some of the belie{i held within MI6 at the time. Generally, Sovietologists weredivided into two camps regarding the role of doctrine in Communist politics. On oneside were those who believed that all Soviet decision making was based on Marxist-Leninist dogma. On the other, there were those who believed that the Soviets playedhard and fast with dogma, applying it only when it suited them. Carew Hunt wouldhave none of this attacked those who preferred the latter. In his book this subject formsthe core of his analysis,'Yet there is no doubt that Comrnunists do believe that they are

SPREADING THE .WORD: IRD PUBLISHES

applying to political situations a theory which they fervently accept and which they holdto be scientific.' Even his close friend and Gllow IRD wrirer, the academic LeonardSchapiro, could not swallow this one whole. 'Writing

a foreword for a new edition ofthe book after Carew Hunt's death in 1959 he said, 'I am inclined to think while thismay be true sometimes, it is generally an overstatemerft.' The Theory and Practice ofCommunism was one of nine books bought in bulk by IRD in the latter half of 1949 anddistributed to British posts aboard. Other books included Julian Huxley's Souiet Cenetics

and World Science, andJan Stransky's East Wind ouer Prague.

Another early venture into publishing came when IRD played a part in arranging thepublication of the Ilrst book by a Soviet defector to Britain, Lt Col G.A. Tokaev,though this proved 'a less than happy experience'. The idea, a book called Notes on

Bolsheuistn-Communism, was designed to provide an unemotional and interesting accountof Soviet life, and the Foreign Secretary agreed to Tokaev publishing the book.F{owever, both the text and the author proved dif}icult to handle, Tokaev causingconsiderable confusion by revealing himself to the British press before extracts of thebook were ready to serialize.l6 Hora.,ever, important lessons rvere learned about thehandling of defectors for propaganda coups. Despite IRD irritation, it was later revealedthat Tokaev had been an important military intelligence source shared with theAmericans. It was he who had revealed that the Soviets were building a srrategic airforce based on a copy of the B-29 bomber, a revelation that was a catalyst iater for thePentagon's mythical 'bomber gap'.

On 28 January 1949, Mwray informed his boss, Christopher'Warner, that ''We are

now at a stage of considering pians for attempting to influence, and perhaps to enterinto, the book market abroad, particularly in Asia.' Subsidizing cheap book productionswas considered 'essential for the proper extension of our work abroad', as publicationslvould 'tackle the themes on which public opinion needs to be enlightened . . . in thenational interest.' It could become 'politically quite important [to] interveneunobtrusively to cause them to appear in suitable cheap editions'.tz

Aithough Orwell's suggestion to get Gollancz to publish its books was not realized,IRD continued to look for a possible left-wing publisher. It also tried Odhams, whichwas considered to be the ideal publisher because of its 'association with the LabourParry'. Murray told the company that he wanted discreetly to influence publishers toproject 'social democracy as a successful rival to Communism'.

Murray's memos reveal that eariier attempts to use the TUC were stymied by itsbureaucracy:

'W'e have had a dismal experience trying to induce the TUC to take some action. 'We

shall never get any sadsfictory results out of the TUC alone: they are too cumbenome,too unpubliciry minded and too short staffed to make a significant contriburion in prac-tical publiciry . . . neither the Labour Parry as such, and still less the TUC as such, iscapable of producing a flow of literature, either in this country or abroad, which can

compete with the Comrnunist propaganda machine. . . . They are incapable of writingdown the useful facts by themselves, but if tactfully and discreetly interviewed by some-one saying he came from the Labour Parry or the Fabian Sociery (Not H. M. G. whichwould frighten them) they would talk and produce much valuable information.18

99

00 BRITAIN'S SFCI\ET PROPAGANDA -WAR

None of these apploaches appears to have come to fiuition. IRD's entry into full-cale publishing onlv came rvith the cooperation of the IRD/MI6 'front' team ofiheridan, Maturin and Cannon-Brookes: it rtas to be another combined operation. In9"16, Leslie Sl-reridan had reeistered at Companies House a publishing company cal1ed

\mpersand as a collmercial venture. In 1950 it was to become the first of IRD's covert,ublishing operations.

The first Ampersand titles s-ere the Bellrnan Books series, edited by Michaelloods-in. u'ho u'as to s'ork for Ampersand trom 1952 to 1955. He was to become a

rbiquitotis fiqr-ue auronq the professional Cold 'Warriors. He had joined the BBC in935 anc'l srar-ecl u'ith it except ibr a break tbr active service rt'ith the Royal Artillery19+0-3). From 19-17 to 1952 he edrted the magazines 19th and 20th Century'

Bellman Books rvere a dozen concise handbooks, each on a different anti-Communisthenre. One by Denis Healey, entitled Neutralism, implied that neutralism was akin tolommunism. The books did not se11 well, probably mainly because Ampersand lacked a

rroper distribution system, a defect that was later corrected by arrangements made withrn established publisher, Allen & IJnrvin. Berr,veen the early 1950s and 1977, more than

wenq/ titles u,ere published b,v Ampersand, including works by Robert Conquest, a

brmer ernplovee of IRD, and the ex-Communist Douglas Hyde, who had once been

rews editor of the Daily Worker. Hyde had left the Communist Party in 1948, and his

1951 bestseller I Believed, published by Heinemann, \/as an expos6 of the workings ofhe Communist Parw of (lreat Britain.

Horvever, by far the largest IRD publishing operation \,'as not under the Ampersand

mprimateur but rvas publishecl bv companres that may have been unaware of any-elationship rvith the department. This operation rvas fronted by Stephen Watts, a pre-

*ar Sttndalt Express fiim critic, rvho had rvorked lbr MI5 during the war. A series ofi)ooks was published urrder the general title of Background Books, with.Watts as editor.'Ihe first titles in the series rvere published by Batchrvorth Press in 1951, with a large

ivhite question mark on a bright red cover. Through the question mark was printed the

ritle and the author's name. The first books were Why Communism Must Fail, by

Bertrand Russell, xtd Trade Ltnions: True or Fake,by Vic Feather, then Assistant General

Secretary of the TUC. An introductory note explained that Background Books were

designed to provide ordinary people, interested in the world today, with some back-

sround infomration abollt events, institutions and ideas. They will not interpret cur-

renr history for 1.or.r but thev rvill help vou to interpret it for yourself. Background

llooks rvi1l range u,idely in subject, dealing with r.vhat lies at the roots of the ques-

tions thinking people are asking, filling in the background r.vithout which worldallairs todav cannot be proper11, seen orjudged.

From 1951 Batchrvorth Press handled the Background Books series, printing 20,000

copies of each title r.vith a cover price of 1s 6d. Batchworth was an odd choice ofpublisher. It r,vas a srnall company run from a 'sleazy' first-floor ofEce in Bloomsbury by

Wiliiani Sydney Shears, who liked to use his \vartime rank of major. He had a been a

PO'W for most of the war. The company counted a number of aristocrats on the board,

including the then Duke of Buccieuch and the Earl of Ellesmere. Maj Shears seems to

SPREADING THE WORD: IRD PUBLISHES

have had connecrions with the Special Operations communiry, as his most successful

coup was publishing Col Maurice Buckmaster's account of SOE operations in Europe,

speiiotty Employed, in 1952. One of the directors of a subsidiary company had worked

for the SOE. But ail was not well. Fresh out of universiry, Jackie Latham was one of the

nvo staff and had a small batch of shares. Latham became concerned with the accounts

that he discreetly u,,arned shareholders. Even IRD could not keep tsatchworth a viable

concern. In 1954 the accountants qualified the accounts, and in 1956 the company

collapsed r,vith debts of more than d26,000 and was bought out.1e

The Background Book series was to be transferred to Phoenix House (1955-9) and

finaliy Bodley Head (1960-71).20 Nearly 100 titles were published in the series over rwo

decades. Through Stephen 'Watts, IRD not oniy selected t'riters but also subsidized

production through bulk orders amounring to rens of thousands of pounds.

Many of the tsackground Books are rather simple anti-Communist propaganda.

Authors were rvell-known as writers, public figures in the trade unions, politics or

universities, or Cold W'ar protagonists, some - like Leonard Schapiro, Sir Robert Bruce

Lockhart, Christopher Ma-vherv, Francis Noel tsaker. Bickham Su-eet-Escott and Monry

Woodhouse - rvith intelligence backgrounds. Other titles included in the series, all on

anti-Communist themes, rvere T/re Fanatic artd the Sarre, bv Oxtord academic G F'

Hudson, and Economic Imperialism: the Lesson of Eastent Europe, by Alfred Zawberl:r:lar,'

Nearly all of these books were wiclelv distributed by IRD through Foreign OtEce

information o{Iicers in the Third 'World. I{a1f a dozen of the authors, rvho together

wrote eleven titles in the series, had extremely close links with IRD. These included the

Czechoslovakian 6nrigr6 'W'aiter Kolarz, recommended to IRD by Denis Healey' His

book, How ls Russia Ruled?, was published in 1953 by Batchworth. Mayhew contributed

rwo books ro rhe series, the first in collaboration with his wife Cicely: What is Titoism?

(1951) and Coexistence Plus (1,962). Another autiror with close links to IRD, and who

contributed four titles to the series, was Guy Wint, a journalist and, for ten years, a

leader r.vriter for the Manchester Cuardian.'Wint was an authorized ciient of IRD lvith

access to IRD's research desks, as was academic Hugh Seton-'W'atson, r'vho wrote the

Background Special, The New Imperialism, in 1961. IRD writers, like Tosco F1ve1 who

wrote llhat is Culture? (1953), merely reformulated existing IRD research papers to be

published as Background Books - presenting government propaganda material as

ind.pen,lent research. Brian Crozier, at one time a consultant to IRD wrote r\'vo tities

for the series: N'eo-Colonialism (1964) and The StruggleJor the Third World (1966)' He

revealed in his autobiography that 'Before leaving The Economisr, I hrd on contract"

transformed a thick folder of IRD documents into a short book called Neo-Colonialism

to demolish the Communist claim that "imperialist" companies continued to exploit

colonies after independence had been granted.' Similarly, The Strugle fot the Third

World, whrch dealt with the 'competitive subversion' ber\,veen China and the USSR in

the Third'World, was basecl on a 'sanitized' report the Crozier had eariier produced for

IRD antl a Chatham House article of the same name.21 According to one IRD insider,

'Lord Bottomley wrote a book and I should think that 80 per cent of that was

material researched by IRD and made available to him.' The Use and Abuse oJ Trade

(Jnions was published in 1963. Primarily an attack on Communist involvement in the

trade union movenlent g1obal1y, it attacked the World Federation of Trade [Jnions

101

102 BRITAIN'S SECIIET PROPAGANDA WAR

'WFTU), one of IRD's targeted Communist front organizations: 'the WFTU and its

rffiliates urge u'orkers to press for higher wages, shorter hours, more social benefits and

rrotection from automation. These are the legitimate objects of all trade union activiry.

:]ut the Communist inspired bodies expioit them to an rrnreasonable extent with the

rim of damaging the economies of non-Communist countries.'22

Many of the authors seenl to have had rro Lnks rvith IRD or even knew that it:xisted. It rvas not necessarv tbr them to do so because they could be chosen with their(nown viervs rn nrind. And s,hile Bertrand Russell, another left-wing intellectual in

rontact rvith IRD, s'ould not be asked to rvrite a book on the question of nuclear

Jeterrence, he rvould be approached, as an anti-Communist since visiting the USSR in

:he 1920s, to write l|4tat is Freedom? (1952) and What is Democracy? (1953). As historian

Lyn Smith concluded: 'There is no evidence that writer's views were trimmed toparticular iines; for Background Books or Background Specials rather it was the case that

if their independent opinions fitted in with IRD's requirements then their output wouldbe used.'23

According to Bryan Magee, Stephen Watts approached him having recently read

Magee's book The New Radicalisnr (Secker & Warburg, 1962). Magee, at the time an

active member of the Labour Parry, who had recently stood nvice for parliament, had

argued that to win the next election, survive as a parfy of government and be trulyradical, the Labour Parry should cut itself free from what he saw as an attachment to

Marxism and support for the Soviet Union. 'Watts had asked Magee whether he would

write a book with a corresponding message for people overseas. Magee agreed and

wrote The Democratic Reuolution (1964). According to Magee:

The thesis was that Communism was already a failed system and was already being

abandoned from the top, and that its many attractions for Third World countries

were entirely illusory. Far and away their best prospect of achieving societies that

embodied social justice, I argued, was to opt for democracy, which would revolu-

tionise their societies radically and in desirable ways. No one had attempted to influ-

::::J*, I wrote, and my book was published just as I wrote it, down to the last

Magee had been unaware that Background Books had links with any organization

and was outraged when he found out about the link with IRD.24 Michael Kaser, whohad worked in the Foreign Office's Economic Intelligence Department between 1947

and 195i, knew that IRD existed but said that he was unaware of its relationship withBackground Books. Interestingly, Kaser was not approached by 'Watts but by the'Warden of St Anthony's College Oxford, Sir

'William Deakin, who had been seconded

to the SOE during rhe rvar and led the first British mission to Tito.2s Deakin was a close

friend of Adam'Watson, who visited him frequently in Oxford, discussing, among other

things, IRD.26It seems that the main tRD target audience for the series was the educated middie-

class, particularly in the Third World. Information o{licers overseas would distribute

editions of the series in coileges and libraries free of charge, as well as passing them on to

selected contacts.2T According to Bryan Magee, commissioned by Stephen Watts to

SPREADING THE WORD: IRD PUBLISHES

wite The Democratic Reuolution (published in 1964), Watts had explained to him that'These books . . were aimed mostly at readers in the Third World who were getring a

higher education in English even if that wasn't necessarily their first language, e.g.university students in India and Africa.'28 Background Books were available in Britain,distributed through the normal channels, and can still be found in significant numben inuniversiry libraries to this day.

The investigation by the Observer in 1978 first revealed IRD covert publishingoperation and the fact that IRD/MI6 had reimbursed all Ampersand's expenses - bothpublishing and overheads - at the end of each year, using funds allocated to the SecretService.2e In this way, Watts explained, the operation was safe from scrutiny byParliament. (The Secret Vote, by convention, is never debated.) Ampersand was, ineffect, acting as a 'cut out'.30 However, it was this peculiar subsidy that confirmed toRichard Fletcher that these publishing companies were fronts for MI6 and IRD. Wattswas required to deliver detailed annual accounts to MI6, but rather than have the botherof sanitizing them to the minimum information required under Companies Law, hesimply sent the same accounts to Companies House as part of the annual retum.

Ampersand also bought books for IRD from other publishers. Its accounts3l showthat for the ten years up to 1977 d55,991 was paid to Bodley Head alone, where thedeal was arranged through Max Reinhardt, Managing Director of Bodley Head. LeslieSheridan for Ampersand had negotiated a different arangement with Allen & (JnwinLtd - through Rayner unwin, the chairman - in which Ampersand paid all publishingcosts. The books were sold by Allen & IJnwin which returned a proportion of theproceeds to Ampersand. Allen & unwin thus received a retum on all Ampersand sales atno risk and with no financial outlay.

Ampersand was still operating in this way in 1978. Using Secret Service funds itseems to have been remarkably successful at providing the cheap, short publications of a

popular nature and free from government labels which the Foreign Office had called forthirty years earlier. Background Books represents one of the means by which IRDmanaged to link its propaganda with the'voice'of the independent media. As a meansof influencing opinion, this method was highly effective.

103

CHAPTER TWELVE

Int er n al,4ffrir s : /RD 3

Domestic CarnpaignsIn November 7956 the Daily Mail ran a front page splash accusing Communist unionofiicials in the Fire Brigades LJnion of squandering'more than d20,000 of union funds'.The article said that union members alleged that the money had been spent on'Communist directed political activiry in Britain lvhich brought no benefit to memben',and that 'the rest of the monev . . has been squandered bv three officials on personalluxuries including expensive living and enrerrainmenr of rvomen friends.'1

Although the vast majoriry of the rank and file of the Fire Brigades Union (FBU)were not Communist, they were content to elect Communists or Communist-inclinedo{Iicials at a district and national level. The union's rwo leading figures in the 1950s, theGeneral Secretary, John Homer, and the Assistant General Secretary, Jack Grahl, wereboth in the British Communist Party. These oilicials were the subject of govemmentand sometimes rank-and-file suspicion, exacerbated by the left-wing policies and issues

that the FBU both followed and pursued. These included affiliation to the Campaign forNuclear Disarmament (CND), the National Council for Civil Liberties and theMovement for Colonial Freedom. Such associations proved enough to provoke activestate intervention by IRD.

Earlier that year the Conservative MP Douglas Dodds-Parker, then lJnder-Secretaryof State at the Foreign Ofiice, had been approached by Norman Reddaway. The year

before, on his return from a posting to Canada, Reddaway had, to his disappointment,found himself in IRD, appointed assistant to the then head, J.O. Rennie. However, he

set about his task with energy. Dodds-Parker had been elected a Conservative MP in1945 and was appointed to the Foreign Office in 1953. During the Attlee govemment,Dod&-Parker hrd collaborated behind the scenes with Bevin on anri-Communist issues,

and on request he would '"vrite letten drawn up beforehand in the Foreign Office forpublication rn The Times. Dodds-Parker, like Reddaway, believed in getting things done:

There is not very much you can do in the diplomatic world . . . but if you could dis-credit a dictator in his own country by getting information through the press in his

country on what his private Life was iike, whether he stashed away money abroad,

things like that. If those were known, it could work . . . and this is one of the ways

you can weaken a dictatorship, or incompetent organizarion . . . by getting the tnrthtold. And that seemed to me to be one of the few useful ways one could do somethingand not just sit at the back of the smoking room, saying, 'Tut-tut. Isn't it a\vfi.rl.'2

t06 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA'WAR

Reddaway wrote a short minute, alerting Dodds-Parker ro a potenrial gold mine ofnformation to undernrine British Communists. Whitehall's Home Region Committee,et up in the 1950s to gather information on the activities of Comrnunists in Britishndustry, comprised members from the Department of Trade and Industry, the Ministryrf Labour, the Home Office, the Police, Foreign Office (IRD) and MI5. Theommittee had been discreetlv gathering information on the damage that Communist-ed industrial action \\.as doing to British industry. As ex-MIS otTicer Peter Wrightecalled, 'ln the late 19-10s, Mi5 began to devote resources in an effort to monitor andreutralise CPGB activitv in trade union movement. By 1955 . . . the CPGB washoroughly penetrated at aimost every leve1 by technical surveillance or informants.'3fhe committee did not, horvever, see it as part of its job to exploit the information thathe,v had gathered, despite its obvious attraction for sections of the press.

Dodds-Parker, Iike Reddaway, of whom he thought highly, saw the opponunity torndermine Communist influence and power in the trade unions - continuing Bevin's;ood work - and immediately convened a meeting under Cabinet Secretary NormanJrook to see what could be done. The other members at the meeting were Norman\eddaway for IRD, the late Patrick Dean for the Foreign OlEce, and Roger Hollis,lirector of MI5. Hollis, who in the late 1940s had been responsible for Communist\ffairs in MI5 and would later become alarmed enough to place CND on the MI5 listrf subversive organizations, was, after a short discussion, ordered by Norman Brook to)nsure that MI5 intelligence on Communists in the trade unions would be provided toRD for exploitation.a

Liaison betr,veen MI5 and IRD was maintained through an experienced IRD handrnd an MI5 man assigned to liaise with him. 'W"henever the MI5 liaison officer identifiednaterial that had news value, he would get in touch with his IRD contact to discuss itsrossible use. They wouid then talk about how the information should be handled to gett out in the right format, at the right speed and into the right hands. One pair of rightrands was 'Woodrow Wyatt, a good friend of Reddaway's, who became a primeoumalistic outlet for the MI5/IRD material.

Officia\ the line has been maintained that IRD never became involved in domesticrolitics or smear campaigns. Yet we can reveal that the Homer story was just one resultrf the MI5/IRD liaison agreed at that meeting in 1956. IRD planted the Homer story.t was one of a number of smear operations against Communists in which IRD had a

idden hand and was often based on information gathered by MI5, reflecting the close'ooperation between the two agencies. In the FBIJ case, a trusted contact of\eddaway's, Daily Mail diplomatic correspondent 'Walter

Jack' Farr, had agreed torblige IRD as he had previously been given defector stories. Along the way a sentencerad been added at the end saying that the Horner brothers kept a luxury flat in whichhey entertained ladies of easy virtue. This produced a writ from the FBU.5 Therroblem for the Daily Mail was that the allegation about ladies of easy virtue was notrrovable. However, in classic Daily Mail style - attack being the best means of defence -t put half a dozen hard-nosed reporters on the case ro dredge up anything else they'ould about Homer and his comrades to blacken the Homer name. Grahl had, by now,luarrelled with Horner and began to teed inside dirt on what was going on in the FBUo journalists. The writ meant that the Daily Mail felt it could not publish new material,

IRD'S DOMESTIC CAMPAIGNS

so it went to ex-Trotskyite called Hugh Chevins, who was the industrial correspondentof the Daily Telegraph. Through chevins, the pressure was maintained on Horner andthe left-wing leadership of rhe FBU.

The FBU had been attacked by the Daily Mail before in the press, in general withaccusations of Communist domination and malpractice. In November 1951, in a rwo-day dispute that marked a watershed in the history in the union, the FBU took the firstnational industrial action in its history. The 'spir and polish' demonstrations, as theybecame known, were aimed at regaining pay pariry with the police and involved unionmembers refusing to do all domestic and 'brass-bashing' chores, while conrinuing toanswer all fire calls. Nevertheless, on the last day of the demonstration, Henry Brooke,Conservative leader of the London Counry Council, referred to it as a 'Communistinspired mutiny', and the Daily Mail picked up the story and condemned Communistinfluence in the union. Flowever, as Victor Bailey, in a contribution to the FBU'sofficial history, commented:

Draggtng in the red bogey came as no great surprise to the union; it was not the firsttime it had sutTered a smear campaign in the press. . . In the 'red scare' climate of1949-51, moreover, it rvas de rigtteur to ascribe any organization demanding a wageincrease, or taking industrial action to secure one, as the tool of Communist agitators.Critics of Labour's policy of wage restraint, of which the FBU was one, had invari-ably aroused government accusations of Communist infiltration. Unoflicial strikeswere always described as Communist-fomented, part of a master plan to intensifyLabour's economic difiiculties.6

The Horner story came immediately after both British intervention in Suez andSoviet intervention in Hungary. on 31 october 1956, Royal Air Force bombers hadattacked Egyptian targets and Britain's military acrion against Nasser began. As we haveseen, the British intervention was fiercely criticized across the political spectrum. Inresponse to the events of 31 OctoberJohn Horner had called on the TUC to go on a

general strike in protest. Although Horner's call was ultimately unsuccessful, it wasprobably this inflammarory acr rhat provoked the attack from IRD.

In the ensuing days the Daily Mail continued to pursue Flomer and his colleagues,portraying them as die-hard Moscow-controlled Communists. The facts were notalways so convenient. Horner, who was forry-five years old, had left the Labour Parry tojoin the Communist Party after the Second'World'War. However, on 1.4 November1956 he had announced his resignation from the parry in protest over Soviet suppressionin Hungary. In a letter to the Communist Parry's general secretary, John Gollan, Hornerstated, 'I feel I have been responsible for propagating and advancing policies which haveproduced this latest tragedy. . . . I am no longer convinced that a parry of our rype is anecessary condition to achieve socialism here.'7

The opportunity to go on the oflensive against British Communisrs, which the Sovietinvasion presented, was not to be wasted. The party was in turmoil. The hardlinersfollowed the Soviet line, that the uprising was of 'Fascist and counter-revolutionaryeiements'. Many other members left in disgust. This included a third of the joumalistsworking for the party organ, the Daily Worker. Despite the fact that Horner had already

107

108 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA \vAR

resigned, the Daily Mail reported that delegates representing 250 Manchester firemenhad demanded the immediate resignation of Horner and other Communist and ex-Communist officials.8

This storv reveals that the IRD not only directed its operations abroad but also

intervened directly in domestic politics. Although membership of the Communist Partyrvas legal in Britain, IRD u,aged a covert rvar against it. IRD assumed that a Communisttrade unionist acted as a tool of the Soviet (Jnion and not to eradicate legitimategrievance. As vn'e can see, IRD carried out campaigns against individual trade unionistsof whom it disapproved.

IRD had tried to change the polirical face of Britain early on. Oficial govemment policybanned overt propaganda against the Comrnunist Parry of Great Britain. A report to a

cabinet meeting of 19 December 7949 had recommended that 'the Govemrnent shouldtake in the United Kingdom any such action as might be necessary to discredit theCommunist Party in the eyes of the people and should, in particular, undertake for thispurpose a campaign of educative publiciry involving the use of public funds and theemployment of Govemment agencies.' The cabinet decided'&om the constiturional pointof view it would be very difficult for a Government to take official action of this kindagainst a poiiticai parry which has not been declared an illegal organization and in fact

represented in the House of Commons'.e However, the cabinet discussed informal methodsof countering'Communist infltration in this country', including an approach to Mr SurreyDane of Odhams Press to secure anti-Coffmunist material in papen that he controlled.

Domestic anti-Communist propaganda was to be covert. IRD briefings weredistributed to ministers on a regular basis for their use whenever appropriate. Mayhewsuggested that they should be given anti-Communist talking points and that the texts ofany useful speeches that they made should be passed on for wider distribution. Bevin,Mayhew thought, should consult IRD before all speeches for the possible inclusion ofIRD material. Similar arrangements were made for selected 'friendly' MPs, in particularto aid anti-Communist MPs in the Labour Party. IRD files show that Col Sheridan wasmeeting with the Depury General Secretary of the TUC, Victor Feather as early as

1950. This was to discuss 'placing articles'. The rwo men discussed their concem aboutthe ine{fectiveness of the anti-Comnunist propaganda of the intemational Trade lJnionbody, the ICFTU, which had been set up primarily to split the Soviet intemationalTrade Union'front', the WFTU.lo

Another IRD domestic target was organizations perceived to be Soviet 'fronts'. Thiswas paft of a wider campaign. Col Douglas Dodds-Parker, when Parliamentary under-Secretary at the Foreign O{Ece, was responsible for liaison with MI6. According to KimPhilby, he was also chair of the Psychologrcal 'W'arfare Consultations Committee, knowas the Dodds-Parker Committee. This carried out 'psychological operations against anypeace movements . and planned Intelligence Service operations against progressiveorganizations in England'.tl

IRD worked closely with MI5 on the domestic side, and it was clearly receivingintelligence frorn MI5 on suspected Communist fronts. One file in the Public Record

IRD'S DOMESTIC CAMPAIGNS

O{Ece is entitled 'Association with the National Council of Civil Liberties of CertainTUC Atliliated Trade LJnions'. In one letter, Ralph Murray wrote to H.G. Gee of the

TUC on 3 February 1949, expressing concern that 'a number of Trade lJnions' whowere 'in some way afliliated to, or who lend support to, the National Council of CivilLiberties' were helping the Soviet propaganda cause: 'The National Council of CivilLiberties is heavily Communist-penetrated and is in fact being used for little if nothingmore than attacking our Coloniai administrations and politics at every opportuniry. Youwill remember that E.M. Forster, who was a prominent member of the Council in its

heyday in the '30s, resigned last May precisely because the Council was being used forpolitical matters of which he did not approve'. Murray intended to sever the'connection of the Council with Trade Unions' by persuading those concerned to'u'ithdraw their support, aiiiliation or connection with the Council'. On 18 February'

Gee responded that the TUC was 'under no illusions about the present complexion ofthe National Council of Civil Liberties . . . it is obvious that all those with a powerful

Communist element will have joined, especially the AEU, ETU, Construction'W'orkers, Tobacco'W'orkers, Fire Brigade lJnions and CSCA etc.' Although the TUCwas aware of the link betrveen individual unions and the National Council, Gee

informed the IRD that the TUC could not force individual unions to cut their ties.

However, the TUC was able to educate its members into taking action thernselves as

part of its 'general anti-Communist drive'. In a handwritten note on 25 Aprtl 1949'

Murray wrote, 'this is now going quite weIl, as regards the TUC'.In 1953, the Labour Parry suddenly increased the number of organiza:tions on its

proscription list - organizations to which Labour Parry members could not belong - by

eighteen. The information on which this decision was based had come through the

International Department from 'the Foreign Oltrce and Special Branch'.12 The main

conduit for propaganda from IRD into the Labour Movement was the Labour Paffy's

owr International Department. In the late 1940s, material was sent directly by IRD toMayhew's friend and the secretary of the International Department, Denis Healey. The

rype of nuterial sent ro the Intemational Department varied. Briefings in the archive

include titles such as 'soviet Suppression of Liberry in Germany's Eastern Zone' and

'Russian Trades lJnions and How They Operate'.IRD would also provide the International Department with the means to rebut

Communist allegations against'W.estern powers. For example, a 'Memorandum On The

Daily Worker editoriai of 12Ju1y 1951', sent to the Intemational Department ''With the

Compliments ofJ.H. Peck', head of IRD berween 1951 and 1954, presented an analysis

and rejection of the editorial's estimate of comparative 'Western and Soviet militarystrength and rearmament. Material like this could then be used by the International

Department or sent on to reliable anti-Communists and other parties to use themselves,

probably unaware of the material's origin. The instant rebuttal was a techniquedeveloped by IRD to a high state of perfection, long before the Labour Party's much

vaunted rebuttal unit was formed in the run up to the 1997 election. 'When ofiicials

spotted an article or letter in a newspaper that they felt assisted the Communist cause,

they would look for errors and imrnediately have a response sent offto the paper. These

rebuttals were usually fronted by an apparently neutral and well-known figure - MPs

were preferred and many were happy to see their names in print for no effort.

109

110 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA'WAR

Another route of IRD influence into the Labour Movement was through the TradesUnion Congress. An early link was established with Herbert Tracey, the influentialTUC publiciry officer who also ran an anti-Communist organization called FreedomFirst. Through Tracey, IRD was able to insert its material into his organizarion'snewsletter, which was read by several hundred influential trade union organizers. Aninternational edition of the newsleter was proposed and covertly funded by IRD. Itwould purchase a sutJicient number of copies for distribution through its own channelsto ensure the ner.vsletter's continued financial viabiliw and thus the propagation of itsviews through an apparently independent medium. Through Tracey, 'mutual assistanceber'uveen the Foreign Ollice and TUC on publiciry overseas' was established.13 In this her,vas helped by leading members of the TUC general council, Percy Cudlipp, thenediror of the Daily Herald, and Denis Healey.

A self-proclaimed cold 'w'arrior, Healey was to be one of IRD's key contacrs. Bornof middle-class parents in Kent at the height of the First 'world 'w.ar, Healey wenr toBalliol in 1936 where he joined the Communist Party for rwo years. During the Secondworld war he had joined the Royal Engineers and seen acrion in the Army, rising tothe rank of major. ln 1945, after failing to win a seat, he had been given the job ofInternational Secretary of the Labour Parry. 'As Intemational Secretary it was my job toexplain the Government's foreign policy to the Parry and the world,' he wrote in hisautobiography. 'Bevin gave me a prerfy free run of the Foreign OIfice, and I mademany friends among its officials - notably Gladwyn Jebb, a lordly radical who had beenDalton's diplomatic adviser at the Special Operation's Executive . . . and the intellectualEvelyn Shuckburgh; he once starded me, in a discussion of Tito's break with Stalin, bysuggesting that it might have been a trick to deceive the West.'1a

It is hard to underestimate Healey's influence over early perceptions of the Cold War.'fhe Keep fuy' pamphlet was published in mid-1947.In part written by Michael Foot, itderided Ernest Bevin for his pro-Americanism and anti-Soviet inclination. AlthoughFoot was a Daily Herald commentaror, the paper offered its full support to Bevin'scounterattack, the pro-Atlanticist anti-Soviet Cards on the Table written by Healey.

The Labour Party's International Department became a major conduit for disguisedIRD propaganda to penetrate into the Labour Movement. It is worth noting that theflow of information was rlvo-way. In a letter written in November 1948, Denis Healeywrote to IRD, recommending possible contacts for them. One of the three on his listwas a Czechoslovakian Social Democrat who had recently emigrated to Britain calledWalter Kolarz. Healey enquired whether IRD 'could make use of his abilities?'l5 It did.Healey also developed a sideline that made him an even more important asset for IRD.According to Healey, he and his wife Edna and newborn daughter found it hard to liveon their Labour Parry salary, so he took up journalism and broadcasting. 'Bush House,the Headquarters of British broadcasting overseas, became my second home. I did a

weekly commentary in French on whatever caught my fancy in the news; I broadcastoccasionally in German and Italian, and before long I was doing a great deal in English,for audiences abroad,' he recalled.r6

IRD material was supplied to Healey and his successors in publications such as Dlgest,and in 1949 the department began to produce nvo specialized publications. SpeakelsNo/es developed from material provided to ministers for use in speeches to counter the

IRD'S DOMESTIC CAMPAIGNS

allegation that the 'W'estern powers were failing to cooperate with a willing Russia. AndPoints at Issue, a small booklet, was intended to supplement Speaker's Noles. Mayhewwanted it sponsored by an organization like the TUC for wider publication. HoweverNewsweek (9 May 1949) spiked this gun by reporting that 'the British Foreigrr Officedistributed last week a guide for ofEcial speakers on Soviet-Western relations

[which] reflected British distrust of current Berlin blockade peace talks.' It was heavilycirculated but never published. The unattributable nature of the publication frustratedone potentiai customer. The Foreign OfIice ruled that the War Oflice, which hadsuggested supplying every single officer with a copy, would have to take politicalresponsibiliry if mass distribution of an imprintless publication gave rise to any questions,

possibly in Parliament. The service ministers failed to agree this condition.lTMayhew also arranged that answers to 'unhelpful' resolutions sent to the Labour

government from constituency Labour Parties on 'familiar Communist themes'(including Greece, Eastern Europe and the colonies) would be drafted by IRD on behalfof the departments to which they had been addressed.lS The 'Communist theme' inGreece was the arbitrary execution and imprisonment of trade union leaders by theGreek government.le

International Department archives show a steady stream of material from IRD andintimacy berween the rrvo departments' senior officials. In 1955 the department began

receiving IRD's new bimonthly publication Quotations. The new head of IRD, JohnOgl"y Rennie, wrote to Healey's successor, Saul Rose, inquiring whether he would be

interested in receiving it under the usual unattributable conditions: 'It consists of a

selection of quotations from the Soviet Press and radio, the Large Souiet Encyclopaedia andthe Marxist classics, reflecting trends, shortcomings and anomalies in Soviet internal and

external propaganda.'20 A letter dated 18 March 1955 from Rose to Rennie expressedthe wish to receive the new pubLication 'under the usual conditions'.

One of the most e{fective methods used by IRD was the placement of propaganda bycontacts in the Labour Party and the TUC, to bolster anti-Communists againstCommunists and those less enthusiastic about the Cold War, the Atlantic alliance and

nuclear deterrence. This was done with the help of both 'witting' and 'unwitting'journalists and academics. 'Woodrow Wyatt, for example, was at the forefront of those

to claim that the influence of the Russian front organizations on trade unions was

causing disastrous damage to the country. In about 1956 he wrote a book called The

Peil in Our Midst,2l which claimed that, under the influence of the'WFTU, people likeHomer in the FBU, and, more seriously, Foulkes and Haxell22 in the Electrical Trades

Union, were working in the interests of Moscow. This was a continuation of theoperation of which the F{orner story was but a part. Wyatt had close links with Britishintelligence. He had been a shareholder of an MI6 news agency since 1952. Wyatt'sinformation came from MI5 via IRD and Wyatt's inability to find a publisher for The

Peril in Our Midst was solved when IRD's Leslie Sheridan stepped in and had itpublished by one of the department's front operations.

Wyatt also campaigned against Communist ballot rigging in the trade unionsespecially the leadership of the Electrical Trades (Jnion (EtU;.2: In a spectacularcourt case, the judge, Mr Justice

'W'inn, found that a group of Communist leaders ofthe union, including Fouikes and Haxell, had 'conspired together to prevent by

111

11) BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

fraudulent and unlau,ful devices the election of the plaintiff Byrne in place of thedefendant Haxell as general secretary of the defendants union'.2a Justice Winn foundthat 'not only was the ETU managed and controlled by Communists and pliantsympathizers, but it was so managed in the service of the Communist Parry of theUnited Kingdom and the ideas.of that parry.':5 Haxell was immediately replaced by

Jock B,vrne as General Secretar,- and Foulkes r,vas replaced in 1963 by Les Cannon. Asone insider commented. the combination of Wyatt, IRD and MI5 material provedhighly elfective as part of 'an extraordinarily successful operation.'26 As a result theunion rvas taken over bv a moderate leadership under John Byrne, Les Cannon andFrank Chapple, rvho led the ETU as General Secretary untll 7984.27 (Jnder theirleadership, in 1965, Communists rvere banned from holding union office.28 AlecDouglas Home was so impressed that he sent a personal note of congratulation toReddarvay, rvho was by that time in Beirut.

The historical version of these events has largely remained that recorded by the Ner.r

Statesman. In an article inJuly 1961, following the court's decision in favour of Byme'sreplacement of Haxell, the anti-Communist campaign was described as having beenwaged by 'a handful of "revisionists" and Labour Party members who have neither theresources nor the opportuniry to compete with a machine of 2,500 CP members'.2eIndeed, Arthur Bottomley, in his book The (Jse and Abuse of Trade (Jnions, published byIRD front Ampersand tn1963, wrote that'the ETU was cleaned up, not as a result ofoutside protest and agitation (though this undoubtedly played a part) but by theslogging, painstaking and dedicated efforts of a group of socialist trade unionists.'Bottomley commented that the case was,'One of the best documented exposures of theruthless Communist minoriry domination of a trade union . and has already beenhailed as a landmark in the history of labour struggles'.30 Not for the last time, IRD andthe discreet machinery of the British State would miss out on the credit that it was due.Those in IRD and MI5 who had been involved had to remain silent about their role in,what the historian of the ETU, John Lloyd, described as 'the single most importantpolitical change in the union since the war'.31

The relationship berween intelligence agencies and the right-wing press was close,and none more so than with the Daily Mail. One example from the mid-1950s wasprovided by a lormer IRD ofiicial. ETU leaders had denied that they had a caucus todecide on tactics during the TUC conference. MI5 intelligence, passed through IRD torhe Daily Mail, revealed that the ETU leaders would be at the headquarters of theBritish Communist Parry in King Street shortly before conference. The group wasphotographed from a window opposite in King Street. The Daily Mail published thisand said that this was eviderrce of a caucus meeting.

ln 1962 the Radcli{fe Committee, set up by the Macrnillan government in the wakeof the Vassall spy case, alleged extensive Communist Parry control over the civil serviceunions. In the same year the former Labour, later Conservative, MP and journalist,Aidan Crawley, ciaimed that the CPGB was strongest in the NUM, building workersunions and the AILJ, warned that they were making inroads into the clerical unions,and cited sections of the woodworkers, the plumbers and the painters unions as beingunder CPGB control.32 Aidan Crawley, like Mayhew, was one of the first postwargeneration of tsBC TV presenters and also close to IRD. The media, especially right-

Chrrstopher Mavheu, proposed thelormrtion of IRD rr hile r junior'Forergn Ofllce Minister inAttlee's government. (UnivelsalPictorial Press)

John Cloake, an earlv recruit toCloake)

IRD. (lohn Norman Reddarvay, one of lRD's n.rost

influentral fisures. (Norman Reddau.ay)

Lenrn and Stalin. the architects of Sovret Comrnunism that IRD strove hard to undermine(Russian Archives)

'Winston Churchill 'set Europeablaze'. SOE and IRD blossomedin the Churchill years ofthe 1950s.

(Press Association)

SOE veteran Sir Douglas

Dodds-Parker provided thenecessary political backing for IRD'sdomestic carnpaign in the mrd-1950s. (Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker)

North Korean Comnrunist Prime Mimster KinrWar, 1951. (Pau1 Lasl'rnrar Collection)

[1 Sung r.vrth Soviet advisers during the Korean

Mrchael Ivens, head of right-rving lobbv group

Aims of Industr,v and leading :rclvocate forBritain joining the EEC. (Michael lven$

John Horner, Communist leader of the FireBrigades lJnion rvho was targeted by IRD.(Fire Brigades Union)

Nikita Khrushchev. IRD didpohcv. (Russian Archives)

not believe he r.r,ou1d liberalize Soviet Communism and foreign

Presrdent Sukarno oflndonesia rvith his rvrfe

to the West u'hich assisted in his overthrorv.Der'vi. Sukarno's leadership was perceived as a threat(Hulton Getry* Picture Library)

Gen Soeharto, rvho came to powertn 1966 aided bv Western efforts totopple his predecessor President

Sukarno. (Associated Pless)

Harold Macmillan's governmentordered IRD to help destabihze

Sukarno's Indonesia. (D aily T elegraph)

Foreign Secretary David Or'ven, seen here u.ith Leonid Brezhnev, found IRD's Cold'Warriors an

embarrassrnent and closed the department dorvn in 1977. (Lord Or,ven)

Hilalv W. King, forner Ambassador toGuinea, a crrtic of IRD's Cold War blackpropaganda. (Hi1ary \V. King)

Roland Challis, BBC correspondent in South-East Asia during the rise of Gen Soeharto inIndonesia. (Roiand Challis)

IRD'S DOMESTIC CAMPAIGNS

wing newspapers like the Daily Express and the Daily Mail, frequently carried lurid 'red-under-the-bed' stories.

IRD's activities had clearly gone beyond the 'informal' distribution of propagandareferred to in IRD's original briel-. Ail of these examples of IRD's intervention indomestic politics were part of the attempt to achieve what was, according to Mayhev"',IRD's principle aim on the domestic front: to support anti-Communists in govemment,the Labour Parry and the trade unions. To what extent this intervention was successfulis difficult to determine, but according to Mayhew, 'lt is amazing how those to whomone sent it IIRD rnaterial] were, even if they didn't use it, influenced themselves to see

that Stalinism was an evil thing, and certainly IRD's propaganda coincided with a

considerable politicai defeat of the extreme left in the Labour Parry.'::lt was not only the Labour Party. As IRD ggew and became more confident, it became

more interventionist. Early IRD documents show that it was prohibited by govemmentfrom domestic operations - the mles of etiquette r.vere explicit: carqring out domesticpropaganda was Home Otllce territory. Horvever, this hurdle seems to have beenovercome. From 1951 a more aggressive approach rvas taken under the new head, JohnPeck, an Oxford classicist and rvriter of iight vene. Peck had been a private secretary toChurchill during the rvar. His former Foreign Ofice colleague Michael Cullis later wroteof the effectiveness of Peck at IRD, 'Having myself in pan rvorked for it in the fie1d, I was

well placed to admire what he did (perhaps occasionally overdid) by way of getring thisrvhole, very necessary, operation offthe ground at an important juncrure in worid affain.'3a

Peck's Cold'W'arriors became particularly concerned when support was given to thepeace lnovement by opponents of nuclear weapons who were respectable establishmentfigures. Early on, IRD had built up a relationship with the Church of England and hadspent a great deal of time enlisting leading Church figures to the pro-nuclear and anti-Communist cause. The main point of contact was the Church's Council for ForeignRelations (CFR), which had enorrnous influence over the political line dictated to itscongregation, not only throughout the country but also abroad. Through CanonHerbert 'Waddams, General Secretary of the CFR, IRD rvas able to disseminate a greatdeal of covert propaganda. Waddams had been in the Ministry of Information duringthe Second World War and well understood the use of propaganda. The archive reveals

the council in constant contact with IRD. 'W'addams had initially been a hesitant entrantinto the Cold War, but by 1948 he took up the role with some vigour. IRD wasprepared to provide sensitive material to the CFR providing that it was all retumedincluding the original cover letter. On one occasion Canon Waddams failed to returnthe covering letter, so it is now in the CFR archive. IRD was offering personalinformation on the'Red'Dean of Canterbury, HewlettJohnson, clearly wanting to ridthemselves of this turbulent priest. Peck wrote to Waddams:

I wonder if you would mind looking at the attached? These notes came to us bv a

roundabout route in case we could make any use of them. It is quite a formidablecollection, and I see no reason why we should be very tender in our treatment of theDean. In general we do not like to publicise overseas British nationals who have goneoff the rails in any manner, but he has become such an international figure that Ithink anyone wishing to refute him should have some materiai at his disposal.

BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

I think however that you should know what is going on, and if you wish to use

any of this material yourself there would be no objection. If on the other hand youwould prefer to know nothing of this, please return the letter and the enclosurewhich will then have never been sent.35

This was clearlv Ml5-generated material on Hewlett Johnson. To his credit, Waddamsdid not use it and returned it to Peck, saying, 'I agree that there is no reason why he

should be tenderly treated and I should be very glad to see him debunked. But I am

pretw sure that the kind of notes you enclosed are not the right way of doing it. . . . Ithink vou rvould be making a mistake to use this material.' HewlettJohnson had a longhiston' of tolerance tor.vards Communists and Peck's correspondence took place shortlyafter Johnson had returned from China. He carried a number of appeals from ChineseChristians who rvere well known and respected in the 'West, complaining about theAmerican use of germ warfare in China and North Korea. This resulted in an onslaughtagainstJohnson by the media and politicians.36

This is not the only example of Foreign Office intervention. Church of Englandarchives also show that, in May 1953, a MrJohn Egg of IRD called in person on ColBarron of the CFR. Egg, for reasons we think are obvious, later, changed his name and

was IRD's liaison oflicer to MI5. He drew Col Barron's attention to a letter in theManchester Cuardian of 8 May, in which the Dean of Manchester stated that hewelcomed the holding of a peace congress in Manchester on 1.7 May, and that everyChristian should do likern'ise. As Bishop of Singapore, the dean had been a prisoner ofthe Japanese and was a respected figure. He openly acknowledged that he knew nothingof the organization behind the peace congress, but he nevertheless authorized the Revd'W.'Watts. who vu,as associated with it, to make use of his letter in an).'rvay he chose inthe interests of peace. Egg informed Barron that the Foreign OIEce saw this as a rypicalexample of an inteilectual who was being hoodwinked by Communist peace

propaganda and lending it support without any knowledge of the facts. Egg gave Barrona unattributed IRD paper, 'British Peace Congress 1953', and asked him to send a copyof it to the Dean of Manchester. According to historian Dianne Kirby, he also asked

whether the CFR could help in getting over this rype of document to members of theclergy-, and if it would submit for their guidance a list of Church newspapers. societies.

women's guilds, etc, 'which we think would benefit by an unofficial circulation ifnecessary by the Foreign Office, of this kind of pamphlet'. Kirby said, 'Thecorrespondence befween the CFR and the Foreign O{Ece demonstrated that the latterwished the former to disseminate what was effectively grey propaganda withoutattributing its real source.'

In August 1953, John Peck sent Herbert Waddams a paper 'on propaganda moves

which the Soviet Government might take to further its campaign to secure world-wi<iefavour as the champion of "peace and friendship" betvveen nations,' and told him that,'should you wish to use any of the information contained in this paper, please do so, butI must ask you to ensure that neither the paper itself, nor the speculation it puts forward,is attributed to the Foreign Office.' The CFR was certainly interested in what theForeign Otlice had to say. On 22 October 1954,

.Waddams asked for a list of front

organizations that might tempt clergymen. J.O. Rennie at IRD replied that the

IRD'S DOMESTIC CAMPAIGNS

'Communist-tainted' bodies that ciergymen might be induced to support were dividedinto three categories: those aimed specifically at practising Christians; secularorganizations whose aims might attract clerical support; and organizations that, u'hilenot proscribed by the Labour Parry, couid fairly be described as Comrnunist in aim andcharacter. The organizations existing to mobilize Christian opinion were the Society ofSocialist Clergy and Ministers (SSCM), whose origins lay in the 1942 MalvernConference organized by William Temple, the Christians and Crisis Group and theChristian Peace Group - (the latter two, thought to have merged, were seen as less

'dangerous' than the SSCllt;.:zIRD had therefore defined and covertly harried its enemies by the mid-1950s, but it

had also defined and covertly nurtured its friends.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

/RDt Fellow T\auellersIn the strange'wilderness of mirrors'world inhabited by IRD, it was often hard to tellu,ho r'vere government propagandists and who were journalists. In many cases,individuals were both at the same time or changing hats effortlessly benveen the two.One year they would be working for the MI6 'friends', the next for a Fleet Streetnewspaper. MI6 and IRD both had a close relationship with The Economist. BoanCrozier, who freelanced for IRD as r.r,ell as working at The Economist, iliustrated theextelrt of the relationship in his autobiographv, Free Agent. While he was a writer o{ TlrcEconomist's Foreign Report, crozier rvas taken to MI6's headquarters, century House, byhis SIS contact: 'l met a number of people rvhom I had talked to . . . in the betief thatthey were "Foreiggr Office". One of them l had known as a colleague when he hadworked for the Econonrist Intelligence (Jnit.'1

One ex-Foreign Ofiice source said that, in the 1950s, The Economist's Foreign Report, a

by-invitation-only subscription newsletter started in the late 1940s, was a major conduitfcrr IRD material. Ruth Dudley Edwards wrote in her study of The Economist,'Since itwas first launched people have tried to define the difference in content berween thisblue, eight-page, expensive newsletter and The Economist.' She quoted a vague GeoffreyCrowther, editor and later chairman of The Economist, as saying that 'There are thingpthat one doesn't want to put into print and have quoted on the Moscow radio next day;or things that v"e think are colrect but aren't sure; or which, for one reason or another,get displaced from a paper that is prety rigid in size and form.' Brian Beedham, rheforeign editor of The Economist berween 1964 and 1989, was equally obscure: 'It has

always seemed to me that the good Foreign Report piece feli into one of rlvo categories

- either the under-the-bed piece, reporting on something not yet known to the publicpress, or not Properly, or the novel item of analysis and interpretation looking fartherinto the future than other eyes can see.'2

The Economist's Foreign Report was started by two of Crowther's prot6g6s, Jean Birdand Alison outhwaite. During the u'ar, outhwaite had been a European expert in theForeign Ofiice's Political Intelligence Department andJean Bird, 'an American who hadserved in the American embassy in London on similar work', had written a BackgroundBook for Batchworth Press in 1954 entitled East-West Trade. According to Edwards,'From the very beginnings of Foreign Report . . . there were tensions with the foreigndepartment, whose editor was nominally responsible tor Foreign Report's contents.outhwaite in particular was too much of a cold warrior for John Midgeley's liking andher critics thought her sources were too 'Establishment'.'3

In fact, IRD appears to have established an effective outlet with the Foreign Report.Staff working on this eight-page confidential letter included Brian Crozier and Andrew

118 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA'WAR

Boyd, who introduced Crozier to his IRD contact, H.H. 'Tommy' Tucker. crozier

said that much of the lnaterial presented h the Foreign Report carrre direct from IRD: 'IfI were to try and put a percenrage ro it, it would be round about maybe 20 or 30 per

cent. But it varied, I .,r.rr, .u.ry ,ow and then they'd have something really sensational

and so one uscd it, but there wele a lot of other sources.' Crozier was introduced to

IRD over lunch at the Travellers Club early in 1955. 'l already knew of their eistence

but I hadn't contact. so one of mv colleagues took me for iunch and after that I was

involved rvith them. not on a pa,v-ing basis until I actually left The Economist, but

exchanges of information, that kind of thing.'a

Manv of The Econontist's staff \ rere very close to the intelligence establishment'

D.prrqi Editor Donald Mclachlan had been part of Seftol Delmer's black propaganda

team. John Midgeley, Foreign Editor in the late 1950s, had worked for the Guardian

before and after the *r. dr.irrg which he had served in military intelligence' Another

member of the foreign department was the historian and ex-director of the Middle East

division of the Ministry of trrfo.-ation, Elizabeth Monroe. The joumalist and foreign

editor Patrick Honey, for a period the Foreign Editor at The Economist, became a friend

of Crozier's and wrote articles and books for IRD'From the mid-1950s, IRD developed a hard core of trusted and like-minded

journalists and academics r,vho were to remain remarkably consistent throughout its

existence. This inner caucus was refined from a wider, more politically diverse circle of

contacrs. IRD strove to make links with the media through relationships with individual

journalists, both directly and through the contacts of the Foreign OfIice's information

offi..., in dipiomatic missions abroad. They would be approached with the olfer of

material produced for the diplomatic service but available to a few people outside the

service who rnight find it useful. The journalist was free to use the material however he

or she wished on condition that it was not passed on to anyone else and that it was not

attributed to Her Majesry's government' Many agreed'

IRD had its own in-house team of writers: some career Foreign Ofiice people, others

professional journalists. Of the ninety-one articles sent out during 1948, some forry-one-had

been written by IRD staff writers using pseudonym's like John Cardwell' and

'David Laidlaw'. In the initial wave of recruitment, IRD wisely hired a number of

contract staff with leftist credentials, like Celia Kirwan, in much the same way that it

sought to use left-wing publishers and figures. It suited the mood of the times and gave

articles an anti-Communist credibiliry that a right-wing writer might have lacked'

The rest of IRD's journalistic output came from outside contributors' In November

1950 the new member for Bristol south-east, Tony Benn, was con{identially

approached by IRD's Col Leslie Sheridan using his public relations consultant cover'

(iheridan wrote to his boss, Ralph Murray, that Anthony Wedgwood Benn 'is a really

brilliant young man'.) Benn recalled that he was offered a substantial annual salary to

write anti-Communist articles for IRD. He declined the ofler. In a letter to Sheridan

he wrote, 'I have been thinking over the matter rve discussed yesterday * have come

ro the conclusion that I cannot take on the work. I feel that it would be incompatible

with my independence as an MP * in any case it's not really up my street at all. I

wouldn't be any good at it.'s Tony's brother, the historian David Benn, pointed out

that it is technically illegal for an MP to be paid in such a way by the Crown'

IRD'S FELLOW TRAVELLERS

Tony Benn may have rejected IRD overtures, but how many other Mps wererecruited by IRD and what were they paid?

other left-wingers, like the writer Tosco R. Fyvel, were also approached andrecruited. Fyvel had been Tribune's literary critic from 1946 to 1950 and became aregular writer for IRD. A well known figure in pre-war left-wing circles, Flvel was afriend of both Orwell and Koestler. He went to Cambridge after atiending various Swissand Engiish schools, and during the war he too became involved in psychologicalrvarfare. In 1939-40 he had co-edited with George orwell, a series of pamphlets on waraims for the British Army called the Searchlight Books. He the., worked onpsychological warfare in North Africa with both the British and the American armies.From 1951 Fyvel became involved in IRD's continued efforts to exploit the propagandapotential of Soviet military defecrors, the technique that had started off,r.ry .rr*..1ywith Lt col G.A. Tokaev in 1948.6 They quickly became more skilled in defectorhandling. In March 1952 IRD pubiished the tale of a young Russian rifle regiment non-cornmissioned otlicer, entitled 'sergeant Shutov reads the road signs,. It was by_linedT.R. Fy'vel, r,vho r.vas described as a 'leading left lving critic of Sralin,. Flwel and hiscolleagues industriously produced articles that, in keeping lvith IRD practice, if notwith journalistic ethics, did not say that they r,vere paid by the Foreign Ofiice.7 Otherjournalists came from Fleet Street, like the dipiomatic .o...rpo.rd.nt of the DailyTelegraph, R'H.c' Steed. Hugh chevins, the Daily Telegraphjoumarist who played apivotal role in the Horner Affair, was paid to u,rite articles for IRD. In the summer of1949 he wrote Pro3'ress Towards a Free T.LI. International, r.vhich was distributed to allForeign Office posts. 'Woodrow Wyatt MP wrote on The Two Imperialisms. Other well-known names included Freda lJtley, oscar Hobson, Rhys Davies Mp, Harold Laski,J.A. Hough and Paul Anderson of the picture posr. Additionally, IRD bought secondrights for thirty-seven published articles in that year from such authors as prof GilbertMurray and Julian Huxley.s These articles were sold very cheaply and appeared innewspapers a1l over the world.

As well as contact with individual journalists, IRD made arrangements with severalnewspapers, including the ohseruer, The Times and rhe Sunday Times, by which IRDbought the right to republish selected articles abroad without alterarion and withacknowledgement for the author and original publisher only. By these means IRDcould ensure the distribution of favourable and independent articles throughout theworld.e

IRD assiduously built up a rrerwork ofjournalist conracrs: a circulation \ist fot 1976lists ninety-rwo British journalists working for publications including the Obseruer, thecuardian, rhe Financial Times, The Times, the Daily Minor, the Daily Mail, rhe Telegraph,and the Sunday Express, as well as freelance journalists and journalists working foifiNand Reuters. Many of these had only loose contacts with IRD and some treated IRDmaterial with caution. Perhaps the most interesting and questionable relationship wasthat berween IRD and a carefully selected, small group of influential journalists. In the7976|ist there were a number of people who, in some cases, had been key IRDcontacts for more than rwenry years. As each showed that they could play the gameaccording to IRD's rules, he or she found that they were rewarded with 'exclusives' thatin tum would get them the appreciation of their editor. 'W'e have already seen how this

119

120 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

could work in the case of 'V7alter Farr and Hugh Chevins. The attraction of free

research on topics ofinterest to the selectedjournalist is obvious as it relieves him or her

of a great deal of rvork. EtTectively, those joumalists rvere able to pass offthe enornousintelligence collection abiliry of the Foreign Oflice as their own work, the source never

being attributed. For IRD it was a means of getting material into circulation and

encouraging a news focus on the failures and evils of Communism and the USSR.

Journalists u,ere intluenced both through the material and through the potential threat

of rvithdrau'ing the information should the joumalist behar.,e in a way that IRD disliked.

As late as the 1970s there rvas a "vhole

bery of joumalists on the more right-wingtabloid newspapers u.ho made their living out of such stories, some just plain ludicrous

and manv supplied by IRD.The department was able to help to build the reputations ofjournalists of whom it

approved. Victor Zorza of the Guardial, was very close to IRD. 'The wordKremlinology was not invented for Victor Zorza . . . but for more than wvenry-fiveyears he r'vas its leading exponent,' observed one close friend.lo He is attributed withjoumalistic coups that included the discovery of the ideological split between Moscowand Mao Zhedong's China and the prediction of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakiain 1968. Zorza, a PolishJew, had been part of vast deportations to Siberia by the Sovietsjust before the Second'World War. He had escaped and gradually made his way across

Europe, ending up in England and joining the RAF. From 1948 he had joined the BBCnronitoring serr,'ice at Caversham. He began writing for the Cuardian in the early 1950s,

finally joining the staff in May 1956. Zorza covered the Soviet (Jnion, not fromMoscow but from his London home. He did not go back to the Soviet union until7977. He even moved to Slough, it was said, to have fast access to Pravda and lzuestia

arriving at Heathrow. Zorza specialized in analysing the subtle nuances of Sovietpolitics. 'For the Cuardian he also analysed the trends behind the secrecies of Soviet

socieq- through a method which though infinitely painstaking in practice, was simple intheory. It depended on considering not only what was said and written but oncomparing it with what might have been said and was not.'11 Many of Zorza's articles

were based on Soviet publications and credited them. Other stories are unsourced and

presented as bald statements of fact. Zorza's sryle lent itself ideally to absorbing IRDoutput. According to a number of former IRD stalf, he was a key 'client'. One IRDresearcher said 'I recall an articie we produced on the Soviet motor industry in the mid1970s. A week later it turned up w'ord for word in a national newspaper under Zorza's

by-line.'r: Reddaway said that, as an authorized client of the Soviet Desk of IRD, he

could easily switch to using information from other desks.13 This helps to explain howZorza, working from London, suddenly became an expert in the complexities of the

Indonesia lJntung coup, producing a series of detailed articles for the Cuardian. Onerevealing example began, Jakarta Radio, which has not even mentioned the word"Communist" since the beginning of the current troubles yesterday turned on theComnrunist Parry with a demand that it shouid be disbanded.' Zorza, while clearlygetting material from Foreign Office sources, was the one journalist to discern that the

Communist probably played no major part in the lJntung coup attempt.It wouid be naive to suggest that correspondents like Zorza werejust mouthpieces of

IRD. These individuals were usually highly capable and had their own sources. The

\121 \IRD'S FELLOW TRAVELLERS

relationship betrveen Zorza and IRD can best be described as thriving on creativetension. Zorza, for instance, increasingly came ro believe that the Soviet LJnion wasundergoing relbrrn ancl could coexisr rvith the -west

- not a popular line with Fohardliners. He also encountered the wrath of the hardliners when he questioned theveraciry of the book The Penkovsky Papers, originallv published in the United States inthe early 1960s. This very anri-sovier rexr was allegedly u,'rirten by a high-level cIA spyin Moscou'before he was caught and executed just before the Cuban Missile Crisis.la Itwas serialized bv numerous nrajor newspapers including the Washington Post. Zorzainclicated that he thought that it was a piece of ghost-written propaganda, an opinionthat earned hiru vilification by the CIA. He suggested at the rime that intelligenceagencies in democracies 'sufTer from the grave disadvantage that in artempting todamase the adversary they must aiso deceive their own public'. He also denounced,u,'rongi1, as it turned out, Krushchev's memoirs as a CIA fake.

According to IRD sources. Z<>rzafdT out \vith the department from time to time. In1964 he implicitlv criticized it in a C-uardian arttcle tor failing to see rhe downfall ofKrushchev. 'Bv far the qreater nun-rber of 'w'esrern experrs, mostly employed inGovernment agetrcies and therefore anonvmous, and those in the academic world,tended to Pour scorn on ar-ralyses shot"ing the proeressive u-eakening of Mr Krushchev'sposition.' And Zorza \vas not beyond making sonle strange pronouncements. The()uardiLtrr articie entitled 'Ner'v Soviet attempt to turn Europeans against America' wasbased on rather thin evidence: 'The Soviet initiative was in the form of a Prauda articler,vhich r'velcorled the success of the new dialogue r,vith France, and declared that thetime had conte to take the next, nlore specific steps in the search for European securiry.'

The Cuardian leader rvriter Griy 'Wint also had a close relationship with IRD, as didDavid Floyd of the Daily Telegraph. Floyd said rhat, on one occasion he had writren a

booklet about China at IRD's request. It told hirn that ir rvas ro be distributed todiplomats.15 These correspondents might have asserted their independence from IRD,but there were also iazv journalists who were prepared to be fed by IRD and made a

career out of it. Read the tabloids, especially the Sunday tabloids during IRD's lifetime,and you can read wild clain'rs about Soviet activities that were risible nonsense andgenerally unsourced, but n-rany u,ere supplied by IRD's 'subterranean channels'.

But IRi) rvas selecrive abour u,ho it gave information to. Some journals andjournalists rvere considered unlikely to play the game by gentleman's rules. NormanReddarvav explained:

For example. Time ntagazine rvould not be suitable, because you could not say to a

Time nngazine nlan - rvho rs a sort of licensed ferret - 1ook, you must not attributethis arrd you must not reveal the source and so on, because Time magazine doesn'tu'ork that way. It has its licensed ferrets, Grreting out all over the place, they bung inu,'hatever thev can dig out of the holes and bung it into New York. And there is nocontrol over what to put in, say in London, and what comes out in New York, andgoes rvorldwide.

So I anr not aware that anv Time ntagazine person had access to IRD, I wouldn'thave authorised it. And of course the Daily worker wasn't suitable - rvhy would youlrave tlre Daily worker? on the other hand a lot of other people were. I mean the

122 BI{ITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA'WAR

Daily Herald rnan was a very regular nser. Seton-'Watson, very regular. I mean, these

are the respectable ones. Nicholas Carol, later Victor Zorza, Guy 'Wint, all these

people were judged to be safe to deal rvith and rvouldn't attribute it.

Occasionallv thev slipped up bv makinp; the source of information a litt1e too clear. Thisincurred IRD's irntation, as the Srnday Telegraplt \1'as to discover. 'Nicholas Carol, forexample. once virtuallv said that this had come from either the Foreign OfIice or theresearchers or u'hatever and I had hir-n in and said - "Look, this is the last time you can

do this." I renrember he n-rote a ven- apologetic letter, mea urlpa etc, etc. And fromthen on he u'as r-en- qood. Thev realized the1.'d got an absolute goid mine of serious

research in there and thev valued it enoirnouslv of course,'said Norman Reddaway.i6Also on the 1976 list rvere a number of academics who specialized in areas of Cold

War and \\:ere nurtured by IRD, which provided them with all of the department'slatest research. As rvith the favoured joumalist, IRD paid many of these academics tovn'rite articles and books as long as they took the correct anti-Communist line. These

chosen lew were able to build reputations assisted by material fed to them on a plate.

Crozier's memoirs expiain how this worked. FIe rvas askeC to write a report on Sino-Soviet subversion in the Third World for IRD and was provided with material fromboth GCHQ and MI6: 'After the document had been "sanitised" by the excision ofsecret material, I was allowed to take the scissored fypescript home,' he said. The reportformed the core of a further Ilackground Book, SrrlgqleJor the Third Woild (1966). Hisnext book, The Future of Cornmun.ist Pou,er,was u.ritten at IRD oflices'on the basis of a

vast supply of classified documents'.17

The standard postwar text-book, The Theory and Practice of Communisrz by R.N.Carew Hunt. r'vas prompted by Mavherv. It provided the MI6/IRD o{Ecer CarewHunt with academic respectabiliry. An even more glaring example was that of RobertConquest. Now based at Stanford Universiry in Califomia, Conquest has the reputationas a leading Sovietologist and is the author of The Creat Tenor, a renowned critique ofStalin. Conquest was employed by the Foreign OfEce and was on the staff of IRD from1946 to 1956, before pursuing his successfui academic career. According to an ex-lRDofficial, Conquest produced a huge amount of IRD's early briefing papers and was 'one

of our success stories'. After leaving IRD he was able to olfer publishers Bodley Head a

series of eight books on 'Soviet studies'. These established his reputation. In a laterinterview he was to admit that mr.rch of the material had come from IRD: 'There was

very little rvriting to be done. Only bridging passages really.'18

The etlect of the Cold.War on British academia is a relatively unexplored subject and,

despite ideals of academic freedom, there is no doubt that some academics waged theCold \Var with fervour. Leonard Schapiro, who was at the London School ofEconornics (LSE), wrote or contributed to four Background Books as well as numbernine in Ampersand's tsellman Books series. Schapiro, 'Professor of Political Science,

with Special Reference to Russian Studies', was to become one of the most prominentCold War'Warriors. llorn in Glasgow in 1908, he had been called to the bar in the1930s. From .l

9,10 to 1942he rvorked at the BBC monitoring service at Caversham. Hethen joined the War Office and was in the intelligence division of the German ControlComnrission from 19,15 to 1916 with the substantive rank of major. He returned to

IRD'S FELLOW TRAVELLERS 123

practise at the bar, rvriting extensively for IRD, before joining the LSE in 1955.According to Stephen'Watts, Schapiro also suggested several possible authors to him.

. Maurice cranston, prolessor of political science at the LaE (1969-g5), conrributedthree titles to the series and edited one other. This was A Clossary o;f political Terms(1966), which included contributions by H.B. Acton and Schapiro. The LSE andespecially Schapiro formed a centre for anti-Comrnunist academics. Robert Conquesthad a research fellorvship at the LSE in the 1950s and the LSE became a centre of'Sovietology'. Another ieading academic, Max Beloff of oxford Universiry, later thePrincipal of the Universiry of Bucki,gham, also wrote a Background Book. However,when contacted in l995, Lord Beloff replied, 'After forry yer.s one,s memory tends tofade. I do not think I wrote any other book for the series and do not know whether ornot I knew the series was sponsored by the IRD about whose role I also knownothing.'lr He was made a life peer by Mrs Thatcher in 19g1.

At St Anronv's Coiiege, oxford, which had exrremely good contacts with theintelligence communirv. the Soviet Studies Departnrent r"rs herded by an ex-SoE mancalled David Footnran. Places t,ere ibund for anri-communist 6migr6s such as JohnErikson, who rvrote a book on the Red Armr'. Hou'ever, Foreign Oftice interventionswere not confined to the promotion of the work of 'suitable' acadernics. Direct actionw'as taken to ensure ideological conformi6'. For example. according to Professor Donaldcameron-'watt, in the early 1950s, at the height of the cold wa., a number of ,fellowtravellers' rvere purged from the School of Slavonic Studies, while a new direcror wasbrought in from outside.

If the British can be commended for not entering a McCarthyite witch hunt againstCommunists in public institutions - Churchill resisted any such suggestions - this mustbe tempered by consideration of the effrcacy of the informal Britiii system in findingout if an individual, in Mrs Thatcher's r.vords, is'one of us,. This system used (and usesJa svstem of subtle checks, like an individual's school, college, as well as informalsuarantors to ensure sorneone with the 'wrong' viervs does not get the job. Besideskeeping generations of talent from the'r,vrong'social classes out oipositions of power,this systern co,ld and did go spectacularly wrong, as in the case of the cambridge SpyRing. The IRD system u,as equally informal and beneficial for those who were deemedsuitable to partake. Acadenrics rvould not only benefit from publishing deals but moreimportantly u'ould also gain access to other-wise unavailable information and research onrvhich tirey could build. As any rnodern academic u,,ill tell you, rhe number of papersa,d books you pubhsh is crucial to your chances offurtheri,g your career.

During the 1950s IRD took a move to the right and the tone of its outpur graduallychanged. A conservative government was elected in 1951 and was to remain in powerfor thirteen years. Even the Suez disaster only resulted in a change of prime ministerrather than of administration. The number of IRD writers with left-of-centrecredentials dropped off as there was no longer a need to pay lip service to socialdemocracy. They were replaced by a more right-wing tendency of cold 'war 'warriorswho saw all Soviet politicians as Stalinists.

By 1960 the IRD inner circle had settled down to a small dedicated band ofprofessional cold warriors. They included Brian crozier, Leonard Schapiro, HughSeton-'watson, Maurice cranston, Leo Labedz and Michael Goodwin, and they were

124 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

sceptical of any softening of tone from Moscow or Beijing, or indications of a desire toloosen Cold'War tensions. They r,vere in a strong position to influence British responses

to Moscow. Their position on, for example, Krushchev's 'peaceful coexistence', likeMayhew's. was sceptical.

The effect of a1l of these operations was staggering. If it was the American freemarketers who first realized that think tanks rvere an effective way of hothousingintellectual traditions, it u'as the British state that first realized that, by backing potentialopinion formers. r'ou could alter the political spectrum. According to historianChristopher Lasch. 'The modern state is an engine of propaganda, alternativelymanufacturing crises and claiming to be the only instrument which can effectively dealrvith them. This propaganda, in order to be successful, demands the co-operation ofrvriters, teachers, and artists not as paid propagandists . . but as "free" intellectualscapable of policing there own jurisdictions and of enforcing acceptable standards ofresponsibilicy within various intellectual professions.'

The IRD had it both ways. Selected journalists and academics who had the resourcesof the British intelligence service and the Foreign Office at their disposal artificiallyenhanced their reputations. But IRD was also able to promote the reputation of its ownpeople by slipping them in among the more respectable academics that graced its articleand book lists. In addition, IRD's coterie of writers and academics were brought to theattention of American Cold War circles, which in tum couid enhance their academicand media reputations even further.

However. throughout it all there were aiways hidden hands pulling the financial andideoiogical strings, and they stretched across the Atlantic from Langley, Virgrnia.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

A Mirror Image:

the CIAFour da,vs after North Korea had invaded South Korea and the Cold

.War had suddenly

become hot, 15,000 people gathered in the Frankturm Gardens in the British sector ofBerlin. The crowd was addressed by Arthur Koestler, ex-Communist and author of thesemitral anti-Communist novel Darkness at Noon, rvho ended his speech with thedeclaration, in German, 'Friends, freedom has seized the offensive!'1 Koestler told hisBerlin audience, poignantlv a small piece of the West.lust behind the Iron Curtain, that'the theory and practice of the totalitarian state are the greatest challenge which man has

been called upon to rneet in the course of civilised history . . . indifference or neutralityin the face of such a challenge amounts to a betrayal of mankind and to the abdicationof the free mind'.2 As historian Paul Kennedy noted, 'There was to be no middle way inan age of Stalin andJoe McCarthy.'r

The rally and Koestier's speech, which launched an anti-Communist, anti-neutralist'Freedom Manifesto', was the culmination of the first intemational assembly of anti-Communist inteliectuals, called the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). TheCongress had been sponsored by Der Monat, a cultural magazine published by the USoccupation government and edited by Melvin Lasky, a short, stocky 29-year-oldAmerican with a Lenin-rype beard who had worked on the staff of the American anti-Communist fortnightly New ltader. In August 1949, Lasky had met in Frankfurt withex-Communists Franz Borkenau and Ruth Fischer, the former leader of the GermanCommunist Party. There they had come up lvith the idea of the conGrence. Fischeroutiined the plan to a friend:

It should be a gathering of all ex-Comrnunists, plus a good representative group ofanti-Stalinist American, English, and European intellectuals, declaring its sympathyfor Tito and Yugoslavia and the silent opposition in Russia and the satellite states, andgiving the Politburo heli right at the gate of their own hell. . . . [t rnould create greatpossibilities for co-operation afterwards and would also lift the spirits of Berlin anti-Stalinists, which are somewhat fallen at present.4

The small organizing group was soon joined by an Estonian American called Michael

Josselson who, after working as an interrogator in a psychological warfare section of theUS Army in Europe during the war, had stayed on in Berlin to work for the USoccupation government. Josselson, a brilliant administrator and organizer, set about

126 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

helping the conference to become reality. Under his influence it took on a less explicitlypolitical, broader cultural complexion. Invitations were sent out for 26June 1950 and a

distinguished group of philosophers, inciuding Bertrand Russell; the Italian BenedettoCroce and the AmericanJohn Deu,ev r,vere approached.s

When the congress convened in Berlin, rhere u-as an impressive array of 'Western

intellectual, political. scientiijc and literan' individuals. Delegates from the lJnited States

included historiar.r Arthur Schlesinger Jr. philosopher Sidnel, Hook, playwrightTennessee Williams. actor Robert N4onrgomen' and ex-Communist James Burnham.Brrtish delegates included philosopher AJ. Aver, historian Hugh Trevor-Roper and

politician JuLan Anren'. lVlan,v delegates \\'ere active in the movement for a EuropeanUnion. such as Denis de Rougemont, Francois Bondy and Altiero Spinelli. Eastern

European 6migr6s included Nicholas Nabokov and the editor of an obscure (JS

fortnightlv magazine called the New Leader, Sol Levitas. Messages of support werereceived from Andr6 Gide, John Dos Passos, lJpton Sinclair, George Grosz and Englishpolitician Richard Crossman.

As soon as the congress started, it polarized into factions representing di{ferent viewson confronting the totalitarian threat. The first was led by Arthur Koestler; the other bythe Italian socialist Ignazio Silone. Koestler had already led a varied and active politicalcareer, u,hich had led him in turn though Zionism and Communism before hisrenunciation of Communism in the late 1930s.'While in the Communist Parry, Koestlerhad worked underground in Germany, in Spain during the Civii War and in Paris at theoffice of the World Committee for the Relief of the Victims of German Fascism. Thiswas run by the infamous \Vi11y Muenzenberg, Comintern propaganda chief in 'Western

Europe, and the organization had been the first major Soviet front organization in'Western Europe." Koestler's rejection of Communism, expressed most dramatically and

influentially in Darkness a, Nloori, was to be as deep and as militant as his previousinvolvement in it. Koestler was an extremist in an age of extremes.

Ignazio Silone was also an ex-Communist who had joined, together with AntonioGramsci, rvhen the Italian party rvas formed in 1921. Silone had become not only a

member of the parry's Central Committee, but also a member of the Executive of theCommunist International. His break with Communism arose from his refusal tocondemn Trotsky, rvhich 1ed to his expulsion in 7931,. Silone, unlike Koestler,remained a Socialist and served t\ ''o years as a Socialist depury in the ltalian ConstituentAssenrbly following liberation. ln 1942 Silone had written that 'The most important ofour moral tasks today consists in liberating our spirits from the racket of gunfire, thetrajectory of propaganda war{are and joumalistic nonsense in general'.7 In 1950 he was

reluctant to go to Berlin, suspecting that it was a IJS State Department operation.8Both Koestler and Silone gave opening speeches.

'While Silone saw the congress as

o{Iering the opportuniry to reach across national frontiers and urged that the best way tooppose Communism was to promote social and political retorm to undermineCommunism's moral advantage, Koestler advocated a more aggressive strategy. It was

Koestler's sentiments that carried the congress.e Koestler castigated the imbeciles whoadvocated neutraliry and more or less called for Communist Parties in the 'West to be

banned. Actor Robert Montgomery argued in a blunt Hollywood sound bite that'There is no neutral corner in Freedom's room.'l0 The Russian 6migr6 composer and

A MIRROR IMAGE: THE CIA 127

u'riter Nicholas Nabokov declared that 'out of this congress we must buiid anorganization for war. -We

rnust have a standing comrnittee. 'We must see to it that it callson all figures, all fighting organizations and all methods of fighting, with a view roaction. If rve do not, we rvill sooner or later ali be hanged. The hour has strucktwelve.'11 Picking up on Koestler's anti-neutralist theme on 28 June, British economjstand journalist Richard Lowenthal described the idea of Europe as a .Third Force,, ,as

dangerous an illusion as an unarmed neutrality r,vhich is simply another name forsubmission.'t2

Reactions to the ccF were varied and in some cases, even in 'w'estern Europe,hostile. In the Manchester Guardian, Hugh Trevor-Roper, who had attended theconfbrence and had subscribed to the resuiting manifesto, wrote with some concern of'Hysterical German applause echoes from Hitler's Nuremberg . anti-Russian,perhaps ex-Nazi, and hysterical with a frontier hysterix.'r:r Folowing Trevor-Roper,sarticle, Bertrand Russell announced that he x,'ould be u,,ithdrawing from the position hehad accepted as one of the honorarv chairmen of the Congress,s Internationalcommittee. Koestler and Arthur J. Schlesi,ger Jr visited Russell and managed topersuade him othenvlse. In a letter ro Russeil, u'rirren the folloil.ing day, Koestlerthanked Russell profusell' and outiined his analvsis of the situation:

Both Arthur Schlesinger and I were very happy about the result of our pilgrimage toyou. Your rvithdrawal from the Congress would have caused other members of thecommittee to wonder -,vhy, and would probabiy have brought the roof down overour heads. The whole thing is still a very tender plant; we have little money, only ascant paid personnel and no Cominform behind us. But if we can produce resultsduring the next six months, support vr,ill grow rapidly, for there is a vacuum inEurope and a reasonable chance that u,e can fill it.1+

Nabokov's call for a perlnanent organization was ans.lvered. Despite the lack oflnoney referred to bv Koestler, the ccF was placed on a permanent footing with anexecutive comnrittee, a secretariat based in Paris and national a{Eliates in countriesaround the rvorld. Sr.,,iss philosopher Denis de Rougemont was made president,Nabokov became secretary-general and Josselson execurive director, while Koestler,Silone and American iabour leader L-r''ing Brown all became members of the executivecommittee. A programnre of activities, including conferences, festivals of art and theestablishment of a range of literary nragazines to act as forums for anti-Communist.liberal intellecruals. rvere soon under rvay. At its height, the ccF would employ 2g0ntembers of staff, have representatives in thirry-five countries organizing conferencesand seminars, as rvell a nerrvork of sponsored journals.ls

These journals rvere presented as independent entities, although they were financedby the ccF. Josselson later claimed, 'The journals were not organs of any movement.'We rvanted to provide people r'vith a platforrn. Of course, we decided who to cultivate;we wanted to put over exciting ideas over a wide spectrum. We didn,t expect thesepeople to be our spokesmen. 'W'e

excluded only the extreme right and the extreme ieft.we all had a common inrerest in freedom of expression.'16Journals set up by the CCFincluded Preuues in France and Quest in India, but the most influential of the ccF

128 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

lournals was set up ir.r the UK in 195-1. Encounter, the CCF secretadat decided, was to bers much literary as political, and In'ing Kristol and the poet Stephen Spender werechosen as its first editors. Kristol arrived in the UK tiom Nerv York, where he had been.tssistant editor of Comrnentary and developed something ol a reputation rs an anti-Conrmunist polemicist. In a Conmleillrir1, x11i.1. in 7952 entitled 'Civil Liberties, 1952 -r Study in Confusion'. Krrstol had made the controversial statement that 'there is onething that the Arrerican people know about Senaror McCarthv: he like them, is

unequivocallv anti-Conunrlnrst. About the spokesr-nen for American liberalism; they feel

rhev knos' no such thing. And rvrth sonre justificatron.'1iFollou'ing drscussions u'ith Josselson and representations by a number of British

,tssociates of the CCF, rncluding Tosco Fr,r,el and Malcolnr Muggeridge, it had been.rqreed that Encounter rt,ouid be published by Secker & lVarburg as an independentlournal sponsored by the CCF. Most important, it w'as agreed that there u'ould noofilcial editorial board to guide the editors. The CCF originally wanted closer controlr)ver thejournal and had rnanted it to concentrate on reaching areas such as Scandinaviarnd the Far East where, Nabokov told Kristol, 'neutralism is the strongest force'.i8 Theobjections of the editors and the CCF's British associates won through. As Spender toldthe CCF's executive committee, 'There was amongst the English intellectuals a

suspicion of, and instinctive aversion against, all oihcial or semi-ofiicial publications oforganizations.'1e Independence \\.as crucial to the journal's success.

Despite the iack of anv overt direction from Paris, sorne of the themes and issues

taken up by the ne'"v magazine, u-hen the first issue came out in October 1953, r,vere

strikingly similar to those of the CCF. The 6rst 10,000 issues sold out and Entotntter

srzu,iftly becarne'the first, the best monthly review in English'.zo Historian of the CCF,Peter Coleman \vrote that, by 1958, even Graham Hough and AJ.P. Tayior - anothere'arly critic - \vere contributing, and Kristol and Spender were able to inforrn Paris that'circulation had almost reached sixteen thousand a larger circuiation than anycomparable monthly review in the English language.'21

The reason for this success was partially a result of a toning down of the political andconsequential increase in the journai's literary content. However, also, unlike otheriournals. Encounter rt as able to pay substantial fees to its u,,riters. Journalist Andrew Rothrecalled that, at a time when academics and other.uvriters were 'u,,riting aticles for d3O,Encounter was paying up to d200'. Appearing in. Encounter could also lead to invitationsto speak on the American lecture circuit for substantial fees.22

By 1963 the magazine's circulation had reached more than 3,+,000 per issue, whichwas without doubt substantial for a publication of its rype.23 Despite its literary fee1,

where politics w-ere concerned Encounter maintained and developed some permanentrnti-Comlnunist themes. For example, in the June 1955 issue, the ex-ambassador ofBritain to Moscorv, Sir David Kelly, made the direct connection betr,veen theCommunist and the Nazi threat: 'The lamentable slowness of the 'Western peoples andqovernrrrents in realizing the true nature of the Soviet threat, and in laying thefoundations of the Atlantic Union, is not dissimilar to the slowness of the sarne peoplein realising the nature of the Nazi menace befiveen 7932 and 1939.'21 Cornmunism,personified by the Soviet lJnion, was consistently presented as expansionary ando{Iensive in contrast rvith the West, which was presented as essentially defensive. In

A MIRROR IMAGE: THE CIA

l95ti Peregrine'Worsthorne argued that. ''When they write of "vicrory", thev do notmean. ;1s does the West, a mere avoidance of defeat. They have in mind a victory thatrvoulci result in the spread of Communist control over the conquered area.'25

N4ore generally, holvever, anti-Commnnism took the form of a markedconcentration on the problems of the USSR alld Easrern Europe - the oppression ofinteliectuals in particular - often rvithin articles that were primarily concerned withpoetry, literature and music. For example, Nabokor,'s expos6 of the effects oftotalitarianism on music in the USSR, 'No Cantatas for Stalin',26 and the regular series

of articles edited bv Leopold Labedz, 'From the Other Shore', rvhich first appeared in1957 .2i According to Cloleman. this regular col-lmn r,vas highly successful and wasdistributed separatelv around the rvorld.28

The reaction to unilaterahsm. as propaeated bv CIND and manv on the LabourPartv's left rving, r'vas predorriinantly, if not uniformlv, hostile in the pages ofEncount.er. In his articlc'Bolnbs and scapeqoats', L)avid Marquand argued thatunilateralism \\ras an elllotional rathel than a ratiorlal position to take. It rvas, 'L]seless

to argtle that nuclear \\-eapons are not tl-re chieicause of s,orld tensions; that althoughthe tsritish people . . . might prefer Conrnrunisrn ro war. rnillions of people in far less

fortunatt' countries do not: that rf no nuclear \\-e,rpons existed, bacteriologicalweapons rnight be used instead. . (Jseless to arque so - useiess. in fact, ro rrgue at

all. One cannot argue u,ith an enlotion.'l')under Lasky's editorship from 1957 onrvards, EncoLrnter became increasingly

interested in Africa. Foliou,'ing a tour of Africa suggested by Josselson, Lasky edited a

series of articles on Africa for Encounter and the journal began regularly to publisharticles on the subject by Elspeth Huxle1., Colin Legum, Dan Jacobson and RitaHinden.3t'IJnder L,asky, Encounter aTso moved closer to the Gaitskellite wing of theLabour Part1, and by the earlv 1960s had become one of its rnain forums fordiscussion.3lIn 1960, Lasky was able to rvrite toJohn Hunt that'Gaitskell has beenvery glad of our support and has r'vritten to me personally to express that gratitude.'32Richard Fletcher. who rvas acrive i1) rlre Labour Parry at the time, argued thatEncounter, through acting as a platform for Labour politicians such as AnthonyCrosland, I)enis Healey and Hugh Gaitskell in their carnpaigns to move the LabourParty torvarcls the right and awa,v fiom nationalization and unilateralisn'r, played an

irr-rportant part in unden-nining the British Left.33

Anthon,v Crosland was one of the rnost influential Labour leaders to write forEntounter and becorrre inr.olved in the CCF, many of the conferences and seminars ofrvhich he attended. Betu.een 1950 and 1960 the CCF sponsored forty-threeinternational conferences in locations that included Beyrouth in West Germany, Tunis,Rangoon and Mexico. Topics inciuded Science and Freedom (Hamburg, 1953), Islam

in the Modern World (Karachi, 1959) and Chauges in Soviet Society (St Antony'sCollege, Oxford, 1957).t+ It rvas at a CCF conference that Crosland met the AmericanDaniel tse1l, fbrnrerly managing director of the Nicrl Leader. tse11. r.vas in the process ofdeveloping the ideas that he rvould publish under the title Tlrc End oJ ldeology. His thesis

was that grorting economic allluence had in effect made the traditional working class

indistinguishable from the uriddle c1ass. Consequently, Marriist theories of class strugglervere redundant and the Socialist project lvould now be iimited to the gradual reforrn of

129

130 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

capitalism in the direction of further welfare and equaliry on the back of economicgrowth.3' Crosland was undoubtedly influenced by Bell's ideas, which were evident inhis seminal work The Future of Socialism (1956).

In an article in the French L'Observateur in 7950, commenting on the CCF's firstcongress in Berlin, Mich6le Barat described the gathering as 'A political manifestation,an enormous detnonstration of America's rvill to fight the Soviet power on every level:that r'vas u'hat the Congress rvas about, nonvithstanding the presence of many a man ofgood r.vill rvho had come in all good faith to talk about spiritual matters and the defenceof cultural freedom.'Barat rvas scathing about Koestler's speech, rvhich he described as

'an impassioned attack agarnst rhe fundamental principles of intellectual freedom, i.e.tolerance and respect for the thought of others . . in the name of democracy andiibert\'.'-16

Barat rvas far closer to the truth than he ever probably realized. ln 1,966 the New YorkTimes ran an article on CIA operations that contained the revelation that 'Encounter

magazine, a rvell known anti-Communist inrellectual monthly with editions in Spanishand German, as well as Engiish, was for a long time - though it is not now - one of theindirect beneficiaries of CIA funds through arrangements that have never been publiclyexplained.'37 The article caused outrage, particulariy in the Third 'W'orld, although inEurope the CCF and Encounter tried to ride out the protests. Nabokov issued a

statement denying that the CCF had 'ever knowingly received support, directly orindirectiy lrom any secret source'. Kristol, Laskv and Spender wrote to the Neu, York

Times that they knew'of no "indirect" benefactions'.3S Legal action was threatened bythe CCF, but the London Times did not include any mention of Encounter in itsreportage and it seemed that the story had died.

In early 1967 the CCF and Encounter received a second blow. A small radicai monthlymagazine published in San Francisco called Ramparts had uncovered how the CIA hadused various charitable foundations as routes for covert funds. The focus quicklywidened as CIA conduits rvere identified and the CCF once again found itself in thefiring line as even such a notable non-Communist as Walter Lippmann called for theabandonment of the CIA's 'totalitarian method'.3e Then, in May, further -unquestionable - light on the involvement of the CIA was cast by ex-CIA bureaucratTom Bradon, who wrote an article for the Saturday Euening Post entitled 'I'm glad theCIA is "immoral".'

Bradon joined the CIA in 1950 as assistant to the deputy director of the CIA,Allen W. Dulles, at a cmcial point in the agency's development. Like IRD, the CIA was

confronted with the threat of the Soviet'Peace Offensive'. Bradon recalled, 'It seemedto me that this organization [the CIA] was not capable of defending the United States

against a new and extraordinarily successful weapon. The weapon was the internationalCommunist f16ng.'ao Bradon's strategy was to fight fire with fire. Late one day he wentto see Dulles. 'l told him I thought the CIA ought to rake on the Russians bypenetrating a battery of international fronts.'a1 Dulles agreed, and three months later theInternational Organisation Division of the CIA was established to conduct a centralizedotTensive against the Soviet fronts. Central to the strategy were what became know as

the non-Communist left (NCL). In the midst of the anti-Communist hysteria thensweeping the United States, Bradon recognized that 'the very people who many

A MIRROR IMAGE: THE CIA

Americans thought no better than communists - were the only people who gave adamn about fighting communism.'a2 within rhe context of the cold'war there was aclear need to ensure the support and acceptance of 'Western intellectuals for a USinspired agenda, which included 'commitment . . to a strong, well-armed, and united'Westem Europe, allied to the United States, which would stand as a bulwark against theSoviet bloc; supporr for the common Market , . . [and] advancing the cause ofNATO.'13

It was a need that the British had also perceived, and Brian crozier, who laterworked for the CIA as weli as IRD, has suggested a British dimension to the origins ofthe CCF. 'The British had suggested to the CIA that it would be a good idea to providea broader intellectual haven for 'w'estern writers. . . . The Americans had respondedwith characterisric generosiry, and the CCF was bom in 1950.,aa

Bradon, whose article was r,vritten in defence of the cIA's methods, made therevelation that the CIA 'had placed one agent in a Europe-based organization called theCongress for Cuitural Freedom. Another agent became an editor o{ Encounter.'Bradoncontinued, 'The agents could not onlv propose anti-Communist programs to the oficialleaders of the organizations but thev could also suggest ways and means to solve theinevitable budgetary problems. whv nor see if the needed money could be obtainedfrom "American foundations"? As the agents knerv, the clA-financed foundarions werequite generous when it came to the national interest.'a5 One of them, MichaelJosselson,resigned as executive director of the CCF.

Despite apparent editorial independence and in spite of frequent pressure appliedfrom Paris, 'For Josselson the important thing was to have editors in whom he hadconfidencel the problems could then be sorted out as they arose.,46 unlike Sovietpropaganda fronts, the cIA fronts were not expected to follow every twist and tum ofUS policy' The men who set them up had a much more sophisticated conception ofhow their operations would work. In his 1967 article, Bradon outlined the gold-en rule:'disguise the extent of American interest; protect the integriry of the organization by notrequiring it to support every aspecr of ofEcial American policy,.+z According to theminutes of a meeting held in 1968 of the Discussion Group on Intelligence and ForeignPolicy (those present included represenrarives of the cIA, including Allen Dulles,businessmen! reporters, and military representatives), Richard Bissel of the cIAobsen'ed 'It is notably true of the subsidies to cultural groups that have recentlybeen publicised that the Agency's objective was never to control their activities, onlyoccasionally to point rhem in a certain direction, but primarily to enlarge them andrender them more elfectir.e.'+8

What problems there ',vere between the CCF and the editors of Encounter were, asoften as not, tactical disagreements rather than disagreements over what the magazinewas trying to achieve. In defence of criticisms that the magazine was not stridentenough in its approach in 1955 Malcolm Muggeridge wrote, ,I can quite see that thecongress might r.vish it to be more specifically and voluminously ideological, but I amequally certain that, given the circumstances prevailing in this counrry and in Asia,this rvould be a mistake and would undermine the magazine's very real utility.,+eThe debate ended t'ith general agreement that Encounter should sharpen its politicaledge.5o

131

'132 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

As well as raising criticisms of Encounter with Spender and Kristol in 1955,Josselsonisked NormanJacobs, chief political commentator on The Voice of America, to prepare

r report ot Encounter and its perceived failure to combat British anti-Americanism.

Jacobs'report praised Ertcounter as the best of its kind in the English language but he didcomplain that it failed to combat the clich6 that all Americans were 'barbarians' and thatEncounter did not present its readers ' . . . rvith a svmpathetic understanding of the roleAmerica must plav as le;rder of the free rvorld coahtion'.51

Encorrnter sun.ived the revelations of CIA inr.,olvement in 1966 and 7967. AlthoughStephen Spender resiqned. Melvin Lask,v ren'rained as editor, insisting that he was not a

CIA agent. lJnder the direction of Josselson, Enrowtter had found a new sponsor in theibrm of the Internatronal Publishing Corporation, which publishedthe Daily Minor, andbroke rts financial dependence on the CIA. That this support had been necessary is

clear. According to Ray Cline, a former CIA executive, the magazines, includingEntounter. that were born out of the CCF 'would not have been able to survivetlnancially u,ithout CIA funds'.s2 During the early 1950s, according to Tom Bradon, theCIA 'budget for the Congress of Cultural Freedom was about $800-$900,000,which included . . . the subsidy for the Congress's magazine Encounter.'53 By the mid-1950s the CCF was being subsidized to the tune of around $1 million a year.5a Thecovert funding of the CCF lasted until at least 1966, and that of Encounter until 1964,

when its finances were placed on less embarrassing foundations as it became clear thatthe CIA connection rvould soon be exposed.

Over the following ten years the sheer extent of CIA propaganda operations includingCCF gradually became apparent. ln 7L)76 the Congressional Pike Committee outlined theextent of these operations: 'Activities have included support of friendly media, majorpropaganda efforts, insenion of articles into the local press, and distribution of books and

leaflets.'ss By the late 1960s, media and propaganda projects were absorbing over a third ofthe CIA's covert action budget. The emphasis was on clandestine propaganda, infiltrationand manipulation of youth, labour and cultural organizations.' Included in the propaganda

arsenal was Radio Liberry and the Voice of America which by 1950 was transmittingaround 850 hours per week in over thirqr-four languages as part of the internationalpropaganda campaign.56 The extent of these programmes was such that the CIA founditself operating in areas that, according to Tom Bradon, the Russians had not evenentered. Bradon has, for example, been unable to identiiT an operation similar to that ofEncounter carried out by the Soviets in Westem Europe.57

These operations must be seen as complementing other CIA covert operations as wellas those run by IRD. During the immediate posrwar period, they were concentrated in'W'estern Europe owing to the perceived threat of Communist expansion throughindigenous Communist Parties and included subsidies to political parties, individualleaders and trade unions. For example, in 1947 , in response to strikes led by theCommunist-led French trade union Confi3d6ration G6n6rale du Travail, Jay Lovestoneand Irving Brown had helped to organize a non-Communist union, Force Ouvridre.This supposedly independent, 'free' trade union was soon being financed by the CIA.58

Lovestone had been the leader of the American Communist Parry before the war, buthad srtitched allegiarrce to the US government for whom he worked during the war.According to Richard Fletcher, 'Through its nerwork of front organizations, magazines,

A MIRROR IMAGE: THE CIA 133

an subsidies, the CIA in the late fifties and early sixties had a decisive effect on socialismthroughout'Western Europe, and in Britain in particular.'se

Individually, the various CIA operations were probably not enough to make a

decisive impact on any one country's political iandscape, but, cumulatively, the effectcould be enormoLls, as extreme cases like Chile demonstrate. As Richard Bissellrecognized, 'Covert intervention is probably most effective in situations where a

comprehensive effort is undertaken with a number of separate operations designed tohave a cumuiatively significant effect.'60 In Britain the CIA was no less active thanelse',vhere.

The CIA helped to set up and fund numerous youth organizations in opposition toestablished international organizations, which were perceived as being Communistfronts. These included the lnternational Student Confederation and the EuropeanYouth Campaign, which was almost entirely funded fiom the CIA purse. Pro-USpoliticians, notabiy in Italv and Germany, were also generously funded and theircampaign's r'vere backed b,v those of the CIA. Lett-s,ing politicians found themselves

outspent or even smeared bv CIA dirn' tncks. Most of those poLiticians supported by theCIA r,vere not on the right rving of the poiitical spectrum but rvere nght-wing SocialDemocrats. As Michael Ivens. ex-head of the right-wing pressure group, Aims inIndustry, complained: 'The CIA's decision. in the '60s certainly, was that there was nofuture for the conservative parties in Europe, they were washed out, they were finished.So therefore they ought to back the labour pafties, the social democratic parties, thiskind of thing.'ct

The bite noire of the British radical left, Brian Crozier was to make anotherastonishing appearance in the publicity surroundiog the CIA's activities. In 1975 theBritish Time Ou4 then a radical London listings magazine, obtained a memo written in1968 addressed to the Director of Central Inteiligence, Richard Helms. The memo was

an operational summary for a CIA propaganda front based in London called Forum'World

Features (FWF). According to the memo:

Forunr'Worid Features is an international news feature service located in London and

incorporated in Delaware whose overt aim is to provide on a commercial basis a

comprehensive weekly service covering international aIl?irs, economics, science and

medicine, book reviews and other subjects of a general nature. In its first trv'o years

FWF has provided the United States with a significant means to counter Communistpropaganda, and has become a respected Gature service well on the way to a positionof prestige in the joumalism world.62

The FWF had its orig5rns as a media o1l-shoot of the CCF. The CCF had had threefeatures services: Forum Information Service based in London and Preuves-Informationsand El Mundo en Espaf,ol based at CCF headquarters in Paris. Forum, which haddeveloped from an earlier CCF information serwice, Information Bulletin Ltd in around1960, was managed by an American book editor called Mier Mindlin. The editorialdirector was Melvin Lasky. The service was provided free, usually copyright cleared,

and was presented as 'a service for friends, editors, and writers who follow the world-vu'ide issues of cultura] freedom'.

134 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

Most Forum writers were European and mainly British. They included Rita Hinden,who in the early 1960s was editing the right-wing Labour joumal Socialist Commentary,

{inancial joumalist Douglas Evans and, on one occasion, a radical academic at LondonUniveniry's School of Oriental and African Studies, Malcolm Caldwell. Caldwell, whosespecialist area was Indonesia, u.as asked to u.'rite a piece on Sukarno. His article, in whichhe had attempted to convey a s.vmpathetic understanding of Sukarno's anti-'W'esternnationalism, appeared in an Indian newspaper rvith a completely different angle. He was

outraged and told Tinrc Out that 'thev actuallv added material without telling me and

completel)'changed the slant of the story, tuming it into a smear'. An article by Douglas

Evans that r.vas critical of the Comrnon Market was rejected as too technical.63

In early 1964, Anthony Hartley of the CCF approached Brian Crozier with the offerof a job. The CCF wanted Crozier to take over the CCF's features services and tocommercialize them. Crozier refused but agreed to visit South America to meet localrepresentatives of the CCF affiiiate and to compiie a report on the CCF's Spanish

language service. As well as producing rlvo articles for Encounter, Crozier covered thearea for the Sunday Times and the BBC.6a A year later, the CCF renewed its approach toCrozier. Despite disagreements about the degree of independence from the CCF thatthe new service would enjoy, Crozier agreed. In his fascinating autobiographical history,Free Agent, he revealed that his acceptance of the offer was prompted by hh knowledgethat the CCF was a CIA operation. He wrote that his MI6 contact and friend, 'RonaldFrank', had told him that the CCF was CIA.65

The new press service, FW!, was set up in olhces on Kingsway in London with a

holding companv ca11ed Kern House Enterprises Inc, registered in Delaware as a frontfor CIA funding. Initial finance r,vas provided bv a terminal grant from the CCF and an

estimated $100,000 provided by the CIA via Kern House Enterprises, owned by ex-USAmbassador to London John Hay \I/hitney. In charge of the sensitive financialmanagement of the operation was Charles Johnson, rvhom Crozier soon discovered tobe CIA.66 Another CIA man involved was 'case ofiicer' Gene Gately, the F'W'F's vice-president and treasurer.6T

The free serwice was dropped, although 1ow rates were maintained for Third Worldeditors. The staff, who had been restricted to Mindlin and a secretary, were increased tomore thantwenfy- New services, including Chinese and Spanish, were started and ner,v

writers of a more conservative political stance were brought in by Crozier includingAnthony P. Hartley of The Ecortotnist and Henry Farlie of the London Daily Mail.68

The main target area for FWF's material was the Third World. The FWF providedt1,vo ry*pes of article: longer, signed pieces and shorter, unsigned pieces on current news

or research. By the time FWF was launched in January 7966, it had obtained some forrycontracts for the serwice, including one from the Sydney llorning Herald. According toCrozier, the aim was to provide 'first-class background coverage to pre-empt space thatmight othenvise go to Communist disinformation. There was no ban on selling theservice in'W'estern countries, apart from America, but this was not the main point of theexercise'.6e By the late 1960s the FWF rvas providing a ser-vice that was no longerlimited to news media in the Third World. In Britain the serwice was taken by theCuardian and the Sundal, Times and the FWF had become 'perhaps the most widelycirculated of the ClA-or,vned news serwices.'70

A MIRROR IMAGE: THE CIA 135

An early contributor to the service who witnessed the change from Forum to FWFwas American journalist Russell 'Warren Howe, who in the late 1950s covered Africafor the Washington Pos/. In 1958 Russell was invited to a CCF seminar on'Progress andRepresentative Government' in Nigeria by Melvin Lasky. Following the seminar,which he attended, Russell was contacted by Mindlin, who asked him to contribure tothe then Bulletin serr,-ice. Russell agreed and over the next seven years contributedabout thirry articles. Russell later wrote, 'I was included, with my Pos/ credentials andfree-spirit, liberal, but non-Marxist analyses of African affairs, to give balance andcredibilitv to a service rvhose basic aim, presumably, was to counter Communistpropaganda.'71

InJune 1966, an article by a right-wing Polish 6migr6 was put our by the FWF. Thestory, on Soviet influence in Somalia, purported to show that Moscow was supplyingSomalia u'ith 150 MiG-17 fighter-bombers. It was taken and printed by the Cuardian.However, as Time Olr pointed out, 'The real Somalian Air Force has perhaps 12MiGs'.71 Russell recalled that he had told Gately at the time that the story was 'bullshit',but it had gone out nevertheless.Ts

Crozier had also brought in BBC radio producerJohn Tusa as editor. Crozier recalledthat 'Tusa had produced manv of my or.vn talks and discussion programmes, and Ithought highlv of him.'71 Tusa u,as. like Russell, unwitting of the CIA connection and,despite crozier's high regard for him, Tusa soon became a probiem. According toCrozier, 'I had become increasingly critical of what seemed to me to be a pro-Sovietand anti-American bias. There were also, it is true, articles reflecting the American andAllied viewpoint, but it w-as clear that John Tusa and I were out of harmony on thedefinition of "balance".'7s Years later, Tusa recalled being given a lecture by crozier onthe threat of world Communism when Crozier returned from a meeting in New yorkwith Whitley and Gateiy.

The December 1966 meeting in New York was a key evenr. Gately left, and it hadbeen made clear that, unless Tusa improved, he would have to go. According roRussell, 'it was also apparently decided that Forum should tell the "US side" of theVietnam story.'70 crozier's cIA contact ofiicer in London suggested, as a replacementfor Tusa, 9gq1] F1,.ite Although not considered particularly talented, Eprile told Crozierthat, 'if appointed, he rvould be absolutely loyal to me in my absence and at all times. Ioffered hirn the job and he gave me [Crozier] no cause ro regret it.'77 Epriledemonstrated this to Tusa shortiy before Tusa resigned and returned to a successfuicareer u,'ith the BBC. Tusa 'rvas about to send out a positive piece about Soviet ruralclinics. Epriie, Tusa said, "hit the roof", insisting on cuts, and leaving nothing thatsuggested that the Soviet svstem had any merits.'78

By 1970 Russell u-as rvorried by the increasingiy political siant that the FV/F wasadopting. 'I could see that ir rvas now taking a decidedly conservative slant - pro-Nixon, harvkish on Indochina. with articles urging "caution" on South Africa. Therewere frequent pieces by Crozier's highly conservative Economi.sl friend, Robert Moss . . .

and Lynn Price, a fomrer Foreign OfEce man rvith a cold-war stance.'7e The FWF was,by this point, not limiting itself to the provision of a features service, material for whichwas sometimes supplied by IRD via Crozier, but had gone into the book publishingbusiness, just as IRD's output of books was declining.8o crozier recalled that IRD's

tsI{ITAIN'S SECRET PiI OPAGANDA .wAR

'l3ackground Books series was stili useful, but I envisaged something sharper and

stronscr. u,ith greater irnpact'. Crozier approached his MI6 and CIA contacts to discuss

the project, of u,hich thev approved. the CIA agreeing to pick up any extra costs. Indiscussiorrs r,vitir his unu,ittir-rg publisher rt Seckcr & Warburg the general title of World

Raalitics rvas :rgreetl urd (lrozrer persuaded Loril Gladsrn to contribute the first edition,De Caulle's Europ( t)i tl'lry tlrc Gute r,tl 5ir1',r -\0. Other editions in the series included Tfte

Future tll Briti:h Forcrgrt Pohcl,bv NIar Belotf and Ilte Future of Souiet Foreign Polny byBritain's cr-Ambassailor to the USSR. Sir William Ha,vter.sr The most controversialbook to colr1e ollt in tl-re senes rvas C/ii1e'-. -l/c1'-rist Expt'rintentby ex-ErcnomisrjournalistRoben Ntoss. A ti'iencl oi Crozier and a rcgr-rlar contributor to the F\VF, Moss visitedChrle at the F\{rF's e\pclrse and rvrote the book h 1.972, conducting his research in thernidst oi r rnassive CIA campaign to destabilize Allende, Chile's Marxist president whohad been deniocraticallv elected irr 1970. Crozier recalled, 'The destabilization of theAllende regime in Cliile rvas probably the last successful covert action undertaken by theCIA betbre the disaster of Watergate. I playc-d a rlrodest part in it, willingly and in whatI considered a good cause.'S2 The CIA suggested a book on Chile and Crozier had

conrrrrirsionr'd Mo:s to rvrire ir.The irnportance of the CIA's propaganda operation, which was coupled with

econornic destabilization, in preparing the rvav for the nrilitary coup that overthrewAllende r.vas recognized b.v Moss r,vho later wrote that 'The sur-vival of a powerfulopposition press and radio netrvor:k in Chile r.r,as crucial to Allende's final defeat; it is

scarcely an exaggeration to sav that this was the nerve centre of the political oppositionto N4arr:ism.'$l

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

The Fat Years:

the 1950sWhen the 1960s arrived, IRD found itself, once again, under the direction of RalphMurray, who returned to the Foreign Office from a posting at the Cairo Embassy.Murray's new appointment was as joint superintending Under-Secretary of the ForeignOffice's information departments together *,ith Patrick Dean. The head of IRD was(later Sir) Donald Hopson. He had taken over the department in February of 1958,replac?rgphil Rennie. Hopson, a highly decorated rvartime commando had joined theForeign Service rn 7945. He had previously r.r,orked in IRD as assistant to John Peck inthe early 1950s. Sheridan was still energeticaily in charge of the editorial section,wheeling and dealing with his shadowy contacts. ln 1961 his cover as a 'public relationscousultant' finally fell by the wayside when he received his one and only mention in theForeign Office year book as an assistant head of IRD. Sheridan worked in the section,assisted by l"osephine O'Connor Howe and H.H. 'Tommy' Tucker, both formerjoumalists. Trlcker had worked on both regional papers and the Daily Telegraph beforejoining the Foreign Otlice in 1951. Following a period with the Treasury's EconomicInformation Unit, Tucker rvould spend much of his career in IRD, before leaving in1974 to become director of British Information Services in Canberra.'lfhen

Sheridan died relatively young in 1964, Tucker took over his job. BrianCrozier, whonr Tucker persuaded to join IRD in 1964, recalled Tucker in hisautobiography: 'Tommy, six and a half feet tall, and thin to match, had started as a

journalist, then married into the Foreign Office. F{e was now, at thirty-eight, theyoungest Counsellor in the lbreign sen'ice. He was aiso shrewd and highly skilled.'1

O'Connor Howe joined IRD in 1952 at the instigation of her friend, John Peck.Following Oxibrd and a course in journalism, she had spent the war working for theInter-Allied Information Committee, later the United Nations Information Office. Aftera year in the Hague for the Foreign Office, she worked on a freelance basis and for theInternational News Service. One of her jobs in IRD was as the editor of IRD's

_ publication, Drgesl.

,' '^

Anothe.,.rrio. IRD figure of the period was Christopher'Kit'Barclay. He started \, working for the Foreign Ofiice in 1946 and served in Iraq, Egypt and Bonn, beforeI joining the Information Policy Department as its adviser on the Middle East in 1953. In; 1960 he served a year in Beirut as regional information ofiicer before being transferred

\ to IRD in 1961. ln 1962 he became its new head, when Hopson left to become .'

Ambassador to Laos. It was under Barclay's stewardship that IRD reached its zenith. By i

138 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

the mid-1960s it had about 400 staff - rather more than the original sixteen when fileshad to be stored in the bathrooms of Carlton House Terrace. The department hadmoved to new accommodation at Rivenvalk House, a modern twelve-storey officeblock on the South Bank of the River Thames and rather distant from the rest of theForeign OtEce. Bv norv IRD's oltrcial budget rvas in the regon of d1 million per year.2

The reai budget rvas ftr greater.

According to some IRD ofiicials. hou,ever, IRD's size did not always translate intoeffectiveness. Nomran Reddau-av. ',vho rvas to take .rverall responsibiliry for IRD in theearly 1970s, recalied that. 'During rhe sr,xties IRD became fat and sluggrsh, unlike thedavs of its "lean teanr" of the iate fifties. Its FCO Head from1962-66 excelled at raisingnerv, mostlv secret vote money, for "research".'3

'Whatever its value for money, during the 1960s, all of the IRD operations were at

their peak. The news agencies were engaged in a last great flourish and the bookpublishing empire put out more volumes in the period than in any other. IRDcontinued to concentrate on its standard themes. Attention was paid to exploiting andattempting to widen the Sino-Soviet split. In April 1960 the split became a chasm whenMao allowed a series of polemics to be published in connection with the ninetiethanniversary of Lenin's birth. The Chinese accused Krushchev of 'revising, emasculatingand betraying' Lenin's vision by endorsing cooperation with the 'West, the inevitabilityof war and the possibility that the Communists could come to power by non-violentmeans. IRD expioited the split and did everything in its power to open the woundrvider. Organizationally, reflecting the increasingly worldr,r,'ide scale of the Cold 'War,

IRD was divided into rwo sections in 1958. From then on one section dealt with theSoviet bloc and another with areas of interest to IRD outside Eastern Europe.a

The department was still organized in terms of geographical desks, but, although itsprime pulpose \,\'as still the Soviet Union and the Eastem bloc, the development of theThird 'World

as the main arena of the Cold War led to greater interest in IRD. Indeed,according to senior IRD o{Ecials, the Third World was taken 'extremely seriously' andthe Vietnam War led to the significant growrh of the South-East Asia desk.s

IRD material dealing with the Third World multiplied, but all with the same slant.For example, an IRD paper entitled 'East German Spearhead in Africa', dated August1960, reported that,'Current activities in Africa by several Communist States reflectinternational Communism's declared aim of extending its influence throughout theworld.' It pointed out that 'The Communists are exploiting the inevitable reaction ofnewly-independent peoples against the former Colonial powers.' The briefing cited as

evidence that an academic 'Institute in Leipzig . maintains "close links" with a

number of developing countries.' Also, 'Since the begrnning of 1959 at least 12 EastGerman trade delegations have visited Africa.'6

In the early i960s IRD also became involved in supporting wider media projects inthe 'private' sector, including TV programmes which were for the first time becomingrelevant as propaganda tools. When the government changed in 1964,'lVilson's trustedally, George Thomson presided over longer-term IRD acrivities, such as 'English byTV' in lran, the Gulf, Sudan, Ethiopia and China. 'English by TV', srarted by theBritish Council in Tehran, was, taken up by IRD, broadcasting an English Languagetuition programme to an estimated 100 million Chinese each week. The presenter, an

THE FAT YEARS: THE 1960S 139

English girl by the name of Kathy Flower, was rhe best known foreigner in china.There was also disguised support for selected non-govemment organizations (NGo$,such as the Thomson and Ford Foundation.T

According ro Sir oliver 'wright, a major concern was how to respond toKhrushchev's theory and offer of 'peaceful coexistence' between the Soviet bloc and thecapitalist west. The olrer of coexistence by Khrushchev, promoted by Soviet frontsaround the u,orld, from the late 1950s, was widely considered to be a continuaiion ofStalin's Peace Offensive foilowing the Second World'War. The porential success ofKhrushchev's appeal prompted Christopher Mayhew into action. ffe fraa lost his seat in1950 and ceased to be a Foreign Office minister. He had won 'W.oolwich East in 1951tut,'with his parry, was out of porver for thirteen years. Nevertheless, he kept in contactrvith III.D. Mayhew' came up with the idea of 'coexistence plus, in response and as achallenge to Krushchev's declaration that 'peaceful coexistence' was possible berweenthe Communist and Capitalist systenls, an idea that Mayhew believed the Soviets werehaving some propaganda success rvith. Ma,vherv explained that: 'what they meant bycoexistence was not coexistence as vou or I know it. It was the struggle without warbefween capitalism and Socialism in rvhich all the forces of peace, f...Jo-, etc. must bemobilised on the Socialist side to ensure the defeat of capitalism by non-military means.So I launched an altemative concept called coexistence Plus which meanr coexisrenceplus ideological coexistence, and ideological coexistence is the exact antithesis ofMarxism, at the same time it sounds rather decent.,

According to Mayhew, after he wrote an articre in the cuardian about it, it waspicked up by IRD, rvho 'did everyrhing they possibly could to spread it'. IRD swiftlyorganized ministerial statements of support for the idea from the Conservativegovemment. The Foreign Secretary, A-lec Home, made a speech in its favour and it wastaken up and pushed by the BBC overseas Service. publication of a57-page book byMayhew o' the subject, by Bodley Head, was organized and IRD distributed g,000copies. Lord Mayhew believed that it was probably very useful in the Third World andclaimed that this organized promotion of the idea provoked Krushchev to declare thatideological coexistence would be the death of Marxism.s The genesis and developmentof Mayhew's book is of some interest as its history illustrates how sponsored pubiishingcould be integrated into a wider propaganda campaign using the ,rr.iou means at IRD,Sdisposal.

Coexistence or not, 1962 rvas the year in which the Soviet lJnion and the UnitedStates took the world to the brink of nuclear conflagration. At the time, the cubanMissile Crisis, despite Khrushchev's withdrawal of the missiles, seemed to indicate thatan increasingly strong Soviet (Jnion was ready to act even more belligerently than in thepast' However, leading historians now believe that such a view was mistaken and thatthe Cuban Missile Crisis arose because Krushchev understood that the 'W'est waswinning the Cold War. John Lewis Gaddis noted:

Kennan had predicted that its outcome wourd depend upon whether westernEurope andJapan . . . wound up within a Soviet or American sphere of influence. By1961 that issue had been resolved: democratic politics and market economics hadprevailed in the countries that counted. The Marxist-Leninist alternative retained its

110 tsRITAIN'S SECRET PI\OPAGANDA WAR

appeal in much of the'third rvorld', to be sure, but it lacked and capacity for coordi-

nated action. Moscow might occasionally benefit from what happened there, as with

Castro's revolution, but it couid hardly create or control such opportunities.e

Folior.ving the crisis, a new kind of Cold War emerged. Soviet-American competrtron

took on a degree of stability and predictability. Despite the intensification of the

strategic arnls race follou,ing the rnissile crisis, fuelled by the perceived humiliation of

the USSR. the conrest was conducted r.vithin a precise set of ruies. These rules were

codified 11 forrnal agreemenrs. uhich included the Limited Nuciear Test Ban Treary of

1963 and tl.re Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. Equally important was the inforrnal

toleration of sarellite reconnaissance (although there was not much either side could

practically do about satellites). The Cold'War evolved, at least at supefpower level, into

a 'peacefuf international system of military coexistence.lo On the ideoiogrcal level, as

Gaddis recognized in retrospect, 'Moscow's economic, ideological, cultural, and moral

example had largely lost its appeal by 1962,leaving only military strength as an effective

means of projecting influence.'1r Nevertheless, at the time this was not widely

perceived. For good or ior i11, the Communist bloc and the 'W'est were locked into an

ideological struggle from rvhich neither was prepared, or perhaps able, to escape. The

war of r,vords went on. no"vhere more so than in IRD. Krushchev's climb-down over

Cuba and his arremprs to find rapprochement with the West led to his downfall. In

1964 a putsch rn.as organized by hardliners, led by Brezhnev. The Soviet Union

retgmeci to a more confrontational stance, not only towards the West but also towards

mounting deviationalisrrr in its or'vn satellite territories.

ln this period IRD rvas particularly close to MI6. From i966 until 1969 the Head ofIRD u,as Nigel Clive. Clive rvas another appointment to IRD from outside the Foreigrr

Of1ice mainstream. Follor',,ing u.artime service r.vith MI6 in Greece, where he worked

with the resisrance and the SOE, Clive became a fu1l-time MI6 career ofiicer. Although

by definition a secrer career, details have surftced in relation to his role during the Suez

Crisis, r,,,hen he rvas MI6's Poiitical O{ficer. A contemporary of Chris Mayhew's at

Oxford, Clive had known and approved of IRD since its inception in 1947. Seeking

out and exposing Soviet meddiing was Clive's specialiry and chief interest, making him

particularlv suited to his position as IRD's Head. A close focus was maintained on

attacking and exposing Brezhnev's Soviet lJnion. According to one IRD official, 'It was

a number one prioriry.'rl The same ofhciai confirrned that, as in the cases of cyprus and

Kenya, IRD's interest in any given conflict or situation was in tracing and exposing any

Soviet involvement, which was useful for ensuring the US'understanding' of the British

position.l3A major opportunity to go o11 the o{fensive against the Soviet (Jnion was provided

by the So.,,iets themselves u'hen they invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Soviet

invasion may have been greeted with horror around the world, but in Riverwalk

Hguse it met with a far from negarive reception. One senior IRD o{ficial recalled, 'I

remember people turning round and saying "Oh, this is too awful for words." And I

said, "Frorn one point of view, from a Czech point of view I entirely agree. ' but

from u.here I am sitting I am rubbing my hands. Proves horv bloody right I've been

al1 this timel"'1a

t

THE FAT YEARS: THE 1960S

MI6's relationship with IRD reached a new levei with the appointment of clive.Now MI6 had one of its own in charge of the department. Sanitized MI6 materialcontinued to be used by IRD. Liaison -nvas 'forrnal' cooperation rather than a structuralrelationship and, 'If MI6 wanted to get something out they would often go to IRD,depending on the matter in hand.' One IRD oflicial also confirmed Brian Crozier'srecollection that there u.as a small unit concerned with placing specific stories thatneeded to Elet out. 'Ir wasn't the only way in which MI6 and IRD were in conract.Across the board they were in contact, but of course this speciai department and MI6were naturally in contact with one another.'1s

During the 1960s the Foreign Office, reflecting the American line, began extollingthe view that the non-aligned countries, particularly in Africa were the key to thebalance of power between the "West and Communism. It worried about the SovietLlnion's increasing interest in Third \Vorld countries. The Future policy Review ofMarch 1960, which established the framework tor British foreign policy in the 1960s,predicted that it u'as in the underder.eloped countries that the struggle between East and'W'est rvould be most iikelv to continue.r{Up to 1960. ner,vs in British colonial Africar,vas distributed mainlv bv British Information Service (BIS, run by the Foreign office)and by the BBC. IRD needed to expand covert access ro rhe press in the non-aiignedcountries. As vu'e have seen tn chapter nine the last n'ave of news aBency fronts set upincluded Africa Features Ltd and \Vorld Features Services (WFS). Africa Fearures wasdescribed by the Kenya Press Directory (1968) as follows:

Africa Features Ltd was incorporated in Kenya in August 1966.|t is a subsidiary of a*J[t-knot"n iniernational syndication service, rNRAR Ltd, which is based inLondon. Africa Features was founded in the beiief (allquately justified by the subse-qiiEaf rbsponse) that there was a need e1 a mairg{ f.rt r.., 1ervice established inAfrica by African journaiists of the newspapers, radio stations and magazines of Africa.

AU articles and photo features are comnrissioned from Al'rican journalists in rhefollou'ing counrries: Ethiopia, Kenya, (Jganda, Tanzania, Zarnbia, Maiawi,Swaziland, Borswana, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. The company's ofEce inLondon is responsible for commissioning articles from African journalists resident inT,ondon. Paris, Geneva, Vienna and Bonn.

The-compan.v has trvo staffcorrespondents: one whose task is to rove Eastem andCentral Africa, and the other rvho covers 'West Africa. The 2 staffers and all stringersoperate under the direction of the senice editor from his oftrce in Nairobi.

The service is provided generally on a contract basis - with a guaranteed numberof feature articles' sent to subscribers each week. A speciai reporting service is alsoavailable to contract subscribers.

In the short time since Afiica Features was started, a gratifiiing number of newsorganizations in Eastern, Central and West Africa have become subscribers to thesetwice. The fbatures range from economic subjects to human interest articles, from sportand athletics to child care and women's specials. Ali of them relate directly to A.&ica.

According to the publiciry', Africa Features was unique as the only Africa-based andAfrican editorially staffed service on the continent serving the continent. The two staff

141

BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA .wAR

correspondents at the time were Johl,Dumoga, the 'Wes!_Africa correspondent, and

Charles Kulundu, .,^rho covered friffiC.rtril Rfri.r.' Dumoga. a Ghanaian. *ori.d as one of the 6rsr hlack journalists in Kenya for Easr

Africa Newspapers (in Nairobi) after Kenyan independence in Deiember 1963, andthen went back to Accra to be supervisorv-editoa ofthe Daily Graphit aid Sunday Mirrorin 1966 and 1.967. He joined Africi Featuies inJanuary 1968. In the late 1960s he wrotea Ba-kground Book, Africa bettyeen East and tr'trlest, which provides a flavour of the toneof his repons:

In,Africa, as elseu,here, Communism has presented itself as the only sincere ally ofunationalism. Through propaganda, slogans, aid programmes, foreign policy pro-

nouncements and smooth diplomacy, the Soviet and Chinese govemment are desper-ately trying to penetrate the African continent by their identification with Africanleaders and by equating Communism with nationalism, anti-colonialism and anti-neo-colonialism.17

. . . The GPP under Nkrumah was closely patterned on the Communist model ofa poiitical party; it used Communist methods of organization - intimidation's,blackmail, character assassination, deceit, rigged eiections, single lists of electioncandidates, and every other trick from the Communist book to win and retain powerand finally imposed a.g9111ess dictatorship on Ghanaians.l8

Kulundu trained at the Commonwealth Press lJnion and gained a scholarship in1962, b,efore becoming a Kenya government press of{icer and editor on The Voice ofKenya radio. He also worked for East Africa Newspapers in Tanzania in lgOO-l ,joiningAfrica Features in May 1968. Although billed as African based and staffed, AfricaFeatuies' weekly fi1e of marerial airmailed to clients was being edited, and in some iases

writte-n, in London in 1979. Addresses of fietd offices were given in Nairobi,-Gtrana'andNigeria.

WFS produced a similar fiie of material for clients, mainly in India, where it had an

office in New Delhi. The Indian press director of INFA in 1978 reported that, in March1978, Asia Features (lndia) Private Ltdle'took over the Indian business of WorldFeature Services rvhich is now a partner in the new venture. Daily bulletins in Englishand alternate dailies in Hindi are provided for subscribers.' A former Asia Featuresemployee said that its material was taken by nearly every English-speaking paper inAfrica, and a considerable amount of Asia Features and WFS copy has been traced inmagazines with a Third'World orientation published in Britain. Both in the Africanpress and in Britain, this material was published rvithout attribution - a procedure that isdifficult to explain for a genuine comrnercial agency trying to build up its business..Weemphasize that any journalist, employee or director may have been unaware of the MI6and IRD roots of any of these agencies.

However, despite high points, such as IRD's role in the fall of Sukamo, one IRDotlicial complained that, 'ministerial and oilicial interest waned in the sixties.'2o IRD was

also subject to complaints and criticism from inside the Foreign OfEce mainstream,rvhich held IRD in some suspicion. One critic who would later go public was HilaryKing, Ambassador and Consul-General to Guinea in 1962. Prior to Guinea, King's

II

I

il

THE FAT YEARS: THE 1960S

career had taken him to vienna, washington, Moscow and yugoslavia. while invienna, berween 1951 and 1953, rvhere he served as a Russian secretary, he had firstcome across IRD. King recalled in 1,996 that he 'became aware not only of mountainsof "unattributable" briefing papers, but also of British joumalists who seemed ro havesorne sort of hidden agenda as propagandists'. King was worried at the time by thequality of the sources used in IRD rnaterial. He recalled that 'they weren't choosy, andwere quite happy to use unverified press clippings. They claimed to be using secrerintelligence, but the secret inteiligence in circulation was very often prery poor stuflderiving such verisimilitude as it had, for most recipients, more from the special SecretInteliigence forms it rvas printed on than from proven accuracy or careful screening.' Hecommented, 'Given the volume of the IRD output, I doubt whether systematicscreening of ali their texrs would have been physically possible.,

ln 1962, King had been faced with just such a possibiliry. He recalled, 'I once foundin one of these briefing papers a hair-raising allegation about the country in which I wasserving, and was paid to know about. r.vhich appeared flat contrary to all the evidenceavailabie. Y/hen I queried the source of this information, I was told that the IRD, ofcourse, had access to secret information rvhich I had not seen.'21 The story alleged thatCuban revolutionaries were in Guinea training Black African guerrillas from all overAfrica. King recalled, 'I had seen ali the MI6's reports bearing on Guinea, and hadreason to know the unreliabiliry of the author of some of them.,22

Worried that information, which he considered of dubious veraciry, was being passedoffas fact, King set about checking out the origin of the story further. Among others, hecontacted the Foreign office Research Department, which also drew on classifiedinformation, and found that it was as puzzled as he was. 'After weeks of research . . . itwas established that the only authority for the original report had been a few linesappearing in an insignificant foreign newspaper and nowhere else.' The newspaper was,in fact, a tiny south German publication. It is quite possible that the report, rnre or nor,had been planted by IRD to lend credibility to the story.23

with grolr.ing criticism from within the Foreign oflice, a less tense period of theC*old War raised questions over the future of IRD. It needed to find a broader agendato justifi, its existence. Britain's increasing ties with Europe were to provide IRD withthat new spark.

143

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Indian Summer:/RD and the EEC

Iolate 7972, Alistair (later Lord) McAlpine was recnrited as treasurer for a discreet andhigh-porvered pro-Europe lobby organization called the European League forEconomic Cooperation (ELEC). It rvas onlv very much later rhat he discovered thereason for his appointment. 'A secret Forergn o{Tice unit, closely linked to MI6, was setup to combat left-u.ing opposition to Britain remaining in Europe,' he said in hisautobiography. This unit had been funding invitation-only meerings betu,een seniormedia figures and pro-European politicians, diplomats and businessmen. These wereregular, expensive and rvell-attended breakfasts at rhe plush Connaught Hotel.l Thissecret unit was, of course, IRD. Twenry-five years on, McAlpine was asked whether hethought it appropriate to have had civil servants involved in the European Econorniccommuniry (EEC) campaign. He said, 'certainly not, particularly thar sorr of civilservantllt was a highly politicised campaign, there is no doubting it. I'm quite clear - ifit is poiitical, civil servants had no business to be involved in it.'2

The crunch had come, said McAlpine, when william (later Lord) Armstrong, thenhead of the Civil Service, found out about the unit and'its dubious activities', which heconsidered 'scandalous'. He went to Prime Minister Ted Heath and demanded that thefunds were withdrawn. As a result, ELEC took over running the breakfast meetings andfundraiser extraordinaire McAlpine was brought in.

British and American intelligence services, it now appears, had a history of supportingBritain's entry into the EEC as a bulwark against the Eastern bloc. The cIA was used topreserve the British govemment's anti-federalist poiicies and encouraged Britain to enterEurope as part of 'the special relationship' to promote American interests withinEurope. The cIA funded the European Movement, the most prominent exrra-governmental group seeking to influence public opinion for a European communiry.Between 1949 and 1953, rt was subsidized by the cIA to the rune of d330,000,channeiled through the American committee on lJnited Europe (ACUE). Today, thiswould be worth more than d6 million. ACUE's board can now be seen to have beenthe alumni of the CIA, and the president of honour was the CIA director, Allen Dulles.clA money conrinued to be paid into the coffers of the related European youthCampaign until 1959.

146 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

In June 1970, Ted Heath's Conservative government had been elected with a pro-European manifesto. Horvever, although the chances of securing entry throughnegotiations with The Six looked increasingly promising, the situation at home, interms of securing the consent of the Houses of Parliament and the British public,appeared to be less so. In the country at large, opinion polls were strongly against

membership in the period 1970-1. This appeared to have been, to a large degree, the

result of disillusionment rvith Europe follorving the last rejection by De Gaulle.Nevertheless. disillusior-rnrent and opposition u..ere not limited to the voting public, whohaci, after all, just elected a government for whom British entry was a principle policy.In realit1.. although the cabinet rvas packed with pro-Europeans, Heath presided over a

parr)' rhat rvas deeply ambivalent about the EEC. In February 1.971, the whips calculated

that 19,1 Conservative MPs were in favour, but 71 were doubtful and 62 against. In the

party as a whole, the situation was even worse, with both pros and antis feeling the

constituency parties to be hostile. In the Labour Parry, anti-European sentiment was

grou,'ing and, although an influential faction of the party was stridently pro-European,the bi-partisan, pro-European consensus was obviously crumbling.

During the campaign, Heath promised that membership would only occur 'with the

full-hearted consent of Parliament and people'. Heath now faced the danger that, even

were he to be able to overcome the primary obstacle of negotiating entry with The Six,

he milht find that Parliament, under constituency and public pressure, might reject the

terms and block the British membership that he had so passionately fought for. Heath

told the No. 10 Press Secretary, Sir Donald Maitland, to convene a meeting of senior

information ofiicers in Whitehall to find out what could be done.According to IRD sources, 'Maitland told the meeting that "the Prime Minister is

very keen to have an effective job done on what his policy is for Europe" and howmistaken people like Crossman and Shore and Walker-Smith were in saying that it was

not in the interests of our country to go into it'. And the onjy people who were judged

to be capable of doing something about this were IRD, so the whole thing was given toIRD to, as it were, advertise Ted Heath's policies for Europe."3 IRD was to supply 'the

main guts of the operation' to ensure support for entry.a

The civil servant chosen to run the covert pro-Europe campaign was NormanReddaway, then (Jnder-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office for 'CulturalDiplomacy', with a brief covering IRD and other Foreign Office information services.'With his usual gusto, Reddaway set up a special IRD unit to propagandize in favour ofBritish entry and counter those who opposed it. According to Reddaway, the unit, 'was

extremely useful because although there was not much to say about Soviet Imperialismand the gulags, the researchers were extremely good at researching the facts about goinginto Europe'.s Its main writer was Foreign Oflice staffer H.H. 'Tommy' Tucker, 'abrilliant writer and shaper.'6 The unit was drawn mainly from staff on IRD's WestEuropean desk and included IRD stalu,artJosephine O'Connor-Howe.

The advent of d6tente and a more peaceful coexistence with the Soviet (Jnion

removed, to some extent, the apparent raison d'Atue of IRD. The European unit allowedIRD to move into broader areas, but using tried and tested methods. According toinsiders, the unit rvorked closely with a number of pro-European politicians, to rebutthe anti-European campaign in the media. IRD wrote and brokered articles through

INDIAN SUMMER: IRD AND THE EEC

Tufton Beamish MP. These were placed in the press. 'There was no shortage of Mpswho were pleased to see something published under their name rn The Times andelsewhere,' said one former insider. IRD launched a massive operation, relentlesslyissuing briefings, articles and letters to the press and influential pro-Europeans. By allaccounts the material diligently avoided the difficult questions of federalism and whetherBrussels bureaucrats would be able to impose laws on the British peopre.

Placing pro-European material and close contact with the negotiators in Brusselsenabled the unit to ensure wider dissemination through radio and television. The teamalso developed a technique that pre-dated New Labour's much touted rebuttal unit. Ifan anti-Europe article appeared in the media, IRD would place a detailed counterwithin hours, complete with the by-line of a prominent and consenting politician. Oneunit insider said:

You might get a letter from Crossman tn The Times sayiog that this [British entry tothe EEC] was a load of rubbish. By about iunchtime you'd have a little brief on theweaker parts of Crossman's argument and that would go across to the broker and thebroker would have half a dozen Mps u,ho rvouid like a seven out of ten chance ofseeing their names in the paper. And so by that evening you would get somethingbased onr*re brief going offto The Times.Well that gives you immediatety half a mil-lion copies going world wide.

Material in the press convinced the broadcasters that they, too, should be coveringthe story. As the insider said, 'lf you went to the BBC and said, "Look, for God's sake,make the case for Europe." They'd say, "Get stuffed.'w'e don't do that sort of thing."On the other hand, if it has appeared in the papers then one can fairly ask whether theBBC are reflecting this for their audience.'

Reddaway and IRD also became discreetly involved in the non-govemment pro-European campaigning. Emest Wistrich, a former RAF Poiish section ofiicer and failedLabour parliamentary candidate, had been appointed director of the British EuropeanMovement in 1969. According to him, he was approached by Geolfrey Rippon Mp,then Chancellor for the Duchy of Lancaster and responsible for negotiating Britain'sterms of entry into the EEC. Rippon asked 'wistrich to run an overt pro-Europecampaign as the governmenr could not be seen to be campaigning during thenegotiations.T By this time the European Movement's budget of d550,000 per year wasmainly donated by big business and prominent individuals like Sir Michael Sobell.

Starting in November 1970, the meetings of the European Movement's campaigngroup were held in its ofiices in Chandos House, Victoria, and were also attended by arepresentative of the Foreign Olfice. The presence of this civil servant was deemedsensitive enough to have it omitted from the minutes and deleted by means of anerratum slip when it vu'as once included by mistake. wistrich confirmed Reddaway'scentral role. 'Nornan Reddaway was . head of the European unit in the ForeignOfIice. He had a particular European Desk I think at this stage.,s

Overseeing the various groups was a governmental coordinating committee, usuallychaired by Tony Royle, now Lord Fanshawe of Richmond, who was thenparliamentary lJnder-Secretary of State for Foreign and Comrnonwealth Affairs. These

148 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

brought together a number of participants from all of the different groups, includingIRD, to exchange ideas and ensure coordination.

A highly effective part of the campaign rvas organized by the ex-Director of Publiciryfor the Conservative Party, Geotlrey Tucker. Tucker took charge of Conservative Parq,advertising in 1959 and rvrote the famous siogan 'Life's better with the Conservatives'.Don't let Labour ruin it!' It rvas considered a major aid in helping the Tory Parry tocome back to power in spite of the fact that the fiasco of Suez was still fresh in thepublic's mind. Tucker lelt the position follorving the Conservative's electoral victory in1970, to return to independent public relations, but, as a convinced European, he

suggested to Heath that a series of informal meetings should be organized to find ways

of ensunng support fbr entry:

At the end of '70 after we had won the election I went to Ted and sat down withhim and said 'The next big thing is Europe. I'm a pro-European, I've been convertedto being a pro-European as against believing in the Empire'. But the public was apa-

thetic. And I said to Ted 'Uniess you can move public opinion, it will be very di{E-cult for the pro-Europeans inside the Labour Party, let alone the pro-Europeansinside the Conservative Parry to vote for Europe in the House of Commons, if youcan negotiate the right terms, that we should go into Europe'. So Ted tumed to meand said, 'Weli Geo{hey, llet on with it then.' It's a very curious thing that people donot believe that, in fact, it is enough for a politician to say to somebody, ''W'ell get onwith it!' So I set offto do it.'e

These meetings were to be benveen'insiders' from the govemment and Civil Service(including the negotiators) and 'outsiders' (such as media figures and opposition leaders).

The frequent breakfasts v"'ere held in a private room at the Connaught Hotel. At a timewhen the cross-parf)' consensus was breaking down, pro-Europeans from ali partieswere represented. Those from the Labour Parry included Roy Jenkins, Roy Hattersleyand the Deputy Secretary of the Parry, Gwyn Morgan, who was then working for theEuropean Commission. Also present was Michael Ivens, director of the right-wingorganization Aims of Industrv. They were usually also attended by Reddaway and'Wistrich.

Despite apparent differences and political antagonisms over dift-erent issues, the

€foup was united by the overarching poJitical aim to get Britain into Europe. GeolheyTucker said, 'I reahzed if we were going to get the vote in the House of Commons infavour of Europe, against the background of apathy and resistance, then we had to dosomething about the people out there and show them [the MPs] that the country was

behind them.'10

The meetings usuallv involved tlvenry to thirry people, many of them newspaperreporters, including Majorie Proops of the Daily Minor. By bringing in figures such as

Nigel Ryan (from N'erirs at Ten), Ian Trethowen (managing director for BBC Radio)and Marshall Stewart (from the BBC Radio 4 Today programme) the media breakfasts

were able to suggest pro-European programming for television and radio. Tuckerallowed the media guests access to the EEC negotiators. 'Into the breakfasts came thepeople from Bnrssels. So the people who went to the breakfasts from the media got a

briefing on what was actuallv going on day by day. So we were making news,' he said.

INDIAN SUMMER: IRD AND THE EEC 149

As a result of the breakfasts Nerus at Ten started a series of five-minute specials on theEEC with a strong fictual tone - television time that as advertising would have costsomething llke d1.25m in one month. Niger Ryan said, 'I certainly-met Tucker manytimes in the period as he was Heath's media man. I cannot specifically remember thesemedia breakfasts in this distance of time but the ITN special items may have come outof them' These items would have been made with the usual editorial independence thatITN so fiercely guarded.'1r Marshall Srewart recalled attending a number of themeetings, which he said he found usefui to gather information 'at a time when therewas a pauciry of facts about the EEC'.12 Tucker even claimed that, after pressure fromthe campaigners, the.broadcasterJack de Manio was removed from his job as a presenterof BBC Radio's Today programme because he was 'too anti-European,. However,Marshall Stewart denied the claim, describing it as

.bizarre'.

According to McAlpine, IRD secretiy financed the breakfasts. very few of theparticipants apPear to have been aware of the involvement of IRD or its funds in thelobbying operation, although some of the campaigners had their suspicions. Ivens saidthat he suspected that it might have been funded bv IRD. 'Tucker once tord me rhatTed [Heath] objected ro the cost of the breakfasts,' he said.13 Tucker said he thoughtthat they had been funded by the European Movemenr.14 Ernest Wistrich said that hewas unsure where the money came from.15

Following withdrawal of govemmenr support, 'the flame was kept alive', accordingto Tucker, by Geoffrey Rippon and ELEC. Rippon had taken over the ,rearlymoribund ELEC like 'a giant cuckoo', said McAlpine. 'Geoffrey Rippon tord me:always choose a near defunct organization where the members have nearly all left as thevehicle for your coverr operations.' Rippon had brought into ELEC many prominentEuropean and British politicians, and businessmen including Valery Giscard D,Estaing,Douglas Hurd, RoyJenkins and Lord carrington. 'when Lord Armstrong had pr.rr"ilJon Heath to cut IRD's secret subsidies, ELEC appointed McAlpine to find funds tokeep the pro-Europe media campaign going. 'o.r. mrtt.. I reaily do know about ishow to orgamze a good breakfast. A choice of kippers, ,"rrrg.r, kidneys, scrambledeggs, bacon and tomatoes was laid on,'said McAlpine.ro ihe breakfasts were tocontinue untii after the 1975 referendum.

Heath's Sovernment was very sensitive about the media breakfasts. The most detailedaccount of the European campaign is [Jwe Kitzinger's book Diplomacy and persuasion,which included a chapter on the meetings.lT Kitzinger, a., academic and pro-Europemovement acrivist from the late 1950s, was called rwice to the Foreign of1ice by asenior Whitehall mandarin who told him that it wanted the whole chapter on them tobe suppressed. Kitzinger rvas threatened with repercussions if he did not. The officialclaimed that he was concerned about the potential embarrassment for Labour Mps whohad attended. Actually it seemed that it was really concerned about the role of civilseryants who were taking a very decided line on an issue on which they should haveretained neutrality. Kitzinger ignored the threats and rhe chapter was published.r8

The eIl-ect of these overt and covert propaganda operatio.r, o., prbli. opinion quicklybecame apparent. Between late 1967 and earry 1i71, public r.rppo., for entry hadslipped from 65 per cenr to 22 per cent. By July 1971, r.rppo* *rr-rrp to 2g per cent,and by August the Financial Times ptt it at 34 per cent fo. ,rd 51 per cent against.

150 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

Perhaps more significantly, as opposition in the country waned and support grew, the

opposition in Parliament crumbled; wavering MPs were brought into line under a

barrage of propaganda and arm-tr,visting. In October 1977,Parliarnent voted by 356 to244 to accept the conditions of entry. Some 69 Labour MPs voted against the whip. In

January T9T3,Bitainjoined the Common Market.There is no further evidence of,IRD involvement in the EEC campaign or the 1975

Referendum after Armstrong's order to desist. However, Conservative MP Sir RichardBody, rvho rvas joint chairman of the council of the 'Keep Britain Out' campaign, has

said that Western intelligence services took a profound interest in the 1975

Referendum:

At the verv beginning of the campaign two CIA agents came to see me in the House

of Commons. They were Anglophiles and they were very upset at the way theiragency was going to interfere in the referendum campaign. They said a new head ofstation was going to be appointed who was not a normal CIA man, he was very wellknown in the federalist movement and they (CIA) were going to intervene in differ-ent ways, and they produced a substantial number of documents to veri!, what theywere saying.

I read these documents through and they seemed very hot stuff showing as theydid that the CIA had been financing the European Movement since its inception. Ishowed them to one or rwo others and they agreed. However no newspapers wouldpublish these documents, nor were they rvilling to interview the rwo CIA men. Inthe end I was reduced to Time Out, which then had a very small circulation.le

The Time Out story u,'as published as '(Jncle Sam goes to Market'.20 The documentstold the basic story of how the CIA had covertly subsidized the early EuropeanMovement. The head of the station appointed to 'intervene' in the referendumcampaign was Cord Meyer Jr, who had been one of the leading figures in the UnitedWorld Federalists before joining the CIA. He was one of the CIA's most famousoflicials, with friends in high places. His first wife was a friend of Jacqueline Kennedyand her sister was married to Ben Bradlee, the editor of the Washington Post. There is nohard evidence that Meyer was sent primarily to make sure that the British stayed inEurope, but his tenure as head of station from 1975 to 1.976 was not much longer than

the run of the campaign. Body said, 'US Policy after the war had been in favour of the

British joining the EEC. I think the Trojan House argument appealed especially toKennedy and Kissinger and the Americans thought that by having the Britons in Europewould be more sympathetic to the Atlanticist point of view.'

Body also got intimation of other intelligence agency activiry during the campaign: 'Iwas having dinner with a long time friend, a man I trusted totally, and who had

intelligence connections. During the course of the meal he wamed me that my phone

was being tapped. He told me that MI5 was tapping the phones of anyone connectedwith former Labour MP Ann Kerr.'21

Ann Kerr had been the hard left-wing MP for Rochester, but had lost her seat in1970. She was married to the prominent left winger Russell Kerr and was on the 'No toEEC' Campaign that Body sat on, but she attended only one committee meeting. 'Ann

INDIAN SUMMER: IRD AND THE EEC

Kerr was reputedly a Communist as was her husband who was an Australian. You haveto remember at this time MI5 was obsJssed by communism. They thought that AnnKerr was a fellow traveller and that the Soviets were supporting the No vote to leaveEurope weak - so that the Soviets could walk into Germany and France. Therefore Iwas contaminated by having contact with her. My contact put it to me that I or any ofmy committee must expect to have our phones tapped.' Body has said that it is hardnow to imagine the paranoia of that rime. 'l think some of MI5 got wound up thar theNo vote was against the national interest. They were by no means alone. People in highplaces got very wound up over the issue. It was very difiicult for the No campaigners toget their point of view over on the media. The BBC were the worst offenders.' AnnKerr and her husband are now both dead.

Ilody has said that he is not aware of any Soviet money funding the No campaign.'The Soviet lJnion subsidized The Morning Star by purchasing many thousands of copies.The nervspaper was anti-EEC so it was reasonable for MI5 to assume that Moscowsupported the No campaign. We had no Communists on the committee and I do notbelieve that Moscorv or the communist Parry gave any money or help to the Nocampaign.' His vier'v is reinforced bv Sean Stervart, in 1975 rvorking for Labour cabinetmember Peter Shore: 'l thought the Civil Service was intensely disloyal. Peter Shorewas my minister: mosr of my colleagues thought he v,as a "fellow traveller"; and Bennwas a regarded as a Communist. You rvould not believe it, rvould you? In the whole ofwhitehall, at the middle level, there was fear ail over the place, and the "antis" [i.e.those anti-EEC membership] were being labelled as communisrs and "fellowtravellers".'22

In the 1975 referendum the British people vored to stay in the EEC. The impact ofmembership continues to be controversial. Ted Heath has frequentiy been accused sinceof not informing the British public of the full ramifications ofjoining Europe, especiallyover the loss of British sovereignty. For IRD the covert operations in favour of Britain'smembership were considered highly effective and became feathers in the department'scap. Reddaway has described it as one of the department's most successful campaigns.Heath too thought it successful and asked whether similar IRD techniques could beapplied to lJlster.

151

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

Painting it Red: /RDand A/o rthern lreland

IRI)'s succcss during the EEC campaign for British entry in 1970-1 impressed TedHeath; he sarv the possibiiities for discreet propaganda -,vork. The most serious problemfactng the go\rernment at that time rvas the recent explosion of violence in NorthemIreland, rvhich had ied to the deplovment of British troops in the province in August1969. In particular, the govemmenr \1'as traced rvith the problem of how to respond todemands tor a united Ireland, allegations of human rights abuses by the British Army,Irish American support tbr the Republican cause and Soviet propaganda characterizingthe conflict in tenns of British colonialism. Heath's govemment again saw a role forIRD. It rvas decided that the sma1l rebuttal unit under Tommy Tucker should bemaintained and turn its expertise towards rebutting r.vhat was seen as pro-Republicanpropaganda. The unit, based in London, used the same techniques that it had used so

successfull.v against the anti-Europeans. According to one IRD source, a primary target,for the unit's attention was the American senator Edward Kennedy, rvho had been I

rvriting r.vhat rvere perceived as pro-Republican and pro-IRA letters in the British press.tCounter material was put into the media via various IRD contacts including LordWavell Wakefield.1

But IRD also played a roie in Northern Ireland itself. At the beginning of theTroubles in the e:rrly 1970s, tsritish intelligence was represented in Northern Ireland bythe Secret Intelligence Senice. MI6 is generaily the overseas arm of British intelligencebut the involvenrent ol the Republic of Ireland in events made MI6 a convenientchoice to carry out intelligence operations in the province.2 During discussions withIRD, MI6 requested that it should be assigned some IRD experts to bolster its effort.One of the experts ser)t was Hugh Moonev, listed at the time as'First Secretary, FCO'.Mooney arrived in Northern Ireland in 1971 and was given the title of informationadviser to the general ofEcer commanding'.

When Mooney arrived in Lisburn tn 1971, the British propaganda effort was still inthe process of development.'When Northern Ireland had hit the headlines in 1969, theArmy had found itself unusually exposed to the world's media. Previous counrer-insurgencies, such as in Malava and Cyprus, had demanded a propaganda strategy, butnever befbre had the actions of the Army and the British government come under quiteso much scrutiny or been so close to home. The Army also recognized that, in thisconflict more than in any other, psychological operations would have to play a

significant role. In his 1971 study of counter-insurgency, Gen Sir Frank Kitson, who in

I]RITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

1970 had been appointed comnrander for Belfast, wrote that, in situations of civildisorder accompanied by sabotage and terrorism, 'the operational emphasis rvill sr,ving

away from the process of destroying relativel.v large groups of anned insurgents tolvards

the business of divorcing extremist elements from the population which they are tryingto subvert. This means that persuasion rvill become nrore important in comparison witharmed offensive action.'l

Initiallv the Anlr' had responded to the media attention by setting up a network ofpress ollices at headquarters and unit level. Horvever, the development of events soon

demanded a more concerted approach. B.v early 1971 the British Army, originallyrvelcomed b1, the Nationalist communiry as offering protection from Loyalist attacks,

u,as increasingly seen as the upholder of the status quo, the role of which, it appeared,

\\.as ro contain the Nationalist community rather than protect it. The insecuriry of the

Catholic community and the lack of political progress facilitated the revival of the Irish

Republican Army (IRA), and the first British soldier u,'as shot on 6 February.

This was follo'"ved in August by the introduction of internment, which, owing to a

lack of accurate intelligence provided by the Protestant-dominated Royal UlsterConstabulary, led to the imprisonment without trial of many political activists, as well as

members of the IRA. Even lvorse, sonre people rvere mistakenly identified. HistorianJ.

Bouryer tsell said 'The army rvas quite unprepared . . . propeffy rvas ruined, innocent

people hurt, the wrong men taken. . . . Hundreds of men were beaten and then jammed

into cells . . . lvithout charges . . . families howiing at the gates, solicitors u'ith papers,

demonstrations through the British Isles, questions in Parliament, and hectoringeditorials, and the whole thing on television.'a Internment was a public relations disaster

on an international scale and only serwed lirrther to convince the Catholic community

that the British Amry rvas the enemy. This increased sympathy for the IRA. For the

British infom-ration services it s'as a tuming point.The IRA rvas itself split as to the correct policy to pursue. At the Sinn F6in annual

conference at Ballsbridge in Dublin in January 1970, the division berween the OfficialIRA and the Provisional IRA became overt. The Officials became increasingly radical

in their politics, r,vith a move towards Marxism, they moved away f,rom the policy ofarmed insurrection. The Provisional IRA, with a reiatively conservative Nationalist

agenda, concentrated on organizing for war and offering protection for the Catholic

conrmuniry. AsJ. Bor.rryer Be11 noted of the Ofiicials, 'They might have an organization

in place but all of their voiunteers had to be made aware of the poiitical implications ofeach act u,,hile the Provos had only to be taught to shoot.'5 It was the Provisionai IRAthat emerged as the main antagonists of the British Army.

Responding to the increasingly diflcult demands of the situation and, in particular,

the need to present the British case, the information services were reorganized. The

major innovarion was the establishment of an Information Liaison, soon to become the

Infbrmation Policy Department, headed briefly by one Lt Col Johnny Johnston whowas soon replaced bv Col Maurice Tugwe1l. Before his arrivai in Northern Ireland,

Tugwe11, a paratrooper, had served as an intelligence oflicer in Palestine, followed by

stints in three other areas where counter-insurgency methods were used: Malaya, Kenya

and Cvprus. Tony Staughton, who had worked in Army information as both a soldier

and a civilian, and had run Arrny PR in Northern Ireland since 1964, remained head of

IRD AND NORTHERN IRELAND

Army PR. He rvas backed up by Maj rony Yarnold, who had run an Arrny press officein Hong Kong during the Malayan communist insurgency, and colin wallace, a

civilian information o{Ecer whose local knowledge was considered invaluable. Next tothe regular PR otlice was Infomration Policy under Tugwell. Journalist Paul Foot notedof the Army information services under Tugwell, 'Information policy was a separateunit working for the intelligence services but expected to work under cover of publicrelations. Its function was psychological warfare.'6

Staughton recalled that the new direction in information was accompanied by thearrival of new personnel: 'lmmediately after internment, the IRA started to get theupper hand. And from that time on, rhe Foreign ofEce and the Intelligence peopleinsisted on much more say in public relations.'7 IRD was brought in to lend advice andguide propaganda policy: 'They sent over a man cailed Hugh Mooney - he was from a

department of the Foreign Otllce called the Information Research Department. Noneof us ever knew what Moonev was about: who he reported to or what he was entitledto. A11 rve knew rvas that they gave him a big house to live in and freedom to move atwill throughout the barracks and Stormonr.'8

colin wa1lace, u'ho rvould end up rvorking r,r,ith Mooney frequently, rememberedthat Mooney 'r,r''as operating on his o.uvn betbre he got a post at Headquarters. He carnein to Headquarters Northern Ireland, the Armv Headquarters, under the title ofInformation Adviser to rhe General ofEcer commanding, which was osrensibly a

Foreign olIice policy post, but v"'as really a cover name. He had his own separatefunction initially, but then as Information Policy grew we all joined into the same suiteof oflices.'e According to wailace, 'there was the Army Press Desk, which operated likea news room. It was manned 24 hours a day, series of watch keepers. And all theinformation coming in from the Army units all over rhe province was Gd into that.Their job was dealing with factual information.' The offices of Information Policy layacross the corridor, 'and we were regarded as much more of a think-tank. . . . we alsoran community relations, for example, "hearts and minds", classic psych-war typeactiviry. But we did all these srrange things which people could never quite work outexactly what.

.we ran the Army newspaper, in fact we created that. In addition to

influencing public opinion we had ro influence the soldiers opinions.'10The effect of these developrnents quickly made itself apparent. As Bowyer Bell noted,

'Never after internment was the media rreated so inept\. The Army learned how tomanipulate these observers u,ith cameras or note books: briefings, special lunches, treatsin London, tours and leaks and detailed kits rvere all ready. . . . The basic assumptions ofthe British vievu' rvere . . . rarely questioned and even the more egregiously unpleasantpolicies found sympathetic ears.' 1 1

As in most counter-insurgencv situations, propaganda was never the province of oneagency. Infonnation PoLicy had a variety of personnel and sources represenring variousinterested parties and departments. Northem Ireland was not a single IRD operation. IRDwas a specialist area, but in the unit there were difGrent elements, all having differentinputs for different reasons.12'Wallace's main sources of information for dissemination tothe many joumalists who were now visiting Northem Ireland on a frequent basis wereMI6, IRD and Army intelligence. 'Each person had rwo or three different inputs. But inNonhem lreland the bulk of our day-to-day information, for my side, came direct from

155

156 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA'WAR

Army Intelligence. 'We worked for Anny Intelligence. I also worked for SIS which was

my . . . main role initially, whereas Hugh Mooney had his input largely from IRD orfrom other sources in London which we never rea\ knew.'13 According to'Wallace, 'the

mdn thnrst of IRD . was realiy the Cold 'War and therefore the bulk of our work was

to create links benveen Irish terrorism and the Soviet bloc, or Soviet satellites.' -Wallace

observed, 'The whole idea of Sovret involvement was absolutely silly, but it was easy to

undentand in temx of the tabloids.'1a'Wallace claimed that, not only were IRD distorting

political and public understanding of the nature of the'Irish problem', but they were also

distorting the facts themselves. This is vigorously denied by IRD sources involved at the

time u'ho claim that IRD in'as not wittingly involved in any of what, they admit, were

black propaganda operations. Nevertheless, according to Wallace, 'most of the stuff wervere doing u,-as fictitious, which was supposed to be confusing the terrorists'.15

Disinformation, from whatever source, threatened to undermine Britain's ownoperations as well as those of the IRA. Wallace recalled that disinformation put out byInformation Policy'ran the danger of colouring our own intelligence operations, because

an intelligence oflficer would come to us with reports which we had actually Gd out'.16

ln 1972 Colin .Wallace

and Hugh Mooney carried out a classic 'black propaganda'

operation to 'prove' Soviet involvement in 'Britain's Cuba'. .Wallace

and Mooneyapproached Trevor Hannah, a Northern Ireland joumalist working for the Lllster Newsnews agency in Belfast. Wallace recalled that 'Trevor Hannah was [working at] . . .

probably the most prolific of the local agencies. He covered for all sorts of people, he

covered for the BBC. You tended to get troughs when nothing much was happening

and people would pull out all their teams and he would be the sort of anchor man forGod knows how many agencies.'17 Wallace and Mooney sold Hannah a story ofRussian submarines landing KGB-trained subversives off the coast of lreland. Togetherthey took the story to George Maclntosh, northem editor of the News of the World, and

handed over 'proof at a meeting at the Waldorf Hotel in London. In a Thames

Television documentary for the series Tftls Weekin April 1990, Maclntosh recalled the

meeting: 'There were various photographs. There was attached to the photograph a

report from the pilot of the aircraft, the reconnaissance aircraft from which thephotograph had been taken. Many other documents connecting eastem bloc countries

with activities in Northem Ireland basically.' According to Maclntosh, 'Wallace told the

story, Mooney confirmed it.'18 Nevertheless, Maclntosh was careful enough to check

out Mooney's credentials, confirming that he was a senior o{Ecial at the Foreign Office.Maclntosh did not know of IRD until he was approached by David Leigh, the 7ftls

Week reporter in 1990. With its authenticity confirmed by such an official and

authoritative source, Maclntosh decided to run the story, splashing it on the front page

under the headline 'Russia in IRA Plot Sensation'. 'Wallace said, 'the Russian

submarine, classic! IRD faked photographs taken by us. A1l the sort of peripheral back-up intelligence to support that was all produced by us. And that was

^galn, a straight

IRD operation.'1e

Comments made by Michael Ivens, director of Aims for Industry, cast a little light onIRD activities in Northern Ireland at the time. According to Ivens, Reddaway 'was the

sort of number one or number two at the Foreign Office w-ho was head ofcommunication and he'd do a lot of interesting stuff Guns were unloaded in IRA boats.

IRD AND NORTHERN IRELAND 157

Norman's peopie appeared miracurousry to photograph the operation and it appeared inthe Express or something like that. He's qrite an operator.,2o Senior IRD officials denyIRD involvement to this day. In fact, one IRD operative claims that the story andphotograph came from Wallace and Army intelligence and that IRD involvement wasmjnimal - that they had been as fooled as the public were.21

Perhaps the most serious ailegation with regard to IRD in Northem Ireland is that,like MI5, it w-as involved in the dissemination of anti-Labour smear stories. Accordingto Colin Wallace, an IRD ofiicial went as far as to disseminate material against HarolJ'wilson. As Stephen Dorrill and Robin Ramsay wrote in their book, Smear!, anunattributable briefing paper entitled 'soviets Increase Control Over Britishcommunists'r'vas produced in the period before December 1973. According toRamsay, Dorrill and wallace, 'the briefing included annotations on it in thehandwriting of Hugh Mooney'. The paper was concemed with the visit to Britain by agroup ofSoviet officials and included these passages:

The Soviet [oflicials] paid tribute to the excellent contacts built up in the pastbetween British Labour partv activists and the Soviet Trade Deregation inLondon. In particular they spoke warmly of the work done by Harold w.ilsonduring his four years ar the Board of Trade and his help in ..,rbiirrg the SovietGovernment to purchase the latest Roris Royce engines (Derwent and Nene) in1e47. . . .

Needless to say the Soviet visitors forgot to tell their unquestioning hosts that theSoviet Trade Delegation for whom Wilson and his friends had played ,Santa

Claus,was the tront for Soviet Intelligence operations in Britain.22

The unmistakable aim of the briefing paper was to cast Wilson in a bad light. Whateverthe source of this nlaterial, the withdrawal of IRD, according to 'lvallace and IRDsources, was a disaster for propaganda work in Northem Ireiand. MI5 took over thecoordination of the propaganda carnpaign, which was run by the director of B Branchof MI5 and chief of Intelligence, Northern Ireland, trorn 1973 to 1975, Denis HenryPayne.z3

.Wallace recalled:

The problem. . . for most of us arose in 1973 when Hugh Mooney was withdrawnfrom Northern Ireland, because of a conflict with MoD, and also because MI5 tookover the role of coordinating intelligence in Northem lreland. Hitherto the seniorintelligence oflicer had been an MI6, sIS of1icer. 'when

the Securiry Service tookover because of the inrer-service rivarry, IRD, which was aligned with SIS, then lostits role and Hugh Mooney and his assistant were withdrawn. And this is when ouroperations were directed much more at the Labour Parry and politicians and all kindsof strangle things happened.

with the withdrawal of Mooney, 'wallace iost access to IRD. From then on .w.allace

was forced to rely on the intelligence and securiry services. He recalled, .I had . . . MI5in terms of the way the overall policy was going and the SIS who, I suppose was mymain source of information output.,24

158 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

Wallace and Information Policy output became increasingly political in nature,reflecting MI5's political concerns at the time. These, Peter Wright recalled, rvere

moving towards British domestic politics: 'The Irish situation was only one part of a

decisive shift inside MI5 torvarc'l dornestic concerns. The grorvth of student miiitancy inthe 1960s gave \\'av to industrial militancy in the early 1970s. The miners'strike of7972, and a succession of stoppages in the motorcar industry, had a profound etTect on

the thinking of the Heath govemment. Intelligence on domestic subversion became the

overriding priori6'.'r: MI5 rvas increasingll, concerned that the major targets of the

KGB rvere the Intelligence Senices, the Civil Ser-v'ice and, increasingly in the 1960s, the

trade unions and the Labour Pargy.2o These concems were increasingly apparent in the

material that Wallace lvas being asked to put out. Wallace recalled, 'The u'hole thing

was very heavily loaded in terms of the infiltration . . of the Labour Movement by

extremists and by the Soviets and all that sort of stuf{'27

Indeed, W'allace's allegations of a campaign run by MI5 officers against the 'Wilson

govemment followed the revelations of Peter 'Wright. Wright alleged that, as early as

1968, there had been an attempt by MI5 olficers to smear Wi1son.28 However, 'Wright

recalled, 'the approach in 1974 was altogether more serious. The plan was simpie. In the

run-up to the election . . . MI5 would arrange for selective details of the intelligence

about leading Labour Parry figures, but especially Wilson, to be leaked to sympathetic

pressmen. (Jsing our contacts in the press and among union officials, word of the

material contained in MI5 files and the fact that 'Wilson was considered a security risk

would be passed around.'2e According to 'Wright, up to thirty M[5 officers were

involved in the plot.This material began to appear in Northern Ireland. According to'Wallace:

the earliest, whar I u,ould call overt political material was probably about October,November '73. And then really it intensified dramatically in the lead up to the gener-

al election. Begrnning of '74, March, April. And then because it was a minoriry gov-

emment . . . and there u'as quite clearly going to be another election very soon. The

campaign, I think, against politicians intensified dramatically right through toOctober '7,1 , the next election. And that period betr,veen the first and second elec-

tions was total and utter madness. I mean that was complete lunacy. Not an exaggera-

tion, 90 per cent of my time was spent in political disinformation, totally, totallyignoring the terrorists.30

V/allace compiained that, 'for six years I was employed by the Army in NorthernIreland to Iight terrorism, but for part of that time I was mis-employed by MI5 todisseminate black propaganda against British politicians including Harold Wilson.'31

Since the i970s, evidence confirming MI5 involvement in questionable counter-

subversionary activiry has continued to come out. In 1990 the European Human Rights

Commission found MI5 guilty of smearing two British citizens associated with the

National Council of Civil Liberties, considered a Communist front organization byIRD as well as MI5. As ex-Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Labourpolitician, Merlyn Rees recalled, 'I had not the slightest idea that down the line was a

desk of1icer who had NCCL as a subversive organization that had to be looked at. This

IRD AND NORTHERN IRELAND 159

is r'vhy the rvhole thing has to be cleared up. You cannot target people on the basis of anumbrella description. It cannot so be.'32 Furthermore, in August 1996 a channel 4documentary featured Lord Hunt, ex-cabinet secretary to Harold wilson, whoconfirmed that 'malicious malcontents' in MI5 had tried to smear Wilson. According toHunt, 'There is no doubt at all that a few, a very few, malcontents in MI5, people whoshould not have been there in the first place, a lot of them like peter wright who wereright-wing, malicious and had serious personal grudges, gave vent to these and spreaddamaging malicious stories abour that Labour government.'33

Although IRD pulled out of Norrhern Ireland tn 1973, the department's .western

European desk continued its work on Northern Ireland. This included the handling ofIRA deGctors and the issue of briefings on the situation ro press contacts. One suchbriefing paper was 'The IRA and Northern Ireland: Aims. policy. Tactics'. when thiswas first put out is not clear, but a revised edition u,as published in October 1974. This63-paee briefing covered topics ranging from IRA front organizations to fundraising andextrerlist support for the IRA in Britain, linking the revival of the IRA to the activitiesof the Nerv Left. Colin 'W'allace recalled. 'There's no doubt that IRD were certainlytargeting the Nerr'Lelt, but that interpretation rvas very 1ylds.'3a IRD pointed out thatthe IRA had allorved the civil rights movenlent to function as a sorr of Trojan Horse:

The IRA ieaders decided reluctantly to give a free run ro rhe Northern Ireland CivilRights Association (NICRA), rvhich was founded in Londondetry in 1967 by a

group of Socialists, Liberals, Trotskyists, Communists and Nationalists, to agitate forthe rights of the Roman Catholic minoriry in (Jlster. NICRA was an immediate suc-cess and by the end of 1968, under strong Trotskyist and 'International Socialist'influence, had disrupted conditions in Ulster. This was the IRA's opportuniry and in1969-70 it moved in on a situation rvhich had been made subversively promising bythe New Lefr.3s

A serious concern of IRD was American funding for the IRA. IRD noted, ,overseas

aid, mostlv from private contributions in the United States, has played a major role infinancing the IRA's campaign. Since the current troubies began, Irish-Americans areestimated to have donated berrveen one and rwo million doliars, ostensibly for "reliefwork" among the dependants of detainees. But contributions have been divertedtowards the purchase of arms.''Wa1lace recalled that this area was also being covered byInformation Policv in Northern Ireland: 'a lot of the work I was doing was aimed atpreventing money, anns coming from America and all sorts of places.,3o

IRD informed its contacts that 'American finance for the IRA first becamesignificant when the activities of the original Northern Ireland civil rights movement of1968-69 led to violent clashes between the mainly Catholic marchers on one side andthe police and extreme "loyalists" on the other. Since then it has tended to fluctuatewith events in Ireland, reaching a climax at such times as early 1,972 when the riots inLondonderry received widespread attention in the world Press.'37 The reference toriots in Londonderq, was, of course, a reference to the events of Bloody Sunday -thirteen Catholics rvere killed rvhen British paratroopers opened fire on civil rightsprotesters in Derry. f r i ', r: a. 'i-r.- :i ',

{, '.., ::. r"'1

60 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

A subsequent tribunal, under Lord ChiefJustice'Widgery, gave a 'somervhat guarded,xculpation of the troops'3s - a verdict that has been consistently challenged and

rndermined ever since. Horvever, at the time, the perceived needs of propaganda may

rave outweighed the requirenrents ofjustice. The events of Bloody Sunday were'learly approached s.ith propaganda in mind. In 1995, the Cuardian revealed that a

even-page confidentiai llentorandum recording :i conYersation between Edward

-Ieath and Widgen'. clated ts'o davs atler the killings, thanking him for agreeing to.onducr the heannq-s. had L.een iound in the Public Record OtEce. According to the

lemorandunr, Heath Ieminded'Widgery that 'It had to be remenlbered that we r'vere

n Northern Ireland trghting not only a militar"r r.var but a propaganda u''ar.'3e The IRDraper also identrfied pro-Republican 'fronts' in the Communist tradition and civil.ights organizariorls rhat had fal1en under IRA influence. These included the Northern

ireland Civil Rights Association, the Irish Civil Rights Association and the Association

or Legai Justice.IRD also briefe<l its readers on IRA links with international terrorism, but,

Although sporadic links have been have been established u'ith Palestinian guerrilla

organizations, separatist movements and European Trotskyists, there is no evidence that

rhe IRA is part of any "terrorist international".''10 Nevertheless, 'By 1972 Libya was

becoming the main centre in the Arab world tbr Irish contacts.' According to IRD,'Further Libyan involvement r,vith the IRA was confirmed in March, 1973, r,vhen the

Irish Nalry arrested the Cypriot coaster, Claudia, as she was attempting to land a cargo

of arms on the Irish coast. . . . The vessel's owner! a 'West German businessman and

convicted arms smuggler, Gunther Leinhduser, said he bought the guns from President

Qaddhafi.' The source for the story was cited as the Daily tuIail, dated 2 Aprll 1973.

Where the Daily llal1 obtained the information is an open question, but a senior IRDofficial in the 1970s ciairned that the department helped to prove the link betr,veen

Libya and the IRA.]rBut even though IRD had been removed from Northern Ireland and the increasingly

dubious activities of Information Policy, it could not escape being caught up in the

tallout. According to the IRD briefing, 'The central aim of the Provisionals and the

claimed justification for their campaign of violence in the North is to force the

u,ithdrawal of the British military and political presence. Given a British comnritment to

r,vithdra1v, the Provisionais say they would call off the campaign and cooperate rvith the

Army and the Protestant leaders to ensure communal peace; Irishmen wouid then

negotiate future political arrangetnents in Northern Ireiand.' However, 'secret plans

captured from the Provisionals in Belfast in May, 1974, shor'ved that they were not only

aware of the possibiliry of civil rvar resulting from this situation, but were also prepared

in certain circumstances to provoke it'. Indeed,'lRA denials that the bombing

carnpaign is intended to increase sectarian hatred are not supported by the plans', r'vhich

were 'evidence that the Provisional IRA rvas preparing a major campaign.' The briefing

correctly reported that 'The Prime Minister, Mr Harold Wilson, told the House of

Commons on May 13 that there was an IRA plan to occupy parts of Belfast and carry

out a "scorched earth policy".'The captured documents'revealed "a specific and

calculated plan on the part of the IRA, by means of ruthless and indiscriminate violence,

to foment inter-sectarian hatred and a degree of chaos".'a2

IRD AND NORTHERN IRELAND

The origins of this IRA plan lav in the criticisms that had been level1ed against it forits failure to defend Catholic areas in Northern lreland in 1969, when, like Belfast's

Divis Flats, they had come under attack fronr Protestant extremists. As a consequence,

plans u,ere drawn up for impiemerltation in just such an emergency, rvhereby the IRAwould evaclrate the area in question under the cover of burning cars, lorries and

buildings. The plans had been obtained by British Intelligence and passed to ColinWallace in Information Policy in 1.972, at rvhich point 'Wallace had passed them on tothe press. The Dail1, Mirror covered the story, and, as Paul Foot noted, made it clear that

the 'L)oon-rsday' plan was, crr-rcially, a proposed reaction to a Protestant attack.a3

However, in 1971, further documents, rvhich added some detail, were found. These

u,ere passed to Wallace, rvho recalled, 'we rvere simply given the documents and told toprepare them for a press conference u,hich would announce to the world that an IRAplan had been uncovered to blor,v up half of Belfast, including iarge areas occupied byordinary people.'l'+ Despite the plan being defensive. a fact that Wallace raised, Wa11ace,

'set to rvork to prepare those parts of the rlaps and documents r,vhich u,'ould reveal the

IRA plan - and to take out anvrhing in thern $-hich save a clue to their defensive

purpose'.15

On 13 May 197-1,'Wilson revealed the existence of the plans to a shocked House ofComrnons. A press conference at Stornront presented the selected documents to the

media. A cautious Robert Fisk, then u'orking for T'he Tirrte-c, rvrote of the find: 'lf, as

Mr Wilson has said. they represented a campaign that was about to be put into action.

then the Provisionals, rvho have alw-ays clair-ned to be non-sectarian, emerge as an

organization of awe-inspiring cynicisnr.'a6 This. no doubt, had been the intention.Interestingly, the IRD r.vrirer noted that Moscow Radio had identified the 'scorched

earth' story as a 'propaqanda bomb'. For once the Soviets had got it rightLarge sections of IRD's paper on the II\A made a guest appearance in a book entitled

The British Army in L,'lstcr, bv lbrmer Scotland Yard press oflicer and Belfast journalist

David Barzilay.aT The book, publishecl by Century of Belfast, came complete withphotographs, including one of Colin'Wallace. It had three reprints, the last in 1981.

tsarzilay told reporters at a reception ibr the book's publlcation in 1973, attended bysenior nrembers of lJlster's security forces, 'I've . . . tried to give a short history of the

IRA, some of its ob-jectives and detaik of some of its u''eaponry in order to 1et people

see what troops \\rere up aeainst.'l! Entirc- passages trom the IRD paper were copied

almost word for t ord.l')Another publication \\'as a sevent)'-page booklet entitled Fianna Fail - the IR-4

Connection. Journalist Duncan Canrpbell rvho rnvestigated the propaganda u,'ar inNorthern lreland, wrote that, 'Although it entirely lacks any details of its purportedauthor or publisher, it provides astonishing details of phone ca1ls and bank accounts

allegedlv used by Fianna Fail nrernbers.'The centrai allegation made r'vas that fourmembers of an Irish govc'rnnlenr conrmittee, including the former Taioseach, Charles

Haughev, were secretlv collaborating u,ith the IRA. According to Carnpbell, 'The sWle

of lvriting and indeed the rypography . . . is characteristic of Foreign Office InformationResearch Departrnent publications both before and since.'5(l

161

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

The FallOne of the most significant developments in the anti-Communist propaganda war was

the establishment of the Institute for the Study of Conflict rn 7970. The formation ofthis new addition to existing private anti-left organizations, such as the long-establishedEconomic League and Aims in Industry, both of which were concemed with industrialand labour issues, was a perceived gap in the market left by a retreating IRD and CIA.Brian Crozier, the ISC's founder, reca1led, 'In the increasingly threatening situation,I sau' a serious gap. Existing instirutes or research centres however worthy, wereeither too academic, or too neutral, or too heavily concentrated on hardware strategy. . . .

The need, as I sarv it, rvas for a research centre which would produce studies on the ever-widening range of groups and forces bringng violence, chaos and disruption into oursocieties, but alr,vays in the context of Soviet strategy.'1

The 1970s had begun u'ell for IRD rvith the department moving into new areas ofinterest and meeting with considerable success, most notably with its contribution to theEEC campaign. Although there had been problems in Northern lreland under theHeath government, with ministerial interest and support, IRD's future seemed secure.Nevertheless, by 1974, it had undergone considerable change and was much reduced insize. ifnot influence.

IRD had reached its peak, in terms of personnel, in the early 1960s. It had been cutdown slightly both in 1964 ar,d 1968, but it was not until 1970 that radical cuts began

to be made. The first of these was made by Norman Reddaway, who returned topropaganda rvork as Supervising (Jnder-Secretary for Information and CulturalRelations in 1970. Reddaway found IRD very different from the 'lean team' that hehad rvorked rvith in the second half of the 1950s. IRD had become too big and was

producing too much research without enough careful and effective exploitation of thematerial that it rvas gathering.

According to Brian Crozier, tn1973 IRD underwent cuts of a serious nature. These

were driven by the Chief Cierk at the Foreign Office, Oliver 'Wright, who pressed forsubstantial economies in the department. IRD had received funding through the Secret

Vote, so it had been able to spend without adequate accountabiliry and had, in the past,

exploited that fact. There rvas, therefore, a good case to be made. Crozier recalled:

There was much heated discussion, at the end of which it was decided that IRDshould come offthe secret vote. This automatically created the problem of absorb-ing the existing staff under the open vote. As many as one hundred personnel weretaken into the Foreign Office but many others went into the ResearchDepartment. . . It was a kind of administrative massacre, with broken careers, the

BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA -WAR

disappeararrce of rnanv spccialists .,vho rvould never be replaced, and generaldemoralisation .2

' 'he cuts amounted to some 60 per cent, but do not appear to be reflected accurately intlre figures provided to the House of Commons, u.hich seem to contain only those ontire officiai pa,v role. According to these figures. berrveen 1977 and1977 the of}'icial staff, ,f IRD shrunk from l 1 7 to 85.1

The cutbrcks were causing IRD's Cold 'Warriors great concern. They believedtl-rat, at the tinre that rhelr resources rvere being reduced, the'Evil Empire'wasr rou-ing in porver and influence. Such complacency threatened the future of the'vestern s'orld. In rvhat was to be a portent of the future, the private sector movedjr as the public sector retreated. The ISC had its origins in the Currenr Affairsl{esearch Sen,ices centre of the CIA news agency front, Forum 'world FearuresrFWF), but it was set up as an independent entity rn 1970. The crime de la crime of1'rofessional Cold Warriors and IRDers moved to supporr Crozier. Leonard Schapiror greed to join as chairman of the nerv institute, while ex-IRD pioneer, Adam'vatson, joined the Founding council. other members included IRD contacts Maxlleloff and Hugh Seton-'watson; Maj Gen Richard clutterbuck from the Royalt )ollege of Defence Studies; Geoffrel, Fairbairn, a historian at the Ansrralian Nationall lniversirl; Brig w.F.K. Thompson, military correspondent for the Daily Telegraph;: nd Sir Robert Thompson. r'vho had headed the British Advisory Mission to Vietnami r the early 1960s.

To obtain funds for his neu,' enterprise, Crozier approached his contacts in MI6, theI IIA and IRD. crozier recalled that all three initially agreed ro pur up some of ther'roney. 'Ali three of them had agreed. CIA, IRD and MI6.'a However, then a problem; rose and the Foreign office rvithdrew its backing for the project. Crozier later, xplained, 'the ner'v Permanent ljnder-Secretary at the Foreign office, Sir Denist ]reenhill, vetoed anv British financial contribution to the Institute for the Study ofilonflict. In the insider parlance of the Diplomatic Service at that time, Sir Denist ireenhill was a "better notter", rvith the standard characteristics: a distaste for stretchingt t.re ruies, and for unrvanted publicity. Faced with two British defections, the CIAt ecided to drop out as well.'5

Despite the distinct lack of funds for his new outfit, Crozier evenrually managed ro: -'cure funding from international oil companies, iike She1l and BP. His clA conractsthen put him in touch with Richard Mel1on Scaife, heir and major shareholder in Gulft )i1, u'ho not only took over the financing of the FV/F but also funded the ISC to the1:rne of $100,000 a 1,ear.6

Although it refused to fund the ISC, IRD became both a customer and a source ofi rfornration for the nerv organization. For example, in 1973, 'As a sign of renewedr rutual confidence,' IRD commissioned a series of the ISC's 'Counter-InsurgencyI tudies'. Crozier reca1led, 'I prepared a kind of manual for them on counrer-insurgency: nd very sensiblv it was divided into sections. Each one was numbered separately so they'.'ould give it out on a selective basis. Some people could see something but notirmething else, so that is the wav it was done. That took some months and committeeI reetings and all the rest of it.'7

THE FALL 15t

The policy of d6tente pursued by world leaders from the 1960s onwards opened updiscussions between the 'West

and the Communist bioc. It was a bid to ease the worldaway frorn constant confrontation and the potential of nuclear devastation. Flowever, ithad also opened up a spiit within the 'IVest between those who believed that the Sovietswere prepared to coexist and those who believed that the Soviets were luliing the'Westinto a sense of false securiry before they struck. Challenglng d6tente became the ISC'sover riding concern during the 1970s. Crozier recalled, 'Throughout my period as

Director, the Institute for the Study of Conflict was involved in exposing the fallacies of"d6tente" and waming the'West of the dangers inherent in a policy of illusion.'8

The ISC's critique of d6tente was eagerly picked up by sections of the press. Forexample, long-standing IRD contact R.H.C. Steed of the Daily Telegraph wrote anarticle in March 7973, illustrating, 'How d6tente opens the way to Soviet subversion.'The article in question rvas a review of an ISC study entitled The Peacetime S*ategy o;f the

Souiet Union, which, Steed explained, 'set out the essential facts of Russia's vast and wellorchestrated campaign to overthrorv'Western governments by any means short of war.'D6tente, he argued. brought relief to Moscorv. 'Without iessening her militarysuperioriry she can reduce her crushing arms burden. She can also import the'Westerntechnology and capital assistance that she desperately needs for the modernization of hereconomy and the opening up of mrneral and other resources.'e

A year later the ISC held an intemational conference, chaired by ex-IRD head SirRalph Murray, on the 'New- Dimensions of Securiry in Europe'. The ISC 'SpecialReport', which contained the four study group reports presented at the conference,argued that 'The situation in'Westem Europe leaves no room for complacency. There is

a dangerous conjunction of military weakness, half-heartedness towards political unity,economic crisis and social unrest.'10

A more extrenle perception of d6tente was provided by Chapman Pincher. In hisbook The Secret Ofensiue, he described d6tente as a Soviet deception designed to coverincreasing subversion and military build-up. According to Pincher, 'Brezhnev himselfassured his co-conspirators that, like "peaceful coexistence" in the past, d6tente wouldnot interfere with the long-term aims of active measures but would, in fact, provide a

more favourable operational environment for them. . . . The military chiefs were toldthat if the'W'est could be 1ul1ed into continuing "d6tente" until 1985, the Soviet (Jnionwould then be so u,el1 placed that it could take a much tougher line, especially as

regards military intimidation.'1 1

The ISC was fi11ing a role that an increasingly constrained and downsized IRD was

no longer able to play. Adam'Watson recalled, 'Obviously one had a very much freerhand. I think by then it r.vasn't just a question of getting out certain elementary facts.

Indeed, I think one could say not that there was a need for exposing Soviet activities inthe world. so much as that in a world where a press values its freedoms and doesn't liketo depend on government for its information, it is obvious that there are considerableadvantages in a private operation.'12 Not only did a private propaganda organizationhave the advantage of apparent objectiviry and disinterest, but it could also cover areas

that state agencies were restrained from, or wary of, covering. One such area wasdomestic subversion and the activities of the British far left. This was a gap that the ISCwas already in the process of fil1ing. For example, it had already published a report in

156 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

November 1972 by Nigel Larvson, enritled 'subversion in British Industry', targered atcompanies as a means of raising further sources of finance.l3

The report followed an approach by the ISC to rhe Depury Director-General of theconfederation of British Industry, John whitehorn, in January 1972. Followingcorrespondence with Crozier, whitehorn had drarvn up a memorandum marked'Strictly private and confidential' to send ro leading industrialists. The proposedmemorandum informed its readers that, 'During 1971 the President and Director-General off the CBI had talks rvith a number of heads of companies who are worriedrbout subversive influences in British industry. . . . They have also been in touch with a

number of organizations which seek in their differenr \,vays to improve matters.'whitehorn pointed out that, while the State's security forces were concerned withillegal subversion, business had a legitimate interest in defeating the efforts of thoservhose activities ran counter to their interests but nevertheiess remained legal. He then:alled for financial support for a number of private organizations whose work:omplemented the aims of business leaders. Interesringly, he commented that 'Theirobjectives and methods naturally vary; and we see no strong case to streamline them orbring them together more ciosely than is done by their present loose links and mutual:ooperation.'11

The organizations in question included Aims of Industry, common cause Ltd, theEconomic League, the Industrial Research and lnformation Services Ltd, and thetSC. The ISC's main activity, the memorandum explained, was subversiveinovements overseas, and 'lt conducts special research under contract, especiallyrverseas. This activity is of considerable interest to industry, in particular to overseastnvestors. Its overheads are d30,000 ^

year. It plans to take an increasing inreresc in"he study of subversion at home, and has a research project on the drawing board on:onflict in British industry to be carried out, if finance is forthcoming through:hrough case studies of conflicts in the docks, shipbuilding, motor industry, and:onstruction. ' 15

The ISC's first paper on subversion in British industry was followed by the special"eport'Sources of Conflict in British Industry',14 which, published as it was in the heatrf a general election in 1974, caused considerable fuss. Crozier recalled, Just before:olling day, the Institute's reporr . . . had been published with unprecedented:ubliciry. . To our surprise, David Astor bought it for the Obseruer. . . . A wholelage was devoted to the controversial last section of the report. Congratulations on my'uncanny sense of timing" reached me from friends and strangers.'17

The period 1970 to 1974 had been marked in the Labour Parry by a definite swing tohe le . By the time that Labour was elected in February 1974,Bitain had entered a

reriod of widely perceived crisis. According to crozier, who believed that the new'-abour government was 'deeply penetrated' by communists, the advent of Labour:ower also caused a degree of disquiet within IRD. 'when Labour got in 1964 andrgain in the early 1970s, they were very worried. I mean the second time that Labour;ame in after Heath had collapsed as a result of the miners' strike, they panicked and'rdthout any orders from above they stopped issuing anything on parties in this country,'vhich I thought was a disastrous decision. In fact, suddenly it became much moremportant that they should have this.'1s

THE FALL 167

IRD's Whitehall bosses had become nervous about the political repercussions of itsdomestic counter-subversion ro1e. 'Untii the election, the Department (IRD) had been

issuing regular and accurate reports on the rival Communist parties and on variousTrotskyist groups. As soon as the news of Labour's narrow victory came, IRD suspendedall its reports on subversion in Britain,' said Crozier.le IRD's civil servants, Crozieralleges, 'saw that the new govemment was closer to these problems than any previousgovemment and they knew that there might be a bit of a scandal or . . . mass sackings orthat kind of thing. I can understand u.,hy they did it. They regretted it, of course.'

But in some $,ays things vv'ent on as before. A former IRD researcher working in thedepartment in the 1970s observed that, unsurprisingly, what his senior colleaguesdemanded were analyses that identified the failings of the Soviet system. When he had

once oflered the opinion that the Soviet education system had some merits, he had beenfirmly told that this r.vas of no interest.2o By the mid-1970s the reiatively relaxedatmosphere that the department had had in the late 1940s and early 1950s had gone.According to one IRD deskman of the period. 'lRD officials themselves were screenedfrom parts of rvhat went on and ordered not to te1l even other FO staff where theyv",orked.'21

Then came an expos6 that made IRD bosses even more nervous. In summer 1975

came the story in the radical London gtide Time Out thar had linked Forum WorldFeatures to the CIA.:2 Two months later, rvith Crozier as its common link, the ISC also

came under the spotlight. Some 1,500 ISC documents came into the hands ofjournalistsPhil Kelly and Steve'Weissmann. Time Out reported that, 'the leak of literally hundredsof secret documents to Time Our revealed a CIA hand behind the London Think Tank,the Institute of the Study of Conflict.'23 The tangled webs of the secret state werebecoming exposed and investigative journalists were closing in on IRD.

The political climate was changing both nationally and internationally. The CIA'smurky past was exposed to daylight in a series of congressional hearings. In 7976, theNew York Times ran a leader on the CIA's involvement with joumalists. 'Practically as

well as philosophically, this was wrong. American readers have a right to assurance thatthe journalists are not in anv sense accountable to unseen paymasters. And foreignsources of nerr,.s and the international consumers of American news have a right toexpect that govemment puryoses do not influence the process of reporting and editing.'The idea that the intelligence sen'ices had an open remit was beginning to disintegrateand the question rvas raised: 'Were they sometimes detrimental to democracy?'

Similar questions rvere being asked in Britain. It was James Cailaghan's ForeignSecretary in 1975, Anthony Crosland, who started to examine IRD. Crosland came

from the right-rving Gaitskellite section of the Labour Party and could by no means be

characterized as sott on the Soviet (Jnion. One of those close to him at the timerecalled, 'There was a report on the firture of IRD, then under Ray V7hitney. 'What

IRD then did was unattributable anti-Soviet, anti-Communist propaganda. Onlybriefing against Communism, no other ideologies, not right-wing ones.'21 Crosland was

not impressed by IRD, which he felt inappropriate to the times. A colleague recalled,'Quite frankl-v they were just Cold 'Warriors. We felt there was a need for an

organization wrth a rvider brief, so we gave them a sort of test. We asked them to writea broad philosophical briefing on South Africa. 'What they came back with was a

t68 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

briefing, South AJiicd: tlte Contnnnist Peril. It completely ignored the bad behaviour ofrhe Apartheid State. Obviousiv. they hacl failed to get the point entirel.v.'25

As he recalied, rl,here IRD failer'l, tbr Crosland. \\,rls that it r,vas only directed against

rhe Comnrunist thle'at. Crosland rvanted something else. 'W'e rvanted to do business

cven I'ranc1ed1,v, about ali forr-r-rs of Nrannv and oppression.'26 IRD and, for that matter,

the ISC had tlouble glasping thc nrood oi the tirne. Although officially set up tocanrpaign ior social .lernocLacr'. IRD's lal-ion d'itre had always been anti-Communism. Itwas thus ill-equipped ro rllrl) lrs atrcnriorl ro non-Communist dictatorships, criticism ofrvhrch oftc.n came- liom the Soviet lJnion and the left. To many Cold Warriors, left-rving critics of Sor.rth Afiica rvere to a greater or lesser extent the rnitting or unwittingsel-\iants oi Conununisrn and Soviet policy. It r'vas this analysis that in tum led to the

tr:rilure oi the Cold 'W:rr profbssionals to understand the New Left as it grer,v during the

1960s. As far as they were concerned, you were'either with us or against us'. They didnot understand a generation whose motto was 'A pox on both your houses'. By the mid1970s IRD was ollt of touch.

It is irot knou'n r.vhether or not Crosland had intended to retain IRD in one form or.lnother. In 1.976 he died suddenll' and his place was taken by a young right-wingLabour MP, David Or,verr. Orven, like Crosland, soon had his attention drawn to IRD.Accordirrg to Crozier, lbllorving hostile questions about the ISC in the House ofCornmons, Evan Luard, a junior minister under Ow'en, looked into 'Whitehall

contacts

lvith the organization. According to Crozier,'He sent for a list of recipients of material

tion-r the Information Researcir Departrnent, saw my name on it, and alerted Dr Owen.Apparently alannerl. the futr,rre defector from the Labour Parry took the momentous

decision, in May LL)77. to ciose dor,vn the Department. Thus the Labour Governmenthad destroved the oni1. active instrument of counter-subversion in the United Kingdom. as a sop to the Lett. The KGts had rvon, possibly when it least expected victory.'IRD, Crozier belic'r.ed, u.hich had been set up by Bevin to take on Communism, 'was

rrorv being destroved bv the very tbrces against which Labour had fought'.27

Chapman Pincher took a sirnilar view r'vhen he wrote regarding Callaghan and

Ou,en's decision to close IRD. He said: 'Their reasons have never been made plain butthe Labour Government lvas in a phase when it desperately needed to pacify its far leftto rellrain in ofiice. It can be safel,v assur.ned that the Politburo was pleased.'28

There is some truth in Crozier's allegation. According to an adviser to Callaghan at

the time, IRD's right-u'inq contacts were a factor in the decision to close thedepartnrent.:'r Indeed, according to the ()uardlart, Orven confirmed that the 'private

circulation list had become suspect'.3()

Hou'ever, collcern rvith the political complexion of IRD's contact list was by no

means the wholc story. Another factor in Ornen's decision was undoubtedly the need forrefonn and economies in the Foreign Office. Orven recalled in his autobiography, 'In1976 Sir Colin Crowe undertook an investigation of the three information departments

of the Foreign Office: the Infbrmation and Administration Department, IAD; the

Guidance and lnformation Poiicy I)epatment, GIPD; and IRD.'31 Indeed, the whole ofthe l)iplomatic Ser-v-ice was then under review, and, despite an extremely effectivecanrpaign by Foreign Otlice civil servants, the final White Paper cut the Research

I)epartment by .l 7 per cent, r,,,hile overseas information staft were cut by 16 per cent.32

THE FALL 169

The result of Sir Colin Crowe's investigation was a review of IRD's terms ofreference. The formal shift from a concentration on anti-Communism to a widerconcem with British interests in general, in line with Crosland's thinking, was clear. In a

memorandum written by Crowe in 1976, entitled 'Revised Terms of Reference forIRD', IRD had a positive role:

to influence decisions being taken abroad in matters affecting our economic, defenceand political interests and to persuade international opinion of our case where specifi-cally British interests are at stake, e.g. Northern Ireland, Southem Africa, or in bilat-eral disputes to which the UK is one of the parties. Its major role however is defen-sive, exposing and countering of threats both to the home base, the UK, comingfrom abroad, and to the interests of our allies and alliances, notably the EEC andNATO. This defensive role carries with it the capaciry to counter-artack, to counteractivities which damage British interests abroad or hamper the acceptance of HMG'sforeign policy.33

However, everyone kneu. that ir rvas not going to work. Inside IRD the writing wason the wall. As an IRD member of staff recalled, 'It was clear that they were going towind up IRD. There rvas a considerable amount of panic. There was gralliti in thetoilets and people started to look for other jobs.' Internal secrecy, which had mostlyprevented discussion about the department's history, began to break down. Accordingto the same member of sta{f, 'We picked up rhrough gossip what the origins of thedepartment lvere - that was when things started getting shaky. It was only later I realisedhow disliked IRD was by the rest of the Fo. . . . There was a suspicion of IRD peoplein the Foreign Office. There were about frvelve old timers. As it became clear thatmajor changes were imminent a last ditch effort was made to save the department. Thenthey began to talk about old times.'3a

Indeed, there had always been hostility towards IRD from the Foreign Officemainstream. Many diplomats Glt that IRD's activities were not suitable or useful. IRDinsiders Glt that this attitude was based on a simplistic reaction: that propaganda workwas 'not for otEcers and gents'. whether owen was influenced by Foreign officehostiliry to IRD is not known, but, as he told us, a more fundamental reason for closingIRD was the policy of d6tente. For many inside and outside government and the CivilService, d6tente appeared to be a retreat from justified confrontation of the enemy. Itwas a retreat that some saw as outright surrender to long-term Soviet objectives.3s Evensuch hard-line Cold .Warriors

as Henry Kissinger, who had persuaded Nixon torecognize the People's Republic of china and pursue the SALT I talks with the USSRon lirniting strategic limitations, was increasingly seen as 'soft on Communism' by theCold Warrior fratemiry.

Supporters of d6tente took a radically different view. While some critics saw d6tenteas a cover for funher Soviet subversion, some old anti-Communists saw the situationquite differently. And for Owen:

D6tente nleant something to some of us who fought for it against all the odds. . . .

you started to put obligations on both sides of the Cold 'War. I think looking back it

170 tsRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA \VAR

was one of the most successfui parts of the Cold War. The idea that it all started withReagan is compiete rubbish. The break-up of the Soviet lJnion has been a slow andsteady process in r,vhich at diflerent times you used different instruments.36

Later right-wing critics of d6tente rvould argue that both SALT I and SALT II gave theSoviet Union strategic advantages in the nuclear field. As for the Helsinki Final Act(HFA), as Paul Mercer argued. 'ln return for some vague and, in the event, dishonouredcommitments to the recognition of basic human rights, the Soviet Union gainedpoiitical concessrons, trading links and, in particular, greater access to'Westernrechnologl'.'i; Florvever, this was not how the architects of Heisinki saw it, attacked as

thev rvere for grving in to Soviet pressure. Owen recalled, 'We . . . believed in thedialogue. Openness and greater transparency, that's what we fought for. I now think itrvas successful, and through the '70s and '80s . . . the pressures we tried to bring onrhese people. They loathed it, they loathed the review conference of the HFA. Theydisliked intensely that they had signed a document which legitimated their practicesbeing examined.':s

Indeed, the Helsinki Final Act, far from being a victory for the Soviets, as some ofthem believed at the time, was the beginning of the end. As Richard Davy noted in hisstudy of d6tente, 'the Final Act as it emerged was almost the opposite of what the SovietUnion had wanted. Instead of endorsing the status quo, it was a charter for change.lnstead of legitirnising the Soviet sphere of influence, it legitimised 'Wesrem inrrusioninto it. Instead of making frontiers immutable, it specifically afiirmed the principle ofpeaceful change.':e

Within IRD, steeped as it rvas in the darker side of Soviet policy, there was also

concern about the new policy. According to Crozier, IRD ofllcials were 'worried andsceptical' about d6tente.a0 An IRD Background Brief expressed similar sentiments.The paper on d6tente, dated November 1975, over a year into the new Labouradministration, echoed ISC papers and right-wing concerns. Entitled 'Two Standardson D6tente', the briefing argued that'Anaiysis of Soviet and East European commentsince the close of the Conference on Securiry and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)on August 1, 1975, shor,vs the Communist-ruled countries continuing ro interpretd6tente and peacefui coexistence as allowing, and even assisting, the promotion ofCommunist revolutions throughout the world.'a1 As historian Peter Hennessyremarked in an article written in 1983, 'a frequent complaint from the more d6tente-minded in Whitehall was that: "'We have one foreign policy, IRD has another".'42Although IRD briefings were, by definition, not government policy, factual briefingsimplicitly attacking the policy were undoubtedly giving ammunirion to the opponentsof government.

However, other sources who have had close involvement with IRD have made moreserious allegations regarding the department's demise. A slightly different conclusion is

suggested by Colin Wallace: 'Labour ministers including David Owen . . . discovered byvarious means that some of the material being run against the Labour Party during the'70s emanated from IRD. Now there may be very good other reasons why it wascurtaiied, but someone who was very close to David Owen, a former MP, came to see

me round about '87 and we were going through a lot of the material and he actually

THE FALL 171

told me that he had discussions with David Ornen about this and he was quite sure thatit was.'a3

O'"ven made no mention of this to the authors, but said that he was concerned overthe unclear line of accountabiiiry that IRD had developed as a result of its close linkswith MI6. This is the action desk for 'black operations' whose existence former IRDstaff denied for so long. MI6's accountabiliry, like the Diplomatic Service, runs rhroughthe Foreign Secretary, but, as Owen pointed out, 'lt is a completely different channeland you keep it separate and it is better to have it clear right down through the system.Once you get it into this cloudy area, then things can happen which are not right andsome thingp happened that were not defensible or right, in the climate of the 1970s . . .

I uncovered quite a few things rhat quite shocked me and that's why I made itabsolutely clear this had to change.'a't

'What might once have been appropriate, was not appropriate in the era of d6tente as

far as Owen was concerned: 'In the late '40s, '50s you could take a preffy tough stanceand you could be pretry* unscrupulous. You were up against something that hadn'ttempered. From Krushchev onrvards there 'rvas a difference. How much of differencewas open to argument. But horr", ,vou handled it mattered.' Owen was concemed thatIRD's existence.'vould be revealed, and its activities cause a scandal and giveammunition to the Soviets. 'If . you are lecturing on democratic procedures andaccountabiliry and these things, you had to have your house in order if you were tocarry any conviction.'as

In his autobiography, Owen recalled his decision to ciose IRD: 'In May 7977 |agreed that there should be a comprehensive reorganization and IRD was closed .

and a new department was formed out of the remainder. The aim was to achieve greaterclarity and end the grey area, which for too long had escaped proper scrutiny, fallingneither in the open area of diplomacy nor in the closed area of spying.'a6 Owen reducedIRD down to a small general-purpose section renamed the Overseas InformationDepartment (OID). To detach the research element of IRD from its capabiliry forcovert action - the point at which Owen felt the line between IRD and MI6 hadbecome blurred - the covert capabiliry of IRD was removed and incorporated intoMI6. 'That rvas the big change, the covert element - the head of the covert unit was nolon;5er accountable to the head of OID.'a7 Exactly who the head of the coverr unit was,and what he had found so shocking, Orven would not make clear.

Lord Mayherv said of the closure, 'kt 1977, I think I banged into David Owen andsaid "'What are you doing getting rid of my baby IRD?" And he said, "'Well, it wasgetting very big ,vou knorv and of course the Communist threat was not what it was." Ithink that it probably expanded its sphere of operations too far. I mean, there is a limitto what you ought to do with taxpayers' money and I think perhaps some governmentswere tempted to use IRD for their political purposes. I don't know, I'm onlyguessing.'18

The closure of IRD was done, as ever within the Foreign Ofiice, discreetly in April1977. The role that IRD had played during the Cold War only began to be revealed in1978 with a series of major media expos6s. In an article in the Cuardian on27 January,entitled 'Death of the Department that never 'Was', wrirten by David Leigh, IRD's'world-wide propaganda network' was revealed for the first time.ae The Cuardian article

172 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

was followed the next weekend by a more detailed article in the Obseruer by a team ofresearchers led by Richard Fletcher, entitled 'How the FO waged Secret Propaganda'War in Britain'.3o While the first gave an overall outline of IRD's history and demise,the second focused on IRD's links with book publishers in Britain and Ampersand.These articles were fo11ou,ed by several others, including critical pieces in left-wingmagazines like the Lercller, rvhich linked IRD's operations to the recently discreditedoperations of the CIA.i1

Not surprisingll-, the Soviet press agencv, TASS. made as much mileage as it couldout of the revelations. Irnrnediately follor.ving the article rnthe Cuardian, TASS reportedthat 'another political scandal' had been exposed in Britain. Despite the fact thatindependent Bntish journalists had uncovered the story, TASS claimed that 'the IRD'scarefulll' concealed activities demonstrate that the freedom of the press, which thedelbnders of 'Western democracy so persistently vaunt, has again failed to withstand a

controntation rvith realiry'.s2 Nevertheless, the decision was, Leigh argued in 1978, 'thelogicai culmination of moves to bring the organization . . . under firm political control,and aboiish its furtive Cold War attitudes'.53 [RD's 'special tasks', as referred to ininternal reference books at the time, had been brought to an end.s4

The left-wing magazine the ltveller pointed out that the di{ference betr,veen IRD andCIA rnedia operations was 'the CIA, nominally at least, did not try to aflect US politicsthrough propaganda. . But the IRD effort was in part deliberately directed atinfluencing public opinion at home'.55 Attributing the demise of IRD to 'the collapse ofthe social-democrat conservative "broad right" coalition which underpinned it', theLeueller argued that, 'As the right has moved further right, its anti-Communism has

become too hysterical even for Labour Ministers: like the late Anthony Crosland . . . orDr David Owen.'5r'

Mayhew, inten'ieu,ed bv David Leigh, came quickly to IRD's defence. EchoingSefton I)elmer's characterization of black propaganda as defined by a hidden source,Mayhew commented, 'We certainly did absolutely nothing to distort or tlvist the Britishmedia. It was onlv black propaganda in the sense that our work was allundercover.'57

A few old IRD triends came to defend it from the exposure from the liberal press.

American theatre critic and polemicist Milton Shulman, writing in the Euening Standard,

said at the tin.re, 'The complex explanations for this decision include the ForeignOffice's need for economy. suspicion amongst certain Labour Ministers about IRD'scontacts and a desire to further the atmosphere of d6tente between Russia and theWest.' Shuhnan, who had himself been asked by Stephen Watts to write one of theBackground Books, said, 'It seems to be both pusillanimous and short-sighted that just as

our economic condition is about to put us back into a position of real power andinfluence in the world, our expertise at disseminating a fair and factual picture ofourselves as well as combating Communist propaganda aimed at subverting ourinstitutions should be discouraged and curtailed in the transitory names of economy andd6tente.'58

llichard Fletcher continued to uncover more of IRD's hidden past. On the daybefore the ()bseruer published theJanuary 1978 story, Fletcher met up with a close friendof Col Sheridan's. This former SOE ofiicer had once taken wartime sibs to Churchill's

THE FALL I /)

bunker under Admiralry Arch for the 'old Man' to approve. Fletcher said, 'He rvas a

sick man and was obviously keen to tell me something: he said he had never spoken toanyone about these things before, not even his family. Before I left he said: "I'11 giveyou a clue. One word - Britanova. Follow this up and you'll be surprised where it willlead you."' Britanova led to the unravelling of the whole MI6IIRD news agencyoperation. However, IRD had still not lost its potential for political embarrassment.Some months later, Fletcher was commissioned by Sean MacBride of UNESCo to tel1

the IRD story. He wrote the paper entitled 'Free Fiow of Nervs' and delivered it toMacBride. Its opening paragraphs read:

The current debate on freedom of the press is largely conducted in terms of generali-ties. This is mainly due to a lack of detailed empirical studies as to how the mediaactually operate, as against hor,,, the various protagonists imagine that they function.

Gerald Long of Reuters is quite right in asking those who allege that the press ismanipulated 'to tell us horv the manipulation is brought about, how it works, to giveus some exanrples of it'.

This paper, a historical studv of some of the methods used by one ex-colonialpower to present a favourable image of itself in the Third World, looks at one aspectof the larger problem of the rvorld flor'v of news. It is hoped that it will prompt otherresearchers to examine in more detarl some of the further questions that it raises.

Gerald Long been challengrng Third World critics to demonstrate manipulation by'Western media. As Fletcher proved in his paper, Reuters had been closely involved insuch manipulation. This, you might think, would be grist to the UNESCo mill. Not a

bit of it. They did not print it, although they had paid for it, because they did nor wantto upset the British or American government, which at the time were refusing to paytheir crucial annual IJNESCO dues. An edited version of the paper eventually appearedin the Cuardi.7fl, setring o{f more interest in IRD's activities.

Lacking IRD's covert faculry, finance and numbers, IRD's successor, the OID, was a

pale shadorv of its pred,ecessor, its output no longer appreciated by those who hadbene{ited most. crozier has commented that, 'Unlike the IRD papers . . . the origin ofthe new service r'vas stared on each paper issued. The "unattributable" rule, which hadproved so effectir.e in the past, had gone.'se Nevertheless, the oID continued to issueIRD-type briefings, for example, on Northern Ireland.60 In 1988 the Foreign Office wasforced to admit and correct mistakes in an oID Background Brief entitled 'TheProvisional IRA International Contacts Outside the United States'. The briefing,sections of which appeared in the national press. smeared, among others, writer LizCurtis as one such IRA contact. 'Writs were threatened and the Foreign Ofiice backeddown.61

The need for IRD's more covelt skills had also not gone. [n the 1980s, as d6tentegave way to renewed confrontation and the decision to station US Cruise missiles onBritish soil provoked confrontation r,,,ith a revitalized cND, the precedent of IRDattracted renewed interest. In 1981, concern at the success of CND's propagandacampaign led ministers such as Douglas Hurd, Minister of State at the Foreign oIEce,and Peter Blaker, Minister of State at the Ministry of Defence, to seek a means of

174 BRITAIN'S SECRET PROPAGANDA WAR

responding. Following discussions, Hurd and Blaker agreed to set up a small unit,specifically concemed with CND and deGnce issues.62 Crozier remembered that 'It wasresurrected very briefly. And on a smaller scale . . but it only lasted, as far as I know,about a year . the rnan rvho ran it was Peter Blaker . . . As far as I know it wasn'teven named, or maybe it rvas part of the other Information Department, an1,way, Imean, in terms of volume of stuff that was distributed it was no more than about rr;vopercent of the old material.'63

Crozier, like other ex-lRD olficials, had been advising both Blaker and MargaretThatcher to set something up ro counter CND and internal subversion. ln 7978 a

reconrmendation made bv Shield, a body made up of members Crozier, ConservativeMP Stephen Hastings, ex-MI6 man Nicholas Elliott and banker and SOE veteran HarrySporborg, to advise Thatcher on foreign affairs, intelligence and domestic subversion,advised the establishment of a Counter Subversion Executive. According to Crozier, thesuggestion was discussed at a meeting with Thatcher and Peter Carringon. 'l asked forreactions to its functioning in the margin of the Foreign Office, as tRD had done, butcarrington . . u'ould have none of it. There was indeed little logic in handlingsubversion from a foreign ministry, but then that was what IRD had done, successfullyenough within its limits.'61

A small unit, set up along IRD lines in 1981, appears initially to have establishedcontact with the British Atlantic Committee and Conservative MP Ray'Whitney. Thelatter had been the last head of IRD and its scaled-down successor the OID until 1978,when he resigned to fight a by-election in the safe Conservative seat of High'Wycombe.According to ex-IRD oflicials, the unit was quite elfective until Blaker, who oversawthe operation, rvas succeeded.65

If IRD had gone, many of its principles continued to be applied. Those who hadserved or had contact with the secret department had learned skills that would continueto be used to control and manipulate information, both at home and abroad. Ageneration of Cold

.Warriors, whose skills had been honed in the war with Hitler, passed

their skills on to a successor generation who have learned the merits of rebuttal,selectivity and spin in imposing their own version of events on the general public.

ConclusionsThe most generally held concept of propaganda is that it is a series of tall stories, a tis-sue of lies, and that lies are necessary for effective propaganda. . . . Anyone holdingthat conviction is extremely susceptible to propaganda, because when p.opagandadoes tell the 'truth', he is then convinced that it is no longer propaganda.l

What is to be made of IRD? How effective was it? And what did it achieve? Estimatingthe success of any propaganda operation or agency, excepr commercial advertisin!r'vhere triumphs can be measured in financial terms, is extremely difficult. NormanReddalvay considers several IRD operations to have been major successes, most notablyIRD's campaign against Sukarno in Indonesia. According to Lord Mayhew, IRD hadno organized machinerv for measuring the impact of its propaganda. However, he wassure that it had an effect. notablv in the Labour parry where ,IRD,s propagandacoincided with a considerable defeat of the extreme Left'; and in the trade unions whereIRD material 'stiffened the backbones of trade union leaders who were anti-communisr'.2 [n part IRD had succeeded in the task it had been set by Mayhew. Bypromoting and supporting specific intellectuals, politicians and trade unionists it helpedshape and define the political consensus for a generation. That consensus, which reachedfrom the right-wing of the Labour Parry across to the far right of the political spectrum,was defined by its anti-communism. It is notable that when, in the 1970s, that anti-Communist aliiance began to come apart, the consensus which had been reached inmuch of the rest of British political life, for example on the welfare srate, also began tobreak dorvn.

Overall, although few specific operations can be identified where a particular effect isclear, the evidence suggests that IRD's influence was enornous. while the BackgroundBooks, for instance, never produced a classic or world bestseller, overall through all itsmyriad outlets IRD influenced journalists, academics and the public's perception of theCold 'War. 'Whether this could have been achieved wirh a less coverr operation isdebatable. certainly, rhere seems little reason why campaigns like that to expose thehorrors ofthe Soviet gulag could not have been conducted openly. However, althoughan open department distributing attributable material could have been just as effective,in that case at least, it seems clear that as long as journalists were willing to follow therules, the unattributable nature of IRD's material was its strength. Information andexclusives could be directed solely to those who would make appropriate use of them.And while to the man in the street it appeared that a diverse range of media wereseparately coming to similar conclusions about Communism and the nature of the Cold'w.ar, in fact much of the media was singing from a hymn sheet which was provided byIRD. For this the media itself must accept a degree of responsibility. While there is nodoubt that many journalists individually were in tune with Foreign Oftice thinking, to

176 CONCLUSIONS

rely on IRD as a major source, as many did, was complacent. 'W'ith respect tocolonialism and Northern Ireland, the portrayal of these troubles as extensions of theCold War distorted realitv and prevented ordinary people from grasping the real issues

at stake-

Most importantly, bv organizing a constant stream of anti-Communist material intothe media machine IRD could manipulate the media's focus towards issues events and

aspects of an,v given situation of its ovr'n selection, encouraging a polarized perception ofthe world as divided bett een Communist and anti-Communist. A perception of theworld upon rvhich the Cold War thrived. And although it is almost impossible toestimate the degree to rvhich the media's focus was distorted during the Cold 'War,

given IRD's close coiiaboration with the United States' own far greater propagandaoflensive, it clearly had an effect, however unquantifiable.

This inquiry is necessarily imperfect. The veil of secrecy behind which govemmentsso often hide their activities is not easily drawn aside. But it is clear enough from thematerial that in the late 1940s the British government set out secretly to influence its

orvn people and the press of the world to its own ends, and laid careful plans to thiseffect. In 1,992 tw'o Britain-based academics, Scott Lucas and Cate Morris asked a

number of pertinent questions in a paper on IRD: 'How much of the material in the"independent" British press and the BBC was "planted" by a government body that wasnot accountable to Parliament or. arguably, the cabinet? At what point did "anti-Soviet"operations turn into an "anti-anti*British" campaign? 'W'ho controlled theimplementation of "subversion": the Cabinet, the Foreign Secretary, permanent ForeignOtlice otlicials, MI6, or another group?'3 Although to a great extent these questionsremain unanswerable in detail, it is perhaps appropriate to offer some tentativeresponses. The evidence so far suggests a considerable amount of IRD material found its

way into the British media, despite the claim by ex-lRD o{Ecials that 90 per cent of itswork was directed abroad. Secondly, IRD was an anti-Communist propagandaoperation, but as almost all opposition to Britain during the Cold'War was definedwithin its framervork. in which opposition and criticism of the West would bydefinition benefit Communism, to be anti-Communist was to be anti-anti-British.Finally, from the limited evidence available, it appears that while the day-to-day workof IRD was overseen by permanent civil service ofircials, campaigns to subvert domesticor foreign enemies seem to have demanded political approval from the Foreign OfficeMinister responsible. Hor.vever, exactly where the line was drawn at any glven time and

how the rnachinery rvhich linked IRD with MI6 and MI5 worked remains partiallyunclear. Nevertheless, Lord Owen's comments suggest that in his view IRD had, in thepast, overstepped the line.

Fonner IRD ofticials emphasize that their materiai was accurate and factual. Indeed,Mayhew accused IRD critics of failing to produce evidence of a single lie or fabrication.Most of IRD's output was indeed true and accurate. Flowever, it was selective,delivered with a careful spin. Propaganda with impact is not to be found in liesdelivered in stilted language. It is far more effective and likely to be found in thepropagation of selective truths - a set of facts which on their own appear compelling,but rvhich ignore evidence suggesting any alternative explanation. Truth, or facts, whichthe British propagandists discovered during the Second W'orld War proved potentially a

CON CLUS IONS 177

far more eflective weapon than lies and untruths which might backfire. IRD's cold.Warriors applied the lesson with considerable effect, even to the extent that the

journalists and organizations which they serviced treated them as a normal researchdepartment.

Altlrough IRD was closed in 7977, its spirit lives on in many ways ar the irrtersectionberween poiitics and the media. Any organization that can propagate its message in sucha rn'ay that it appears to be a consensus reached by diverse opinion, yet is really a scriptwritten by one person or group of people, ultimately threatens to distort publicperception of any issue. Consequently, such attempts deserve attention whether they aremade by government ministen, or media proprietors. As Jacques Eilul, the French socialand political philosopher, noted, 'When the eyeglasses are out of focus, everything onesees through thern is distorted.'a

AppendixWe include here a typical IRD backgrouttd briefng as an example o;f the department's work. It can

be found at the Public Record Offce, re;ference FO97 5 / 3 3 .

FOREIGN OFFICE,s.w.1

30th August, 1949.

CONFIDENTIALPR.2502/8/913

THE COMMUNIST'PEACE OFFENSIVE'

.We are sending you with this letter a copy of a paper, for use in publicity and

elsewhere, on the Communist 'peace offensive'. Topicality is given by the Communist-inspired peace congress which will start in Mexico Ciry on 5th September, and by theone which has just ended in Moscow; other examples were'W'roclaw (September 1948)and Paris (April 19,19).

2. In view of the great importance which the Kremlin attaches to this movement, youshouid make every etTort to make widely known the reai morives behind it. TheSecretary of State has directed that attention should be given to this matter.

3. This paper is sent to Iron Curtain posts for information only.

Yours ever,

INFORMATION RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

180 A PPENDIX

THE COMMUNIST ?EACE OFFENSIVE'

Whv is it that the Kremlin has recently become so interested in 'peace'? 'Why have

instmctions gone our that 'peace con55resses' should be held wherever possible - in Paris,

New York, Moscorv and norv Mexico Ciq,*?

'Peace' is submitted bv the Krem1in to the same test as any other policy - does it inpresent circumsrances lbnr-ard the rvorld revolution? If it does, it will be for the time

being, and just so iong as it suits the Krenrlin's purposes, the parry line; but, if the

situation changeci, rvar u-ould be pursued rvith equal enthusiasm. To understand the

reasons behind these present tactics, and to see how peace propaganda is designed purely

for countries outsicle Communist control, it is only necessary to look at the main lines ofSoviet $'orld strategy.

Sovret Strategv.

The basic pronouncements are to be found in the leading textbooks of Communism,

e.g.

''We are living not mereiy in a state, but in a system of states, and the existence of the

Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable.

One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end supervenes a series offrightful coliisions between the Soviet Repubiic and the bourgeois states will be

inevitable. That means that, if the ruling class, the proletariat, wants to hold sway, itnlust prove its capaciry to do so by this military organisation ' . ''

('Problems of Leninism', Page 160)

This rvas originally said by Lenin in 1919, and is quoted in Stalin's essay'On

Problems of Leninism' (first pubiished in 1926), follorned by the remark 'clear,

would think'.This work now appears in his collected 'Problems of Leninism' which is compulsory

reading for all Comn:runist Parry members throughout the world as a guide both for

theory and action; ir is obligatory for studv in all Soviet schools. Further to prove its

present-day relevance one might quote from just one of the tributes which appeared in

pracrically all Soviet journals on the 25th anniversary of the publication of a course oflecrures entitled'The Foundations of Leninism', which now forms the introduction to,Problenrs of Leninism'. 'New Times' (No. 19, May 4th, 1,949), the o{ficial Soviet

propaganda weekly with a world-wide circulation said: '. . . every line strikes today . . .

as trenchantly and as telling as it did a quarter of a century ago . . . this work is as true

and applicable in the conditions of today as it r,,.as in the conditions of a quarter of a

century ago when it first appeared'.-W'grks that the Kremlin considers out of date receive very brusque treatment. The

ofhciai 'Large Soviet Encyclopaedia' is to be completely revised; since the great purges

many of the biographical articles read rather unfortunately. The stenographic reports ofthe early Plenums of the Communist Paty have been completely suppressed, since some

parts of them do not agree with the olEcially approved Party history. 'Problems ofLeninism' has never been revised and is never likely to be.

theone

APPENDIX

'war, however, is something to be thought about much more seriously today than itwas in the '20s r'vhen it may have seemed that a Communist revolution was about tosweep across the world' Besides, the North Atlantic Treary has issued a severe wamingto anv pou,er which may have been thinking of any low-cost military adventures. In[act, the potential threat carried by the Soviet anned forces, so far from advancing theclornmunist p1an, has resulted in a very great drawing together and stiffening of thedemocratic camp. What Stalin has called the 'objective conditions' for success do not atpresent exist.

In 'The Foundations of Leninism' (1924), however, Stalin also out-lines the broadstratefy- to be followed by Communism in the third stage of the revolution, i.e. after ithad been accomplished in the U.S.S.R. He wrires:-

'Objective: to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, using it asa base for the overthrorv of imperiaiism in all counrries. The revolution is spreadingbeyond the confines of one countn'; the epoch of world revolution has commenced'.

('Probiems of Leninism', page 69).

This revolution, hor.vever much Conrmunists may try to deceive peopie by calling theiraims 'dc'mocratic' or 'progressive' has no connection r,vith the revolution that socialdemocrats went. If we look at the proggammes of revolutionary parties of 100 years ago,w-e see that at our present stage rve have accomplished and in many cases far surpassedthem' A revolution has already taken place in this country, and is still i. prog.ess.certain people do not seem capable of recognizing a revolution when they see one,mereiy because it is not accompanied by fighting at barricades, famine and purges. ourrevolution will continue just as tlr and just as fast as the majoriry in this country wishand thc- realities of the situation permit.

We have all observed the so-cailed 'revolutions' in Eastern Europe since the war.These meant the imposition of the ready-made clictatorship of a minoriry backed by therealitv or threat of Soviet armed force. A more suitable title for them would be'prefabricated revoiutions' or 'steos in Soviet imperialism,.

(To prove thrs, *,e have onlv to listen to Communist spokesmen. Revai, theHungarian comr.nunist leader, has recentlv said, when anrlysing to his communistParty hou, thev obtained po\ver:-

'in the beginning we \\:ere a minoriw. Nevertheless, we had a decisive influence inthe armed forces. Our strength u,as increased by the existence of the SovietUnion r^d th. o..r.r.. of th. Sori"t Arrry or, *hor" ruppo.t *..orld rl*,ryr r.ly'.

The Central Committee of the Cormunist Pary,' of the Soviet [Jnion said, in its ietterto the central comnrittee of the communist parry of yugosiavia on 4th May, 194g:-

'. . . the Soviet Anny carre to the aid of the yugoslav people . . and in this waycreated the cor.rditions which were necessary for the Communist Parry of yugosiaviato achieve power. ljnfortunately. the Soviet Army did not and could not render suchassistance to the French and Itaiian Comrlunist parries.,

181

182 APPENDIX

In its number of August 11th, 1948 the authoritative Czech Communist Tvorba read:-

'The Tito group declared that they were able to build socialism with their ownstrength, which means rvithout the help of the Soviet union and the other Peoples'

Democracies. They also denied the decisive role rvhich the Red Army played in set-

ting up the Yugoslav People's Democracy.

Experience has shot'n that the participation of the Red Army in liberation is the

decisive factor. This can be seen from events in France . . . where the main factor was

missing.'

In Czechoslovakia the Red Army put the Communists in control of the police and

other key positions; and the Communists were in a position to stage the Putch of 1948

without actually calling back the Red Army, which merely stayed as a threat round the

Czech frontiers.)As we have already said, the North Atlantic Treaty has removed the 'objective

conditions' for such assistance to be safely given to any further countries in Europe.

Neverrheless an extremely frank statement that long-term Soviet strategy remains still

the same has recently come from a uniformed major of the Soviet MilitaryAdministration in Berlin. Speaking in a series of lectures on 'Bolshevik Strategy and

Tactics' on 30th May, Major Patent said:-

'. . . the ultimate aim of Communism - world revolution - remains unchanged; only

rhe means . . . change from the time to time . . . the decisive factor is correct timing.

when the enemy is stronger, it is of no use kicking against the pricks. The time to

attack an enemy and destroy him is ',vhen his forces, after an interval, have begun to

disintegrate.'

It should be noted that Soviet majon do not use a House of Soviet Culrure as a platform for

airing their private views; lecrures on Parq, strategy are meant as guides to action for the

party cadres. Further, Major Patent was in full accord with that part of Staiin's 'The

Foundations of Leninism'which deals with'strategy and Tactics'. In this secrion Stalin sets

out cerrain rules of 'strategic leadership', of which the following is significant in this context:

'Manoeuvring the reserves with a view to effecting a proper retreat when the enemy

is strong, when retreat is inevitable, when to accept battle forced upon us by the

enemy is obviously disadvantageous, when, with the given alignment of forces,

retreat becomes the only way to ward o{f a blow against the vanguard and to keep

the reserwes intact . . the object of this strategy is to gain time, to demoraiize the

enemy, and to accumulate forces in order later to assume the offensive.'('Problerns of Leninism', page 7 4).

Soviet Tactics.'What then are Soviet tactics when their opponent is strong? They are to attempt by any

and every means to isoiate the democratic countries from each other, and govemntents

APPEND IX

from their peoples. Communists will ally themselves with any movement, whatever itsprinciples, so long as it will help them in reaching this objective.

(As Lenin said, in 'Left-V/ing Communism - an Infantile Disorder,:-

'. . . the most powerful enemy can be conquered only by exerting the utmost effort,and by necessarily, thoroughly . . . and skilfully taking advantage or every, even rhesmallest, rift among the opponents . . . and by taking advantage of every opporruniry. . . of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be only remporary, vacillating, unsta-ble, unreliable and conditional'.)

If only the strength of the democratic countries should be sufliciently weakened, the'objective conditions', r,r'here even a threat of force might be e{Iective, would then exist.Every reasonable person wants peace and the Kremlin is making a determined attemptto use this universal sentiment for its or.vn ends. Its tactics concerning peace aredeveloped on three main lines, each of u,hich consists of superficially attractive ideas tocatch the unthinking or unwan,.

(a) Armament expenditure.The Krem-lin, lvhich has ar:ned forces over 4 million strong and an armament industryof proportionate size, is making great efforts to show that in non-Communist countriesany expenditure on such objects means impoverishment for the peoples in them; andthat other governments should therefore at once stop spending their resources on suchreprehensible matters.

(b) The horrors of atomic warfare.The press in Communist-controlled countries takes the line that the atom bomb isextremely ineflective as a weapon of warfare; the Communist press, however, in non-Communist colrntries is frequentiy fuli of blood-curdling details of the horrors of a

atomic r.varfare and the wickedness of the Americans in developing such a weapon. Oneis reminded of the remark that, if only the Soviet Government possessed large stocks ofatomic bornbs, l,hat a por.ver{ul weapon for peace it would be!

(c) Neutralit),.The Kren-rlin has also declared that anv forms of alliance or even friendship berweendemocratic powers is extremelv dangerous to the national independence of thesecountries, and puts them in great danger of becoming mere colonial appendages of theu.s.A. lJnfortunatelv, it is becoming very widely realized that the term 'narionalindependence' means to communisrs 'suppolt the Soviet lJnion right or wrong'. Alsothe years before 1939 have shown many people that 'neutrality' is always encouraged bythose who would find it easier to pick off their victims one by one; until the time hascome to absorb their prey such predatory powers are always very solicitous about their'freedom' and'independence'.

Soviet' Peace Offensive'.This tactical move is so important, however, that it requires closer study. The first

183

APPEND IX

essentiai to realize is that 'peace' in the mouth of Communists and their supporters

means something quite diflerent from what we mean by it. This rype of 'peace' mightbe defined as 'ANY STATE OF AFFAIRS, INCLUDING WAR, 'WHICH HELPS

THE SOVIET UNION'. At rhe recent so-called 'Peace Conference' in Paris, the self-

styled 'delegates' made E5reat play with the horrors of war in Greece, Malaya and

Indonesia. Such people as the Greek Government and the vast majority of the

population, rvho rvere defending their own country, were condemned as criminalwarrnongers; the forces of peace were of course the rebels and such countries as Albania

and Bulgaria rvhich were supplying them with arms and bases. 'W.hen a solitary British

speaker remarked that it might be as well to deplore also the desolation of war in China,

he rvas received in silence, and the French Communist daily 'Humanit6', withoutquoting what he said, merely recorded that he made 'some remarks that did not receive

the approbation of the congress'. On the news of the fall of Nanking, however, the

'delegates' stood and cheered for two minutes; in the Chinese war, of course, the

Communist side was winning - a real triumph for 'peace'.

Further light on 'peace' is thrown by official Communist pronouncements. For

example the Soviet'History of Diplomacy' (published 1945) says:-

'To the same group of examples of the concealment of predatory ends behind noble

principles also belong rhe instances of the expioitation of the idea of the disarmament

and pacifist propaganda in the broad sense of the word for one's own purposes. From

time immemorial, the idea of disarmament has been one of the most favoured fomrs

of diplomatic dissimulation of the true motives and plans of those govemments whichhave been seized by such a sudden "love ofpeace".'

An interesting srarernent on this subject was also made by the Communist Ministerof Defence in Hungary, Farkas, who r.r,rote in a leading article in 'Szabad Nep' on

April 12th:-

. a certain pacifism has made itself felt within the ranks of our parry, particularly

lately. Slogans like 'we want no more wars' are very significant of this pacifism. First

of all. therefore. we have to overcome this feelin&of pacifism within our own parr,v

in order to be able to fight it down in the masses . . . a considerable feeling of paci-

fism is reigning among our peopie, particularly among our women and peasants . . .

we must, however, continuously point out to them that what they fear - war - is

wanted by the irnperialists'.

The serious dangers ofpacifism have also been pointed out by 'Szabad nep' (13thJune),

when commenting on Revai's new Ministry of Popular Education and demanding the

forcible elimination of "Western culture:-

'. . . the positions of the enemy in this field are just as dangerous as if he held posi-

tions in economic or political life. If we remember that in the enerny's arsenal we

find such mental trends as cosmopoiitanism and pacifism. it is clear that in this field

too we must fiqht for . . . our freedom.'

APPENDIX 185

This rype of pronouncenlent is not new rn Communist countries. Quite shortly afterthe end of the rvar the ar.rthoritative'soviet Literary Gazete' (28th December 1946) wasannouncing its policy in the follolving words:-

'we do not intend to abandon the war theme we must write of war so that thegeneration of young peopie that colnes after us can love arms.'

What are we to think of such statements as this?

We might also glance at a 'peace offensive' of the past. After Poland had been dividedup in 1939 benveen the Nazis and the Krenrlin, in accordance with the secrer Stalin-Ribbentrop agreement signed before the u,ar began, the Nazis issued peace proposals,rvhich rvere supported bv the Kremlin. Stalin said (Pravda 29th November, 1939):-

'lt rvas not Genlanr. rvho attacked Frarrce and Britain, but France and tsritain whoattacke'd Gemunv. thus assumins responsibiliw for the present'uvar. The ruling circlesof Britain and France rr,rdelv declined both Gern-ranv's peace proposals and theattenlpts of the sovic'r Union to achir'r.e the earliest temrination of the war.'

conrmunists in orher counrries took up their master's line. on 22nd February, 1940,Mr. Pollitt even fought a br.-election at Siivertown on the slogan 'Stop this war'. FromMav 1940 the rvhole of Europe lav under Nazi control, and the British Commonrvealthrvere the only group fighting against them. But Communists had forgotten about anti-fascisrn. about the extemxnation policv being carried out in Europe and the defence ofderrrocracy; Mr. Pollitt had aiso obediently tbrgotten his bold rvords of July 7939:'anend to the mealv-n'routhed pacifism which would lie down humbly and let Fascismrvipe its boots on our bodies as a preliminary to trampling us down forever'. TheKremlin thought its policies would be forrvarded by the cessation fo the r.var, and so

Clornnrunists evervu,here, castigating the Rritish Government as imperialists andwarnonqers, tvere strong11, lbr 'peace'.

22ndJurre. i94 1. altered all this.'When Russia was forced into the war by the Naziattack, British Comrlunist complaint no\\i' was that the Government was notprosecutins the vr'ar hard enough. The aggressors \e,ere no\,, the Nazis, and GreatBrit:rin, tbr the tinre beins at least, had be'en admitted to the circle of the 'peace-lovingnations'. Only tiil 19'{5. hou'evc-r. After the u.ar some of our policies seemed to stand inthe wav of (lonrrnunisr-sponsored 'revolutions' in various parts of the world. wetherefore reverted to ottr role of u'annongers; ther Soviet lJnion again becarne the reaiand oniv lorce Iirr 'f r'ir'e .

Doves over Yusosl.]r-ie.

The emptiness of the Krerrrlin's viervs about national independence are shown veryclearlv in their pre-sent quarel lr.ith Yugosiavia. Few peopie would regard that countryas any thing but a Comtuunist police state, run with no iess rigour and ruthlessness thanthe Soviet Union itself, the on1,v unusual tiring about Tito is that he would like to carryout his policy in his or,r,'n n av. The Kremlin there{brc has no words of peace for himbut savs instead: 'it u.ill not tolera[e such a situation, and will have to resort to othermore effective mealls t to order the un-restrainecl Fascist offenders'.

186 APPENDIX

It is, in fact, a curious phenomenon that the 'peace olfensive' and the 'war scare' bothbear the trademark 'made in Russia'. Every medium of information within SovietRussia warns the people there daily to prepare for a war to be iaunched against them;we cannot help recalling here the manoeuvres of another country which was so

concerned to tel1 its population about the 'encirclement' to which it u'as beingsubjected. Further, since the recent Soviet jamming campaign against B.B.C. and Voiceof Amenca broadcasts. most Soviet citizens have been prevented from hearing anythingr,vhich might cause them to realize that the war scare did not exist in the outside world.

The 'peace oifensive' therefore is clearly shown for rvhat it is - a cover for the

furtherance of Soviet inrperialism. Following the party directive given out at the'Partrsans of Peace' meeting in Paris, efforts were to be made to hold similar congresses

in everr,' country. We sha1l, unfortunately for their sponsors, be able to recognize themtor rvhat they are. They will not consist of serious discussions, at which the mistakes

made at various times by all governments are impartially criticised and means ofavoiding them in future considered; if they were, good democrats would be prepared tojoin in. Our whole system has been built up on our right to criticise others and theirequal right to criticise us. But these 'conferences' in fact consist of prepared lecturesdenouncing everything connected with our system in the most violent and partisan

terms and extolling the Soviet Union; the audience comprises a well-drilled band ofComrnunist synlpathisers, claiming to represent the nation, but - as their record ineiections has shown - representing fer,v but themselves; there will be a small handful ofgenuine people who have not yet realized, though they soon will, the purpose forrvhich their enthusiasm is being exploited; every attempt is being made to shut out thesmallest criticism of the Soviet lJnion. Democrats can predict what these meetings willbe like. 'We have alreadv set out exactlv u,hat their object is, and who it fits into Sovietstrategy.

(Note:- all references to'Problems of Leninism'are taken from the 11th edition,Moscorv Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947).

A/o tes

INTRODUCTION1 Tlrc Times 28/1/61.2 Obseruer 28/1/78.3 No."v foreign editor ot The Titnes.

'{ 'The Department that never rvas', David Leigh, Cuardian 27 /1/9g.

CHAPTER 1 Indonesia: Prelude to Slaughter1 The brutal regime of pro-western president, Generar Ahn ed Soeharto was

for its human rights record bv the Labour Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook,Indonesia in the summer of 1,997. The General, aged sevenry-five had been in

mildly rebukedon his visit topower for over

thirw years.

2 Political Killings b\, Couernments: Mass Killings In Intlonesia (1965 toto 1979) (Amnesry International publications, 19g3).

1965) and Kampuchea (1975

3 Andreu' Roadknight, 'United States Policy Torvards Indonesia, 1945-1949: A ConflictBetween Rhetoric And Realiry' (unpublished MA Thesis, Universiry of war,"r,ick, September1 99s).

4 Roadknight. 'United States policy Torvards Indonesia,.5 BBC, \I/AC, El12,071/1. 26 November 1,959, p. 1..

6 PRo Fo371/5-1052, 'British Foreign policy in the Far East',31 December 1945, cited inRoadknisht. 'United States Policv Tor,",ards Indonesia', p. 12.7 Roadknight, 'lJnrted States polic,v Torvards Indonesia,, pp. 12_1,3.8 Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, Tlrc CIA and the Cult o;f Intelligence (Nerv york, Dell

Publishing Co., 1977), pp. 51-2.9 BBC, WAC, E112,071i1.26 November 1959 p. 1.

10 Julie Southrvood and Patrick Flanagan, Intlonesia: Law, Propaganda and Terror (Londgn, ZedPress 1983), p. 10.

11' Budiardjo was a supporter of Sukarno and was imprisoned by the army of General Soeharto.She norv lives in London.12 carmel Budiardjo, surviuing lndonesia's curag (London, cassell, 1996), p.42. Theseorganizations rvere largelv rvorkers and peasants unions.13 'Liquidating Sukarno' The Times 8/B/1986.11 rbid.i5 Interview with Hunrer Wade byJames Oliver 21./9/1996.

188 NOTES

16 Tonv Geraghty, [.]'ho Dares ll'ins: The Story o;f the SAS, 1950-1980 (Glasgow, Fontana,1981), p. 76.

17 rbid.l8 Inten'ierv r.vith lloland Challis byJarnes Oliver 25/1/ 1996.19 Budiardjo, Sur,,'iuing Indonesi,t's Grilag, pp. 45-6.20 Ibid. p.59.2t Ibid.22 Private source.

23 Inten'ierr.rvith Non.nan Reddarvav bvJames Oller 9i1/1996.21 Ib1d.

25 Intr'n-ic"n'rvith Rolancl Challis bvJames Oliver 25/4/1.996.26 Ibid.2t 'Tvrannl Exposed: British role in Siaughter of 500,000'. Obseruer2BlT/7996.28 Ba&ground on Indonesia, B. 759, 7 /10/1965.2() Ibid.30 Political Killings by Clrrrrrr,rarts Amnesry Intemational Publications. Gilchrist commented toLondon on the massacres tl-rat, 'l have never concealed from you my behef that a little shooting inIndonesia rvould be an essential prelirninary to effective change.' Indeed, Gilchrist ensured thatthe Anly could concentrate on eliminating the PKI by giving them a verbal assurance that Britainu,or"rld hold back from militarv action in Borneo. See the Obseruer,28/7 /1,996.31, tsBCl Radio 4.7 p.n 3i8/1998.32 rbid.33 Intervier.v rvith Roland Challis bylames Oliver 25/1/1.996.34 ()uardion 2/ 1{)/1965.35 Birdiarcljo, Sttruiilng Indonesia's Gulag, p. 42.36 Inten'ie*, rvith Norman Reddau'ay byJames Obver 9/l/1996. The GCHQ intelligence also

appears to har.e been passed b1, somebody to the indonesian Army. See John Hughes, The End ofSukarn.o: A Coup that l[is.fired: .4 Putpe that llan l4'llr/, (London, Angus & llobertson, 1968),pp. 1 12-165.37 The ll',tshingnttt Post 27,5/199t).38 Inten'icrv r,,'rth l{oland ChaLlis; byJames Oliver 25/4/1996.

CHAPT'ER 2 'Lies and Treachery': the Origins of IRD1 iU.R.D. Foot, Rcsrsratre (London, Paladin, 1979), p.2.2 Iloth MI5 lnd MI6 have been accused of conducting propaganda operations against the

Labour Parry cluring the irlterwar period. The most lamous case is that of the Zinoviev letter,rvirich recent rc'search by Nigel \d/est and fomrer KGB agent Oleg Tsarev indicates was forged byr Ilussian agent r.r,orking for N{I6. See 'Our Secret Life' Curtlian 12/3/1998.3 Sir File Clark, T/rc Central Ofice o-f lryfonnation (London, George Al1en & Unrn'in, l9l0), p.27.4 Charles Cruickshank, The Fourth Arm: Psychologiul Wafare, 1938-1945 (Oxford, Oxford

Universiry Press, 1977), p. 9.

5 Phiiip Taylor, "'lf W'ar Should Come": Preparing the Fifth Arm for Total War, 1,939-1.945',

/ournai of Contempoldry llktory, 1(, (11)81),21 .

6 E.H. Cookridgo. lnside SOL: (London, Arthur Balfour,1966), pp. 5*6.7 lbid., p. 3.

8 Full accounts olthe fomration ol'the SOE are given in Cookridge, Inside SOE, and M.R.D.Foot SOE in l:rance (HMSO, 1 966).

9 Cocrkridge , In-,ide S()E, p. 37 .

l() ibid., p. 39.

NOTES 189

11 M'R.D. Foot, soE: the special operations Executiue, 194u46 (London, BBC, 19g4) p. 172.1'2 Sonre 192 successful drops rvere made during the unsuccessful rising in August andSeptember 1.9 44, at a cost of forty-one aircraft. See Foot, SOE 1 9 40-16, p. 191.13 Foot, SOE 1940-46. p. 191.14 lbrd., p. 200.1 5 Quoted in Foot, Resistance, p. I37 .

16 Cookridge, Inside SOE, p. 12.l7 Of the banking funrily.18 llickham Sr.veet Escott, Baker Street lrregular (London, Methuen, 1965), p. 1,25.19 Foot, SOE 194t)-46. p.172.20 J. Montgornery Hyde, The Quiet Canadian (London, Hamish Hamilton,21 Richard Fletcher, 'Free Flow of News', pubhshed paper for UNESCO.22 'W.

Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid (London, Book Club Associates,has, however, recentlv been rubbished bv Nigel 'West lvho has describedfictional'. See 'Our Secret Life'. Cuardidn 1.2/3/1998.23 Cruickshank, a-ourth,4rn. pp. 25-6.21 Foot, SOE 1940-16, p.21.25 Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, 'Political Warfare', Lecture at the Royal United ServicesInstitute, 25/1/l95O.Jotrnul t,[RUSI, pp. 194-5. Anthony Eden had replaced Ha.lifax as Foreignsecretary rn December 19-10; Brendan Bracken replaced Duff cooper at the Ministry ofInformation in July 19,11.

26 Lockhart, 'Political Warfare', p. 196.27 Cruickshank, Fourth Amt. pp. 32-3.28 Cookridge, Inside SOE, pp. 20-1.29 Sefton Delmer, Black Boomerang: An Autobiograpfty (London, Secker & warburg, 1962),p 14.

30 Ibid., pp. 74-5.31 Cruickshank, Fourth Arm, p.80.32 Foot, Resi.stanre, pp.28-9.33 Ibid., p.30.34 Cruickshank, Fowth Amt, p. 109.35 Delmer, Black BoomeranB, pp. 122-3.36 Ibid., p. 123.

37 'Assault on Britain's "lie lictory" b,vJesuit,, The Times 19/1/197g.38 rbid39 Cruickshank, Founh Amr,pp. 110-11.40 Intervier,v with Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker b,r, James Oliver 25 /7 / 1997 .

41 Cruickshank, Fourth Arm, p. I51.12 David Stafford, Britdin and European Resistante, 1910-1945 (London, Macmillan, 1981)),pp. 116*7.43 Delmer, Black Boomerang, p. 168.14 Ibid., p. 167.

45 Lockhart, 'Political Warfare', p. 197.46 Cruickshank, Fourth ,4rm, p. 1.48.47 Lockhart, 'Politicai Warfare', p. 797.48 Delmer, Black Boomerang, pp. 163-4.49 Cruickshank, Fourth Arm, p. 69.s0 Ibid., p. 34.

51 Lockhart. 'Political Wadire', p. 195.

1962).

1976). This accountit as 'almost entirely

190 NOTES

52 PRO, INFl/724; Memorandum by International Broadcasting and Propaganda Enquiry21, / 6/ 1939.

53 Philip Taylor, 'Techniques of Persuasion: Basic Ground Rules of British Propaganda Duringthe Second World War', HistoriulJounnl of Film, Rddio and Teleuision (1981), 57.

54 PRO, INFl/72.1; Memorandum by International Broadcasting and Propaganda Enquiry21/6/193955 rbid.56 Quoted in Cruickshank, Fourtlt Arm, p. 1.8.

57 Philip Schlesinger, Pnting Reality Together: the BBC Neur.s (London, Constabie & Company,i978), p. 1-1.

58 Ibid., p. 27.

59 Quoted in Cruickshank, Fourth Arm, p. 181.60 Foot, Reslsranre, p. 58.

61 Cruickshank, Fourth Arn, p. 69.

62 Ibid., p. 78.

63 Ibid., p. 101.

64 Quoted in Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the Linited Kingdom, vol. 3 (Oxford,Oxford University Pres, 1970), p. 58.

65 Taylor, 'Techniques of Persuasion', p. 58.

66 Lockhart, 'Political Warfare', p. 196.

67 Quoted in Cruickshank, Fowth Arm, p. 1.86.

68 Inten iew rvith Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker by James Oliver 25 /7 / 1997 .

CHAPTER 3 Origins of the Cold War1 L.Y. Gibianski, 'How the Cominform Emerged: the New Archivai Materials', Nouaiia i

noueishaia isroriia (4.Jul-AL:g 1993). l3t.2 Vladislav Zubok, and Cor-rstantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: from Stalin to

Krushcheu (London, Han'ard lJniversiry Press, 1996), p. 110.

3 Ibid., p. 11.1.

4 Ibid., p. 119.

5 Denis Healey, The Time of My Llfe (London, MichaelJoseph, 1989), p. 100.

6 Interview r,",ith Lord Mayhew by James Oliver 18/7 / 1.995.

7 Interuiew with Norman Reddaway byJames Oliver 9/1./1.996.8 Healey, Time of My Life, p. 103.9 PRO FO371 56835, T. Brimelow, minute, 9/9/1.946, quoted in Dianne Kirby 'The

Religious Component in the Anglo-American Cold'W'ar Alliance, 1945-48'. A paper delivered at

the conlbrence 'Britain and the Cold War' organized bv the Institute of Contemporary BritishHistory, July 1997.

10 Healey, Time of My Life, p. 106.11 Lyn Smith, 'Covert British Propaganda: the Information Research Department 1947-77',Millenniwn: Jonrnal of International Studies,l (1980), 68.

12 Interview with Norman Reddaway by Anthony Gorst and W. Scott Lucas, 1989.

13 PRO FO371166371 N 9549.14 Michael Nelsorl, 'The BBC External Services and the Cold War'. A paper delivered at theconGrence 'Britain and the Cold 'War' organized by the Institute of Contemporary BritishHistory, July 1997.

15 Kirby, 'The Religious Component in the Anglo-American Cold'War Alliance, 1945-48'.16 PRO FO37115832, Warner Memorandum, 'The Soviet Campaign against those Countryand our responses to tt' 2/ 4/ 1946.

NOTES

17 PllO FO371/56886iN12335/5169/38G, minutes of Russia Committee meeting, 3/9/1946and7i11l19,16 cited in Tonv Sharv, 'The British popular press and the Early cold,war',Journalo.f C)ontemporary Brirish Hktorl, (998).18 PI\o Fo371/56788/N12332, memorandum issued by N. Ronald 22/g/1916.19 Note to Secretarv of Srate from C.P. Mayhew, Mayhew pryers,23/1/1947.20 W. Scott Lucas and C.J. Morris, 'A Very British Crusade, The Information ResearchDepartnrent and the beginning of the Cold War', in Richard Aldrich (ed.), Bntish IntelligenceStrategy dnd the Cold Wa1 (London, Routledge, 1992), p. 90.21 'Third Force Propaganda', paper to Secretary of State from C.p. Mayhew, Mayhew papers

6i12/1947.22 PRO CAB129/23, C.P.(48)8, 'Furure Foreign Publicity policy' 8/1/1918.23 Smrth, 'Covert British Propaganda', pp. 68-9.24 Bill Jones, The Russia Complex: the British Labour Party an.d the Souiet (Jnion (London,Manchester Universiry lrress, 1977), p. 136.25 Interview '"r,ith Lord Mayherv bv Jan'res Oliver 18/7 / 1995.26 PRO CAB129/23 'Future toreign publiciw policv'Memorandum by Secretary of State forForeign Affairs CP(.+8)8 1/1i1918.27 cited in wavne Knrght, 'Labourite Britain: Amenca's "Sure Friend"? the Anglo-SovietTreary* Issue, 1947,' Diplomatk Historl,.7 (1.983). 270-2.28 Kim Philby, ),[y Silertt II.ar (London. panther. 1968), p. 99.

CHAPTER 4 A Crusade Begins1 Quoted in Smith, 'Covert British Propaganda'.2 Norman Reddarvay inten ier,v with James OiiverJanuarv 1996.3 Annexe D, PR 29191112lg, PRO FO 1110/277.4 PRO FO 1170/176 Letter to Sheridan and Murray from Mclaren 4/B/1949.5 PRO FO111.O/277. 30248.6 PRO FO1110 174-1.77.

7 Foreign OtEce Historians, Note of Developments in 1949, IRD.8 Irrterview rvith Fay Weldon byJames Oliver 28 /11/1997.9 Iriter.rieu. rvith Hugh Lunghi by Paul Lashmar 3/12/1997.

10 IRD, Origins and Establishment of the Foreign Otlice Information Research Departmenr1916-18. Histonans: LIID 9 August 1995 FCO.1.1 rbid.L2 PRO FO1110/328; 'lnforrnation Research Department's Finances', 9/1/1950. The notes forthe meeting, which are partiaily censored, note that the operation in question 'might even resultin a sma11 profit'. With regard to the employment of outside specialists, of which there were somethirty-five, it was noted that, 'If sucl-r a large number were shown under the heading ofInformation Research Department, the functions of that department would not stand up toexamination, more partrcularly since many of its supposed functions could equally be performedby FORD.'13 llobert Mtrett, Through the Back Door (London, pergamon, 1968).1,4 Private source.

15 Interview r,vith Colin Wintle by Richard Fletcher, 1979.16 Interwielu withJohn Cloake byJames Oliver 1,0/12/1997.17 rbid.18 rbid.19 Parrott, Cecll The SerperLt dnd the Nightingale (London, Faber, 1,977), p.24.20 Ibid., p. 47.

191

192 NOTES

21 US National Archives, tron'r London to Sec. of State. Top Secret. No 1993. Ivlay 20. 1'949.

811 .2o2oo / 5-2019 .

22 Dianne Kirby, 'The Chulch of Engiand in the Origins of the Cold War 1945-67' (PhD

thesis, UniversitY of Hull. 1990).

23 The Vatican h;rd been m disgrace for its failr-rre to condernn Fascisrn, but was to achieve

some rerlenrption lor its vigour in attackrng Cotnmunistn.

24 PRO FO 1110i22. CI(+E)13 ot'26i11/1948. PR 1250/23l913G,

25 Foreign Ottrce Histonans. Note of Developrnents rn 19-19, lRD.lb Pl{O FO .11 | - 16.1, t.

27 I)raru.re Kirbr'. 'Church of England in the Origns of the Cold War'.

28 PRO FO371 .',11631 .

29 Foreisn Ottlce Historiatrs, Note of Developments in 1949, IRD.30 These catr norv be seen at the Public Record Ollice, FO975.

-31 Torr\. Sharv, 'The British Popular Press and the Early Cold War', Journal of Contemporary

British History (1998).

32 h'rter-vieu, rvith Norman Reddaway by Anthony Gorst and'W'. Scott Lucas 6/1989.

33 Wesley K. Wark, 'corning in from the cold: British Propaganda and the Red Army

Defectors 19'15-52', Tht lnternatiLtnal History ReuiewlX (i987), 50.

34 Inren,iew rvith Lord lVlayheu. bv-Jarnes oliver 18/7 i1995. Authors' emphasis.

35 PRO FO1110 /217 ,IkD Progress l{epon'36 Andrerv Boyle, j-he Clinate ttf Treasor (London, Coronet 1979)' p.347.

CHAPTER 5 Korea: a Hot War in a Cold'War1 US National Archives, Foreign Senice Serial 93217/11/L948. British Record Group 59

(see note on sources at the end ofreport).2 US Natiglal Archives, LJnder State l)epartment I{ecord code no.841.202xx (xx is

appropliate country code), RC)59.

3 US National Archives, Henderson to Secretary of State no. 469 27/4/1949.811.20245/1-

27.+9, RG 59.,l US National Archir-es. Errclosure to despatch No 3.17, Ap.27 1949.'Cooperation with the

United Kirrgdom on Anti-Cornmunist Propaganda'. 841.20245/4-2749, RG 59'

5 US National Archives, From London to Secretary of State. Top Secret. No. 1674.

30/ ,+/ 1919. 811.20200/ 1-30.t9 1{C5.

6 US National Archives. Personal for Henderson from Kennan. Top Secret. Mry 91949.

81L.20215/ 4-2719.7 US National Archives, Hun-relsine to Souers, 15/3/1918 and PPS enclosure. 861.00/3-1548,

RG 59.

8 US National Archives, Nerv l)elhi to Secretary of State. Top Secret. No.737 25/6/1949.

811.20245/6-22, RG 59.

9 PRO FO1110/208 Despatch no.20 of 21/6/19'+9, PR 1808/20lG.

10 US National Archives, Extract from a letter dated 6 January 1949 from the head of IRD,

Foreign Ofice, to the British Embassy, 841.20246D/1-1049, RG59.

11 See, for example, US National Archives, US reports of meetings of British Defence Co-

ordination Committee, Far East, at the time. RC 8'11'20. RG 59.

12 Thatis,J.B. Smith, Portralt of a Cold lllamor(NewYork, Putnarn,1976)'

13 Interuier.v rvith U. Alexis Johnson by Paul Lashmar, Washington DC 1995.

11 PRO FO37118,+061 FK1015/125Murray to Lord President's Office,4 /7/1950.15 Interwierv rvith the authors, Septenlber 1997. Prior to June 1950 the United States limited

NOTES 193

hear.ry weapons supplies to South Korea to Prevent a rash attack.

16 PRO FO953/628P1013/29 Minute from'Warner to State Department, 9/5/1'950.

1,7 Tony Shaw, 'The Information Research Department of the Foreigrr Ofice and the Korean

War, 1950-53' Journal of Contemporary Britkh Hktory (,998).

18 rbid.19 Museum of Labour History, Labour Party International Department files.

20 Shaw,'lnformation'.21 PRO FO371 i841.78 FK1.661,/12. Minute by A. Rouse, 14/9/1950, FO371./87178

FKL661/1.1,IRD minute October 1950, FO371/84178 FK1661 /77, notes to Lord Henderson,

8/ 11 / 1950.

22 Shaw,'Information'.23 Healey, 1-ime oJ My Life.

21 For a much more detailed account of this, see Susan L. Cam:thers, 'Korea: the Great Brain

Robberv?', Paper presented at the 'Britain and the Cold -War' conference, organized by the

Institute of British Contemporary Historv.July 1997.

25 The authors have spent a good deal of time investigating the claims of germ warfare and feel

that the rlatter is not conclusively resolved either way.

26 MOD Treatment oJ Birish Pisoners oi War in Korea (London, HMSO, 1955).

27 PRO'WO206/-+014.28 PRO FO953i 635 P1013/10/G Burrows from Washington to FO, 9/8/1950.

29 Shaw,'Information'.30 PRO FO371l1063 P10122/22, Adarr 'W'atson telegram to IPD, 21/3/195t. FO371/1063

P10122/32 Circular from Morrison on Overseas Information Services, 14/B/1951.

31. Interview with Adam Watson byJames Oliver 9/3/1998.32 Carruthers,'Korea'.33 PRO FO1110/422.34 Shaw,'lnformation'.35 rbid.36 Kim I1 Sung was the self-proclaimed 'Great Leader' of North Korea until his death rn t996.

lle left behind an underdeveloped agrarian society run on the harshest Stalinist lines with littlecontact u,'ith the outside world. In 1998 North Korea was wtacked by famine.

CHAPTER 6 Offensive: into the 1950s1 Interview ',vith Fay Weldon byJames Olivet 28/11/1997.2 Interview rvith Hugh Lunghi bv Paul Lashmar 3/1,2/1997.

3 Inten iew with Fay Weldon by James Oiiver 28 / 11/ 1997 .

4 rbid.5 rbid.6 rbid.7 rbid.8 Ibid. in spnng 1951 IRD held a long-term planning meeting which set the anti-Communist

themes it would concenrrate on for its worldwide campaign. These were: Sabotage of Peace;

Labour and Social Conditions (this to include 'The Impoverishment of the Workers'); Crime:

Lack of Liberty: Kremlin Imperialism; Opposition to Nationalism; Hostiliry to Islam; Land

Reform; Philosophic Background and Deleat Story. The target ateas were in order of prioriry:

South East Asia; India and Pakistan; Near and Middte East; Italy; -Western Germany; France;

Africa; South America; Scandinavia and Low Countries. (FO11 10/305)

9 Interview with Hugh Lunghi by Paul Lashmar 3/1,2/1997.

194 NOTES

10 rbid.11. Interview with Fay Weldon byJames Oliver 28/17/1997.1.2 IRD, 8.291 The Second Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party (RWP)December 1955.

13 IRD,8.423 The Polkh Generul Election;January 1957.lRD, Bj71 (R); Souiet Pre-Eminence or

'Proletaian Internationalism August 1 956.14 Interview with Fay Weldon byJames Obver 28/11/1997.15 FO1110/377: Letter from Jack

'Ward (Deputy High Commissioner, 'Wahnerheide) toF.R.H. Murray 18r 1r 1951 .

16 PRO FO1110/377,'Diective on Press Interviews with Soviet and Satellite Defecton inCare of Intelligence Division' 1951.

17 Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War Hktory (Oxford,Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 210.18 IRD, B. 347 New Roads to Socialkm May 1956.

19 Gaddis, We Now Know, p.210.20 IRD, B. 393 Can Rakosi Escape Tial? October 7956.21 W. Scott Ltcas, Bitain, the US and the Suez Cnsrt (London, Sceptre, 1996), p.276.22 IRD, B. 399 Souiet Agression in Hungary November 1956.

CHAPTER 7 Nothing but the Tiuth: IRD and the BBC1 Nelson, 'BBC Extemal Services and the Cold War'.2 IRD: Origins and Establishment of the Foreign Office Information Research Department

1946-48. Historians: LRD, no. 9 August 1995 FCO.3 Gary D. Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda: the BBC and VOA in International

Politks, 1956-54 (London, Macmillan, 1996). p.16.4 Interview with Norman Reddaway by Anthony Gorst and W. Scott LucasJune 1989.

5 Interview with Norman Reddaway byJames OliverJanuary 1996.

6 IRD: Origins and Establishment of the Foreign OfEce Information Research Department1946-48. Historians: LRD, no. 9 August 1995 FCO.7 PRO FO371/56886/N12335/5169/38G. Russia Committee Meeting, 17 /9/1946.8 BBC, WAC, E2/324/1. 3/1./ 1947.9 Obseruer 18/8/1985.

10 Mark Hollingsworth, and Richard Norton-Taylor, Blacklkt: the Inside Story of Political Veuing(London, Hogarth Pres, 1988).11 This was AlaricJacob, a Labour Parry supporter who was married to novelist and Marxisthistorian Iris Morley.12 PRO FO1110/1.6/22 Ralph Murray, Minutes, 17/2/1948, cited in Hugh Wilford, Tfte

Information Research Depdrtfient: Britain's Secret Cold War Weapons Reuealed (unpublished paper,1996).

13 PRO FO1110/16 PR10/10/91.3.14 BBC, WAC, E2/324/5,21./5/1952. R.H.K Marett appears to have been working inInformation Policy in 1,952. ln September 1953 he was promoted to counsellor and appointedhead of the Information Policy Department. In the early 1960s, Marett was supervising Under-Secretary overseeing IRD as well as the IPD.15 IRD: Origins and Establishment of the Foreign Office Information Research DepartmentL946-48. Historians :LRD, no. 9 August 95 FCO.1,6 PE 2030 / 5s / 967, PRO FO9s3 / 229 A; Pk 228 / 227 / 91 3, PRO FO1110 / 49.17 PRO FO1110/1,6Pk377, Letter fromJacob to'Warner of 28/5/1948.18 BBC, WAC, E2/324/3, 11/7/1950. According to Stephen Dorrill and Robin Ramsay,

NOTES 195

Kenneth Younger rvas a former senior member of MI5 who had run agents inside Communistorganizations. See Stephen Dorrill and Robin Ramsay, Smear: Wikon and the Secret Srare London,

Fourth Estate. i99l). p.30.19 PRO FO1110/84, PR 578/578/913 of23/7/1948. FO1110/ss, PF-1292/265/913 of9/12/1948.20 PRO FO1110/33. PR 902/71/91.3 Minutes of the Russia Committee, 14/10/1948,.21 BBC, WAC, E2/324/2, 7949. Tangye Lean wrote to Ralph Murray on 18 October and

received a letter from Murray with corrections on 17 November. See BBC, WAC,E2/324/2.22 Nelson, 'BBC External Services'.

23 Report of 6/8/1958 totheCentralCommitteesignedbyL. Ilyichev,A.RomanovandG.Kazakov, CPA, Fond 5, Op. 33 Case 75, 163-7 .

24 Smith, 'Covert British Propaganda', pp. 70-1.25 Interview with Lord Mayhew byJames Oller 18/7 /1995.26 Michael Evans, 'MI6 Fed Cold War Propaganda to BBC' The Times 20/10/1997.27 Smith, 'Covert British Propagtnda', p.73.28 Ibid., p. 73.

29 He was later head of IRD berr'veen 1962 and 1966.

30 BBC, WAC, E2/321/4,16/3/1951.31 BBC, WAC, E2/324/4,16/3/1951,32 rbid.33 Grace Wyndham Goldie was the edttor of Panorama rndhired Woodrow Wyatt as a reporter

in 1955

34 Interview with Norman Reddaway by Anthony Gorst and-W'. Scott Lucas 6/1989.35 Interview with Gordon Waterfield by Richard Fletcher 21/11/79.36 PRO FO 371/66370/N81.14/271/38, Sir Orme Sargent to Sir M. Peterson, BritishAmbassador in Moscow 28/7 /1.947.37 BBC, WAC R34/1580/1, Note by A.D. Dodds Parker, Foreign Office Minister1,1/10/1956.38 BBC WAC R34/1580/1, Note undated, but annotated as'Late September or EarlyOctober', Top Secret.

39 'W. Scott Lucas, Dhided We Stand: Britain, the IJS and the Suez Crur pondon, Sceptre 1991), p. 287.

40 Nelson. 'BBC External Services'.

CHAPTER 8 The Medium is the Message: IRD and MI61 Interview rvrth Fav'Weldon byJames Oliver 28/17/1997.2 Intervierv with Lord Owen by the authors 1,0/1,997.

3 Interview rvith ex-CIA ofEcer by Richard Fletcher, Washington DC, 1979.

4 He took over from Maurice Oldfield. It must be said that Rennie was a Foreign Office

career ofEcer and not an MI6 career officer.

5 Ann Elwell obituary Daily Telegraph 1/t996.6 On a number of occasions partisans, provoked by aggressive allied radio broadcasts, had

launched campaigns against Nazi forces. Allied forces were unable to support these dangerous

attacks and the partisans were overrun and destroyed by German forces.

7 CAB 130/37.8 Anthony Verrier, I-ooking Class War (London, Jonathan Cape, 1983).

9 PRO FOt1.10/226 PR1463/38/G Report by Wamer.10 BBC, WAC, E2/324/4,23/2/lg5l.Information officen in Egypt put the respective audiences

of the BBC, Sharq al Adna and Egyptian State Broadcasring respectively at 65, 35 and 100 per cent.

195 NOTES

1.1 rbid.1.2 Richard Beeston, Itokingfor Trouble (London, Braseys, 1997).

13 FO1110/235: PR118/38/G, PR119/38/G, PR120/38/G.14 A number of sources assert that Tom Little was in MI6.15 Jan Morris. Conundrum (London, Faber & Faber, 197,1).

16 Selwyn Lloyd, Sae.z 1956 (Nerv York, 1978).

17 Swinburn had spent nearlv thifi years in Egpt and had been a lecturer at Cairo Universiry.

When British subjects rvere dismrssed fiom the univeniry staffin 1952, he joined the ANA.18 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (15083) 8-I5/9/1.956.19 Luca:. Diuided. p. l13.20 USNA, RG59. CDF,774.00(W)/9-656, SANA to State Department, Despatch 189,

6/9 / 1956.

2 t Lue as, Diuided. p. 132.

22 Ibid., pp. 116-17.23 Ibid., p. 132.

24 US National Archives, United States O{Ece of Strategic Services documents.

25 Interview with Gordon Waterfield by Richard Fletcher 21/11/79 at Travellers C1ub,

London. File 30/3-NA,'Waterfield.26 'News Agencies - their structure of operation' UNESCO 1953.

27 Interview with Bob Petry by Richard Fletcher 4/12/1.980.28 Verrier, Looking Class War, p. 750.

29 Ibid., pp. 154-5.30 Private source.

31 Extract fronr speech made by Denis Healey MP in the House of Commons; LPID; Eastern

Europe; 3/1.1,/1956.

32 Extracts from Mr Hugh Gaitskell's Speech; LPID; Eastem Europe; 6/11/1956.33 Lucas, Diuidrd. p. 276.

34 Kodumaa 13/I0/1971., from FBI files see Lobster 76. Surprisingly, a lot of the statements made

by Philby about MI6 after his defection were accurate where checkable.

35 This on the surface seerns to be a wild claim, yet as late as the 1970s it was widely known inFleet Street that many well-known joumalists, especially foreign correspondents were close to

MI6. How ciose and whether they were actually paid, we will probably never know. No one

demonstrates the interchangeability between journalist and spy in his generation better than

Philby, who, of course. after suspicion fell on him, became rn Obsewer correspondent.

CHAPTER 9 Agencies of Change: the News Agency Nefwork1 Interview with Norman Reddaway by W. Scott Lucas and Anthony Gorst; June, 1989.

2 Tom Clarke had been editorial director of the Nerps Chronicle until 1933. He was depury

director of the Nervs Division of the Ministry of Infonnation from 1939-40 and in 7941/2 he

organized British propaganda in Latin America as a representative of Hulton Press. His activities

were reported on with some amusement by the US State Department. Tom Clarke's Word of the

Englishman (London, Hutchinson, 1942) explains his trip's objective: 'keeping alive the Britishjoumalism tradition' (p. 11) dunng and after the war.

3 Thrs sectlon is based on intervier,r's with nvo tbrmer senior officers of the SOE in 1.979, and

Annual Returns at Companies Registration office, London.4 Inten'iew with Bob Petty by Richard Fletcher 4/12/L980.5 Articles of Association NAFEN, NAFEN (Asia) Ltd and ANA (Cairo) Ltd.6 INFA 551 Prcss and Aduertkers Year Book,5th edn, INFA (India News and Features Agency)

(Neu'Delhi, 1966).

NOTES

7 Tom Little's friendship with Nasser was such that he even allowed Litde to remain in Egyptfor a year or so after Suez.

B John Lawrenson, and Lionel Barber Tlrc Pice oJ Truth: the story oJ the Reuters df,f, nillions(Edinburgh, Mainstream Publishing, 1985), pp. 99-101.9 That is in charge ofbroadcasting to the Indian countries and Iran.

10 BBC Yearbooks and Stalf Lis* 1958-64.11 Newspaper Press Directory, annual editions from 1955 to 1968.1,2 Intervieu'wirh Gordon Waterfield by Richard Fletcher 21/11/79.13 David Leigh and Paul Lashmar,'UK Propaganda went on in Peacetirr,e' obseruer,20/ 12/ 1981.

14 Obseruer 29/1./1978.15 They also claim that no Reuters correspondent was appointed to an important post overseas

r.r'ithout first checking that he was acceptable to the British Embassy. (Defenden of this practicesay that it was essential for the correspondent to be on good terms with the embassy, as this wouldbe an important source of nens.)16 According to some sources Ons1olv, al1er leaving the Foreign Office, went to work for Staror Globe News Agencres. I-obster 77.17 Profile of Cranley Onslorv bv Andreu'Roth, Neu Statesman.

l8 No. 1095456, Registry of Business Narnes, London.19 Little's friends ponray him as a dedrcated joumalist specializing in the Middle East. He r,r,as

also an anti-Comnrunist and u'ent on to be one of the founden of Brian Crozier's Institute of theStudy of Conflict. See l-o6-rrer 11.

20 These were Gl.vns Nominees Ltd and a body called the Detur Fund. Glyns Nominees wasthe wholiy owned subsidiary of Williams and Glyns bank. The Detur Fund gave an address inNorth London, c/o S.c. Rogers, Edgware, Middiesex, a williams and Glyns branch man. Itcould not be traced in business, cooperative or charitable directories. INRAR made a totaloperating loss of d20,277 up ro 7971.21 James Holburn, telephone conversation with Richard Fletcher 13/7/1.979.22 Leigh and Lashmar, 'UK Propaganda Went on in Peacetime'.23 13,1 Lo.,ver N1arsh. London SE1.24 Permanenr Secretary, Ministry of State, Kenya, 1959-63.25 Biographic details are frorn the Kenya Press Directory (MJB Productions, 1968).26 Published by Constable in \977.27 D.R' Mankekar, One l|'ay Free Flotu: Neo-Colonialism yid News Media (Claion Books, 1978).28 Richard Fletcher, 'Bntrsh Propaganda since world war II - a case Stedy', Media, cuhureand Society, 1982.

CHAPTER 10 Imperial Adventures: IRD and the Colonies1 PRO FO953/1695,John H. Peck to L. C. Gltss;22/6/1956.2 PRO FO953/1.695,John H. Peck to L. C. Glass22/6/1956.3 'Winning the war and losing the empire are the most inrmediately striking developments of

the period'. See PJ. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction,1914-1990, (London, Longman, 1993), p.265.4 Historian Andrerv Roadknight noted, 'the United Nations (UN) Declaration on National

Independence of March 1943 . . . committed colonial powers to setting timetables for theliberation of their colonies. On the face of it, by the middle of the Second'World War, the USand its allies had agreed on the principie of independence for colonies and also on a

mechanism for bringing it about.' See Roadknight, 'United States Policy Towards Indonesia1915-1919

1 9',t

198 NOTES

5 David Fieldhouse, 'The Labour Governments and the empire-commonwealth, 1945-5f inRitchie Ovendale (ed.) The Forcign Polky oJ the Bitish Ltbour Covemments, 1945-1951 (Leicester

University Pres, 1984) p. 98.

6 Cain and Hopkins, Bitkh Imperialism, p.279.7 lbid., p.277.8 lbid., p. 280.

9 Brian Lapping, The End of Empire (London, Paladin, 1989) , p. 202.10 Michael R. Stenson, 'Repression and Revolt: the origins of the 1948 CommunistInsurrection in Malaya and Singapore' Papen in International Strdies, South East Asia Series, Centerfor Intemational Studres (1969), p. 2. See also Michael R. Stenson, Industial Conflict in Malaya:

Prelude to tlrc Commun*t Reuolt oJ 1918 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1970).

11 The PMFTU rvas an MCP 'front'. See Stenson 'Repression and Revolt', p. 5.

12 Lapping, End oJ Enpire, p. 221..

13 PRO FO953/1637 "lhe Work of the Regional Information OfEce at Singapore'.11 rbid.15 PRO FO1110/386; Minute by T.S. TuJL8 /1/1952.16 Interview with John Cloake byJames Oliver 10/12/1997.17 PRO CO537/5698 'The Colonial Empire Today: Summary of Our Main Problems andPolicies'CC) Reladons Department paper annex 5/1950.18 PRO FO371176005 Top Secret letter fromJ.H.

.Watson to O.H. Morns 1./12/1949.

19 Susan Carruthers, Winning Hearts and Minds: British Couernments, the Media and ColonialCounter-Insurgency 1944*1950 (London, Leicester Univeniry Pres), p. 97.

20 Cain and Hopkins, British bnpeialkm, pp.266-7.21 [bid., pp.277-8.22 Lapping, End of Empire, p.209.23 Carnrthers, Winningp. 162.24 Quoted in Carmthers, Winningp. 163.25 Susan Carruthers, 'A Red Under Every Bed?: Anti-Communist Propaganda and Britain'sResponse to Colonial Insurgency' Contemporary Record 9 (2) 1995 , p. 306.26 Carnrthers, Winning, pp. 1.61.-2.

27 See Christopher Hitchens, Hostage to History: Cyprus,from the Ottomans to Kissinger (London,Verso, 1997), pp. 33-4.28 Ibid., p. 36.

29 Ibid., p. 37

30 Ibid.31. Quoted in Lapping, End of Empire, p. 390.32 Ibid., p.390.33 PRO CO926l180 Cipher from Washington (IVatson) to Foreign Ofice 13/8/1954.34 PRO CO926l180 D.C. Hopson to D. Williams 16/8/1954.35 PRO CO926l180 Sir P. Dixon, Inward Saving Telegram From New York to ForeignOffice 1.6/8/1954.36 PRO CO926l180 Note for UK Delegation to United Nations 8/1954.37 PRO CO926l180 Hesmondhalgh to Cope 26/8/1954.38 Carnrthen, Winning, p.205.39 PRO CO296l180 Minute 18/8/1,954.40 PRO CO296l180 Minute 18/8/1954.41 Lapping, End of Empire, p. 399.42 PRO FO953/1695 Peck to Gray 13/7 /1956.43 Lapping, End of Empire, p. 390.

NOTES

44 PRO FO953/1695 Minute M.E. Cox 17/7/1956.45 'The BBC and Cyprus', New Statesman 14/12/1957.

CHAPTER 11 Spreading the'Word: IRD publishes7 Cuardian l1/7 /1996.2 'Orwell is revealed in role of state informer' Daily Telegraph 12/7 /1996.3 'Orwell's d6butante friend tells of role in writer's "betrayal" list' Cuardian 13/7 /1996.4 PRO FO1il0/221 .

5 PRO FO1110/221PR920.6 PRO FO111o/221PR3361.7 Philiip Deery, 'Confronting the Cominform: George Orwell and The Cold.W.ar Offensive

of the Information Research Department 1948-50', l-abour Hi*ory,73 (ll/lgg7).8 PRO FO1110/189 PR 1,13s/11/G.9 PRO FO1110/189. Letter from Orwell to Kirwan 6/4/1949 p. 1.

10 Cuardian 11. /7 / 1,996.1l 'Socialist icon who became Big Brother', Daily Telegraph,22/6/199g.12 The Colleaed Essays,Journalism and btters of George Orwell. Vol. 111- As I Please 1943-1945(Harmondsworth. Penguin, 1970), pp. 457-8.13 Mayhew Papers, 6/1.2/7917.14 The authors are grateful to David Chipp, former\ of the Press Association for lending themhis copy.

15 Philby, My Silent llar, p. 101.16 PRO FO 1110/80 PP.523/523/913G,July 1948.17 PRO FO1110/221 PR505 - Proposal to Organize Publication of Cheap Books, for Anti-Communist Publicit,v Purposes, sponsored where possible by Publishers with known Leftafiliations.18 PRO FO1110/221 PR15891,9 Correspondence berween DrJ.E.M. Latham and the authon 1997.20 British National Bibliography , 1.951-197 | .

21 Brian crozier, Free Agent: the (Jnseen war 1941-1991 (London, Harpercollins,lgg4),pp. s1*7.22 ArthurBottomley, The [Jse and Abuse of Trade Unlors (Ampersand, 1963), p. g5.23 Smith, 'Covert British Propaganda', p. 177.24 Letter from Bryan Magee toJames Olwer 14/6/1975.25 Letter from Michael Kaser to James Oliver 1,2/6/1995.26 Interview with Adam Watson by James OIwer 9/3/1998. 'W'atson discussed IRD's workwith both Deakin and Brig Fitzroy Mclean, who followed Deakin to Yugoslavia. Watson recalled,'those people had this operarion [IRD] in their minds'.27 Smith, 'Covert British Propaganda', p.76.28 Letter from Bryan Magee to James Ollet 14/6/1995.29 Obseruer 29/1/7978.30 Interview with Stephen Wans by Richard Fletcher 27 /1/1978.31 Filed at the Companies Registration Ofice, London.

199

CHAPTER 12 Internal Affairs: IRDI Domestic Campaigns1 'Reds "Squander" Union d20,000' Daily Mail 15/11/1956.2 Interview with Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker byJames Okver 25/7 /1997.3 Peter Wright, Spycatcher, (Australia, Heinemann, 1987), p. 55.

200 NOTES

4 Dodds-Parker recalled of Reddau,ay, 'He'd just bring in a file and say, "We recommendthis." It would be 6 p.m. or 7.30 p.m., and "The Secretary of State is unavailable and we want toget on with it quickiy. Could 1,ou initial it?" It wouldn't be anything major. It was probablygetting some - I don't iike the r.vord "tame" joumalist - but there were people in the war, in thepress, rvho were either on your side or they weren't.'5 IRD sources rnaintain that thrs allegation did not come from them.

6 Victor Bailev. 'The "Sprt and Polish" Demonstrations' in Victor Bailey, (ed.) Forgetl in Fire:

ihe Hbtory of the Fire Brigades Lrnlon (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1992).

7 'Trade tJnion Leaders Resign from Communist Pxq' The Tines 14/1.1/1956.8 'Chief Reds Meet A1I Dav As Parry Shrinks' Daily Mail 16/11/1956.9 CAB 1i0/37.

10 See Peter Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War (Califonia, Stanford lJniversiry Press,

1 e88) .

11. Dorrill and Ramsay, Smear!, p.44-5. As noted, this is denied by Dodds-Parker.12 Eric Shaw, Discipline antl Discord in the Labour Party (Manchester lJniversity Press, 1988),

P. 59

13 Mayhew P apers 17 / 5 / 79 48, 17 / 6 / 19 48 and 9 /7 / 19 18.14 Healey, Time of My Life.

15 PRO FOi110/15 Letter from Denis Healey toJ.H. W"atson 2/71/1948.16 Healey, Time of My LiJe, p. 109.17 PRO FO 1110 / 183 Pk3217 / 8/9. Extract from SM/M (40) Second Meeting, 12/7 / 1949.18 Mayhew Papers 24/3/ 1948.19 John Demelis to William Green2S/2/1949'Convention file 1948', papers of 'William

Clreen, President of Arnerican Federation of Labor.20 J.O. Rennie to Saul Rose 1.6/3/1955.21. 'Woodrow Wyan, The Peril in Our ,l4id-sr (London, Phoenix House, 1956). At that timePhoenix House u,as sponsored bv IRD to publish Background Books.22 Frank Foulkes. President of the ETU in the 1950s. Frank Haxell, General Secretary of the

ETU in the 1950s.

23 See Wyatt's unsiglned article 'How Communists Run a Trade Union' New Statesman

7 / 12/ 1957 .

24 Quoted in Henry Pelling, A Hktory of British Trade Unionism (London, Penguin, 1992),p. 241.25 John L1oyd, Light and Liberty: the Hktory of the EETPU (London, 'tr/eidenfeld & Nicolson19eQ, p. 457.26 Private source.

27 Frank (later Lord) Chapple rvas a Communist who had left the CPGB over the Sovietinvasion of Hungary in 1956.

28 Lloyd, Light and Liberty, p. 486.29 'The Future of the ETU' New StatesmanT/7/1961.30 BottomJey, Use and Abuse of Trade Unions, p. 41..

31 Lloyd, Light and Liberty, p. 470.32 Aidan Crawley, 'The Hidden Face of British Commrnrsrr,' Sunday Times 28/10/1962, a

four-part series reprinted as a pamplrlet.33 Interview with Lord Mayhew byJames Oliver 18/7 /1995.34 Obituary of SirJohn Peck Independent 20/l/1995.35 J.H. Peck to Canon H.'Waddams 29/9/1952 CFR papers.

36 For a ful1 account see Dianne Kirby, 'The Church of England and the Cold 'War NuciearDebate' T*entieth Cenrury Bitkh History 4 (3) (1993), pp. 25G-83.

NOTES 201

37 Ibid.

CHAPTER 13 IRD's Fellow tavellers1 Brian Crozrer, Free Agent, p. 55.2 Ruth Dudley Edu.ards, The Pursuit oJ Reason: The Economist, 1843-1993 (London, Hamish

Hamilton, 1993) pp. 900-1.3 rbid.4 ir-rtervierv with Brian Crozier byJames Oller 15/1,/1997.5 From documents supplied by David Benn.6 'lVark, 'Coming ir.r from the Cold', p. 68.7 Fyvel \tu'rote a Background Book, What is Culture? In the early 1960s Fyvel wrote The

Insecure Ofenders: Rebellious Youth in the Welfare State f$ Pelican Books, primarily a study of theTeddy boy phenomena. In his biography he fails to menrion his IRD work.8 PI\O FO111O/277 PP.291,9/112/G, and FO1110/ 359, PR 110/5/G.9 Srnith, 'Covert Rritish Propaganda'.

10 Obituary of Victor Zorza Cudrdian 23/3/1996.11, rbid.12 Private source.

13 Intervrerv r.r,ith Norman Reddan'av by w. Scott Lucas and Anthony Gorst, June 1989.14 Penkovskv rs attnbuted as providing some warning of the Cuban Missile Crisis.15 David Leigh, 'The Deparrment that never was', Cuardian 27 /1/1997.16 interv-ierv w-ith Nomran Reddarvay byJames Oller 9/7/1996.17 Crozier, Free -AgerLt, pp, 57, 86.18 Intervier,,'u'ith Robert Conquest by Richard Fletcher 25/1/1978.19 Letter from Lord BelofftoJames Oliver 13/6/1995.

CHAPTER 14 A Mirror Image: the CIA1 Peter Coleman, 'IJte Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress of Cuhural Freedom and the Strugle Jor the

Mind of Postu,dr Ewope (London, Collier Macmillan Publishen, 1989), p. 1.

2 Iain Hamilton. Koestler: a Biography (London, Secker & Warburg, 1982), p. 190.3 Paul Kennedy, The Rke and Fall of the Creat Powers: Ercnomi Change and Military Conflict fronr

1500 to 2000 (London, Fontana Pres, 1988), p. 480.4 CIA History Staff Cultural Cold'War: Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, Sradles

irr Intelligente 1.995.

5 rbid.6 Hamilton, Koestler, p. 28.7 Coleman, Liberal Conspirucy, p 27.

8 rbid.9 In his historv of the CCF, The Liberal Conspiacy, Peter Coleman described how the hardline

message was carried by Lasky, Koestler and their supporters through intensive caucusing andorganization, through u,'hich they rvere able to maintain the initiative. See Coleman p. 27.10 rbid.11 Ibid., p. 28.

12 Congress for Cultural Freedom, Press Reiease # p. 44 28/6/1950.13 ibid., p. 195.

14 Hamilton, Koestler, p.207.15 Coleman, Liberal Conspiracy, p.9i6 Interview with MichaelJosselson by Richard Fletcher 5/5/L972.

202 NOTES

17 Coleman, Liberal Conspiracy, p. 63.

i8 Ibid p. 60. Josselson wrote to Spender that 'The Congress is not primarily interested in'eaching readers in England and the IJS because a Communist or neutralist problem does not exist

n those rvvo countri.es.' See Coleman p. 61.

19 Hugh Wilford, "'Winning F{earts and Minds": American Cultural Strategies in the ColdWar', Borderlines, I, .1 $une 1994), p. 321.l0 Coleman, Liberal Conspiacy, p. 59.l1 lbid p.77.22 Conversation benveen Andre*, Roth and the authors.l3 Coleman, Liberal Conspiracy, p. 185.

14 EncounterlV (6) 5/6/1955.2s rbid., xr (1), 11/7 /1958.26 rbid., r, (1),56 10/1956.27 rbid., rx, (2) 8/19s7.28 Coleman, Liberal Conspiracy, p.77.29 EncounterXYl (1) 61/1961.l0 Coleman, Liberal Conspiacy, p. 184.11 Ibid., p. 12.

32 lbid., p. 18s.

l3 Richard Fletcher 'How CIA Money Took the Teeth Out of British Socialism' in P. Ageernd L. Wolf (eds) Dirty Work: The CA in Western Europe (Lordon, Zed Press, 1981),p. 193.i4 Recapitulation Des Seminaires CCF 30/3/3.l5 Fletcher, 'CIA Money' in Agee and VTolf (ed$ Dity Work, p. 1.93.

16 Hamilton, Koestler, p. 197.\7 Coleman, Liberal Conspiracy, pp.222-3.38 lbid., p.223.39 Ibid., p.226.10 Tom Bradon, 'l'm glad the CIA is "immoral".' Saturday Euening Post 20/5/1967.+1 rbid.12 rbid.13 William Blum, Tfte CLA: A Forgotten History (London, Zed Press, 1986), p. 115.

44 Crozier, Free Agent, p. 61.

"+5 Bradon, 'I'm glad the CIA is "immoral".' .

16 Coleman, Liberal Conspiracy, p. 61.17 Bradon, 'I'm glad the CIA is "immoral".'.+8 Marchetti and Marks, The CIA dnd the Cub of Intelligence, p. 336.19 Coleman, Liberal Conspiracy, p.70.s0 lbid., p. 71.

51 lbid., p.72.52 Blum, The CA,p. 144.53 J. Ranelagh, The Agency: the Rise and Fall o;f the CIA (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson,1986), p.246.54 Fletcher, 'CIA Money' in Agee and Wolf (ed$ Dirty Work, p. 199.55 P. Agee, (ed.) CIA the Pike Reporr (Nottingham, Spokesman Books, 1977), p. 190.>6 Philip M. -faylor, Munitions of the Mind: Wm PrcpagandaJrom the Ancient World to the Nuclear

.4ge (.Wellingbrough, Patrick Stephens, 1990), p.224.57 Blurn, The CA, p. 1.16.

58 Bradon, 'I'm glad the CIA is "immoral".'59 Fletcher, 'CIA Money' in Agee and Wolf (edg, Dirty Work, p. 200.

NOTES 203

60 Marchetti and Marks, The CA and the Cuh of Intelligence, p. 338.61 Interview with Michael Ivens byJames Oller, 19/7/1996.62 Time Out 20-26/6/1975.63 Ibid.64 Crozier, Free Agent, p. 52. Crozrer also appears to have used the trip to collect informationfor MI6 at the request of MI6 oficial Ronald Franks.

65 Ibid., p. 64. According to a handwritten note on the 1968 memo to Helns, the FWF was

'run with the knowledge and cooperation of British intelligence'. See Steve .Weissman, 'The CIA

Makes the News', in Agee and Wol[ (ed$ Dirty Work, p.206.66 Crozier, Free Agent, p. 68. John Hay Whitney also published the lnternational Herald Tibune.

67 'Weissman, Steve 'The CIA Makes the News' Agee, P. and'W'ole L. (eds) Dirty Work: The

CIA in Western Europe London, Zed Press 1981 p. 206. According to Dorrill and Ramsey, 'It is

probable, in our view, that the CIA's expansion in 1965 of the London-based propaganda front,Forum World Features was a response to the political and financial pressure on IRD.' See

Dorrill and Ramsey, Snear!, p. 71.0.

68 Russell 'Warren Horve, 'Asset Unwitting: Covering the World for the CIA', More (Mey1,978).

69 Crozier, Free Agent. p. 69.70 'W'arren Howe, 'Asset Unrvitting'.71 rbid.72 Time Out 20-26/6/ 1975.

73 'Warren Howe, 'Asset Unr.vitting'.74 Crozier, Free Agent, p.70.75 Ibid., p. 73.

76 'Warren Horr.e,'Asset Unwitting'. According to Russell, Crozier'ousted'Gately, butCrozier maintains that Gately was merely transferred to other duties. See Crozier, Free Agent,

P.71.77 Crozier, Free Agent, p.73.78 Warren Horve, 'Asset Unwitting'.79 rbid.80 Intervierv u,ith Bnan Crozier byJames Olser 15/1./1.997.81 Crozier, Free Agent, pp. 83-4.82 Ibid., pp. 109-10.83 Cuardian 20t 12/ 1q76.

CHAPTER 15 The Fat Years: the 1960s1 Crozier, Free Agent, p. 51.2 Some d10,500,000 in today's money.3 Letter from Norman Reddaway to James Oliver 25/10/1997.4 Lucas and Morris, 'A Very British Crusade' in Aldrich (ed.), Bitkh Intelligence, p. 106.

5 Private IRD sources.

6 East German Spearhead in Africa 8.588(R); IRD 18/1960.7 Private source.

8 Interview with Lord Mayhew byJames Oliver 18 /7 /1995.9 Gaddi, We Now Know, p.261.

10 Ibid. p.280.1.1. tbid. p.279.12 Private source.

13 Private source.

NOTES

:4 Private source.

5 Private source.

.6 Ann Lane, 'Neutralism, non-alignment and British Cold War strategies 1958-1962' Paper

Siven at the conference, 'Britain and the Cold War' organized by the Institute of ContemporarySritish History, July 1997.t7 John Dumoga, ffica Between East and West (Background Book, 1969), p. 114.i8 Ibid., p. 121.

L9 8 Bhagat Singh Mang, Nerv Delhi 1i0001.l0 Private source.

l1 Letter from Mr H.W. Kirrg The Times 9/3/1983.12 Letter to the authon 23/4/1998.13 Conversation with Hi1ary Ktng27 /6/1.997.

CHAPTER 16 Indian Summer: IRD and the EEC1 Alaistair McAlpine, Once aJolly Bagman (London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1997).

2 'Revealed: How MI6 men funded Euro Propaganda drive' Sunday Telegraph 27 /4/1,997.3 Private source.

4 Interr,'iew with Norman Reddaway by Scott Lucas and Anthony Gont, 6/1989.5 rbid.6 Later disarmament co-ordinator, FCO, 1983-4.7 Interview with Ernest Wistrich byJames Oller 19/1.2/1996.8 lbid.9 Interview with Geoffrey Tucker byJames Oliver 30/5/1996.

l0 Ibid.11 Interview with Nigel Ryan by Paul Lashmar 4/1.997.12 Interview with Marshall Stewart by Paul Lashmar 4/1997.i3 Interview with Michael Ivens byJames Oliver 19/1/1996.14 Intervie*'with Geoffrey Tucker byJames Oliver 30/5/1996.t5 Ernest Wistrich interview withJames Oliver 1996

16 McAlpine, Once aJolly Bagman.

17 Uwe Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Bitain Joined the Common Market (London,Thames & Hudson, 1973).

i8 Private sources.

l9 Sir Richard Body,'The 1975 Referendum On Europe' Contemporary Record l0 (3),pp. 93-920 Time Out 23/5/1975.21 Interview with Sir Richard Body by Paul Lashmar 1997.

22 Roger Broad and Tim Geiger, 'The 1975 British Referendum on Europe: a WitnessSeminar' Contemporary Record 70 (2), 1996.

CHAPTER 17 Painting it Red: IRD and Northern Ireland1 Private source.

2 Par;JFoot., Who Frumed Colin Wallace? (London, Pan Books, 1989), pp. 39-40.3 Frank Kitson, fuuu Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peaceleeeping (London, Faber

& Faber, 1.971),p. 199.

4 J. Bowyer Bell' The lrish Troubles: a Ceneration oJ Violence, 1967-1992 (London, Gill &Macmillan, 1993), p. 229.

5 Ibid., p. 167.

6 Foot, Wro Framed Colin Wallace?, p. 16.

NOTES 205

7 Quoted in ibid., p. 17.

8 Quoted in ibid., pp. 17-8.9 Interview with Colin'W'allace byJames Okver 26/2/1996.

10 Ibid.1.1 8e11, lnslr Troubles, p.230.12 Interview with Colin Wallace byJames Oliver 26/2/1996.1,3 rbid.14 rbid.15 Ibid.16 rbid.17 rbid.t8 'MI5 on'frril' This Week26/4/1.990.1.9 Interview with Colin Wallace byJames Oliver 26/2/1.996.20 Interview with Michael Ivens byJames Okver 19/7 /1996.21 Private source-

22 Quoted in Dorrill and Ramsey, Smear!, p. 247.23 'MI5 on Trial', Tftrs Week26/4/1990.24 Interview with Colin Wallace byJames Oliver 26/2/1996.25 Wright, Spycatcher, p.359.26 Ibid., p. 361.27 Interview with Colin Wallace byJames Oller 26/2/1996.28 Wright, Spycatcher, p. 369.29 Ibid.30 Interview with Colin.W'allace byJames Oliver 26/2/1996.31 'MI5 on Tial', This Week26/4/1990.32 Ibid.33 'Wilson was the target of MI5 'malcontents' Guardian 16/8/1996.34 Interview with Coiin Wallace byJames Oliver 26/2/1.996.35 The IRA and Northern lreland: Aims, Policy, Tactics 10/1974.36 Interview with Colin'Wallace byJames Oliver 26/2/1.996.37 The IRA and Northern lreland: Aims, Polky, Tactics l0/1974.38 Kenneth O. Morgan, The People's Peace: British History, 1945-1989 (Oxford, OxfordUniversiry Press, 1990), p. 333.

39 'Memo reveals "propaganda war" in Ulster' Guardian 10/11/1995.40 Tlrc IRA and Northern lreland: Aims, Polky, Tauics 1,0/1,974.

41 Private source.

42 The IRA and Northern lreland: Aims, Policy, Tactis 10/1974.43 Foor, Mrc Framed Colin Wallace?, p. 94-5.44 Quoted in ibid., p. 95.

45 Ibid., p. 96.

46 Quoted in ibid., p. 98.

47 David Barzilay, The Bitkh Army in Ulsrer (Belfast, Century, 1973).

48 'The Army in Uister' Euening Standard 24/10/1973.49 'How the British Army Wins Hearts and Minds' Time Ort 14-20/10/1,977.50 'Still Dark in Paranoia Gulch' Nerz Statesman €t Society 9/2/1990.

CHAPTER 18 The Fail1 Crozier, Free Agent, p. 86.

,06 NOTES

2 lbid., pp. 101-5.3 l-ob*er 16 (1988).

4 Interview with Brian Crozier byJames Oller 75/1./97.

5 Crozier, Free Agent, p.89.6 Ibid., p. 90.

7 Interview with Brian Crozier by James Okver 15/1/97 .

8 Crozier, Free Agent, p. 96.

9 'Softening up the'West' Daily Tslgtr.rP 12/3/1.973.0 ISC Special Report 'Ner'v Dimensions of Security in Europe', ISC 5/1975.1 Chapman Pincher. T'he Secret Offensiue (London, Sidgwick &Jackson, 1985), pp. 239-40.2 Intervierv rvith Adam'Watson byJames Oliver 9/3/1998.3 ISC Special Report 'Sources of Conflict in British Industry', ISC 2/1974.1 Crozier, Free Agent, p. 106.

i5 Lener fromJohn'W'hitehorn (CBI) to Brian Crozier 24/1/1972.t 6 lbid.17 Crozier, Free Agent, pp. 1,07 /8.l8 Interview with Brian Crozier byJames Olivet 15/l/1997.l9 Crozier, Frce Agent, p. 708.:0 Private source.

21 'Death of the Department that never Wts'; Cuardian 27 /l/1978.!2 'CIA makes the News' Time Out20-2.6/6/1975.),3 'Conflicting Accounts' Time Out 29 August to 4 September 1975.

)1 Private source.

15 Private source.

26 Private source.

)7 Crozier, Free Agent, p. 120.

l8 Pincher, Secret Ofensiue, p. 31,1.In a footnote, Pincher also alleged that IRD may also have-eceived money for its operations from the CIA. According to Pincher, his source for this was an

MI5 informant who had told him that IRD had been wound up as a result of CIA involvement in:he wake of the Watergate revelations. See Pincher p. 356. When questioned on this, Pincher was

:nable to expand or recall the allegation.29 Private source.

]0 'A Briel Secret Glimpse' Guarilian 1.6/6/1978.11 David Owen, Time to Declare (London, Penguin Books, 1991), p. 348.

\2 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (London, Secker & 'Warburg, 1989), p. 272.

13 New Statesman E Society 3/3/1995 p. 15.

14 Private source.

15 See Crozier, Frce Agent, pp.96-7.16 Interview with Lord Owen by the authors 7 /11/1997.17 Paul Mercer, 'Peace' oJ the Dead (London, Policy Research Publications, 1986), pp. 87.

18 Interview with Lord Owen by the authors 7 /11/1997.19 Quoted in Michael Neison, War of the Black Heauens: The Battles oJ Western Broadcasting in the

CoM IAu (London, Brassey's, 1997), p. 138.

+0 Interview with Brian Crozier by James Oliver 15/ L / 1997 .

+1 IRD, Background Brief 'Two Standards on D6tente' 11/1975.+2 'Revival of Political W'arfare' The Times l/3/1983.43 Interview with Colin Wallace byJames Oliver 26 /2/1996.14 Interview with Lord Owen by the authors 7 /11./1997.,15 Ibid.

NOTES 207

46 Owen, Tine to Declarc, p.34g.47 Interview with Lord Owen by rhe authors 7 /11./1997.48 Interview with Lord Mayhew byJames Obver 1g/7 /1995.49 'Death of the Department that Never Was' Cuardian 27 /l/1g7g.50 'How the Fo waged Secrer propaganda war in Britain' obseruer 29/r/197g.51 'The Ministry of Truth' Ineller 3/797g.52 'Another exposure - by TASS' Cuardian 31/1/l.g78.Interestingly, this article was written byIRD contact Hella Pick.53 'Death of the Department that Never Was, Cuardian 27 /l/197g.54 rbid.55 kveller 3/7978.s6 rbid.

17 'Death of the Department that Never was' cuadian 27/1/1g7g. Mayhew,s reference roblack propaganda is lamented widelv among ex-IRD personner as having given the wrongimpression of IRD's work.58 Euening Standard 7 /2/1978.59 Crozier, Free Agent, p. 189.60 In 1981 the olD pur out a revamped IRD briefing entitred 'points at Issue,.61 See "'Smears" rolv over briefing on IRA, Guarilian 11/5/1ggg.62 Private source.63 Interview rvith Bnan Crozier byJames Oliver 15/1/1,997.64 Crozier, Free Agent, p. 713.65 Private source.

CONCLUSIONS1 Jacques E71ul. Propaganda: The Formation oJ Men,s Attitudes, (New york, Vintage Books 1973)

p. 52.2 Intervierv rvith Lord Mayhew byJames Oliver lg/7 /1995.3 Lucas and Morris' 'A very British crusade', in Aldrich (ed) Bntkh Inteiligence, p. 106.4 Ellul, Propaganda, p. 61.

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'\ichelson, Jeffrey T., Ameiun Espionage and the Souiet Target, New York, Quill, 1987.

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Richelson, Jeffrey T.A., century oJ spies, oxford Univenity press, 1995.Rothwerl' yictor' Bitain and the coid war: lg41-lg4T,London,Jonathan cape, 1gg2.Saville' John, The poritics

"of continuity: aritisl, ronign poricy anirih, Iubo* iour**rn, 194s_46,London, Verso, 1993, Appendix 2.

Shaw' Eric, Disciprine and Discord in the Ltbour party, Manchester university press, 19gg.Slessor, SirJohn, The Creat Deterrent, London, 195i.Stevenson, William, A Man Calted Intrepid,London, Macmillan, 7976.Strang, Lord, The Foreign Ofice, Lond,on, All.r, &Urrwin, 1955.Sweet-Escott, Bickham, Baker Street IneguLt,f""a.", Methuen, 1965.Taylor' Geoffrey, changing Faces: a Hkiory o;f th, Cu*dian 1950-gg,London, Fourth Estate, 1993.Taylor, Phiilip , Munitions of the Mind, Clrrgo*, prt i.t Sr.u.rs, 1990.'Walker, David, Lunch with a Stranger, Lond"on, Wingate, 1957.rrest,.Nigel, A Mauer oJTrust: uis, tg+s_zi, L";;;r, Coronet, 1982.*l::::T#1die, Grace, Facing the Nation, Teteuision and politics, 1936-7l,London, Bodley

Vansittart, Lord, The Mist procession, London, Hutchinson, 195g.

Y:-:', Anthony, tnoking class War,L""d.",J;;;;an Cape, 1983.Y:g|,, P eter, Spycatcher, Australia, ff .il,.-rrr,, t Sgi.Zubok' vladislav and pleshakov, constanrine , tnside the Kremrin,s cord war: from starin toKrushcheu, Cambndge, Mass., Harvard. 1996_

ARTICLES

Adamthrvaite' Anthonv,_'The BBC's Response to peace and Defence Issues, 1945-5g,,Contemporal, Record vii (1993), 557_77 .

Aldrich, Dr Richard, 'British Intenigence and the Anglo-American ,,Special Relationship,, during

. ll., a:,0 W ar',

.Reui ew qf rntematiinal Studies, 2i:4 1i 6ra;, :: r_:S r.

"' ";!;,L::: : ̂ :!".?:'?::;,',1T:, In' 1

" i ;;;;h' ;{;ffi ;; ; E u rop e : a witne ss S eminar,,

- Contenporary Record 1.0(2) (1996).

Camrthers, Susan L.. .Korea: the Great Brain Robbery', ICBH Conference: Britain and the Cold'War,

Senate House, London (luly 1997).Crarvley', Aidan, .The Hidden Face of Biitish

reprinted as a psmphlgs.Sunday Times (28 October 1962)

(September 1986).ICBH Conference:

Debate' Twrntieth Cenrury

Deery' Phillip' Contronring the cominform: George orwell and the cold war offe,sive of theInformatron Research Departrnent 1g4g-50" r-abour History73 (November 1gg7).Fletcher, Richard. 'British propaganda since'world war II - a case stLrdy,, Media, curture antlSociety (1982).Gibianski' L Y ' 'Ho*' the C-ominlorm Emerged: the New Archival Materials, Nouaiia I nouekhaiaistoiia I fluly-August 1993), 131.Hennessy, Peter, 'The Secrets that *.ill Stay Secret For Ever,, Tlre Listener 11Jenks, John, 'Fight against peace: Britain and the World peace Council,Britain and the Cold 'W'ar,

Senate House, London (July 1997).Kirby, Dianne, ,The Church of England "ra ,fr. LJfa War ft,r.f.",Bitish History 4(3) (1993), 250_83.--, 'The Religious component in the Angro-American cold war A-niance, 1g45_g,,Instiruteof Contemporary British History .orf.r.r.I ,Britain

and the Cold War, $uly 1997).Knight, 'wayne, 'Labourite Britain: America,s .,sure Friend,,? The Anglo Soviet Treaty Issue,

_ 1.947', Diplomatic History 7 (Fal1. 1.983),270_7.Lashrnar, Pau1, 'Covert in Glory', Neu'statesman(3 March 1995).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Leffler, Melvyn P., 'Inside Enemy Archives: the cold war Reopened" Foteign Alfaits 75

fluly/August 1996).

Lucas, W. Scott and Morris, CJ., 'A Very British Crusade, the Information Research Department

and the Beginning of the Cold 'W'ar' in Richard Aldrich (ed), Bntkh lntelligence Strategy and the

Cold War London, Routledge (1992), 85-110.

Mayhew, Christopher, 'British Foreign Policy since 7945', Intemational Afaits XXVI(4) (1950)'

Neison, Michael, 'The BBC Extemal Service and the Cold War' from the conference 'Britain and

the cold war, held ar the insrirute of contemporary British History $uly 1997)'

Shaw, Tony'The Information Research Department of the Foreign office and the Korean war,

1.950-53' , Journal o;f Contempotary Bntish History $998)'

-,

.The Bntish Popular Press and the Early cold war"Joarnal of contemporury Bitkh History

(1 ee8).

, ,Bntish Feature Films and the Early cold war' in Gary Rawnsley (ed.), cinema Macmillan

(in pres).Smith, Lyn, 'Covert British Propaganda: the Information Research Department 1947-77"

Millennium: Joumal of lntemational Studies 9(1) (1980).

Van Courtland Moon, John Ellis, 'Biological Wadare Aliegations: the

?,12

of New York Academy of Sciences 666 (31 December 1992)'

wark, wesley K., "'Coming in from the cold" British Propaganda and the Red Army Defecton

lg45-52' , The International History Revieu IX(L) (February 1987)'

warner, Geoffrey, 'collusion and the Suez crisis' International Afairs (Apnl 1979).

weathersby, Kathryn, 'soviet Aims in Korea and the origins of the Korean

CWIHP Working Papers 8 (November 1993).

-,

iTo Attack or not to Attack? Stalin, Kim I1 Sung and the Prelude to War'

5 (Spring 1995).

-, 'To Artack or not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung and the Prelude to \X/ar' CWHP Bulletin

5 (Spring 1995).

-, 'New Russian Documents on the Korean War' CWIHP Bulletin 6 & 7 flMinter 1995/6)'

Wilford, Hugh, 'The Information Research Department: Britain's Secret Cold War 'W'eapons

Revealed' (1996).

-,

.Britain, the US and the Cultural Cold War, tg45-1960' from the conference 'Britain and

the cold war, held at the Institute of contemporary British History $uly 1997).

In addition, all editions of The Cold War Hktory Ptoject Bulletin were extremely helpful'

OTHER MATERIALThe authors drew extensively upon an archive ofmaterial on the IRD researched by a team under

the direction of Richard Fletcher in the 1970s, which led to the exposure of the IRD's true

function in 1978. The material includes bioggaphies of IRD personnel and a large section on

Ampersand, as well as the typescriprs of interviews with christopher Mayhew, Max Reinhart and

Steph.r, Watts and -rrry oih..r. This archive contains, at present, probably the most detailed

maierial on Ampersand and the Background Books series. It is now in the possession of Paul

Lashmar.

Another archive containing substantial evidence confirrning the relationship berween the IRD

and the Labour Party is the Labour Party International Department paPers' which can be found at

the Labour History Archive and Study Centre in Manchester'

The third archive that was investigated was the Public Record Office at Kew. Until recently

the ol6ce held few identified IRD files. The Foreign OfEce held back the release of IRD 6les

Korean Wx Case', Annals

War, 1945-50',

CWHP Bulletin

BIBLIOGRAPHY 213

until 17 August 1995, when the majoriry of files for 1948 were finaily released. A year later rhematerial for 1949 was released' In eariy 1998 the material for 195G-1 was released; some materialfor the years 1948-51 is withheld.

IndexActon, H.P. 123

Adams. Alec 7

Aden 87

Africa 52, 71,129,111Africa Features 78, 81, 1,+1

Agee, Philip xiiiAims oflndustru 133, 1+3, 157, 163, 1.66

AKEL 93

Al-Ahram72A.lbania 68, 74All India Radio ,10, 73Allen & Unwin 100

A-1lende, Presrdent 136

Aliott, Rosemary 32American Comittee on United Europe (ACUE)

145

Amery, Julian 70, 126

Amnesry International 2

Ampenand Ltd xiii, 100, 103,112,122,172Anderson, Paul 119

Arab News Agency 70Armrtage, Sir Robert 91

Annstrong, Lord William 145, 149Amy Intelligence 756, 157

Associated Engrneenng Union (A-ELf 709,1.12Association for LegalJustice 160Astor, David 166

Attlee, Clement 23, 105

Austria 53

Ayer, AJ. 126

Background Books 100--3, Lli, 122, 123,736, I7Z775

Bailey, Victor 107

Balkans News Agency 72Baltic States 68Barat. Michele 130

Barclay, Christopher 68, 69, 137

Bames, G.R.60Banon. Col 114

Barton, Dixon 88

tsarztlay, David 161

Batchrvorth Pres 100-1, 117

Beamish, Tufton 147

Beedham, BnanJames 117

Beeston, Richard 69

Beirut, Boleslaw 54Bell, Daniel 129,130Bell,J. Bowyer 154, 155

Bellman Books 100, 122

Beloff Max (Lord Beloffof Wolvercote) 123, 136,164

Benn, David 118

Benn, Tony 98,118,119, 157

Berlin 125

Berlin Tunnel 62

Bevan, Aneurin 26Bevin, Emest 23-9,33,105, 108, 110, 168Bird, Jean 1 17

Bissell, Richard, 131, 733Blaker, Peter 173-4Bles, Geoffrey 98

Bloody Sunday 160Bodley Head 101, 103, 722,139Body, Sir Richard 150Bondy, Francois 126

Borkenau, Franz 97, 128Bottomley, Arthur, later Lord 101, 112

Boyd, Andrew 118

Bracken, Brendan 13, 17

Bradley, Sir Kenneth Granville 81

Bradon, Tom 130, 137, 732Brezhnev, President 140Brimelow, Lord Thomas 24Brimmell, Jack 32, 35, 96Britanova 77,80, 173

)16 INDEX

ilritish Arnx 158, 159

ilritish Atlantic Committee 174

:lritish Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 7- 10, 1 1,

26. 12. .11 . 52. il. 57. 6{ ) 5, 69, 1 3, 19, 92,720,134,138, 139, 140, 1.t6. 1,+8, 151. 156

i-lritish Council 11

tlritish Grriana 87

llritish Infumation Scn'ice 30, 86. 1.+1

ilritish Peace Committee .13

ilrook, Nonnan 58. 106

:lrooke, Henn' 107

3rorr.n, In'ins 127. 132:Jruce-Lockhart. Sir Robert 13, 16, 17, 101

.luccleuch. Duke of 100

Suckmaster, Maurice James 101

iludd, Stanley 8

iludiardjo, Cannel 4, 7, 9i3urgess, Guv xv, 37

iiumra 37, 85, 92

llurnhani, James 126'lyrne, Jock 1 12

-lain, A.G. 84, 86

laldrvell. Malcolm 134

,--allaghan, James 167, 168

.Jameron, James 44

--ampaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) 105-5,129. 173*4

-lanrpbell, Duncan 161-2lannon, Les 112

,lannon Brookes, Victor xir,, 78, 79. 81. 100

--areu-Hunt. Robert Nieel siir.35.';E-9. l12larlton House Temace 30, 51,63,67.-larol. Nicholas 122

)arrington, Lord Peter 149, 174

-)arruthers, Susan L. .17, 88. 91

.lastle. Barbara 92

leausescu. Nicolae 51

,ientral Intelligence Agency (CIA) xiii, 2.-70, 41,54,62, 67, 68, 7 1. 7 4-5, 120, 130-6, 1,15, 150,163, 167, 172

.lentral Otlice of Infomation 24. 37)eylon 92

-lhallis. Roland 7-10)haplin, Charlie 97

Jhapple, Frank 112

.lharles, Derek 81

ihevins, Hugh.107, 119

lhile,l, 133, 136

--hina 39, 40, 45-7. 52, 54, 1 14, 133. 169.lhristian Peace Group 115

.)hurch of Engiand, Council lor Foreign Relations113-14

lhurchill, Winston 12, 18,23, 123, 172

Clark, Tom 77,78,86Ciark, J.H.63Clark, Wiliiam 65. 71

Cline, Ray 132

Clive, Nigel 67,17, 140

Cloake, John 31, 32, 69, 85

Clutterbuck. Sir Richard 164

Cole. G.D.H. 27

Coleman, Peter 128. 129

CollierJohn 81

Colonial OfEce 33, 34, 86, 87. 88

Cominfom 21-9Comintem 21-9Cotnnentary 728

Comon Cause Ltd 166

Comrnon Market. see EECComronwealth Relations Ofice 34

Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) 100, 105,

112, 151

Confederation of British Industry i 66

Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) 125,127-35Conquest, Robert 32, 35, 100, 722, 123

Conservative Parry 146, 148

Cranston, Maurice'William 1 23

Crawley, Aidan 112

CreechJones, Arthur 86

Crick. Bernard 97

Croce, Benedetto 126

CrosJand, Anthony 129-30, 167-9, 172

Crossman, Richard 1,1, 18,25,37, 726, 746-7Crowe, Sir Colin 168-9Crowther, Geoffrey 117

Crozier, Brian Rossiter 67, 701, ll7, 122, 124, 137,733, 137, 141, 165-8, 170, 173-4

Cruickshank, Charles 14, 15, 17

Cuban Missiles Crisis 139-40Cudlipp, Percy 110

Cullis. Michael 113

Current Affairs Research Services Centre 164

Curtis, Liz 173

Cyprus 71, 83, 87-8, 9O-2,740,753Czechoslavakia 35-6, 120, 140

D'Estaing, Va1ery Giscard 149

Daily Expres 14,70, 87 , 173, 157

Daily Herald 30, 110, 722

Daily Mail 7, 12, 35, 70, 105-8, 1 12-73, 119, 130,160

Daily Mimr 12,30,75,719,132, 148

Daily Telegraph 30,72,75,81,95,97, 107, 119, 121,164,1.65

Daily Worleer 44,60, 100. 107, 121

Dalton, Hugh (Lord) 12, 17

Dane, Suney 108

I NDEX 217

Davies, Rhys 119

Darry, Richard 170

Deakin, SirWilliam 102Dean, Patnck 106,137Deery, Phillip 97-8de 1a Billidre, Gen Sir Peter 4Delmer, Sefton 14-18, 118, 172de Manio, Jack 149

Dempster, Fergie 41

Der Monat 125

de Rougemont. Denis 126-7d6tente 146, 164-5, 169-70, 172-3Dewey, John 126

Digut 110, 137

Dixon. Sir Pierson 47

Dodds-Parker, Sir Douglas 15. 19,71.105-6, 108Donovan, William 13

Dorill, Stephen 157

Dos Passos, John 126

Douglas, Le*ls .{0

Douglas-Home. Alec l1l. l3qDnberg, Tom 97

Dulles, A-llen W. 7+. 79. 13a!lDulles, John Foster 7.1

Dumoga, John 1.12

Dunkirk 18

East Timor 1

Economic League 163. 166

Economist, Tre 93. tir1. 1 17. 118. 13.+-5Eden, Anthonv 13. 63-.+. 73

Edrvards. Ruth Dudlev 117

EEC 145-50. 153. i63. 169

relerendurn ( i9, f I lt()Egg, John 1 1.1

Egypt 37. 63-5. 88

Egypt Commrttee 6-lEisenhower, President Ds.ight i6Electrica.l Trade Union (ETU) 109. 111-12Ellesmere. Earl of 1{)0

Elliot, Nicholas 17.1

Ellul,Jacques 177

Elwell, Ann 68

Entounter 128-32. 134E,OKA 91.93Eprile, Cecil 135

Erikson, John 123

Estonia 29

European Human Rights Commission 158European League of Economrc Cooperation (ELEC)

745. 149

European Movement, The 145, 147, 149, l5OEuropean Youth Campaigr 133,145Evans, Douglas 134

Evans, T.E. 69

Evening Standard xJli, 16,70, 172

Fairbairn, Geoftrey 164Fairlie, Henry 134

Fan, Walter Jack' 106, 120Feather, Victor Grayson Hardie (Lord Feather of

Bradford) 100,108Fergusson, Bemard 71

Fianna Fail 161-2Fieldhouse, David 83Financial Times 75,78, 80, 119, 149Fire Bngades Union (FBU) 105-7, 171First World War 11

Fischer, Ruth 61, 125

Fisk. Robert 161

Fletcher, Richard xiii, w, 73, 103, 129,732, 172-3Floyd, David 121

Foot M.R.D. 11-19Foot, Paul 155, 160

Footman, David 123

Ford Foundation 139

Foreigrr Ofice (and Commonwealth Office) 1, 5-7,12-15, 22-8, 33-5, 40, 44, 47, 50, 53, 57_63,65, 67-8, 70, 72, 79-81, 90, 98, 100, 106, 1t4,rt8-20, 124, 1411, 155,168*9,775

Foreign Office Research Depanment (FORD) 34,742

Foreign Repoi Qhe Economist's) 11710,724Fonter, 8.M.109Forum Infomatron Service 133, 135

Forum World Features (FWF) 133, 7344, 164, 167Foulkes, Frank 111-12France 23, 37 , 7 1

Franco, Gen 95

FreedomFintll0F1vel, Tosco 101, 119, 128

Gaddis,John Lewis 54, 139-40Gaitskell, Hugh 64,74, 129

Gallman, WaldemarJ. 127Gamer, Joe 6

Gately, Gene 13,1--5

Gee, H.G. 109

Geraghty, Tony 4

germ warfare 45-7, 114Germany 11*19, 50, 53,62,725,733Ghana 142

Gibson, R.P.T., Lord 80Gide. Aadre 126

Grlchrist. Sir Andrew 5-8Gillie, Darcy 97

Gladwyn, Lord 136

Globe News Agency 77-8

218 I NDEX

.3old Coast 87

3oldberg, Anatole 62

Soldie, Grace Wyndham 693o11an, John 107

.]ollancz, Y ictor 96-7, 99

.lomulka, Wladyslav 54

loodwin, Michael 100, 124

lordon-Walker, Patrick 14-16. 33lovemment Comunications Headquanen

(GCHQ 9,62,67,122-iraham, D.M. 61

-)rahl, Jack 105-6

-]ramsci. Antonio 125

lreece 22-3, 83

3reene, Hugh Carleton 59,62,94lreenhill, Sir Denis 1643rey, Edward 88

.)rey, Peter 65, 71

Srivas, George 81, 89,913rosz, George 126

]uardian xiii, 9, 30, 97, 98, 101, 174, 11811,734-5, 139, 168, 171

iuinea-Conkary 142-3lulf Oil, 164

iutman, Hans 16

{aigh, Anthony 89

{ambro, Sir Charles 12

:Iankey, Sir Robin 58

Iannah, Trevor 156

{arding, Field Manhal SirJohn 91

{are, Hon Alan 78, 80, 81-Iartley, Anthony 134-Iastings, Stephen 174-Iattersley, Roy 148

{aughey, Charles 161

luell, Frank 11i-12layter, Sir William 136

:Iealey, Denis (Lord) 8, 22,24,43, 45,50,59,74,86, 100, 101, 109-7t,729

{eath, Edward 145-6,148-9,151, 158, t60, t63,766

{eath-Mason, Mr 62{elms, Richard 133

felsinki Final Act 170{endenon, Loy 39-40{ennessy, Peter 170

'Iesmondhalgh, W.B. 91

{es, Rudolph 12

:Ieydrich, Reinhard 12

{illingdon, Lord 80

limmler, Heinrich 14, 17

iinden, Rita 729,134{itchens, Christopher 89

Hider, Adolf 11, 12, 17 , 50

Hobson, Oscar 119

Holbum, James 81

Hollis, Roger 106

Home Office 706.773Home Region Comittee 106Honey, Patrick 118

Hook, Sidney 126

Hopkins. PJ. 84, 87

Hopkinson, Henry 89, 92

Hopkinson, Tom 44

Hopson, Donald 90, 137

Homer,John 105-8Hosenball, Mark xiiiHough, Graham 128

Hough, J.A. 119

Howe, V/arren Russell 135

Hoxha, President Enver 74Hudson, Prof G.F. 101

Hulton Press 77

Hulton, Sir Edward 77

Hungarian Uprising 5,1--6

Hungary 52,54, 61,74, 107

Hunt, Lord 159

Hunt,John 129

Hunter, Edward 45

Hurd, Douglas 149, 773-4Huxley, Elspeth 129

Huxiey, Julian 97, 119

Hyde, Douglas 100

Il Paese 60

lndta89,142Indonesia 1-10, 85, 720,775Industrial Research and Infomation Services Ltd 166

Information Policy Department 30, 87, 91, 168

Information Policy Department (Northem Ireiand)154, 155,156, 158, 159, 160, 161

Infomation Research Department (IRD)action desk 67

aims 27 , 113, 138

andBBC 42,47,59-65coexistence 139

Colonial Office 86-8Colonies 83-8, 90-2cuts 163-4Cyprus 88, 9G-2

domestic activities 105, 115

EEC 145-50end,169-72Foreign Office criticism 142, 169funding 28, 31, 50, 86, 138, 163

gem warfare allegations 46Hungary 54-5

TNDEX 219

Indonesia 1, 5-10intelligence section 35joumalists 117-2;tKenya 84, 87-8Khrushchev's secret speech 53*4Korean War 42-4.46-8Malaya Emergency 8,t-6and MI5 28,67-8,106, t11-12and MI6 28, 11, 52, 67 -8, 7 I-2, 7 4-5, 77-9,

110-2,171news agencies 70,72-3,77-8. glorganization 32, 19, 138origrns 27-8propaganda 32-4, 35-6, 39-40, 5 1

raison d'itre 146

rearrnament 97

Reuters 79-80sibs 69

Singapore regionai ofice 41, .+6, 85, 86sources 52-3Soviet labour canrps campaign 29-30staffing 31-2, .19-50

Suez Crisis 63-5, 68*73tems of referenc e 27 , 30, 169TUC 110

Institute for the Study ofConflict (ISC) 163-gIntemational News Rights & Royalnes Ltd 79, g0,

81

Intemational Organization ofJoumalists 22Intemational Student Confederation 133Intemational Union of Students 22Interpreter 50

IRA 154, 155, 156, 159, 160, 161, t62IRA (Oficial) 154

kan 68,74,79Iraq71Ireland, Republic of 153

Isaacs, George 43

krael 63, 71

ltaly 37, 133

ITN 119. 149

Ivens, Michael 133, 148, 1'+9, 156

Jacob, Gen Sir Ian 58, 59, 60

Jacobs, Noman 132

Jacobson, Dan 129

Japan 53, 83

Jebb, Gladwyn 74, 110

Jenkins, Roy 118,119

Johnson, Charles 134

Johnson, Dean Hewlett 113-14

Johnson, U. Alexis 42

Johnston, ColJohnny 154

Josselson, Michael 125, 127, 728, 129, 731, 132

Joumalism Quafierly 73

Kaser, Michael 102

Keighley, Gen Sir Charles 71

Kelly, Phil xiv, 167

Kelly, Sir David 128

Kennan, George 40Kennedy, Edward 153

Kennedy,John F 4, 150

Kennedy, Paul 125

Kenya 84, 86,87,88, l4O-2Kem House Enterprises 134Kerr, Am 150-1Kerr, Russell 150--1

KGB 29,79, 156

Kim Il Sung 41-8Kimche, John 16

Krng, Hilarv W. 112-3Kirby, Dianne 30, 11.1

Krrkpatrick, Ivone 28Kiman, Celia 95,96,97, 718Kissinger, Henry 150, 169Kison, Gen Sir Frank 15!4Kitzinger, Uwe 149

Knight, Peter Hadden 73, 80Kodumaa '7 4

Koestler, Arthur 95, 96, 719, 725, 126, 727, 130Kolarz, Walter 59, 101, 110

Konfrontasi poliry 4Korea 41-8, 774,125Korentchevskaya, Zine 50Kristol, Irving 128, 130, 131Khrushchev, Nikita 53, 54, 55, 63, 721,124,

739-40, 177

Kuomintang 39

Kuwait 71

Labedz, Leopold 124, 729Labour Party xili, 14,26,33, 43,92,97,99,102,

108-9, 111, 113, 115, 129, 146, 748, 757, 158,766, t67, 168, 175

Labour Party Intemational Department 43,86, 709,t71

Lapping, Brian 84, 87,89,97,92Lasch, Christopher 124Lashmar, Paul xiv, xvLaski, Harold 34, 119Lasky, Melvin 126, 127, 730, 132, 133, 135Latham, Jackie 101

Lawson, Nigel 165

Lean, Tangye 64Leeper, Regrnald 14-76, 18,89Legum, Colin 129

Leigh, David xix, 156, 771,172

220 INDEX

Lenin. V.I. 21

ltueller 172

Levitas. Sol 124

Liberal Party 92

l.-rbya 71 , 72, 160

i.ippmann,-Walter 130

Little, Tom 70, 7 3, 79. 80. 81

l.loyd, John 1 12

I-loyd, Sehwn 3. 7t)

l-ondon Press Sen'ice 37

i-ong, Gerald 80, 173

i-ovestone, Jav 132

i,ucas,-W. Scott 54, 176

Lunghi. Hugh 29-38,19,50, 51, 59

McAJpinc, Lord Alastair 143, 145, 747, 149\4acArthur, Gen Douglas 44MacBride. Sean 173

McCaIl, R. 6t)

McCarthy,Joe 126,128McFadden. Tom 73

Machen, Harold 35Maclntosh, George 156

Mclachlan, Donald 118

Maclaren, Colin 32

Macmillan, Harold 4, 63, 93

Macmillan, Maurice 80Magee, Bryan 102

Mahurin, Col Bud 46

Maitland, Sir Donald 73, 1.16

Main. Emest 96

Makarios, Archbishop 89, 91. 93Malaya (Malaysia) 10,37,39, 83, 153

\4alaya Emergency 84-6Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Amy 85

Malenlcov, George 21-4Ylanth e s t er Cu ardi an 127

\[anchuian Candidate, T'\rc 45

Marett, R.H.K. 60

Marquand, David 129

r4arshall, George 27, 28

Maturin, Adelaide xiv\4ayhew, Christopher Paget (Lord Mayhew) 22-9,

33,36, 52, 62,98. 101, 11t-13, 122, 124. 739.140, 171, 112, 175-6

Mercer, Paul 170

MI5 xiv, 28, 67-8,97, 100, 106, 108, 111-12,714,t50-1. 157, 158, 15e. 175

i4I6 xiv, 1-9, 72, 28. 41, 53, 62, 67 -7 2, 7 +-5, 77,79, 98, 103, 108, 117, 122,134,140-3,745,153, 156, 157, 158, 164,171, \73, t75

\[iami News 45

diddle East 87vliddle East News Agency (MENA) 79

Midgeley, John 11,7, 118

Miller, Hon. Barbara 30

Mindlin, Mier 133, 131,135Ministry of Economic Wadare (MEW) 12, 13,

17

Ministry of Information (MOD 13, 24

Ministrv of Labour 106

Molotov, Vyacheslav 21-5Monroe, Elizabeth 118

Montgomery, Robert 126

Mooney, Hugh 153, 155. 156, 158, 159

Morgan, Gwyn 148

Moming Star 751

Morris, Cate 175

Morris, Jan 70

Moms, Noman 80

Moss, Robert 735, 136

Mossadeq, President 68, 74

Movement for Colonial Freedom 105

Muenzenberg, Willi 126

Muggeridge, Malcolm 128, 131

Munay, Prof Gilbert 119

Murray, Sir Ralph 30*7, 41, 42, 47 ,50, 53, 59, 60,71,96,99,118,157,165

Nabokov, Nicholas 126, 127, 128, 129, 130Nasr, Abd El-Rahman 72

Nasser, President 61-72National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL), later

Liberw 105,109, 159

National [Jnion of Mineworkers 112

NATO 131, 169

Nazi-Soviet Pact 33, 61

Near and Far East News (Asia) Ltd 78, 86Near and Far East News Ltd 78Needham, Joseph 47

Nehru, Pandit 41, 46

Neil, Tom 81

Nelson, Michael 57, 61

Netherlands 2

New Labour 147

New Left 159, 168

New kader 125, 126, 129

New Yorle Times 128. 166

Neu,s at Ten 148, 149

News of the World 35,756Nau Statesman 92, 93, 112Nicholas, Czar 55

Nigeria 1,12

Nrxon, Richard 169

NKVD 98

Noel-Baker, Francis 92, 101

Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) 140

Northem Ireland 151, 15342, 163,169,173

I NDEX 221

Northem Ireland Civil Rights Association 159,160

Nye, Archibald.ll

O'Connor Howe, Josephine 137, 146Obseruer xjv,75,79,86,97, 103, 119, 166, 1':2Odhams Pres 99, 108

Ofiice of Strategic Seruices (OSS) 72Oliver, James n'Oliver, Richard xiv, pOnslow, Cranley 80

Operation Musketeer 73Operation Overlord 13, 16

Onveil, George n , 19, 25, 37 , 95. 96, 97 , 98-9, 119Outhu'aite. AIison 'l 17

Overseas Infomation Deparrment 1/-7. 173Overseas News Agencv 13

Owen, Dr David (Lord Orven) xiv. 67. 168, 169,170, 771, 7 /-2, 17-)

Oxford 27

Pakistan Radio 78

Palairet, Sir Michael 89

Palestine 92

Panott, Cecil 30. 32, 33, 35Payne, Denis t{enry 157

Peck, SirJohn 17,83,92, 109, 113-14. 137

Penguin (Bookg 98People's Daily 46Peterson. Sir Maunce 66Petw, Bob 73

Philby, Kim 12,28,38.58, 7.S-5, 78, 79, 98, 108Philippines 85

Phoenix House 5-9. 101

Picnre Post 12. 779

Pike Conminee 132

Pincher, Chapman 165, 168

PKI 2_9

Pleshakov. Constantine 2l-.1Penleotsby Papers, The 11,9

Poland 11, 12,51,54Political Warfare Executive (PWE) xiv. 13-19,24,

31, 34. .+9

Pope, Allen 3

Posseu 96

Poston, Ralph 69POWs 46-8Prada 720, 121, 183

Preuyes 127

Price, Lynn 135

Priestley, J.B. 97

Prittie. Terence 9

Project Wringer 53

Proops, Ma.lorie 148

Psychological Warfare Consultations Comm-rttee 75,108

Public Record Ofiice 4, 17,30, 51,108, 160

Quest 726

Radcliffe Comrnittee, The 112Radio Canada Intemational 57Radio Deutsche Welle 57

Radio France Intemationale 57

Radio Free Europe 54, 57

Radio Liberry 57, 132

Rakosi, Mathias 54

Ramparts 130

Ramsa.v, Robin 157

Reddau'ay, Noman. F. 4-10, 27-9,36, 58, 64,71,77, 105, 706, 112, 120, 121, 722,138, 140,148, 151, 157.163, t75

Rees, Merlyn xiii, 158

Regional News Sewice Ltd 79, 80Reinhardt, Max 105

Rennie, John, O. 67, 77, 105, 111, 115, 737Reuters 57, 70, 76,78, 178, 173

Rhee, Syngrnan 42, 44

Rippon, Geoffrey 147, 119

RNS (Latin America) Ltd 79, 80Romania 51

Rome 88

Roosevelt, F.D.73,21Rose, Saul 111

Roth, Aldrew 42, 128

Royal Air Force 15, 70, 120royal family 17

Royal Institute for Internarional Affairs (RIIA) 17

Royle, Tony (Lord Fanshawe) 147

Russell, Benrand 95, 700, 102, 726, 127

Russia Cormittee 58

Ryan, A.P. 18

Ryan, Nigel 148, 149

SALT i 169, 170

SALT II 170

Saudi Arabia 72

Savile, John 97

Scaife, Richard Mellon 164

Schapiro, Prof Leonard 31, 99, 101, 722,723,724,1.64

Sclrlesinger, Arthur J. 724, 127

Schlesinger, Phillip 18

Schwable, Col Frank 46

Scnvenor, R. 63

Secker & Warburg 128, 136Second World War 2, 11, 12, 19,21,30, 51, 58, 69,

72.83" 722

222 INDEX

Secret Vote 28, 31, 50, 80, 103, 163

Seton-Watson, Prof. Hugh 101,120, 122, 1,64

Sharpley, Ann 70

Sharq al Adna 69,71,73Shattock, J.S.H 39

Shaw, George Bemard 97

Shaw, Tony 35, 43,14,48Shean, William Svdnev 100

Sheridan, Caroline xivSheridan, Col LesLie xir,i, 12, 3l-2, 77,78, 100, 103,

108, 111, 1t8,172Shore, Peter 146, 151

Shuckburgh, Evelyn 110

Shulman. Milton 172

sibs 14, 15, 69

Sinclair, Upton 126

Sinn Fein 154

Smart, Tony xivSmithJ.B. 41

Smith, Lyn 102

Sobeli, Sir Michael 147

Sociery of Socialist Clergy and Ministen (SSCM)115

Soeharto. General 1-10Somalia 49

South Africa 168, 169

Soviet Union 21-2,34-8,40, 43, 45-8, 50, 52-5,58, 61-3, 62, 65, 68, 72, 89, 96-9, 107, 707-9,779, 120-t,138, 151, 153, 156, 169,770

Soviet Weekly 44,50Spanish Civil Wzr 95,98, 726Special Operations Executive (SOE) 11-19, 70, 71,

77 ,78, 101-2Spectator 93

Spender, Stephen 128, 130,132Spinelli, Altiero 126

Sporborg, F{arry 174St Antony's College, Oxford xiii, 123

Stalin, Josef2l-8, 41-8, 53, 61, 62,725Star News Agenry 78

State Department 3,39,41, 46Staughton, Tony 155

Steed, R.H.C. 165

Stenson, Michael 85

Stephenson, Donald 64

Stevenson, William 13

Stewart, Marshall 148, 749

Stewan. Michael 49

Stewart, Sean 151

Stransky, Jan 97

Struve, Gleb 97

Suez Crisis 63-5, 68-7 7, 107

Sukamo, Ahmed 1-10, 134, 175Sumatra 3

Sunday Express 100, 119

Sunday Craphic 35

Sunday Telegraph7,722Sunday Times 75, 119, 134

Sweet-Escott, Bickham 101

Swrnbum, James 70

Sydney Moming Herald 134Syria 72

Tanganyika 87

TASS 46, 172

Taylor A.f.P. 25,98, 128

Taylor, Phillip 11, 19

Temple, William 115

Templer, Sir Gerald 85

Thatcher, Margaret 174

This Week 156

Thomson Foundation 81, 139

Thompson, Sir Robert 164

Time Out 732,733, 150, 766

Times, The 7, 15, 81, 105, 119, 721, 13O, 146, 161

Times of India 82

TitchenerJ.L.B. 65

Tokaev, Lt Col G.A. 97, 119

Tracey, Herbert 110

Trades LJnion Congress 25,26,99-700, 107-12Travis, Eileen 70

Trethowen, Ian 148

Trevor-Roper, Hugh (Lord Dacre) 126, 127

Tibune 37, 179

Truman, President H. 23, 40, 42, 44Tucker, Geoffrey 148, 149

Tucker, H.H. 'Tommy' 778, 737, 746, 753Tugwell, Col Maurice 154, 155

Tunstall, Jeremy 82

Tusa, John 135

Ukraine 68

UNESCO 173

United Nations 25-9,30, 42-7, 61, 65,83usA 2-5, 70, 73-t4, 22-3, 25, 27 , 36, 3948, 52-3,

83, 86-7, 91, 1254, 137, 135, 140, 1 50, 159,

776

United States Infomation Seruice 43

United States Military Intelligence 53

Unwin, Rayner 103

Udey, Freda 119

Uzbekistan 29, 61

Vatican Radio 15, 57

Vatican 60

Venice 88

Vietnam 135, 138, 164

Voice of America7,37,96, 132

INDEX 223

Voice ofthe Arabs 64, 68Voice of the Coast 73

Waddarns, Canon Herbert 113, 1I4Wade, Hunter 4-8Wakefield, Wavell 153'Wallace, Colin 153, 156, 157,158, 161, 170\X/allinger, G.A. 61'Wamer,

Christopher 26, 59, 60, 69, gg

Washington Post 719,133, 150Water6eld, Gordon 63, 64, 69, 73, 79, gO'Watson,

Adam 47,96,90,96,97, lO2, 164, 165'V7atts, Stephen Glas 100-3, 123,172'Weissman,

Steve 167

Weldon, Fay 49,51,67'Wheeler,

Charles 62

Whitney, John Hav 134'Whitney, kay 167, 174'Widgery, Lord ChiefJustice 160Williams. D. 90

Williams, Tennessee 126Wilson, Harold 5, 138, 15,+. 155, 157, 15g. 159. 160Winningon, Alan.,{4Wint, Guy 107,121,122Wintle. Colin 31

Wistrich, Emest 147, 148, 149Wobum Abbey 14

Woodhouse, Hon. Christopher Montague g9, 101'World Feature Service 81, 141

World Federation ofDemocratic Lawyen 22World Federation of Trade Unions 22, g6, 101-2.

171'World

Peace Movement 22'Wonthome,

P eregnne 729Wright, Sir Oliver 53, 139,163Wright, Peter 106, 158, 159Wyatt, Woodrow (.ord Wyatt) 80, 106, 11 1,

7t9

Yamold, Maj Tony 155

Young, George 71, 97Younger, Major Kenneth 61Yugoslavia 12, 125

Zarb, James 70Zauberman. A.lfred 101

Zhdanoy, Andret 27-4Zhedong, Mao 39, 720Zorza, Yrctor 120-2Zubok, Vladislav 21-4