Information OperationsNewsletter

Compiled by: Mr. Jeff HarleyUS Army Space and Missile Defense Command

Army Forces Strategic CommandG39, Information Operations Division

Table of Contents

ARSTRAT IO Newsletter on OSS.net

ARSTRAT IO Newsletter at Joint Training Integration Group for Information Operations (JTIG-IO) - Information Operations (IO) Training Portal

Page 1

The articles and information appearing herein are intended for educational and non-commercial purposes to promote discussion of research in the public interest. The views, opinions, and/or findings and recommendations contained in this summary are those of the original authors and should not be construed as an official position, policy, or decision of the United States Government, U.S. Department of the Army, or U.S. Army Strategic Command.

Table of ContentsVol. 11, no. 06 (1 – 23 May 2011)

1. The Bin Laden Aftermath: The Internet Jihadis React

2. South Korea Fears Government Sites Next Target Of North Korean Cyber Attack

3. N. Korea's Highly Trained Hacker Brigades Rival CIA

4. Military Social Influence in the Global Information Environment: A Civilian Primer

5. Experts Skeptical On New Iran "Cyber Attack" Claim

6. Flagship Organization for Joint Operations Sets New Course

7. US National Security Information Operations

8. Marines to Add First Dedicated Offensive Cyber Operations Company

9. Train Like You Fight, Even in Cyberspace

10. Now showing in Afghanistan: "Why We Are Here"

11. 101st Airborne Division General Confronts Afghan Journalists

12. Cyber Security Plan Proposed By White House

13. Bin Laden Videos as Psy-Ops: What US Wants Afghan Insurgents to See

14. Libya Was Target of Sub, Ship and Air-Launched Cyber and Electronic Attacks

15. Army Reserve Seeks to Expand Cooperation Plans

16. Obama Administration Outlines International Strategy for Cyberspace

17. Secrets Surface about North Korea's Cyberwar College

18. Al Jazeera's Social Media Experiment "The Stream" Launches Online

19. Norway Army Faced Cyber Attack after Libya Bombing

20. Joint Training Integration Group for Information Operations (JTIG-IO) - Information Operations (IO) Training Portal

Page 2

The Bin Laden Aftermath: The Internet Jihadis ReactBy Aaron Y. Zelin, Foreign Policy, May 2, 2011 Following President Barack Obama's announcement yesterday of the operation that killed al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, the latter's online grassroots supporters in forums and blogs began quickly to respond. These pronouncements provide key insights into how these activists view Bin Laden as well as their continued commitment to the movement, showing a range of emotions but also the durability of the ideas that bin Laden worked so hard to propagate through propaganda and massive anti-civilian violence. Below is a taste of the reactions from members of some of the major pro-jihadi forums, including the Ansar Arabic Forum, the English Islamic Awakening Forum, al-Jahad al-‘Alami Arabic Forum, and the Jamia Hafsa Urdu Forum (also in English). Many expressed shock at the news and did not want to believe that he had really been killed. A member of the Ansar Forum wrote, "How sound is the news of the martyrdom of Sheikh Osama bin Laden?" While another responded "O Allah, make this news not true." Another quipped in a different post "God willing, [this] news is not true. Catastrophic if it is authentic." Others were elated and felt pride that Bin Laden had died as a martyr. A member of Islamic Awakening said joyfully "May Allah increase you rank in Jannah [paradise] o Sheikh Usamah!" While another responded, using the Muslim version of "Amen," "Ameen AMEEN AMEEN! May Allah give you a place next to our beloved Prophet... ameen amen." Showing solidarity with bin Laden, a member stated, "I'm with Osama either in winning a victory or earning status as a martyr." Some online jihadi activists are still waiting to hear official word from jihadi sources, refusing to believe the news from "kuffar" or infidel sources, especially after the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) denied this morning that Bin Laden was dead. Still others have reacted angrily, with one member in the Islamic Awakening Forum declaring "God damn you, Obama." Others placed blame on Pakistan for betraying its people and Islam. "And if it's true it would be the most shameful moment for the Pakistani people who could not protect one Muslim hero," one forum commenter wrote. "I personally feel the lowest I have ever felt, we couldn't protect our beloved Sheikh." Another expressed hope that the killing would encourage Pakistanis to rise up and fight the Americans: "Seems like a plot of America to wage war on Pakistan. Anyways, it will be good to see Pakistan fighting America ... actually Excellent!" The celebrations in American cities of the news also drew jihadi scorn. "Just look at those beer-drinking, hog-eating, incestuous, red-necks, uncle sams, house negros...all celebrating outside the White House," one commenter wrote. "It's like a holiday for them. Really a sad bunch of people. I'm just waiting for the Chocolaty Muslims, Talafies [fake Salafi Muslims], and those borderline murtad[apostates]/moderates to join the ugly bandwagon of cheering this so-called victory." Another opined, looking down on Americans: "The celebrations are amusing. Cheer all you want kuffar, you only have a limited amount of time in this dunya [present world] in which to do it. And then you will see the reality of this life." Forum participants also warned Americans that they should be careful what they wish for: "please let them celebrate, they are celebrating their own end. Osama is in the heart of every Muslim, even those who don't admit publicly ... Oh Allah send them endless tornados to destroy their homes and earthquakes to crash them." Ultimately, though, some jihadis tried to bring sobriety to the jubilant conversations in the forum threads that Bin Laden was a true shahid (martyr). One stated: "Why can't people admit [bin Laden] was killed? He is a human being, not a prophet. Another man will replace his shoes, it's easy." Although bin Laden's death is a large symbolic victory for the United States, one cannot forget that this fight is against an ideology - jihadism - that is bigger than one individual or an organization, which an online activist picked up on. "Mashallah the whole nation is celebrating the death of one man. Shaykh Osama was a true lion." And it is apparent that for some, the fight is far from over. "We renew our pledge of allegiance with the Covenant and the first with the Lord to continue our path until the end," he declared. "We will continue .. We will continue .. We will continue"Table of Contents

South Korea Fears Government Sites Next Target Of North Korean Cyber Attack

By Windsor Genova, AHN, May 4, 2011South Korea’s national security policy-making institute said on Tuesday that North Korean hackers are getting more sophisticated after paralyzing the computer network of a local agricultural cooperative bank and will next target government websites.

Page 3

Nam Sung-wook of the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS) said the probable next targets are the government's computerized network managing resident identification numbers or state medical insurance files.Intelligence officials said power grids, nuclear power plants, airports, maritime ports or subway systems could also be crippled by North Korean hackers.The concerns were aired as investigators of the cyber attack on Nonghyup on April 12 discovered 200 more computers planted with viruses to serve as the hackers’ zombie machines.Investigators have found that a laptop used by an employee of Nonghyup was among the zombie computers where the cyber attack was launched to crash the bank’s server, throwing offline its automated teller machines for a few days.The disruption of the bank’s online service affected 20 million clients.The cyber attack also partially crippled Nonghyup’s credit card service for weeks.Investigators linked the attack to North Korea as one of 27 IP addresses found on the IBM laptop was the same source of another cyber attack in March that planted viruses on computers so hackers can remotely control and use them for cyber attacks.A total of 27 overseas servers were used in the Nonghyup attack and South Korean prosecutors are asking 13 countries where the servers are located to help identify the source of the attack.Table of Contents

N. Korea's Highly Trained Hacker Brigades Rival CIAFrom Chosun Ilbo, 5 May 2011North Korea's 1,000 or so hackers are as good as their CIA counterparts, experts believe. Due to difficulties in expanding its conventional weapons arsenal following the economic hardships during the 1990s, North Korea apparently bolstered electronic warfare capabilities. The regime opened Mirim University, now renamed Pyongyang Automation University, in the mid-1980s to train hackers in electronic warfare tactics. A defector who graduated from Mirim University said classes were taught by 25 Russian professors from the Frunze Military Academy. They trained 100-110 hackers every year. The Amrokgang College of Military Engineering, the National Defense University, the Air Force Academy and the Naval Academy also train electronic warfare specialists. Jang Se-yul, who served in a North Korean hacker brigade, said on Tuesday there are around two brigades, or 1,200 soldiers in total, directly supervised by the department that handles electronic warfare. "Each squad also operates a unit specializing in cyber warfare." The two electronic warfare brigades are stationed in Sangwon and Nampo in South Pyongyan Province. North Korea's General Bureau of Reconnaissance, which oversees all espionage operations against South Korea, also specializes in electronic warfare. A source said overall conditions for North Korea's electronic warfare units' hacking operation have improved because of the expanding Internet infrastructure in China. "In the past, they had to operate in faraway locations like Canada or Australia, but now they can operate effectively in areas close to the Chinese border." They apparently operate from Dandong and Dalian. In a 2006 report, the South Korean military warned North Korean hackers could even paralyze the command post of the U.S. Pacific Command and damage computer systems on the U.S. mainland.Table of Contents

Military Social Influence in the Global Information Environment: A Civilian Primer

By Sara B. King, Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, Vol. 00, No. 00, 2010, pp. 1--26, Article first published online: 18 AUG 2010This article provides an overview of the role of social influence in modern U.S. military affairs. Many military strategists are now convinced that modern warfare is centered on a battle for public opinion, rather than a battle for physical terrain. As a result, new military periodic literature, texts, doctrine, and initiatives are increasingly likely to place social influence at the core of military operations. Unfortunately, this literature and doctrine is developing in a conversation that is almost completely independent of civilian university-based scholarly consideration. The goal of this civilian “primer” is to help bridge the gap between civilian and military scholarship by providing (1) an introduction to competing conceptions of the role of influence in modern war, (2) a brief description of current military initiatives using information operations, and (3) examples of influence

Page 4

tactics employed in recent U.S. military action. The article concludes by considering questions that modern military information operations raise about the intersection of social science, democracy, and war.In a 2006 article published in Armed Forces Journal, Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales predicted that social scientists—especially those who study social influence and cultural difference—will soon be as instrumental in war as chemists and physicists have been in wars past.Citing the work of historian Alan Beyerchen, Scales explained that modern wars have been shaped by “amplifying factors,” factors which “don’t simply accelerate the trends of the past, they make war different” (2006, p. 17). For example, in World War I, new applications of chemistry determined advantage on the battlefield. World War II, by contrast, was “a physicists’ war” (2006, p. 17). America’s victory in the Cold War—which Scales (2006) identifies as World War III—was, he said, the result of U.S. superiority in gathering and using intelligence and knowledge about the enemy. World War IV, argues this military expert, “will cause a shift in classical centers of gravity from the will of governments and armies to the perceptions of populations. Victory will be defined more in terms of capturing the psycho-cultural rather than the geographical high ground” (2006, p. 18). World War IV, Scales argued, will be “the social scientists’ war” (2006, p. 19).According to Scales (2006) and others (Boyd, 2007; Darley, 2007) this new era of “psycho-cultural battle”—otherwise termed a “war of ideas” (Murphy, 2010, p. 90) or a battle for “hearts and minds” (Claessen, 2007, p. 97)—is already underway in Iraq and Afghanistan. Modern battle is likely to be more about winning public opinion than about seizing contested geophysical terrain. The modern battlefield is likely to be in the information environment.The U.S. military has been anticipating this increase in the importance of information—including information acquisition, protection, communication, and persuasion—in military affairs for over a decade. By June 2000, the centrality of information operations, or information-related military activities, was clearly articulated in a military Joint Force planning document: Joint Vision 2020 (Department of Defense, Joint Vision 2020 [DOD JV 2020], 2000). The document declared the U.S. military’s goal of achieving “full-spectrum dominance” (p. 3) in every sphere of operations, including the “information domain” (p. 36).More recent documents continue to emphasize the significance of this goal (Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3–13, Information Operations, [DOD JP 3–13], 2006; Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3–24, Counterinsurgency Operations [DOD JP 3-24], 2009). The ability to be “persuasive in peace, decisive in war, [and] preeminent in any form of conflict” (DOD JV 2020, 2000, p. 1), according to the Department of Defense (DOD), now requires that Information Operations (IO) be regarded as a military core competency, “on par with air, ground, maritime, and special operations” (Department of Defense, Information Operations Roadmap [DOD IO Roadmap], 2003, p. 4). The ability to control the information environment, including interrelated physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions, is now seen as vital to national security (DOD JP 3–13, 2006). And it is the cognitive dimension, in which “people think, perceive, visualize, and decide,” that is seen as most important (DOD JP 3–13, 2006, p. I–2).This ongoing “revolution in military affairs” (Metz & Kievit, 1995, p. iii) has precipitated, among other things, a steady increase in U.S. military capacity to conduct social influence campaigns at every level of the modern world’s information environment: in local, national, regional (or “theater”), and global spheres; in domestic and foreign populations; among individuals, groups, organizations, and governments (Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3–13.2, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations [DOD JP 3–13.2], 2010). It has, at the same time, renewed the need for psychologists and other social scientists to reconsider the optimal relationship between social science and war, and between influence and democracy.Not surprisingly, military information strategists and educators often rely on the work of social scientists. But the conversation between the U.S. military and academic scholars is almost entirely one-way: Very few civilian journal articles or textbooks [with the exception of the brief, yet notable, discussions of IO presented by Taylor (2003) and Miller (2004), along with some consideration of specific IO components by Jowett and O’Donnell (2006)] even reference, much less study, the multifaceted, multilayered, increasingly synchronized “perception management” campaigns planned and conducted by the U.S. military.An important factor in the failure of social scientists to keep pace with the military’s increasing emphasis on persuasion is that almost all IO doctrine was classified until themid-1990s (Armistead, 2004; Shou, Kuehl, & Armistead, 2007), and some remains classified still. But much IO doctrine, along with military research reports, periodic literature, and university textbooks, is now accessible. And though the doctrine, strategy, administrative structure, and even terminology is still in flux, it is now possible, if not imperative, for those who study and teach about social influence to understand U.S. information operations, arguably among the largest, most controversial, and most influential social influence campaigns in modern times.This article is designed to help meet that goal. Essentially a primer for civilian scholars, this article is designed to introduce the premises, goals, structure, and implementation of modern U.S. military information operations. In the interest of promoting scholarly consideration of, and contribution to, the ongoing development of military information campaigns, this civilian IO primer provides (1) an introduction to

Page 5

competing conceptions of the role of influence in modern war; (2) a brief description of current military initiatives using information operations; and (3) examples of influence tactics employed in recent U.S. military action. The article concludes with a consideration of questions that modern military information operations raise for psychologists and others who study influence.Competing Conceptions of the Relationship between Social Influence and WarAs might be expected in any complex social influence campaign, though military Information Operations initiatives are already in place, disagreement about appropriate goals, tactics, and administrative structures continues. There is general agreement among military theorists that the expanding information environment—along with the associated revolutions in technology and social influence—has changed war. But both the degree and the direction of that change are widely debated. Five competing perspectives are noted below. Each, of course, has varying implications for future military force structure, budgets, Department of Defense civilian contracts, and research in social influence: 1. More power in an old weapon: Some conservative information warriors believe that the future of information warfare looks much like its past (de Czege, 2008; Gray, 2005: Henry & Peartree, 1998). Shaping the information environment— defined as persuasion and propaganda, in old-fashioned terms—is an important means of enhancing troop effectiveness. Persuasion, from this perspective, is a “force multiplier” (DOD JV 2020, 2000, p. 27) in that it can help our military forces succeed by increasing rates of enemy troop surrender, minimizing civilian casualties, shrinking public support for adversaries, and increasing support from allies or neutral populations. All that is new in our information age is the increasing size of accessible audiences, the speed of communication, and the effectiveness of influence techniques. The nature of war is unchanged. 2. New battlefields and new weapons: A more prominent view among information warriors is that changes in information, technology, and social influence capabilities have actually transformed the terms of war. War between standing armies of nation-states is seen as increasingly unlikely, both because the United States is an unmatched military superpower and because damage that would result from use of modern physical weapon systems is deemed intolerable. Our military’s enemies, experts predict, are most likely to be small, rogue groups who attempt to prevail by winning popular support and undermining U.S. political will for war (Nagl & Yingling, 2006).The argument here is that in most modern war, physical battles, if they exist, will be for the purpose of defining psychological battlespace (Emery, Werchan, & Mowles, 2005; Scales 2006). For example, insurgents in Iraq may blow up U.S. military vehicles because they want spectacular video footage (Kilcullen, in Packer, 2006) that can appear on the evening news, a jihadist recruiting website, or YouTube. And terrorists may time a vicious attack—such as the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center—to make sure it appears on live television (Kuehl, 2004). Modern insurgent campaigns are essentially information operations supported by violent activity (Emery et al., 2005; Hammes, 2007) and terrorists are “armed propaganda organizations” (Kilcullen, in Packer, 2006) who are waging psychological warfare through the media (Post, 2005, p. 106). Information, these military theorists argue, is now the primary battlefield and persuasion the essential weapon. 3. A new instrument of national power: Other military experts, concurring that perception management may be a key to victory in battle, also argue that military Information Operations should play a large role in U.S. international affairs. From this perspective, the military, in concert with the civilian government, must work to shape the global information environment before, during, and after conflict, to advance U.S. interests (Halloran, 2007; Jones, 2005; Murphy, 2007; Murphy & White, 2007). What is needed, according to this point of view, are coordinated perception management initiatives, spanning military and civilian offices, to exploit global media as a primary means for achieving U.S. goals (Halloran, 2007; Jones, 2005; Hendricks, Wenner, & Weaver, 2010; Murphy, 2007). 4. Education for democracy: In his 2006 monograph for the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, former Marine officer and CIA analyst Robert D. Steele offers another, sharply contrasting, view of the future role of information and influence in the military. While also identifying information as an element of national power, Steele locates the source of that power in education, rather than in perception management: “Modern IO is not about the old messages of psychological operations (PSYOPS), but rather about empowering billions of people with both information tools and access to truthful information. It is about education, not manipulation” (Steele, 2006, p. 3). 5. New soldiers and new skills: Other writers envision yet one other direction of change. Their concern is with the transformation of the role of the individual soldier in the context of the increasing transparency of the global information environment, the decreasing utility of conventional weaponry, and the increasing power of social influence. It has been suggested that the modern soldiers of western democracies are essentially “heavily armed social workers” (Taylor, 2003, p. 312). These troops work to change behavior in the glare of a multi-technology-based global media. They are obligated to minimize casualties, manage the perceptions of the global audience, and influence behavior through nonviolent means. Each of these five perspectives is reflected to some degree in the now-ongoing military information-based initiatives. Which, if any, of these

Page 6

points of view will predominate in the future is likely to be a function of debate among military theorists, conclusions drawn from trial and error in warfare, and input from civilian scholars—if they so choose. At present, there are two broad information-related initiatives in the U.S. military aimed, at least in part, at shaping attitude, emotions, perceptions, and behavior: Information Operations and Strategic Communication. Both initiatives are relatively new, both require extensive coordination and force restructuring, and, therefore, both are in the process of continuing development (Boyd, 2007; Hubbard, 2007; Rohm, 2008). I will address Information Operations and Strategic Communication in turn.Information Operations (IO): Doctrine and DefinitionInformation Operations (IO) is the best-established military initiative charged with shaping the information environment. It is supported by extensive doctrine and documents (DOD IO Roadmap, 2003; DOD JP 3–13, 2006; U.S. Army FM 3–0, 2008), permanent budget lines (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007), pools of personnel, and university-based training programs (Lamb, 2005b; Shou et al., 2007).The general goal of IO is to “influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own” (DOD JP 3–13, 2006, p. ix). More specifically, IO is responsible for establishing U.S. superiority in every dimension of the information environment: physical (e.g., infrastructure and technology), informational (e.g., information content and flow), and cognitive (the mind of the decision maker and of the target audience).IO integrates five core military competencies and three related capabilities. The core competencies are Psychological Operations, Military Deception, Electronic Warfare, Computer Network Operations, and Operations Security. The related capabilities are Public Affairs, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, and Civil-Military Operations (DOD JP 3–13, 2006; DOD JP 3–24, 2009). IO doctrine also identifies a number of supporting capabilities, such as Counter-intelligence and Combat Camera, the latter charged with “rapid development and dissemination of products that support strategic and operational IO objectives,” (DOD JP 3–13, 2006, p. II 7–8), including digital video and still photography that can be “provided to professional news organizations,” (DOD JP 3–13, 2006, p. II–8). In essence, IO combines both a “hard” and a “soft” focus: Some components of IO, such as Electronic Warfare and Computer Network Operations, are concerned with information content and technology; some, including Psychological Operations and Public Affairs, concentrate on influencing human emotion, attitudes, beliefs, and behavior. Because Psychological Operations and Public Affairs are primarily responsible for broad military influence campaigns directed toward foreign and domestic civilians and soldiers, these components will be the primary focus of the remainder of this introduction to IO.Psychological Operations (PSYOP)PSYOP are defined as planned operations to “convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.” (U.S. Army FM 3–05.30, 2005, p. 1–1). PSYOP may be wholly truthful (“white”); truthful, though masking the actual source (“gray”); or deceptive (“black”) (U.S. Army FM 3–05.30, 2005, p. 1–8).PSYOP are also classified as “tactical” or “strategic” based on intended audience, circumstance of use, and, to some degree, the rank or status of those involved in planning or implementation (Lamb, 2005a). Tactical PSYOP occur within a local area or battlefield; strategic PSYOP have global implications and are planned and executed at a national level (DOD JP 3–13.2, 2010). It should be noted, however, that PSYOP and IO analysts acknowledge that clear distinctions between strategic and tactical PSYOP do not, in practice, hold (Lamb, 2005a; Mullen, 2009): “The world’s almost instantaneous access to news and information makes it nearly impossible to localize any information campaign” (Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on The Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict [DSB PSYOP], 2000, p. 11).The importance of PSYOP in modern IO is reflected by a 2006 change in PSYOP status and, also, by current plans to substantially increase the number of PSYOP troops: In October, 2006, PSYOP was made a basic branch of the Army (United States Army, General Orders No. 30 [GO 30], 12 January, 2007) and the Department of Defense is in the process of expanding the size of the PSYOP force by one third (Hubbard, 2007).Unfortunately, the relationship between IO and PSYOP has been almost impossible to discern from popular media reports. According to Army Colonel Curtis D. Boyd (2007) and others (Collins, 2003; Rohm, 2008), because PSYOP is thought of in pejorative terms, even the most prominent military and civilian leaders often “routinely and improperly use IO and PSYOP interchangeably” (Boyd, 2007, p. 69).Public AffairsPublic Affairs, officially defined as one of three related IO capabilities (DOD JP 3–13, 2006), has a traditional charge of providing information about military activities to domestic civilian, government, and internal military audiences, such as soldiers and their families. Public Affairs officers customarily have defined their work as

Page 7

that of “informing,” rather than “persuading,” internal and external audiences, a definition called into question by modern IO (Boyd, 2007; Scanlon, 2007). Coordinated PSYOP and Public Affairs influence campaigns, including those in Afghanistan (Hemming, 2008) and Iraq (Mazzetti, 2004), have been particularly controversial both in and out of the military because, at the very least, such an association threatens the credibility of Public Affairs and, in a worst case scenario, corrupts the open flow of truthful information (Keeton & McCann, 2005; Scanlon, 2007).The U.S. military has made extensive use of IO in the past few years. Consideration of specific examples of its application provides a much better understanding of how such initiatives actually work. Such a review also provides access to the multitude of scholarly questions raised by IO campaigns.Information Operations (IO): Implementation in Recent WarsWhat follows is an overview of modern IO as employed in two recent wars, including a general listing of communication media, as well as examples of specific influence strategies employed in combat and post combat stability operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq. It should be noted that IO are categorized here in terms of the type of influence tactic employed, both for reader convenience and to underscore the military’s application of social science research.Communication MediaIO influence campaigns are conducted face-to-face, with loudspeakers, through leaflets, letters, flyers, posters, billboards, magazines, and newspapers, via CDs, DVDs, video, radio, broadcast and cable television, cell phones, email, and the Internet (Armistead, 2004; Collins, 2003; U.S. Army FM 3–05.30, 2005; Lamb, 2005a; Roberts, 2005). IO hosts web sites (DOD JP 3–13.2, 2010; Silverberg & Heimann, 2009). It has, or is pursuing, both satellite radio and television capabilities, cultivating the ability to jam others’ signals and to broadcast our own (DSB PSYOP, 2000; DOD IO Roadmap, 2003; Lamb, 2005a). “New media,” which include cell phones with video capacity and Internet connectivity, blogs, and Internet-based social networking sites, have recently drawn much interest from IO experts (Caldwell, Murphy, & Menning, 2009; Murphy, 2010). Social networking sites are thought to hold particular power for IO, both because the information that an individual site member receives on the network is assumed to come from a trusted source and, also, because information can move across these networks almost instantaneously.The selection of media channels for an IO campaign is, of course, partly dependent on the characteristics of the media environment of the particular military theatre of operation. For instance, the very lean media environment of Afghanistan offered very few venues for distributing messages of any kind. As such, thousands of hand-cranked radios locked to U.S. PSYOP frequencies were dropped into Afghanistan in concert with the U.S. ground invasion there in an effort to help explain to Afghanis what happened in the United States on September 11, 2001, and why our government had decided to invade their country (Armistead, 2004; Lamb, 2005a).Leafleting is a traditional PSYOP specialty, still widely used. Millions of leaflets, including at least 40million leaflets in Iraq alone (Collins, 2003; Hubbard, 2007; Lamb, 2005a), were airdropped in the two recent U.S. military actions. Samples of PSYOP leaflets dropped in Afghanistan and Iraq are available at http://www.psywarrior.com.Influence Strategies: Selected ExamplesAttitude change—central route. Some IO are appropriately classified as persuasion attempts, according to the definitions provided by modern influence scholars (Jowett & O’Donnel, 2006; Pratkanis & Aronson, 2001; Taylor, 2003).As such, these influence attempts openly acknowledge intent to persuade, accurately acknowledge the message source, and largely rely on reason—that is, they use the central route to effect attitude change (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). PSYOP leaflets warning Afghani civilians away from mine fields and bombing targets, along with mass media-based public service announcements directing these citizens to humanitarian supplies or explaining U.S. policy, are examples of IO efforts to persuade (Lamb, 2005a; http://www.psywarrior.com/Afghanleaflinks.html).Attitude change—peripheral route. IO also rely extensively on exploitation of non-rational, or peripheral, route factors (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), such as communicator credibility and the activation of emotion in attempts to change attitudes and behavior (Baker, 2006; Lamb, 2005a). Because U.S. credibility is so diminished in much of the world today (DSB SC, 2008; Jones, 2005; Lamb, 2005a), IO experts have urged special effort in finding new ways to associate U.S. messages with credible third-party sources, including the use of Internet chat rooms and third-party evangelists (Lamb, 2005a). One much publicized effort to enhance the source credibility of pro-U.S. messages is that of planting ghostwritten articles in Iraqi newspapers, falsely attributed to Iraqi authors (Julian, 2007; Marx, 2006)—a practice declared to be legal in a military court review (Murphy & White, 2007).IO has traditionally relied on the creation of emotion, including fear, to alter enemy soldier and civilian behavior (Lamb, 2005a). For example, leaflet-based fear appeals are employed to urge enemy troop surrender.

Page 8

IO has also, in recent years, dramatically increased its reliance on emotion as a persuasive tool by increasing its use of images instead of words to communicate with its external publics: Combat Camera, which captures digital images of military operations that can be distributed worldwide instantly, has become an integral part of IO planning and execution (U.S. Army FM 3-0, 2008).Compliance gaining. Other IO, particularly tactical PSYOP (psychological operations conducted in a small battle zone or community), employ compliance gaining techniques such as reciprocity, social proof, and commitment and consistency (Cialdini, 2004; Lamb, 2005a). For instance, Tactical PSYOP soldiers in post invasion Afghanistan distributed soap and kites (both previously prohibited by the Taliban), along with greeting cards sent at the end of Ramadan, blankets, medical supplies, and school supplies (Lamb, 2005a; Roberts, 2005; U.S. Army FM 3-05.30, 2005) in efforts to trigger reciprocity and, as such, the willingness of citizens to provide necessary assistance to U.S. troops. In Iraq, tactical PSYOP troops distributed coloring books, soccer balls, t-shirts, comic books, water bottles, and other “logo” items, as well (Crawley, 2005; Paschall, 2005; U.S. Army Comics, 2005). Of course, blunting similar enemy persuasive efforts is an important component of PSYOP, too. As such, some U.S. PSYOP troops fought the information war by spending time in Afghani markets trying to buy up “all the Osama/pro Al Qaeda [logo] merchandise they could find”(Roberts, 2005, p. 75).To maximize the power of social proof, PSYOP personnel in Iraq built a crowd for a staged pro-U.S. demonstration (Zucchino, 2004), and have been generally instructed to build crowds to listen to U.S. military messages (United States Army, Field Manual 33-1-1 [FM 33-1-1], 1994).In one application of commitment and consistency, or the “self-sell” (Pratkanis & Aronson, 2001, p. 166), PSYOP troops in Afghanistan sponsored a school writing contest on the theme of how the student writer’s life had changed since the U.S. invasion (Roberts, 2005, p. 129). In Iraq, U.S. military commanders worked to establish citizen commitment to U.S. policy by inviting selected community leaders to weekly meetings to voice complaints and request changes in military policy (Baker, 2006).Normative influence, group formation, and group function. Post (2005), in his recent article in Joint Force Quarterly, argued that IO should do more to exploit influence factors related to successful terrorist recruitment. Post suggested addressing what other recent authors have termed “descriptive” and “injunctive norms” (Cialdini et al., 2006, p. 4): (1) challenging the wide-spread belief in some Middle Eastern communities that terrorist membership was common behavior and (2) identifying means to diminish the public celebration of terrorist bombers. Post (2005) also argued that IO should attempt to weaken terrorist group cohesiveness, by magnifying dissention within the group and by providing support for defectors.Direct reinforcement. IO has also attempted to shape pro-U.S. attitudes in selected target populations by associating U.S. troops or activities with tangible reinforcement. PSYOP and Civil-Military Affairs worked together to secure appreciation for U.S. efforts, by rebuilding schools and repairing infrastructure (Armistead, 2004; Baker, 2006). The schedule of reconstruction was established, where possible, for maximum influence in critical circumstances (Paschall, 2005). Medical care has also been employed to win hearts and minds in Iraq (Baker, 2007).Control of information sources. Much IO attention in recent campaigns has been devoted to maximizing informational influence by controlling available information sources (Lamb, 2005a). For example, as the recent U.S. invasion of Afghanistan began, the single Taliban radio transmitter in Kabul was destroyed by U.S. cruise missiles and the frequency was taken over by U.S. PSYOP (Armistead, 2004). Similarly, PSYOP forces in Baghdad disabled or destroyed Iraqi communication facilities (Cox, 2006) as U.S. forces approached that city 7 years ago.In both post invasion Afghanistan and Iraq, efforts to control the information environment were even more extensive. In fact, U.S. PSYOP units worked to build a new media environment, now widely judged to be an important component of nation-building (Taylor, 2003). PSYOP troops converted to permanent status those broadcast media launched prior to the war (Roberts, 2005), established, or assisted other U.S. government agencies in establishing, new television and radio stations (Cox, 2006; Hubbard, 2007; Pryor, 2005), published newspapers and magazines (Cox, 2006; Hubbard, 2007; Roberts, 2005), and established Internet sites (Crawley, 2005; Marx, 2006). They also assisted with funds and programming for private Iraqi TV and radio (Freeburg & Todd, 2004; Harris, 2004).Propaganda. Modern IO campaigns also employ propaganda. To be sure, scholarly definitions of propaganda differ widely with regard to breadth, specific components, and essential contexts (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006; Miller, 1937– 1938; Pratkanis & Aronson, 2001; Sproule, 1997). But most modern definitions argue that propaganda is distinguished by a focus on mass audiences, a deliberate intent to deceive and manipulate, an effort to create an advantage for the propagandist, and a reliance on non-rational influence mechanisms (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006; Pratkanis & Aronson, 2001). At least two recent PSYOP clearly fit this definition. The toppling of the huge statue of Saddam Hussein, one of the most widely reproduced images symbolizing popular Iraqi support for the U.S. invasion of Iraq, was “stage-managed” for photographers by U.S. PSYOP troops (Cox, 2006; Zucchino, 2004). Another PSYOP-sponsored campaign was the “The Zarquawi Campaign”

Page 9

(Ricks, 2006; Schulman, 2006), which overstated the role of the Al Qaeda leader in Iraq in order to enlist Iraqi citizen support for continued U.S. military battle against insurgents. Each of these operations ostensibly targeted the Iraqi population, but was widely reported in U.S. and global media.Strategic Communication (SC): Doctrine and DefinitionStrategic Communication (SC) is the newest Department of Defense initiative aimed at perception management, and, like IO, is backed by doctrine, permanent budget lines, and personnel resources. Strategic Communication differs from Information Operations in key ways. Strategic Communication doctrine stipulates that SC, in contrast to Information Operations, can be intentionally aimed at global audiences, domestic as well as foreign. And SC need not be associated with a military campaign (DOD SC Execution Roadmap, 2006; DSB SC, 2008).SC is defined as “Focused U.S. Government (USG) processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and synchronized with other elements of national power ” (DOD SC Execution Roadmap, 2006, p. 3). Strategic Communication is supported by military Public Affairs, Visual Information, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, and Psychological Operations (DOD SC Execution Roadmap, 2006, p. 3).Military experts have identified the widely supported World War II Office of War Information, as well as the much-criticized World War I Committee on Public Information (the Creel Committee) and the short-lived 2002 Office of Strategic Influence, as forerunners to Strategic Communication (Halloran, 2007; Kuehl & Armistead, 2007; Murphy &White, 2007). One military writer recently described current SC as “PSYOP at the strategic [global] level” (Rohm, 2008). For some, the term “strategic communication” is simply the new, less controversial, term for “propaganda” (Halloran, 2007; Murphy & White, 2007; Taylor, 2002).SC, though well established, remains controversial even in the military. Silverberg and Heimann (2009) point to two serious concerns: The goal of SC is to influence; however, PSYOP is the only military arm with statutory authority to do so—and PSYOP is to be aimed only at foreign audiences. Further, the Defense Department’s Strategic Communication initiative draws the U.S. military into foreign policy activities, sometimes wholly independent of military battle, which used to be the province of civilian government agencies.In the Cold War, global influence campaigns similar to those espoused by SC were coordinated by the civilian government. But now, largely because the Department of Defense has the resources and organization to do so—and civilian agencies such as the Department of State do not—it is Defense that is taking the lead in U.S. government SC (Gates, 2008; Kilcullen, 2007; Ludowese, 2006).Strategic Communication (SC): TacticsShaping the Information EnvironmentNaming. “Since 1989, major U.S. military operations [e.g., Iraqi Freedom; Afghanistan-Operation Enduring Freedom] have been nicknamed with an eye toward shaping domestic and international perceptions about the activities they describe” (Sieminski, 1995, p. 81). Prior to that time, the U.S. military chose meaningless code names or pragmatic descriptive names for specific combat operations. Sieminski (1995) suggests that at least some of the time, senior military officers are involved in operation naming.Agenda setting. According to U.S. Army Brigadier General Mari K. Eder and others (Baker, 2006), one essential function of strategic communication is agenda setting: “manag[ing] public discourse not by attempting to tell people what to think,” but by telling them “what to think about” (Eder, 2007, p. 62). SC experts argue that it is risky to allow enemies to frame the discourse surrounding conflict. We need to “push” information, so that we “scoop” our adversaries, pre-empt their stories, and have a pro-active media posture (Collings & Rohozinski, 2008; Jones, Kuehl, Burgess, & Rochte, 2009).Embedded media. In the Department of Defense’s embedded media program, reporters are assigned to live with, travel with, and report on the activities of a particular military unit for an extended period of time. Military reports, (DSB SC, 2004; DSB SC, 2008), texts (Hubbard, 2007), and journal articles (Collins, 2003; Payne, 2005) identify the U.S. military embedded media policy as one of the outstanding examples of strategic communication success. One military author recently pointed out that the embedded media policy keeps media attention on small details, rather than on the “big picture”—such as questions concerning overall progress of the war or the propriety of a particular strategy or procedure (Payne, 2005).The Army newspaper Stars and Stripes reported recently that the Pentagon has hired The Rendon Group, a public relations firm, to screen reporters prior to assignment in the embed program (Reed, 2009; Reed, Baron, & Shane, 2009): Rendon develops a reporter profile, assessing the journalist’s previous writing to see if it presents a complimentary picture of U.S. military activities. For instance, a Stars and Stripes reporter was prohibited from embedding with a unit in Iraq in June 2009 because of the judgment that he had, in past work, failed to highlight positive war stories (Reed, 2009).

Page 10

Department of Defense Digital Video Imagery Distribution System. The Department of Defense Digital Video Imagery Distribution System (DVIDS), initiated in 2004, provides one example of current Department of Defense SC (DOD SC Execution Roadmap, 2006; Julian, 2007). This system, now with a permanent budget line (DOD SC Execution Roadmap, 2006), supplies prepackaged video, audio, news stories, and images of U.S. military activity, without charge, to any broadcast news organization in the world, including U.S. domestic channels. DVIDS provides up-to-the minute images and broadcast-quality video of military activity, along with interviews with military personnel. The system also maintains a huge, accessible electronic library of previously produced images, video, and stories. U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Julian (2007) reported that from 2004–2006, media downloaded more than 72,000 video files. According to Zewe (2004) all major U.S. networks, both over-the-air and cable, use DVIDS material. Information provided by DVIDS is identified as “public” and users are not required to credit DVIDS when using the products that it provides. One U.S. Army Iraq commander argued recently that the prepackaged news stories are especially effective because “the current global media gravitates toward information that is packaged for ease of dissemination and consumption; the media will favor a timely, complete story” (Metz, Garrett, Hutton, & Bush, 2006, p. 110).Defense Media Activity. Established in October 2008, Defense Media Activity’s vision, according to its website, is to provide multimedia products and services to inform, educate, and entertain both military and civilian audiences around the world. This agency consolidates a number of long-standing and recently created Department of Defense media and internal communications offices into one organization. Some Defense Media Activity components, including Hometown Link (providing news stories that target a soldier’s hometown media market), Defense Imagery.Mil (home of Joint Combat Camera), and DODvClips.org, provide free “news products” for use by civilian news outlets.Pentagon channel. The Pentagon Channel (TPC) is a Department of Defense sponsored cable news channel available to 1.4 million active duty troops, 1.2 million National Guard members and reservists, 650,000 civilian employees, 25.3 million veterans and their families—and is also free to any U.S. cable or satellite television service (Zewe, 2004). Distribution to a general domestic audience is, of course, the factor which defines this Pentagon television news service as SC. Pentagon Channel senior producer Scot Howe declared that “[w]e are an advocate of the Department of Defense and its voice” (Dotinga, 2005; p. 11).YouTube channel. One of the newest Pentagon SC initiatives is the YouTube Multi-National Force Iraq (MNFIRAQ) channel, which features one much-viewed clip, “Battle on Haifi Street” (Chinni, 2007). U.S. military officials acknowledge that one purpose of this YouTube channel is to present information from the Pentagon’s point of view, in lieu of reliance on an independent press, which fails, from a military perspective, to do so (Chinni, 2007).Talking points and bloggers. U.S. Army Central Command deploys a number of official bloggers (Collings & Rohozinski, 2008). In addition, Silverstein (2007) reported that the Pentagon has an SC project, called “Communications Outreach,” that provides retired military officers with talking points that can be used to deliver information directly to politically conservative civilian bloggers and talk radio hosts.Film and television industry liaison. The Office of the Chief of Public Affairs—Western Region offers assistance for film or television productions about the U.S. Army. Representatives of this office will review scripts, provide equipment and personnel, access to military facilities and on-site technical assistance when the film is judged by the military to reflect a reasonable representation of military activities and life. Otherwise, the office will decline to participate in the project (Barnes, 2008). Recent films produced with the assistance of this Los Angeles-based U.S. Army Public Affairs office include GI Joe: The Rise of the Cobra and Transformers: Revenge of the Fallen (Hames, 2009).Network news analysts. From 2001 until the program was suspended in late April 2008 (Barstow, 2008), the Department of Defense recruited a select group of former military officers to serve as “a rapid reaction force to rebut what it considered as critical news coverage” (Barstow, 2008) on major U.S. television networks, including Fox, CNN, ABC, NBC, and CBS. A study by Media Matters (2008) indicated that these analysts were quoted more than 4,500 times on National Public Radio, and network and cable television, combined.Marketing and (Other) PropagandaPR firm coordination of post-9/11 advocacy for U.S. military activity. Though there has been much criticism of the White House for use of marketing techniques to garner U.S. citizen support for recent wars (Altheide & Grimes, 2005), it was, according to military writers, the Pentagon that took the lead in these strategic communication campaigns: “In response to the apparent perception management policy vacuum, the Department of Defense (DOD) initially contracted the Rendon Group—a civilian company that specializes in strategic communications advice— to assist with a perception management campaign centered on military operations in Afghanistan” (Malone & Armistead, 2007, p. 145).Rendon subsequently helped market the Iraq war to the U.S. public, working with high-level civilian and military officials to identify talking points or themes for the day (Bamford, 2005; DSB SC, 2004) in this coordinated strategic communication campaign.

Page 11

Domestic support for fall 2007 troop escalation. A Department of Defense based SC campaign, reported to Congress in July 2007, was launched in the United States to secure domestic support for the fall 2007 escalation—or “surge”—of U.S. forces in Iraq (Wells, 2007).Effectiveness of Military Influence CampaignsDoes military influence work? The simple answer, at least when looking at PSYOP which targets a specific battlefield, or “Tactical PSYOP,” is yes. Certainly, trying to precipitate specific behavior change by modifying attitudes first, as PSYOP often does, can be difficult. And measuring the impact of an influence attempt in a battle zone, where multiple variables beyond the control of an influence practitioner are at play, is no easy task, either (Lamb, 2005a; Seese & Smith, 2008). Still, U.S. Tactical PSYOP has documented success in recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, facilitating high rates of enemy troop surrender during the initial phases of invasion (Lamb, 2005a) and reducing civilian casualties both during and after initial combat operations and (Dunbar, 2009; Lamb, 2005a).The success of SC and IO’s Strategic PSYOP, the broad perception management initiatives aimed at foreign and, in the case of SC, domestic populations, is far more questionable—and even harder to measure (Jones et al., 2009; Lamb, 2005a; Shanker & Hertling, 2009). There is documentation that some recent U.S. military-coordinated perception campaigns (campaigns run in concert with the Bush Administration) were successful in the short run, at least with the U.S. domestic population: A large majority of Americans initially supported the U.S. invasion of Iraq (Stevenson & Elder, 2004), basing their support on heavily promoted, though erroneous, assertions (1) that Al Qaeda had ties to Iraq, (2) that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, or (3) that world opinion backed the U.S. invasion (Brewer, 2009).When considering the potential for information operations’ success, both military and civilian writers (Brewer, 2009; Goldstein, 2008; Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006; Murphy & White, 2007; Pratkanis & Aronson, 2001; Simpson, 1994; Sproule, 1997; Taylor, 2003;) point to the success of military information campaigns in WWI and WWII. The recent military information operation in Bosnia, coordinated by United Nations troops, is also regarded as an example of an effective initiative (Taylor, 2003).Beyond this, U.S. military perception management specialists are convinced that modern enemy information campaigns have been so successful that they have tipped the balance in recent conflict, successfully frustrating U.S. and allied forces (Collings & Rohozinski, 2008; Murphy, 2010; Seib, 2008). For instance, it has been argued that optimal management of satellite television, Internet-based media, and journalist access to information thwarted Israeli Defense Force (IDF) activity in Lebanon in 2006 (Caldwell et al., 2009). And Al Qaeda, many believe, continues to be a formidable foe, not because of military resources, but as a result of their highly coordinated global media campaign (Kilcullen, in Packer, 2006; Seib, 2008).In contrast, almost all military literature describes the U.S. Army’s Iraq and Afghanistan-related perception management campaigns as falling short (de Czege, 2008; Goldstein, 2008; Jones et al., 2009; Richter, 2009). Some military officers cite this failure as evidence that policy and action, not mass persuasion, win a war (Mullen, 2009). But many military analysts insist that lack of success in perception management only underscores the need to do it better (Collings & Rohozinski, 2008; Goldstein, 2008; Richter, 2009).What is clear is that IO and SC are firmly established in Department of Defense doctrine and budget and are significantly supported by defense contractors. It does not seem likely that either initiative will fade away soon.Conclusion: Questions for Civilian ScholarsEfforts to leverage the power of social influence in war, whether through deception, persuasion, creation of fear, shaping available information, or even shaping the information environment, are as old as war itself. And the contributions of influence scholars to U.S. war efforts to shape the perceptions, emotions, attitudes, and behaviors in domestic, enemy, allied, and neutral populations date from WWII (Hoffman, 1992; Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006; Lee, 1986; Simpson, 1994; Sproule, 1997).In a very significant way, therefore, IO and SC reflect the continuation of a long tradition. They also resurrect long-standing questions—first propelled by Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI) associates and by the 1930s Institute for Propaganda Analysis contributors—about the proper relationship between science and war and about the role of mass persuasion in American democracy (Lee, 1986; Sproule, 1997). Is it our patriotic duty to assist our nation’s war effort? If so, how should we help? Is our first obligation to protect the integrity of science? Should our clearest commitment, in any foray into public policy, be to the health of democracy?But these questions take on new urgency, maybe even a new shape, in a modern world transformed by globalization, rapidly changing information technologies, a media environment saturated by ever-more sophisticated persuasion campaigns, and the U.S. military’s embrace of influence as a primary weapon of war. When foreign and domestic audiences cannot be demarcated, is military mass persuasion in a democratic society significantly more problematic? Are psychologists’ ethical problems increased as our power to transform behavior expands?

Page 12

The American Psychological Association’s (2002) ethical guidelines for psychologists underscore our obligation to use psychological knowledge to improve the condition of society. We are charged to correct any misuse of the application of knowledge we produce. We must “take care to do no harm” (American Psychological Association, 2002, p. 3) and psychologists, particularly those associated with SPSSI, have a long history of devotion to fostering democratic process (Allport, 1955; Lanning, 2008; Lewin, 1992, Pratkanis & Aronson, 2001). We can identify the general principles of our ethical obligations. And we are committed to them. The devil, of course, is in the details—the topics and application of our research, along with the choices we make about advocacy in the public sphere.The Relationship between Science and War: Assisting the War EffortScientists who join the effort to assist the U.S. government in waging war follow a much-honored tradition. Prominent social scientists who joined U.S. government and military efforts during World War II—including Carl Hovland, Kurt Lewin, Rensis Likert, and many more (Lee, 1986; Simpson, 1994; Sproule, 1997)—were convinced that their participation was warranted and that their efforts would be beneficial both to the nation and to the development of social science. Opposition to fascism, in general, and Hitler’s genocidal regime, in particular, seemed—both then as now—a clear moral imperative.The “justness” of recent U.S. wars has been more controversial. Still, psychology in the service of national security (Kennedy & Zillmer, 2006; Mangelsdorff, 2006) is regarded by many as both honorable and important. The question for some, then, is not if service to the military is appropriate, but, rather, what sort of service is consistent with psychologists’ ethical concerns. Recent debate about the role of psychologists in military torture exemplified this point (Costanzo, Gerrity, & Lykes, 2007; Suedfel, 2007; Zimbardo, 2007).Assisting with Tactical PSYOP, at least from some traditional vantage points, would be consistent with psychologists’ ethical obligations: Tactical PSYOP has fairly straightforward goals of abbreviating conflict, reducing casualties, and increasing cooperation with the U.S. military among the population in a small geographic area.The ethicality of Strategic PYSOP and SC, as now employed, is more opaque. In contrast to Tactical PSYOP, Strategic PSYOP and SC introduce clear costs in concert with any advantage they might offer. These broad-based military perception management initiatives, argue some, have the potential to endanger both science and democracy.The Relationship between Science and War: Endangering ScienceIt is possible that any association with global PSYOP and SC poses a risk for academics who study influence. Lasswell (1970) charged that the long-term connections between social science and war have been costly for both science and society. In his 1969 address to the American Psychological Association, Lasswell argued that the social sciences’ continuing service to the “the institutions of war and oligarchy” (Lasswell, 1970, p. 117) has been both ethically and practically dangerous. The allegiance, he said, has done little to help the commonwealth. Social science could have been devoted to enhancing the dignity of average individuals. But, instead, “more men are manipulated without their consent for more purposes, by more techniques by fewer men than at any time in history” (Lasswell, 1970, p. 119). In addition, Lasswell (1970) believed that the general public will eventually recognize that science rarely works on their behalf. And to whatever degree science is distrusted by the general population, its potential for influence becomes ever-more limited.The Relationship between Propaganda and DemocracyU.S. military Strategic PSYOP and SC—both aimed at global populations, reliant on mass communication, and, at the extreme, geared toward domination of global media—raise anew another discussion once prominent in the past: a debate about the relationship between mass persuasion and the health of democracy. There are a number of key questions inherent in this debate: What responsibility does science have to American democracy? Do some applications of science help build—or help weaken—democratic “character”? “What are the implications of a fully matured social science for individual human freedom and for democracy?” (Vallance, 1972, p. 112).Debate among social scientists, including those in SPSSI and in the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, about these questions was most vital in the decades between WWI and WWII, as technologies of mass persuasion, including radio, were beginning to take hold. The scientists’ concern about the impact of propaganda also came in the wake of the infamous, and successful, WWI Creel Committee, the coordinator of U.S. government propaganda widely criticized for its use of blatantly false information and highly effective compliance-gaining techniques to help draw the United States into a world war (Simpson, 1994; Sproule, 1997).According to Sproule (1997), those who have weighed in on questions concerning the relationship between mass persuasion and democracy have generally fallen into one of the two camps: (1) proponents of a “managed democracy,” who characterize propaganda as an essential tool used by elites to shape the behavior of the larger population in ways consistent with the national interest and (2) propaganda critics, who regard reliance on propaganda as antithetical to democratic process.

Page 13

Proponents of “managed democracy,” or “social engineering,” says Sproule (1997), put forth the argument that elites, perhaps even scientists, should determine the goals of a society, as well as the optimal behaviors for individual citizens. The job of influence scholars, these advocates believed, was to persuade people, using nonviolent means, to behave in the desired ways (Sproule, 1997). For proponents of managed democracies, neither psychological freedom nor participatory democracy are seen as particularly important concerns (Bernays, 2005; Cone, 2004; Lee, 1986; Sproule, 1997).Propaganda critics have offered a variety of arguments in reply (Cone, 2004; Lee, 1950; Sproule, 1997). Some have worried about the degradation of democratic political process in the absence of access to accurate, in-depth information; others have expressed concern about the lack of opportunity for reasoned analysis of persuasive messages (Cone, 2004; Lee, 1950; Miller, 1938; Pratkanis, 2001; Pratkanis & Turner, 1996; Sproule, 1997). Still others have argued that “propaganda for democracy” is simply a contradiction in terms, because pervasive propaganda inevitably shapes totalitarian, rather than democratic, psychological process. “With the help of propaganda, one can do almost anything, but certainly not create the behavior of a free man” (Ellul, 1973, p. 256). The job of influence scholars, say (the hopeful) propaganda critics, is to find ways to insulate, or inoculate, citizens from propaganda’s damaging effects.A small contingent of social science writers has, in the decades since WWII, worked to draw attention to the impact and potential danger of mass persuasion (Brady, 2009; Curnalia, 2005; Hoffman, 1992; Kipnis, 1994; Lee, 1950; Pratkanis & Aronson, 2001; Pratkanis & Turner, 1996; Simpson, 1994; Vallance, 1972). But the social science-based anti-propaganda critique in modern times is nearly invisible in contrast to years past. McCarthy-era investigations of social scientists associated with the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, along with Cold War-era suspicion of any who did not support the U.S. battle against Communism, helped derail the social science critique of propaganda. The establishment of the discipline of Communications, along with the Department of Defense’s investment in mass persuasion research, further marginalized academic criticism of mass perception management (Cone 2004; Hoffman, 1992; Lee, 1986; Simpson, 1994; Sproule, 1997). After WWII, few scientists devoted attention to protecting citizens from propaganda; far more spent their time trying to figure out how to make mass persuasion work.Engaging the debate. Americans are now faced with coordinated, extensive, U.S. military and enemy-sponsored influence campaigns surely equal to, and probably greater than, those associated with WWII. Modern U.S. information warriors believe that the need to establish information dominance is now central to “the American way of war” (Lamb, 2005b; p. 88). But civilian scholarly engagement in the study of Joint Force influence initiatives has not yet begun to mirror the level of importance that the U.S. military assigns to “perception wars.” This omission will certainly limit our understanding of the military’s application of basic scientific findings. And it leaves us oblivious to any related cost to social science that such application brings. Perhaps most importantly, our inattention to military influence operations is likely to limit significantly our ability to help shape the role of influence in modern war—and, as a consequence, in democracy.Robert Oppenheimer (1956) once observed that both physics and psychology have developed technologies that pose a threat to modern society. Psychology’s capacity for the control of human behavior, he argued, was probably the more dangerous of the two. As the impact of scientific knowledge on human destiny grows, said Oppenheimer (1956), with it grows the responsibility of scientists to explicate, explain, communicate and teach (p. 128) about the implications of its use. IO and SC seem to exemplify his point. But Kipnis (1994) argued that psychology’s capacity for individual influence demands more than increased education. He insisted that such power requires that psychologists engage with greater determination than ever before in the debate that has shadowed Psychology since its inception: Who should psychology be for? What groups or goals should our now effective behavioral technologies serve?Our primary ethical obligation with regard to IO and SC is that of asking questions and provoking debate. It is past time for psychologists to consider again the costs as well as the benefits of military influence.ReferencesAllport, G. (1955). Becoming: Basic considerations for a psychology of personality. New Haven , CT : Yale University Press. Altheide, D., & Grimes, J. (2005). War programming: The propaganda project and the Iraq War. The Sociological Quarterly, 46, 617–643. Direct Link:AbstractFull Article (HTML)PDF(177K)ReferencesAmerican Psychological Association. (2002). Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code Of Conduct. Retrieved December 28, 2009, from http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx. Armistead, E. L. (Ed.). (2004). Information operations: Warfare and the hard reality of soft power. Washington , DC : Brassey's, Inc. Armistead, E. L. (Ed.). (2007). Information warfare: Separating hype from reality. Washington , DC : Potomac Books. Baker, J. (2007, September-October). Medical diplomacy in full-spectrum operations. Military Review, 87(5), 67–73. Baker, R. (2006, May-June). The decisive weapon: A brigade combat team commander's perspective on Information Operations. Military Review, 86(3), 2–12. Bamford, J. (2005, December 1). The man who sold the war: Meet John Rendon, Bush's general in the propaganda war. Rolling Stone, 53–62. Barnes, J. (2008, July 7). Calling the shots on war movies. Los Angeles Times, A-1.

Page 14

Barstow, D. (2008, April 20). Behind TV analysts, Pentagon's hidden hand. [Electronic version]. New York Times. Retrieved May 1, 2008, from http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/washington/20generals.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. Bernays, E. (2005). Propaganda. Brooklyn : IG Publishing. (Original work published 1928).Boyd, C. D. (2007, May-June). Army IO is PSYOP: Influencing more with less. Military Review, 87(3), 67–75. Brady, A. (2009). Mass persuasion as a means of legitimation and China's popular authoritarianism. American Behavioral Scientist, 53(3), 2009. CrossRef,Web of Science® Times Cited: 1Brewer, S. (2009). Why America fights: Patriotism and war propaganda from the Philippines to Iraq. New York : Oxford University Press. Caldwell, W., Murphy, D., & Menning, A. (2009, May-June). Learning to leverage new media. Military Review, 89(3), 2–10. Chinni, D. (2007, May 11). The military's Iraq channel on YouTube. [Electronic Version]. Pew Research Center: Project for Excellence in Journalism: Understanding media in the Information Age. Retrieved June 20, 2007, from http://www.journalism.org/node/5553. Cialdini, R. (2004). Influence: Science and practice (4th ed.). Boston, MA : Allyn and Bacon. Cialdini, R., Demaine, L., Sagarin, B., Barrett, D., Rhoads, K., & Winter, P. (2006). Managing social norms for persuasive impact. Social Influence, 1(1), 3–15. CrossRefClaessen, E. (2007, May-June). Discouraging hearts and minds: Democracies and insurgencies. Military Review, 87(3), 97–103. Collings, D., & Rohozinski, R. (2008). Bullets and blogs: New media and the warfighter [Electronic version]. Carlisle , PA : U.S. Army War College Workshop Report. Retrieved December 1, 2009, from http://www.csl.army.mil/usacsl/publications/Bullets_Blogs_new_Media_warfighterWeb_20_Oct_09.pdf. Collins, S. (2003, Summer). Mind games. NATO Review, 13–16. Retrieved January 25, 2007, from http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue2/english/art4.html. Cone, S. (2004, Fall). Democratic morality and the freedom academy debate: A conflict about institutionalizing propaganda in America, 1954–1968. American Journalism, 21(4), 13–38. Costanzo, M., Gerrity, E., & Lykes, M. (2007). Psychologists and the use of torture in interrogations. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 7(1), 7–20. Cox, J. (2006, March 25). Information operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom: What went wrong? Leavenworth , KS : U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Crawley, J. (2005, June 10). Psychological warfare effort to be outsourced: Army command hires three firms to sway Afghans and Iraqis. Richmond Times. Retrieved December 26, 2006, from http://www.timesdispatch.com website. Curnalia, R. (2005, October). A retrospective on early studies of propaganda and suggestions for reviving the paradigm. The Review of Communication, 5(4), 237–257. CrossRefDarley, W. (2007). The missing component of U.S. strategic communications. Joint Force Quarterly, 47, 109–113. De Czege, H. (2008). Rethinking IO: Complex operations in the information age. Military Review, 88(6), 14–26. Defense Science Board (DSB) (2000, May). Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the creation and dissemination of all forms of information in support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in time of military conflict [Electronic version]. Washington , DC : Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Retrieved November 1, 2006, from http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/psyop.pdf. Defense Science Board (DSB) (2008, January). Report of the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication [Electronic version]. Washington , DC : Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Retrieved June 14, 2008, from http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2008-01-Strategic_Communication.pdf. Department of Defense (2000, June). Joint vision 2020 [Electronic version]. Washington , DC : U.S. Government Printing Office. Retrieved October 14, 2006, from http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jvpub2.htm. Department of Defense (2003, October 30). Information operations roadmap. [Electronic version]. Washington , DC : U.S. Government Printing Office. Retrieved August 26, 2006, from http://www.information-retrieval.info/docs/info_ops_roadmap.pdf. Department of Defense (2006, February 13). Joint Publication 3–13: Information operations [Electronic version]. Washington , DC : Joint Staff. Retrieved June 6, 2006, from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf. Department of Defense (2006, September). Quadrennial defense review strategic communication execution roadmap [Electronic version]. Washington , DC : U.S. Government Printing Office. Retrieved June 17, 2007, from https://akss.dau.mil/Documents/Policy/OSD-2013697-06.pdf. Department of Defense (2009, October 5). Joint Publication 3–24: Counterinsurgency operations. [Electronic Version]. Washington , DC : Joint Staff . Retrieved March 5, 2010, from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/doctrine.htm. Department of Defense (2010, January 7). Joint Publication 3–13.2. Doctrine for joint psychological operations. [Electronic version]. Washington , DC : Joint Staff. Retrieved March 6, 2010, from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13_2.pdf. Dotinga, R. (2005, April 25). Military channel reports for duty. The Christian Science Monitor, 97 (105), p. 11. Retrieved December 15, 2006, from http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0425/p11s01-usmi.html. Dunbar, R. (2009, Winter). Achieving irreversible momentum. IOSPHERE , Journal of the Joint Information Operations Center, 8–13. DVIDS: Digital Video & Imagery Distribution System [Website]: http://www.dvidshub.net/index.php. Eder, M. K. (2007, July-August). Toward strategic communication. Military Review, 87(4), 61–70. Ellul, J. (1973). Propaganda: The formation of men's attitudes. New York : Vintage Books. Web of Science® Times Cited: 1Emery, N., Werchan, J., & Mowles, D. (2005, January-February). Fighting terrorism and insurgency: Shaping the information environment. Military Review, 85(1), 32–38. Freeburg, J., & Todd, J. (2004 November-December). The 101st Airborne Division in Iraq: Televising freedom. Military Review, 84(6), 39–41. Gates, R. (2008, January-February). Beyond guns and steel: Reviving the nonmilitary instruments of American power. Military Review, 88(1), 2–9. Goldstein, C. (2008). A strategic failure: American information control policy in occupied Iraq. Military Review, 88(2), 58–65. Gray, C. (2005, Spring). How has war changed since the end of the Cold War Parameters, 35(1), 14–26. Halloran, R. (2007, Fall). Strategic communication. Parameters, 37(3), 4–14. Hames, J. (2009) The “reel Army.” WWW.ARMY.MIL: The Official Homepage of the United States Army. Retrieved January 2, 2009, from http://www.army.mil/news/2009/11/24/30905-the-reel-army/. Hammes, T. (2007, May-June). Fourth generation warfare evolves, fifth emerges. Military Review, 87(3), 14–23. Harris, S. (2004, April 7). Voices of America: Two U.S. government-run TV networks are fighting to win over Iraqi viewers. Retrieved December 24, 2006, from http://www.govexec.com/features/0404-1/0404-1newsanalysis5.htm. Hemming, J. (2008, November 29). Press and Psy-Ops to merge at NATO Afghan HQ [Electronic version]. Reuters, Retrieved January 3, 2009 from http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE4AS0ZV20081129. Hendricks, B. Wenner, & Weaver, W. (2010, May). DIME is for integration: Strategic communications as an integrator of national power. IO Journal, 2(2), 36–39.

Page 15

Henry, R., & Peartree, C. (1998, Autumn). Military theory and information warfare. Parameters, 28(3), 121–135. Hoffman, L. (1992). American psychologists and wartime research on Germany. American Psychologist, 47(2), 263–273. CrossRef,Web of Science® Times Cited: 1Hubbard, Z. (2007). Information Operations in the global war on terror: Lessons learned from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In E.L.Armistead (Ed.), Information warfare: Separating hype from reality (pp. 45–72). Washington , DC : Potomac Books. Jones, J. (2005). Strategic communication: A mandate for the United States. Joint Force Quarterly, 39(4), 108–114. Jones, J., Kuehl, D., Burgess, D., & Rochte, R. (2009). Strategic communication and the combatant commander. Joint Force Quarterly, 55(4), 104–108. Jowett, G., & O’Donnell, V. (2006). Propaganda and persuasion (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks , CA : Sage Publications. Julian, G. (2007). Transforming the Department of Defense strategic communication. In D.Murphy, J.Groh, D.Smith, & C.Ayers (Eds.), Information as power: An anthology of U.S. Army War College student papers (pp. 53–58). Vol. 1. Carlisle , PA : U.S. Army War College. Retrieved June 14, 2008, from http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/publications/InfoAsPowerTOC.pdf. Keeton, P., & McCann, M. (2005, November-December). Information Operations, STRATCOM, and Public Affairs. Military Review, 85(6), 83–86. Kennedy, C., & Zillmer, E. (2006). Military psychology: Clinical and operational applications. New York : Guilford Press. Kilcullen, D. (2007). New paradigms for the 21st century. eJournal USA, 12(5), 39–45. Retrieved January 15, 2008, from http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0507/ijpe/kilcullen.htm. Kipnis, D. (1994). Accounting for the use of behavior technologies in social psychology. American Psychologist, 49(3), 165–172. CrossRef,Web of Science® Times Cited: 14Kuehl, D. (2004). Forward. In E. L.Armistead (Ed.), Information operations: Warfare and the hard reality of soft power (pp. xvii–xviii). Washington , DC : Brassey's, Inc. Kuehl, D., & Armistead, L. (2007). Information operations: The policy and organizational evaluation. In E. L.Armistead (Ed.), Information warfare: Separating hype from reality (pp. 5–25). Washington , DC : Potomac Books. Lamb, C. (2005a). Review of psychological lessons learned from recent experience. Washington , DC : National Defense University Press. Retrieved October 25, 2006, from http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/lamb.pdf. Lamb, C. (2005b). Information operations as a core competency. Joint Force Quarterly, 36, 88–96. Lanning. (2008). Democracy, voting, and disenfranchisement in the United States: A social psychological perspective. Journal of Social Issues, 64(3), 431–446. Direct Link:AbstractFull Article (HTML)PDF(106K)ReferencesLasswell, H. (1970, Feb). Must science serve political power American Psychologist, 25(2), 117–123. CrossRef,Web of Science® Times Cited: 21Lee, A. (1950). Can the individual protect himself against propaganda not in his interest Social Forces, 29, 56–61. CrossRefLee, A. (1986). Depression, war, SPSSI, and SSSP. Journal of Social Issues. 42(4), 61–69. Direct Link:AbstractPDF(487K)ReferencesLewin, M. (1992). The impact of Kurt Lewin's life on the place of social issues in his work. Journal of Social Issues, 48(2), 15–29. Direct Link:AbstractPDF(880K)ReferencesLudowese, J. (2006, March).Strategic communication: Who should lead the long war of ideas? Carlisle , PA : United States Army War College Research Project. Retrieved June 30, 2007, from http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/ksil408.pdf. Malone, J., & Armistead, L. (2007). Speaking out of both sides of your mouth: Approaches to perception management in Washington, D.C. and Canberra. In E. L.Armistead (Ed.), Information warfare: Separating hype from reality (pp. 139–151). Washington , DC : Potomac Books. Mangelsdorff, D. (2006). Psychology in the service of national security (1st ed.). Washington , DC : American Psychological Association. CrossRefMarx, W. (2006). Misinformation intern: My summer as a military propagandist in Iraq. Harper's Magazine, 313, 51–59. Mazzetti, M. (2004, December 1). PR meets Psy-Ops in war on terror. Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles , CA , p. A-1. Retrieved January 3, 2009, from Proquest database. Media Matters for America (2008, May 13). Military analysts named in Times exposé appeared or were quoted more than 4,500 times on broadcast nets, cables, NPR [Electronic version ]. Retrieved December 27, 2009, from http://mediamatters.org/research/200805130001. Metz, S., & Kievit, J. (1995). Strategy and the revolution in military affairs: From theory to policy. Report from the Strategic Studies Institute. Retrieved August 25, 2007, from http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=236. Metz, T., Garrett, M., Hutton, J., & Bush, T. (2006, May-June). Massing effects in the information domain: A case study in aggressive Information Operations. Military Review, 86(3), 2–12. Miller, C. (19371938). Preface. In Propaganda analysis: Volume 1 of Publications of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis (pp. iii–v). New York : Gordon Press. Miller, D. (2004). Information dominance: The philosophy of total propaganda control? In Y.Kamalipour & N.Snow (Eds.) War, media, and propaganda (pp. 7–16). New York : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.Mullen, M. (2009). Strategic communication: Getting back to basics. Joint Force Quarterly, 55, 2–4. Murphy, D. (2007, December). Strategic communication. In U.S. Army War College, Information Operations Primer—AY 08 Edition (pp. 9–13). Carlisle , PA : Department of Strategy, Planning, & Military Leadership. Murphy, D. (2010, May-June). Attack or defend? Levering information and balancing risk in cyberspace. Military Review, 88–96. Murphy, D., & White, J. (2007, Autumn). Propaganda: Can a word decide a war Parameters, 37(3), 15–27. Nagl, J., & Yingling, P. (2006, October). New rules for enemies. [Electronic version]. Armed Forces Journal. Retrieved February 26, 2008, from http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/10/2088425. Office of the Secretary of Defense (2007). Fiscal year (FY) 2008/FY 2009 budget estimates (pp. 657;659) [Electronic version.]. Washington , DC : Department of Defense. Retrieved June 22, 2007, from http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_PARTS/23_OSD.pdf. Oppenheimer, R. (1956). Analogy in science. American Psychologist, 11(3), 127–135. CrossRef,Web of Science® Times Cited: 113Paschall, J. (2005, July-August). IO for Joe: Applying strategic IO at the tactical level. [Electronic version]. Field Artillery. Retrieved March 4, 2007, from http://sill-www.army.mil/FAMAG/2005/JUL_AUG_2005/PAGES25_29.pdf. Packer, G. (2006, December 18). Knowing the enemy: A reporter at large [Electronic version. The New Yorker, December 18. Retrieved December 26, 2006, from http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/12/18/061218fa_fact2. Payne, K. (2005, Spring). The media as an instrument of war. Parameters, 35(1), 81–93. Petty, R., & Cacioppo, J. (1986). Communication and persuasion: Central and peripheral routes to attitude change. New York : Springer-Verlag. Post, J. (2005). Psychological Operations and counter-terrorism. Joint Force Quarterly, 37, 105–110.

Page 16

Pratkanis, A. (2001). Propaganda and deliberative persuasion: The implications of Americanized mass media for established and emerging democracies. In W.Wosinska, R.Cialdini, D.Barrett, & J.Reykowski (Eds.), The practice of social influence in multiple cultures (pp. 259–284). Mahwah, New Jersey : Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Pratkanis, A., & Aronson, E. (2001). Age of propaganda: Everyday use and abuse of persuasion (Rev. Ed.). New York : W. H. Freeman and Company. Web of Science® Times Cited: 2Pratkanis, A., & Turner, M. (1996). Persuasion and democracy: Strategies for increasing deliberative participation and enacting social change. Journal of Social Issues, 52(1), 187–205. Direct Link:AbstractPDF(1111K)ReferencesPryor, M. (2005, September 21). U.S. troops help launch Afghan radio station. Defend America: U.S. Department of Defense news about the war on terrorism. Retrieved December 27, 2006, from http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/sep2005/a092105tj2.html. Psywarrior [Website]. Operation Enduring Freedom: Leaflets dropped over Afghanistan. Documents AFDDG1; AFDDG2. Retrieved February 3, 2008, from psywarrior.com: http://psywarrior.com/Afghanleaflinks.html. Psywarrior [Website]: Operation Iraqi Freedom: Leaflets dropped over Iraq, 20022003. Document IZD-050; IAD-057; IZD 0330. Retrieved February 3, 2008, from psywarrior.com http://psywarrior.com/Iraqleaflinks.html. Reed, C. (2009, August 24). Journalists’ recent work examined before embeds [Electronic version]. Stars and stripes, Retrieved December 30, 2009, from=104&article=64348.Reed, C., Baron, K., & Shane, L. (2009, August 29). Files prove Pentagon is profiling reporters [Electronic version]. Stars and Stripes, Retrieved December 30, 2009, from http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=64401. Richter, W. (2009, January-February). The future of information operations. Military Review, 89(1), 103–113. Ricks, T. (2006). U.S. military plays up role of Zarqawi: Jordanian painted as foreign threat to Iraq's stability. The Washington Post. (Final ed.) Washington , DC : April 10, p. A01. Retrieved from Proquest database. Roberts, M. E. (2005). Villages of the moon: Psychological operations in southern Afghanistan. Baltimore, MD : PublishAmerica. Rohm, F. (2008, January-February). Information operations and psychological operations, Military Review, 88(1), 108–111. Scales, R. (2006, July). Clausewitz and World War IV. Armed Forces Journal, 16–24, 48. Scanlon, J. (2007, May-June). Truth in defense of public affairs doctrine. Military Review, 87(3), 92–96. Schulman, D. (2006, May-June). Mind games. Columbia Journalism Review. Retrieved August 2, 2006, from CJR archive http://cjrarchives.org/issues/2006/3/schulman.asp. Seese, G., & Smith, P. (2008, November-December). Measuring PSYOP effectiveness. Special Warfare, 21(6), 31–34. Seib, P. (2008, May-June). The Al-Qaeda media machine. Military Review, 88(3), 74–80. Shanker, T., & Hertling, M. (2009, September-October). The military-media relationship: A dysfunctional marriage Military Review, 89(5), 2–9. Shou, C., Kuehl, D., & Armistead, L. (2007). Information Operations education: Lessons learned from information assurance. In E. L.Armistead (Ed.), Information warfare: Separating hype from reality (pp. 95–108). Washington , DC : Potomac Books. Sieminski, G. (1995, Fall). The art of naming operations [Electronic version]. Parameters. Retrieved October 25, 2006 from http://www.carlisle.army.mil. Silverberg, D., & Heimann, J. (2009, Summer). An ever-expanding war: Legal aspects of online strategic communication. Parameters, 39(20), 77–93. Silverstein, K. (2007, July 16). Meet the Pentagon's new spin unit: Bush administration hacks court bloggers, talk radio [Electronic version]. Harper's Magazine. Retrieved July 20, 2007, from http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/07/hbc-90000539. Simpson, C. (1994). The science of coercion: Communication research and psychological warfare 1945–1960. New York : Oxford University Press. Sproule, J. M. (1997). Propaganda and democracy: The American experience of media and mass persuasion. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Steele, R. (2006, February). Information operations: Putting the “I” back into DIME. Carlisle , PA : U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute . Retrieved August 20, 2007, from http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?PubID=642. Stevenson, R., & Elder, J. (2004, April 29). Support for war is down sharply, poll concludes [Electronic version]. New York Times. Retrieved July 25, 2008, from http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/29/politics/29POLL.html?pagewanted=print. Suedfel, P. (2007). Torture, interrogation, security, and psychology: Absolutistic versus complex thinking. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 7(1), 55–63. Taylor, P. (2002). Strategic communications or democratic propaganda Journalism Studies, 3(3), 437–452. CrossRefTaylor, P. M. (2003). Munitions of the mind. Manchester, NH : Manchester University Press. United States Army (1994, May 5). Field manual 33-1-1. Psychological operations techniques and procedures [Electronic version]. Department of the Army . Briefly available on the Web, July, 2007. United States Army (2005, April). Field Manual 3-05.30 (FM 3-.05.30). Psychological Operations [Electronic version]. Department of the Army . Retrieved August 16, 2008, from http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-30.pdf. United States Army. (2007, January 12). General Orders Number 30: Establishment of the United States Army Psychological Operations Branch [Electronic version ]. Retrieved April 18, 2007, from http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/go0630.pdf. United States Army (2008, February). Field manual 3–0 (FM 3–0). Operations [Electronic Version ]. Retrieved July 28, 2008, from http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/Materials/FM3-0(FEB%202008).pdf. U.S. Army to produce Mid-East comic: The U.S. military is planning to win the hearts of young people in the Middle East by publishing a new comic (2005, March 31). BBC News. Retrieved December 15, 2006, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4396351.stmVallance, T. (1972). Social science and social policy: Amoral methodology in a matrix of values. American Psychologist, 27(2), 107–113. CrossRef,Web of Science® Times Cited: 9Wells, L. (2007, July 11). Statement before the House Armed Services Committee Sub-Committee on Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, p. 4, note 6. Retrieved August 15, 2007, from http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTC071107/WellsTestimony071107.pdf. Zewe, C. (2004, Fall). ‘Infoganda’ in Uniform: The Bush Administration creates media outlets to tell its story. Nieman Reports, 79–80. Zimbardo, P. (2007). Thoughts on psychologists, ethics, and the use of torture in interrogations: Don't ignore varying roles and complexities. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 7(1), 65–73. Zucchino, D. (2004, July 3). Army stage-managed fall of Hussein statue. Retrieved December 26, 2006, from http://www.commondreams.org website.Table of Contents

Page 17

Experts Skeptical On New Iran "Cyber Attack" ClaimBy Peter Apps and Georgina Prodhan, Reuters May 6, 2011 LONDON - More than a week after Iran said it had been the victim of another cyber attack by its enemies, foreign computer experts say they have seen no evidence, and some doubt its existence.On April 25, the commander of Iran’s civil defence agency, Gholamreza Jalali, told the semi-official Mehr news agency that experts were probing a virus they called “Stars”, but gave no details of its apparent target or intended impact.Last year, Iran said computers at its first nuclear plant had been infected with the Stuxnet computer worm, widely believed to have been designed by a foreign intelligence agency to attack its nuclear program. Stuxnet - believed to work by corrupting the plant’s industrial processes to cause physical damage - spread around the world, allowing computer experts to analyse it and close programming holes to halt its spread.In contrast, no one at any of the range of anti-virus firms, technology consultancies and think tanks contacted by Reuters had any further details of “Stars”.“Until the Iranians provide some more information or someone else can verify the nature of this apparent new threat, I think I need to remain sceptical,” said John Bassett, associate fellow at Britain’s Royal United Services Institute and former senior official at Britain’s signals intelligence agency GCHQ. “We can’t exclude the possibility of exaggeration or even invention in such claims for domestic political purposes, particularly given the current unrest across the region.”Iran - which crushed widespread protests after disputed elections in 2009 - has proved largely immune to the wave of dissent pressuring governments across the Middle East this year.Iranian leaders have praised uprisings in the Arab world as “the Islamic awakening”, saying that they have been inspired by the 1979 Islamic Revolution that toppled its U.S.-backed shah.But some foreign analysts suspect Iran and potentially in Syria might step up anti-Western and anti-Israeli rhetoric to distract from problems at home and entrench their positions.Iranian officials declined to provide further updated comment on the “stars” attack. RUSI’s Bassett said that if it was genuine, Tehran should swiftly share details to stop it spreading globally and potentially inflicting more damage.Experts said it was possible Iran was overreacting to a conventional computer virus or piece of malware. But it was also possible Iran had simply chosen not to share information.“If it is real or a hoax is impossible to tell,” said Toralv Dirro, security strategist at the anti-virus firm McAfee. “There’s a possibility that they are working with some anti-virus company under a non-disclosure agreement for analysis/remediation, something that is not uncommon.”Even if “stars” was a genuine foreign attack, it might be designed to extract information rather than do physical damage.“It sounds more like cyber espionage than cyber sabotage,” said Mikko Hypponen, chief research officer at security firm F-Secure. “Cyber espionage happens all the time. Cyber sabotage doesn’t.”Gauging the success of the original Stuxnet attack is still far from easy. Iran said at the time it had neutralised the worm before it do any damage, but foreign experts say it probably slowed Tehran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon.No country has claimed responsibility, although in Febuary, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor said cyber warfare offered advanced nations an alternative to “ugly war”. In an age of rolling television news, he said traditional military strikes now had a much higher political cost.Since Stuxnet was unleashed, there has been much less talk of a possible Israeli or U.S. strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, where Western powers believe it is working to develop a nuclear weapon, something Iran vehemently denies.Many states are believed to be working on ever-more sophisticated cyber attack capabilities, but the time and effort required to design a weapon for a single target is considerable.One veteran former government official described it as akin to “handcrafting nuclear weapons” that could become obsolete in a matter of months if left unused, while others say cyber defences are also becoming increasingly effective.“Stuxnet is something that will work brilliantly the first time, less well the second time (and) hardly at all the third,” said Richard Aldrich, professor of international relations at the University of Warwick and a historian of GCHQ. “Maybe Stuxnet and similar forms of attack have already had their day.” Table of Contents

Page 18

Flagship Organization for Joint Operations Sets New CourseBy Beverly T. Schaeffer, SIGNAL Magazine, 5/06/11 The U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) has propelled U.S. military transformation over the past 12 years and is now under its own transition. JFCOM has completed its mission: making interoperability among the forces a reality. Now it must transform itself by devolving from the old and evolving into the new: organizations that are more pertinent to today’s realities.JFCOM’s mission and future are the topic of Maryann Lawlor’s article, “JFCOM Implements Transition Plan,” in this issue of SIGNAL Magazine. Lawlor gleans insight from JFCOM’s commander, Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, USA, as well as from her own years reporting on this combatant command’s journey.Gen. Odierno is applying his tactical expertise—gained while leading U.S. troops in Iraq from combat to sustainment operations—to the huge task of transforming JFCOM into a completely new entity. The general is now directing the implementation stage to ensure a smooth transition.By examining JFCOM’s core functions, the staff is working on ways to judiciously retain jointness over time, as well as to minimize the regional impact of job transitions and losses. The new organization will concentrate on three major areas: joint individual and collective training, joint concept development and joint doctrine development. These will be underpinned by modeling and simulation, as well as some experimentation.The Joint Staff J-7 will lead the new organization, which physically will be located at the existing Joint Warfighting Center. Possible name changes include the “Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center.” The organization will comprise the Training Directorate, Synchronization/Integration Directorate and Joint Development Directorate; personnel in these directorates will meld their work and ideas to facilitate better coordination, according to Gen. Odierno:

I believe this new organization will be more efficient and effective.The general is no stranger to JFCOM or to monumental transitions. He shares that, as the commanding general of U.S. Forces–Iraq, he benefited from many JFCOM-developed capabilities. It assisted in training at the large headquarters in Iraq and developed concepts that had him and his staff seeing the joint environment in different ways. JFCOM also helped guide the shift from counterinsurgency operations to stability operations in Iraq. In addition, it played a major role in introducing the Joint Urban Fires Prototype when U.S. military forces in Iraq were concerned about how to conduct joint fires in an urban environment. JFCOM also helped Gen. Odierno command forces in Iraq that experienced problems with standardization of the U.S. Air Force’s Joint Terminal Attack Controller.Leading JFCOM’s change over the next few months, Gen. Odierno is transforming on the fly. Affected command personnel, scheduled for relocation to Suffolk by March 2012, continue to work diligently on several projects. Earlier this year the command conducted its largest-ever joint training event, the Unified Endeavor 11-2 Operation Enduring Freedom mission rehearsal exercise. JFCOM simultaneously connected the U.S. Army’s Battle Command Training Program, the U.S. Marine Corps’ Air-Ground Task Force Staff Training Program, and NATO’s Joint Force Training Center.The command also will maintain focus on unmanned aerial systems and on information operations through its Information Operations Range. These crucial areas will continue to receive attention and support, Gen. Odierno explains:

We’ve been working this very hard with each combatant command, service, coalition member and our joint team users. Information from events and exercises is shared. Each service, combatant command and coalition partner creates its own set of lessons learned, and then the joint lessons learned analysis team collects this data to review as JFCOM develops new concepts and doctrines moving forward.

Table of Contents

US National Security Information OperationsBy John Stanton, Sri Lanka Guardian, 9 May 2011(May 09, Virginia,) According to the Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare, September 2008, “Information is a strategic resource vital to national security. Dominance of the information environment is a reality that extends to the armed forces of the United States at all levels. Military operations, in particular, are dependent upon many simultaneous and integrated activities that, in turn, depend upon information and information systems, which the United States must protect…With the free flow of information present in all theaters, such as TV, phone, and Internet, conflicting messages can quickly emerge to defeat the intended effects. As a result, continuous synchronization and coordination between Information Operations, Public Affairs, Public Diplomacy, and U.S. allies is imperative. It also helps to ensure that information themes employed during operations involving neutral or friendly populations remain consistent.”

Page 19

In short, the media in all its forms—mass, blog, social, print, electronic, spoken word—is a physical element to be accounted for in national security operations just like the weather or inhospitable geographic terrain. And that means citizen consumers of information are absorbing content from providers who are accounted for and manipulated by national security commanders (civilian and military) in planning and executing operations.Shaping the information environment means targeting the media not with violence but with logrolling techniques, trial balloons, trades/leaks, etc. The main stream media (MSM) is the focus of these efforts as the population/culture largely looks to the MSM for guidance on how to dress, think, travel, eat, listen, watch and speak. The Combatant Commands and the US Department of Defense News Services assist in shaping the consciousness of the nation as well.I Shot Bin Laden, But I Didn’t Shoot the Deputy The National Security Operation approved by US President Barak Obama that ended Osama Bin Laden’s was a gem in terms of Military Information Support Operations (though it should be renamed National Security Information Operations). Planning included meeting with editors of US publications like The New York Times, Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal. CNN and FOX, and select allies, were likely briefed as well. These outlets transmit the voices and thoughts of those who take the country to war, set economic policy, and decide whether a Broadway play succeeds or fails.Even though the original version of the Bin Laden story continues to crumble/change, it was wildly successful in stimulating US nationalism through the media’s constant repetition of the matter. Even Hezbollah’s website Al Manar carried wires stories from AP on Bin Laden’s ignominious demise.But it is far too early for anyone to speculate what the fallout will be from the targeted killing of Bin Laden and the use of the media to exploit his death and humiliate Pakistan. Kristen Eichensehr’s Assassination Policy Under International Law--in the May 2006 issue of Harvard International Review-- cautions against the celebratory madness seen in the USA after Bin Laden’s death. It reminds that retribution against US leaders should not be unexpected.“Publicized US employment of targeted killings in the war on terror made a return to the previous era of credible moral superiority in rhetoric impossible. The preferable alternative to targeted killing of enemies should always be arrest and trial, but in cases where those alternative measures are not available, targeted killing may be the next best alternative. However, careful calculation of the risks and benefits of employing the policy must be weighed before it is implemented. The threat of reciprocity and repercussions for society are serious considerations that are often not given enough weight, and the policy should be re-examined continually to evaluate its effectiveness in decreasing the threat to the employing state's citizens. In some instances, targeted killings are both legal and effective, but for societies founded on principles of human rights, they should never be the first choice.”Higher on the list of tasks for the Navy Seals, than terminating Bin Laden, was to gather information/intelligence from Bin Laden’s hideout that would allow further exploitation and shaping of the domestic and global information terrain; and, hence, public consciousness on matters of national security. Indeed, much appears to have been collected by the pickers on the Navy Seal Teams (designated shooters and pickers of information) in the form of hard drives and other electronic/print media.This has provided the National Security System, led by President Obama, to “do a Wikileaks.” Over the coming months (and years?) bits and bytes of Bin Laden’s operation will be given to, or leaked to, favored media outlets. The Hollywood liaison offices at the Pentagon and elsewhere will be busy working with script writers for the Bin Laden story to further shape the information environment via the movie screen.Cry Havoc! Let Loose the Electrons and Photons of War Like their US counterparts in the national security machinery, The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has similar views on the importance of media exploitation. They are savvy too.“Wars today cannot be won without media. Media is directed to the heart rather than the body. The weapon is directed to the body. If the heart is defeated the battle is won and the body is defeated. In the beginning, with the fall of the Islamic Emirate, the enemy thought that the field was completely open before them, and they spread their lies and falsehoods that they had destroyed the Islamic Emirate and its Mujahideen and that their victory in the land of Afghanistan was complete. All of their resources, especially their media were directed towards changing the ideas of Afghans and injecting defeatist thought into them and instilling in them a petrifying fear of the new occupiers. First through the grace of Allah, subhanahu wa ta'ala, then through the victories of the Mujahideen and their rightly guided leadership; and after defeats were inflicted on the enemy on the field of battle, a media committee was established to contest with the enemy in the (media) field.Among other committees, the Islamic Emirates established a special Media Committee to spread news about Jihadist activities in different fields and chase away the voice of the unjust enemy who, before the entire world, was distorting the image of the Jihad in Afghanistan and was claiming false victories here and there over the Mujahideen. Need called for the existence of a media agency to take responsibility for the Mujahideen in

Page 20

Afghanistan; speaking on behalf of the Islamic Emirate; delivering news of its victories on the battlefield to its friends and to the world; exposing the falsehood of its enemies and their media; responding to the claims and its daily changing deceptions; and delivering to the world the voice of truth and jihad and its point of view about current Jihadist events in the land of Afghanistan.Our website specializes in conveying field reports from the combat zones and publishing the statements of the Ameer ul-Momineen and the statements of the Command Shura Council about different issues pertaining to Jihad, in addition to articles and official analysis. They have many sections: for example there’s an Islam page, a magazines page, and a page for films produced by official studios. We also print magazines and statements and distribute them in popular circles at home and abroad. Additionally, we produce different publications and regulations and distribute them among the Mujahideen. There is also a “Voice of Shari’ah” that broadcasts news and official statements day and night.”Civil and Military Become One, Media a Tool It now seems ridiculous to use the term “military operations” since the lines differentiating civilian and military practice have long since ceased to exist. The only notable difference between civilian and the military is in the clothing; one sports a Brooks Brothers business suit, the other military gear adorned with awards.

At any rate, President Barak Obama implied as much in his National Security Strategy of the USA. As a matter of policy, America has gone “beyond traditional distinctions” indicating that America’s homeland defense, commercial activities and military operations have all fused together to defeat terrorists, drug lords, the black market, et al. The moniker selected for this is “Whole of Government, Whole of Nation” effort which the world will hear more of in the coming months and years.Better now to think of the USA as a National Security System. National Security Operations are conducted on either the strategic or tactical level using any one or all of the USA’s instruments of national power as excellently defined by the US Army’s Unconventional Warfare manual cited above. Those elements of power are diplomatic, information, military, economic, intelligence, law enforcement, and financial.So, where to turn to for the news? How to differentiate between news content of Al Manar (Hezbollah) and the New York Times? How to know whether the Washington Post or Press TV (Iran) has the right angle on the story? The “bad guys” at those publications are carrying items off the AP, Reuters’ wires. They report on floods in the US Midwest like their US counterparts. Al Manar is a huge fan of NBA basketball and LeBron James. And what to make of the reporting style of Xinhua (China) or the Daily Star (Lebanon)?The US Army Special Forces document cited above outlines the dangers of a centralized media. The hazards are real, the battlefield is everywhere now, and the mind, or heart, is the target.Conspiracy Theorists: Take a Hike! Understanding the operation of the National Security System is not hard if one is an educated information consumer, a student of the information terrain cognizant of the doctrines used by those who manipulate and attempt to shape individual and collective thought. Marketers selling soda and beer use techniques that are similar.Before forming opinions based on information provided by the media be it Fox News, Press TV, Al Manar, the Wall Street Journal or the Washington Post, beware the hazards of National Security Operations.Hazards of centralized mass media include the following: 1.) A disproportion of power occurs and disproportionate informational power accrues to those who control centralized mass media; arguably, it is inherently undemocratic. 2.) An inability to transmit tacit knowledge; the context of content presented must either be explicitly explained or is assumed to be understood by the receiver. 3.) An inclination to focus on the unusual and sensational to capture the receivers’ attention, leading to a distortion and trivialization of reality. 4.) The deliberate promotion of emotions such as anxiety, fear, or greed can be used to sell a particular agenda. 5.) An inability to deal with complex issues because of time and economic constraints leads to simplification, further distorting and trivializing reality.Table of Contents

Marines to Add First Dedicated Offensive Cyber Operations Company

By Amanda Palleschi, Inside the Pentagon, 9 May 2011Marine Forces Cyber Command will stand up its first dedicated offensive cyber operations company this October, according to Col. Steve Zotti, the command's chief of staff.

Page 21

The new company -- known as Papa company -- will include 56 Marines dedicated solely to offensive cyber operations. The command is also standing up Lima company, which will include approximately 50 Marines but will not be devoted exclusively to offensive cyber operations.Together these companies will provide computer network exploitation and computer network attack (CNE/CNA) capabilities support to MARFORCYBER.The companies are being established following the Marine Corps' recent force structure review, which called for boosting the Marines cyber forces by an additional 250 Marines -- a 67 percent boost over its current cyber capacities.MARFORCYBER is seeking $10.9 million in its fiscal year 2012 budget to support its labor and operations costs.Zotti said that the boost would come in the areas of defensive global information grid operations, defensive and offensive cyber operations.The "critical shortfalls" in capabilities in the command currently, he said, are "on-net operators and cyber planners.""We need to build cyber planners and people who know how to integrate across ranges and military operations," he said. "The whole spectrum of cyber -- from defense to offense and exploitation activities -- you need people to integrate all of it, put it all together. It's a team sport."Those 250 additional Marines would not be added all at once, he said."You get these Marines phased over years. The 250 don't show up tomorrow. They show up over the next two or three years, all high-demand folks," he said. "We have to grow; we have to train them. You can't pull these key people out of the places they already are."Although greater capabilities are needed, the Marine Corps has been "very lucky" in its ability to recruit those who want to work in the cyber domain, Zotti said.MARFORCYBER "continues to get a good influx of qualified Americans who want to service because of the unique draw for those who want to be Marines. They want to be special and different," he said.But, he said that "the future could change" as far as funding and staffing levels.The Marine Corps also launched a capabilities-based assessment which looks five years into the future of its cyberwarfare requirements to identify gaps and solutions in January. That assessment is on target and slated to be completed this summer, Zotti said.Additional details on the command's 67 percent capabilities boost, including the ramp-up rate and level of investment beyond FY-12 will depend on the outcome of the assessment and pending decisions by Marine Corps leaders.MARFORCYBER command elements are currently sending cyber-planning experts on temporary additional duty to support Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) requirements with the goal of transitioning those responsibilities to billets permanently assigned to the task force, once the force structure review group structure is approved.Table of Contents

Train Like You Fight, Even in CyberspaceBy Rita Boland, SIGNAL Magazine, May 2011The world of ones and zeroes requires partners to learn together before they tackle the bad guys on the grids. Joint and coalition relationships that begin long before forces meet on the field have become a cornerstone of defense policies and officials in the military’s cybersecurity training arena are working to make sure the same holds true in the newest battlespace domain as well. Troops from the various armed forces branches already are attending education courses together, no matter which service sponsors the class, and in some cases coalition partners also are participating. The U.S. Air Force has graduated two soldiers and a Marine from its Information Operations Integration Course (IOIC) at the 39th Information Operations Squadron (IOS). In addition, over a seven-month period, three Royal Australian Air Force officers and one enlisted student, in ranks ranging from corporal to squadron leader, attended. The class focuses on the operational level of cyberwarfare, preparing all students to work together in the joint environment. An Army chief warrant officer also went through a class under the 39th IOS, attending the undergraduate network warfare training. Lt. Col. Brian Denman, USAF, 39th IOS commander, explains that his squadron’s school teaches courses at different levels. Some are tactical in nature and apply to jobs that are Air Force-specific; others, such as the IOIC, focus at the broader, higher level of operations. The officer explains that the integration course trains people who serve on information operations teams in air and space operations centers (AOCs). “That’s a prime

Page 22

place where we collaborate with our coalition partners,” Col. Denman says. He believes it makes sense for individuals from other military organizations to come to the IOIC course where they learn how to work together during real-world missions. The colonel says that cyber capabilities are in great demand, and various entities are pushing to move training forward in different ways.Class participants mirror the personnel makeup generally found in functioning AOCs; mid- to field-grade officers and mid to senior noncommissioned officers are the main categories of students. Col. Denman explains that a staff sergeant is probably the most junior Air Force member who would attend, while the most senior likely would be a lieutenant colonel. Though the military world increasingly relies on joint and coalition partnerships, the arrangements create certain concerns such as security. When course leaders prepare to start a class that contains coalition partners, they have to review their materials for release-related issues. The colonel explains that his organization has brought in some systems that allow it to handle coalition data more easily; on rare occasions, instructors must change what they plan to deliver. “That is by far the exception rather than the rule,” Col. Denman says, adding that they do face limitation issues, but these exist for everyone who works in a coalition environment. While the 39th IOS runs the courses, the Air Combat Command (ACC) serves as the registrar. “All prospective students go through the ACC for course attendance,” Col. Denman explains. The integration operations course and other classes are listed in the Air Force’s security systems catalogue, so non-Air Force personnel interested in attending can choose their class based on syllabus and international agreements. The catalogue specifies who can attend what courses according to established deals among different organizations. These agreements include what information the Air Force can share with specific students. Col. Denman notes that not all countries can send students to attend every course offered. Bringing partner-military troops into the 39th IOS courses began with senior-level dialogue regarding efforts to expand the cyber domain. Air Staff officials and other counterparts who work on international partnering agreements made a decision to open up existing courses for joint and coalition partners. However, overall, courses at the school were developed to provide specific initial or mission qualification training for Air Force positions.Because of the main purpose of the courses, Air Force students are the prime beneficiaries of open seats in any class, and priority is given to their needs and the roles they will assume. Training officials set aside opportunities for other personnel as they are available and when there is interest. Fortunately, priority seating has yet to become an issue. “To my knowledge we’ve never turned away a request” from people representing organizations with standing training agreements in place, Col. Denman says. Usually, decisions come down to logistics regarding how to send non-Air Force personnel to the courses as they become available. Students in the Joint Cyber Analysis Course train for six months, learning how to look at problems in cyberspace, not at specific systems. Though the U.S. Navy serves as the program executive agent for the class, participants come from every military branch, and all the services provide input into its development.The primary operational-level course is the IOIC, popular with the partner students. The majority of the remainder of courses, of which Col. Denman says there is an ever-growing number, is specific training for Air Force roles in Air Force squadrons. “Those just naturally fit into the Air Force role,” he explains, because airmen need to attend the training. Most of the work is advanced learning that either trains supplementary skills or is specifically designated advanced training for the cybercommunity. Other categories include knowledge new to the cybercommunity or recurring training for those moving on to different missions in the cyber and information operations realms. As the Air Force has developed the pipeline of personnel who come to work in the cybermission area, it also has been creating the classes necessary to enable troops to attend to obtain the skills they need at the right time in their careers. Col. Denman says the same paradigm holds true even from a traditional information operations standpoint. People who attend the IOIC are en route to a job at an AOC or a role at a similar level in another place. The students receive “just in time” training before moving on to their new assignments. The effort the Air Force already has put into accommodating joint and coalition students, as well as plans to expand the mutual education, is only a small part of shared cybertraining. Col. Denman shares that his group closely partners with both the Army and the U.S. Navy in all sorts of training activities, such as planning courses for the various services’ schools. The various educators compare notes about how they run classes. Col. Denman says he coordinates with Navy trainers in Florida and Army personnel at Fort Gordon, Georgia. The Air Force sends its personnel to training courses outside of the Air Force as it deems appropriate. To date, he also has shared experiences with counterparts in coalition training establishments, but they have not traded any courseware. Though the exchanges between countries have not yet evolved to that level, Col. Denman states they do certainly share expertise, and coalition partners are moving forward in the cybertraining space as well.

Page 23

Behind all the levels of cooperation is what Col. Denman says may be an overused, but is definitely an applicable, phrase: Train like we fight. All these partners are conducting operations together, and they need to train in that capacity as well. Another significant point he highlights is the global nature of the cyber battlefield. “Risks shared by one are shared by others,” he explains. Because limits in cyberspace lack any type of traditional boundaries, groups must work together to become more secure in their operations. The courses at the 39th IOS help partners operate more effectively when they combine efforts during mission scenarios. Another important partner in this type of battle is industry. Though the colonel knows of no plans to include private-sector students in Air Force courses, the 39th IOS does work with industry to develop the classes because of the tight coupling between industry and the military in the cyber domain.Cyberthreats will remain a problem into the future, and Air Force officials are working to ensure that allies stay connected as well. Col. Denman says his people are collaborating with their partners at Air Staff to determine what courses might be offered in the future that could include more joint and coalition students. Other discussions center around how to create interagency information sharing. Col. Denman believes that, moving forward, more opportunities for the Air Force to work with civilian government agencies will surface. “Partnerships really are what the course sharing is all about,” Col. Denman says. Through the joint training, students can communicate with a common lexicon, improving idea exchange. He explains that joint training gives airmen a greater appreciation for the operations of sister services and coalition nations, which results in benefits in terms of future operations. When they work together in the field, they already have a foundation of understanding. Mutual training also helps build trust among partners, forging relationships to enable the best actions in the field. Conversations between various personnel are another benefit students in a mixed class receive. Though the IOIC is designed to address joint and coalition situations, discussions generated by the presence of non-Air Force personnel enhance the learning experience. Officials plan to continue promoting this type of dialogue and offering training in ways that make sense for everyone involved. Another joint training course, with an even broader interservice mix, is the Joint Cyber Analysis Course (JCAC), for which the U.S. Navy serves as the program executive agent. The class begins almost every two weeks at the Center for Information Dominance Corry Station, Florida. In addition to sailors, warfighters from every branch of the military along with some civilian personnel attend, learning side by side. “We subscribe to the Department of Defense notion that you train joint when you can,” says Lt. Joseph Anderson, USN, cyber and signals intelligence branch officer. He adds that the Navy strives for as much interservice training as possible, with some exceptions that pertain to knowledge that is fleet specific. Lt. Anderson explains that while joint training is almost always a benefit because it exposes students to more ideas and experiences, it is especially valuable for cyberoperations. “It’s not a mission that’s going to fall under the old paradigms. ... The cyberthreat is wide ranging,” he says. “It’s going to affect everyone. If we try to teach it under the old paradigm, we would be wrong.”In the JCAC, instructors focus not on specifics, but on methods and ways to look at a problem. Instead of highlighting particular systems, students learn tools and techniques to overcome adversities. The course is not geared to a Navy mission, but rather for a national one, though differences among the service branches still exist. For example, the Navy sends certain sailors to the course straight out of boot camp, while the other services select only experienced troops at present. Navy officials choose whom to send based on overall Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, or ASVAB, score, and the score from cyber-related questions. The sea service also enrolls in the class seasoned sailors—some from technology fields, some from other jobs—who can help the new personnel learn the ways of the Navy while instructors focus on course material. Because the Navy decides whom to send based on test scores, the JCAC is designed to take even individuals who have minimal computer experience and make them proficient in cyberanalysis within six months. Lt. Anderson says there is no guarantee who will pass; he knows a former Navy cook who went through with flying colors and programmers who failed. “It’s a very challenging course,” the officer explains, adding that everyone anticipates that level of difficulty. When students graduate, they are expected to enter directly into operations and successfully complete their missions. In addition to the joint environment in the class, determining the curriculum is a multiservice experience. Each military branch sends a signatory to represent it to help decide how the course should develop. The individuals meet to voice concerns and ideas. “It’s a really adaptive system that allows us to respond to the changing world and the ever-evolving cyberthreat,” Lt. Anderson explains. He expects to see even more joint classes and training opportunities in the future and says officials already are looking toward the next version of the JCAC.Table of Contents

Page 24

Now showing in Afghanistan: "Why We Are Here"Maura R. O'Connor , Globalpost, May 11, 2011FORWARD OPERATING BASE SALERNO, Afghanistan — In the bottom of a dry, ancient riverbed near a small village in Khost province, a local employee of the U.S. Army presents a battery-powered, handheld DVD player to a crowd of boys and men.They gather around the small screen to watch a movie called “Why We Are Here.”Produced by the U.S. Military Information Support Operations (MISO), traditionally referred to as “PSY-OPS,” the movie describes the events of 9/11, when an “Arabian group called Al Qaeda,” says the narrator in Pashto, flew planes into two “very tall buildings where thousands of people, including Muslims, worked.”Sadly, “Al Qaeda launched these attacks from Afghanistan, where the Taliban supported them.”The film explains that the United States entered Afghanistan to aid the Afghan people in defeating Al Qaeda and its supporters through training the national army and police, and helping the economy so that “people are able to stand on their own feet and believe in themselves.”At the end of the film, the audience is told they have an opportunity to make the right decision for their family and country by supporting the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.“The Taliban claims to be true Muslims, but do true Muslims kill innocent people?” the film asks.Afterward, Sar Fraz, a village elder, was given the DVD player and a handful of other films produced by MISO, some of them showing Taliban bombings and civilian deaths.“I’m going to show the movies to the village,” Fraz said as he held the films.The opportunity to watch movies is rare for the 300 people who live there because, as Fraz explained, there is no electricity for televisions. When asked what he thought about the message of the film, Fraz said, “I know the Taliban does bad things. But I can’t talk about it here,” indicating he couldn’t speak freely in front of the crowd of men surrounding him.In recent months, about 1,200 handheld DVD players have been handed out in Afghan villages and urban areas around eastern Afghanistan, along with movies such as “Why We Are Here.”According to military officials, the campaign, called “Roll the Tape,” was launched in late 2010 because Afghanistan’s high illiteracy rate made pamphlets and posters an ineffective method of delivering information, and polling conducted in Afghan villages indicated some of them didn’t know about 9/11.“Most of the people in our area are Pashtun,” said Maj. Steve Smith who works in psychological operations for Task Force Duke in Khost province. “In Pashtun [moral] code, justice is one of the strong words, and revenge.”After watching the movie, Afghans “relate to the fact that we’re here because Americans were killed on that day and the training was conducted here and a lot of fighters were here,” Smith said.But with the killing of Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda's leader, are the films already dated? Does the explanation for “Why We Are Here” still hold?On Saturday, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates described bin Laden’s death as a potential game changer, though he said that it could be six more months before the true effect of bin Laden’s killing on the war in Afghanistan can be surmised. U.S. President Barack Obama described the event as “making progress” in the goal of dismantling Al Qaeda.“We have cut off their head, and we will ultimately defeat them,” he told soldiers at Fort Campbell, Ky., on Friday.The president restated his intentions to begin scaling back the number of soldiers in the country in July, and to pass security operations over to Afghans. But in the last week, pundits, politicians and policy experts have debated the plan from all sides, with some arguing for a faster scaling down of U.S. troops than is planned, and others stating their case for more troops.Thus far, the death of bin Laden appears to have only highlighted how the Afghanistan War has evolved over a decade, from a simple hunt for Al Qaeda militants to a complex counterinsurgency and government capacity-building effort.But military officials said they don’t anticipate a change in the fundamental message of the Roll the Tape campaign and films like “Why We Are Here.” Plans are now underway to give every company within Task Force Duke a movie projector and speakers in the coming months in order to conduct public viewings of the movies.Local media institutions and universities are also being approached with micro-grants, so Afghans can begin producing their own movies for the campaign that will cover development projects in the area, as well as profile government officials and events.

Page 25

“We’re not going to tell them what to produce,” Smith said. “We want them to develop it so it’s an Afghan product and it has more legitimacy.”Some military commanders are using the magnetism and novelty of the Roll the Tape movie screenings as an opportunity to inflate the biometrics databases of local Afghans.Since it was launched in 2009, the biometrics program has registered a few hundred thousand Afghans and there has been an even greater push in recent months to increase the database because of its effectiveness as a counterinsurgency tool.“We show the videos and then we use that as an opportunity to enroll folks in biometrics, sort of the price of admission to the movie,” said Lt. Col. Jesse Pearson, battalion commander of the 1-26 Infantry with Task Force Duke. “It’s a way of making sure that we know who we are talking to, we know who are insurgents and who are not because they are indistinguishable.”Unlike some other military units, Pearson said he makes sure his troops don’t give the DVD players away because of their high value as means of disseminating propaganda — both for military or the Taliban.“I’m not going to be out there handing out grenades to local kids,” Pearson said. “I’m not going to be giving them DVD players because there are tons of DVDs that are insurgent propaganda.”Table of Contents

101st Airborne Division General Confronts Afghan JournalistsBy Philip Grey, Leaf-Chronicle, May. 11, 2011 BAGRAM AIR FIELD, Afghanistan — U.S. military officials on Tuesday used the occasion of an Afghan National Media conference to strike back at what they say is inaccurate reporting of civilian casualties in the ongoing war in Afghanistan.The conference, partly a training session, encouraged a two-way dialogue. However, it was clear the U.S. military wanted to get its message out regarding the perception of culpability in civilian deaths.Presenters expressed some frank exasperation with Afghan journalists, particularly hitting at the willingness of many to pass along Taliban news releases without running them through any fact-checking process. Particularly rankling to American military leaders is the storyline that has been allowed to take hold — reinforced by Afghan President Hamid Karzai and others — that Coalition forces are causing a lot of civilian casualties.The numbers paint a different picture, and Maj. Gen. John F. Campbell, commander of the 101st Airborne Division, calmly but firmly emphasized that 90 percent of Afghan civilian casualties this year can be laid at the feet of the Taliban and other insurgent groups.According to the most recent figures from 1st Cavalry Division Public Affairs, in Regional Command East, International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) have been responsible for 57 civilian casualties, ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces) have caused four, and the Taliban and other groups have caused 455. Figures for other regional commands were not included.A United Nations report released earlier in the year showed the Taliban and other insurgent groups were responsible for over two-thirds of the civilian deaths last year, primarily through "horror attacks" using homemade bombs and suicide bombings aimed at civilians and conducted in places like bazaars — calculated to produce the most casualties.The U.N. figures showed a trend of increasing Taliban-related deaths from the previous year and a corresponding decrease percentage-wise in deaths attributed to Coalition forces. The report also cited an alarming 105 percent increase in assassinations of civilian officials by insurgents.Campbell stressed that the insurgents regularly target civilians, which is something ISAF forces do not do. He added that every incident of civilian casualties blamed on Coalition forces is investigated and that the U.S. takes responsibility when warranted.He also stressed to the Afghan journalists that information operations are a big part of the insurgent campaign, that the insurgents tell people what they want to hear, and that they lie or get others to lie about incidents that are easily disproved if someone takes the time to check the facts.Openly encouraging Afghan journalists at the conference to take part in the embed process is one way ISAF is trying to turn the public opinion tide.Though embedding host-nation journalists with Coalition and ANSF forces entails some level of risk, especially since the experience level of Afghan journalists in direct combat reporting is not on par with journalists of other nations, the move is consistent with the emphasis of Campbell and other leaders that the war cannot be won by body counts.

Page 26

Military officials also focused on other topics, such as ambitious projects to repair and improve Afghanistan's inadequate infrastructure.Host-nation reporters were assured that U.S. and Coalition officials would not stand in the way of factual negative reporting of Coalition and ANSF activities.Table of Contents

Cyber Security Plan Proposed By White House From BBC News, 12 May 2010The White House has proposed legislation to protect the country from cyber attacks by hackers, criminals and spies. Under the plan, companies that run infrastructure like power plants and financial systems would get incentives to make sure their systems are secure.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would also have the authority to impose its own security on industry.Similar legislation is already being discussed by Congress.US officials have said government and private systems are attacked millions of times per day.Too weak?The plans are designed to counter threats such as foreign nations attempting to steal sensitive data and computer hackers attacking financial institutions.The White House proposal would empower the DHS to step in and develop security systems for institutions like financial and energy firms, if US officials felt the companies failed to have adequate measures.An independent organisation would then be brought in to evaluate the security measures.Some business leaders have said they would prefer a voluntary programme rather than government mandates.The administration hopes the bill will be passed this year. But other critics say the plan is too weak and lacks a sense of urgency.Former senior Homeland Security official Stewart Baker told the Associated Press news agency: "It tells even critical industries on which our lives and society depend that they will have years before anyone from government begins to evaluate their security measures."Various House and Senate committees have been working on cyber security legislation for the past two years, waiting for the Obama administration to propose its own version.The two proposals differ in that the House and Senate want the White House cyber co-ordinator to be subject to Senate confirmation, while the White House has rejected that idea.Table of Contents

Bin Laden Videos as Psy-Ops: What US Wants Afghan Insurgents to See

By Anna Mulrine, Christian Science Monitor, May 12, 2011 The videos of Osama bin Laden that the US has elected to release so far have an important common denominator: They portray the Al Qaeda leader in a less-than-flattering light – diminished, hunched, gray, and, perhaps, a bit self-obsessed. That is no accident.Bin Laden journal reveals his calculations for another 9/11-style attack Bin Laden raid: A model for how US should fight Afghanistan war? After bin Laden: Why the US wants military access to Afghanistan beyond 2014 Top Afghan insurgents tout girls' education, not bombs The five short clips released to the press last weekend amount to powerful tools of psychological warfare. Not only are they intended to humiliate a widely reviled terrorist mastermind, but they are also careful strategy meant to make Taliban fighters and other insurgents think twice about the caliber of their leadership – and whether the burden of the fight is being fairly distributed."They've seen videos now of bin Laden sitting in a small room, looking at a TV of pictures of himself up there, kind of alone and desperate – not this, you know, this big leader that they thought he was," Maj. Gen. John Campbell, the commander of US troops in eastern Afghanistan, said at a Pentagon briefing Tuesday.Officials have been quick to offer their interpretation of what those videos show, lest insurgents fail to see it. A senior US official characterized bin Laden as "living high on the hog" in a luxurious house, while his followers

Page 27

were fighting and dying in "dire conditions." The official also made a point of noting his penchant for dying his beard for video appearances, in a bid to suggest vanity and sleight of hand.Whether the videos will induce Taliban fighters to lay down their arms and reconcile with the government of Afghanistan, as the US hopes, remains to be seen. Senior military officials, including Campbell, acknowledge that the toughest insurgent syndicates include "hard-core irreconcilables." Still, psyops – or what the Pentagon calls "information operations" – remain much in evidence more than a week after bin Laden was killed in a US raid. Campbell argued that other terrorist networks heads operate like bin Laden. “Many of the other insurgent groups that we deal with, the leadership stays in Pakistan. They don’t come across the border. They don’t share the same hardships as the fighters.” He added that fighters “are going to think twice now, why are we doing this? Why is [bin Laden] over in Pakistan – or why was he in Pakistan – when I’m suffering over here?”Officials hope these videos will make an impression on low-level group members who wage the bulk of the attacks on US troops. “I think the insurgents are going to see this [and] say, ‘Hey, you know, why am I doing this?’ ” he added.“I think there’s great potential for many of the insurgents to say, ‘Hey, I want to reintegrate,’ ” Campbell noted. “I think that gives us a great opportunity.”Haqqani network may hold outWhether that will happen remains to be seen. Senior military officials, including Campbell himself, acknowledge that many of the toughest insurgent syndicates include “hard-core irreconcilables.”First among these is the Haqqani network, a group that many consider to be more dangerous than the Taliban, particularly in eastern Afghanistan. Haqqani network fighters are “definitely … the most lethal threat,” Campbell said. “They have sanctuary in Pakistan, they come across the border,” and they seem to have a never-ending supply of new recruits.The prospects for Haqqani fighters laying down their arms don’t look good, Campbell acknowledged this week.Even if the psychological impact of bin Laden’s last years on his own men is not what the US hopes, the impact on US troops in the field has been palpable, say senior military officials. “At the soldier level, it’s a great psychological victory for us,” says Marine Maj. Gen. Richard Mills, who recently commanded US troops in southwestern Afghanistan.Afghan insurgents begin to reconcileIn the meantime, officials hope to accelerate efforts to reconcile low-level insurgents. To date, about 500 fighters have laid down their arms and pledged loyalty to the Afghan government in the east, Campbell estimates.He expects to see more insurgent reconciliations “as we continue to get the message out … of the benefits of coming back and reuniting with your family, having a job – you know, living a normal life, not on the run, not sitting in a cave someplace,” he adds. “They’re going to see that running – a life of running all the time and hiding – is not the way to go.”Table of Contents

Libya Was Target of Sub, Ship and Air-Launched Cyber and Electronic Attacks

By David A. Fulghum, Aviation Week, 5/16/2011 Libya’s air defenses, air bases and military communications were schwacked by U.S. submarines, warships and a squadron of EA-18G Growlers, the chief of naval operations, Adm. Gary Roughead said in response to questions from Aviation Week.In a time of declining defense budgets, the results justify increasing investment in cyber and electronic attack capabilities, he says.“I don’t consider our aviators flying into the air defense system of a third-rate power any less critical than going into [the defensive ring of] a high-end system,” Roughead says. “It has to be taken seriously because of the proliferation of [anti-aircraft missile systems] that we see around the world.”Libya, for example, fielded the long-range SA-5, the medium range SA-6 and SA-8 -- all upgraded to some degree -- and the newest, Russian-made, SA-24 short range missile. The presence in Lybia of the new SA-24 was first identified publicly by Aviation Week.“You are always going to have to go in and bag that system electronically before you do anything else,” he says. “As you know, for the last several years we have very much wanted to take on the broader electronic

Page 28

attack mission. The first Growler squadron in Iraq recovered from the combat mission [there, and] 47-hrs. later they launched a combat mission on a Libyan air base.“That’s pretty extraordinary in terms of agility,” Roughead says. “That’s why we’re investing in Growler. Electronic attack is going to become increasingly important. [That capability is being integrated with] the electronic suites on our surface ships and submarines.“On the cyber side, [aircraft and ships] but particularly submarines [had] an extraordinary system with which to participate in cyberoperations,” he says. “Those are areas we focused on.”In the Navy aviation, airborne electronic and cyber attack will come together in the Next Generation Jammer program that will be installed first on the EA-18G Growler and then the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.“The Next Generation Jammer is very important [for naval aviation] and our investments are going into that because the fight is going to begin and be sustained in the electromagnetic environment,” Roughead says. “Nor is it going to be limited to just the [operations against] high-end countries.”Table of Contents

Army Reserve Seeks to Expand Cooperation PlansBy Donna Miles, American Forces Press Service, 16 May 2011LILONGWE, Malawi, May 16, 2011 – The after-action reports still are works in progress after a successful MEDREACH 11 medical humanitarian assistance exercise that wrapped up here May 13, but the Army Reserve already is exploring ways to expand its participation in theater security cooperation engagements in Africa and elsewhere.Nearly half of the participants in U.S. Army Africa’s first MEDREACH exercise, which began May 3, were Army reservists, most of them assigned to the Boston-based 399th Combat Support Hospital. Working alongside the Illinois National Guard’s 404th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, which provided command and control for the exercise, and small teams of Air Force Reserve dentists and active-duty Army ophthalmologists, they provided the bulk of the manpower to teach medical skills to Malawi Defense Force medics and provide medical and dental treatments at three outreach clinics during the exercise.Additional Army Reserve soldiers contributed civil affairs and military information support operations expertise to the mission.These theater cooperation engagements support the broader U.S. strategy in the region, explained J.T. Ice, political-military advisor at the U.S. Embassy in Lilongwe.MEDREACH 11 promoted two specific U.S. Mission Malawi goals for the Malawi Defense Force, he said. It increased its capacity to conduct peacekeeping operations on the African continent, and it helped Malawi become a stronger partner in responding to humanitarian assistance and disaster response crises.The exercise is an example of the “whole of government” approach to U.S. foreign policy objectives, with the military dovetailing with its State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development and Peace Corps counterparts to support common goals, Ice said.“Working the interagency is the future. We have gotten our marching orders that the different parts of government will – not may – work together on these issues,” he said. “And here at the U.S. mission in Malawi, the country team understands that it takes different parts of government working together on these issues.”Army Lt. Gen. Jack C. Stultz, chief of the Army Reserve, said he wants to see his troops play a bigger part in these engagements, particularly as wartime demands in Iraq and Afghanistan subside. The Army Reserve provides many of the enabling capabilities the active component has come to rely on, particularly in areas such as civil affairs, transportation and engineering. Stultz said he sees no end to demand for these capabilities, even after the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan conclude.He cited “pent-up demand” among U.S. Africa Command and other geographic commands that he said would love to tap into Army Reserve capabilities to support more theater engagement activities such as MEDREACH 11.The Army Reserve already supports many of these efforts: medical support and engineering missions in Central America and the Caribbean as well as Africa, and aboard U.S. Southern Command’s Continuing Promise and U.S. Pacific Command’s Pacific Partnership medical missions.Stultz said combatant commanders get excited when he suggests contributing additional Army Reserve capabilities to enhance these activities.“What if in the future – when these units are in the [Army Force Generation] model and when there is no requirement for them in Iraq and Afghanistan – I could give you these units for 90 days at a time?” he asks, rather than the current two or three weeks.

Page 29

“Their eyes light up,” he told American Forces Press Service. “They say, ‘Now you are talking about really expanding our horizons as far as engagement strategy, if we were able to build a strategy around that capability.’”The approach could be used to fine-tune reserve-component capabilities, he said, while putting no additional burden on the active force.Army Lt. Col. Klemens “Van” Schmidt is on the leading edge of a division being established to help in making Stultz’s vision a reality.“I am the guy trying to figure out business practices for the Army Reserve, or to take all those pre-existing business practices we have and then try to put it into one well-working mechanism,” he said.With two years of experience as U.S. Africa Command’s deputy for humanitarian assistance and program manager for military and civic assistance under his belt, Schmidt said the Army Reserve is particularly well-suited to support some of the operations for which he has helped to lay groundwork. Its structure is heavy with “enablers” – the combat support and combat service support capabilities as important to these engagements as to combat operations, he noted.This blend of capabilities is ideal for many theater engagement missions such as MEDREACH 11, said Navy Cmdr. Jonathan Adams, exercise planner for Africom. Many of the participants are doctors, nurses and other medical professionals in their civilian careers, and also have operational experience from deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.“So they bring an added level of professionalism and expertise in these specific areas we are dealing with,” he said.But beyond that, the reserve component has a manpower pool able to support the Africom exercise program.“The biggest thing is that they are available,” Adams said. “The [active] Army is stretched very thin, but we want to have engagement. So they are a very useful, viable source of manpower to do these exercises.”As they contribute needed capabilities in exercises such as MEDREACH 11, Schmidt said, they realize an often-overlooked payoff in terms of military occupational skills training. Working with their Malawi military counterparts, participants operated in austere environments not found in the United States, and exposure to diseases and challenges not seen at home, he explained.Schmidt emphasized the importance of working with the host nation during missions such as MEDREACH 11 to ensure that what’s started can be sustained.“Just going to one location at one time and giving 30 days of vitamins is just that – 30 days of vitamins. These episodic, one-time events are only one-time events,” he said. “You want to have something more sustainable.”With an expanded role in security cooperation and international engagements, the Army Reserve can help to provide that sustainable support, Schmidt said. “We get wonderful experience” from even short, one-time engagements, he said. “But if we can get another group to come in a year later, six months later, that would be wonderful.”Reoccurring engagements help build relationships and credibility about U.S. intentions in Africa, he said. Ultimately, Schmidt said, that’s the foundation for strong partnerships needed to address regional challenges, whether natural disasters or enemy threats.Meanwhile, Stultz noted another consideration in tapping Army reservists to support these engagements: the troops themselves. He’s convinced that after playing key roles in an operational reserve, they’ll never be satisfied reverting to their long-abandoned “weekend warrior” status.“We have created an environment and culture that [the soldiers] want to be part of and that they feel good about,” he said. “We have Army Reservists [for whom] two weeks at home station ain’t gonna cut it anymore,” agreed Schmidt. “They want to go out and do something exciting, particularly the ones who have been deployed. They have seen the goodness they can do, and they want to continue to do that.“And we want them to continue to do that,” he continued, “because A, it retains them, and B, it is good for their [specialty] skills – the training they get in those austere places.”Army Spc. Brian Zimmerman, a member of the Army Reserve’s 403rd Civil Affairs Battalion in Syracuse, N.Y., said he jumped at the opportunity to participate in MEDREACH 11 and would welcome more, longer engagements.“It’s meaningful, and I can’t overstate the experience we’ve gotten from this,” he said, shaking hands with Malawian civilians as they filed from a tent, mosquito nets in hand, following a class in malaria prevention. “We are doing something. We are helping. I wish we could be here longer, because the work we are doing here really matters.”Table of Contents

Page 30

Obama Administration Outlines International Strategy for Cyberspace

By Ellen Nakashima, Washington Post, May 16, 2011The White House on Monday unveiled an international strategy for cyberspace that stresses developing norms of responsible state behavior to promote a secure, open Internet and other critical computer networks.Drawing on President Obama’s principle of global engagement, the strategy marks the first time any administration has attempted to set forth in one document the U.S. government’s vision for cyberspace, including goals for defense, diplomacy and international development. “A new era of global engagement and vigilance has begun,” said Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr., one of several senior administration officials who introduced the strategy to an audience of foreign and U.S. officials, as well as representatives from industry and civil society groups. The 30-page document, which argues that expanded access to secure networks is essential to economic prosperity, is a broad, aspirational strategy intended as a guide for more detailed policies. Its release follows the U.S. decision last summer to change its position on cybersecurity , agreeing to work with other nations to reduce threats to computer networks. Previously, the United States resisted proposals limiting possible military use of cyberspace.“This is just the beginning of a conversation within governments, between governments, the private sector and beyond,” said Howard Schmidt, the White House cybersecurity coordinator, who also spoke Monday.The document is crafted to signal other countries that the United States wants to collaborate in securing digital networks, not dominate them, said James A. Lewis, a senior fellow and director of the Technology and Public Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.“This is a departure from the Bush administration, which refused to engage on these issues,” Lewis said. “The Obama administration is turning around and saying not only will we engage, but here’s where we’d like to end up.”It is also a “counterbalance” to fears that the United States, by recently setting up a military “cyber command” to defend military networks was seeking to dominate cyberspace, said Greg Rattray, former White House director of cybersecurity and a partner at Delta Risk, a cyber-security consulting firm. Two years ago, Obama made a nationally televised speech proclaiming the nation’s networks and computers “a strategic national asset,” and saying that protecting them would be a national security priority. “We will ensure that these networks are secure, trustworthy and resilient,” he said at the time. The international strategy is an effort to build on that speech. It states that the United States will, with other nations, “oppose those who would seek to disrupt networks and systems, dissuading and deterring malicious actors, and reserving the right to defend these vital national assets as necessary and appropriate.”It says the United States will help other countries strengthen their abilities to defend their networks and foster an open Internet.The strategy noted that the norms should be based on principles such as recognizing that states have an inherent right of self defense that may be triggered by certain aggressive acts in cyberspace, and that states should act within their authorities to help ensure that the Internet remains accessible to all.One challenge will be working with nations such as China, which exercise state control over the Internet in the name of national security, Rattray said. “On balance,” he said, “this is a major step forward.”Leslie Harris, president of the Center for Democracy and Technology, said “some principles outlined in the strategy will sometimes come into conflict — one measure of who we are as a nation will be how those conflicts are resolved.”Table of Contents

Secrets Surface about North Korea's Cyberwar CollegeBy Matt Liebowitz, SecurityNewsDaily, 11 May 2011The inner workings of a secret North Korean cyberwar college in existence for the past 25 years are finally coming to the surface. According to the South Korean newspaper the DailyNK, Mirim College, in a mountainous region of North Korea's capital, Pyongyang, was opened in 1986 by North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il, and in the 25 years since has made it its mission to train about 120 students per year in electronic warfare.The DailyNK spoke to a North Korean defector, Cheong, who said he is familiar with Mirim, although he did not attend himself.

Page 31

Cheong said basic coursework at Mirim takes five years to complete. Students, who wear the same uniforms as military officials, choose between five departments: electronic engineering, command automation, programming, technical reconnaissance and computer science. The command automation department includes a course, the article said, focused on hacking its southern neighbor, called "South Chosun's Early Warning System and How to Respond to It."(Chosun is another name for Korea.)In addition to its highly sensitive curriculum, security guards patrol the grounds, and no car is allowed to enter the college unless it's carrying Kim Jong-il.After graduation, students join the People's Armed Forces and are frequently assigned to two electronic warfare brigades.John Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org, told Wired that despite North Korea's poverty and isolation, he is not surprised the country would focus so much effort on training cybercrime troops."Even if the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) can't feed its own people, it's quite capable of developing and using the full spectrum of modern weaponry, including cyber."Table of Contents

Al Jazeera's Social Media Experiment "The Stream" Launches OnlineBy Gregory Ferenstein, Fast Company, 18 April 2011 Fresh off the wild success of Internet-fueled Middle-East revolution stories, Al Jazeera English today is launching the online component to its forthcoming social media-centered news program, The Stream. It's the most aggressive integration of social media into a live news program to date. And Al Jazeera says it wants to capture a new generation of cable "cord cutters," push the limits of so-called "citizen journalism," and inch into American media territory.A social storytelling service powers the editorially curated content, which is complimented by community commenting before, during, and after the anchored news show. It's scheduled to start airing May 2nd.A Community Webshow"Most TV creates a show and then have a website as an addendum," says newly minted co-host Derrick Ashong. And other news orgs such as NPR with its Twitter correspondent Andy Carvin, have incorporated curated reporting from the crowd. But "The concept of The Stream is actually a web community that has its own daily television show on AJ," Ashong says. The co-host's own politically charged viral Youtube video catapulted his career into radio. He imagines The Stream as a 24-hour news show with a 30-minute anchored broadcast component (aired Monday through Thursday). After the broadcast ends, there will be will be a "seamless transition into the dialog that's already going on."News is constructed through Storify, a social media curation platform that interlaces freeze frames of original sources and videos with original analysis. The screen capture below is from a beta version of the website and is about an imprisoned blogger.Though the live broadcast airs three separate times throughout the day, Ashong is hopeful that the staff can make the interactive portion sufficiently distinct so that the re-air experience is never actually a simple duplicate. Additionally, The Stream's online community doubles as a self-selected focus group, alerting staff to editorial oversights and signaling new trends "When we come to do an editorial meeting the following day, we may say 'Hey, there was a lot traction around this story, but people raised x, y, and z questions that they want more answers to."The Stream hungers for online conversations and thus gives preference to stories of activism and genuine emotion. "It might be that everyone is tweeting about the Grammy's," Ashong says, but it’s probably not a "passionate" discussion. He's aiming for stories that lend themselves to "substantive and robust online discourse." For many news websites, pop culture stories, from the iPad 2 to Justin Bieber, are an important traffic driver, and The Stream will be challenged to find a balance between viewership and "substance."However, Ashong believes professional curation can help the show avoid the stigma of amateurism attached to the broadcast use of social media--i.e. avoid being made fun of by Jon Stewart.The Cord Cutters Cometh"Cord cutters," those who have ditched their cable subscription, have sent broadcasters scrambling to prepare for a world with less traditional television programming. Some, such as CNN, are propping up the traditional models with device-agnostic streaming of their regular content. "If programming does not respond to the new, more democratic of ways of gathering and analyzing information, then there's a risk audiences will go elsewhere," Al Jazeera's director of programming, Paul Eedle, tells Fast Company.

Page 32

Eedle sees The Stream as a step toward tackling the unknown future of news, but he admits no one has figured out the full recipe for success. Experimentation is the only way to find it. And Eedle has been dreaming of this opportunity for over a decade and just now feels there's a critical mass. Prior to Al Jazeera, Eedle worked on Out There News, where he began experimenting with online reactions during a British oil strike in the late 90s. Back then, a few hundred comments on an AOL message board was a revolutionary achievement."Through social media, you can have not 55, but 5,500 or even, on occasion, 55,000 eyes and ears on the ground," he says.Eying AmericaEmboldened by Hillary Clinton's flattering congressional testimony that Al Jazeera is "real news," Al Jazeera is pushing to break into the American mainstream. It should be no surprise, then, why The Steam is hosted in Washington D.C. with two American anchors. "Of course we're looking to get coverage in the US," says executive producer of programming in DC, James Wright.Both Wright and Eedle walk lightly around why Al Jazeera is not yet accessible through a cable provider. A factor is the lingering Bush administration's displeasure with the news station that heightened fear among cable companies that Al Jazeera was a politically and culturally risky partnership and thus prolonged years of what Al Jazeera considers de facto censorship. Now with a stark change in tone, Al Jazeera's chiefs are optimistic that the cable companies will see their channel as a valuable station, and they're pushing ahead with or without the cable providers. Additionally, Al Jazeera considers America a hub of innovation. Ashong and other staff members have strong ties to the new media industry, something they consider crucial for a show that sits on the shoulders of breaking technology trends.Both Wright and Eedle wanted it to be noted that The Stream will maintain a strong international news focus and is considering plans for satellite outlets around the world should the viewership warrant expansion.More than anything, The Stream is a place to bring in fresh faces. Young, new media-savvy voices, such as Azita Ardakani of Love Social, are deliberately favored as contributors instead older experts. Prominent activists and bloggers will be given a spotlight; insightful commenters will hold sway over the direction of news. Whether it will work is anyone's guess. But, as Wright says, Al Jazeera is determined for The Stream to facilitate "handing over the airwaves to a younger generation."Table of Contents

Norway Army Faced Cyber Attack after Libya BombingFrom Defense News, 19 May 2011OSLO (AFP) - The Norwegian military said May 19 that it had been the victim of a serious cyber attack at the end of March, a day after Norwegian F-16 fighter jets for the first time carried out bombings in Libya."The army is regularly the target of cyber and virus attacks, but not as extensive as this," Hilde Lindboe, a spokeswoman for Norwegian Defence Information Infrastructure (INI), told AFP.On March 25, a day after Norwegian F-16s first took part in the NATO-led bombing in Libya, around 100 military employees, some of them high-ranking, received an email in Norwegian with an attachment that, once opened, let loose a virus made to extract information from the host computer."From what we have seen, no sensitive information has been obtained," Lindboe said.According to INI, only one computer containing non-classified information was contaminated.The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) has opened an investigation to determine who launched the attack, but authorities say it is too soon to say whether there was a link to the Libya bombings.Norway has six F-16s stationed on the Greek island of Crete as part of the NATO campaign against leader Moammar Gadhafi's forces, authorized by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 to protect the Libyan population.The Scandinavian country has however said it plans to curb its military role in Libya if the campaign lasts longer than June 24.Table of Contents

Joint Training Integration Group for Information Operations (JTIG-IO) - Information Operations (IO) Training Portal

Link: https://jko.harmonieweb.org/coi/InformationOps/default.aspx From JFCOM J7: On behalf of the Joint Training Integration Group for Information Operations (JTIG-IO), we are pleased to announce the launch of the Information Operations (IO) Training Portal. The portal provides several

Page 33

IO focused training resources including a DoD IO Training Catalog, an IO Policy and Guidance library and various Education & Training resources available via the web. The IO Training Catalog is a searchable database that lists Service, Joint, NATO, Interagency, National Defense University and Naval Postgraduate training and education opportunities to include course descriptions, locations and enrollment procedures. The IO Library lists IO related doctrine, policy, guidance, and periodicals and provides links to electronic libraries that house current versions of each document. The portal also offers Education & Training Resources which provide a growing list of IO Training and Education resources available via the web. The portal is hosted by HarmonieWeb and is available via the world wide web. Initial membership directions: copy and paste https://jko.harmonieweb.org/coi/Pages/default.aspx into your browser; select Information Operations Training; click on Request Membership; provide the "Required Info" and then submit (you should receive and email within one working day with you user name and password); once you receive your user name and password, return to the HarmonieWeb site (link provided above) and select the Information Operations Training link and then sign in.Table of Contents

Page 34