Bennett's Texas Criminal Jury Selection January 28, 2015

8/9/2019 Bennett's Texas Criminal Jury Selection January 28, 2015

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Revised 1/28/15 i

Texas Criminal Jury Selection

Mark W. BennettBennett & Bennett917 Franklin Street

Fourth FloorHouston, Texas 77002

(713)[email protected]

http://Blog.BennettAndBennett.com


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Revised 1/28/15 ii

Table of Contents

I. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 1

II. The Purpose of Voir Dire ............................................................................................................................. 1

III. Voir Dire Procedure .................................................................................................................................... 1A. Formation of jury panel ............................................................................................................................ 1

1. Electronic or Mechanical Selection.......................................................................................................... 1B. Composition of the venire ......................................................................................................................... 2C. Qualifying the venire ................................................................................................................................. 2D. Presence of defendant ............................................................................................................................... 3E. Interim jury service ................................................................................................................................... 4F. Open courtroom ......................................................................................................................................... 4G. Group or individual voir dire .................................................................................................................. 4H. Recording jury selection ........................................................................................................................... 4I. The shuffle ................................................................................................................................................... 4

J. Time limits .................................................................................................................................................. 5K. Alternate jurors ......................................................................................................................................... 5L. Questioning by counsel .............................................................................................................................. 5

1. Scope of questioning ................................................................................................................................ 5a. Diligent questioning is required ............................................................................................................................ 6b. Proper questions: intelligent, but not TOO intelligent ............ .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. ....... 6c. Law applicable to the case .................................................................................................................................... 6d. Permissible questions ............................................................................................................................................ 6e. Impermissible questions ........................................................................................................................................ 6f. Fishing expedition ................................................................................................................................................. 7

2. Commitment questions ............................................................................................................................. 7a. Proper commitment questions ............................................................................................................................... 7b. Improper commitment questions .......................................................................................................................... 8

c. States improper commitment questions ............................................................................................................... 93. Denial of proper question ....................................................................................................................... 104. Improper comments by the state ............................................................................................................ 11

a. Preserving error ................................................................................................................................................... 11M. Questions by the court ........................................................................................................................... 11N. Excusing jurors sua sponte ..................................................................................................................... 12

a. Exemptions ......................................................................................................................................................... 12O. Challenges for cause ................................................................................................................................ 12

1. Challenge for cause: bias ....................................................................................................................... 132. Vacillating jurors .................................................................................................................................... 143. Trick questions ....................................................................................................................................... 144. Rehabilitation ......................................................................................................................................... 14

5. Courts sua sponte strikes for cause ....................................................................................................... 146. Denied challenge for cause: ................................................................................................................... 15

a. Error preservation ............................................................................................................................................... 15b. Showing harm ..................................................................................................................................................... 15

P. Peremptory challenges ............................................................................................................................ 151. Batson ..................................................................................................................................................... 16

a. Batson procedure ................................................................................................................................................ 16b. Some race-neutral reasons: ................................................................................................................................. 17

IV. Further reading .......................................................................................................................................... 18


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Statutory Qualifications

1.

At least 18 years of age.

2.

Citizen of the county.

3.

Qualified to vote.

4. Of sound mind and good moral character.

5. Able to read and write.

6.

Has not served for six days during the precedingthree months (county court) or during the

preceding six months (district court).

7.

Not convicted of misdemeanor theft or a felony.

8.

Not under indictment or other legal accusation for

misdemeanor theft or a felony.

TEX.GOVT.CODE 62.102

The court has discretion to eliminate the literacyrequirement if the requisite number of literate jurors

cannot be found in the county. TEX. GOVT. CODE 62.103. Literacy means the ability to read and write theEnglish language with sufficient capacity to expressones ideas in writing.Davila v. State, 252 S.W.3d 846(Tex. App. 2008).

A court may suspend the qualification for juryservice that requires a person to have less than six daysof service as a petit juror during the preceding threemonths in the county court or during the preceding sixmonths in the district court if it appears to the courtthat the countys sparse population makes its

enforcement seriously inconvenient. TEX. GOVT.CODE 62.103(b).

A deaf or hard of hearing person is disqualifiedto serve as a juror if, in the opinion of the court, hishearing loss renders him unfit to serve as a juror in thatparticular case. TEX.GOVT.CODE 62.1041(a). Adeaf or hard of hearing person serving as a juror shallbe reasonably accommodated in accordance with theAmericans with Disabilities Act. TEX. GOVT. CODE 62.1041(b).

Under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article35.16, a prospective juror is absolutely disqualified

from service if he is convicted of a misdemeanor theftor any felony, if he is indicted or under legal accusationfor misdemeanor theft or any felony, or if he is insane.These grounds for disqualification may not be waived.TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.art.35.16(b).

Section 62.102 encompasses all types of trialsand is a minimal threshold of juror qualifications. Bycontrast, Article 35.16 stated additional disqualifyingfactors to be considered in criminal cases. Cantu v.State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

Government Code section 62.102 provides

additional disqualifications, and no waiver. TEX.GOVT. CODE 62.102. But [t]hose qualificationsfound in the Government Code that are also containedin Art. 35.16 and are waivable under Art. 35.16age,citizenship, qualification to voteare waivable in acriminal case. Mayo v. State, 4 S.W.3d 9, 12 (Tex.Crim. App. 1999) (holding that requirement that jurorbe citizen of county is waivable because it is subsumed

under article 35.16(a)(1)s qualified voter in thecounty requirement). Otherwise section 62.102sdisqualifications are not waivable.

If a defendant learns during trial that anabsolutely disqualified juror is empaneled, he mustraise an objection before the verdict is entered in orderto preserve the issue. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.44.46(1); Nelson v. State, 129 S.W.3d 108, 113 (Tex.Crim. App. 2004). If the defendant preserves errorand is convicted, he may obtain a reversal on thesegrounds without carrying a high burden to showharm. Nelson v. State, 129 S.W.3d 108, 113 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2004).If the service of an absolutely disqualified juror is

not discovered until after the verdict is entered, thedefendant must make a showing of significant harm toprevail on appeal. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.44.46(2).

D. Presence of defendantA defendant has a constitutional right, under both

article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution and theSixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, to be

present at all phases of trial. Lewis v. United States, 146U.S. 370, 13 S.Ct. 136, 36 L.Ed. 1011 (1892); Miller v.State, 692 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 33.03requires the defendants presence at trial unless hevoluntarily absents himself. The defendant cannotwaive this requirement before the jury is selected.TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC. art. 33.03.

The right to be present does not apply to thetaking of excuses and qualifications during the general

jury assembly. Chambers v. State, 903 S.W.2d 21, 31(Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

There is no reason, however, to think that it doesnot apply to questioning of jurors by counsel at thebench.

Two Steps to Preserve ErrorDefendant Absent for Voir Dire

1. On the record.2. Object.


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Five Reasons the Court May Limitthe Defendants Voir Dire

1.

Question commits a venireman to a specific set of

facts.

2. Questions are repetitious.

3. Juror has already stated his views clearly and

unequivocally.4.

Question is so vague or broad in nature as to

constitute a global fishing expedition.

5.

Question is not in proper form.

Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 345 (Tex. Crim.App. 1995) (#s 1-3,5); Sells v. State, 121 S.W.3d 748,756 (Tex. Crim. App.) (#4).

a. Diligent questioning is requiredError occurs [w]hen a prejudiced or biased juror

is selected without fault or lack of diligence on the partof defense counsel, such counsel acting in good faithon the jurors responses and having no knowledge oftheir inaccuracy. Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567,577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).

Defense counsel must diligently ask questionscalculated to bring out that information which mightbe said to indicate a jurors inability to be impartial,truthful, and the like. [D]iligent counsel will notrely on written questionnaires to supply anyinformation that counsel deems material. Gonzales v.

State, 3 S.W.3d 915, 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

b.

Proper questions: intelligent, but not TOOintelligent

The more intelligent or effective the question,the more likely it is that the question will commit thevenire member to decide the case, or to refrain fromdeciding the case, on a basis not required by law.

Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36, 39 (Tex. Crim. App.2002).

c.

Law applicable to the case

The trial court can refuse to allow questionsabout areas of the law that will not be raised in thetrial, but it is error to disallow questions about the lawapplicable to the case. See Loredo v. State, 59 S.W.3d289, 29394 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi-CorpusChristi 2001) (reversing defendants convictionbecause he was prevented from asking relevantquestions on voir dire concerning parole); McGee v.State, 35 S.W.3d 294, 298 (Tex.App.Texarkana2001, no pet.) (reversing defendant's convictionbecause he was prevented from asking relevant

questions on voir dire concerning permissible use ofprior convictions); Gonzales v. State, 2 S.W.3d 600,603 (Tex.App.Texarkana 1999, no pet.) (holdingerror to be harmful after the trial court prohibitedquestioning the panel concerning the theory ofnecessity).

d. Permissible questions

Proper questions seek to discover a jurorsviews on an issue applicable to the case, and are notcommitment questions, nor so vague or broad innature as to constitute a global fishing expedition.Sells v. State, 121 S.W.3d 748, 75556 (Tex. Crim. App.2003).

Hypothetical fact situations may be employedduring voir dire to explain the application of the law,but not to determine how a venireperson wouldrespond to particular circumstances. Cuevas v. State,742 S.W.2d 331, 336 n. 6 (Tex. Crim. App.1987).

A trial court abuses its discretion if it refuses to

allow the defendant to ask venirepersons about whatthey think reasonable doubt means. Lane v. State, 828S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

Some other permissible questions:

With regard to my question of incarceration, Mr.

Robertson, do you consider yourself a believer in

the theory of deterren[ce], punishment, or

rehabilitation? Powell v. State, 631 S.W.2d 169,

170 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982).

Have you read something in the paper that

discusses the pros and cons or just anything

regarding the defense of insanity? Smith v. State,703 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).

Have you ever known somebody that was harmed

by extra-marital affairs? Shipley v. State, 790

S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)

(relevant to an intelligent use of peremptory

challenges).

Prior jury service is an appropriate area for the

parties to question the venire. De La Rosa v. State,

414 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).

e. Impermissible questions

Some questions held impermissible, or at leastwithin the courts discretion to disallow:

No abuse of discretion where trial court refused

voir dire questioning on definitions of terms

deliberately, probability, and criminal acts of

violence in a capital case. Milton v. State, 599

S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).

Appellant's attempt to question venire members

on their willingness to consider his 'background' as

a particular mitigating factor in sentencing him for

aggravated robbery was not a proper question.


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Ledbetter v. State, No. 01-07-00421-CR, 2008

WL 2756684, at *2 (Tex. App.Houston July 17,

2008).

Counsel would like to have gone into that holding

juveniles to higher or lower standards and prisons

for juveniles. In re V.M.S, No. 010300072

CV, 2004 WL 2475111, at *4 (Tex. App.

Houston Nov. 4, 2004) (counsel didnt make a

clear record of the question she would have asked). Could you be fair and impartial in a case where the

victim is an 8-year-old child? is an improper

question. Daniel v. State, No. 01-03-00469-CR,

2004 WL 1485470, at *1 (Tex. App.Houston

[1stDist.] July 1, 2004, no pet.).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

refusing to allow appellant to ask questions based

on facts peculiar to the case on trial Coleman v.

State, 881 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. Crim. App.

1994). It is not error for the trial court to refuse to

allow questions based on facts peculiar to the case

at trial. White v. State, 629 S.W.2d 701, 706

(Tex.Crim.App.1981).

f. Fishing expeditionA fishing expedition question does not seek

particular information from a particular panelmember; rather, it presents a general topic fordiscussion. Smith v. State, 703 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Tex.Crim. App. 1985) (holding that the trial judgecorrectly restricted appellant from asking every jurorfor his or her thoughts on the insanity defense

because the question, as phrased, was improperlybroad and duplicitous).

In Boyd v. State counsel inquired, What Imbasically asking you is what you as layman think is acase that is proper for the death penalty to beimposed? This question was unrelated to thestatutory sentencing scheme, was improperly broad,and so was an improper fishing expedition. Boyd v.State, 811 S.W.2d 105, 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Another example of a fishing expeditionquestion: [W]hat would be a mitigatingcircumstance, in your mind? Dickson v. State, No.

74533, 2001 WL 34736485, at *5 (Tex. Crim. App.Oct. 13, 2004).

2.

Commitment questionsCommitment questions commit a prospective

juror to resolve or refrain from resolving an issue acertain way after learning a particular fact. Standefer v.State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

Commitment questions often require a yes orno answer.Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 346 (Tex.Crim. App. 2010). Often they do not, though, and

often yes-or-no questions are not commitmentquestions. For example, Have you known anyonewho has been abused as a child?

When the law requires a certain type ofcommitment from jurors, the attorneys may ask theprospective jurors whether they can follow the law inthat regard. Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 181(Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

a.

Proper commitment questionsFor a commitment question to be proper, one of

the possible answers to that question must give rise toa challenge for cause. [W]here the law does notrequire the commitment, a commitment question isinvariably improper. Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d177, 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Even if the questionmeets this challenge-for-cause requirement, thequestion may nevertheless be improper if it includesfacts in addition to those necessary to establish achallenge for cause.Id.To be proper a commitment

question must contain only those facts necessary totest whether a prospective juror is challengeable forcause.Id.(Emphasis in original).

So a proper commitment question is one thatwould allow a valid challenge for cause if answered aparticular way, and that contains only those factsnecessary to test whether a prospective juror ischallengeable for cause.

For example, can you consider probation in afirst-degree felony theft case is a proper commitmentquestion (because, assuming that the accused is

probation eligible, jurors must be able to considerprobation); can you consider probation in a first-degree felony theft case involving the theft of morethan $400,000 is not a proper commitment question(because the amount of the theft is a fact beyond thosenecessary to test whether prospective jurors arechallengeable for cause).

Some other examples:

Whether venire members would be biased because

the defendant was a black man and the victim a

white woman. Abron v. State, 523 S.W.2d 405,

407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). In Barajas v. State the

Court of Criminal Appeals distinguished thatquestion from the improper question in Abron of

whether the venire members could be impartial in

an indecency case involving a victim who was eight

to ten years old because the nun question was

precisely tailored to get to the heart of an issue

relevant to the case. Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d

36, 40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The concurrence

added that the prohibition of discrimination on the

basis of race that is embodied in the Due Process

Clause is part of 'the law applicable to the case


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upon which the defense is entitled to rely,' Barajas

v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36, 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)

(Womack, J., concurring).

Do you believe a police officer, any police officer,

just because he is a police officer would not perjure

himself from the witness stand? Hernandez v.

State, 563 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Tex. Crim. App.

1978).

Would you presume someone guilty if he or sherefused to make a statement to the police?

Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 183 n.28 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2001).

(1) Full range of punishment

Bias against the range of punishment is a properarea of inquiry for both challenges for cause andperemptory challenges. Mathis v. State, 576 S.W.2d835, 83637 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).

Asking a juror if he is able to consider the fullrange of punishment is a proper commitmentquestion. Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 346 (Tex.Crim. App. 2010). Asking a juror if he can consider the

minimum sentence given specific evidentiary facts isnot. Cardenas v. State, 325 S.W.3d 179, 184 (Tex. Crim.App. 2010). A defendant is entitled to jurors who canconsider (not necessarily give) the entire rangeof punishment. Cardenas v. State, 325 S.W.3d 179, 184(Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In other words, a juror mustbe able to conceive of both a situation in which themaximum penalty would be appropriate, and asituation in which the minimum penalty would be

appropriate, for a particular offense as charged in theindictment. McCoy v. State, 996 S.W.2d 896, 898(Tex. App.Houston [14thDist.] 1999, pet. refd).

A prospective juror must be able to consider thefull range of punishment for the offense generally, notfor some specific manner or means of committing theoffense. Johnson v. State, 982 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Tex.Crim. App. 1998). A hypothetical question seeking tocommit the jurors to a particular set of facts is animproper question. Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787,789 (Tex. Crim. App.1997).

Once a prospective juror admits an inability toconsider the full range of punishment, includingcommunity supervision, a sufficient foundation hasbeen laid to support a challenge for cause. Cumbo v.State, 760 S.W.2d 251, 25556 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).

b. Improper commitment questionsAn improper commitment question either a)

attempts to commit jurors to do (or not do) somethingthat they are not required to do (or not do), or b)contains more facts than necessary to test whether aprospective juror is challengeable for cause.

For example:

Can you be fair and impartial if the victim in this

case is a nun? See Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36,

40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (overruling Nunfio v.

State, 808 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991))

(too many facts).

Whether jurors could be impartial in an indecency

case involving a victim who was eight to ten years

old. Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36 (Tex. Crim.App. 2002) (too many facts).

Whether a juror considers a particular type of

evidence to be mitigating Standefer v. State, 59

S.W.3d 177, 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (jurors do

not have to consider a particular type of evidence to

be mitigating).

If the evidence, in a hypothetical case, showed that

a person was arrested and they had a crack pipe in

their pocket, and they had a residue amount in it,

and it could be measured, and it could be seen, is

there anyone who could not convict a person, based

on that- Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787, 789

(Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (too many factscould

you find someone guilty if I proved to you, beyond

a reasonable doubt, that he had knowingly

possessed a trace amount of cocaine would have

been a proper commitment question).

Would you presume someone guilty if he or she

refused a breath test on their refusal alone?

Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 183 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2001) (jurors may convict based on refusal

alone).

[W]hich jurors would require an additional factsuch as mercy killing before they could consider

assessing probation? Richardson v. State, 83

S.W.3d 332, 360 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi

2002).

[W]hether the prospective jurors would be able to

consider the minimum range of punishment where a

gun was used in the commission of a crime. Cuero

v. State, No. 01-93-00989-CR, 1994 WL 620897,

at *7 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 10,

1994).

Absent statutory directionCode of CriminalProcedure Article 38.14, for example, or 38.141, or38.15, each of which requires a certain amount ofevidence in a certain type of casea challenge forcause based upon the sufficiency implications of anitem of evidence would be inappropriate.Standefer v.State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 183 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).


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Three-Part Inquiry:Commitment Question

1.

Does the question attempt to commit jurors to

doing or not doing something? (If yes, it is a

commitment question.)

2. Does the law require the jurors to do what the

question would commit them to? (If no, not aproper commitment question.)

3.

Does the question contain more facts than

necessary to test whether a prospective juror is

challengeable for cause? (If yes, not a proper

commitment question.)

c.

States improper commitment questionsThe Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the

harm test to be used, when the State has been allowedto ask improper commitment questions of the entire

panel, is whether the defendant was tried by a jurorthat [sic] had prejudged him or some aspect of his casebecause the State had improperly committed one ormore veniremen to a verdict or course of action beforehearing any evidence. Sanchez v. State, 165 S.W.3d707, 714 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The court listedseven non-exclusive factors for courts of appeals toconsider in determining whether there was harm:

1) Whether the questions wereunambiguously improper and attempted to

commit one or more veniremen to a specificverdict or course of action;2) How many, if any, veniremen agreed tocommit themselves to a specific verdict orcourse of action if the State produced certainevidence;3) Whether the veniremen who agreed tocommit themselves actually served on the

jury;4) Whether the defendant used peremptorychallenges to eliminate any or all of thoseveniremen who had committed themselves;

5) Whether the defendant exhausted all ofhis peremptory challenges upon thoseveniremen and requested additionalperemptory challenges to compensate fortheir use on improperly committedveniremen;6) Whether the defendant timely assertedthat a named objectionable veniremanactually served on the jury because he had towaste strikes on the improperly committed

jurors; and

7) Whether there is a reasonable likelihoodthat the jurys verdict or course of action inreaching a verdict or sentence wassubstantially affected by the Statesimproper commitment questioning duringvoir dire.

Sanchez v. State, 165 S.W.3d 707, 714 (Tex. Crim. App

2005).In Sanchez, the Ansonfactors (that the defendantexhausted his peremptory challenges, that he asked formore, that the request was denied, and that he had toaccept an objectionable person as a result, see infra,section 3.O.6.b, Showing Harm) are only one part ofthe harm analysis; it is important to make an Ansonrecord even when theAnsonfactors are not dispositive.

(1) Inability to judge

The state often looks for those jurors who,because of their religious beliefs, are unable to judge

other people. Judges treat an affirmative answer to thisquestion as grounds for a challenge for cause.

The Texas Constitution provides:

RELIGIOUS TESTS. No religious test shallever be required as a qualification to anyoffice, or public trust, in this State; nor shallany one be excluded from holding office onaccount of his religious sentiments, providedhe acknowledge the existence of a SupremeBeing.

TEX.CONST. art. I Sec. 4.Article VI Section 3 has a similar injunction

against religious tests for public offices, without therequirement that officers acknowledge the existence .

Does your religion prevent your judging otherpeople? is a religious test; juror is an office orpublic trust.

The Supreme Court has held (in the capital-murder context) that a potential juror can be barredfrom service if he holds religious or personalviews thatprevent or substantially impair the performance of

his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructionsand his oath. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 418(1985).

A jurors oath does not require him to judgethe defendant, but only to render a true verdictaccording to the law and the evidence. TEX. CODECRIM. PROC. art. 35.22 (setting out jurors oath). Itcannot be assumed that a person whose religionadvises him to judge not, lest he be judged cannotperform the duties of a juror in accordance with hisinstructions and his oath.


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Article I section 4 and article VI section 3 do notprotect the rights of the accused; they protect therights of the potential juror. But the only people whocan protect those rights when they are at risk in acriminal trial are the court, the accused, and the state.SeePowers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (defendant canvindicate potential jurors right to equal protection in

jury selection) and Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42

(1992) (state can vindicate potential jurors right toequal protection in jury selection).The issue of whether excluding people who have

religious preferences against judging other peopleviolates Texass Constitutional rule against religioustests has not been litigated.

Six Potential Objectionsto the Can You Judge? Question

1.

Texas Constitution article I Section 4.

2.

U.S. Constitution article VI Section 3.3.

Texas Constitution article I Section 6.

4.

U.S. Constitution Amendment I.

5.

Improper voir dire.

6. Improper commitment question.

3. Denial of proper questionRefusing to allow the defendant to ask a

permissible question is error. See Loredo v. State, 59S.W.3d 289, 29394 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi-

Corpus Christi 2001) (reversing defendantsconviction because he was prevented from askingrelevant questions on voir dire concerning parole);

McGee v. State, 35 S.W.3d 294, 298 (Tex.App.Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (reversing defendant'sconviction because he was prevented from askingrelevant questions on voir dire concerning priorconvictions); Franklin v. State, 23 S.W.3d 81, 83(Tex.App.Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (finding errorharmful when the trial court refused the defensecounsel to further question a juror concerning therelationship between juror and victim); Gonzales v.

State,2 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex.App.Texarkana 1999,no pet.) (holding error to be harmful after the trialcourt prohibited questioning the panel concerning thetheory of necessity).

In Anson v. State the Court of Criminal Appealsheld that an appellant has to go through the four-stepprocess applicable in other voir dire areas (showing a)that he exhausted his peremptory challenges, b) thathe asked for more, c) that the request was denied, andd) that he had to accept an objectionable person as aresult) to show harm arising from the trial courts

refusal to let the defense ask proper questions. Ansonv. State, 959 S.W.2d 203, 204 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)(see infra, section 3.O.6.b, Showing Harm).

InRich v. State, however, the court held:

Rich was prevented from asking a validquestion to the entire venire. Exhausting hisperemptory challenges and requesting

additional peremptory challenges would nothave remedied the trial judges error sincethe error extended to the entire venire.

Rich v. State, 160 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Tex. Crim. App.2005).

The Rich court then applied Texas Rule ofAppellate Procedure 44.2(b)s harm analysis to thetrial courts improper exclusion of a proper voir direquestion. This was contrary to a string of Court ofCriminal Appeals opinions holding that the exclusionof a proper question was constitutional error. Rich v.

State, 160 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).In 2007, the Court of Criminal Appeals clarified:

Although Rich analyzed error in refusing to permitthe asking of a proper question as non-constitutional,it did so because the defendant did not contest thecourt of appealss characterization of the error as such.Thus, the court of appeals in this case erred in relyingupon Richfor the proposition that the error was of thenon-constitutional variety. Jones v. State, 223 S.W.3d379, 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

According to Jones, if the defense is denied the

opportunity to ask a proper question, it isconstitutional error, subject to Rule 44.2(a) erroranalysis.

While Jones is the leading published case, in anunpublished 2010 case the Court of Criminal Appealscited Anson for its harm analysis without discussingeither Rich or Jones: The erroneous prohibition ofproper questioning of individual prospective jurors issubject to the harm analysis traditionally applied to theerroneous denial of a defendants challenge forcause. Storey v. State, No. AP76018, 2010 WL3901416, at *13 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2010)

(unpublished).It is an open question whether the defendant who

has been denied the opportunity to ask a properquestion must make the Ansonharm showings: a) thathe exhausted his peremptory challenges, b) that heasked for more, c) that the request was denied, and d)that he had to accept an objectionable person as aresult. Richmakes more sense than Storey; exhaustingperemptories does not help when you have not beenallowed to ask questions intended to help you decidehow to exercise your peremptories. The First Court of


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venire, were fundamental error of constitutionaldimension and required no objectionBlue v. State, 41S.W.3d 129, 132 (Tex. Crim. App.2000).

N. Excusing jurors sua sponteThe trial court has broad discretion under Texas

Code of Criminal Procedure article 35.03 to excuseprospective jurors for good reason. The power to

grant an excusal from jury service (pursuant to Article35.03) inheres to the trial judge from the firstassemblage of the array until the juror is, at last,seated. Butler v. State, 830 S.W.2d 125, 131 (Tex.Crim. App. 1992).

An excuse cannot, however, be given for aneconomic reason without both parties consent. TEX.GOVT. CODE 62.110(c) (applied to criminal case inJasper v. State, 61 S.W.3d 413, 424 (Tex. Crim. App.2001)).

a. Exemptions

Section 62.106 provides nine exemptions fromjury duty.

These exemptions belong to the potential jurors;they can use them to avoid jury duty. The defendantdoes not have a right to exempt a potential juror.Moorev. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

O. Challenges for causeArticle 35.16 of the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure sets out eleven grounds for challenges forcause available to either side.

A challenge for cause is forfeited if not made.Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. Crim. App.2007).

The test for a challenge for cause is whether thevenirepersons bias or prejudice would substantiallyimpair [his] ability to carry out his oath and

instructions in accordance with the law. Feldman v.State, 71 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

Eleven Grounds for Challenge for Cause

1. Juror is not qualified to vote.2. Juror has been convicted of theft or a felony.3. Juror is under legal accusation for theft or a

felony.4. Juror is insane.5. Juror has defect or disease rendering her unfit

for jury service in the case.6. Juror is a witness in the case.7.

Juror served on grand jury that foundindictment.

8. Juror served as a juror on a trial of the samecase.

9.

Juror has a bias or prejudice in favor of oragainst the defendant.

10. Juror has prejudged the case.11. Juror cannot read or write.

TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.art. 35.16(a)

Three of those groundsthat the juror has beenconvicted of a felony or theft; that the juror is underlegal accusation for a felony or theft; and that the juroris insaneare not waivable. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.art. 35.16(a).

Aside from those, there are three statutorygrounds for challenges for cause available only to thestate, and two available only to the defense:

Nine Exemptions from Jury Duty

1.

Over 70 years of age.

2.

Has legal custody of a young child and service

would require leaving the child without adequate

supervision.

3.

Student of a public or private secondary school;

4.

Enrolled and in actual attendance at an institutionof higher education.

5.

Officer or an employee of the legislative branch of

state government.

6.

In county >200k without a plan for electronic or

mechanical selection under Government Code

section 62.011, and has served in the last 24

months.

7.

Primary caretaker of invalid.

8.

In county >250k, has served in last three years,

unless wheel reconstituted since last service.

9.

Active-duty military deployed out-of-county.

Tex. Govt. Code 62.106


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13

Three Grounds for Challenge for CauseAvailable Only to the State

12.

In a death-penalty case, that the juror hasconscientious scruples in regard to theinfliction of the punishment of death forcrime.

13.

That the juror is related within the third degreeof consanguinity or affinity to the defendant.

14. That the juror has a bias against any part of thelaw upon which the state is entitled to rely.

TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.art. 35.16(b).

Two Grounds for Challenge for CauseAvailable Only to the Defense

12. That the juror is related within the third degreeof consanguinity or affinity to a person injuredby the offense or to any prosecutor in the case.

13.

That the juror has a bias against any part of thelaw upon which the defense is entitled to rely.

TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.art. 35.16(c).

Article 35.16 is a complete list of challenges forcause Butler v. State, 830 S.W.2d 125, 130 (Tex.Crim. App. 1992).

The statutory requirement that jurors be able toread and write is not satisfied by a jurors ability towrite his name and nothing more.Hernandez v. State,506 S.W.2d 884, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). Rather,the prospective juror should be able to express hisideas in words on paper.Id.at 887.

Where a juror has a bias or prejudice against somepart of the law applicable to the case, the test iswhether the bias or prejudice would prevent orsubstantially impair the prospective jurors ability tofully follow the law as set out in the trial courtsinstructions and as required by the jurors oath.Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 99 (Tex. Crim.App. 2003);Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex.Crim. App. 2002).

Before venire members may be excused for cause,the law must be explained to them, and they must beasked whether they can follow that law, regardless oftheir personal views. Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274,295 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

The attorneys do bear the burden of providing asufficient record showing that the venire has beeninstructed and understands the law. Presumably, if the

trial court fails to provide adequate instruction, thelawyers may provide the missing information to thevenire or may ask the trial court to do so. Waller v.State, 353 S.W.3d 257, 266 (Tex. App.Fort Worth2011, pet. refd).

Seven Steps to Preserve Error

Denial of Challenge for Cause1. Voir dire recorded.2.

Strike lists on the record.3.

Timely and specific objection.4. Use peremptory challenge on that juror.5. Exhaust peremptory challenges.6. Request more strikes until request is denied.7.

Identify an objectionable person seated on thejury on whom you would have exercised aperemptory challenge.

When the trial court erroneously grants thestates challenge for cause, the defense must show alsothat the state used all its strikes (because otherwise thestate could have used one of its peremptories in placeof the challenge for cause), and that granting thechallenge deprived the defendant of a lawfullyconstituted jury. Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 394(Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The logic of this is that theaccused is not entitled to a specific fair jury, but onlyto a fair jury.

Nine Steps to Preserve ErrorGrant of States Challenge for Cause

1. Voir dire recorded.2. Strike lists on the record.3.

Timely and specific objection.4.

Use peremptory challenge on that juror.5. Exhaust peremptory challenges.6. Request more strikes until request is denied.7. Identify an objectionable person seated on the

jury on whom you would have exercised aperemptory challenge.

8.

Show that the state used all its strikes.9.

Show that the error deprived you of a lawfullyconstituted jury.

1. Challenge for cause: biasJurors must be open-minded and persuadable,

with no extreme or absolute positions regarding thecredibility of any witness. Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d547, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, 529U.S. 1070, 120 S.Ct. 1680, 146 L.Ed.2d 487 (2000).


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14

2. Vacillating jurorsWhen the record reflects that a venireman

vacillates or equivocates on his ability to follow thelaw, the reviewing court must defer to the trial court.

Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 400 (Tex. Crim. App.1999).

3. Trick questionsThe proponent of a challenge for cause has the

burden of establishing that the challenge is proper.Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 295 (Tex. Crim.App. 2009). The proponent does not meet this burdenuntil the proponent shows that the venirepersonunderstood the requirements of the law and could notovercome his prejudice well enough to follow the law.

Id.A common trick question is the one-witness

rule question; it is asked correctly of the first juror

(assuming that we prove all of the elements beyond areasonable doubt from the testimony of a singlewitness, would you require more to convict), then ashorthand version of the question is asked of later

jurors.By the time the question reaches the back rows

the jurors have lost track of the underlying assumption(that they believe the witness beyond a reasonabledoubt). I have found that these later jurors are oftenrehabilitable because they answered yes onlybecause they did not accept the assumption.

Before the trial court may sustain a Stateschallenge for cause on the ground that the veniremanwill not convict on the testimony of a singleeyewitness, it must be demonstrated to the trial courtthat the veniremans categorical refusal is predicatedupon something other than his understanding of proofbeyond a reasonable doubt. Castillo v. State, 913S.W.2d 529, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

(It is doubtful that this is a proper area of inquiryin the vast majority of cases, in which the state doesnot intend to prove its case using a single witness,because it is not the law applicable to the case.)

4. RehabilitationA venireperson who initially indicates an inability

to consider the full range of punishment may berehabilitated through further questioning by theprosecutor or the trial court. See Von Byrd v. State, 569S.W.2d 883, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Westbrook v.State, 846 S.W.2d 155, 160-61 (Tex.App.Fort Worth1993, no pet.).

By statute, a juror who says that she has reachedsuch a conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the

defendant as would influence her in finding a verdictmay not be rehabilitated. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC. art.35.16(a)(10).

5.

Courts sua sponte strikes for causeA trial judge should not on its own motion

excuse a prospective juror for cause unless the juror isabsolutely disqualified from serving on a jury.

Goodman v. State, 701 S.W.2d 850, 856 (Tex. Crim.App. 1985) (overruled on other grounds,Hernandez v.State, 757 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).

When the courtsua sponteexcludes a disqualifiedjurorone who is subject to challenge for cause[t]he defendant must establish that he was tried by a

jury to which he had a legitimate objection. Bell v.State, 724 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Hemust also exhaust his strikes and request (and bedenied) additional strikes. Green v. State, 764 S.W.2d242, 247 (Tex. Crim. App.1989).

In support of a legitimate objection, the

appellants complaint about the jury must have a basisin the record. In addition, the appellants complaintshould be directed to a specific juror or jurors. Thecriticism will invariably relate to the jurorscharacteristics and attitudes that are inconsistent witha defendants objectives in a case but which would notsupport a challenge for cause but neverthelessdistinguish the juror or jurors from other members ofthe panel. Green v. State, 764 S.W.2d 242, 247 (Tex.Crim. App.1989).

Preserving Error:Courts Sua Sponte Excusal of Disqualified Juror

1.

Object to the excusal of the juror.

2.

Exhaust all of his peremptory challenges and

request additional peremptory challenges.

3.

At the conclusion of the voir dire claim that he is to

be tried by a jury to which he has a legitimate

objection.

4.

Specifically identify the juror or jurors of which he is

complaining.

Green v. State, 764 S.W.2d 242, 247 (Tex. Crim.App.1989).

When the trial court sua sponte excludes aqualified juror (that is, one not subject to a validchallenge for cause), a defendant can show harm andthus reversible error by establishing that the Stateexhausted its peremptory challenges. Green v. State,764 S.W.2d 242, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). The


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rationale is that the state got the effect of an additionalperemptory.Id.

Is the error-preservation portion of Green stillgood law in light of Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 394(Tex. Crim. App. 1998), which held that when the trialcourt erroneously grants the states challenge forcause, the defense must show not only that the stateused all its strikes, but also that granting the challenge

deprived the defendant of a lawfully constitutedjury? The same logic that applies to the stateerroneously granting the states challenge for causemight well apply to the courts own challenge forcause.

6.

Denied challenge for cause:To preserve error for a trial courts erroneous

denial of a challenge for cause, appellant must showthat: (1) he asserted a clear and specific challenge forcause; (2) he used a peremptory challenge on thecomplained-of venire member; (3) his peremptory

challenges were exhausted; (4) his request foradditional strikes was denied; and (5) an objectionable

juror sat on the jury. Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 105(Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

If a trial judge errs in overruling a challenge forcause against a venire member, then a defendant isharmed if he uses a peremptory strike to remove thevenire member and thereafter suffers a detriment fromthe loss of the strike. Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738,744 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)

The test is whether a bias or prejudice would

substantially impair the venire members ability tocarry out the jurors oath and judicial instructions inaccordance with the law. Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d274, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

In reviewing a decision to deny a challenge forcause, courts look at the entire record to determine ifthere is sufficient evidence to support the ruling.

Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex. Crim. App.2002).

Before a prospective juror can be challengedunder article 35.16, the law must be explained to theprospective juror and he or she must be asked whether

they can follow the law regardless of their personalviews. Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 390 (Tex. Crim.App. 1998).

The proponent of a challenge for cause has theburden to show that the challenge was proper.Feldmanv. State, 71 S.W.3d 738, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).The proponent does not meet that burden until therecord shows that the prospective juror understood therequirements of the law and could not overcome anybias or prejudice.Id.

Appellate courts review denials of challenges for

cause with considerable deference because the trialjudge is in the best position to evaluate a veniremembers demeanor and responses. Gardner v. State,306 S.W.3d 274, 295-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

When a venire members answers are vacillating,unclear, or contradictory, appellate courts accordparticular deference to the trial courts decision.Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 296 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009).

a. Error preservationA party preserves error by a timely request that

makes clearby words or contextthe grounds forthe request and by obtaining a ruling on that request,whether express or implicit. TEX.R.APP.PROC.33.1.Here, a party preserves error (but does not show harm)by making the challenge for cause and explainingclearly its grounds.

b. Showing harm

In addition to preserving error, the defendantwhose challenge for cause has been denied must beconscious of the need to show harm.

To show harm resulting from the denial of achallenge for cause, the defendant must show that hewas forced by the denial to accept an objectionable

juror. This showing requires a record showing that (1)he exhausted all of his peremptory challenges; (2) herequested more challenges; (3) that request wasdenied; and (4) he identified an objectionable personseated on the jury on whom he would have exercised a

peremptory challenge. Anson v. State, 959 S.W.2d203, 204 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).The fundamental basis of this rule recognizes

that without exhausting his peremptory challenges it isimpossible to conclude that the defendant had toaccept an objectionable juror. Green v. State, 764S.W.2d 242, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).

P. Peremptory challengesA peremptory challenge is made to a juror

without assigning any reason therefor. TEX. CODECRIM.PROC.art. 35.14.

Each party gets fifteen peremptory challenges in adeath-penalty trial with one defendant; if two or moredefendants are tried together, each defendant getseight peremptories and the state gets eightperemptories per defendant.TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.art. 35.15(a).

In a non-death-penalty felony trial with onedefendant, the state and defendant each get tenperemptory challenges; if two or more defendants aretried together, each defendant gets six peremptoriesand the state gets six peremptories per defendant.


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TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.art. 35.15(b).In a misdemeanor trial with one defendant, the

state and defendant each get five peremptorychallenges; if two or more defendants are triedtogether, each defendant gets three peremptories andthe state gets three peremptories per defendant. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.art. 35.15(c).

If one or two alternate jurors are to be impanelled,

each party gets one additional peremptory challenge; ifthree or four alternate jurors are to be impanelled,each party gets two additional peremptories. Thesechallenges are to be used against alternate jurors only.TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC. art. 35.15(d).

Because no reason needs to be assigned for aperemptory challenge, the most common issue in theperemptory-challenge context is theBatsonchallenge.

Number of Peremptories(Single-Defendant Case)

1.

State seeking death: fifteen.

2.

Other felonies: ten.

3. Misdemeanor in district court: five.

4. Misdemeanor in county court: three.

TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.art. 35.15

1. BatsonThe rule of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79

(1986), that the state cannot exercise peremptorychallenges for the purpose of excluding people fromthe jury on the basis of their race, is codified at TexasCode of Criminal Procedure article 35.261. The trial-court remedy for a Batson / 35.261 violation isdismissal of the array and calling of a new array. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC. art. 35.261

Batsonis more than just race-based peremptoriesby the state, though. Race-based peremptorychallenges by the defense are barred by theBatsonlineof cases, Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992), asare sex-based peremptory challenges, J.E.B. v.

Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).

a. Batsonprocedure

To establish a prima facie case under Batson, adefendant must show (1) that the state exercised itsstrikes to exclude members of a cognizable racial groupfrom the venire, and (2) that this fact, along with anyother relevant facts and circumstances, raise aninference that the State exercised these strikes againstthe venire members because of their race. See Batson v.

Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712.

While there is, for obvious reasons, no caselaw onpoint, in theory the procedure for the state to allege adefenseBatsonviolation would be the same.

Undisputed observations and uncontradictedstatements of trial counsel can provide support in therecord for a prima facie showing. See Yarborough v.State, 947 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997);

Emerson v. State, 820 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1991); Greer v. State, 310 S.W.3d 11, 14(Tex.App.Dallas 2009, no pet.).A pattern of exercising strikes against venire

members of a particular race may establish a primafacie case. See Keeton v. State, 749 S.W.2d 861, 867(Tex. Crim. App. 1988).

What may be revealing, however, is a repetitionof such strikes in suspiciously large numbersnumbers larger than one would expect if race hadnothing to do with it.Linscomb v. State, 829 S.W.2d164, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

The appellate remedy for a trial courts failure to

conduct aBatsonhearing when the defense has made aprima facie case of racially motivated strikes isabatement for a hearing. [W]e have long abatedappeals and remanded cases to the trial court toconduct a Batson hearing when the trial court haderroneously denied such a hearing after the requisite

prima facie showing had been made. Hutchinson v.State, 86 S.W.3d 636, 63839 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).But it would be prudent for a trial court to allow afullBatsonhearing if there is any substantial argumentas to whether the defendant made a prima facie

showing of racial discrimination in the States exerciseof peremptory strikes. By proceeding in this fashion,the court could create a record while memories arefresh. Hassan v. State, 346 S.W.3d 234, 242 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2011), revd, 369 S.W.3d872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

The second step of the Batsonchallenge processdoes not demand an explanation that is persuasive, oreven plausible, Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68(1995), but the court cannot merely accept thoseexplanations at face value and end the Batsoninquiry.Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707, 716 (Tex. Crim. App.

1989). The trial judge must consider whether thefacially neutral explanations are contrived to avoidadmitting acts of group discrimination Keeton v.State, 749 S.W.2d 861, 868 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Aprosecutor may not rebut the presumption merely bydenying that he had a discriminatory motive or byaffirming his good faith in individual selections,

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).The Court of Criminal Appeals has laid out a

non-exclusive list of five factors that tend to show thatthe states reasons for a challenge are not supported by


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the record or are an impermissible pretext:

Five Things that Call Into Question

Race-Neutral Reasons

1.

An explanation based on a group bias where the

group trait is not shown to apply to the challenged

juror specifically.2.

No examination or only a perfunctory examination

of the challenged juror.

3.

Disparate examination of the challenged juror, i.e.,

questioning challenged venireperson so as to evoke

a certain response without asking the same

question of other panel members.

4.

The reason given for the challenge is unrelated to

the facts of the case.

5.

Disparate treatment where there is no difference

between responses given and unchallenged

venirepersons.

Keeton v. State, 749 S.W.2d 861, 866 (Tex. Crim. App.1988).

The presence of any oneof these factors tends toshow that the State's reasons are not actuallysupported by the record or are an impermissiblepretext. Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707, 713 (Tex.Crim. App. 1989).

Once the State has articulated a race-neutralexplanation, the burden shifts back to the accused to

show that the States explanations are actually apretext for discrimination.Hernandez v. New York, 500U.S. 352, 360 (1991). It is not enough merely to showthat a proffered explanation turns out to be incorrect.Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. Crim. App.2002).

When the State offers numerous race-neutralreasons for challenging a venireperson, the fact thatother venirepersons possessed one or more of theobjectionable attributes is not sufficient to establishdisparate treatment. See Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d667, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

While [D]iligent counsel will not rely onwritten questionnaires to supply any information thatcounsel deems material. Gonzales v. State, 3 S.W.3d915, 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), a venire memberswritten answers to a juror questionnaire may provide avalid reason for a peremptory strike. See, e.g., Jasper v.State, 61 S.W.3d 413, 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001);Camacho v. State, 864 S.W.2d 524, 529 (Tex. Crim.App. 1993).

BatsonProcedure

1.

On the record.2. After the parties deliver their strike lists to the

clerk.3.

Before jury is sworn.4. Show that the state exercised its strikes to exclude

members of a cognizable racial group.5. Show race of accused (CCP 35.261), race ofvenirepeople, race of struck jurors.

6.

Show facts that raise an inference that the statestruck certain people because of their race.

7. Request a hearing.8. State provides race-neutral explanation.9.

Rebut states proffered explanation (for example,evidence of a pattern or practice; evidence ofdisparate questioning of minority jurors; evidenceof racially motivated shuffle).

10.

Make sure prosecutors notes are part of record.

b. Some race-neutral reasons:1.

Last name shared with known criminal family.

Nieto v. Texas, S.W.3d , 2012 WL 1605150,

at *5 (Tex. Crim. App. May 9, 2012).

2.

Starting a new job. Meshack v. State, No. 05-04-

01215-CR, 2005 WL 2995098, at *5 (Tex. App.

Dallas Nov. 9, 2005, no pet.).

3.

Failed to understand the States legal burdens.

Meshack v. State, No. 05-04-01215-CR, 2005 WL

2995098, at *5 (Tex. App.Dallas Nov. 9, 2005,no pet.).

4.

Wearing a large peace sign necklace. Keovixay v.

State, Nos. 05-03-01407-CR, 05-03-01408-CR,

2004 WL 1535168, at *3 (Tex. App.Dallas July

9, 2004, pet. refd).

5.

Appeared to be sleeping during the courts remarks

to the jury panel. Keovixay v. State, Nos. 05-03-

01407-CR, 05-03-01408-CR, 2004 WL 1535168,

at *3 (Tex. App.Dallas July 9, 2004, pet. refd).

6.

Prior conviction. Holmes v. State, No. 01-03-

00281-CR, 2004 WL 1119954 (Tex. App.

Houston [1stDist.] May 20, 2004, pet. refd).7.

Failure to complete jury-selection questionnaire.

Ealoms v. State, 983 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. App.

Waco 1998, pet. refd).

8.

Bad record during prior jury service. Webb v. State,

840 S.W.2d 543, 545-46 (Tex.App.Dallas 1992,

no pet.);

9.

Inattentiveness or disinterested appearance and

nodding in agreement with the defense during

voir dire. Tate v. State, 939 S.W.2d 738, 744-45

(Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. refd).


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10.

Inattentiveness or disinterested appearance during

voir dire. Moss v. State, 877 S.W.2d 895, 899

(Tex.App.Waco 1994, no pet.)

11.

Relative or friend in prison. Chambers v. State, 866

S.W.2d 9, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied,

511 U.S. 1100, 114 S.Ct. 1871, 128 L.Ed.2d 491

(1994)

Factors Appellate Courts Considerin Reviewing Batson Challenges

1.

Whether the proponent of the peremptory

challenge exercised its challenges to eliminate a far

greater proportion of jurors of the same race of the

juror in question;

2.

Whether the reasons offered for striking the juror in

question appeared to apply equally well to other

jurors of a different race who were not struck;

3.


challenge utilized its option to shuffle the jurypanels in a manner that supported an inference of

race discrimination;

4.


challenge directed questions expressly designed to

elicit grounds for peremptory challenges

disproportionately, in a manner that suggested an

intent to single out jurors of an identified race for

elimination; and

5.


challenge had followed a formal policy to exclude

jurors of an identified race.

Adair v. State, 336 S.W.3d 680, 687 (Tex. App.Houston [1stDist.] 2010, pet. refd.)

IV FURTHER READING

Garcia-Colson et al., Trial in Action (The

Persuasive Power of Psychodrama, including a

substantial section on voir dire.

SunWolf, Practical Jury Dynamics Second Edition,

LexisNexis 2007 (how juries work [and how they

dont]).

Georgetown Law Journal Annual Review of

Criminal Procedure (for an overview of federal

criminal procedure on any topic)..


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Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15

Greer v. State, 310 S.W.3d 11, 14 (Tex.App.Dallas 2009, no pet.) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 16

Hackbarth v. State, 617 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981) ------------------------------------------------------------------ 11

Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11

Hassan v. State, 346 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. App.Houston [14th

Dist.] 2011), revd, 369 S.W.3d 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) -------- 16

Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991). -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------17

Hernandez v. State,506 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 13

Hernandez v. State, 563 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8

Hernandez v. State, 757 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 14

Herring v. State, 758 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1988, pet. refd) ------------------------------------------------------------ 11Hogan v. State, 496 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 11

Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2

Holmes v. State, No. 01-03-00281-CR, 2004 WL 1119954 (Tex. App.Houston [1st

Dist.] May 20, 2004, pet. refd)-------------17

Hutchinson v. State, 86 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16

In re Commitment of Crosby, 09-11-00371-CV, 2012 WL 983168 (Tex. App.Beaumont Mar. 22, 2012) ---------------------------- 5

In re Commitment of Hill, 334 S.W.3d 226 (Tex. 2011) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5

In re V.M.S, No. 010300072CV, 2004 WL 2475111 (Tex. App.Houston Nov. 4, 2004) -------------------------------------- 7, 11

J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 16

Jasper v. State, 61 S.W.3d 413, 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12, 17

Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------17

Johnson v. State, 982 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8

Jones v. State, 223 S.W.3d 379, 381 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5, 10Jones v. State, 833 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4

Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13, 15

Keeton v. State, 749 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16, 17

Keovixay v. State, Nos. 05-03-01407-CR, 05-03-01408-CR, 2004 WL 1535168 (Tex. App.Dallas July 9, 2004, pet. refd) ---17

Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13

Lane v. State, 828 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6

Ledbetter v. State, No. 01-07-00421-CR, 2008 WL 2756684 (Tex. App.Houston July 17, 2008). ----------------------------------- 7

Linnell v. State, 935 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4

Linscomb v. State, 829 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16

Loredo v. State, 59 S.W.3d 289, (Tex. App.Corpus Christi-Corpus Christi 2001) ---------------------------------------------------- 6, 10

Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236, 242 (11th

Cir. 1982) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2

Mathis v. State, 576 S.W.2d 835, 836837 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 5, 8

Mayo v. State, 4 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3McCoy v. State, 996 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. App.Houston [14

thDist.] 1999, pet. refd) ------------------------------------------------------- 8

McGee v. State,35 S.W.3d 294, 298 (Tex.App.Texarkana 2001, no pet.) ---------------------------------------------------------- 6, 10

Meshack v. State, No. 05-04-01215-CR, 2005 WL 2995098 (Tex. App.Dallas Nov. 9, 2005, no pet.) -----------------------------17

Milton v. State, 599 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6

Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12, 14

Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 4

Nelson v. State, 129 S.W.3d 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 3

Nieto v. Texas, S.W.3d , 2012 WL 1605150 (Tex. Crim. App. May 9, 2012) --------------------------------------------------------17

Nunfio v. State, 808 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8

Powell v. State, 631 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 6

Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10

Presley v. Georgia, 130 S. Ct. 721, 725 (2010) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 4Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16

Rich v. State, 160 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10

Richardson v. State, 83 S.W.3d 332 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 2002) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 8

Rios v. State, 4 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. App.Houston [1st

Dist.] 1999, pet. dismd) ---------------------------------------------------------- 11

Rivas v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 480 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Tex. 1972) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1

Sanchez v. State, 165 S.W.3d 707, 71011 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1

Sanchez v. State, 165 S.W.3d 707, 714 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1, 9

See U.S. v. Rodriguez-Lozada, 558 F.3d 29 (1st

Cir. 2009) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2

Sells v. State, 121 S.W.3d 748, 75556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 6

Shipley v. State, 790 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 6

Smith v. Cunningham, 782 F.2d 292 (1stCir. 1986) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2


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Tex. Govt. Code 62.103 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 3

Tex. Govt. Code 62.103(b) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3

Tex. Govt. Code 62.1041(b) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3

Tex. Govt. Code 62.110(c). ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1, 12

Tex. Govt. Code 62.002-62.004 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1

Tex. Govt. Code 62.012-62.013 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1

RULES

Tex. R. App. Proc. 33.1 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Tex. Const. art. I 10 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1, 3

Tex. Const. art. I 4 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9

Tex. Const. art. VI 3 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9

Bennett's Texas Criminal Jury Selection January 28, 2015

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Transcript of Bennett's Texas Criminal Jury Selection January 28, 2015