Boosting Work and Earnings for Housing-Assisted Families Nandita Verma Solutions 2013: National...

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Boosting Work and Earnings for Housing-Assisted Families Nandita Verma Solutions 2013: National Conference on State and Local Housing Policy September 17, 2013

Transcript of Boosting Work and Earnings for Housing-Assisted Families Nandita Verma Solutions 2013: National...

Boosting Work and Earnings for Housing-Assisted Families

Nandita Verma

Solutions 2013: National Conference on State and Local Housing Policy

September 17, 2013

MDRC

• Not-for-profit social policy research organization

• Based in NYC and Oakland

• Rigorously evaluates (and sometimes helps design) innovative social policies

• Pioneered large-scale random assignment evaluations of social programs

• Mission: Build evidence to improve the lives of low-income families

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Topics Broad issueHelping housing subsidy recipients make progress toward

economic security. Making assisted housing a “platform” for interventions to

improve work outcomes for low-income families Evidence

• Jobs-Plus: A place-based employment intervention for residents of public housing

• Work Rewards: A demonstration for “Housing Choice Voucher” recipients

Future work • HUD’s National FSS evaluation• HUD’s Rent Reform demonstration

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Jobs-Plus DemonstrationTarget group: Residents of public housing

• Place-based employment intervention• Multi-component, “saturation” strategy

3 components:1. Employment and training services

Convenient on-site “job centers” 2. New rent rules to “make work pay”

Rent rises less as earnings grow3. Community support for work

Neighbor-to-neighbor outreach

Public and private sponsors: • HUD, The Rockefeller Foundation, other public and private

funders 4

Diverse housing developments in 6 cities: Baltimore Chattanooga Dayton Los Angeles St. Paul Seattle

Randomly allocated developments within each city to program and control groups

Local partnerships and collaboration: • Public housing authorities• Welfare agencies• Workforce agencies • Residents• Other service agencies

Mandatory partners

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Jobs-Plus sites

Figure pooled 1

Mean Quarterly Earnings for the 1998 Able-Bodied Sample:3 sites pooled

Post-program period

Pooled average quarterly earnings, 1998 cohort* (full implementation sites)

*1998 cohort – focus of impact analysis

SiteAvg. per year (2000 - 2006)

Cumulative (2000 - 2006)

Change (%)

Pooled $1,300 $9,099 16%

Dayton $984 $6,888 14%

Los Angeles $1,176 $8,233 15%

St. Paul $1,883 $13,181 19% 

All results statistically significant

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Earnings impacts through 7 years (full implementation sites)

New York City• Now serving 4 public housing developments

• A key feature of Mayor Bloomberg’s new “Young Men’s Initiative”: Will add up to 7 new Jobs-Plus sites

San Antonio, Texas– Operating in public housing developments

Obama administration (HUD) – Proposing federal expansion in new budget

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Replication efforts

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Testing 3 employment interventions for Housing Choice Vouchers recipients

2 NYC housing agencies• HPD: Dept. of Housing Preservation and Development• NYCHA: New York City Housing Authority

Early impact results• 30 months for employment & earnings

NYC Work Rewards Demonstration

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HPD Sample (Dept. of Housing Preservation and Development)

1. Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) program • Employment and other service referrals• Asset-building (Escrow “savings” accounts)• 5-year program

2. FSS + workforce incentives• Cash rewards for:

‒ Sustained full-time work: $150/month‒ Completed education/training

• Paid every 2 months over 2 years

NYCHA Sample (NYC Housing Authority)

3. Workforce incentives alone

The 3 Interventions

Do more immediate work incentives “add value” to effects of FSS alone?

Does FSS increase work, earnings, other outcomes (vs. control group)?

Do workforce incentives alone (“outside of” rent rules) increase work, earnings, other outcomes

(vs. control group)?

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Findings from the FSS study

HPD Sample

Participation and services, 18 Months

Outcome (%) FSS-Only Group

FSS + Incentives

GroupDifference (Impact)

Orientation 42.0 71.1 29.1 ***Case management 33.4 51.6 18.2 ***

Linked to benefits/work supports

8.3 12.3 4.0 **

Began education or job training

7.9 13.8 5.9 ***

Started employment 10.8 15.5 4.7 **Continuous employment (30 days)

12.9 22.1 9.2 ***

Any milestone 44.9 67.5 22.6 ***12

Program Control

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Ever employed (%)

Average per quarter (%)

FSS-Only FSS+Incentives

Ever employed (%)

Average per quarter (%)

HPD sample

Impacts on employment, 30 months

Program Control

Diff: $503 Diff: $550

FSS-Only FSS+Incentives

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Total Earnings Total Earnings

HPD sample

Impacts on earnings, 30 months

FSS-Only FSS + Incentives

Impact($) Change (%) Impact($) Change (%)

Full sample +503 +2.8 + 551 +3.1

Employment subgroups Not working at baseline +1,658 +24.3 +3,102** +45.4

Working at baseline -706 -2.4 -1,940 -6.5

SNAP subgroups Receiving at baseline +2,056* +15.2 +1,261 +9.3

Not receiving -2,127 † -7.9 -704 -2.6

††

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HPD sample

Impacts on earnings by subgroup, 30 months

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$0

$200

$400

$600

$800

$1,000

$1,200

$1,400

$1,600

Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11

Control

FSS + Incentives

FSS-Only

Note: Earnings include $0 for non-workers

Subgroup: Not working at baselineIncentives end

month 24

HPD sample

Impacts on employment

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Findings From the Incentives-Only Study

(NYCHA SAMPLE)

Statistical significance levels: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent .18

Diff: $1,453

Program Control

Diff: 3.9**

Ever employed (%) Total Earnings (%)

NYCHA sample

Impacts on employment and earnings, 30 months

Incentives-Only

Impact ($) Change(%)

Full sample +1,452 +8.3

Employment subgroups Not working at baseline +1,375 +17.1

Working at baseline +928 +3.0

SNAP subgroups Receiving at baseline +2,711*** +18.7 Not receiving -2,186

†† -8.819

NYCHA sample

Subgroup impacts on earnings, 30 months

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$0

$500

$1,000

$1,500

$2,000

$2,500

$3,000

$3,500

$4,000

Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11

Control

Incentives-Only

Note: Earnings include $0 for non-workers

Subgroup: receiving food stamps at baselineIncentives end

month 24

NYCHA sample

Impacts on earnings

• Early NYC test raises cautions about FSS-Only, but…– Longer follow-up to come (results could change)

• Incentives may matter. Impressive earnings gains for: – Tenants not working at baseline (FSS+Incentives)– Tenants on food stamps at baseline (Incentives-Only)

• Future reports: Survey analysis, longer-term impacts, and cost-benefit

• National influence of Work Rewards:– Only available evidence on effects of FSS alone– Shaping HUD’s new national FSS evaluation (benchmark;

guide for analysis)– Inspiration for planning a new supplemental test

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Conclusions and next steps

DRAFT – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 22

• Employment services not always a primary focus

• Staff more skilled in job placement than advancement coaching; “value added” for working participants unclear

• Escrow and Section 8 difficult for CBO staff to understand and explain – Escrow marketing not well integrated into service

delivery or payment milestones

• Efforts to leverage existing CBO services and resources not as strong as envisioned

Observations on operating FSS

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NEW HUD-FUNDED EVALUATIONS

Randomized trial, starting June 2013• FSS-Only vs. Control (N=2,000)

Number of housing authorities• ~ 20 PHAs in 6 to 8 states• Test FSS “as is” • Range of programs• Opportunity to confirm subgroup patterns

observed in NYC Work Rewards

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HUD’s National FSS Evaluation

Design new rent policy for voucher holders to: • Promote work and income reporting• Simplify rent rules for residents and PHAs• Reduce administrative burden for PHAs• Stay revenue neutral

Randomized trial in 5 PHAs, starting July 2013• Combined sample = 4,000 households:

Existing rent rules (30% of income)vs.

Alternative rent rules (TBD) 25

HUD’s Rent Reform Demonstration