Aspj May Jun 2012

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

1/113

Senior Leader Perspective

Team Building 4The Next Chapter o Airpower Command and Control in Aghanistan

Maj Gen Tod D. Wolters, USAFLt Col Joseph L. Campo, USAF

International Feature

Thinking about Air and Space Power in 2025 16Five Guiding Principles

Lt Gen Denis Mercier, French Air Force

Features

Operationalizing Knowledge 31A New Chapter in the Saga o US War Fighting and Cognition

Philip Kao

Airpower in the Interagency 45Success in the Dominican Republic

Lt Col S. Edward Boxx, USAF

Departments

61 Views

Ten Thousand Feet and Ten Thousand Miles:

Reconciling Our Air Force Culture to Remotely PilotedAircrat and the New Nature o Aerial Combat 61Maj Dave Blair, USAF

Long-Range Strike: The Bedrock o Deterrence andAmericas Strategic Advantage 70

Maj Wade S. Karren, USAF

MayJune 2012Volume 26, No. 3

AFRP 10-1

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

2/113

MarchApril 2012 Air & Space Power Journal| 2

82 Historical Highlights

Mobility in the Next WarColonel Cliord J. Hefin

98 Ricochets & Replies

102 Book Reviews

Hubert R Harmon: Airman, Ofcer, Father o theAir Force Academy 102

Phillip S. Meilinger

Reviewer: Dr. John F. Farrell

Shield o Dreams: Missile Deense and US-RussianNuclear Strategy 105

Stephen J. Cimbala

Reviewer: Gilles Van Nederveen

In the Graveyard o Empires: Americas War in Aghanistan 107Seth G. Jones

Reviewer: Dr. Michael R. Rouland

Daring Young Men: The Heroism and Triumph o theBerlin Airlit, June 1948May 1949 110

Richard Reeves

Reviewer: Amanda B. Biles

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

3/113

MayJune 2012 Air & Space Power Journal| 3

Lt Col Eric Braganca, USAF

Naval Air Station, Patuxent River, Maryland

Dr. Kendall K. BrownNASA Marshall Space Flight Center

Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun

US Army War CollegeDr. Mark ClodfelterNational War College

Dr. Conrad CraneDirector, US Army Military History Institute

Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired

USAF School o Advanced Air and Space Studies(proessor emeritus)

Maj Gen Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF, Retired

Duke University

Dr. Stephen FoughtUSAF Air War College (proessor emeritus)

Col Richard L. Fullerton, USAF

USAF Academy

Lt Col Derrill T. Goldizen, PhD, USAF, RetiredWestport Point, Massachusetts

Col Mike Guillot, USAF, RetiredEditor, Strategic Studies QuarterlyAir Force Research Institute

Dr. John F. Guilmartin Jr.Ohio State University

Dr. Amit Gupta

USAF Air War College

Dr. Grant T. HammondUSAF Center or Strategy and Technology

Dr. Dale L. Hayden

Air Force Research Institute

Mr. James HoffmanRome Research CorporationMilton, Florida

Dr. Thomas Hughes

USAF School o Advanced Air and Space Studies

Lt Col Jeffrey Hukill, USAF, RetiredAir Force Research Institute

Lt Col J. P. Hunerwadel, USAF, Retired

LeMay Center or Doctrine Development and Education

Col Mark P. Jelonek, USAFAir Force Space Command

Col John Jogerst, USAF, Retired

Navarre, Florida

Mr. Charles Tustin KampsUSAF Air Command and Sta College

Dr. Tom KeaneyJohns Hopkins University

Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF, Retired

Department o Homeland Security

Col Chris J. Krisinger, USAF, RetiredBurke, Virginia

Dr. Benjamin S. Lambeth

RANDMr. Douglas E. Lee

Air Force Space Command

Dr. Richard I. LesterEaker Center or Proessional Development

Mr. Brent Marley

Redstone Arsenal, Alabama

Mr. Rmy M. MauduitAir Force Research Institute

Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired

West Chicago, Illinois

Dr. Daniel Mortensen

Air Force Research Institute

Dr. Richard R. MullerUSAF School o Advanced Air and Space Studies

Dr. Bruce T. Murphy

Air University

Col Robert Owen, USAF, RetiredEmbry-Riddle Aeronautical University

Lt Col Brian S. Pinkston, USAF, MC, SFS

The Pentagon

Col Bob Potter, USAF, RetiredPensacola, Florida

Dr. Steve RothsteinColorado Springs Science Center Project

Lt Col Reagan E. Schaupp, USAF

Naval War College

Dr. Barry SchneiderDirector, USAF Counterprolieration CenterProessor, USAF Air War College

Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, RetiredTofer Associates

Lt Col Edward B. Tomme, PhD, USAF, Retired

CyberSpace Operations Consulting

Dr. Christopher H. TonerUniversity o St. Thomas

Lt Col David A. Umphress, PhD, USAFR, RetiredAuburn University

Col Mark E. Ware

Twenty-Fourth Air Force

Dr. Harold R. WintonUSAF School o Advanced Air and Space Studies

Editorial Advisory Board

Gen John A. Shaud, PhD, USAF, Retired,Air Force Research Institute

Lt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF, Retired

Dr. J. Douglas Beason (Senior Executive Service and Colonel, USAF, Retired),Air Force Space Command

Dr. Alexander S. Cochran, Ofce o the Chie o Sta, US Army

Pro. Thomas B. Grassey, US Naval Academy

Lt Col Dave Mets, PhD, USAF, Retired, School o Advanced Air and Space Studies (proessor emeritus)

Board of Reviewers

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

4/113



Team Building

The Next Chapter of Airpower Commandand Control in Afghanistan

Maj Gen Tod D. Wolters, USAF

Lt Col Joseph L. Campo, USAF

On 22 May 2011, command o the 9th Air and Space Expedition-ary Task ForceAghanistan (9AETF-A) shited rom Maj GenCharles Lyons team to ours, and almost immediately we wentto work writing the next chapter o airpower support to counterinsur-

gency operations. As we began our new roles, the 9 AETF-A sta and

subordinate commanders were keenly aware o the recent changes tothe command and control (C2) architecture o US Air Forces Central

(AFCENT) that occurred in November 2010, thus establishing the sub-

theater C2.1 Major General Lyons tenure in Aghanistan included sig-

nicant organizational change, and his team did an outstanding job o

laying the oundation. By the time our team took the reins, everything

was in place and running smoothly. Assuming the transormation

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

5/113



complete and the major changes behind us, we discovered, however,that the stark situation on the ground made those expectations a arcry rom reality.

Specically, the 9AETF-A underwent a second major C2 transorma-tion between December 2011 and May 2012 when the 9 AETF-A com-mander was appointed the International Security Assistance Force(ISAF) Joint Commands deputy chie o sta or air (IJC DCOS AIR).2This change signicantly aected how the Air Force conducts air-power C2 in Aghanistan. Given this relatively new organizationalchange and the major events that unolded during the past year, thisarticle seeks to (1) describe in detail the airpower C2 transition that oc-

curred as a result o assuming the IJC DCOS AIR position in December2011, and (2) present observations and lessons learned rom our teamstenure in Aghanistan, especially with regard to airpower C2 and theAETF-A structure.

Our Goal: Make the ISAF Commander Successul

Unity o command ensures concentration o efort or every objective underone responsible commander.

Air Force Doctrine Document 1

Air Force Basic Doctrine, Organization, and Command

14 October 2011

As the 9AETF-A sta and subordinate commanders entered Aghani-stan in the spring and summer o 2011, the AFCENT subtheater C2construct was well established and running under both 9 AETF-A and 9

AETF-Iraq. Because discussion and debates regarding the utility o asubtheater C2 had passed, we could immediately ocus on the mission,taking ull advantage o the responsibilities and authorities establishedseven months prior.

As the 9 AETF-A, we recognized our most important priority: Sup-port the commander of ISAF (COMISAF), and help him succeed by his

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

6/113



measures of effectiveness.3 Everything that our team executed in Aghan-istan refected this short yet clear requirement, which provided

straightorward guidance to the sta and subordinate commanders in

terms o directing their eorts and resources. We oten reerred to thispriority statement as a reminder o why and how we should operate asan organization.

In May 2011, the 9AETF-A commander lled three roles simultane-ously (commander, 9 AETF-A; director, Air Component Coordination

ElementAghanistan [ACCE-A]; and deputy commander or air, USForcesAghanistan [USFOR-A]), later lling a ourth role as IJC DCOS

AIR. As 9 AETF-A, we conducted Air Force orces duties at the combined/

joint operating area level while serving as the connective tissue betweenthe AFCENT sta and the groups and wings o combined/joint operat-ing areaAghanistan. This construct allowed the groups and wings to

have a voice and advocate or their positions and requirements whileensuring that the AFCENT sta had a senior Air Force commanderpushing its theater priorities down to wing and group level.

A years experience operating under the AETF-A convinced us thatselecting this construct was the correct decision or the air component.

As an airpower team, we ound that having a single Air Force Airmanleading rom the ront but living alongside subordinate commanders

and coalition partners represented a highly eective design or condi-tions on the ground in Aghanistan. Perhaps more importantly, the

commander o 9AETF-A and its approximately 10,000 US Airmen serv-

ing in Aghanistan aorded the air component a seat at the table orevery major strategic and operational discussion that occurredthroughout the past year. Personal and proessional relationships re-

mained critical to sustaining eective airpower advocacy and movingorward, but our joint and coalition counterparts were more receptive

to a commander than a senior liaison.

The ACCE-A lls the doctrinal role established by the Air Force or

liaison and coordination between the air component and the jointorce commander.4 Although the 9 AETF-A commander began the tour

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

7/113



with three distinct roles and picked up a ourth in December 2011,

mentioned above, we actually ound that the requirement or the sec-

ond role, that o ACCE director, increased in proportion to the span o

control exercised through the other three roles. The chain o command

or the 9AETF-A commander runs directly to the combined orce air

component commander, with no direct linkages to the joint orce com-

mander (see the gure on the next page).5 However, the role o direc-

tor, ACCE-A, allows the air component unencumbered access to the

joint orce commander, permitting an Airman to articulate key issues

directly to the highest levels o the coalition command structure while

continuing to serve as the combined orce air component command-ers direct and personal representative to the COMISAF. Additionally,

as ACCE-A members and liaison ocers to the combined orce air

component commander, we could plug in directly with the tactical-,

operational-, and strategic-level planning eorts at the ISAF, ISAF Joint

Command (IJC), and regional commands. Two o the most notable o

these eorts included the ISAF revision to Operation Plan 38302 (the

strategic-level operation plan) and its operational-level counterpart,Op Naweed 1391, written by the Aghans (Naweed means good

news in Dari).6 In the coalitions counterinsurgency model o Aghani-

stan, the ACCE-A construct continues to oer access and liaison op-

portunities across all levels o the sta and command headquarters.

Under the third role, deputy commander or air, USFOR-A, our sta

expended considerable eort on a myriad o issues such as the bed-

down o US orces, logistics, retrograde operations and redeploymento orces, orce-management-level accounting, and US-only planning

and operations. The deputy commander or air, USFOR-A, reports di-

rectly to Gen John Allen in his capacity as commander, USFOR-A (see

gure). This position and its accompanying sta remain a critical ele-

ment to US-specic unctions in Aghanistan.

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

8/113



COMISAF USFOR-A

CENTCOM

AFCENT / CFACCDCOMISAF

COSISAF ACCE-A DCDR AIR AETF-A/CC

COMIJC

DCOS AIR

DCOS AIR

A-1

A-2

A-3

A-5

A-6

451 AEW

455 AEW

438 AEW

504 EASOG

966 AES

Air Operations Combined AviationDevelopment Directorate

Air OperationsControl Center

Fixed-Wing

Plans

Rotary-Wing

Plans

LNO to AFCENT

KabulInternational

Airfield

KandaharAirfield

Civil Aviation and

Military Basing

Operations

GovernanceMOTCA LNO

MOD LNO

OPCON/TACON

COORDINATION

Joint Force

Commander

ISAF Chain ofCommand

IJC Chain ofCommand

AFCENT Chain ofCommand

USFOR-A Chain ofCommand

Color Legend

A-1 Personnel Directorate

A-2 Intelligence DirectorateA-3 Operations DirectorateA-5 Plans DirectorateA-6 Communications DirectorateACCE-A Air Component Coordination ElementAfghanistanAES Air Expeditionary SquadronAETF-A/CC Commander, Air and Space Expeditionary Task ForceAfghanistanAEW Air Expeditionary Wing

AFCENT US Air Forces CentralCENTCOM US Central CommandCFACC Combined Force Air Component CommanderCOMIJC Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint CommandCOMISAF Commander, International Security Assistance Force

COSISAF Chief of Sta, International Security Assistance Force

DCDR AIR Deputy Commander for AirDCOMISAF Deputy Commander, International Security Assistance ForceDCOS AIR Deputy Chief of Sta for AirEASOG Expeditionary Air Support Operations GroupIJC International Security Assistance Force Joint CommandISAF International Security Assistance ForceLNO Liaison OcerMOD Ministry of Defense

MOTCA Ministry of Transport and Civil AviationOPCON Operational ControlTACON Tactical ControlUSFOR-A US ForcesAfghanistan

Figure. Airpower command and control in Afghanistan

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

9/113



Unexpected Challenge Equals Opportunity

Coordination may be achieved by cooperation; it is, however, best achieved

by vesting a single commander with the authority and the capability to di-rect all orce employment in pursuit o a common objective.

Air Force Doctrine Document 1

Air Force Basic Doctrine, Organization, and Command

14 October 2011

The IJC DCOS AIR position, the ourth role, has authority over theKabul and Kandahar airelds, oversight o all conventional North At-

lantic Treaty Organization (NATO) xed- and rotary-wing assets incombined/joint operating areaAghanistan, a robust planning sta oapproximately 20 personnel (mixture o NATO and US), and severalkey positions on the IJC operations foor within the air operations con-trol center. The let side o the gure depicts the IJC DCOS AIRs spano control. Within IJC, the DCOS AIR sta works closely with IJC Fu-ture Plans and IJC Future Operations to integrate airpower into opera-tional- and tactical-level planning. Additionally, the sta o the air op-

erations control center (currently led by an Air Force colonel) worksclosely with the combined orce air component commanders air op-erations center during execution o air tasking orders to ensure the de-livery o airpower eects where and when needed in support o theCOMISAFs objectives. Unexpectedly, in December 2011, Germanychose to cease lling the IJC DCOS AIR position.

Following approval rom the chie o sta o the Air Force and thesupreme allied commander, Europe, the 9 AETF-A commander also

became the IJC DCOS AIR, a role that has proven instrumental inaligning unity of effortunder unity of command. Whereas the air compo-nent previously relied upon personal relationships and tight coordina-tion to align the eorts o AFCENT and NATO airpower, the new struc-ture provides a unity o command that streamlines decisions at alllevels. One can nd a clear example o the alignment benets at Kan-dahar Aireld, a NATO air base. The commander o this aireld, who

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

10/113



reports directly to the IJC DCOS AIR, runs many o the base acilities.

Conversely, the 451st Air Expeditionary Wing, AFCENTs resident

wing at Kandahar, reports directly to the 9 AETF-A commander (see

the gure). Under the old construct, the two chains o command nevermet, resulting in riction and time delays whenever a contentious is-

sue such as orce protection or base support demanded attention rom

a senior ocer. Under the new construct, the two chains o command

technically still never meet, but they both reach the same senior o-

cer in their chain, ensuring accelerated decision making with a much

reduced potential or riction between the AFCENT and NATO chains

o command.

Under the IJC DCOS AIR role, we implemented the additional mea-

sure o combining some o the 9 AETF-A/A3 and A5 sta with the IJC

DCOS AIR sta, resulting in an increased level o interaction that did

not occur under the previous unity-o-eort model. Operational- and

tactical-level planning now occurs with the AFCENT and NATO plan-

ners sitting side by sideand they both have the same boss who gives

them the same guidance. During the past year, we continued to de-

velop some o these positions, but every adjustment thus ar has pro-duced gains in combat eectiveness and coalition cohesion.

Furthermore, the IJC DCOS AIR realignment presented an opportu-

nity to reorganize the development o civil aviation in Aghanistan.

The 9AETF-A had a joint air trac management cell that worked air-

space issues and aviation development while the ISAF deputy chie o

sta or stability maintained an aviation development branch that had

similar and sometimes overlapping unctions. During the winter, we

realigned all o these unctions under the IJC DCOS AIR as the Com-

bined Aviation Development Directorate. By doing so, we brought to-

gether air trac, aireld management/development, civil air control,

international donor coordination, and the long-term plan or transer

o airspace control under a single commander; moreover, this realign-

ment eectively merged the AETF-A and NATO stas working these

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

11/113



projectsanother example o going beyond unity o eort and achiev-ing unity o command.

Observations and Lessons

The AETF concept is working well in Aghanistan. Having an in-theater commander has both claried the lines o authority and en-sured that the air component retains a seat at the table or key opera-tional- and strategic-level decisions. No example more clearly paintsthis picture than the US orce-reduction decision bries that occurredbetween the commander, USFOR-A, and his subordinate commanders

in the all o 2011. US orce reduction is a complex, tough, and some-times emotional topic as the entire combined/joint operating areaAghanistan team works to reduce the US ootprint while retaining theright capability to continue meeting the COMISAFs objectives. The 9AETF-A commander, with tactical control o nearly 5,000 Airmen andoperational control o an additional 5,000, received a seat at the tableor these discussions. More importantly, rom an Airmans perspective,the air component was given a voice to advocate the value o airpower

and had the opportunity to hear and understand other subordinatecommanders points o view. Most signicantly, rom the perspectiveo the commander, USFOR-A, the room included an Airman who not onlycould articulate a position but also, without hesitation, agree to executea course o action once the commander, USFOR-A, made a decision.

Having the senior Airman in Aghanistan simultaneously ll ourroles works well in the current environment, but we should not auto-matically consider this either the standard or template or uture op-

erations. The character o counterinsurgency operations, the coalition,the geography, and the unique C2 structure o ISAF all played a part inmorphing the ACCE into the multiaceted organization that exists to-day. Serving multiple roles simultaneously and AETF activationshould be considered a part o the Air Forces tool kit or C2 in utureoperations, but we should not blindly turn away rom more than 50years o airpower C2 based upon our experiences in Iraq and Aghani-

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

12/113



stan. The latest edition o Air Force Doctrine Document 1,Air Force

Basic Doctrine, Organization, and Command, does a good job o laying

out the multiple options available or theater C2.7

Finally, change is inevitable. Our experiences in Aghanistan dem-

onstrated the importance o embracing change as an opportunity

rather than viewing it as a challenge. We had minimal warning about

the change in IJC command structure that took place in December

2011, but the result took the orm o a more eective ghting orce that

combined unity o eort under unity o command. With the approach

o the 201415 transition, organizational realignment looms on the ho-

rizon; indeed, change is around every corner in Aghanistan. The spe-

cics, timing, and players remain a mystery, but it will happenchange is inevitable.

Looking Forward

Our team in Aghanistan tackled many more issues than simply or-

ganizational and C2 realignment during the past year. Oversight o

orce-management levels, implementation o air support to the Secu-

rity Force Assistance Model, planning or the post-2014 transition, and

the drawdown o US orces to 68,000 by 1 October 2012 as directed by

the president o the United States represented just a ew o the major

items worked by the AETF-A and its subordinate commanders. Addi-

tionally, the airpower we supplied to the coalition team every day across

the spectrum o Air Force capabilities was a monumental accomplish-

ment, and I am extremely grateul to the Airmen serving inside and

outside Aghanistan who morphed the air tasking orders direction into

tangible airpower every single day; they truly make it look easy.

Further, the 438th Air Expeditionary Wing, charged with supporting

development o the Aghan air orce (AAF) within NATO Training Mission

Aghanistan, continues to press orward steadastly with AAF develop-

ment and training. The 9AETF-A commanders opportunity to take a

seat at the table has enhanced our understanding o the connection be-

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

13/113



tween NATO Training MissionAghanistan and the 438th, as our AirForce brethren working alongside the AAF play a critical role withinthe COMISAFs campaign plan. The 438th Air Expeditionary Wing now

stands as an equal partner in the cross-check o the multirole 9AETF-Acommander, making certain that he receives the appropriate level osupport rom the entire air component. This cross-check and supportwill continue to grow in importance as the AAF reaches greater opera-tional capability and independence.

Looking orward to the 2013 and 2014 ghting seasons, US Airmenserving in Aghanistan have both challenges and opportunities await-ing them. We must continue working with our Aghan partners to de-

velop their air orce and its sorely needed capabilities while ndingcreative solutions that maximize the amount o joint and coalition air-power we provide to the increasingly independent Aghan securityorces. Mitigation o civilian casualties also will remain a critical areaas we move orward. Our air component has perormed very well inthis area, but we must continue looking or opportunities to improve.Finally, as Airmen, we must remain ocused on the COMISAFs objec-tives. The character o the Aghanistan counterinsurgency continues

to evolvethis dynamic ght demands constant reassessment o objec-tives, apportionment priorities, and weight o eort. But i the air com-ponent continues to retain the joint orce commanders objectives asour top priority, we stand a very good chance o delivering the right e-ects on the battleeld.

Closing Toughts

According to Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Airpower results romthe eective integration o capabilities, people, weapons, bases, logis-tics, and all supporting inrastructure.8 One could replace the wordairpowerin that sentence with a successful military force and apply thesame concept to our coalition in the combined/joint operating areaAghanistan. In Aghanistan, our Airmen work side by side with jointand coalition partners (including Aghans) to integrate the many

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

14/113



pieces o our team and orm a successul military orce. During thepast year, our air component solidied the AETF-A construct andstrengthened unity o command under the NATO and AFCENT ban-

ner. At the end o the day, however, the personal relationships andtrust that Airmen build throughout all levels o war still matter more.Whether its an Airman working alongside an AAF partner, an AirForce MC-12 crew passing threat data to our ground brethren, or agroup o senior ocers deciding on the new phase o the campaignplan, the oundation begins with personal relationships and trust.

Notes

1. See Maj Gen Charles W. Lyon and Lt Col Andrew B. Stone, Right-Sizing AirpowerCommand and Control or the Aghanistan Counterinsurgency,Air and Space Power Journal25, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 511.

2. The ISAF, part o the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, has responsibility or execut-ing operations in Aghanistan. We commonly reer to the ISAF commander and his sta asthe strategic headquarters and to the commander o the ISAF Joint Command and his staas the operational headquarters.

3. Major General Lyon initiated this important priority: Support the commander oISAF. . . . Help him succeed . . . by his measures o success. See Lyon and Stone, Right-Sizing

Airpower Command and Control, 6. We altered the wording slightly in 2011, but the intentremained exactly the same. In the Aghanistan area o responsibility, the COMISAF / com-mander of US ForcesAfghanistan is thejoint force commander. We use these terms inter-changeably throughout the article but distinguish between the two when necessary or thesake o clarity.

4. See Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1,Air Force Basic Doctrine, Organization,and Command, 14 October 2011, 99, http://www.e-publishing.a.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFDD1.pd.

5. Although the chain o command went directly to the combined orce air componentcommander, we worked very closely with the deputy combined orce air component com-mander every day or both planning and execution.

6. See Department o Deense news brieng, Lt Gen Curtis Scaparrotti, ISAF commander,8 February 2012, http://www.deense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4973.

7. AFDD 1,Air Force Basic Doctrine, 9498.8. Ibid., 20.

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

15/113



Maj Gen Tod D. Wolters, USAF

Major General Wolters (USAFA; MS, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University;

MS, National War College) is the commander, 9th Air and Space Expeditionary

ask ForceAghanistan; director, Air Component Coordination Element

Aghanistan; deputy commander or air, US ForcesAghanistan; and deputychie o sta or air, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Com-

mand. He commands three wings and two groups consisting o nearly 10,000

US Airmen engaged in combat operations in Aghanistan. Additionally, the

general serves as the senior airpower liaison and personal representative o the

combined orce air component commander to the ISAF commander. Prior to

his assignment in Aghanistan, he served as the director o air, space, and

cyberspace operations or Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colorado.

General Wolters, who has commanded at the squadron, group, wing, and air

expeditionary wing level, has more than 4,900 ying hours in the F-22, F-15C,

OV-10, and -38, including over 180 combat hours in the F-15C.

Lt Col Joseph L. Campo, USAF

Lieutenant Colonel Campo (BS, University o Michigan; MA, Naval Command

and Sta College; MA, School o Advanced Air and Space Studies) is the chie,

Plans Division, 9th Air and Space Expeditionary ask ForceAghanistan. Prior

to his current assignment, he served as director o operations or the 26th

Weapons Squadron, USAF Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nevada. Lieutenant

Colonel Campo has more than 2,100 ying hours in the F-16, MQ-1, and MQ-9

aircrat, including over 900 hours o combat support time in the MQ-1/9 and

in excess o 100 combat hours in the F-16 over Iraq and Aghanistan.

Let us know what you think! Leave a comment!

Distribution A: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

Disclaimer

Te views and opinions expressed or implied in theJournal are those o the authors and should not be construed as carrying the ofcial

sanction o the Department o Deense, Air Force, Air Education and raining Command, Air University, or other agencies or departmentso the US government.

Tis article may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. I it is reproduced, the Air and Space Power Journal requests a

courtesy line.

http://www.airpower.au.af.mil
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/newcomment.asp?id=77http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/newcomment.asp?id=77

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

16/113



Thinking about Air and Space

Power in 2025Five Guiding Principles

Lt Gen Denis Mercier, French Air Force*

The year 2025 is not ar away. However, the coming years will

doubtless surprise us since geostrategic or technological devel-

opments are so unpredictable. The air and space environment

will certainly eature major breakthroughs that we must be ready to

ace. This article does not claim to treat this topic comprehensively;

rather, it suggests a ew principles that one can apply to support a viewo the stakes or tomorrows airpower.

Preparing or the uture is dicult. One must select the time rame in

order to build an innovative but realistic and reachable vision. Economist

*This article is a revised version o the authors postscript toEnvol vers 2025. Rfexions prospectives sur la puissance arospatiale(Takeo or 2025: Thinking about the uture o air and space power), Stratgie arospatiale series, ed. Grgory Boutherin and CamilleGrand (Paris: La Documentation Franaise, 2011).

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

17/113


Mercier Thinking about Air and Space Power in 2025


Peter Drucker used to argue that the essence o planning is to make

present decisions with knowledge o their uturity.1 Indeed, the yearsbetween now and 2025 have already been dened by a program o or-

ders and deliveries that scales the ormat o military orces until 2020,within a given nancial ramework infuenced by military orces.

Consequently, any modication remains subject to the law o inter-connectedness, whereby a new program must replace another one, or

several, in order to avoid budgetary problems. Because such planning

reezes capabilities until 2020, it takes on a budgetary character andlimits strategic thinking to the time rame in question. Consequently,

i we wish to go outside this ramework, we must look beyond. The

2025 time rame is signicant because it gives strategic thinking a re-newed scope, keeping in mind the objective o shedding light on theuture so we can better assess todays decisions.

Various approaches present themselves and numerous parametersrequire assessment as we seek to plan air and space power or the year

2025. Given the diculty o creating a denite vision o the uture that

will not be misunderstood, this article oers ve principles that allowus to avoid the dual pitalls o a vision that is too uturistic and discon-

nected rom reality, or an approach that lacks innovativeness becauseo constraints imposed by current projects and studies.

First Principle:

Overcoming Current Tinking,

Which Can Bind Future Ideas

Although we must open up our thinking in a spirit o operationaland technical innovation, Air Marshal Sir John C. Slessor reminds usthat the lessons o the past still represent a tremendous source o data

and experiments that we can revisit in anticipation o tomorrows

stakes.2 Neither the visions o the uture nor the lessons o the past, but

the tyranny o todays commitments imposes constraints on our think-

ing. It is very tempting to scrutinize operations in Aghanistan as a

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

18/113




way o imagining models o uture orces, but the present is hazardous

in that it has a strong legitimacy in countries where the news and cov-

erage by the media exert much infuence on public opinion. Airpower

plays a signicant role in Aghanistan but remains insuciently pro-moted. On the one hand, its appreciation comes rom successes that

were as continuous as discreet; on the other hand, the visibility o its

action is refected in the land engagement. Airpower thus provides

continuous surveillance, makes possible the stealthy designation o

targets in a country with a number o natural or man-made vertical ob-

stacles, oers a wide range o kinetic or nonkinetic eects, and rees

itsel rom land constraints or the transportation o personnel and

equipment, all the while minimizing losses among both allied troops

and civilians.

Several incorrect lessons drawn rom that engagement involved air-

power. Given the very nature o the operation and ghting, we em-

ployed airpower in a wide range o missions, leveraging its variety o

networked, interacting capabilities that combine their eects to benet

the tactical level. This situation refects both the magic and perversity

o networked operations. That is, integrating ever more versatile capa-bilities that cooperate in open operating modes, regardless o the level

o use to which they belong, increases the eectiveness o tactical ac-

tions conducted in the eld. However, we orget that under other cir-

cumstances, some o the capabilities oer courses o action that pro-

duce a substantial range o eects at the strategic level.

Thus, using a new-generation reconnaissance pod on a modern plat-

orm such as the Raale or F-22 will supply the theater commander

with highly signicant images, but it raises the question o whether

employing such platorms or this task constitutes overkill. However,

these platorms equipped with that sensor, having taken o rom the

homeland and operating stealthily thousands o kilometers rom their

base, will give decision makers essential inormation on very short

noticea major strategic role.

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

19/113




The relevance o strategic platorms does not necessarily lie in high-

intensity operations. The termination o the Mirage IV in 2005 ater 41

years o servicemade France neglect, or a while, long-range missions,

whether reconnaissance or stealthy strikes against highly valued targets.Recent operations, including the confict in Aghanistan, generated tac-

tical lessons that ignored this abilityimportant or any powerul na-

tionto take advantage o airspace fuidity to conduct strategic mis-

sions against distant targets. The lack o such capabilities may have led

us to consider them useless. In such instances, past engagements can

enlighten us. The pre-positioning o orces has hidden the benets o

immediate projection. However, more distant, new areas o interest

along with the need or certain stealthy missionsrenew the relevanceo capabilities whose ubiquity allows them to gather intelligence or

strike with very short notice, including targets at great distances.

Operations in Libya oer a good illustration. Falling within the

ramework o Resolution 1973, passed on 17 March 2011 by the United

Nations Security Council ollowing a Franco-British initiative, the en-

gagement o air orces (rst rom France as early as 19 March [Opera-

tion Harmattan] and then rom the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,

starting on 24March [Operation Unied Protector]) demonstrated the

strategic advantages provided by the air arm in terms o reach, adapt-

ability, or long-distance strikes. The rst bombs dropped during those

air operations came rom French Air Force Raales and Mirage 2000Ds

that had taken o a ew hours earlier rom their bases (Saint Dizier

and Nancy), located more than 3,000 kilometers rom the intervention

area. The interdiction, reconnaissance, and ground attack operations

conducted in Libyas airspace also show the diversity o missions inwhich air orces can participate, including those in an environment

less permissive than a theater such as Aghanistan due to the existence,

admittedly limited, o surace-to-air threats. Those operations over

Libya, which ocially ended on 31 October 2011, remind us o the im-

portance o not ocusing our thinking only on counterinsurgency op-

erations even though the latter seem to characterize the modern era.

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

20/113




Using lessons rom current operations is easy and ree o risk be-

cause they give legitimacy to investments. As ar as airpower is con-

cerned, i the last decade involved tactical operations, everything sug-

gests that the uture will entail strategic actions or a combination oboththe rst aspect infuencing quantities and the second, clarity

and identity. Ultimately, strategic missionsas illustrated by the op-

erations over Libya, among othersdierentiate pure airpower rom

an air orce that operates or the sole benet o ground orces. As a

matter o act, these missions might represent a kind o transition be-

tween this tactical decade and the uture that airpower will have to

conront. We might as well consider them a warning about the poten-

tial risk o reducing airpower to a tactical dimension. To think o theair arm this way would strain its capabilities and harm the know-how

that shapes its engagement.

Second Principle:

Distinguishing among Eectors, Systems, and Platorms

Tomorrows airpower probably will rely less on complete platorm-

based systems, as is the case today. A platorm is nothing in itsel. Dis-

tinguishing among eectors, systems, and platorms allows greater

fexibility and certainly better adaptability.

Effectors Produce Effects

The missions eectiveness depends on the eectors (e.g., air-to-air or

air-to-ground weapons, cameras, data-collection pods, cannons, or

other devices). Dierent platorms can use the same eector. The e-ectors will become more varied in order to adapt to the power, lethality,

use, and accuracy o the orce. The credibility o airpower will rest on

the most complete mix o eectors handling all types o missions. By

2025 new eectors that enable better control o orce and engagement

o stealthier targets will join the mix. Later on, new eectors will ap-

pear as we develop nonkinetic eects, smart weapons, and directed-

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

21/113




energy weapons. Furthermore, a combination o sensors able to collect

inormation in a wide range o requencies will enhance the accuracy

o intelligence and surveillance.

Systems Provide Interoperability and Determine

the Level of Network Integration

The system makes an eector more or less eective. Technology per-

mits a sophisticated system to adapt to unsophisticated platorms

take, or instance, the Americans use o older aircrat such as theA-10

in Aghanistan. Having proven its survivability, this aircrat carries out

its air support missions perectly, certainly better in this environment

than would a new-generation platorm. The A-10s system underwent

complete updating to take into account the complexity o engage-

ments, but its eectors remained very similar to those o the most

modern aircrat. The systems open architecture and capacity to com-

municate with other systems determine integration into complex op-

erations. The worldwide prolieration o airpower largely depends

upon the integration o systems into a vast range o platorms.

The system causes eectors and platorms to cooperate. By 2025 we

may begin to conduct continuous area surveillance with great accu-

racy and a proper reresh rate rom satellites. I the accuracy o intel-

ligence obtained through satellites becomes widespread, transmitting

rom space in real time over a given area would represent a true break-

through in terms o surveillance capabilities.Lastly, systems are associated with norms on which interoperability

depends. Those norms will continue to lie at the center o major issues

in the uture. Given the development o networks and cooperative ca-

pabilities, systems will become the object o power struggles that weigh

as much on industry as on the ability to operate within a coalition.

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

22/113




Platforms Determine Missions

Very long range strategic platorms oer reach and omnipresence,

whether or strikes, reconnaissance, or transport missions. The United

States divides its platorms, distinguishing between strategic and tactical.

For a country such as France, which has chosen versatility, the lessons

rom recent conficts show the need or thinking about this principle

in the design as well as the use o platorms. Any such analysis neces-

sitates drawing on all lessons learned rom the operational use o the

Raale, the A400M transport aircrat, and the multirole tanker and trans-

port aircrat. The fexibility o certain capabilities and the integration o

a substantial range o equipment and eectors (so long as they have aninteroperable architecture) allow us to contemplate true operational ad-

vancements. However, even i the versatility o platorms permits mul-

tiple uses at dierent levels, this eature may create redundancy issues

at the tactical level. As such, excessive versatility may hinder the under-

standing and visibility o a capabilitys strategic character.

Recognizing that their feets could become one o a kind and con-

tinue to operate or the next 30 to 40 years, most countries have en-

gaged in a modernization process. Air orces must be able to react tothe speed and unpredictability o strategic and technological develop-

ments that emerge in 2025 and beyond. Although current capabilities

are intended to be evolutionary, one should nevertheless pursue the

analysis o operational interest o new platorms, such as long-range

heavy airliters, possibly combining combat and support unctions;

manned, remotely piloted, or even optionally manned delivery sys-

tems; airships; and miniature systems able to operate in swarms.

In preparing airpower or its fight toward 2025, one must do more

than remove concerns about preserving the necessary fexibility to mi-

grate toward innovative capabilities while avoiding unique feet pit-

alls. More than likely, budgets and maintenance costs will not allow

signicant feet enlargement, but keeping certain feets in service be-

yond 2025 may create a new window o modernization dierent than

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

23/113




the midlie updates o platorms designed to last or 30 or 40 years,

which hinders innovation.

This situation applies to combat as well as transport capabilities. That

is, transported resources, covered distances, and deployment bases

may avor the development o platorms with more or less tactical ca-

pabilities that can operate rom various environments. Aircrat capable

o conducting operations rom makeshit airelds (e.g., heavy or light

air-mobility vehicles) will complement transport feets, and new plat-

orms such as heavy or ast helicopterseven airshipsmay appear.

Wherever possible, one must emphasize simplicity through solutions

that are pragmatic, aordable, and appropriate to the operational con-text and geographic environment. The year 2025 and beyond will ea-

ture many dual platorms whose onboard systems will dierentiate

their military capability.

Surveillance depends upon the sensor, which guides thinking and

provides broad or narrow coverage as well as accuracy. The system

creates interoperability, integration, and data transmission within the

required time rame. The platorm, which determines use, compromis-

ing among vulnerability, speed, and persistence, may unction in di-erent environments and may be interchangeable.

A primitive platorm dedicated to a specic environment and possibly

derived rom existing equipment will carry out targeted tasks better

than a multipurpose generic delivery system. A good-quality electro-

optical turret installed on a tactical transport or light aircrat may prove

quite eective in certain environments and conditions o use. A drone

will oer persistence, a transport aircrat interchangeability and hori-

zontal reach, and a satellite near invulnerability and vertical exten-sion. Combat aircrat would prove more suitable or reconnaissance.

Surveillance and reconnaissance missions become more eective

through a broad combination o platorms such as manned or re-

motely piloted aircrat, drones, and satellites, each complementing

the others. An important dierentiation lies in the ability to operate

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

24/113




inside or outside sovereign spaces. However, these considerations

must not make us orget that platorms give airpower its identity and

that they remain the most important element o missions executed in

the core o the air and space power domain.

Globalization extends the area o strategic interest worldwide, mak-

ing air and space power all the more relevant. The ability to reach any

point in the world through the air and outer space heightens the im-

portance o commanding the endo- and exoatmospheric spaces. This

struggle or command o airspaces involves open conrontation be-

tween opponents, unlike the situation in land or ocean spaces, where

asymmetric courses o action undermine the equilibrium. In the realm

o air and space power, however, the strongest prevails. Conrontationson land may combine primitive and modern capabilities eectively,

but air war requires orce and domination since the opponent is never

asymmetric. (Granted, a number o nonstate actors [e.g., the Liberation

Tigers o Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers) and Hezbollah] operate in the third

dimension either by engaging platorms, including remotely controlled

ones, or by trying to challenge traditional air and space powers or use

o the third dimension.) The current air arms race and the proliera-

tion o sophisticated combat aircrat or surace-to-air systems oer thebest illustration o the orce and domination that air war demands. A

platorm is a most important and obvious component o domination.

Long-range conventional or unconventional strategic missions also

rely on platorms. These missions, along with airspace control, will

characterize tomorrows airpower. However, combat support, recon-

naissance, in-theater air mobility, or ground attackall o them less

strategic in nature, depending on the level o space controlcan make

do with primitive platorms.

Air and space capabilities oten attract criticism because they are ex-

pensive. Thus, more fexible capabilities would better meet our needs

while keeping costs under control. This approach must guide air and

space power as it adjusts to uture circumstances and resists over-

reliance on versatile eectors, systems, and platorms. Although they

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

25/113




do not determine quantities, platorms related to space control and

strategic missions will give airpower its clarity and condition its iden-tity, as they did in the past. By this logic, distinguishing among eec-

tors, systems, and platorms will shape the development o tomorrowsindustrial landscape as well as national or international cooperation.

Tird Principle:

Discriminating Personnel or Future Systems

A capability consists o eectors, a system, and a platorm. The ope-

rator, the most important link, whether inside or outside the platorm,

produces the eect. With new delivery systems such as drones, themain operator controls the sensor since all or part o the fying can be

automated. This arrangement closely links the operator to the eector,whereas the missions success previously depended more on fying the

platorm. This new role or operators leads to a thorough rethinking otheir skills and training.

Airpower will become more dependent upon the cooperation o

several capabilities. Air reueling, or example, strengthens the strate-gic nature o a delivery system by giving it extra reach. The same

tanker can act as a picture- or video-transmission relay, thus oeringreal-time operation. Data links increase mission eectiveness,

whether by controlling spaces or cooperating with ground or navalorces. Surveillance systems eed combat capabilities, providing them

with updated situations.

These examples will only multiply, allowing any air capability to t

better in more environments, to manage its data, and to create the ap-propriate eect with the right pacing. This cooperation among capa-

bilities, the result o networking actors who operate in all environments,

will have no bounds, as satellites explode the boundaries o visual range.Limitations will become increasingly human; or instance, airpowers

handling o inormation will depend on the ability o men and womento do so. In 2025 and beyond, the coexistence o dierent platorms

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

26/113




and their communication capabilities both in-theater and worldwide will

multiply their eectiveness tenold. Technology makes that possible.

Although todays technology levels the playing eldunlike the situa-

tion during previous generations, when pilots combat skills dierenti-

ated between themthe ability to integrate and t into complex net-

works will likely become dening. Airmen will not have an equal

understanding o complex systems. Some will have the capacity and

training to devise networks and understand their place in uncertain

environments in which they can determine their perimeter o respon-

sibility; others will be destined to act only in a limited number o

bounded networks. These dierences will prove undamental in plan-

ning as well as in command and control and operations, inevitably cre-

ating expansive disparities. We must prepare or this eventuality, ana-

lyze the related skills, and t them into training. Thus, the current

military reorm in France may produce a benecial side eect. That is,

by understanding their place in the new complex organizations and

networks involving many actors, individuals will have indirectly pre-

pared themselves or uture operational environments.

Fourth Principle:

Acknowledging Joint Integrations

Dependence upon Airpower

The airspace is a shared environment. All o the worlds orces in-

clude airmen who contribute to airpower development. Airmen will

continue their association with all types o engagement, one way or

the other, through transport, strike, ground attack, support, surveil-lance, or intelligence missions.

The airman will become indispensable. The inantryman in Aghani-

stan does not see the airman, yet the latter is present everywherefy-

ing drones remotely; embedding with commandos; controlling close

air support missions; fying combat or transport aircrat; or operating

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

27/113




in command and control structures, merging inormation and provid-

ing updated data to in-theater commanders. By having airmen operatein any environment, we guarantee reedom o movement. The net-

working and coordinating o all air capabilities will allow airmen to teven better into operations in their entirety.

Even though joint work within stas has existed or a long time, weneed improvements in the eld. Understanding airpowers role in all

aspects o an operations execution will acilitate true joint integration,

permitting more integrated courses o action. We can do this only i allairpower components interconnect in common networks that are not

partitioned into environmental segments, such as air-land or air-sea

segments. The ull integration o air capabilities o dierent environ-ments and services will enhance joint cooperation at the tactical level.

Fith Principle:

Airpower Will Move Higher and Drive

Future Industrial Challenges

The year 2025 will likely see such innovations as the more fexibleuse o outer space and the commonplace employment o medium- andhigh-altitude drones. The sel-deployment o drones and their integra-

tion into air trac will give these platorms a strategic character, put-ting them at the core o airpower and allowing more interdepartmental

use. In the more distant uture, technical advances will lead to the de-

velopment o stratospheric drones (high-altitude platorms), adding thebenets o increased persistence and space observation without suer-

ing the drawbacks o the air and space environments. When the tech-nology becomes available, the use o the stratospherea space still

ree todaywill become an important issue or civil and military tra-c. The rst vehicles to use it will likely be long-endurance drones.

Once access to this realm becomes widespread, the nature o its rst

use, civilian or military, will determine the weight in the developmento uture regulations.

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

28/113




By 2025 we may witness such space missions as satellite de-orbiting

as well as the interception or destruction o space vehicles. Clearly

some countries are positioning themselves or these developments,

having learned that investing in this eld is not as costly as commonlythought. Any country that wishes to become a major actor in space

must nd a strategy which encourages evolution o the requisite know-

how and technologies. For example, launching a supply module to the

international space station and then controlling it rom the ground

demonstrates real skills in this eld. Despite budgetary constraints,

the continuation o studies such as those designed to develop reactive

space interception modules will prove essential to controlling reedom

o action in space during the uture.

The fight toward 2025 also involves industrial stakes. With regard to

progressive areas such as space or drones, the armed orces will con-

tinue to act as a driving orce and partner in industrial development.

These stakes will depend upon the militarys accommodation o exist-

ing or uture regulations and its investment in the human and nan-

cial resources necessary to guarantee the reedom o use and move-

ment in shared environments.

Conclusion

Only the decisions made in the appropriate window o opportunity

will prove correct. To be right too early is as useless as letting opportu-

nities go by. Planning the uture involves oreseeing the consequences

o todays decisions, taking into consideration lessons rom the past.

Airpower suers rom a major constraint as it attempts to imagine the

uture: more than any other orce, it is subject to technological devel-

opments. Although certain areas draw their inspiration rom yester-

days great battles and established principles o war, technological

breakthroughs modiy the evolution o air strategy. This dimension

overlaps the others and complicates thinking.

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

29/113




In 2025 and beyond, a complex reality will combine manned and re-motely pilotedor even optionally mannedvehicles. The continuityo endo- and exoatmospheric spaces will become more obvious. More

or less sophisticated platorms will operate side by side, overlappingcivil and military applications. And the third dimension will witnessall manner o conrontations. This complexity will continue to encoun-ter criticism because that which is hard to understand tends to intimi-date. A new dimension, communication, will become a priority in or-der to explain how actors in various environments will benet romthese developments, giving rise to challenges involving training, theintegration o air and space power in the uture, and, as a conse-

quence, the identity o those who control air and space capabilities.Air-land operations will remain tied to the land environment, as

will air-sea actions to the maritime environment. The ull spectrumo strategic missions and air command and control missions lies atthe core o the air and space airmans identity, unbounded and en-compassing all environments. By 2025 those missions will have re-gained all o their meaning. The fight toward 2025 will take place inthe air and space environment. More than ever, we must shed light

on the uture in order to make the right decisions today regardingour people and capabilities.

Notes

1. Peter F. Drucker,Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices (Oxord, UK: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1974), 121.

2. J. C. Slessor,Air Power and Armies (1936; repr., New York: AMS Press, [1982]), x.

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

30/113




Lt Gen Denis Mercier, French Air Force

A graduate o the French Air Force Academy (Capitaine Caro de Kervezec,

class o 1979), Lieutenant General Mercier received his commission as a ghter

pilot in 1983. He ew Mirage F-1C and 2000C ghters as a squadron member

and then leader at Orange Air Base (AB) and Dijon AB (Squadrons 1/5 Vendeand 3/2 Alsace; and 2/5 Ile-de-France). In 1990 he became deputy com-

manding ofcer and then commanding ofcer o Squadron 1/12 Cambrsis,

ying the Mirage 2000C (Cambrai AB). In 1994 General Mercier became deputy

head o the manpower ofce at the Air Combat Command (Metz). He joined

the Collge Interarmes de Dense (Joint Deense College) (Paris) in 1996

beore being assigned to the North Atlantic reaty Organization (NAO) ofce

o the joint operational planning sta (Creil). In 1999 he was appointed deputy

head o the combined joint task orce department at NAOs Northern Com-

mand (Brunssum, Netherlands) beore taking command o AB 112 Comman-

dant Marin-la-Mesle in Reims in 2002. In 2004 the general joined the Air

Force Sta as deputy chie and then chie o plans. Promoted to brigadier

general on 1 December 2007, he became deputy to the assistant chie o staPerormance-Synthse o the Air Force Sta. In 2008 he took command o

the Air Force ofcer schools in Salon de Provence beore becoming chie mili-

tary adviser to the minister o deense and veterans aairs in 2010. He was pro-

moted to lieutenant general on 1 February 2011. An ofcer o the Legion o

Honor and o the National Order o Merit, General Mercier has 3,000 ying

hours, including 182 in combat missions.

Let us know what you think! Leave a comment!

Distribution A: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

Disclaimer

Te views and opinions expressed or implied in theJournal are those o the authors and should not be construed as carrying the ofcial

sanction o the Department o Deense, Air Force, Air Education and raining Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments

o the US government.

Tis article may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. I it is reproduced, the Air and Space Power Journal requests a

courtesy line.

http://www.airpower.au.af.mil
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/newcomment.asp?id=78http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/newcomment.asp?id=78

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

31/113


Feature

Operationalizing Knowledge

A New Chapter in the Saga ofUS War Fighting and Cognition

Philip Kao*

War is the unfolding of miscalculations.

Barbara uchman

This article addresses what has changed in the conduct o war,especially with respect to the way intermediate-level leaderslieutenants to colonels and some noncommissioned ocersexperience, talk about, and conduct their business within the context

o the operational level o war. In modern military parlance, the

United States and many militaries around the world divide warare

into three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. Most people con-ceive o the individual military member as simply a tactical entity

*I presented an earlier drat o this article at Soldiering: The Aterlie o a Modern Experience; the Annual InterdisciplinaryHumanities Graduate Student Conerence, the Humanities Center, Harvard University, 2223 April 2011.

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

32/113


Kao Operationalizing Knowledge

Feature

someone who engages the enemy in close physical proximity, con-

ducting maneuvers within a specic domain such as the battleeld,

sea, or air. This article, however, looks at the art o war rom the per-

spective o the operational level: a practice, an outlook, and a set o or-ganizing and planning constructs situated between tactics and strategy.

To some extent, this study deals with and in abstractions. Many o

the concepts discussed, tested, and implemented by the US Depart-

ment o Deense (DOD) appear vague and open-ended. Nevertheless,

the article attempts to give the reader an account o some o the de-

bates going on within the military institutiondebates not readily

ound in public culture. As discussed later, the operational level o war

is not just an organizational or even a bureaucratic construct. Rather, it

is a contested space, a nexus o theory and praxis, where the modeling

o enemy networks and the firting with ideas and rameworks such as

complex adaptive systems structure the ormation o actual military

units and organizations. Debates eatured in various blogs catering to

warrior-monk types o proessional soldiers, such as the Small Wars

Journal blog, are turning the operational level o war into a discourse.

Ways o conceiving the enemy and making sense o the political pur-

poses and desired end states o military campaigns are not just policyplatitudes let to higher-level and civilian-led strategies. Nor are they

ignored or simply orgotten about by the military, as one might as-

sume. These issues are addressed in some ways more intellectually

and intensely by service members working at the operational level

than by politicians and national civilian leaders.1

The structure o this article is simple. First, it oers a very brie ac-

count o the history o the operational level o war, including a urtherdiscussion and renement o denitions along with a treatment o re-

cent developments in operational thinking, unctions, and areas o re-

sponsibility. It then proceeds with a case example o an organizational

command and control (C2) entityUS Joint Forces Commands stand-

ing joint orce headquarters (SJFHQ)in order to showcase the extent

to which campaign design and planning have become epistemological,

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

33/113



Feature

bureaucratic, and cognitive at the operational level. A ew points re-garding how deense and development concerns relate and come into

being as a system o systems, requiring new models o thinking and

adaptation, ollow naturally rom the case example.

Te Operational Level o War

In a broad and limited sense, military strategy concerns itsel withthe geopolitical outcomes o war or a particular military campaign. Amore nuanced way to think about strategy takes into account the waysin which military organizations strategize and implement certain ideas

and practices in order to attain specied aims.2 Strategy encompasseshigher-order agendas such as national security, peacekeeping, and eco-nomics (including the economics o confict).3 Situated between tacticsand strategy is the operational level o war, a term relatively absentrom the history o Anglo-Saxon military terminology and thought.4The operational level endeavors to translate strategic objectives intomilitary campaign plans, ocusing on the combination o tactics em-ployed to assert decisive victory over an enemy. Service members and

deense contractors in-theater who work at the operational level de-sign campaigns and orchestrate operations (using not only military butalso economic and political assets). In 1982 the operational level owar ocially appeared or the rst time in US military doctrine.5 Ac-cording to a joint doctrine publication, The operational level links thetactical employment o orces to national and military strategic objec-tives. The ocus at this level is on the design, planning, and executiono operations using operational art: the application o creative imagina-

tion by commanders and stas . . . to design strategies, campaigns, andmajor operations and organize and employ military orces (emphasisin original).6 Although the boundaries among the strategic, operational,and tactical can be quite blurry, operations have come to encompassthe bulk o campaign design and planning. Jacques Richardson makesthe additional point that strategy tends thus to be linear and stable,[while] operations [are] linear but oten o unpredictable stability.7 The

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

34/113



Feature

term operational art, then, describes the skills, operating concepts, andart orm o engineering successul campaigns at the operational level.

At this level, military members serve as conduits and translators be-

tween strategy and tactics; they are also knowledge organizers, dataminers, and process managers. More than anything else, the opera-tional level has shaped the growing bureaucracy o warare and the ex-panding military-contractor / knowledge-economy complex.

The appearance o new railroad systems and the growth o modernarmies in the latter hal o the nineteenth century meant that logisticsneeded more planning and that the ate o war likely would not de-pend upon the outcome o any one or two decisive battles, but upon

the result o a series o strategic engagements. This prospect gave riseto the notion that a war o annihilation is no longer always tenable ordesired. Tactical operations require more medium-term planning andstrategic vision. In the early twentieth century, Soviet-era Russian andGerman war thinkers developed fanking techniques and variousstyles o attack, including the German blitzkrieg, which constitutedearly operational planning and coordination. The sequencing o tacti-cal battles over space and time became associated with the operational

level o war: a level o grand tactics exercising deception, deep at-tacks, strikes against the center o gravity, and the element o surprise.

The operational level o war has evolved signicantly since WorldWar II. War o attrition is no longer the oremost strategy. Instead opursuing cumulative destruction (and attrition-style warare), the mili-tary utilizes relational maneuver to disrupt an enemys system by tar-geting its weak points. In relational maneuver, avoidance o the ene-mys strength is paramount. Edward Luttwak urther explains that

although war o attrition depends upon resources, relational maneuverdepends upon knowledge.8

In todays context, the operational level has grown in size and scope.Many people believe that discussions at the national strategic levelabout how and why we go to war are seldom rmly grounded in theunolding operational nature o war. Rather, the abstract national po-

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

35/113



Feature

litical terms used in these discussions shed little light on just what theoperations and complexities o war really amount to. Justin Kelly andMike Brennan observe that our national civilian leaders have become

mere sideliners and strategic sponsors o war.9 War as a national ex-perience and enterprise has become increasingly separated rom civil-ian lie and governance. Because contemporary politics demands

brieer wars, deployments, and smaller combat ootprints, the opera-tional level is let with serious challenges. It has to devise comprehen-sive campaigns, stretching across a broad range o domains, that in-volve traditional military objectives, nation building, and development.Reashioned concepts and resurrected working philosophies such as

the shock-and-awe campaign, as well as winning hearts and minds andsystemic operational design, are examples o recent obsessions withoperational art. The shit towards viewing and modeling the enemy asa complex adaptive system and the emphasis on devising new pro-cesses or decision making based on sensing-deciding-acting-adaptingeedback loops continue to inorm missions today.

Eects-Based Operations and the

Standing Joint Force Headquarters

Recent developments in operational-level thinking have led to newrameworks and organizational constructschanges ueled by the mili-tarys ocus on knowledge and inormation management. Intelligenceno longer involves just revealing secrets and deciphering code; rather,intelligence proessionals gather vast inormation and turn databasesinto elaborate epistemological networks, maps, and systems. Buzzwords

like transormation and the knowledge battleeldreverberate in meetingrooms and twinkle in the rituals o PowerPoint slide presentations. Theimmediacy o complexity meets with the engineers obsession or plan-ning, and what soon emerges are organizational constructs, touted asplanning multipliers, and C2 weapons systems. Development issues arealso necessarily brought into the old, especially in the postconfictphases o war, to deal with stabilization, transition, and reconstruction.

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

36/113



Feature

In a very telling account o this so-called mission creep, H. R. McMaster

in a chapter detailing eective civilian-military planning, asserts that

operational level plans should identiy and advance macroeconomic

policies that remove obstacles to economic growth (or example, legalimpediments to oreign direct investment and subsidies that provide a

disincentive to entrepreneurship or incentivize corruption) and provide

a stable economic environment (such as low infation).10

My experience working with the SJFHQ at Joint Forces Command in

Norolk, Virginia, in 2007 highlights just how one o these multiaceted

planning and inormation-gathering organizations operates.11 The SJFHQ

received ocial sponsorship back in October 2004 when ormer secretary

o deense Donald Rumseld directed that each regional combatant com-

mand establish its own SJFHQ as part o a larger transormational push to

support the global war on terrorism. The history o the SJFHQ, however,

reaches back even urther to the military experiments and exercises or-

mulated in the late 1990s. In particular, Millennium Challenge 2002

(MC02), a large-scale military game and exercise costing approximately

$250 million, explored and tested uture war-ghting concepts, including

the advent o new communication technologies and net-centric warare.Consisting o live exercises, computer simulations, and role players, MC02

displayed several concepts. Some o them received lukewarm reception

while others having to do with knowledge networks and the leveraging o

computers to gather and share inormation received nearly immediate

validation.12 The SJFHQ, one such organizational construct in play dur-

ing MC02, sought to realize an operational concept called eects-based op-

erations (EBO). Maj Craig Barkely denes EBO as

operations that are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted based on a

holistic understanding o the operational environment in order to infu-

ence or change system behavior or capabilities using the integrated appli-

cation o selected instruments o power. . . . Eects-based planning inte-

grates diplomatic, inormational, military, and economic elements to

create the desired condition to meet the national objective. However, it is

important to remember, an eect describes the potential or intended con-

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

37/113



Feature

dition o the political, military, economic, social, inrastructure, and inor-

mational systems not the immediate target eects at the tactical level.13

EBO generated a plethora o supporting tools and derivative con-

cepts as well. Conceived o as a holistic approach to understanding theoperational environment o the enemy, EBO looked to infuence be-havior by generating and anticipating the rst-, second-, and third-order eects o any given action or inaction across a wide range o do-mains. The enemy and its networks were converted into an intricateand evolving system o systems, including such categorical divisionsas the political, military, economic, and so orth. As an epistemologicalapproach, EBO needed a new language, new measurements, and a ma-

trix o inputs and outputs. Its our operating components consisted oa urther breakdown into knowledge-base development as well as e-ects-based planning, execution, and assessment. The knowledge-basecomponent included ormation o the collaborative inormation envi-ronment (CIE), dened as a process and network(ing) tool. The abilityo planning ocers and military members in the eld to share inor-mation in real time became ormalized. CIE consisted o a virtual con-guration o networks and chat rooms that ostered communication

between military and civilian governmental organizations. The sharedinormation provided system-o-systems-analysts data that they couldinterpret in their attempts to locate critical nodes and centers o gravityor planning an array o strikes. Meanwhile, inormation collected andanalyzed ed another concept called the operational net assessment(ONA). This concept unctioned as an evolving database, producing in-ormation on specic nations and regions as well as various stakehold-ers and interrelationships between those stakeholders in the context ohistorical and projected contingencies. In theory, ONA was the SJFHQsplanning touchstone, serving as an integrated and continuous model oinstitutional memory.

The SJFHQ consisted o 58 core members, with an additional sixsystem-o-system analysts as needed, organized or the purpose o aid-ing in the rapid establishment o a joint task orce (JTF) headquarters.The concern was that past JTFs and JTF headquarters had to pull people

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

38/113



Feature

together in an ad hoc ashion in order to respond to a given crisis. These

crises oten carry normative labels such as humanitarian assistance,

disaster recovery, and major combat operations. Having a separate

group not tied to a service-specic command or even pulling resourcesaway rom a regional combatant commands sta ensured the SJFHQs

ready availability or deployment. Additionally, since SJFHQs trained

and worked together on planning and populating the ONA databases,

they were already joint, ready to serve as the core around which a JTF

headquarters would then coalesce during operations. SJFHQs were

created to save time and to introduce fexibility as well as new war-

ghting and operational-level concepts while oering the military a

low density, small ootprint, but high demand solution.

The SJFHQ organization included our main areas o working respon-

sibilities: inormation superiority, planning, operations, and knowledge

management. The inormation superiority group worked with the CIE

and contributed much to the ONA, discussed earlier. The planning group

consisted o experts, or individuals trained to locate subject-matter ex-

perts, in such diverse elds as political-military aairs, service-specic

capabilities, special operation orces, and nongovernmental organizations.

Additionally, planners doubled themselves into red and blue team counter-parts, role-playing how an enemy might plan and conduct operations in

the same battlespace. The operation group within the SJFHQ monitored

ongoing missions and ocused on measuring and tracking the eects o

certain actions taken by the JTF. Meanwhile knowledge managers

worked on organizing inormation and provided guidance on where to

nd relevant and timely inormation in order to conduct various tasks.

In their relatively short lie span, SJFHQs have been deployed toIraq, Aghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Doha, Japan, and New Orleans.

The SJFHQ provided its team members a venue or refecting on the

nature o the civilian interagency as well as the tensions and ssures

among strategy, operations, and tactics. EBO called or campaign de-

signers and planners to use and leverage a host o assets, including

those residing beyond the DOD. Everyone understood that the phrase

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

39/113



Feature

implementing the national instruments o powerdid not denote a orm ocollective strategy but an exercise involving intricate operational art.My work and interviews with various SJFHQ members revealed that,

rom their deployments and training exercises, many o them learnedabout the uncoordinated nature o civilian-military relations and theimpossibility o operationalizing the knowledge and tools theoreticallyresident within a whole-o-government approach.

Deense and Development

The type o military planning undertaken today at the operational

level, especially in places like Iraq and Aghanistan, amounts to whatgenerals and military analystshave called mission creep. Battles areno longer just mechanized outbursts o war or even the advanced coor-dination o air and land strikes across multiple echelons. Furthermore,US warare has changed signicantly since Vietnam. Operational art-ists will have us believe that the battleeld stretches across a multitudeo domains. Consequently, Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines unc-tion as multitaskers training on the job, or as my colleagues said, fy-

ing while building the plane at the same time. Future military memberswill serve as security advisers, civil protection trainers, economic and devel-opment coordinators, and civil/electrical engineers. In the long and shorto it, they have become ambidextrous nation builders and consultants.

It is useul to remember that during decolonization, social scientistsand political thinkers began treating the newly ormed nations as areal-world problem and an academic subject ruitul or social scienceresearch and theory making. At the same time, area studies blossomed

in conjunction with the Cold War, and development began to takeshape as a New World Order, promising to deliver modernization andprogress to Frantz Fanons The Wretched o the Earth.14 During this pe-riod, traditions were at once being reinvented by nationalist elites andconronted by processes o modernization. Social theories and conceptsengaged with real-world political concerns surrounding the can-domodernization era immediately ollowing the end o World War II. More

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

40/113



Feature

oten than not, these theories helped reproduce the power structureso Western hegemony in its categorization and treatment o societies

as (un)stable, (un)developed, (un)modern, and, ultimately, things

that could be studied, understood, and controlled.

Foreign policy makers and social scientists were interested in thetransition rom traditional societies to modern nation-states and in waysto study changes in society. Societies not under the complete control

o Western industrialized nations appeared volatile and entropicinneed o development and, hence, security. Development seemed aninsurgency prophylaxis that deense had to administer and managerom the beginning. As we ast-orward to the present, this legacy is

still with us today: the US military conducts its business rom the op-erational standpoint that it is a orce or good.

I war is entering a new period o reenchantment, this reenchant-ment is not due simply to advances in technology. For ChristopherCoker, the modern military can perorm surgical strikes and limit the

number o casualties because war is much more about gathering andevaluating inormation.15 Rather than just redrawing the map, new

wars transorm the world ideologically. This does not represent any-thing new in world history, but incorporating development, humani-

tarian assistance, and postconfict stabilization and nation building intowar amounts to a dierent kind o reenchantment. Things becomemuch more interrelated, and dense networks across space and timechallenge the military members ability to process inormation and re-

spond quickly and eectively. As a result, this challenge has come tobear on the theory and praxis o operational art.

Conclusion

According to Peter Paret, Wars are ought not to be won but to gainan objective beyond war.16 This statement captures not only the con-troversies and ambivalence surrounding the US militarys attitude to-

wards itsel and recent missions but also the way it plans and makes

7/31/2019 Aspj May Jun 2012

41/113



Feature

sense o these objectives at the operational level. EBO ailed, or is ail-

ing, or many reasons. On the one hand, during EBOs concept devel-

opment and experimentation phase, several senior generals expressed

skepticism over the rigid nature o cumbersome networks and systemsmodeling. They saw EBO as a solution looking or a problem not yet

articulated or even well understood. On the other hand, the SJFHQ ad-

opted the EBO ramework as an operational design and planning tool.

Various members o the SJFHQ acted as representatives o various

unctionalitiessubject-matter expertsand some even stood as proxies

or and brokers in civilian-military relations. In the absence o ideal-

ized interagency at the national strategic level, the SJFHQ attempted

to replicate and erect a simulacrum o various strategic viewpoints and

interagency stakeholders.17 SJFHQs and the US Joint Forces Command

no longer exist, but the SJFHQ concept has transitioned into a set o

joint enabling capabilities residing within logistics at the Joint Sta

level. EBO, however, continues to elicit debate. Critics rightully ask

how we can know or sure that certain actions will lead to certain e-

ects. Others, however, maintain that EBO is useul or specic situa-

tions and that nodal and air strikes based on EBO have proved success-ul in the recent past. These continuing debates resemble and echo a

military-science version o the structuralist/poststructuralist practice-

Aspj May Jun 2012

Documents

Transcript of Aspj May Jun 2012