Richard Aldrich Britain's Secret Intelligence Service in Asia During the Second World War

8/2/2019 Richard Aldrich Britain's Secret Intelligence Service in Asia During the Second World War

1/40

Britain's Secret Intelligence Service in Asia during the Second World WarAuthor(s): Richard J. AldrichSource: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Feb., 1998), pp. 179-217Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/312973Accessed: 11/08/2009 10:49

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the

scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that

promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toModern

Asian Studies.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/stable/312973?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cuphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cuphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/312973?origin=JSTOR-pdf


2/40

ModernAsian Studies 32, 1 (1998), pp. 179-217. ? 1998 Cambridge University PressPrinted in the United Kingdom

Britain's SecretIntelligenceServicein AsiaDuring the Second WorldWarRICHARD J. ALDRICH

Universityof NottinghamThe past twenty years have seen the rapid growth of a new branchof international history, the serious academic study of secret servicesor 'intelligence history' with its attendant specialist conferences andjournals. Two main causes for this development can be identified.The first was conceptual, namely the increasing recognition that thestudy of international history was greatly impoverished by the reluc-tance of academic historians to address a subject which appearedcapable of shedding considerable light upon the conduct of interna-tional affairs. Two leading historians underlined this during 1982 ina path-breaking collection of essays on the subject, suggesting thatintelligence was the 'missing dimension' of most international his-tory.1 The second development was a more practical one, the intro-duction of the Thirty Year Rule during the 1970s, bringing with itan avalanche of new documentation, which, within a few years, wasrecognized as containing a great deal of intelligence material.2 Inthe 198os historians had begun to turn their attention in increasingnumbers to the intelligence history of the mid-twentieth century.They were further assisted in their endeavours by the appearanceof the first volumes of the official history of British Intelligence in theSecond World War.3

The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of the Fulbright Commissionand the American Council of Learned Societies in conducting research for thisessay. The author would also like to thank those who offered their comments at anearlier stage of drafting. Errors remain the responsibility of the author.1 Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (eds), TheMissingDimension:GovernmentsandIntelligenceCommunitiesn the TwentiethCentury London: Macmillan, 1984). SeealsoJohn L. Gaddis, 'Intelligence, Espionage and Cold War Origins', DiplomaticHis-tory, 13, 2 (Spring 1989): 191-213; Donald Cameron Watt, 'Intelligence and theHistorian', Diplomatic History, 14, 2 (Spring 1990): 199-205.2 On British intelligence archives during the 197os and 198os see, Wesley K.Wark, 'In Never-Never Land? The British Archives on Intelligence', TheHistoricalJournal, 35, 1 (Spring 1992): 195-202.3 F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligencen the Second World War:Its InfluenceonStrategy and Operations,Vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 1979).oo26-749X/98/$7.5o+$o. lo

179





179





179


3/40

RICHARDJ. ALDRICHICHARDJ. ALDRICHICHARDJ. ALDRICHAccordingly the 198os saw the development of what some havedescribed as the 'British school of intelligence studies', deeply histor-ical in its approach and with the Second World War and its immedi-ate legacy of a developing 'Western intelligence community' as itsprimary focus.4 There was also a growing consensus that newinformation on intelligence had significantly altered the prevailingunderstanding of the Second World War.5 Yet there remained oneobvious omission amid this growing body of scholarly literature onintelligence during the Second World War. Remarkably littleattempt has been made to investigate intelligence in Asia, andalmost nothing has been written on the British Secret Intelligence

Service during the war against Japan.6 There are several reasons forthis. Most importantly, the official historians of British intelligencedecided not to extend their work on Europe and the Middle East tocover Asian theatres, arguing that Asian subjects would require anAnglo-American approach that ran beyond their official remit. Mean-while, a proportion of the unofficial historians who have turned theirhand to the war against Japan have become unduly fascinated by thePearl Harbor controversy, and have not seemed able to move beyondthat intractable historical quagmire. Others have presumed thatthere is simply not enough primary material, believing that mostrelevant archives remain closed to public inspection.7On the last point they have been wrong. In reality the wartimefiles of the three armed services teem with material generated bythe British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). One explanation forthis might be that the cover name adopted by SIS in Asia after 1942,

4 Donald Cameron Watt, 'Intelligence Studies: The Emergence of a BritishSchool', Intelligence ndNationalSecurity,3, 2 (April 1988): 338-42.5 See, for example, Zara Steiner, 'Deception and its Dividends', TimesLiterarySupplement,-13 Dec. 1990, p. 1,310. For a superb synthesis of the impact of intelli-gence on the European War see Ralph Bennett, Behind theBattle:Intelligencen theWarwith Germany,939-45 (London:Sinclair Stevenson, 1994).6 There are two notable exceptions at the level of field operations. A good accountof SIS activities in Malaya is given in Ian Trenowden, OperationsMostSecret:SOE TheMalayanTheatre London:William Kimber, 1978), pp. 123-46. SIS also makes briefappearances in Terence O'Brien's partly autobiographical TheMoonlightWar: TheStoryof ClandestineOperationsn South-EastAsia, I944-5 (London:Collins, 1987).7 Amongst the official historians of British intelligence the exception is MichaelHoward who has included a chapter on the war against Japan in his volume ondeception, BritishIntelligencen theSecondWorldWar,Vol. V. The most recent litera-ture on Pearl Harbor includes David Kaiser, 'Conspiracyor Cock-up?Pearl HarborRevisited', Intelligenceand National Security,9, 2 (April 1994): 354-72; D. C. S.Sissons, 'More on Pearl Harbor', ibid.,pp. 373-80.

Accordingly the 198os saw the development of what some havedescribed as the 'British school of intelligence studies', deeply histor-ical in its approach and with the Second World War and its immedi-ate legacy of a developing 'Western intelligence community' as itsprimary focus.4 There was also a growing consensus that newinformation on intelligence had significantly altered the prevailingunderstanding of the Second World War.5 Yet there remained oneobvious omission amid this growing body of scholarly literature onintelligence during the Second World War. Remarkably littleattempt has been made to investigate intelligence in Asia, andalmost nothing has been written on the British Secret IntelligenceService during the war against Japan.6 There are several reasons forthis. Most importantly, the official historians of British intelligencedecided not to extend their work on Europe and the Middle East tocover Asian theatres, arguing that Asian subjects would require anAnglo-American approach that ran beyond their official remit. Mean-while, a proportion of the unofficial historians who have turned theirhand to the war against Japan have become unduly fascinated by thePearl Harbor controversy, and have not seemed able to move beyondthat intractable historical quagmire. Others have presumed thatthere is simply not enough primary material, believing that mostrelevant archives remain closed to public inspection.7On the last point they have been wrong. In reality the wartimefiles of the three armed services teem with material generated bythe British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). One explanation forthis might be that the cover name adopted by SIS in Asia after 1942,


Accordingly the 198os saw the development of what some havedescribed as the 'British school of intelligence studies', deeply histor-ical in its approach and with the Second World War and its immedi-ate legacy of a developing 'Western intelligence community' as itsprimary focus.4 There was also a growing consensus that newinformation on intelligence had significantly altered the prevailingunderstanding of the Second World War.5 Yet there remained oneobvious omission amid this growing body of scholarly literature onintelligence during the Second World War. Remarkably littleattempt has been made to investigate intelligence in Asia, andalmost nothing has been written on the British Secret IntelligenceService during the war against Japan.6 There are several reasons forthis. Most importantly, the official historians of British intelligencedecided not to extend their work on Europe and the Middle East tocover Asian theatres, arguing that Asian subjects would require anAnglo-American approach that ran beyond their official remit. Mean-while, a proportion of the unofficial historians who have turned theirhand to the war against Japan have become unduly fascinated by thePearl Harbor controversy, and have not seemed able to move beyondthat intractable historical quagmire. Others have presumed thatthere is simply not enough primary material, believing that mostrelevant archives remain closed to public inspection.7On the last point they have been wrong. In reality the wartimefiles of the three armed services teem with material generated bythe British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). One explanation forthis might be that the cover name adopted by SIS in Asia after 1942,


18o8o8o


4/40

BRITAIN'S SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICERITAIN'S SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICERITAIN'S SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICEthe 'Inter-Service Liaison Department', seems to have confused thedepartmental 'weeders' who prepare files for release, more than itconfused the enemy. As a result, entire files dealing with SIS havesat in the Public Record Office since the late 1970s. Moreover, inthe 1990s the Waldegrave Initiative on Open Government led to adecision to begin the process of releasing approximately 10,000 filesgenerated by the Special Operations Executive (SOE), a sister ser-vice to SIS. The material dealing with SOE in Asia, released in 1993,contains a surprising amount of material on relations between SOEand SIS. Taken together with equally voluminous releases of intelli-gence material in the United States, it is now possible for the firsttime for unofficial historians to undertake some assessment of thenature and activities of the British SIS in Asia during the 1930s and1940s. Accordingly, this essay seeks to shed some preliminary lightupon a hitherto unexplored subject, the troubled Asiatic branch ofSIS from the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 to termina-tion of Britain's post-war administrative duties in Southeast Asia in1946.8That SIS was not an impressive organization in any part of theworld during the inter-war years is already well understood. Under-funded and moribund, SIS as a whole deteriorated through the 1920sand a decade later was entirely unprepared for war.9 SIS in Asia wasthe 'Cinderella branch' of a broadly impoverished service. This canbe partly explained by the primarily colonial interpretation of intelli-gence requirements East of Suez during this period which ensuredthat, while police intelligence was active, SIS was almost non-existent. Although by mid-1941 belated efforts were made to 'gingerup' SIS, good networks took months, if not years, to construct andso the opportunity for remedying the situation in Asia had alreadypassed.The general problems that beset SIS during the 1930s and 1940swere already being addressed by late 1939 with the arrival of a newSIS chief, Sir Stewart Menzies, at its London headquarters at Broad-way Buildings close to Pall Mall. In 1940, anxious to press forimprovements, the Foreign Office, to which SIS was subordinate,

8 This most recent release is described in Louise Atherton, SOE Operationsn theFar East: An Introductory uideto theNewlyReleasedRecords London: Public RecordOffice, 1993).9 The classic account is Christopher M. Andrew, SecretService:TheMaking of theBritishIntelligenceCommunityLondon:Heinemann, 1985), pp. 339-447.

the 'Inter-Service Liaison Department', seems to have confused thedepartmental 'weeders' who prepare files for release, more than itconfused the enemy. As a result, entire files dealing with SIS havesat in the Public Record Office since the late 1970s. Moreover, inthe 1990s the Waldegrave Initiative on Open Government led to adecision to begin the process of releasing approximately 10,000 filesgenerated by the Special Operations Executive (SOE), a sister ser-vice to SIS. The material dealing with SOE in Asia, released in 1993,contains a surprising amount of material on relations between SOEand SIS. Taken together with equally voluminous releases of intelli-gence material in the United States, it is now possible for the firsttime for unofficial historians to undertake some assessment of thenature and activities of the British SIS in Asia during the 1930s and1940s. Accordingly, this essay seeks to shed some preliminary lightupon a hitherto unexplored subject, the troubled Asiatic branch ofSIS from the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 to termina-tion of Britain's post-war administrative duties in Southeast Asia in1946.8That SIS was not an impressive organization in any part of theworld during the inter-war years is already well understood. Under-funded and moribund, SIS as a whole deteriorated through the 1920sand a decade later was entirely unprepared for war.9 SIS in Asia wasthe 'Cinderella branch' of a broadly impoverished service. This canbe partly explained by the primarily colonial interpretation of intelli-gence requirements East of Suez during this period which ensuredthat, while police intelligence was active, SIS was almost non-existent. Although by mid-1941 belated efforts were made to 'gingerup' SIS, good networks took months, if not years, to construct andso the opportunity for remedying the situation in Asia had alreadypassed.The general problems that beset SIS during the 1930s and 1940swere already being addressed by late 1939 with the arrival of a newSIS chief, Sir Stewart Menzies, at its London headquarters at Broad-way Buildings close to Pall Mall. In 1940, anxious to press forimprovements, the Foreign Office, to which SIS was subordinate,


the 'Inter-Service Liaison Department', seems to have confused thedepartmental 'weeders' who prepare files for release, more than itconfused the enemy. As a result, entire files dealing with SIS havesat in the Public Record Office since the late 1970s. Moreover, inthe 1990s the Waldegrave Initiative on Open Government led to adecision to begin the process of releasing approximately 10,000 filesgenerated by the Special Operations Executive (SOE), a sister ser-vice to SIS. The material dealing with SOE in Asia, released in 1993,contains a surprising amount of material on relations between SOEand SIS. Taken together with equally voluminous releases of intelli-gence material in the United States, it is now possible for the firsttime for unofficial historians to undertake some assessment of thenature and activities of the British SIS in Asia during the 1930s and1940s. Accordingly, this essay seeks to shed some preliminary lightupon a hitherto unexplored subject, the troubled Asiatic branch ofSIS from the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 to termina-tion of Britain's post-war administrative duties in Southeast Asia in1946.8That SIS was not an impressive organization in any part of theworld during the inter-war years is already well understood. Under-funded and moribund, SIS as a whole deteriorated through the 1920sand a decade later was entirely unprepared for war.9 SIS in Asia wasthe 'Cinderella branch' of a broadly impoverished service. This canbe partly explained by the primarily colonial interpretation of intelli-gence requirements East of Suez during this period which ensuredthat, while police intelligence was active, SIS was almost non-existent. Although by mid-1941 belated efforts were made to 'gingerup' SIS, good networks took months, if not years, to construct andso the opportunity for remedying the situation in Asia had alreadypassed.The general problems that beset SIS during the 1930s and 1940swere already being addressed by late 1939 with the arrival of a newSIS chief, Sir Stewart Menzies, at its London headquarters at Broad-way Buildings close to Pall Mall. In 1940, anxious to press forimprovements, the Foreign Office, to which SIS was subordinate,


1818181


5/40

RICHARDJ. ALDRICHICHARDJ. ALDRICHICHARDJ. ALDRICHappointed a diplomat, Patrick Reilly, as Personal Assistant to Menz-ies, with the intention of keeping a closer eye on SIS.'? Having lostmany of its networks in Europe during 1940, SIS was able to startafresh, working in new and productive areas such as deception. Italso gave more attention to counter-intelligence in foreign territories(which lay outside the remit of MI5). These efforts against Axissecret services, such as the German Abwehr, were greatly assisted byUltra which permitted the perusal ofAbwehr communications. IndeedSIS, who controlled signals intelligence, increasingly basked in thereflected glory of the codebreakers at Bletchley Park. In theory thisgave SIS a breathing space to transform itself into a more modernand efficient service, but in reality these wartime reforms moved ata constabulary pace.1But the experience of SIS in Asia after 1941 was distinctly differ-ent in character. Unlike SIS in London, it encountered new problemsthat became more awkward and intractable as the war progressed.In Japanese-occupied Asian countries it laboured under a number ofspecial disadvantages. It was hard to find high-grade oriental agentswith recent knowledge of occupied countries and it was difficult forEuropean agents to move or operate in remote Japanese-controlledareas without the knowledge and co-operation of the local popula-tion. Consequently, a different British clandestine service, the newlyconstituted SOE, which was busy training resistance groups anddeveloping contact with leading indigenous figures, discovered thatit enjoyed a far larger intelligence net. SIS was quickly outstrippedby the amateur saboteurs of the new SOE organization. Indeed by1945, in areas such as Thailand, agents independently inserted bySIS were more likely to be picked up and detained by the ubiquitousresistance than by the Japanese security police. The consequencewas a long period of poor relations between SIS and SOE, punctuatedby moments when SIS was increasingly inclined to concede defeatto its sister service.'2These operational problems, peculiar to Asia, were compoundedby serious mistakes committed at a higher level, notably by the

'0 Andrew, SecretService,p. 467.l Robert Cecil, 'Philby's Spurious War', Intelligenceand National Security,9, 4(October 1994): 764-8; E. D. R. Harrison, 'More Thoughts on Kim Philby's SilentWar', Intelligence and National Security, 10, 3 (July 1995): 514-26.12The classic work on SOE remains M. R. D. Foot, SOE in France (London:HMSO, 1966). On SOE-SIS rivalrysee David Stafford,Britainand theEuropeanRes-istance,194o-45: A Surveyof the Special Operations xecutivewith DocumentsLondon:St Anthony's/Macmillan, 1980), pp. 38-56.

appointed a diplomat, Patrick Reilly, as Personal Assistant to Menz-ies, with the intention of keeping a closer eye on SIS.'? Having lostmany of its networks in Europe during 1940, SIS was able to startafresh, working in new and productive areas such as deception. Italso gave more attention to counter-intelligence in foreign territories(which lay outside the remit of MI5). These efforts against Axissecret services, such as the German Abwehr, were greatly assisted byUltra which permitted the perusal ofAbwehr communications. IndeedSIS, who controlled signals intelligence, increasingly basked in thereflected glory of the codebreakers at Bletchley Park. In theory thisgave SIS a breathing space to transform itself into a more modernand efficient service, but in reality these wartime reforms moved ata constabulary pace.1But the experience of SIS in Asia after 1941 was distinctly differ-ent in character. Unlike SIS in London, it encountered new problemsthat became more awkward and intractable as the war progressed.In Japanese-occupied Asian countries it laboured under a number ofspecial disadvantages. It was hard to find high-grade oriental agentswith recent knowledge of occupied countries and it was difficult forEuropean agents to move or operate in remote Japanese-controlledareas without the knowledge and co-operation of the local popula-tion. Consequently, a different British clandestine service, the newlyconstituted SOE, which was busy training resistance groups anddeveloping contact with leading indigenous figures, discovered thatit enjoyed a far larger intelligence net. SIS was quickly outstrippedby the amateur saboteurs of the new SOE organization. Indeed by1945, in areas such as Thailand, agents independently inserted bySIS were more likely to be picked up and detained by the ubiquitousresistance than by the Japanese security police. The consequencewas a long period of poor relations between SIS and SOE, punctuatedby moments when SIS was increasingly inclined to concede defeatto its sister service.'2These operational problems, peculiar to Asia, were compoundedby serious mistakes committed at a higher level, notably by the


appointed a diplomat, Patrick Reilly, as Personal Assistant to Menz-ies, with the intention of keeping a closer eye on SIS.'? Having lostmany of its networks in Europe during 1940, SIS was able to startafresh, working in new and productive areas such as deception. Italso gave more attention to counter-intelligence in foreign territories(which lay outside the remit of MI5). These efforts against Axissecret services, such as the German Abwehr, were greatly assisted byUltra which permitted the perusal ofAbwehr communications. IndeedSIS, who controlled signals intelligence, increasingly basked in thereflected glory of the codebreakers at Bletchley Park. In theory thisgave SIS a breathing space to transform itself into a more modernand efficient service, but in reality these wartime reforms moved ata constabulary pace.1But the experience of SIS in Asia after 1941 was distinctly differ-ent in character. Unlike SIS in London, it encountered new problemsthat became more awkward and intractable as the war progressed.In Japanese-occupied Asian countries it laboured under a number ofspecial disadvantages. It was hard to find high-grade oriental agentswith recent knowledge of occupied countries and it was difficult forEuropean agents to move or operate in remote Japanese-controlledareas without the knowledge and co-operation of the local popula-tion. Consequently, a different British clandestine service, the newlyconstituted SOE, which was busy training resistance groups anddeveloping contact with leading indigenous figures, discovered thatit enjoyed a far larger intelligence net. SIS was quickly outstrippedby the amateur saboteurs of the new SOE organization. Indeed by1945, in areas such as Thailand, agents independently inserted bySIS were more likely to be picked up and detained by the ubiquitousresistance than by the Japanese security police. The consequencewas a long period of poor relations between SIS and SOE, punctuatedby moments when SIS was increasingly inclined to concede defeatto its sister service.'2These operational problems, peculiar to Asia, were compoundedby serious mistakes committed at a higher level, notably by the


1828282


6/40

BRITAIN'S SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICERITAIN'S SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICERITAIN'S SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICEregional head of SIS, Colonel Leo Steveni, during the period 1942-44. His unduly close relationship with the Indian Army and GHQIndia led to pressure to deploy SIS in and just behind the battle areafor the purpose of operational, even tactical, intelligence. This wasa perverse development given that the traditional role of SIS was,in fact, long-range political, economic and strategic intelligence. Thewillingness of SIS to subordinate itself to local demands proved tobe a serious mistake. Yet the pressures of local commanders in Asiawere fierce and unrelenting and those organizations that did notrespond risked being eclipsed by one of the many other rival clandes-tine services.

SIS in wartime Asia was thus beleaguered by two separate typesof difficulties. Firstly, operational problems that were unique to thatpart of the world. Secondly, managerial problems mostly related tothe complexities of an organization responsible to its 'Head Office'in London, yet working in co-operation within regional or 'theatre'commands. These bureaucratic problems were widespread duringthe Second World War, but they were exacerbated by the distancebetween London and the centres of command in Asia. As a result,by 1945, SIS in Asia had deteriorated badly and was only saved fromde facto extinction by the intervention of Admiral Lord LouisMountbatten, the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia, andhis far-sighted clandestine operations supremo, Captain G. A. Gar-nons-Williams, RN. Their decision was a radical one. They urged thewithdrawal of SIS from the war againstJapan altogether, suggestingthat it concentrate resources on developing long-range projectsfocused on the post-war period, and to which SIS wastemperamentally more suited.'3

The generally dismal nature of British intelligence provision inEurope during the inter-war years has already been explored to a13 On Mountbatten and South East Asia Command, see Christopher Thorne,Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, I94I-1945(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978); Philip Zeigler, Mountbatten: The Official Biography(London: Collins, 1985); Peter Dennis, TroubledDays of Peace: Mountbatten and SouthEast Asia Command, 1945-46 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987). OnGarnons-Williams, see Charles Cruickshank, SOE in the Far East (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1983), pp. 88, 171.

regional head of SIS, Colonel Leo Steveni, during the period 1942-44. His unduly close relationship with the Indian Army and GHQIndia led to pressure to deploy SIS in and just behind the battle areafor the purpose of operational, even tactical, intelligence. This wasa perverse development given that the traditional role of SIS was,in fact, long-range political, economic and strategic intelligence. Thewillingness of SIS to subordinate itself to local demands proved tobe a serious mistake. Yet the pressures of local commanders in Asiawere fierce and unrelenting and those organizations that did notrespond risked being eclipsed by one of the many other rival clandes-tine services.



regional head of SIS, Colonel Leo Steveni, during the period 1942-44. His unduly close relationship with the Indian Army and GHQIndia led to pressure to deploy SIS in and just behind the battle areafor the purpose of operational, even tactical, intelligence. This wasa perverse development given that the traditional role of SIS was,in fact, long-range political, economic and strategic intelligence. Thewillingness of SIS to subordinate itself to local demands proved tobe a serious mistake. Yet the pressures of local commanders in Asiawere fierce and unrelenting and those organizations that did notrespond risked being eclipsed by one of the many other rival clandes-tine services.



1838383


7/40

RICHARDJ. ALDRICHICHARDJ. ALDRICHICHARDJ. ALDRICHconsiderable degree. However, in attempting to understand the spe-cially impoverished nature of SIS in Asia prior to the Second WorldWar, it is essential to appreciate that East of Suez, Britain placedan overwhelmingly colonial emphasis upon intelligence concentratedupon the internal security of British territories. The British colonialgovernments in India, Malaya and Hong Kong had developed, overmany decades, effective, if narrowly focused, security intelligenceservices designed to address internal threats from nationalists, com-munists or other types of 'agitators'. Their undoubted success con-tributed to an atmosphere of complacency. Meanwhile, very little inthe way of resources or first class personnel was devoted to secretservice activities designed to address the problems of external for-eign threats and potential adversaries in Asia such as Japan, Chinaand the Soviet Union.14 Concern about this imbalance only began tomount in Whitehall from the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in1937. In the Spring of 1938 the Air Ministry despatched its deputyhead of intelligence, Wing Commander Wigglesworth, on a three-month tour of Asia to examine all aspects of the British intelligenceapparatus in that region. Wigglesworth's expectations were low andhe was not disappointed. He discovered that SIS had only two officersin Asia, located at Shanghai and Hong Kong. The state of SIS repres-entation at Shanghai was particularly shocking. Although initiallywary of intruding into SIS business, he could not let the situationpass without comment. He reported: 'Both at Hong Kong and atShanghai I was asked by many if I knew "Steptoe". No, who was he?Oh, he's the head of the secret service organisation at Shanghai-he's the arch-spy-everyone in China knows who and what "Steptoe"is!' Harry Steptoe's cover at Shanghai was that of a Vice-Consul andhis office was in the consular buildings. But he made little pretenceof being a consul and his real work aroused 'curiosity'. Surely, heasked, SIS could do better than this?'5This was not mere exaggeration by Wigglesworth or by those heinterviewed. Steptoe was, by any standards, an extremely colourful

14 On inter-war imperial security intelligence, see Richard J. Popplewell, Intelli-gence and Imperial Defence: The Secret Service of the Indian Empire, I904-1920 (London:Frank Cass, 1995); Frederick S. Litten, 'The Noulens Affair', The China Quarterly,138 (June 1994): 492-512.15 Wing Commander Wigglesworth (AI2), 'Notes on the tour of RAF and Com-bined Service Intelligence Organisations in the Far East', Part V: Shanghai, 30June1938, AIR 20/374, PRO. For a fleeting glimpse of Steptoe during the mid-192ossee Bernard Wasserstein, The Secret Lives of TrebitschLincoln (New Haven: Yale Uni-versity Press, 1988), pp. 233-4, 244-5, 248-9.

considerable degree. However, in attempting to understand the spe-cially impoverished nature of SIS in Asia prior to the Second WorldWar, it is essential to appreciate that East of Suez, Britain placedan overwhelmingly colonial emphasis upon intelligence concentratedupon the internal security of British territories. The British colonialgovernments in India, Malaya and Hong Kong had developed, overmany decades, effective, if narrowly focused, security intelligenceservices designed to address internal threats from nationalists, com-munists or other types of 'agitators'. Their undoubted success con-tributed to an atmosphere of complacency. Meanwhile, very little inthe way of resources or first class personnel was devoted to secretservice activities designed to address the problems of external for-eign threats and potential adversaries in Asia such as Japan, Chinaand the Soviet Union.14 Concern about this imbalance only began tomount in Whitehall from the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in1937. In the Spring of 1938 the Air Ministry despatched its deputyhead of intelligence, Wing Commander Wigglesworth, on a three-month tour of Asia to examine all aspects of the British intelligenceapparatus in that region. Wigglesworth's expectations were low andhe was not disappointed. He discovered that SIS had only two officersin Asia, located at Shanghai and Hong Kong. The state of SIS repres-entation at Shanghai was particularly shocking. Although initiallywary of intruding into SIS business, he could not let the situationpass without comment. He reported: 'Both at Hong Kong and atShanghai I was asked by many if I knew "Steptoe". No, who was he?Oh, he's the head of the secret service organisation at Shanghai-he's the arch-spy-everyone in China knows who and what "Steptoe"is!' Harry Steptoe's cover at Shanghai was that of a Vice-Consul andhis office was in the consular buildings. But he made little pretenceof being a consul and his real work aroused 'curiosity'. Surely, heasked, SIS could do better than this?'5This was not mere exaggeration by Wigglesworth or by those heinterviewed. Steptoe was, by any standards, an extremely colourful


considerable degree. However, in attempting to understand the spe-cially impoverished nature of SIS in Asia prior to the Second WorldWar, it is essential to appreciate that East of Suez, Britain placedan overwhelmingly colonial emphasis upon intelligence concentratedupon the internal security of British territories. The British colonialgovernments in India, Malaya and Hong Kong had developed, overmany decades, effective, if narrowly focused, security intelligenceservices designed to address internal threats from nationalists, com-munists or other types of 'agitators'. Their undoubted success con-tributed to an atmosphere of complacency. Meanwhile, very little inthe way of resources or first class personnel was devoted to secretservice activities designed to address the problems of external for-eign threats and potential adversaries in Asia such as Japan, Chinaand the Soviet Union.14 Concern about this imbalance only began tomount in Whitehall from the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in1937. In the Spring of 1938 the Air Ministry despatched its deputyhead of intelligence, Wing Commander Wigglesworth, on a three-month tour of Asia to examine all aspects of the British intelligenceapparatus in that region. Wigglesworth's expectations were low andhe was not disappointed. He discovered that SIS had only two officersin Asia, located at Shanghai and Hong Kong. The state of SIS repres-entation at Shanghai was particularly shocking. Although initiallywary of intruding into SIS business, he could not let the situationpass without comment. He reported: 'Both at Hong Kong and atShanghai I was asked by many if I knew "Steptoe". No, who was he?Oh, he's the head of the secret service organisation at Shanghai-he's the arch-spy-everyone in China knows who and what "Steptoe"is!' Harry Steptoe's cover at Shanghai was that of a Vice-Consul andhis office was in the consular buildings. But he made little pretenceof being a consul and his real work aroused 'curiosity'. Surely, heasked, SIS could do better than this?'5This was not mere exaggeration by Wigglesworth or by those heinterviewed. Steptoe was, by any standards, an extremely colourful


1848484


8/40

BRITAIN'S SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICERITAIN'S SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICERITAIN'S SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICEfigure. He enjoyed wearing exotic non-regulation uniforms and haddeveloped a unique surreptitious walk that lent an air of subterfugeto everything that he did. As a result his cover was non-existent.16 Asearly as December 1933 the American Military Attache in Shanghai,Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale, had confidently identified Steptoe asthe 'British intelligence agent'. This was partly because his name didnot appear in the list of his own consulate's personnel and alsobecause of his peculiar activities which led Drysdale to think that hewas on some sort of secretive 'roving commission'.17

Predictably, the intelligence gathered by SIS at Shanghai wasmeagre. A few Chinese dock-labourers were utilized as coast-watchers in Japan. But reliable Chinese agents were elusive. InChina they found it increasingly hard to travel freely in what wasnow a war zone. The Yangste River had been closed to traffic andinformers watching the progress of the Sino-Japanese War had totravel slowly by land routes. Accordingly, the information that SISmanaged to pick up from the missionaries and traders who workedfor them was invariably out of date. Soviet Asia also presented anawkward target. Although there were plenty of White Russian exilesin Shanghai, penetrating into Soviet Siberia was all but impossibleand two SIS agents were already on trial there. Wigglesworth noted:'There are not many Russians who are prepared to enter Siberiawhen they know that suspicion means "liquidation" '.8In mainland Southeast Asia, an area of growing strategic import-ance, there was no permanent British intelligence representation ofany kind. Even during 1940, with Japan extending her presence intoFrench Indochina, SIS did not see fit to station officers there, nor

16 I am dependent on private information for insight into some of Steptoe's morecolourful attributes. One of Steptoe's more notorious SIS colleagues offers a sim-ilarly low opinion of him: 'The near-mental case was Steptoe of Shanghai, who hadcovered the whole Far East for SIS between the wars. How it happened was still amystery to me: I found it difficult to believe that he could hold anyjob for a week.'Kim Philby,My Silent War(London:MacGibbon and Key, 1968), p. 77.17 Drysdale, 'British Intelligence Service in China', G-2 Report No. 8704, 6 Dec.1933, 9944-A-190, RG 165, United States National Archives (hereafter USNA).18 Wigglesworth Report, Part V: Shanghai, AIR 20/374, PRO. On intelligenceand Japan see also Wesley K. Wark, 'In Search of a Suitable Japan: British NavalIntelligence in the Pacific Before the Second World War', Intelligence nd NationalSecurity,1, 2 (April 1986): 189-212;John Ferris, "Worthy of Some Better Enemy":The British Estimate of the Imperial Japanese Army and the Fall of Singapore',CanadianournalofHistory,28, 2 (August 1993): 223-56; Antony Best, 'Constructingan Image: British Intelligence and Whitehall's Perception of Japan, 1931-1939',Intelligence and National Security, 11, 3 (July 1996): 403-23.

figure. He enjoyed wearing exotic non-regulation uniforms and haddeveloped a unique surreptitious walk that lent an air of subterfugeto everything that he did. As a result his cover was non-existent.16 Asearly as December 1933 the American Military Attache in Shanghai,Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale, had confidently identified Steptoe asthe 'British intelligence agent'. This was partly because his name didnot appear in the list of his own consulate's personnel and alsobecause of his peculiar activities which led Drysdale to think that hewas on some sort of secretive 'roving commission'.17



figure. He enjoyed wearing exotic non-regulation uniforms and haddeveloped a unique surreptitious walk that lent an air of subterfugeto everything that he did. As a result his cover was non-existent.16 Asearly as December 1933 the American Military Attache in Shanghai,Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale, had confidently identified Steptoe asthe 'British intelligence agent'. This was partly because his name didnot appear in the list of his own consulate's personnel and alsobecause of his peculiar activities which led Drysdale to think that hewas on some sort of secretive 'roving commission'.17



1858585


9/40

RICHARDJ. ALDRICHICHARDJ. ALDRICHICHARDJ. ALDRICHwere there any permanent service attaches. The latter function wasfulfilled by overworked staff officers from Singapore who occasionallyundertook tours through Bangkok, Saigon and Hanoi. This was incontrast to the Japanese embassies and consulates, where thenumber of service attaches was growing fast.19 Nevertheless, Britishdiplomats in the region were not entirely devoid of secret informa-tion, for on some issues they could turn to the powerful private clan-destine apparatus run by large firms in the area such as ArmstrongVickers and also Asiatic Petroleum, the local subsidiary of RoyalDutch-Shell. In December 1938, SirJosiah Crosby, the British Minis-ter in Bangkok, explained to his superiors in London thatthe intelligence service of the local branch of the Asiatic Petroleum Com-pany is such an efficient one, there is no information which I can myselfusefully impart ... It is they, indeed, who keep the [British] Legation upto date and to whom I myself have to resort for what is afoot.Nevertheless, British officials were unhappy about their dependencyon companies who might carefully select the material that theydecided to pass to the authorities.20Both before and during the Second World War the majority ofBritish secret information in Asia came not from agents but fromintercepting and decyphering signals communications. Prior to 1939the main British intercept station was at Stonecutters Island in HongKong Harbour. Wigglesworth toured these facilities in 1938 and,given the extraordinary value of intercept operations, he was stunnedby the physical dilapidation at Stonecutters Island. The accommoda-tion in the intercept building was totally inadequate: 'even a washingplace is being used as an operating room'. Personnel were beingworked literally round the clock. One operative complained to himthat, since arriving three years ago, he had not enjoyed a single week-end of leave. This paucity of staff meant that while Japanese highpolicy material was decrypted immediately, operational materialbacked up and all tactical intelligence was simply discarded. Thelack of physical security at the station was also quite remarkable and

19On the fast-expanding Japanese clandestine network, see E. Bruce Reynolds,ThailandandJapan's SouthernAdvance,I940-1945 (New York: St Martin's Press,1994), pp. 177-81, 210-1 1, 221-3; Richard J. Aldrich, The Key to the South: Britain,the UnitedStates and ThailandDuringtheApproach f thePacificWar, I929-42 (KualaLumpur: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 128, 185, 222-3, 340-1; PeterElphick, Singapore:ThePregnable ortress London:Hodder and Stoughton, 1994), pp.27-44.20 Crosby to FO No. 562, 28 Dec. 1938, F2o6/204/4o, FO 371/23589, PRO.

were there any permanent service attaches. The latter function wasfulfilled by overworked staff officers from Singapore who occasionallyundertook tours through Bangkok, Saigon and Hanoi. This was incontrast to the Japanese embassies and consulates, where thenumber of service attaches was growing fast.19 Nevertheless, Britishdiplomats in the region were not entirely devoid of secret informa-tion, for on some issues they could turn to the powerful private clan-destine apparatus run by large firms in the area such as ArmstrongVickers and also Asiatic Petroleum, the local subsidiary of RoyalDutch-Shell. In December 1938, SirJosiah Crosby, the British Minis-ter in Bangkok, explained to his superiors in London thatthe intelligence service of the local branch of the Asiatic Petroleum Com-pany is such an efficient one, there is no information which I can myselfusefully impart ... It is they, indeed, who keep the [British] Legation upto date and to whom I myself have to resort for what is afoot.Nevertheless, British officials were unhappy about their dependencyon companies who might carefully select the material that theydecided to pass to the authorities.20Both before and during the Second World War the majority ofBritish secret information in Asia came not from agents but fromintercepting and decyphering signals communications. Prior to 1939the main British intercept station was at Stonecutters Island in HongKong Harbour. Wigglesworth toured these facilities in 1938 and,given the extraordinary value of intercept operations, he was stunnedby the physical dilapidation at Stonecutters Island. The accommoda-tion in the intercept building was totally inadequate: 'even a washingplace is being used as an operating room'. Personnel were beingworked literally round the clock. One operative complained to himthat, since arriving three years ago, he had not enjoyed a single week-end of leave. This paucity of staff meant that while Japanese highpolicy material was decrypted immediately, operational materialbacked up and all tactical intelligence was simply discarded. Thelack of physical security at the station was also quite remarkable and


were there any permanent service attaches. The latter function wasfulfilled by overworked staff officers from Singapore who occasionallyundertook tours through Bangkok, Saigon and Hanoi. This was incontrast to the Japanese embassies and consulates, where thenumber of service attaches was growing fast.19 Nevertheless, Britishdiplomats in the region were not entirely devoid of secret informa-tion, for on some issues they could turn to the powerful private clan-destine apparatus run by large firms in the area such as ArmstrongVickers and also Asiatic Petroleum, the local subsidiary of RoyalDutch-Shell. In December 1938, SirJosiah Crosby, the British Minis-ter in Bangkok, explained to his superiors in London thatthe intelligence service of the local branch of the Asiatic Petroleum Com-pany is such an efficient one, there is no information which I can myselfusefully impart ... It is they, indeed, who keep the [British] Legation upto date and to whom I myself have to resort for what is afoot.Nevertheless, British officials were unhappy about their dependencyon companies who might carefully select the material that theydecided to pass to the authorities.20Both before and during the Second World War the majority ofBritish secret information in Asia came not from agents but fromintercepting and decyphering signals communications. Prior to 1939the main British intercept station was at Stonecutters Island in HongKong Harbour. Wigglesworth toured these facilities in 1938 and,given the extraordinary value of intercept operations, he was stunnedby the physical dilapidation at Stonecutters Island. The accommoda-tion in the intercept building was totally inadequate: 'even a washingplace is being used as an operating room'. Personnel were beingworked literally round the clock. One operative complained to himthat, since arriving three years ago, he had not enjoyed a single week-end of leave. This paucity of staff meant that while Japanese highpolicy material was decrypted immediately, operational materialbacked up and all tactical intelligence was simply discarded. Thelack of physical security at the station was also quite remarkable and


1868686


10/40

BRITAIN'S SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICERITAIN'S SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICERITAIN'S SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICEhe noted that 'Chinese cooks . . . for the operators mess work withina few feet of the operation rooms'.These inadequacies were partly explained by a recent decision tohalt development at Stonecutters Island and instead to considerrelocating the whole operation to Singapore. As Japanese forcesexpanded into China, Hong Kong was increasingly a small Britishisland in aJapanese sea. The possibility of a surprise attack launchedbyJapanese forces located in Formosa, or on Hainan Island, preyedconstantly on the minds of the military staff and, despite protestsfrom the Navy, the British Chiefs of Staff increasingly viewed HongKong as an indefensible outpost. The intercept station, located atthe highest point on Stonecutters Island, was very vulnerable to bothair attack and gunfire, albeit there were some alternative under-ground facilities. Therefore, in 1939 the focus of British intelligencein Asia moved to Singapore.21

IIMatters improved little during 1940 and 1941. The obvious inad-equacies of SIS in Asia were a particularly sore point for the Com-mander in Chief Far East, Admiral Sir Robert Brooke-Popham,whofelt that the newly appointed Chief of SIS in London, Sir StuartMenzies, was deliberately neglecting Asia in favour of the moreimmediate needs of the war in Europe and the Middle East. On 6January 1941 Brooke-Pophamcompleted a tour of inspection whichreviewed British intelligence organizations in Asia, a tour not unlikethat undertaken by Wigglesworth three years before. Dismay at whathe uncovered prompted him to fire off an immediate protest to theBritish Chiefs of Staff in London:Weakest inkundoubtedlys S.I.S.organisationn FarEast.At present ittleor no reliance s placeduponS.I.S. nformationbyanyauthoritieshere andlittle valuableinformation n fact appearsto be obtained. I am satisfiedthat the identityof principalofficerat Shanghai,Hong KongandSingaporeis knownto many.Theirchief subordinates re in generallocalamateurswith no training n intelligenceduties noradequateknowledgeof military,naval,air or politicalaffairs.AgentsarechieflyuneducatedChineseandup

21 Wing Commander Wigglesworth (AI2), 'Notes on the tour of RAF and Com-bined Service Intelligence Organisations in the Far East', Part IV: Hong Kong, 30June 1938, AIR 20/374, PRO.

he noted that 'Chinese cooks . . . for the operators mess work withina few feet of the operation rooms'.These inadequacies were partly explained by a recent decision tohalt development at Stonecutters Island and instead to considerrelocating the whole operation to Singapore. As Japanese forcesexpanded into China, Hong Kong was increasingly a small Britishisland in aJapanese sea. The possibility of a surprise attack launchedbyJapanese forces located in Formosa, or on Hainan Island, preyedconstantly on the minds of the military staff and, despite protestsfrom the Navy, the British Chiefs of Staff increasingly viewed HongKong as an indefensible outpost. The intercept station, located atthe highest point on Stonecutters Island, was very vulnerable to bothair attack and gunfire, albeit there were some alternative under-ground facilities. Therefore, in 1939 the focus of British intelligencein Asia moved to Singapore.21



he noted that 'Chinese cooks . . . for the operators mess work withina few feet of the operation rooms'.These inadequacies were partly explained by a recent decision tohalt development at Stonecutters Island and instead to considerrelocating the whole operation to Singapore. As Japanese forcesexpanded into China, Hong Kong was increasingly a small Britishisland in aJapanese sea. The possibility of a surprise attack launchedbyJapanese forces located in Formosa, or on Hainan Island, preyedconstantly on the minds of the military staff and, despite protestsfrom the Navy, the British Chiefs of Staff increasingly viewed HongKong as an indefensible outpost. The intercept station, located atthe highest point on Stonecutters Island, was very vulnerable to bothair attack and gunfire, albeit there were some alternative under-ground facilities. Therefore, in 1939 the focus of British intelligencein Asia moved to Singapore.21



1878787


11/40

RICHARD J. ALDRICHICHARD J. ALDRICHICHARD J. ALDRICHtill now in Thailand and Indo China reliance has been placed entirely uponFrench sources of information.He added that while SIS had, several times, expressed the intentionto send an officer out from London to review the situation, nothinghad been done. He now considered that 'action is required at once'and he demanded the appointment of an overall regional head forthe SIS organization in Asia 'with power to make changes in person-nel without delay'.22London had long been familiar with the farcical nature of SISprovision in Asia and had chosen to do nothing about it. A seniorrepresentative from SIS in London was finally despatched to Singa-pore to undertake a review in May 1941. This representative wasGeoffrey Denham, a businessman with extensive interests in Java.Denham and Brooke-Popham agreed that, over time, a regional dir-ector could remedy many of the problems, but they also worriedabout the complete lack of any SIS organization in Burma, whichthey presciently suggested 'will become a principle centre in war'.Brooke-Popham was impressed by Denham and persuaded Londonto allow him to stay on to become the first SIS regional director,noting that 'his business activities would provide good cover for hiswork'.23 In future Denham would reside at Brooke-Popham's intelli-gence centre, the Far Eastern Combined Bureau, but would never-theless remain 'responsible to "C" ', 'C' being the acronym for theChief of SIS in London, Sir Stuart Menzies.24The problems identified by Brooke-Popham could not be resolvedquickly even though the need for better intelligence was clearlypressing. In August 1941 he was confronted with dramatic eventsin French Indochina.Japan already enjoyed bases in northern FrenchIndochina, which she had forced the Vichy government there to con-cede during the previous year. Japan now extended her position toinclude a number of bases with airfields in the south of the country,within range of Malaya. Brooke-Popham ordered his intelligenceofficers to 'spare neither time, nor trouble, nor expense in obtainingup to date information about the state of preparedness of these

22 C. in C. FE to COS, 6 June 1941, WO 193/920, PRO.23 C. in C. FE to COS No. 13672, 17 June 1941, WO 193/920, PRO. See also(Hist) (DD), 'Dispatch on the Far East by Brooke-Popham', 1June 1942, CAB 120/518, PRO. Denham was a director of Anglo-Dutch Plantations Ltd., a rubber con-cern in Java.24 WO to C. in C. FE No. 70866, 7 June 1941, WO 193/607, PRO.

till now in Thailand and Indo China reliance has been placed entirely uponFrench sources of information.He added that while SIS had, several times, expressed the intentionto send an officer out from London to review the situation, nothinghad been done. He now considered that 'action is required at once'and he demanded the appointment of an overall regional head forthe SIS organization in Asia 'with power to make changes in person-nel without delay'.22London had long been familiar with the farcical nature of SISprovision in Asia and had chosen to do nothing about it. A seniorrepresentative from SIS in London was finally despatched to Singa-pore to undertake a review in May 1941. This representative wasGeoffrey Denham, a businessman with extensive interests in Java.Denham and Brooke-Popham agreed that, over time, a regional dir-ector could remedy many of the problems, but they also worriedabout the complete lack of any SIS organization in Burma, whichthey presciently suggested 'will become a principle centre in war'.Brooke-Popham was impressed by Denham and persuaded Londonto allow him to stay on to become the first SIS regional director,noting that 'his business activities would provide good cover for hiswork'.23 In future Denham would reside at Brooke-Popham's intelli-gence centre, the Far Eastern Combined Bureau, but would never-theless remain 'responsible to "C" ', 'C' being the acronym for theChief of SIS in London, Sir Stuart Menzies.24The problems identified by Brooke-Popham could not be resolvedquickly even though the need for better intelligence was clearlypressing. In August 1941 he was confronted with dramatic eventsin French Indochina.Japan already enjoyed bases in northern FrenchIndochina, which she had forced the Vichy government there to con-cede during the previous year. Japan now extended her position toinclude a number of bases with airfields in the south of the country,within range of Malaya. Brooke-Popham ordered his intelligenceofficers to 'spare neither time, nor trouble, nor expense in obtainingup to date information about the state of preparedness of these


till now in Thailand and Indo China reliance has been placed entirely uponFrench sources of information.He added that while SIS had, several times, expressed the intentionto send an officer out from London to review the situation, nothinghad been done. He now considered that 'action is required at once'and he demanded the appointment of an overall regional head forthe SIS organization in Asia 'with power to make changes in person-nel without delay'.22London had long been familiar with the farcical nature of SISprovision in Asia and had chosen to do nothing about it. A seniorrepresentative from SIS in London was finally despatched to Singa-pore to undertake a review in May 1941. This representative wasGeoffrey Denham, a businessman with extensive interests in Java.Denham and Brooke-Popham agreed that, over time, a regional dir-ector could remedy many of the problems, but they also worriedabout the complete lack of any SIS organization in Burma, whichthey presciently suggested 'will become a principle centre in war'.Brooke-Popham was impressed by Denham and persuaded Londonto allow him to stay on to become the first SIS regional director,noting that 'his business activities would provide good cover for hiswork'.23 In future Denham would reside at Brooke-Popham's intelli-gence centre, the Far Eastern Combined Bureau, but would never-theless remain 'responsible to "C" ', 'C' being the acronym for theChief of SIS in London, Sir Stuart Menzies.24The problems identified by Brooke-Popham could not be resolvedquickly even though the need for better intelligence was clearlypressing. In August 1941 he was confronted with dramatic eventsin French Indochina.Japan already enjoyed bases in northern FrenchIndochina, which she had forced the Vichy government there to con-cede during the previous year. Japan now extended her position toinclude a number of bases with airfields in the south of the country,within range of Malaya. Brooke-Popham ordered his intelligenceofficers to 'spare neither time, nor trouble, nor expense in obtainingup to date information about the state of preparedness of these


i888888


12/40

BRITAIN'S SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICERITAIN'S SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICERITAIN'S SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICEaerodromes'. But little information was forthcoming.25 Indeed, evenin mid-1941, SIS continued to circulate reports which contained agreat deal of material passed to them by the French, whose ownservice was not well regarded.26 SIS in London even distributedFrench reports on Asia around Whitehall without bothering to trans-late them. Whitehall departments were not impressed and dismissedthis sort of material as 'valueless'.27Denham's arrival was not entirely without effect and more adven-turous programmes were gradually set in train. In the last monthsof 1941, SIS, along with British special operations personnel, didbegin to develop relations with the Malayan Communist Party(MCP), despite the reservations of the colonial government inMalaya. The MCP supplied several Chinese agents who receivedwireless training to provide a stay-behind network which wouldreport on the main Japanese lines of advance during an invasion.However, as Brooke-Popham himself observed, Denham could notcreate an elaborate network overnight and this, in practice, was whatDenham was now asked to do.28

Brooke-Popham's complaints need to be approached with caution,for while his specific observations about SIS were well founded, hisgeneral complaints about a lack of warning of the Japanese attackon Malaya are puzzling and at variance with the facts. British signalsinterception at Singapore was providing a stream of material onJapanese activities in the region, and from early 1941, Bletchley Parkhad begun to produce a great deal of high-grade Japanese diplomaticmaterial. With access to this intercept material we might ask whyBrooke-Popham was so concerned to secure improvements to thetraditional human forms of intelligence gathering practised by SIS,and why he was so critical of SIS in his after-action report of 1942?There are at least two reasons for this.The first answer lies in a fascinating document entitled 'Warning

25 Brooke-Popham to FECB, 21 Aug. 1941, AIR 23/1865, PRO. See also (Hist)(DD), 'Dispatch on the Far East by Brooke-Popham', 1 June 1942, CAB 120/518,PRO.26 See, for example, MI6 Political Report No. 111, 'A Statement of JapanesePolicy: French Information from Shanghai', WO 208/895, PRO.27 Steveni (MI6) to MI2c and MI3a, 17 April 1941, CX.374oo/I/818(untranslated), WO 208/1219A, PRO; Winterborn (MI2c) minute 28.12.40 on MI6CX.37502/991, 21 Dec. 1940, ibid.28 These agents were controlled by Major Rosher of SIS in Singapore, R. Gough,SOE Singapore, 941-2 (London:William Kimber, 1985), pp.68-89.

aerodromes'. But little information was forthcoming.25 Indeed, evenin mid-1941, SIS continued to circulate reports which contained agreat deal of material passed to them by the French, whose ownservice was not well regarded.26 SIS in London even distributedFrench reports on Asia around Whitehall without bothering to trans-late them. Whitehall departments were not impressed and dismissedthis sort of material as 'valueless'.27Denham's arrival was not entirely without effect and more adven-turous programmes were gradually set in train. In the last monthsof 1941, SIS, along with British special operations personnel, didbegin to develop relations with the Malayan Communist Party(MCP), despite the reservations of the colonial government inMalaya. The MCP supplied several Chinese agents who receivedwireless training to provide a stay-behind network which wouldreport on the main Japanese lines of advance during an invasion.However, as Brooke-Popham himself observed, Denham could notcreate an elaborate network overnight and this, in practice, was whatDenham was now asked to do.28

Brooke-Popham's complaints need to be approached with caution,for while his specific observations about SIS were well founded, hisgeneral complaints about a lack of warning of the Japanese attackon Malaya are puzzling and at variance with the facts. British signalsinterception at Singapore was providing a stream of material onJapanese activities in the region, and from early 1941, Bletchley Parkhad begun to produce a great deal of high-grade Japanese diplomaticmaterial. With access to this intercept material we might ask whyBrooke-Popham was so concerned to secure improvements to thetraditional human forms of intelligence gathering practised by SIS,and why he was so critical of SIS in his after-action report of 1942?There are at least two reasons for this.The first answer lies in a fascinating document entitled 'Warning

25 Brooke-Popham to FECB, 21 Aug. 1941, AIR 23/1865, PRO. See also (Hist)(DD), 'Dispatch on the Far East by Brooke-Popham', 1 June 1942, CAB 120/518,PRO.26 See, for example, MI6 Political Report No. 111, 'A Statement of JapanesePolicy: French Information from Shanghai', WO 208/895, PRO.27 Steveni (MI6) to MI2c and MI3a, 17 April 1941, CX.374oo/I/818(untranslated), WO 208/1219A, PRO; Winterborn (MI2c) minute 28.12.40 on MI6CX.37502/991, 21 Dec. 1940, ibid.28 These agents were controlled by Major Rosher of SIS in Singapore, R. Gough,SOE Singapore, 941-2 (London:William Kimber, 1985), pp.68-89.

aerodromes'. But little information was forthcoming.25 Indeed, evenin mid-1941, SIS continued to circulate reports which contained agreat deal of material passed to them by the French, whose ownservice was not well regarded.26 SIS in London even distributedFrench reports on Asia around Whitehall without bothering to trans-late them. Whitehall departments were not impressed and dismissedthis sort of material as 'valueless'.27Denham's arrival was not entirely without effect and more adven-turous programmes were gradually set in train. In the last monthsof 1941, SIS, along with British special operations personnel, didbegin to develop relations with the Malayan Communist Party(MCP), despite the reservations of the colonial government inMalaya. The MCP supplied several Chinese agents who receivedwireless training to provide a stay-behind network which wouldreport on the main Japanese lines of advance during an invasion.However, as Brooke-Popham himself observed, Denham could notcreate an elaborate ne

Richard Aldrich Britain's Secret Intelligence Service in Asia During the Second World War

Documents

Transcript of Richard Aldrich Britain's Secret Intelligence Service in Asia During the Second World War