BHARATIYA NABHIKIYA VIDYUT NIGAM LIMITED … Fukushima Up-Grades in Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor...
Transcript of BHARATIYA NABHIKIYA VIDYUT NIGAM LIMITED … Fukushima Up-Grades in Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor...
Post Fukushima Up-Grades
in
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Project
BHARATIYA NABHIKIYA VIDYUT NIGAM LIMITED
(BHAVINI)
INDIA
Prabhat Kumar * & P. Chellapandi**,
*Chairman & Managing Director , BHAVINI,
& Distinguished Scientist, Department of Atomic Energy, india
**Dir REG, IGCAR, & Distinguished Scientist, Department of Atomic Energy, india
PFBR Flow Sheet
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Sectional View of PFBR
Reactor Assembly
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1 Main Vessel
2 Core Support Structure
3 Core Catcher
4 Grid Plate
5 Core
6 Inner vessel
7 Roof slab
8 Large Rotatable Plug
9 Small Rotatable Plug
10 Control Plug
11 Absorber Rod Drive Mechanism
12 Transfer Arm
13 Intermediate Heat Exchanger
14 Primary Sodium Pump
15 Safety Vessel
16 Reactor Vault
PFBR Layout
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Secondary Sodium
Main Circuit
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Sodium Piping system designMany safety precautions have been taken to prevent sodiumleakage and fire.
• Guard pipe is provided around primary sodium piping.
• Leak detectors & guard pipe nitrogen cooling.
• Leak collection trays are provided for the secondarysodium piping.
• All pipe lines are of welded construction & 100% NDE
• No valves in primary main circuit.
• Sodium fire fighting system using Dry Chemical Powder(NaHCO3) is established.
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Reactor protection system
• Two diversified systems – CSRDM (Control & Safety Rod Drive
Mechanism) and DSRDM (Diverse & Safety Rod Drive
Mechanism) are provided to shut down the reactor. During
the Reactor trip, all the control rods will drop by gravity into
the reactor to make it shut down (subcritical)
• Any one of the above system is sufficient to shut down the
reactor
• Both the systems are seismically qualified
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• There are four safety grade
decay heat removal systems in
PFBR.
• Four dedicated diverse sodium
to sodium heat exchangers
immersed in sodium pool will
transfer the heat from sodium to
air heat exchanger by natural
circulation itself.
• Heat from sodium to air heat
exchangers placed at elevated
locations will be dissipated to
ambient air, by natural circulation.
• These systems do not demand
external power supply
Safety Grade Decay Heat Removal Circuit
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Operation Grade Decay Heat Removal System• Decay Heat Removal through Steam Water System.
• Used when at least one secondary loop and steam water system areavailable.
• In addition to removing decay heat, OGDHRS fulfills the following:
• Decreases sodium system temperature uniformly at 250 C/h
• Maintains primary sodium temperature at hot shut down up to8 hours at 3500 C.
• Maintains plant at cold shut down up to 30 days at 200 0 C.
• Variable pressure steam condensers each of 5 MWt rating.
• Condensate recirculation pump (0.21 m3/s of saturated water at 170kg/cm2(a)
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lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
SCHEMATIC FLOW SHEET OF OGDHR SYSTEM
Na in
Na out
MAIN FEED WATER PIPE
MAIN STEAM PIPEWW
STEAM
GENERATOR
STEAM
SEPARATOR
DECAY HEAT
REMOVAL
CONDENSER
BLOWER
ERVs
AIR
FLOW
ISOLATION
VALVES
RECIRCULATION
PUMPS
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Largest Raft 100mX100m
Pour – II Concrete In Progress
Multi-Well Point Dewatering System
Membrane Waterproofing below NICB Raft
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Tsunami strikes PFBR site onm26th December 2004
• First layer of NICB raft pour was commenced on 15-12-2004 andcompleted on 18-12-2004.
• Second layer of NICB raft pour was commenced on 24-12-2004 and 90% concreting was completed.
• Tsunami tide struck the site on 26-12-04 at 9.15 AM when Secondpour of concreting was going.
• Approximately 3,20,000cum.of water, sand, slush accumulated in
the pit.
• Shore protection was not available.
• Compound wall on sea side was not designed for tsunami force12
P O U R -1 3
P O U R -8 A
P O U R S E Q U E N C E & L A Y E R D E M A R C A T IO N
45°
1000
100 0
625
625 E L 9500
E L 11500
P O U R -9
P O U R -11
P O U R -10
P O U R -12
P O U R -4
P O U R -7 P O U R -8 BP O U R -6
P O U R -5
P O U R -3
P O U R -2
P O U R -1
P O U R N O .R E -B A R (M T )
Q T Y
C O N C R E T E Q T Y
c u .m
2 6 2 0
2 6 9 0
2 9 4 0
2 5 0 0
2 5 0 0
3 3 0 0
3 0 5 0
1 5 8 0
2 8 9 0
2 8 5 0
2 8 5 0
2 8 5 0
3 5 0
3 4 6 0 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8A + 8B
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10
11
12
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T O T A L
N O T E : 1
1 5 5 0
7 0
7 2
3 6
3 6
4 2
4 5 2
1 3 0
7 4
7 4
5 8 7
5 8 0
-
3 6 9 8
P O U R S C H E D U L E
N
4470
625
3 50
66 0
31200 3 08 00
35 00
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Tsunami struck
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Constitution of Expert Committee
• A high power committee consist of National experts wasconstituted to review the chances of occurring Tsunami ofsimilar nature.
• The committee after detail study concluded that the nearestepicenter is 1300KM away from West coast & earthquakeoccurred of severity 9.1 magnitude which is the highest so farseen. With this severity, the damage was minimum &earthquake of similar or lesser magnitude will not damage thenuclear plants in India.
• Sea surface Bathymetry studied various other organizations &it was established that along with East cost the median waveheights are found to be less than 4m.
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Design Status Against Flood:
Finished Floor Level (FFL) Elevations of Important Plant buildings
above Mean Sea Level (MSL 6.096m)
• Nuclear Island Connected Building (NICB)
(RCB, SGB-1 &2, FB,CB ,EB-1&2, and RWB) : 9.7 m
• DG Buildings : 9.7 m
• Service Water Pump house : 9.7 m
Shore protection
Shore protection having for a length of around 1600 M and cross
section width of 30 M which runs parallel to the sea shore has been
provided. The top of the shore protection level is 3.37m above MSL.
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Design Upgrades after 2004 Tsunami
• The finished floor level of Safety related Buildings were raised
to 9.7 metres above Mean Sea Level (MSL). It may be noted:
• During the Tsunami the maximum water level rise observed
was 4.1 to 4.7 metres above MSL (6.096m).
• Design Basis Flood Level is 6.7m above MSL.
• The higher finished floor levels precludes any water entry to
Safety related Buildings, Emergency Diesel Generator Buildings,
and Power island
• Shore protection and Tsunami bund were constructed at sea
shore.
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SECTION OF
TSUNAMI PROTECTION BUND
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Shore
protection
Tsunami bund
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Lessons Learnt From 2004 Tsunami and
upgrade effected
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• Tsunami warning system has to be available
• Plant design has to undergo modification to account for tsunami
caused by 9.1 Rechitar Scale earthquake which resulted in
Wave Surge and Run-up of 4.1 to 4.8 meters at different places
in the plant: Finished grade level needs to be raised
• Shore has to be protected (shore line got altered and breached
the proposed outfall areas (Engineered shore Protection
System was introduced.)
• Tsunami wall has to be constructed
• Storm water drains were designed for one way flow by
constructing gates across the discharge point in order to avoid
back flow during floods.
• In Township RCC Tsunami Protection boundary wall was
constructed with Boulders, Sand dunes & Coastal Plantation.
• Tsunami Warning System was established to alert the residents
and the community around in case of any Tsunami event,
cyclone etc.
• Community development and awareness was made a part of
the Social development program for the neighboring villages .21
Design Upgrades/ Actions after 2004 Tsunami
Rehabilitation of PFBR site after 2004 Tsunami
• Removing sea water and sludge from pit was a large
challenge successfully accomplished in one month (approx.
3.2 Lakh Cum. 7m deep sludge)
• Debris clearing work was started within 3 days of tsunami
strike & was completed in months time
• All fallen trees were cut & approach roads were made
ready.
• Eroded areas of pit was backfilled by massive earth filling,
electrical cables were relayed, ground faults rectified &
power supply established
• Multi stage well point Dewatering system was restored. 22
Reconstruction of NICB with new Raft started in FEB 2005
• After Regulatory Board clearance BHAVINI management
decided to reconstruct new raft on the 2 layers already done
as:
• Chipping of 10mm top concrete having high chloride deposit.
• 100 mm PCC layer (using flyash) concrete on the second layer
of raft which was done before tsunami.
• Water proofing membrane was laid on the new PCC.
• And the new raft height was increased by 2.5m to enable
new FGL 9.7 meter above MSL.23
Drilling for core sampling
Core from rebar congestion in NICB raft bottom Layer
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10mm concrete was chipped off on exposed
portion of NICB Raft. Water proofing layer
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Post Fukushima Actions
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Constitution of Task Force
Immediately after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, aTask Force was constituted to conduct stress test on PFBR.Major areas covered were:
1. Model study to assess maximum height of futuretsunami and study the consequences on the plant andsystems: Modify design to account for such rise of water
2. Study Prolonged Station Black Out.
3. Study Beyond Design Basis Events (BDBE) of naturalorigin.
4. SSSB integrity and cooling of spent fuel27
The scope of the Task Force is on following areas:– Guides of “Safety Analysis”, “Safety Classification”,
– Further Technical Specification, such as:
• Reactivity features of SFR reactor core...
• Design conditions (incl. events lists...)
– Total Approach and Measures, such as:
• Sodium fire,
• Sodium-water reaction,
• In-service inspections
• Capability of Reactor shut down, maintaining shut down condition and corecooling.
• Affect on storage facilities of Spent fuel assemblies in Spent SubassemblyStorage Bay
• Availability of Diesel Generators beyond design basis scenario
• Additional DG back up in the event of emergency DG not available
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The scope of the Task Force is on following areas:
• Accident Management strategy and EmergencyPreparedness
• Radiological impact at site and public domain
• Adequacy of approach to handle emergency scenariofollowing DBA
• Entry of water inside the buildings due to water splash
• Approach road to site
• Multi unit concepts
• Communication
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Increasing the Tsunami Protection Bund Height :
• At present the Tsunami bund height is 5.4m above MSL which is
being increased to 9.4m above MSL and constructed on south of
the existing bund also covering total PFBR site from East, north
and south sides.
• Enclosing the SWPH: Flood retaining wall around Sea water
pump house up to the height of 9.7m above MSL is under
constructed to prevent water entry to pump house.
• Shore protection, sand dune and vegetation created along the
coast.30
Emergency Diesel Generators
4Nos. Diesel Generators are provided to meet the emergency
power requirement when the normal power supply fails.
However 2 DGs are sufficient to meet the Station requirement
during normal power failure.
All the 4 Diesel Generators are located at a higher elevation of
9.7m above MSL. All 4 DGs are in separate buildings, 2 are in
East side and 2 are in the West side of NICB.
Day tank capacity was increased from one hour to four hour
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Diesel Generator
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Additional Diesel Generators Air cooled (2 X 500 KVA)
• 2Nos. Truck mounted Additional Diesel Generators
capacity 500KVA,415V, installed & provision has been
made to connect to the existing battery chargers if
power does not resume in 4 hours.
• This will cater to the Emergency power needs in case all
the 4 Emergency DGs at PFBR become unavailable due
to the event.
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Additional Diesel Generator
500 KVA, 415V – 2 nos.
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Spent Subassembly Storage Bay (SSSB)
• SSSB has been designed with the pool in a pool concept,
where the concrete leak tight structure of the bay is situated
in another concrete leak tight structure with gap all around
including from bottom for regular inspection & leakage
monitoring.
• SSSB is qualified for Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)
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Spent Subassembly Storage Bay (SSSB)
• The storage bay is lined with 5mm thick SS 304L plates with
inbuilt leak detection and collection arrangement below the
liner.
• Pumping back facility of leakage water to pool is available
• All the EOT cranes are Single Failure Proof (SFP) cranes & so
designed that the single failure will not result in the loss of
capability of the system to safely retain the load.
• Water seal tight doors to prevent splashing of water
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Spent Subassembly Storage Bay (SSSB)
Any Beyond Design Basis hypothetical external event can
initiate failure of SSSB & can cause a fall in water level in
bay due to following:
• Extended station blackout
• Leak in the Spent Fuel Storage Bay
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Spent Subassembly Storage Bay (SSSB)
• The system is provided with 3 pumps and 3 heat exchangers.
2 heat exchangers and pumps are sufficient to remove
maximum heat load of 800 kW of decay heat during full core.
• Station blackout whose maximum duration is expected to be
14 hours is considered as design basis which is a Category 4
event. Under this situation, the pool temperature will rise to
42oC under normal storage and 52oC under full core unloading,
after 14 hours.
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Spent Subassembly Storage Bay (SSSB)
• DM water tank of 45 m3 capacity is available for make-up
• Nearest Fire water hydrant is hooked up to SSSB incase DM
water make up is not available
• All piping penetrations are provided from top of the bay such
that complete draining is not possible.
• Syphon break arrangement is provided to limit the fall in
water level by 250 mm only from the normal level.
• If leak is observed in one compartment of the bay the Fuel
Subassemblies can be transferred to the other compartment.
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Bore wells for emergency water requirement to SSSB
• 3 nos. Bore wells (10m3/hr) are made to ensure water additionto SSSB incase of water leakage from SSSB .
• In case DM water & Fire water is not available, water from theBore wells will be pumped to SSSB.
• Spare portable Diesel motor pumps are kept ready forconnecting to bore wells, so that water can be supplied to theSSSB to maintain level even under conditions of station blackout.
• The Bore well motors are also power by emergency dieselgenerators.
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Spent Subassembly Storage Bay (SSSB)
• 4 nos. of portable Diesel generator operated pumps of capacity
10 m3/h are positioned at safe locations in the plant for
emergency in place of fire water pumps and bore well pumps.
• In case of insufficient availability of water from all other sources,
Sea water will be pumped to SSSB to maintain the water level.
The portable DG operated pumps will be used for this purpose.
• Additionally, Fire tenders will be used for pumping water.
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Instrumentation in SSSB
• Additional diverse instrumentation for Level and Temperaturemeasurements of Spent Subassembly Storage bay, independentof the main plant instrumentation system is provided.
• Simple float type level indicators, with level markings in thepool and suitable mechanical set-up to transmit the indicationto the exterior is designed in case of failure of main plantinstrumentation
• Provision has been made to take field measurement oftemperature.
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Water seal tight Doors for preventing Water Splash
• Water seal tight doors at all major openings of NICB & FuelBuilding are under manufacturing & will be installed forpreventing the splashing of water during tsunami.
• All cable terminal boxes/junction boxes located outside NICB &Power Island on the east side are properly sealed against thesplash of water.
• All cable trenches are covered from top & sealed to preventwater seepage during flooding.
• Dewatering pumps installed at all major locations & inside thetrenches.
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Radiation Emergency Handling Procedure & Infrastructure
• Approved procedure for handling of plant & site emergency
conditions available at PFBR along with other units
IGCAR,MAPS,FBTR,CWMF,BARCF for Multi units, duly approved
by District Collector .
• Operating crew for normal shift operation & emergency
conditions are available as per approved procedure.
• Site Emergency exercise drill is conducted once in a year in
PFBR, Kalpakkam along with other units.
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Radiation Emergency Handling Procedure & Infrastructure
• Additional store built away from site
• Radiation protection instruments, equipment, batterypowered portable communication facilities , emergencylights, portable saw & other tools required to handle theemergency situation in is available in Emergency ControlCentre.
• Emergency response center is being made at plant site withSeismically qualified structure, having adequate radiationprotection equipments, emergency equipment, tools anddedicated communication facility with outside agencies isunder construction.
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Radiation Emergency Handling Procedure & Infrastructure
• arrangements is made for continuous staying of crew working
round the clock
• New approach road has been constructed to plant site away
from sea shore with sufficient height.
• Alternate approach road is available incase of flooding of
existing road.
• Solar powered lights at important locations have been installed
in plant site & township.
• Kalpakkam Management Committee comprising of all units
heads is available to deal with all normal & emergency
conditions.46
• Key Viewpoints for future SFRs
– Robustness in power supplies, cooling functions, heat transportation system
including final heat sink
– Instrumentation to identify status of reactor core and containment vessel
– Independency and diversity of safety systems
• General aspects
– Passive safety functions
– Protection measures with adequate margins
• SFR specific aspects
– Attention to flooding in buildings with sodium equipment
• Note on stress tests
– Evaluate safety margins against severe plant conditions & extreme external
hazards.
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THANK YOU
Presented by:
Chenna Keshava B K Chief Engineer / Scientific Officer - H