Information OperationsNewsletter

Compiled by: Mr. Jeff Harley

US Army Strategic CommandG3 Plans, Information Operations Branch

Table of Contents

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The articles and information appearing herein are intended for educational and non-commercial purposes to promote discussion of research in the public interest. The views, opinions, and/or findings and recommendations contained in this summary are those of the original authors and should not be construed as an official position, policy, or decision of the United States Government, U.S. Department of the Army, or U.S. Army Strategic Command.

Table of ContentsVol. 7, no. 14 (30 March – 16 April 2007)

1. Nellis Officials Host Threat Analysis Working Group

2. Chinese Space Force Developing Fast, Congress Told

3. The New Issue of Technical Mujahid, a Training Manual for Jihadis

4. War in the Third Domain

5. Under Fire: Media in Iraq at Risk

6. Media Biased About Iraq War (commentary)

7. Propaganda We Just Can't Ignore (commentary)

8. Army Considering Adding Cyberspace to Tactical Domains

9. Don't Use WEP, Say German Security Researchers

10. Psychological Operations Trials for Global Observer HALE UAV

11. Mid-Valley Soldier Story: Major Scott Pons

12. Al Qaeda Wages Electronic War against US Forces in Iraq

13. The Paradoxes of Propaganda

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Nellis Officials Host Threat Analysis Working GroupBy Maj. Bill Woolf, 57th Adversary Tactics Support Squadron, 29 March 2007 3/29/2007 - NELLIS AIR FORCE BASE, Nev. (AFNEWS) -- Officials from the 57th Information Aggressor Squadron hosted the first-ever Information Operations Threat Analysis Working Group at the Threat Training Facility at Nellis March 27 to 29. This event brought together experts from 31 U.S. intelligence, research and development, and operational organizations to identify and characterize current and emerging threats. "Every time you turn on your computer, you enter the cyber battlefield and become a potential target for hackers, terrorists and nation-states trying to obtain any information they can," said Lt. Col. Lisa Onaga, 57th ATG deputy commander. "Although you may not 'see' them, our adversaries are out there, constantly employing sophisticated techniques to gain access to our systems and extract data." The 57th IAS is one of 11 squadrons assigned to the 57th Adversary Tactics Group. The group's mission is to replicate adversary air, surface-to-air, space and cyberspace threats, and train friendly forces to defeat them during major exercises like Red Flag and aggressor road shows. The 57th IAS staff members will use the information produced by the working group to improve their replication capabilities and educate Airmen on information operations threats. In addition to assessing adversary information operations capabilities and discussing ways to defeat them, working group participants will learn about the U.S. Air Force Warfare Center's emerging threat tactics team and its role in preparing Airmen for battle in the information domain. Cross-talk among members of the information operations community is critical to countering this growing threat, said Colonel Onaga. "Working groups like this one provide an ideal forum to exchange information and leverage efforts in and outside the Air Force to ensure our forces are prepared for the full spectrum of combat operations," she said.Table of Contents

Chinese Space Force Developing Fast, Congress ToldBy Lewis Page, the Register, 30 March 2007China is developing impressive high-tech military capabilities, according to analysis given to an American congressional commission. And, unsportingly, the inscrutable communists refuse to tell anyone what they're up to.The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission heard testimony from a variety of officials and analysts yesterday, covering such areas as "irregular forms of warfare", "modernisation of the People's Liberation Army", and the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. Today the panel will move on to look at "Information Warfare, Missile Warfare, Cyber Operations", and the Chinese forces' objectives in space.US airforce general James Cartwright said China's recent successful test of a satellite-killing missile had come impressively quickly, and "should be a wake-up call". The sat-buster was only one weapon in China's space arsenal, he said.Cartwright also told the commission that the Chinese forces had a well-organised cyber-warfare programme, to which they were firmly committed."It will pay off," he said. "Other nations are doing likewise, but I do not believe any have demonstrated the scale or the financial commitment to move in the direction that China has."Other analysts disagreed over China's future military plans. William Schneider of the conservative-leaning Hudson Institute characterised the ongoing conventional buildup by the People's Republic as "consistent with global aspirations" and "excessive in relation to China's regional security needs". He also complained of communist secretiveness, saying that "China has not responded to requests for greater transparency".

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But others cast doubt on the idea that the Chinese are bent on world domination. According to Andrew Erickson of the US Naval War College, Beijing is focused more on dominating Taiwan. The island state is effectively independent of mainland China, but the People's Republic has always claimed sovereignty over it."There is little evidence to show that the People's Liberation Army (Navy) is developing the capabilities necessary to extend its ability to project power much beyond China's claimed territorial waters," according to Erickson. He thought the PLA(N) would like to be able to prevent US carrier fleets from intervening in any dispute with the Taiwanese, but doesn't yet aspire to challenge American control of the world's oceans.The hearings continue.Table of Contents

The New Issue of Technical Mujahid, a Training Manual for JihadisBy Abdul Hameed Bakier, Jamestown Foundation, 29 March 2007The al-Fajr Information Center, a jihadi organization, recently published the February 2007 issue of Technical Mujahid, a magazine released once every two months that is available online. The release marks the second issue of the publication. The various jihadi websites have posted links to different locations to download the publication, that way stifling any attempts by outside forces to remove the document from the web (http://www.arabteam2000-forum.com, March 13). According to the editor-in-chief of Technical Mujahid, Abu al-Mothanna al-Najdi, the objectives of the magazine are to eradicate the phobia and anxiety suffered by those who refrain from participating in jihad because they erroneously believe that intelligence services are monitoring their every move. Additionally, the publication aims to spread a sense of security, vigilance and self-confidence, in a scientific way, among members of jihadi forums by educating them in jihadi propaganda and enhancing their knowledge of field operations. To achieve these objectives, the magazine is organized into six sections of technical training that are aimed at helping the mujahideen carry out certain tasks. Section 1: Covert Communications and Hiding Secrets Inside ImagesSecure communications, a significant and important tool for any underground group, is the first training subject in the magazine, authored by Abi Musab al-Jazayri, "the Algerian." After a brief historical account of the evolution of secret communications from the use of secret ink to Morse code to binary 256 bit and 2048 bit encoding, al-Jazayri launches into the body of his training article with "the thing that scares the FBI most is the use of secret communication techniques, by jihadis, known as the concealment science." The training article outlines steganography, which is the art of hidden messages; steganalysis, the art of detecting hidden messages; and the merits of hiding data in innocuous-looking images. Al-Jazayri appears to be an expert on the subject judging from the details he included such as image pixels, mathematical equations to prevent distortions in pictures used to hide data and the disadvantages of encryption software available on the market like Ezstego, S-Tools and Hide and Seek, which can all be easily deciphered using hexadecimal editors. He explains that a good program to use is the "Secrets of the Mujahideen" software application because it is a dual system that hides encrypted data in a picture and compresses the files to nullify steganalysis methods. He then provided an example of hiding 20 communiqués of the Islamic Army in Iraq in a 100 x 50 pixel picture. His example highlights the necessity of applying steganalysis before choosing a picture to hide data. Al-Jazayri concludes the training by warning jihadis not to use ineffective encryption programs in their secret communications, reiterating that the best encryption uses multiple concealment techniques such as compression, encoding and concealment or uses communication-engineering techniques such as Spread Spectrum.Section 2: Designing Jihadi Websites from A-ZThe second section, prepared by Abu Dojaina al-Makki, simply explains the steps of designing websites and uploading them to the internet via a host company. There is nothing unusual about this training except that the writer recommends hiring foreign website host companies because Arabic companies are incompetent, have "attitude" problems and break down frequently. To jihadis, experience in website development is important since the web is one of their key communication

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venues across various theaters of conflict. It also provides a recruitment opportunity for jihadi operations.Section 3: Smart Weapons, Short Range Shoulder-Fired MissilesThe training magazine recommends two types of short range shoulder-fired missiles for the jihadis as the most appropriate anti-aircraft weapons: the U.S.-made Stinger and the Russian-made Igla missiles. Abi al-Harith al-Dilaimi, the writer of the smart weapons section, included many details about the specifications of the missiles, operating manuals and the electronic heat-seeking control systems of the missiles. The section is very thorough and even includes pictorial illustrations. Al-Dilaimi does not fail to brag about the recent downing of U.S. aircraft using these missiles, saying "The best example we can give about these missiles is the downing of 10 helicopters in one month in Iraq such as the Apache, Black Hawk, Chinook and even an F-16 supersonic fighter jet that was shot down in al-Karma area west of Baghdad by the Islamic State of Iraq mujahideen in cooperation with the Mujahideen Army on November 27, 2006." Furthermore, the training touches on the types of supersonic aircraft, helicopters and slow military cargo planes and missile counter-measures employed by these aircraft, such as heat flares that can throw off-course heat-seeking missiles and infrared missile repelling systems. The Russian-made Igla is an exception as it has a Nitrogen-cooled heat seeking system capable of resisting the heat flares and identifying the real target among the decoy targets. The section also includes Igla and Stinger specification lists and a table of the English equivalents of the technical terms used in Arabic. Al-Dilaimi ends the training with a note saying, "we would like to assert that the mujahideen have proven skillful use of these weaponry by inflicting heavy loses on the colonizing U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan." Section 4: The Secrets of the Mujahideen, an Inside PerspectiveAlso mentioned in other jihadi publications, the "Secrets of the Mujahideen" is a computer program for internet communications. According to the security section of the Global Islamic Media Front, who wrote this training section, it is the first Islamic encryption software. The section on the program affirms the necessity of creating Islamic encryption tools due to the currently ineffective programs available on the market. In general, the section talks about the following five topics: 1) encryption and correspondence through the internet; 2) encrypting personal emails; 3) the degree of encryption and the symmetric, 128 bit, and asymmetric, 1024 bit, encryption keys; 4) public encryption keys and pass phrases that protect them; and 5) private encryption keys and decryption keys.The authors claim that the Secrets of the Mujahideen program offers the highest level of encryption in asymmetric encoding that furnishes safe transfer of public encryption keys over the internet. The keys, which use "key prints" to identify the recipient, can be advertised in the jihadi forums. In general, the strength of the jihadi encryption program lies in the following: the use of the best five algorithms in encryption science; strong symmetric encryption; private and public asymmetric 2048 bit keys; strong compression of data; use of stealthy encryption keys and algorithms; secure deletion of files, elimination of retrieval possibilities; and the ability to run it from a flash disc, i.e. the program does not have to run from a computer hard drive. The encryption training section is extremely detailed and explains all the technical implications of the program. The writers claim that the program surpasses all international symmetric encryption systems. Section 5-6: Video Technology and Subtitling Video ClipsThis is the second lesson in a series of training that will be included in future issues of the magazine. Although very technical, there is nothing unusual about the video training as it talks about signal reception, sample rates and vertical video samples. In the same context, the training explains how to dub video clips with subtitles and background voiceovers. Video skills are clearly needed by jihadis for their propaganda campaigns. One well known example would be the videos released of the "Baghdad Sniper" (Terrorism Focus, February 14). Abu al-Hassan al-Magribi, the writer of this section, concludes by stressing the importance of translating jihadi propaganda into as many foreign languages as possible.

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The Conclusion of the MagazineThe editor-in-chief ends the magazine with an article calling upon jihadi forum participants to contribute technical information to the magazine, saying "Haven't you thought that you might have some knowledge that would assist your brothers in our nascent Islamic state of Iraq? My technical jihadi brother, this magazine gives you the opportunity to share whatever scientific knowledge you have with tens of thousands of jihadis frequenting the Islamic forums. Half of the efforts we exert in our battles against enemies of God occupying our land in Iraq, Palestine, Chechnya and Somalia lie in the media that will enlighten our fellow Muslims with facts about the crusaders." He reminds the readers of the al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Hamza al-Muhajir's call to Muslim scholars and scientists to utilize their knowledge for the benefit of jihad. Finally, the magazine instructs willing participants to send their technical articles to http://www.teqanymag.arabform.com. That website contains a welcoming note from the board of editors of the magazine and a contact form where participants can send in their technical articles. The next issue of Technical Mujahid is set to contain the following subjects: jihadi forums and secure surfing on the internet; smart weapons such as night vision and thermal imaging; and information on how intelligence agencies can bug cellular phones. Also, al-Fajr Information Center has announced the release of an interview with a jihadi leader in Afghanistan that will be posted soon. Clearly, the Technical Mujahid is not a magazine for the common jihadi since it contains many scientific details. To comprehend and apply the training the magazine offers, the jihadi has to have a certain level of education and specific academic background or be tutored by an expert in training camps or safe houses. Nevertheless, it is another example of how the internet is used to train fellow mujahideen in topics ranging from weapons training to secure communications.Table of Contents

War in the Third DomainBy Hampton Stephens, Air Force Magazine, April 2007When the Air Force formed Air Force Space Command in 1982, it marked formal recognition that space was a distinct operating arena. The first commander, Gen. James V. Hartinger, said, “Space is a place. ... It is a theater of operations, and it was just a matter of time until we treated it as such.”Meanwhile, around that same time, sci-fi author William Gibson published a novel entitled Neuromancer, a work that gave the world a strange new term—“cyberspace.” The book didn’t call cyberspace “a place” but a “consensual hallucination” of billions of humans. Few military men gave it much thought.Nearly a quarter of a century later, though, it’s deja vu all over again. The Air Force has come to recognize cyberspace, like “regular” space, as an arena of human activity—including armed activity. It is, to reprise Hartinger, a theater of operations.The Air Force took a first big organizational step along those lines last fall. Air Force Secretary Michael W. Wynne and Gen. T. Michael Moseley, Chief of Staff, announced a plan to form a new Cyber Command to be established by Lt. Gen. Robert J. Elder Jr., head of 8th Air Force. Its purpose: Organize, train, and equip forces for cyber-war.Though Cyber Command has not yet reached full major command status, it already is providing combat capabilities in cyberspace to the unified US Strategic Command and combatant commanders, according to Air Force officials.Cyber Command has in place systems and capabilities for integrating cyber operations into other Air Force global strike options. All that is lacking, according to one top official, are the “organizational and operational constructs” to integrate cyber ops with those of air and space operations.The Air Force believes it must be able to control cyberspace, when need be, as it at times controls the air. The goal is to make cyberspace capabilities fully available to commanders.“Almost everything I do is either on an Internet, an intranet, or some type of network—terrestrial, airborne, or spaceborne,” said Gen. Ronald E. Keys, head of Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Va. “We’re already at war in cyberspace—have been for many years.”

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The creation of Cyber Command received not only lots of attention but also produced lots of confusion. What, actually, does its establishment mean for the Air Force? For the US military?In answering the questions, definitions are surprisingly important. Lani Kass, special assistant to the Chief of Staff and director of the Chief’s Cyberspace Task Force, is at pains to declare that cyberspace is not a mission, not an operational method or technique, and not just about computers.“Cyberspace is a warfighting domain,” Kass said flatly.The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, adopted in 2006, defines cyberspace as “a domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures.”Thus, said Kass, the virtual world is “like air, space, land, and sea”—all places in which US forces operate. The whole electromagnetic spectrum constitutes the maneuver space, where forces range globally at the speed of light.This is a startlingly expansive concept. Moseley, in fact, has quipped that cyberspace today includes everything “from DC to daylight”—that is, direct current to visible light waves.We Fight ThereKass added that the cyber world comprises not just computer networks but also any physical system using any of various kinds of electromagnetic energy—“infrared waves, radio waves, microwave, gamma rays,” she said, “and rays we have not thought about.”By this definition, someone who uses a computer to crash a Web site used by terrorists has carried out a cyber operation. The same can be said of someone who jams local cell phone traffic to keep the enemy from detonating a remotely controlled bomb. Using a space-based satellite to collect infrared imagery? That, too, is a cyber operation.“You could actually say that operations in cyberspace preceded operations in the air,” Kass maintained. After all, the telegraph—“the Victorian Internet”—ran on electricity and was a tool of military operations. It was a cyber weapon, she said.The Air Force’s goal is plain: to be able to operate in and, if necessary, dominate this nebulous, artificial “place” in which humans interact over networks without regard to physical geography. It is USAF’s third domain of combat.Wynne and Moseley on Dec. 7, 2005 published a new mission statement for the service. In it, cyberspace joined “air” and “space” in the catalog of Air Force domains. They said that the Air Force, from now on, would “fly and fight in air, space, and cyberspace.”Kass and her colleagues on the Cyberspace Task Force see this development as a historic step. In Kass’ office hangs a painting that depicts two World War I biplanes—one American, one German—in a swirling dogfight. Kass said it reminds her that today’s airpower, so supremely advanced and sophisticated, had humble origins and that cyber power stands at a comparable stage in its development.Why is the Air Force only now demarcating and defining cyberspace as an operational domain? In the past several years, it has been made critically important by the emergence of two interrelated factors. The confluence of these developments has created a worrisome, if not explosive, situation.Rise of the cyber badlands. Simply put, cyberspace has become major bad-guy territory. Air Force officials say it never has been easier for adversaries—whether terrorists, criminals, or nation-states—to operate with cunning and sophistication in the cyber domain.Kass said there is “recognition by our leadership that ... cyberspace is a domain in which our enemies are operating, and operating extremely effectively because they’re operating unconstrained.”When it comes to cost and skill, the barriers to entry are indeed low. “You don’t have to be a rocket scientist,” said Kass. The ubiquity of low-cost off-the-shelf cyber technology means would-be cyber-warriors don’t need governmental financing or even backing of a well-organized criminal or terrorist network.

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“One has to have concern about a range of potential adversaries, including other nation-states, including terror networks and ... transnational criminal enterprises,” says John Arquilla, author of Networks and Netwars and a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif.Arquilla also worries about a “wildcard” threat: “individual hackers of very great skill.”He believes 21st century warfare is a new animal, one in which nonstate actors have more prominence than ever before. The cyber domain is tailor-made for this new kind of warfare, he added, and traditional militaries neglect it at the peril of the states they are defending. “As opposed to traditional physical warfare where you tend to focus on the major militaries of the time, here you have to give equal attention to a great nation as well as to a particular network,” said Arquilla. “And of course there may be ties between nations and networks, like the link between a Hezbollah and an Iran.”Growth of US vulnerability. Cyberspace has become a potentially great US military Achilles heel. The Air Force has never been so heavily dependent on cyberspace as a medium supporting critical systems.“Military activities in all domains—air, land, sea, space—and our way of life increasingly depend on our ability to operate in the cyber domain,” Kass noted.It follows that the loss or compromise of these systems would bring catastrophe. American adversaries cannot confront the world’s most powerful military head on, so they look to exploit chinks in the US armor. Cyberspace contains many such chinks because the nation’s military power is more dependent than ever on systems based on the electromagnetic spectrum.What’s Important“The Air Force in particular has some very highly automated systems upon which it’s reliant,” said Arquilla. He noted, for example, the development of an air tasking order, or ATO. Today, it is virtually a fully automated system and is vulnerable to enemy disruption or destruction. “It’s not even clear that the Air Force could [produce] an air tasking order manually anymore,” said Arquilla, “and so the security of the information system over which it’s transmitted and through which it is undertaken is extremely important.”He went on, “Whether you are slowing down a bombing campaign, or slowing down the movement of troops to some theater, we’re talking about a ... great difference.”Wynne said the American “information mosaic”—the sum of data from all sensors that can be “collected and downloaded and cross-loaded for use by all in the fight”—is the key target of Air Force adversaries and a key cyber vulnerability.“All the information flow moves in the cyber domain, meaning the entire flow can be vulnerable to a cyberspace attack,” Wynne said in a Nov. 2 speech in suburban Washington.In cyberspace, the United States is lagging behind competitors, according to Kass. She declined to specify states or nonstate actors outpacing the United States. However, US enemies or competitors are known to be working hard to build their capabilities.The list of national and subnational cyber threats is long. Arquilla reported that he hasn’t seen “anything quite like a cyber arms race going on just yet,” but “leading countries are all involved” in cyberspace operations.The list of potential cyberspace threats starts with al Qaeda. The militant group “has focused extensively on developing a capacity for cyberspace-based operations,” said Arquilla.Al Qaeda has focused heavily on using the Internet for recruiting, fund-raising, and propaganda-spreading. However, it also has trained its operatives “in computer network attack techniques,” Arquilla said.As for nations, China and Russia generally are viewed as the greatest potential threats.“China is one of the more active countries in thinking through the whole business of cyberspace-based operations,” said Arquilla. Beijing’s cyberspace thrust comports with the Chinese military’s well-documented practice of using asymmetric tactics against its superpower military rival.

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Evidence of Chinese interest comes in the form of statements of Chinese officials, as well as past incidents.Example: Beginning in 2003 and for several years thereafter, a cyber espionage ring code-named “Titan Rain” stole information from various US government computers, including DOD networks. In their origin and style, the attacks “seemed to suggest a Chinese connection,” Arquilla said.Writing in a People’s Liberation Army publication, a Chinese general in 1996 touted Chinese plans to move into cyberspace as a combat arena. The CIA quoted the general as saying, “We can make the enemy’s command centers not work by changing their data system. We can cause the enemy’s headquarters to make incorrect judgments by sending disinformation.”And that was more than a decade ago.Kass said Chinese officials have published “strategic documents” outlining “unrestricted warfare” against the American information constellation. They “understand how reliant the United States is on the ability to conduct global command and control,” she added.Moreover, said Arquilla, “the Russians are quite good” at cyber work. Indeed, it is only too apparent that Moscow takes cyberspace operations very seriously. At least one Russian official has said that a cyber-attack on Russia’s critical transportation or power infrastructure would warrant a nuclear response.“This is probably the only warfighting domain in which we have peer competitors,” said Keys of ACC. “We have to stay ahead of them.”USAF is not exactly a fledgling. It electronically jabbed Serbian air defense computer networks during the 78-day NATO bombing campaign over Kosovo in 1999. Later, the then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army Gen. Henry H. Shelton, said, “We only used our capability to a very limited degree,” but with apparent success.USAF’s dive into the cyber world brings not only gains but also certain risks.For civil libertarians, cyber operations cause jitters, which Kass insisted are overblown and are, in any event, offset by the benefits of US power in this area.Early CasesKeys, for his part, noted the potential for confusion in defining which service entity does what. “There’s more to cyber than just computers. I mean, it’s the ether that all this stuff flies through, so people start talking about electronic warfare. Well, is electronic warfare cyber warfare or not? I don’t know.”Marine Corps Gen. James E. Cartwright, head of US Strategic Command and thus the nation’s top cyber warfighter, sees dangers in spreading such expertise.“When you train a person to be good in this environment it’s not unlike the Manhattan Project,” said Cartwright. “You’ve given them the keys to the kingdom.”The Air Force doesn’t have much choice in the matter, though. Cyberspace, nebulous as it is, has moved front and center in the military’s order of battle. “Without cyber dominance,” said Wynne, “operations in all of the other domains are in fact placed at risk.”Like Kass, Arquilla sees parallels with the 20th century development of military aviation. In a long 2003 interview with the PBS news program “Frontline,” he put it this way:“The real meaning of cyber warfare is on the battlefield. Much as aircraft ... transformed 20th century warfare, I think cyber-attacks will transform 21st century warfare. Militaries which are highly dependent on secure information systems will be absolutely crippled [if they are destroyed], just as if they didn’t have aircraft above to protect them in the 20th century.”Table of Contents

Under Fire: Media in Iraq at Risk

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By Mariwan Hama-Saeed, Kurdish Aspect, 26 March 2007IntroductionFor more than three decades before the fall of Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime in 2003, the Iraqi media was controlled by the government. Print, radio and T.V. news outlets were all run by the ministry of information which was directly monitored by the regime itself. The main headlines of the newspapers had to be about the president, and it was the same for radio and television stations. Everyone who became a journalist had to write and report the way the government wanted and blindly follow their policy and actions. During the period of Saddam's reign there was no room for critics; no one could say anything against the policy of the regime. Saddam's family had to be praised all the times. Stories, features, songs, lyrics, films etc were all about them and how great they were. This ended in April 2003 when the US led coalition forces ousted the regime. Unlike the middle and southern Iraq, the Kurdish region in the north enjoyed a semi-independent state starting in 1991. The media was divided totally between the main two parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, PUK, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, KDP. In 2000, Hawalti (Citizen) was the first Kurdish independent newspaper to be published. While there is a certain level of press freedom in Iraq, major challenges exist as well. The legacy of the regime's control over the media is still reflected in news stories. And the Iraqi media still faces huge obstacles such as new government regulations and the Iraqi militias after more than three years of "press freedom" in Iraq. Militias and militants are a big threat on the free and independent media, and party-run newspapers and radio stations dominate the news market. Journalists in most parts of Iraq have to risk their lives in order to file a story or cover an event. The risks of being kidnapped by militias, killed in an explosion, arrested by the US or Iraqi forces and caught in the cross-fire of fighting are all common for journalists in Iraq – especially for Iraqi journalists. This research will shed light on the status of media in Iraq after the 2003 war and analyze the situation in the country.Pre-War Exile MediaMost of the journalists who didn’t want to work for the Iraqi controlled media fled to other countries in the Middle East and Europe. There, they either established their own newspapers (which in most of the cases were not successful because they could not survive financially) or they worked with other media in their countries of exile. Perhaps the most successful example of a newspaper published by Iraqi journalists in exile is Azzman (Time.) Saad Albazzaz was the editor-in-chief of the famous government newspaper, Al-Jumhuryia (The Republic) until he fled to England in 1992. In 1997 he established Azzaman Press & Publication Company in London. Azzaman soon became one of the leading Arabic international newspapers. The newspaper was internationally published in London and after the war the company added the Baghdad edition. The London international edition is still run and the company also runs the Alsharqiya (The Eastern) T.V satellite channel. The opposition parties in exile were using radio and newspapers (mostly in mountains areas in the north or neighboring countries like Syria and Iran) against the regime. The radio signals reached many places in Iraq, but they were blocked by the Iraqi anti-radio coverage. The newspapers were hardly reaching Iraq, in fact they were not regularly published and were only read in places where Iraqi exiles were living such as Iranian camps and Syrian cities. Post-War Media After the fall of the Saddam regime in 2003, dozens of newspapers immediately launched. For the first time in more than 30 years, people could see different images and headlines on the front pages than just Saddam. The press became totally free, with no government watching over them. Newspapers and radio stations could tell people what was going on in the country in the way the things were happening, not in the way that the authorities wanted. Most of the newspapers, radio stations and T.V. channels were divided into three types:1. The Government Media: Following the U.S.-led invasion the Iraqi Media Network television station was launched. The station was sponsored by the coalition forces. Later the organization was named

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Iraqi Media Net, the television station's name was changed to al-Iraqiya and al-Sabah (The Morning) newspaper was published as a government publication.2. Political Party Media: Almost all of the political factions started their own media to serve as mouthpieces of their parties. Some were publishing even before the fall of the regime in the areas that were not under Baathist control, such as al-Ittihad, (The United) from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and al-Taakhi (The Brotherhood) by the Kurdistan Democratic Party. 3. Independent Media: Azzaman launched its Baghdad edition while Hawlati in the north continued publishing. After awhile some other newspapers emerged such as al-Sabah al-Jadeed (The New Morning,) which was launched in 2004 after the staff split from al-Sabah. Some of the staff, including the editor in chief Ismail Zayer, accused the coalition authorities of intervening in their work. Many independent newspapers could not survive financially, however. Immediately after the fall of the regime, dozens of newspapers were launched, especially in Baghdad. An era of the free press in Iraq started (1).The Coalition Provisional Authority and the MediaFrom April 2003 until March 2004 there was not any government supervision or regulations over the media. Everybody was free to establish newspaper, radio or television station with getting a license from the authorities, which was just a routine procedure. In March 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA, was established as a transition government following the invasion of Iraq in May 2003, and L. Paul Bremer became the U.S. civil administrator in Iraq.(2) The freedom of the press in Iraq was almost absolute and many journalists were proudly saying that it was a golden age for journalism. In June 10, 2003 the CPA announced the Code of Conduct to regulate how the media worked in Iraq, which was seen as a first attempt towards controlling media in the country. The code was mainly to ban what the CPA referred to as news and statements run by the media that were hateful or incited violence. "Disseminating material that incites violence … poses a direct threat to personal freedom," the order read. Those materials were "banned under terms of this order." The order also outlined the potential punishment for any media organization that was found to have violated the order. The punishment included withdrawing licenses, closing the establishment and confiscating the prosperities. Violators also faced penalties, including one year imprisonment and a $1,000 fine. The order left room for journalists to appeal the decision (3).But the order still worried journalists. The problem was: how could a journalist or a writer know which were hateful and inciting articles? Some believed the order was created so that news organizations would impose self-censorship."How can they say we have a democracy?" Eshta Jassem Ali Yasseri, editor of the satirical weekly Habezbooz, told The New York Sun when the code was proposed. "That's not democracy. It sounds like the same old thing." (4)Bremer ordered the establishment of the Iraqi Communications and Media Commission, which was responsible for licensing and regulating telecommunications and broadcasting. The order, No. 65 was dated March 20, 2004. It declared that one of the purposes of the commission was to "Promote and defend freedom of the media and assist the media community in Iraq to develop, strengthen and maintain professional working practices that support the media's role as a public watchdog." (5)The commission started working as an independent body to regulate the media and also telecommunications. But the commission's work focuses more on the field of telecommunications. Even the commission's website doesn't provide much information about the media work and environment in Iraq. During the elections in Iraq, the commission provided the Code for Media during Elections and Media Codes and Ethics. The Kurdish MediaFor more than a decade, the Kurds in the north enjoyed a semi-independent state enforced by the U.S. no-fly zone over the region. However, the situation for journalists remained difficult. The media was totally controlled by the two main rival parties, PUK and KDP. The Kurdish region was a civil war

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from 1994-1998, during which time many people were killed and thousands were internally displaced. Independent (non-party) media was almost impossible until 2000, when Hawlati newspaper was established by a number of independent intellectuals and journalists and published by a private print house. Hawlati was established to be "The voice of those who have been marginalized," wrote Asos Hardi, the former editor-in-chief who is now running another independent newspaper called Awene (The Mirror), in the pilot issue's editorial. He wrote that the newspaper was for "those who are not affiliated with the political parties and have no place to say what they want." (6) Awene and Hawlati newspapers are two independent news outlets in the Kurdish north. Their staff members and correspondents have faced problems with the authorities, however. The authorities have tried to sue Hawlati several times and in 2005 they managed to take Hawalti to court in accusing the newspaper for publishing a false story. The judge verdict was against the newspaper; both former and current editors were sentenced to six months imprisonment and fined $50 each. The prison sentences were commuted with the stipulation that the editors not publish errors for the next three years. Kurdish journalists have made several attempts to reveal corruption in the government and criticize the officials, but most of the writers were either threatened or arrested. For example, a New York Times article published on July 1, 2003 talked about how the main parties crack down on journalists who were criticizing the government. The KDP was running the western part of the region with it is capital in Erbil, had arrested three journalists for writing articles about the lack of opportunities for youth and questioning the party's finances. The journalists were later freed. Nuradin Waisi, one of the journalists, told The New York times that he had received a death threat from a senior party official. He later fled to Syria. Goran Salih, another of the journalists, told the same newspaper that the party officials had threatened him. "They said I will see much trouble in my life if I keep writing in that direction." (7)The situation in Iraqi Kurdistan also continued to deteriorate through 2006, when dozens of journalists were arrested and officials started cracking down on independent journalists. Hawlati newspaper is chased by the officials and its journalists have been harassed and arrested on various occasions. Iraq: The Most Dangerous Place for Journalists The freedom that the press enjoyed in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, didn't last long. The area has become more and more dangerous for journalists. The Committee to Protect Journalists, CPJ, listed the country as the most dangerous place in the world for journalists to work in 2005. The following list has been selected from the CPJ's lists of journalists killed in Iraq. The cases reflect various threats, such as being killed by the US army, suicide bombings and militant groups (8).In fact the first journalist that was killed in Iraq because of the US led invasion was Terry Lloyd, a British journalist who was working for ITV News. He was killed in crossfire on March 22, 2003, in Basra province near Al-Zubayr by gunfire from the American military. The Guardian newspaper described Lloyd as, "One of ITN's most experienced war zone correspondents." (9)Paul William Moran, an Australian freelancer, was the first journalist to be killed by a suicide bomber in northern Iraq. This incident occurred on March 22, 2003. Moran, a cameraman on assignment for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) was the first victim of a terrorist act in Iraq. After his death, it was reported that Moran had also worked for the Iraqi National Congress to spread anti-Saddam propaganda during the build-up of the war. (10)Tareq Ayyoub, Al-Jazeera satellite channel's correspondent in Iraq, was killed by a US air strike in Baghdad on April 8, 2003. Some believed that the US was taking revenge on the channel for its anti-war position, especially because the channel's bureau was also attacked in Afghanistan in 2001 by US forces. The US said its forces were fired on from the building where Al-Jazeera was housed. "This morning the Jazeera bureau was bombed by Americans that resulted in the martyrdom of Tareq Ayyoub, a Jazeera correspondent, and Zuhair al-Iraqi, a cameraman," read an al-Jazeera statement said on its website. "Is this an indication that American forces can't stand other views?

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Or is this a preparation for massacres that Baghdad will witness and they want to hide it from international public." (11) In 2004, the Iraqi government closed Al-Jazeera's bureau. Nabil Ibrahim al-Dulaimi, 36, was killed by unknown gunmen while driving from his home to his workplace in Baghdad in December 2006. Al-Dulaimi was a news editor for the privately-run station Radio Dijla. During the last four years CPJ has listed 89 (through November 2006) journalists who have been killed in Iraq. This year, 2006, was the deadliest year for journalists in Iraq. As of November 2006, 28 journalists have been killed. However the figures are considered to be higher as some of the cases of Iraqi journalists have not been reported. Of the 88, 51 of them are Iraqi journalists. (12) Iraqi journalists clearly face grave dangers when they report. Thus Iraq has become the most dangerous place for journalists to work in the world. The death toll of journalists in Iraq has passed of the Algeria conflict, where 58 journalists killed from 1993 to 1996. Prior to Iraq, the Algerian conflict was the most deadly for journalists. (13) The conditions are worsening for journalists in Iraq, especially for Iraqi journalists who have nowhere to go but hope that they will survive. On November 22, 2006, the Associated Press reported that Raad Jaafar Hamadi, a correspondent for al-Sabah newspaper in Baghdad, was killed in a drive-by shooting. (14) Al-Jazeera's Bureau Closed in BaghdadAl-Jazeera is the most popular channel in the Middle East and one of the most viewed channels in the world. The Iraqi government and the US administration were always upset by the way Al-Jazeera was covering the Iraq war and the ongoing violence in Iraq. The Iraqi government formed a commission to monitor the network's coverage of Iraq, and in August 2004, Ayad Allawi, the then interim prime minister, decided to close Al-Jazeera's office in Baghdad. "This decision was taken to protect the people of Iraq and the interests of Iraq," Interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi told a news conference when he announced the decision. "(The commission) came up with a concise report on the issues of incitement and the problems Al-Jazeera has been causing." (15)The channel rejected the accusations. "I don't think that Al-Jazeera ever incites violence." Jihad Ballout, the network's spokesman, told CNN. (Ibid 15)The Al-Jazeera office is still closed in Baghdad. While the new Iraqi constitution (approved by voters in October 2005) grants freedom of expression, press, publishing and media in Article 36, Items 1and 2, (16) this hasn't helped Al-Jazeera, the leading news network in the Arab world, to work in Iraq. The US and the Iraqi Media There have been several cases where US forces shot or detained journalists. Some journalists have been imprisoned by the US forces. For example Abdel Amir Yunes Hussein, a cameraman working for CBS News, has been held at the Camp Bucca prison in Iraq since April 2005, according to Reporters Without Borders. (17)In November 2005 a Los Angeles Times report came out stating that the US had planted positive articles about the war in Iraqi newspapers. This sparked serious discussions among the Iraqi media and tarnished the reputations of newspapers that had published those articles. Some newspapers reacted with anger when they knew they were targeted by the plan. Some of them said they didn’t know they were trapped and some other newspapers apologized for their readers. Newspapers like al-Mutamar, Addustour, and al-Mada had published the stories. (18)The program was funded by The US Department of Defense. Up to $10 million was awarded to a Washington-based contractor, Lincoln Group (17). The company's mission was to translate articles written by U.S. Military Information Operations troops and market them to Iraqi media organization without letting them know that the material came from the U.S. military (19).The US made a huge mistake by using this tactic. First of all it undermined the claims about their efforts to democratize Iraq. Secondly, many independent media in Iraq couldn't survive the hardship financial situations they were in, so they had shut down their papers. There are still many independent news organizations in Iraq that are struggling to work. The US could support those

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media to foster free and independent – and true -- stories of the Iraqis rather than fabricated stories. Iraqi journalists have hardly had any access to the US military, and interviews with the US army are almost never seen in Iraqi papers. Most of the US military quotes and interviews that the Iraqi news organizations obtain either are from international news organizations such as AP, Reuters, AFP, CNN and BBC or are from US military statements or briefs. The Status of the Iraqi Media in 2006The situation has become very dangerous for journalists Iraq; foreign correspondents have very limited or no access to the Iraqi street and Iraqi journalists are jeopardizing their lives to cover the events. Ismael Zayer, editor-in-chief of the independent daily newspaper al-Sabah al-Jadeed, fled Iraq in August 2006 after a source told him his name was on a militia's hit list. He returned several weeks later, when he was told his name was taken off. He had already survived an assassination attempt in May 2004. Zayer told the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, "In most of the cases we can't say what we know. We're afraid that if we publish what we know we'll be threatened. Of course you can write a beautiful, brilliant piece, but it might be the last piece you write." (20)In Iraq, getting information is almost impossible. There is no transparency: The country was ranked 160 out of 163 countries in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (21). There is no room to report and reveal corruption which has engulfed the whole country.The Iraqi government recently passed some laws that criminalizes articles or speeches that ridicule the government or its officials. These laws are exactly the similar to those during Saddam regime.The Iraqi government shut down the channels Zawra and Salahiddin in November 2006 for showing demonstrations against the verdict convicting Saddam Hussein of crimes against humanity. The channels were reopened after a few days form their closure. The Iraqi parliament asked the government to stop the al-Sarqiya channel and Azzaman. The request sparked national and regional protests and the Iraqi government hasn't responded tio the parliament request (22).In September 2006, The New York Times reported that three Iraqi journalists were being tried for articles they had published in 2005. In the articles the journalists had accused some local officials in the southern Iraq of corruption(23).An Institute for War and Peace Reporting journalist, who had fled to southern Iraq when the Shia militiamen of Muqtada al-Sadr had taken control of his neighborhood, told the Institute that it was impossible for journalists to operate in the country. "Militias kill and detain people because [they’re either] Shia or Sunni. If I showed them my press ID, they would accuse me of being a collaborator and kill me on the spot," he told IWPR on condition of anonymity. (24) The situation in the north is not very promising. In fact this year has been described as the worst year by the local journalists. This year Asos Hardi, the former editor-in-chief of Hawlati and Twana Osman, the current editor-in-chief, received commuted six-month sentences and put on probation. They were also fined for publishing "false" information. However, many independent journalists were suspicious of the verdict as the judiciary is not independent in the region. Kamal Said Qadir, a Kurdish-Austrian writer, was sentenced to 30 years after he wrote some articles criticizing Massoud Barzani, the president of Kurdistan. Under pressure by international organizations and the Austrian government, he was released in January 2006. In a course of two weeks in August 2006 the Kurdish security forces arrested 28 journalists while covering demonstrations over lack of basic service. (25)In fact, Kurdish press freedom faces a gloomy future if the regional Parliament approves the proposed press law that has been drafted by Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate, a syndicate that is dominated by the two main parties KDP and PUK. The draft law that was drafted in early 2006 puts huge restrictions and limitations on journalism in the region. The first article of the final draft of the law, which has been proposed to the Parliament, states, "The press is free and there is no censorship on press and freedom of publishing is entitled to every

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citizen within the framework of the law and preserving private freedom of individuals, customs and public order."(26) There is also an entire section (Article 10) for "Forbiddance in Newspapers" that places severe restrictions on journalists."News or photos that are related to a private life of somebody or a family (is prohibited), even though it might be true, if publishing it would result in damaging him or the family," one of the items says. The main problem is that the law is very loose and only serves those who are in power. Under the clause mentioned above, the officials, particularly those who are against free media, can take any newspaper to court if the paper writes anything against them. Kurdish journalists face constant threats for stories they publish. There is no investigative journalism at all and while transparency is propagated in the Kurdish region, it does not exist. Conclusion: The Future of Iraqi Journalism and Journalists The future of the Iraqi media does not look promising. The resurrection of the former Baath regime law by the Iraqi central government means journalists cannot reveal corruption or wrong doings. The militiamen, the government and from time to time the occupying forces have made working in journalism almost impossible in Iraq. The country is now on the brink of a civil war and hundreds of thousands of people have died and millions more displaced. Yet the media coverage in Iraq is mostly focused on the humanitarian situation and political disputes, so cases like corruptions are hardly reported. Even if any cases of corruption are reported either the authorities won't respond, or the journalist could be killed, as Ismael Zayer had mentioned. The Kurdish media situation is quite the same; there is no transparency or access to information from the Kurdish government. Independent journalists face constant threats from the officials and security forces. The new proposed Kurdish press law limits press freedoms in the region and would make working for journalists difficult.The future of the Iraqi media generally depends on the political situation in the country. As political and sectarian violence continues, journalists can't cover the events as they happen, the main problem is they could be killed randomly or targeted.[Editor note: The source used for this article did not have the footnote references]Table of Contents

Media Biased About Iraq War (commentary)By Tad Trueblood, the Spectrum, 5 April 2007It is widely acknowledged that the United States-led Coalition in Iraq, along with the entire U.S. government, have been losing the crucial battle in the media. It's hard to pin down the reasons - media bias, the Bush Administration's strange reluctance to communicate or Pentagon ineptitude - but it's clear we've been getting our butts kicked in the area the military calls "information operations."The main "storyline" on Iraq which most Americans now accept has been successfully defined by parties who bitterly oppose our involvement there. This includes various "media arms" of the terrorists/insurgents, who use Web sites, chat rooms, car-bombs and mass murder to influence opinion.This is truly an information war where the info-sphere is so lopsided that it's hard to find elements of the other storyline on Iraq. But there are some new initiatives being made by our side that hold promise. One is a new Internet effort by the Multinational Forces Iraq (MNFI), which is the Coalition's military command structure. Since about the end of February, the Public Affairs arm of MNFI has been publishing short video clips on a "channel" in the huge Web-based video repository of YouTube. (See www.youtube.com/mnfiraq)

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If you haven't been online much in the last year or so, YouTube is now one of the most popular destinations on the Internet. Anyone with digitally compressed video files can share them where millions have access for free.What MNFI has done is to set up its own space on YouTube.com, where video taken by military personnel can be posted, including those of "Combat Camera" units from each of the armed services. The clips are clearly selected by Public Affairs (they openly state so), and reviewed for sensitivity, but there is no editorializing. You can take what you want from what you see there.I imagine MNFI was originally hoping that these videos would end up on evening news broadcasts, but now they've decided to release them directly to the public. A new video appears on the site every couple of days or so. They generally show actual in-the-streets operations, and quite a few show servicemen actually in combat. Others show Iraqi citizens or their interactions with Coalition troops.The combat action shots offer new understanding of the conditions our troops there face every day. Others show operations underway, such as finding terrorist bomb-making materials, or mounting a night raid to find a high-value target. By doing so, they offer a unique window on the war.But the videos help the most to tell a different story that the mainstream "gloom and doom" line, are the ones showing Iraqi civilians and their interactions with American troops.In one, soldiers pass out soccer balls - donated by American school children - to Iraqi kids who are overjoyed to receive them. By facial expression and body language, you can see how much this means to both sides.In another, an Iraqi radio and TV station manager touchingly calls for unity among his fellow citizens. He ends by thanking American soldiers for saving his country.My favorite, though, is footage of soldiers rescuing a kidnap victim. An Iraqi man is found (intact) in an insurgent hideout in the Diyala province. The priceless part of the clip, however, is the unrestrained joy the family exhibits when the troops call them to give them the good news.While certainly touching, this last clip's meaning becomes huge when you consider Iraq in the long term. Each small success like this engenders cascades of others. And in each clip you catch the dedication of our servicemen, and seeing the development of new ties between us and the Iraqi people.Table of Contents

Propaganda We Just Can't Ignore (commentary)By Warren Kinsella, National Post, April 05, 2007On Wednesday, as a smirking Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced the release of 15 British sailors and marines, as a "gift" to the British people, we were reminded that wartime propaganda is as old as war itself.Everyone knows that, of course; as long as there are men willing to wage wars, there will be men willing to lie about it all. But it was a challenge, just the same, not to feel actual outrage in the past few days, as Iran's foul regime paraded 15 captive Royal Navy personnel across the front pages of the world's newspapers. And, anger notwithstanding, we in the media generally did what Tehran required of us: We showed the pictures. We ran the footage. Did it all, once again, when Ahmadinejad cynically announced his "gift."Iran's objective, as with all wartime propaganda, was twofold. One, unite their own people against a common foe. Two, destroy the morale of enemy troops. The propaganda effort was successful -- at least within Iran.Since the seizure of the British sailors and marines on March 23 in the northern Persian Gulf, the Iranian propaganda machine had been working overtime. Literally tens of thousands of photographs were published around the globe, depicting the Britons sitting in chairs near tables laden with fruit; sprawled on carpets and watching television; drinking coffee, playing chess or smoking a cigarrette, as a nervous- looking Leading Seaman Faye Turney was shown on the front of the Post.

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There was plenty of video propaganda, as well. Iran's state television networks broadcast new video on Sunday, in which two of the British seamen, in fatigues, pointed to a spot on a map, near where they had been seized. They seemed to acknowledge that it was in Iranian territorial waters. One sailor, Royal Marine Captain Chris Air, pointed with a pen to a location on the map, and said it was "apparently inside Iranian territorial waters" -- adding, "We've been treated very well, and we thank you for that."The second sailor, Lieutenant Felix Carman, was also seen pointing to the map, and saying: "I'd like to say to the Iranian people, I can understand why you are so angry about our intrusion into your waters."The photographs and video footage stirred paroxysms of revulsion and disbelief across the West. Opinion-writers rejected the notion that the statements were anything but coerced. And in dozens of media headlines - in media outlets as far-flung as the Toronto Star, the Jerusalem Post, the Times of London, ABC News, Jordan's Al- Bawaba -- editors used quotation marks to express doubt about the "confessions" of the Britons. And rightly so, too: Propaganda of this type is always involuntary.So why do it? And why do we in the news media, knowing or suspecting that we are being manipulated, oblige the murderous thugs who now wield power in Iran's outlaw regime?It is, unfortunately, in the nature of propaganda and the propagandized. As a former professor, military propaganda expert and CIA associate, Paul Linebarger, wrote in his seminal Function of Psychological Warfare in the 1950s, psychological warfare "is no mere tool, to be used on a special occasion. It has become a pervasive element in the military and security situation of every power on Earth."Linebarger asserts that modern war reflects an institutional and political complexity. "A modern battle is a formal, ceremonialized and technically intricate operation," he wrote. "You must kill just the right people, in just the right way, with the right timing, in the proper place, for avowed purposes." The objective, always? "To make them change their minds."Linebarger knew more about wartime propaganda than most of us ever will, but a survey of the world's media suggests that few minds have been changed since the Britons were captured at gunpoint on the morning of March 23. In fact, the reverse is likely true. As during the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979, the civilized world is increasingly turning against Iran. Iran, meanwhile, revels in its isolation.The target of the Iranian propaganda effort, then -- impressive as it was -- was not external. It was directed at the internal Iranian audience -- to demonstrate Iran's strength, Iran's boldness, Iran's defiance. Although impossible to measure, the mass demonstrations that took place in Tehran -- though organized and sanctioned by the state -- undoubtedly demonstrated that the Iranian people have embraced Ahmadinejad's propaganda efforts.Knowing all this, as we do, why have the Western news media been complicit in the dissemination of this vile propaganda?It is, as I say, in our nature. Even as we crossed the borders into feudal empires, many centuries ago, we could not but help but look up at the heads of enemies, impaled on spikes as warning. Then, as now, we were reviled -- but then, as now, we could not look away.Table of Contents

Army Considering Adding Cyberspace to Tactical DomainsBy Peter Buxbaum, Federal Computer Week, April 5, 2007 The Army may follow the Air Force’s lead in setting up a cyber command.“Cyber war is emerging as just as important as kinetic war, some say more important,“ said Vernon Bettencourt, the Army’s deputy chief information officer at the recent AFCEA Belvoir chapter/Program Executive Office Enterprise Information Systems industry day in Bethesda, Md.“We are looking at what the Air Force has done and we keep asking ourselves, ‘Are there any ideas the Army should be adopting?’” Bettencourt added.

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The Air Force announced it would create a cyber command last November that would be located at the 8th Air Force at Barksdale Air Force Base, La. The service named Lt. Gen. Robert Elder, commander of the 8th Air Force, as the command’s first chief. The command is scheduled to begin operations in May and be fully operational by October 2009.Bettencourt said the establishment of the Air Force entity represented a restatement of that service’s mission.“The Air Force did not just create a new command,” he said. “The Air Force changed its mission statement to say that it fights in three domains: air, space and cyberspace. A development like that is worthy of our assessment.”To that end, a high-level Army delegation recently visited the Air Force Cyber Command.“They have amalgamated some capabilities together,” Bettencourt said. “They have consolidated network operations and defense on a global basis.”He added that the Army already has done some of the same by co-locating parts of its Information Operations Command, its computer emergency response teams and its Network Enterprise Technology Command together at Fort Belvoir, Va.Bettencourt also said the Army “is leading the fleet” in the use of common access cards.“It is an important part in defending our huge network,” he said. “In the very near future, we won’t be using passwords anymore.”Col. Tom Hogan, the infrastructure deputy program director of PEO-EIS, said there was at least one exception to that rule.“We will continue to honor passwords for retirees,” Hogan said. “We will maintain a way to get into system for all those don’t get CAC cards.”Bettencourt went on to admonish the defense industry audience not to offer equipment or software to the Army that is not CAC-enabled.Another Army priority that has emerged is the encryption of data at rest, especially because it has been distributing more laptop computers.“As a result, we’re having more computers stolen and lost,” Bettencourt said. “We have issued a policy requiring that any computer taken out of the office must be labeled as authorized for travel and that its data must be encrypted. Even if the machine is CAC-enabled so a thief can’t pull out the hard drive and read all of its data” if it is lost or stolen.Bettencourt said the ultimate decision to stand up an Army Cyber Command will come down to how to best provide cyber capabilities to warfighters.“We are assessing what it means from a command perspective,” he said. “How do we take information operations capabilities and organization and provide them the combatant or joint force commander?”Table of Contents

Don't Use WEP, Say German Security Researchers By Peter Sayer, IDG News Service, April 04, 2007 The Wi-Fi security protocol WEP should not be relied on to protect sensitive material, according to three German security researchers who have discovered a faster way to crack it. They plan to demonstrate their findings at a security conference in Hamburg this weekend.Mathematicians showed as long ago as 2001 that the RC4 key scheduling algorithm underlying the WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) protocol was flawed, but attacks on it required the interception of around 4 million packets of data in order to calculate the full WEP security key. Further flaws found in the algorithm have brought the time taken to find the key down to a matter of minutes, but that's not necessarily fast enough to break into systems that change their security keys every five minutes.Now it takes just 3 seconds to extract a 104-bit WEP key from intercepted data using a 1.7GHz Pentium M processor. The necessary data can be captured in less than a minute, and the attack

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requires so much less computing power than previous attacks that it could even be performed in real time by someone walking through an office.Anyone using Wi-Fi to transmit data they want to keep private, whether it's banking details or just e-mail, should consider switching from WEP to a more robust encryption protocol, the researchers said."We think this can even be done with some PDAs or mobile phones, if they are equipped with wireless LAN hardware," said Erik Tews, a researcher in the computer science department at Darmstadt University of Technology in Darmstadt, Germany.Tews, along with colleagues Ralf-Philipp Weinmann and Andrei Pyshkin, published a paper about the attack showing that their method needs far less data to find a key than previous attacks: just 40,000 packets are needed for a 50 percent chance of success, while 85,000 packets give a 95 percent chance of success, they said.Although stronger encryption methods have come along since the first flaws in WEP were discovered over six years ago, the new attack is still relevant, the researchers said. Many networks still rely on WEP for security: 59 percent of the 15,000 Wi-Fi networks surveyed in a large German city in September 2006 used it, with only 18 percent using the newer WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) protocol to encrypt traffic. A survey of 490 networks in a smaller German city last month found 46 percent still using WEP, and 27 percent using WPA. In both surveys, over a fifth of networks used no encryption at all, the researchers said in their paper.Businesses can still protect their networks from the attack, even if they use old Wi-Fi hardware incapable of handling the newer WPA encryption.For one thing, the researchers said, their attack is active: in order to gather enough of the right kind of data, they send out ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) requests, prompting computers on the network under attack to reply with unencrypted packets of an easily recognizable length. This should be enough to alert an IDS (intrusion detection system) to the attack, they say.Another way to defeat attacks like that of the Darmstadt researchers, which use statistical techniques to identify a number of possible keys and then select the one most likely to be correct for further analysis, is to hide the real security key in a cloud of dummy ones. That's the approach taken by AirDefense Inc. in its WEP Cloaking product, which was released Monday. The technique means that businesses can cost-effectively protect networks using old hardware, such as point-of-sale systems, without the need to upgrade every terminal or base station, the company said.If your network supports WPA encryption, though, you should use that instead of WEP to protect your private data, Tews said."Depending on your skills, it will cost you some minutes to some hours to switch your network to WPA. If it would cost you more than some hours of work if such private data becomes public, then you should not use WEP anymore," he said.Table of Contents

Psychological Operations Trials for Global Observer HALE UAVBy Peter La Franchi, Flight Global, 4 April 2007Aerovironment has confirmed that the US Special Operations Command-sponsored Global Observer joint capability technology demonstration (JCTD) programme using the company’s Global Observer hydrogen-powered UAV will include assessment of psychological operations roles for high-altitude long-endurance platforms.The Global Observer JCTD psyops element will be based on the use of broadcast technologies from altitude, says Ted Wierzbanowski, director of strategic initiatives at Aerovironment. He declines to provide further details.The JCTD is at the contract negotiation phase, with first flights to take place 18 months after award. It will include a military and a civil utility component says Wierzbanowski. The military aspects will focus on provision of sustained imagery intelligence over a limited footprint area and performance of communications relay roles.

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“It has got an EO/IR sensor on it and communications equipment that can talk to a ground commander and two ground teams, so he can take the information coming off the sensor and move it to these ground teams. [It is a] very specific mission, very specific to unblinking eye over a point.”The UAV would cruise at around 100kt (185km/h) and orbit around a 10km (5.4nm) radius. This will see the UAV flying a constant 5° turn bank profile, Wierzbanowski says.The communications demonstration will see the EO/IR suite replaced by a multiband relay suite. “One of the beauties of that is that it is not just communications relay to people on the ground. We are also looking at moving data from Predator, moving data from Global Hawk, using this as a node for moving data around the battlefield so that you do not have to rely on satellite communications.”The civil utility element of the JCTD is still being scoped, but will potentially again include communications relay operations, provision of wide area broadband internet services, as well as airborne imaging, weather tracking and disaster relief operations.Wierzbanowski confirms that Aerovironment will not pursue a prime contractor role on the US Navy broad area maritime surveillance (BAMS) requirement. Instead the firm is continuing to look at possible teaming arrangements with the Northrop Grumman and the Lockheed Martin - General Atomics Aeronautical Systems bids, or a separate role with the USN as a communications enabler.“We are not officially playing in BAMS, but BAMS is going to need communications relay. How are they going to get communications relay? It is either going to be through satellite or some other capability for moving data around so some time in the future when the communications relay requirement becomes a little bit more known – the aeroplane is a very good answer to that requirement, and cheaper.”Aerovironment is also looking at a possible role as a communications services provider to support the planned Royal Australian Air Force’s own BAMS acquisition. The company is in talks with a potential teaming partner in that country to allow it to participate in that nation’s BAMS industry capability partner competition, tenders for which were released on 14 March and will close on 15 MayWierzbanowski says that development of a commercial market for aircraft in the Global Observer class based on the provision of services remains under assessment by the company. He says that current concepts are based on having a global constellation of platforms operating from five sites spread around the world with the company currently seeking co-operation partners for the initiative.A commercially available service could be available in the Asia-Pacific region “in three to four years to do very specific missions”. However, the biggest hurdle to that plan is US releasability policy. The company needs co-operation partners to help it press its case with the US State Department to ensure the initiative proceeds he says.Table of Contents

Mid-Valley Soldier Story: Major Scott PonsBy Lori Cain, Statesman Journal, April 8, 2007Lori Cain: Tell me about your experiences in Afghanistan.Major Scott Pons: Everybody on this task force enjoyed coming on this. They wanted to be here. There are a lot of people saying that reservists don't want to be here. That's a bunch of baloney. Every single person that came wanted to come. Nobody was involuntarily sent on this mission. When we join the military, our expectation is that someday we will be used. We all wanted to do this, and we have no regrets.Do we miss family at home? Yes.Do we regret coming? Absolutely not.This has been a phenomenal experience. You know, I am a history teacher. I am living history.LC: Describe to me a typical day for you in Afghanistan.

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Major Pons: I typically work about 16 hours. There is not necessarily a requirement to do that, but just by the nature of our operations, we tend to stay that long. I hold three different positions so my day is pretty filled.I'm an effects coordinator, an information operations officer -- I run the psychological operations for the task force -- and provost marshall -- the equivalent of the sheriff or head of the military police.LC: What's your most essential item in Afghanistan?Major Pons: Most essential item: laptop computer. That is how I speak to my family daily. I don't often get a chance to talk to them on the phone. It's just talking on e-mails daily with my wife. It's definitely a lifeline.There are computers here, like the Morale Welfare and Recreation room has computers. [Note from Lori: The MWR is a place where you can hook up to the Internet with your computer or use a base computer. There aren't a ton of base computers that I can tell. It is usually pretty busy.]LC: The gym is a big distraction for you. You said you lost 30 pounds since you arrived.Major Pons: It's been a great opportunity to get in shape because I can go to the gym somewhere in that 20-hour work day.LC: What surprises you most about Afghanistan?Major Pons: From that very first day, 99.9 percent of all the Afghans I've met absolutely love the fact that we are here. They're appreciative. They are very grateful.They're a great people. I really enjoy talking to them. Their country is destitute as far as poverty; they have nothing. You'll go to their house, and they will give you everything they have. They will feed you lunch with every single thing they have in their cupboard. That's how hospitable they are. They are incredibly nice.They have been living in a society where for 30-plus years they have been doing the impossible to survive, which has kind of tempered how they act. I was absolutely pleasantly shocked to find that they didn't just absolutely hate us; that they actually enjoy talking to us. It's been neat.LC: What's the most important thing you've learned since being in Afghanistan?Major Pons: Working with them and helping them to rebuild their country. I think we have made a lot of inroads with the (Afghan) National Army.Our training focus had been, prior to this point, focused on the lethal aspects -- teaching them how to be good infantry men so they could fight. And what we hadn't done in the past was teach them the other aspects the non-lethal side. How do you interact with the local governor? How do you do civil affairs?Because in the U.S. military that is a very large function of what we do -- the interaction and the reconstruction -- and they hadn't done that. We've established during our year here training and infrastructure so the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police are doing those things.They are focusing on their interaction with the local villages, establishing relationships, which are far more effective in rooting out an insurgency and far more effective in promoting peace and, ultimately, a very secure society. That's something that's never been done before.We (Task Force Phoenix and the 41st Brigade) are the first group to bring in the Effects Group (the operation group Pons works in). Now we're up to 6,000-plus people. The task force is much larger than just Oregon (41st Brigade). It's growing.I think we have taken this program to the next level because we have spent a lot of focus on the non-lethal side of teaching -- the other half of being an army.When you first start you've got to teach the army how to fight. That's the core. You know, we could kill every single Taliban out there and still lose this war. A fixation on numbers of bad guys killed (isn't good). You've got to look at it. There are 4 million Afghan refugees sitting in Pakistan that they (the Taliban) can recruit from.There is an endless supply of potential insurgents. If we don't do the non-lethal side -- show them that the country is getting better, the government is interested in building schools and clinics and helping improve their life -- it doesn't matter. It doesn't matter how many you kill.

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If you ask the locals, "what's one thing you would change in Afghanistan to make this a better place," the assumption was always they would change to make it a more secure place and they would stop the corruption. That is always the answer from a Western perspective we think would be No. 1. (But according to a recent survey by the Afghan government,) Those aren't even six, seven, eight or nine in the rank order.No. 1 is economic development, then clean water, new schools. Security was way down there. They're not necessarily comfortable with it, but they're used to it. And a minuscule 2 percent of the population is concerned with corruption. Where as in the Western perspective those issues (security and corruption) are huge.These folks want a job. They want to do something productive. They want to build a life for their families. They like clean water.It's something that is hard to understand. It's hard to come to grips with that training infantrymen and fighting an insurgency is only a tiny bit of what we need to do.We've taken that step with the Afghan National Army and the national police now as well, which will pay huge dividends in the near future.We've gotten the South Carolina (National Guard) group incoming that's following us to recognize the importance of what we've started here. Our hope is that it will continue with no huge backsteps in that process, and I think we'll be successful. They're coming here very soon, and I think we're going to spend about a month (with them) to make sure that they understand where we are and where they should go.Because we've established that, or at least got it started, and now we're coming to the end, it's like, "God I'm just hoping they continue this thing." They have to. We've spent so much of our effort and our lives here to do what we think is right. You know, a year from now if it wasn't continued, I would be very, very disappointed. I think it's important.LC: What do you miss most from home?Major Pons: I miss my family. Being a high school teacher, I miss working with the students in school. I mean it's been almost two years now, because I was deployed with Katrina. So, that took the fall semester or part of it; then coming back for a brief six-week period and then leaving for the second semester. So, I missed all of that year and all of this year.You know being a teacher is a lot like doing this. We're committed to the students, and that's the exact same as it is here. So, yeah, I miss teaching. Yeah, I miss my family by far the most.LC: Any message you'd like to send to family and friends?Major Pons: I'd like to say to all the folks in Oregon and the families in Oregon: They've missed their loved ones now for a year. They don't hear a lot of good things about what we're doing here.I want to let them know that this year has not been wasted. We've done some tremendous things for the Afghans. For the country of Afghanistan and (the guard's and their families') sacrifices have produced some significant gains for this country.I hope they would know that it's meant something to this country. We've done good stuff. So, they certainly didn't waste a year.And, if someone leaves here thinking they wasted a year, it's unfortunate because I don't think that's the case.Table of Contents

Al Qaeda Wages Electronic War against US Forces in IraqFrom DEBKA-Net Weekly, April 10, 2007In 2006, the Pentagon spent $1.4 bn to develop sophisticated counter measures for roadside bombs, which account for more US deaths in Iraq than any other weapon. They were designed to locate and detonate the improvised explosive devices IEDs from afar, before American convoys drove past the spot where they are planted. One such system has a sense of smell which sniffs out the presence of explosives; another uses radio beams to jam the IED’s electronic signals.

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Soon after they were fitted on US military vehicles and went into successful use, al Qaeda came up with a device capable of jamming and disarming both US electronic measures by radio signals. The Islamist terrorists thus escalated their challenge to the US military by introducing electronic warfare. Their success has boosted the US and British death toll in Iraq. Of the 50 US and UK soldiers who died in Iraq in the first 9 days of April, 30 were killed by IEDs. Al Qaeda’s mystery device is believed by military experts to account for the soaring rate of effective roadside bomb hits on American vehicles, even those fitted with the new counter-measures.The Pentagon department entrusted with finding a new solution, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, is working day and night to produce a new counter-measure which is not susceptible to the al Qaeda blocker.The Israeli high command is anxiously watching this turn in the Iraq war for two reasons:Firstly, operational innovations appearing on one terror warfront tend to spread with the speed of a contagion to the other fronts.Secondly, al Qaeda is suspected of acquiring its advanced electronic warfare technology from Iran, which also supplies the IEDs to Iraq’s Shiite militias and Sunni insurgents. Tehran owns an interest in the successful performance of its weaponry on Iraq’s battlefields and, most of all, in proving its technology is superior to American systems. If Iran is indeed the source of al Qaeda’s blocking device, then it is only a matter of time before this advanced electronic technology reaches Hizballah in Lebanon and is smuggled to the Palestinian Hamas and Jihad Islam in the Gaza Strip.According to some military experts, the system is already in the hands of one or more of these terrorist groups, but is being held in reserve to catch the Israeli military unawares at the right moment. The device could expose an advancing tank column in Lebanon or the Gaza Strip to mass casualties.But there are other possible sources:1. Al Qaeda developed the technology on its own. The problem with this hypothesis is that the Pentagon, to produce the US anti-IED jammers, activated America’s most advanced and best-equipped scientific and technological infrastructure, a network of test laboratories and hundreds of the finest scientific and electronic engineering brains. Where would al Qaeda find these resources? 2. Some private military-scientific element outside Iran, unknown to the US, contracted to develop al Qaeda’s counter-jammers for a price running into hundreds of millions of dollars. This is not entirely far-fetched. An enterprise of this kind, headed by the father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, A.Q. Khan, once ran a black market which illegally flogged nuclear wares to North Korea, Libya, Iran and China.Table of Contents

The Paradoxes of PropagandaBy John H. Brown, USC Center for Public Diplomacy, APR 16, 2007When I give my course, "Propaganda and US Foreign Policy" (1) -- a historical overview of the subject -- I like to invite the class for a modest buffet dinner chez moi. The last time this get-together took place, it included a screening of Leni Riefenstahl's Triumph of the Will (1935), a film -- considered by some a propaganda classic -- that celebrates the 1934 Nazi Party Congress in Nuremberg. As the students ate their dessert, I turned on the DVD, and the Nazi director's troubling yet spectacular black-and-white images appeared. One member of the class remarked that the movie's opening scene -- Hitler's airplane descent toward Nuremberg -- reminded him of President George W. Bush's "mission accomplished" landing on the USS Lincoln aircraft carrier. Then a student, having far greater confidence in my linguistic abilities than I, asked me to interpret the German. I knew this was the beginning of the end. Soon the students lost interest in the film. After 15 minutes, most of them ignored it, preferring to engage in conversation. Clearly, Triumph was no triumph. The students, no film-techniques fans, found it boring. They didn’t see any art (and certainly no fun), they just saw propaganda. When I tried to joke that the film could

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perhaps be used in a deodorant ad (who wants to put up with the smelly armpit of a brown-shirt uttering Sig Heil), I didn’t get many laughs. This leads me to a first speculation: that, in the words of the famed World War II propagandist (and Plato scholar), Richard H. S. Crossman, "[t]he way to carry out good propaganda is never to appear to be carrying it out at all." (2) Or, as John Pike, the director of a Washington-based defense think-tank, puts it, "[a]nybody who knows about propaganda knows the first rule of propaganda is that it should not look like propaganda." (3) "When you are persuaded by something, says Stanford psychologist Lee D. Ross, "you don't think it is propaganda." (4)This is one of the paradoxes of propaganda: the best propaganda doesn’t appear to be propaganda. Take, for example, the jazz program of Willis Conover over the Voice of America, which he D-J'd for some forty years during the Cold War and which (in the words of his New York Times obituary) "proved more effective than a fleet of B-29s." (5) Willis's millions of listeners in Eastern Europe and the USSR loved his program for what they perceived it to be: new and exciting music, introduced by Willis's unforgettable baritone voice. They didn’t see it as an effort to change their minds or behavior for the benefit of the United States. No, they saw Willis's program as anti-propaganda, and a stark contrast to the official media in their own countries.Which leads me to a second paradox of propaganda, closely connected to the first, and again underscored by Crossman (as noted by his American admirer William E. Daugherty):

One must hate propaganda to do it well. "…in the last war the British did better propaganda than any other nation in the world."We British were ashamed of our propaganda and therefore took more trouble to conceal what we were doing."The Russians undoubtedly did the worst propaganda [during World War II]. The Americans in many ways had the failings of the Russians in the propaganda field."The Germans, because they loved propaganda could not do it..." (6)

Consider the words of Archibald MacLeish, the writer and poet who worked for the Office of War Information, the World War II US propaganda agency:

I hated information work. I was asked to do it, and I always detested it. I suppose that in times of peace, so-called, you could probably devote yourself to information ... . But in war you were always on the verge of propaganda and...although some of the propaganda you could give your whole heart to, some you couldn't. I just detested it ... . As soon as I felt that I could honorably get out of it, I did. (7)

When a propagandist is completely comfortable with (or convinced by) his propaganda, he loses his ability to carry out effective propaganda, Crossman suggests. If he, self-assured in his own righteousness, loudly proclaims his propaganda, he is seen as propagandistic and eventually loses credibility, making it impossible for him to change minds or behavior.There is a third paradox of propaganda: that, for propagandists, often the best propagandist is he who does not know he (or does not consider himself) a propagandist (like Willis Conover). An example of such "unaware propagandists" were the guides who accompanied US government-sponsored exhibits in the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The last thing these dedicated young people would have called themselves were propagandists, but they actually were engaging in very effective propaganda when interacting with Russian audiences in their native language. The “sincerity” of the guides’ observations about the nature of American society, some would contend, led to the changing of minds among ordinary Soviet citizens about their putative imperialistic archenemy. (8) The guides humanized the United States -- innocently (one could say) but (possibly) brilliantly -- and thereby scored a propaganda coup in the process. (9)Other proxy propagandists were the intellectuals who benefited from the support of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (secretly funded by the CIA) during the Cold War. These writers and thinkers, not knowing the source of the largesse that enabled them to publish and attend conferences, believed they were engaging in the exchange of ideas (and indeed they were), not acting as purveyors of what the CIA considered very subtle propaganda to move the mental needle of the Western European intelligentsia in directions favorable to the United States. Magazines supported

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by the CIA like Preuves and Encounter had a considerable impact on the “thinking class” in Europe. (10) Totalitarian propaganda is propaganda without paradoxes. Closely linked to terror, it can dull the minds of domestic audiences (but is far less effective with foreign target groups). Loud, blatant, and repetitive, it can have short-term successes at home by mobilizing the masses through the Big Lie and slogans (Triumph of the Will was a hit in 1930s Germany, yet so were musicals [11]), but such propaganda eventually leads to disbelief about its contentions and intentions, creating deep popular hostility toward the propagandists who are seen as the perpetrators of lies. As the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 (12) suggests, Americans are uncomfortable with US government propaganda, even when it is directed at foreign audiences on behalf of American national interests (whatever that indefinable term may mean). When the secret CIA funding of the Congress for Cultural Freedom was revealed in the mid-1960s, for example, there was a national uproar against this activity and it was terminated by Congress. The morality of propaganda is beyond the scope of these observations. (13) I am simply speculating about the paradoxical side of this phenomenon, or, as the French say, je constate. And what I am suggesting, in a nutshell, is that Casablanca, as propaganda, is a far better tool than Triumph of the Will. It's Sam’s "As Time Goes By" that really wins persons over to the “good guys.” (14) But that's for my students to decide.NOTES:(1) The syllabus of the course can be found at http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/johnbrown_detail/070110_pdpbr_addendum/ . My favorite definition of propaganda is found in Lindley Fraser’s admirable little book, Propaganda (London: Oxford University Press, 1962): “Propaganda may be defined as the activity, or the art, of inducing others to behave in a way in which they would not behave in its absence” (p. 1). What is missing from this definition, however, is that the propagandist employs propaganda for his (or his organization’s) benefit, and not necessarily for the benefit of his target audience. This “selfishness” of propaganda is what distinguishes it from, if I may say, public health campaigns and (among other characteristics) education.(2) W. E. D., “The Creed of a Modern Propagandist: A statement of the views of a leading British propagandist on how and when to employ psychological warfare,” in William E. Daugherty, ed., A Psychological Warfare Casebook (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), p. 45.(3) Pike is cited in Andrew Buncombe, “The US Propaganda Machine,” The Independent, March 30, 2007. http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/article354473.ece(4) Ross cited in Shankar Vedantam, “Two Views of the Same News Find Opposite Biases,” The Washington Post, July 24, 2006. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/23/AR2006072300512_pf.html(5) Robert Mcg. Thomas Jr., “Willis Conover, 75, Voice of America Disc Jockey,” The New York Times, May 19, 1996. http://honors.umd.edu/HONR269J/archive/WillisConover.html(6) Daugherty, op. cit., p. 38.(7) See Walter L. Hixon, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), especially pp. 151-213. Perhaps the most important of these exhibits is the one that took place in Sokolniki Park in Moscow in 1959, the setting for the famous "kitchen debate" between Nixon and Khrushchev. The confidential policy guidelines for the exhibit noted that “[n]o propaganda operation of the U.S. government since the war will be under as intense a spotlight of press, public, and congressional attention as will this exhibit" (Hixon, p. 167). “Aware of the critical role the guides would play as direct representatives of American society, Eisenhower summoned the young people for a personal meeting before they departed for Moscow.” (Hixon, op. cit., p. 171). Ike in no small part was interested in meeting with the guides because they included four African-Americans. "Eisenhower could not have been oblivious to the fact that should any one of the African-American youths emerge as a critic of the United States while in Moscow, the action would deliver the Russians a propaganda bonanza" (Hixon, p. 171).

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(8) Cited in Brett Gary, The Nervous Liberals: Propaganda Anxieties from World War I to the Cold War (New York, 1999), pp. 152-153. MacLeish is evidently talking about OWI’s domestic information activities, but what he says is applicable to propagandists dealing with information programs directed abroad.(9) Of course, life -- and a minor part of it, propaganda -- can never be fully explained by generalizations. Jack Harrod, a distinguished former Foreign Service officer with extensive experience in Eastern Europe, had this to say about the exhibits and their guides, in an e-mail he was kind enough to send me in response to an earlier draft of this article:

John -- Exhibits, of course, visited various parts of the former Soviet Union -- and not only the Soviet Union. I had direct experience with exhibits in Poland as well. What struck me was that a large percentage of Russian visitors (and here I use the word deliberately, since Georgians or Lithuanians, for example, reacted radically differently -- see below) discounted, rejected or refused to believe a lot of what they were seeing and hearing due to a combination of ignorance about the wider world, ideology and national pride (the "u nas luchshe" [it's better in our homeland] syndrome I think we all remember). My first job with USIA [United States Information Agency, founded in 1953 as a propaganda implementator of the US government that organized many of the exhibits] as a lowly summer intern in 1967 was to translate and analyse the "comment books" (knigi otzyvov) from two exhibits -- I've still got a copy somewhere with the statistical breakdown of the comments. I think we may overemphasize the effect the guides had, although it was still certainly a "positive" one in the long run. Even if only a minority of visitors were influenced by the information they received and the openness I hope they perceived, it had a lasting effect. But I think we tend to remember the good experiences and forget about the large gaggles of middle-aged folks in identical coats who sometimes asked us what language we spoke in the US.....On the other hand, in Poland the guides had a reverse problem -- most of the Polish visitors weren't ready to believe anything bad about the US at all. Unemployment? Racial tensions? Vietnam? Who cares? (One Pole, re Vietnam in 1972, said we should kill all the Commies when we have the chance....). I suppose I could say something similar about all the Lithuanians who came to our exhibit in Minsk in 1975 and loved to hear me explain our official policy about not recognizing the incorporation of the Baltic States....("we know," said one guy, "but we always like to hear it again").So I'm a little leary of making any broad generalizations about exhibits or exhibit guides, unless we're being very specific as to time, place and audience.

David Monk, another distinguished retired USIA and State Dept. Foreign Service officer equally kind to respond to my piece, said this in an e-mail:

John, I think you overstate our "innocence" regarding our propaganda role as exhibit guides. I believe that our training made it explicit, while also stressing that we should feel free to express our individuality when we judged it appropriate, as that would authenticate us as Americans speaking for a free and diverse U.S., and thus make us more effective propagandists. I doubt that any of us was unaware of the political purpose of the exhibits program. Some Soviet visitors enjoyed asking several of us the same question, whether factual or provocative, and comparing our answers, sometimes engaging us directly about the differences in our individual replies. In reply, I liked to tell them about my visit not long before to the "Soviet youth" exhibit in Baltimore -- a counterpart to USIA's efforts in the negotiated cultural exchange program. None of the "youth" guides appeared to my then-youthful eyes much younger than about 35; we USIA guides were for the most part in our 20s. Everything the Soviet guides said sounded over-rehearsed. There were no detectable inconsistencies among them, and they dodged controversy. My account of this drew knowing nods. On the Bicentennial exhibit, I was uncomfortably stationed in the "giant Constitution" room right in front of the ceiling-high Second Amendment, and if asked, would state my personal

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concern about its application and my agreement with some visitors' criticism that firearms were too readily available in the U.S. I think many visitors were impressed that I was allowed to stand there and say such things. Regards, David Monk "Technology for the American Home," "Bicentennial of the USA, 1975-76."

(10) See the controversial book by Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters (New York: New Press 2000). Interestingly, Riefenstahl claimed Triumph of the Will was not a propaganda film (and she, therefore, not a knowing propagandist): "If you see this film again today you ascertain that it doesn't contain a single reconstructed scene. Everything in it is true. And it contains no tendentious commentary at all. It is history. A pure historical film… it is film-vérité. It reflects the truth that was then in 1934, history. It is therefore a documentary. Not a propaganda film. Oh! I know very well what propaganda is. That consists of recreating events in order to illustrate a thesis, or, in the face of certain events, to let one thing go in order to accentuate another. I found myself, me, at the heart of an event which was the reality of a certain time and a certain place. My film is composed of what stemmed from that." Cited in Wikipedia at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triumph_of_the_Will#Controversy(11) Andrew J Horton, “Forget the Fascism - Give us the Schmaltz! Escapist films of the 1930s by Austrian and German directors" (Central Europe Review, vol.1, no 4, 19 July 1999) http://www.ce-review.org/99/4/kinoeye4_horton.html. Wikipedia notes, regarding Triumph of the Will, that "there were few claims that the film would result in a mass influx of 'converts' to fascism and the Nazis apparently did not make a serious effort to promote the film outside of Germany." See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triumph_of_the_Will#Response(12) On the Smith-Mundt Act, see the Wikipedia entry at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smith-Mundt_Act(13) On this issue, see John Brown, “Two Ways of Looking at Propaganda” (Public Diplomacy Blog, USC Center on Public Diplomacy, June 29, 2006) http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/pdblog_detail/060629_two_ways_of_looking_at_propaganda/(14) For a comparison of Casablanca with a Soviet propaganda film (which, like Triumph of the Will, shows the Leader [in this case Stalin] -- much like George W. Bush coming down from heaven to land on a US Navy ship -- getting off an airplane after its descent from the skies), see the videos at "For Your Weekend Viewing," The Belmont Club: History and History in the Making (Saturday, February 17, 2007) http://fallbackbelmont.blogspot.com/2007/02/for-your-weekend-viewing.htmlTable of Contents

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