Ann Kite Yo Pale - Best Practice in Communication Haiti 2010
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INTERNEWS EUROPE
Best Practice ad Lessos Leared iCommuicatio with Disaster AectedCommuities: Haiti 2010
let themspeak
Ann KiteYo Pale
By Imogen Wall WIth yves gerald Chry
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a Ki y P ( pk) 2 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
aCKnoWledgements
ti c jc w v i wi y . Ig W wi cwg wig iivi: Suranga Mallawa, Jacb Quintanilla, Philippe
Alluard, Stephanie Armand, Sabina Carlsn, Jn Bugge, Ben Nble, Sharn Reader, Karen Prudlck, Jennier
Mandel, Anita Shah, Carle Chapelier, Lizz Frst Ycum, Lisa Rbinsn, Rachel Hughtn, Mark Turner,
Guillaume Michel, Carel Pedre, Sabine Wilke, Lenard Dyle, PAW Cmmunicatins, Julie Breen, Mildrede
Beliarde.
Yv G Cy i gi wig : Ben Nble, Frantz Duval, Mari Viau, JcelynePierre-Luis, Jean Rmel Pierre, Jacques Desrsiers, Sny Estus, the whle Internews team/ENDK, Carel Pedre,
Jean Lesly Hilaire.
T cntact the authr, please email Imgen Wall at [email protected].
Cv :A man listens t a radi at a reugee camp in Prt-au-Prince, Haiti, Friday, January 22nd 2010.AP PHoTo/JAE C. HoNG
VIsIt: oChaonlIne.un.orG/haItI and WWW.relIeWeb.Int
Baie deMancenille
Baie dela Tortue
Baie deGrand-Pierre
Baie de
Jacmel
Canal deSaint-Marc
Canal dela Gonve
Canal de la Tortue
Golfe de la Gonve
Baiede Henne
LagoEnriquillo
EtangSaumtre
PORT-AU-PRINCE
Cap-Hatien
Gonaves
Hinche
Jacmel
Jrmie
Les Cayes
Miragone
Port-de-Paix
Fort Liberte
Les AnglaisTiburon
Chantal
Arniquet
Camp Perrin
Maniche
Cavaillon
St Louisdu Sud
Aquin
GrandGoave
PetitGoave
Bainet
Pestel
Roseau
BonbonAbricot
Dame Marie
Les Irois
Moron
Ansed'Hainault Beaumont
CorailPetit Trou de Nippes
Baraderes
Anse-a-Veau
Petite Riviere de Nippes
L'Asile
La vallee de Jacmel
CayesJacmel
Marigot
ErnneryMont
Organise
CercaCarvajal
Vallieres
TerrierRougeTrou
du Nord
CercaLa Source
Thomassique
Belladere
Jimani
LascahobasSaut D'eau
Thomonde
Maissade
Pignon
LaVictoire Mombin
Crochu
Bahon
Milot
Limonade
QuartierMorin
Dondon
SaintRaphael
Marmelade
Saint Michelde l'Attatalaye
Dessalines
Petite Rivierede l'Artibonite
Verrettes
LaChapelle
Mirebalais
Grande SalineDesdunes
L'Estere
AnseRouge
MoleSt Nicolas
Bombardopolis
Baie de Henne
Jean RabelBassin Bleu
Chansolme Anse-a-Foleur
Saint Louis du Nord
Le Borgne
Port MargotLimbe
PilateGros Morne
La Branle
Plaisance
Anse a pitres
Grand Gosier
FondVerrettes
Ganthier
Croix desBouquets
Thomazeau
CabaretArchaie
LeoganeChambellan
Perches
Ferrier
Carice
Bas Limbe
Acul du Nord
Terre Neuve
Boucancarre
Kenscoff
Carrefour Petion Ville
Gressier
Cornillon
Ile a Vache
Anse-a-Galets
Pointe-a-Raquette
La Tortue
Caracol
Belle Anse
Torbeck
St Jeandu Sud
Port-Salut
CoteauxPort-a-Piment
Chardonnieres
Thiote
Roche A Bateau
Ouanaminte
MonteCriste
Dajabn
Saint Marc
C U B A D O M I N I C A N
R E P U B L I C
H A I T I
S U D E S T
NOR D EST
AR TIB ONITE
C E N T R E
S U D
G R A N D EA N S E
NOR D OUEST
NIPPES
NORD
O U E S T
LE DE LA TORTUE
LE DELA GONVE
PRESQU'LEDESBARADRES
LES CAYMITES
LE VACHE
720'W7230'W730'W7330'W740'W7430'W
200'N
1930'N
19
0'N
1830'N
180'N
0 10 20 30 40 50
Km
Legend
Capital city
First admin capital
Towns
International boundary
Port
First admin boundary
Main roads
Minor roads
Disclaimer:The designations employed and the presentation of material on this mapdo not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariatof the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory,city or areaor of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.Reference System:UTM 18N, WGS84. Map datasource: United NationsCartographic Section,ESRI, Natural Earth, SRTM.
Caribbean Sea
Atlantic Ocean
200 - 400
400 - 600
600 - 800
800 - 1,000
1,000 - 1,500
1,500 - 2,000
2,000 - 2,500
2,500 - 3,000
0 - 200
Elevation (meters)
H A I T I
BarahonaJacmel
Jimani
Saint-MarcHinche
PORT-AU-PRINCE
SANTODOMINGO
Jrmie
Les Cayes
Miragone
Gonaves
Cap-Hatien
Port-de-Paix Monte Criste
Dajabn
0 80
Km
D O M I N I C A N
R E P U B L I C
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected] -
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a Ki y P ( pk) 3 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
Cotetseci
a Ki y P: l t spk 4mi i 8
m i 11
Cp 1rpi k 13Ii cici k 14
C-ci -cici 18
rci 22
Cp 2rpi c c 24
C ii p 25C i c 25
C c i 26
t iw 26
hw ci w ccici cpi? 28
rci 30
Cp 3Cici c 31
W i i ii? 32
oii wi ic cpci 32
rci ii 37
eci cici p pipc i i 37
Cp 4Cici 42
t cii c i hii 43
Cici 46
t ppci 48
rci 51
Cp 5s cici pc 52
ri 56
rci wki i i 56
Pi 57
rci wki wi pi 57
tii 58
Ci-b cici 58
c--c cici 58
dp- ii pc 59
rci wkiwi ci bii 61
rci 63
Cp 6sms, ci i w c 64
t c c p k 65
t ppci 68
rci wki wi pcpi 68
t i c ppci 72
rci wki wi sms 74
rci wki wi p i 76
rci wkiwi c cici 76
Cp 7mii icici 77
mii i 78
rc 83
rci 85
ac 86
Bibip 87
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a Ki y P ( pk) 4 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
The 7.0 magnitude earthquake
sc so of h o Jy 12 2010
ls spos
sc i Oc ts of 2004.
hs of ol cs lc cy
sposs, locl osos, h spo,
pv sco y oss of vls
also poured energy, money and time into nding ways tolp.
The earthquake was unfortunately not the only
sos cy o s h 2010. t ob
of cholera in the town of St Marc on October 18 2010
brought a new, highly infectious and deadly disease
to a country with weak sanitation and health systems,
and no knowledge or understanding of this illness. The
response of communication actors from the rst hours
was essential to the survival of potentially thousands of
people, whose ability to recognise symptoms and take
prompt action was literally the difference between life
.
ts pp ps o cp so of communication work implemented by a whole range
of partners, and to identify what was delivered from
the perspectives of those affected by these two major
b vy ff cs. t ppos of s
xcs s o fo co spos h
o pov pccl cs ss lyss of bs
practice models that may be useful elsewhere.
While much was done in Haiti, more remains to be
o s sco, bo h lobl lvl.
i s oc ss spos coc
coco-c b vo sol b
widely criticised from the earliest days for being soscoc fo locl cox. t css
sopsco of so spcs of locl
spos s o y obsvo fo h.
This generated models outside the framework of the
ol spos, s sy
s pcl ffo o l lssos fo locl
sposs.
W
l pi bicb i ii. W c c k ic 12. W i ppi, wiibi ki pc, w i i ii p. W ii.elmont pIerre, dIreCtor, Cool m,leoGane
the demand orCommunICatIon
Bo col sposs
cl fo foo fo ffc
cos s , fo vy ls ss of
cy. Fo svvos os o
stations to the overwhelming response to projects that
facilitated communication, it was clear that disaster-
ffc hs foo s ccl.
Executie summaryA Kite Yo Pale:Let Them Speak
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a Ki y P ( pk) 5 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
ti cici [Bhn/saKs Ci as] i i ippic ic w ciic k.WIllY petIt-homme, CommunIt Yleader, leoGane
CommunICatIonWorK Is PossIBle andImPortant rom theearlIest stage o aresPonse
t locl coco spos o
began within minutes as survivors began using phones
to nd out if friends and family were alive or dead, to
broadcast their location (especially those who were
pp) o o s fo lp. dv by svvo ,
cy bocs by locl o, cl oc
family reunication systems, were running within days.
While international agencies were slower to address
foo s, xpc of vloporganisation Internews and the World Food Programme
(WFP) shows not only that effective communication
work can be launched within days, but that it can have
pc o ffcvss of opol lvy.
a i i pp i cc wi WP c icpi i hii i wkwi k, c
WP iii c-p pib pc, c i , b ib i wk.Wp senIor sta member
lIstenIng andCommunICatIng are
vItal
Two of the most important ndings of this report
closly coc: poc of ls fo
ol spos, poc of
process of coco fo ss svvos. Wl
syss fo s foo, slly ccs
by o-o-y ol sb
foo, pclly sss, soo
polf, ols fcl lo
fcl ls o pspcvs cocs of
locl poplos f y c o ffcvo lpl lvls (cl pov opol
s lvy, losp bl, lv
o ccobly spcy cos
vlop s). acs sll s coco
s ply pocss of lv o xc
foo.
Fo svvos, by cos, pocss of
coco of ss o s c s
foo slf. t bly o coc
than just source information to ask a question, share
a story, discuss an issue was often brought up by
Haitians as vital. This was widely recognised by localradio stations, many of whom ran open mikes for days
after the quake, allowing people to come in and talk on
air about what happened. It is also clear in projects such
s iol Fo of r Coss
Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) helpline in Annexe de la
Mairie camp in Port au Prince, where callers surveyed
by oso xpss f ssfco
levels with the call service than with the information
received about IFRCs shelter project.
O of osos ss s so,
os pl ffcv fbc/lo
ols fo s vy posv xpc. to
cocps of fbc, cl ools sc s cll cs copl css, lo of po,
with local and international staff worrying about being
overwhelmed with the volume of calls or having to
deal with angry people, it was interesting to note that
these fears were usually expressed by those who had no
direct experience of such systems. Those who overcame
cocs fo y o fs pcc
those who implemented effective dialogue systems
los vslly scb s o of os
important aspects of their work.
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a Ki y P ( pk) 6 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
W w p c c, w i b p ppi bc w kw w , k w wpp i ic? B i c i 100 wc pp. m c i p cc kb i ii.kurt Jean Charles,ounder o noula
t x sp s pocss h s o cl
feedback and voices from the eld into policy and project
development work on an ongoing basis. This is, however,
cll. t ls p s lc of y
of sysc ppoc o s foo
o o ls, fbc o collc
spo o copls.
dedICated CaPaCIty
There is an important and growing recognition
that communication with affected communities is
a completely separate area of work and a different
technical skill compared to conventional external
relations or international media liaison. To work
operationally, however, organisations need to decide
what this work looks like in practice. Different agencies
in Haiti tried different approaches with the most
sccssfl ol h vlop by iFrC. ts
consisted of a dedicated technical specialist with
socs (pclly locl cpcy), bo sp
from conventional communication and crucially
tasked with providing technical support to all otherbranches of work, including operations, transparency
ccobly oo vlo
(m&e).
the CoordInatIonChallenge
t cll of cooo cy lvl s vy
ff fo fc sys. t
fo foo o b coss coss ff
outlets and agencies, the question of how to share andcollect feedback regarding the response as a whole,
poc of s osos
are not duplicating each others work and are working
o psp s cooo. t
increasing number of agencies investing in this work
s s so v o c, ss
ol sos bo cooo cls lvl,
and increasingly at geographical level in the eld. The
xpc h lso ls po sos,
which need further consideration, about the role of the
ov coco cooo.
The solution piloted in Haiti the coordination and
coss-cls svc pov by ploy
dedicated stafng of the Communications with Disaster
Affected Communities (CDAC) Haiti mechanism
delivered far beyond original expectations. By lling in
this gap, it highlighted the extent to which there was noprovision for coordination of communication work, or
for the provision of common services for those working
in this sector. In particular, interviewees felt that CDAC
h, s coss-cls svc, pov sfl
and important service. This gap will need to be lled at
eld level in future responses.
At global level, adding communication (both projects
and coordination systems) to the range of work that can
be legitimately funded by the humanitarian nancing
system would do a great deal to open up potential for
growth in this sector during the early days of a response.
ts s o o pov sby f foemergency communication work within individual
cs.
eeCtIveCommunICatIon IsClosely lInKed tooPeratIonal suCCess
ao cl lsso fo h s poc
of the relationship between communication and
operations. Several operations staff commented
that it would actually not have been possible toachieve operational success without support from
coco, cl os volv cp
poplo so ssss of -
bls. also vl o opol sccss
s ol ply by fc-o-fc cocos
(coy oblss), poc of
understanding the different ways in which different
ols of coco vl, o b
familiar with the communication environment in the
rst place.
-
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a Ki y P ( pk) 7 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
I w ii [ i cp] w b ipib wi pp cici .CCCm Cluster CoordInator
teChnology hasthe PotentIal torevolutIonIseCommunICatIon
Large-scale ownership of mobile phones and use of
social media in Haiti, as well as the emergence of thevol c coy obl po cops
s cos, ll s coy
continues to be a watershed response in the use of
technology and communication. However, in-depth
understanding of how local communities used these
tools was found mainly in responses launched by localosos. Locl , pv lcos
copy pcl, scc vlop
multi-platform models meshing mobile phones, SMS,
Facebook, Twitter and conventional media such as
radio within days of the response. These are showcased
Cp 6. W cos o coco
ss spos, colocl cocos
xps s o b fo o ffc cos
locl cos. iol plys v c
to learn from local actors, and systematic ways to
identify and connect with local expertise and to build
psps .
Gi w iig
q.
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a Ki y P ( pk) 8 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
the dIICulty oKnoWIng the ImPaCt
O of bs ps coco
response in Haiti was the lack of capture and M&E.
Wl s y b sbl v lpl
cs fc 2010, s b cll. no
oly s o vl fl pc of
many projects but they are also unable to evolve as they
sol o l pocss. ts s pcl
problem involving models new to the humanitarian
response such as SMS, mobile phones and web platforms
for which no M&E models have yet been developed.
Discussions with operational staff in particular indicate c os of lys pc of
communication work may be inadequate, as they do not
capture how such work positively impacts operational
lvy poc of coco
pocss (spclly psycosocl s) o ss
svvos.
O of os po sccss sos h
was the production of consistent research into the
communication environment, primarily by Internews,
who for the rst time invested in a research unit as part
of their early emergency response. Their data, which was
lso vlbl sysclly o sfor the rst time through CDAC Haiti, helped agencies
o pov po pov
col b s by cy sff o sll coco
projects to donors.
usIng the haItIexPerIenCe
ts sc lso sss spos o vy
specic situations in a very specic country. It seeks
only to capture and present what worked within Haiti,
s oo cl s bo earthquake and cholera were highly unusual events
pop sl sposs. i s op f
responses will be able to draw on some of the ideas,
ols ppocs plo h. Wl s
research does identify some major gaps and challenges,
it is also clear that this sector is growing exponentially
as is the understanding of how communication can
cob pccl opol s o
ly, sccss, llc ppopss
of spos. ts s o of os
important and encouraging ndings of this report.
Mai fdigsemergenCy resPonse:ChaPters 1 and 2
ts cps loo s ffcvss of
communication in the early days and weeks of a disaster
spos. Cp 1 covs cy spos
o ; Cp 2 loos sbs
col cy b Ocob 2010.
Communication can make a profoundfdifference to operational effectiveness.
Operational staff interviewed for this research who
had worked alongside professional communication
support in Haiti were overwhelmingly positive
about the impact on their work. They saw the
benets of communication primarily as improving
trust, helping to mitigate conict, developing
losps s o coy
pcpos sss.
Provision of support to thef
communications sector as part of theemergency response is essential. Locl
o ps, cl obl po
cops, o b sppo
f of ss. i h, pccl
sppo sc s fl fo o so
os soo of i ccss (s
is increasingly prioritised by local journalists), as
well as food and shelter for reporters, would have
made a considerable difference. Specialist media
vlop osos lbl sby
f bly o ccss cy
f css. rsoo of obl
phone network in particular should be regarded asa lifesaving humanitarian priority. Partnerships
ahead of time would facilitate this.
The local communication response in Haitif
was both rich and innovative. W os of
, locl o b s bocs
o s foo xpcs, fy
needs, nd assistance, reunite families and help
popl svv. i so css y s p sos
s o vs, op los ly
without support from the international response.
Local communicators, including those working c sco, pov pclly p
using SMS, the Internet (including social media),
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a Ki y P ( pk) 9 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
obl po plfos o s collc
foo, f o so
cos.
CommunICatIon atorganIsatIonal level:ChaPter 3
This chapter focuses on communication work
by osos o o spcls s ,
several of whom developed projects and units, building
communication work into technical projects and
working on practical application of communicationpcpls o opos. ts cp lso
looks at camp-based communication a particularly
po ol h cox.
The most effective organisational modelf
for implementing effective communication
in Haiti was a standalone unit. This was
l by ccl coco spcls,
provided with a budget and tasked with providing
technical support to the whole organisation,
particularly operations. Operations staff working
in agencies where they had direct technicalsppo coco fo spcls sff
were very positive, frequently saying that project
delivery would have been impossible without
sppo of coco colls.
Organisations that viewed communication as
ply fco of ccobly o
b o l pspcv, lss cl
o c coco psol,
develop standalone communication projects or
pov ccl sppo o o ps of
oso.
A multi-channel approach tofcommunication was the most successful. i
s s os sccssfl coco
work in Haiti from the nationwide cholera
spos o cp-bs ols sc s os
vlop by iFrC Jenkins/Penn Haiti
rlf Oso (JPHRO) all used multiple
cls o s foo ls
different but reinforcing and complementary ways.
t bs ppocs cos pofo
differences, benets and limitations of different
coco cls s o
bs v.
CommunICatIon atsystem level:ChaPter 4
This chapter looks at the question of how
communication with affected communities should be
os lvl of
sys vl cs.
As the communication sector expands,f
the need for coordination is growing.
Haiti piloted some important models with
o ss s so, o
them the rst eld deployment of the CDACnetwork. The Shelter Cluster hired a dedicated
communication delegate for the rst time, and
so osos b ss so
of coo locls foo plcs
where multiple agencies were providing services.
The importance and operational benet of
v c coco cooo
capacity was articulated by a very wide range of
cos, cl locl ov bos,
h Cooo, cls ls os
working within the sector, particularly during the
col cy.
Project models that enhance access tof
information about a response exist and
can be nurtured. Internews, for example,
launched a daily radio show providing information
about the humanitarian situation as a whole that
s sll poc bocs ly o ov 30
o sos.Enformasyon Nou Dwe Knonnen
(ENDK) or News You Can Use built on models
developed elsewhere, but in Haiti beneted from
a much closer working relationship with the
international community. However, much more
c b o o pov ccss o foo.
The donor role is key.f doos h
interviewed for this research actually
os s of
interest in the communication sector than was
cooly ss by cs. t
sys os o cos
importance of communication was a serious
hindrance, however, particularly in terms of
f.
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a Ki y P ( pk) 10 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
standaloneCommunICatIonProjeCts: ChaPter 5
The projects covered in this chapter focus exclusively
o foo s coco s
project output. They include those launched to provide
support to local media as well as communication
vs vlop by ol osos o
improve communication with affected communities
lly.
All best practice projects identied by thisf
research involved support from a technical
communication specialist.
The best communication strategies,f
whether highly localised or nationwide,were those that meshed a number of
different communication channels.
Research and understanding of thef
communication environment was
essential. While it was clear from the start
that radio was by far the most signicant mass
medium, with over 250 stations nationwide,
television is also now appearing in surveys1 s
more signicant than assumed. Also, low literacy
did not mean that print work was automatically
without value. The best projects were those thatworked closely with their audiences and explored
multiple ways of using available media.
Face-to-face communication wasf
particularly important,both for localised
communication work and national
campaigns such as the response to cholera.
Osos vs coy
mobilisers found their work to be extremely
vlbl coy losps,
s foo o sly covy o
ss collc foo fo
eld. Haitians in turn appreciated the ability to covsos, o s sos lv
o ccscs.
Localised information is also importantf
for communities. Participants in focus groups
conducted for the infoasaid project commented
that while they appreciated generalised
information, what they most wanted was to know
what was going on in their area, and what plans
were being developed for their future. More
localised information work, in particular with
local radio, is needed within Haiti, and this is also lsso fo f sposs.
1 J, m l, . aic rc I a ti o C: c G svy o hii i, Iw, Jy 2011.
CommunICatIon andteChnology:ChaPter 6
Haiti was a landmark response when it came to
s of poc of
coco coloy ss spos. ts
cp loos pcl locl colocl
spos povs lssos fo ol
spos. i lso lyss svvos pspcvs o
coloy, pv lcos scos pspcv
on working with NGOs and models pioneered
by ol osos cox of
communication with affected communities.
The inuence and importance of modernf
technology is profoundand has the
potential to revolutionise the way aidagencies and affected communities
communicate with each other. i pcl,
s s possbl fo svvos o coc
directly to responders for the rst time, facilitating
volv of spos s bo ffc
cos po cos spos.
Communications technology, however, is at
ps s s cc-ll bs (socl
media and new media are also used) for what are
pcc of vy ff ols
ools. t o cs ps of s
of ff ools soo, b chance of working with them successfully.
Those who made best use of such systems,f
however, were local responders and
specialists, not international aid agencies.
In Haiti as elsewhere, innovation in use of
coloy s b v ply by locl
populations and by the private sector. Some of the
os ffcv coco ols vlop
after the earthquake came from local journalists
c xps. t h xpc lso
llss s of coloy by svvos s
pofoly sp by cll socl os,not just access to services (such as Internet access),
literacy or nancial status.
Many exciting and groundbreakingf
projects were launched in Haiti. However,
several experienced aid workers commented
s of coloy sol o co
expense of face-to-face communication, which
s vl fo bl
losps psps.
There is almost complete lack offmethodology around monitoring and
evaluating projects using communication
technology, in particular capturing the
end user experience. d o vl
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a Ki y P ( pk) 11 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
and impact of SMS, for example, is unclear and in
so css cocoy. ts s bcs
s sco s sll ly s of volo,
and effective capture and analysis of projects
in countries like Haiti, where so much has been
plo, s po fo vlop of
sco fo voccy. t fc y
organisations have experimented with this work
h s s pol fo s
spos o plo l o vlop of m&e
cp ols.
monItorIng,evaluatIon, CaPture
and researCh:ChaPter 7
ts cp loos pocss of oo
evaluating communication projects, the importance and
fco of sc so of oc
projects. Research work in Haiti was strong, but M&E
in communication projects was weak almost across the
bo.
The availability of quality research intof
the communication environment in Haiti
made a signicant difference to the ability
of all actors to develop and deliver good
communication projects.
The operational perspective of the impactf
and value added of communication work
was often profoundly different compared
to the models applied by communication
professionals. In addition, few projects
had ways of capturing the value of the process
of coco o ffc cos,
focss s o sf bsopo of
foo o sss. t s pol
here for development of more holistic ways of
capturing the impact of communication work.
M&E and capture exercises were oftenf
regarded as low priority, formulated in
terms of baseline and endline models and
were seen as requiring additional capacity
and resources. In practice, models that were
fully integrated into the project and generated
constant data were more effective and useful as the
y col lso b f cly bc
into operations and project development.
Methodologyad termiology
methodologyThe bjective this study was t identiy best
practice mdels in cmmunicatin with aected
ppulatins as implemented by humanitarians
wrking in Haiti in 2010. The study des nt aim t
be a cmprehensive verview all cmmunicatin
prjects launched in Haiti since January 2010.
The bjective is rather t identiy, present and
analyse sme prjects that had prven eective,
particularly thse which had emplyed innvative
techniques r mdels r which were new t
the rganisatins in questin. A key prblem incarrying ut the research was the verall lack
capture and M&E that has been cnducted t
date. In determining eectiveness, therere, the
researchers drew n what material was available.
They used bservatin in the eld, cnducted
cus grups, and gauged perceptins agency
sta, and where pssible, survivrs, as t the
value cmmunicatin wrk.
Particular erts were made t identiy and
capture activities that ccurred utside the
sphere the internatinal humanitarian respnse,
including initiatives launched independentlyby lcal media, technlgy actrs and lcal
authrities. Frm amng these, the bjective was
t identiy the mst successul slutins and
mdels and prvide sme insight int why they
may have been eective, and what ideas they
may be able t prvide r uture respnses. The
research cvers cmmunicatin as part the
respnse t bth the earthquake and chlera
emergencies, and t a lesser extent the hurricane.
This study was researched thrugh a prcess
in-depth interviews with a wide range actrs
invlved with the multiple emergency respnseslaunched in Haiti in 2010 (including survivrs),
a series site/eld visits t nging prjects,
a review all existing literature and a series
cus grups in Haiti cmmissined by inasaid.
The apprach was almst entirely qualitative and
cussed as much as pssible n the experiences
Haitians, including lcal authrities, media, civil
sciety partners and aid agency beneciaries.
Fieldwrk was carried ut between February and
May 2011 with subsequent peer review chapters
and case studies taking place between May and
July 2011.
Mst interviews were cnducted inrmally and
cnsisted an initial preliminary discussin
llwed where necessary by llw-up
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a Ki y P ( pk) 12 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
interviews t lk in-depth at a particular prject.
Mst interviews were taped t ensure accuracy,
althugh interviewees were all given the ptin
nt being recrded (nly ne made this request) and
mst spke n the understanding that they wuld
nt be quted by name. Fr mst case studies
several sta members were interviewed, with a
particular emphasis n the experiences lcal
sta. Cnversatins with disaster survivrs were
held, wherever pssible, withut the presence
anyne rm any the rganisatins wrking in their
cmmunities.The cus grup discussins were cnducted by
a lcal Haitian grup n behal inasaid, and
cnsisted 15 grups held in rural and urban areas,
specically Prt au Prince, Legane and St Marc.
The rural grups were split between earthquake and
nn-earthquake aected areas. Cmments cited in
this paper rm Haitian surces are, unless therwise
surced, taken rm these discussins.
Amng ther imprtant data surces r this study
were the audience research reprts prduced
rtnightly by Internews, which analysed inrmatin
needs and access, initially in earthquake-aectedareas but subsequently in ther parts Haiti.
termInology
Thrughut this study the term cmmunicatin
relates, unless therwise specied, t cmmunicatin
between prviders and cmmunities aected by
disasters in Haiti in 2010. This is regarded as distinct
rm cmmunicatin with internatinal media,
external relatins and public inrmatin.
As ar as pssible, this paper als avids use the cncept the beneciary, n the basis that
this term rames disaster survivrs primarily as
recipients assistances r surces data, rather
than practive agents and architects their wn
recvery. It is als generally used t designate ne
specic grup in disaster respnse thse wh havebeen physically r materially impacted and thus is
hard t use t encmpass ther grups essential t
eective cmmunicatin such as the diaspra, r
Haitians ptentially aected by a disaster such as
chlera. Mre imprtantly, given that cmmunicatin
with aected cmmunities is abut equal dialgue
and empwerment, the extent t which lcal
actrs are essential t eective cmmunicatin
and the leadership prvided by lcal specialists in
cmmunicatin, the cncept beneciary was elt
t be bth limiting and at dds with the philsphy
behind this area wrk. The terms survivr, and
aected cmmunity have been preerred wherever
pssible.
ii i dd jc i igi y w i vgii, bbC W t Iw. I c ii y iiig cc iy ii vi
ii ci g iv iicg i ciic w y w gci. Ii jciv g cciy i gci ii cici ci. I vi i c gci i i wi igci i i w-wycici wi c i.
Yv G Cy ii ic c fi wi w i .
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a Ki y P ( pk) 13 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
AT 4.53PM LOCAL TIME o Jy 12 2010,
ly bs of so hthat includes Leogane, Jacmel, Petit Goave
and the capital, Port au Prince, was struck
by a shallow 7.0 earthquake lasting approximately 35
scos. t ol spos s ss
, o ls os coplx of
o, ps ls scl ploy of
scs, pclly
cluster system, and the largest surge of private nancial
sppo fo cy sc 2004.
This chapter will analyse the most important
elements of communication work in the early days and
weeks of the response to the earthquake, drawing oninterviews with actors at the time and where possible
on surviving reports and data (of which there is very
little). It will look particularly at local media initiatives
pspcv, opol pc of
communication work, and the response of specialist
media NGOs and international aid agencies. It will
fy ovos vlops, pov
coos o bl o copsv
coco spos of x ss.
Chapter 1Respodigto the earthquake
Key IndIngs
dic cciy f cici,icig c ggi, i i i y .
eciv cicif
c icic iivy i, w ig viv ii.
a cicif i gcy c igiig y.
mi vfgii iv i gcy
y ii y,icig , i.
tw-wy cicify, wic ig w ii ii, vi iy i i
i .c y f ig y c c c i icy cii-ig v , w i .
pviig c f iic i i
ycci ci i i.
c--c icifi y civ cici,wic iycci c viv.
mg iif cici i y.
a iv i i c
gw, cii igig c v i.
Cici f c ii ig civ,icy i c Cegcy r (Cer) egcy
r ri (err) w i i cyy v i.
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a Ki y P ( pk) 14 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
Iormatio adcommuicatio aterthe earthquake
desPerate to KnoW
t fo foo of
survivors to communicate was overwhelming from the
rst hours after the disaster. It manifested in various
different ways, from hundreds of people arriving atlocal radio stations looking for assistance with family
reunication to those trapped under the rubble using
mobile phones to call for help. Most of this early trafc
happened outside the international aid framework,
as people used tools and systems they already knew:
fs, fly, locl coy ls o
stations, who quickly organised themselves into
information hubs for whole communities.
Anecdotally, use of communications technology was
lso pos. mobl po c bc vbl
business for anyone with an electricity connection while
po copy dcl, op f csvc s p of s spos1 ( o po o
rate for 15 minutes of charge time was 40 gourde,
roughly one dollar equivalent to a days income for
many Haitians). The instant popularity of the Internews
emergency humanitarian radio show, ENDK, which
b bocs ly ys f
was played by some stations up to six times a day (the
show is still carried for free by more than 30 stations),
the overwhelming demand at radio distributions, and
spos o fbc syss, ll clly spo
to a desperate need to know what was going on, where
aid was available and how to access assistance.
destroyed In a tIme ogreatest need
as o cs, s fo foo
o coc c xcly po
the communications infrastructure was itself seriously
damaged by the earthquake. At least 31 local journalists
died and many others were injured.2 Several radio
stations collapsed completely, while those whose staff
and buildings survived lost income and were unable
1 lg, t. C p ri h sv liv a hii Q,Reuters,Jy 24 2010.
2 Ims i ic
o py sls, ply bcs vs
bs collps.Le Nouvelliste, hs py ly
newspaper, lost its printing press and began publishing
online. Digicel and Voila, the two major phone
cops, lso sff fo s of psol
and damage to towers and other infrastructure.
o cci b c i w iw b k. I wi i w b p b
i b b i w wb.hrold Jean-ranCoIs,dIreCtor o radIo Ibo3
Haitis few landlines appear to have been less
ffc. i cocos so ps of
ffc lso pp o v svv b
mobile phone networks anecdotally, some people
managed to make contact with those outside the
country on Skype and social media in the earliest hours,
although based on the records of systems such as Twitterthis only applied to a few.
hoW the loCal medIaresPonded
Despite the devastation and their own personal
suffering, many local journalists and radio stations in
particular went to extraordinary lengths to stay on air,
and to use the radio medium as a way to help people.
Stations that suffered minimal destruction, such as
Radio 1 and Signal FM, began special broadcasts within
24 hours of the earthquake. Stations that were badlyhit, such as Radio Caraibes whose building collapsed,
salvaged what equipment they could and constructed
sf sos pblc spcs o s:
Caraibes FM was back on air three days later. In
Petit Goave, where all stations were badly damaged,
journalists saved what equipment they could and used
o bl copos so bc of c
worked together to get a shared broadcast on air with no
sppo fo ol spos.
rspo o fo lss, y sos
b fco los ly s foo
hubs. Radio 1, which broadcasts nationwide and has
3 Q i ri si sgg t sy o ai, Ims wi, mc 31 2010.
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a Ki y P ( pk) 15 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
an international phone line, was the focus for anyone
wanting to connect with loved ones outside Port au
Prince and in the diaspora. Many survivors had no
specic message but just wanted to talk about what
had happened to them. Even radio stations that were
o bly s p copos s
for those who were too scared to go into buildings
because of the aftershocks. Several Haitian journalists
were keen to stress the psychosocial importance of
communication, both in interviews for this research andelsewhere.
t ppi p, w i.patrICk moussIGnaC,radIo CaraIbes statIon dIreCtor4
From the earliest days there was also a spontaneous
effort, led by the big broadcasters in Port au Prince, to
work together. Members of the media associations met
to debate their response. All were struggling to handle
4 Cy, J.r. hii ri t Ci l I oc, n I mii, g t Ci pci Ji, Jy 28 2010.
reporting: moving around the city was hard, and few
had fuel for transport. Many journalists were also
looking after their families, and were spending days in
lo s fo sssc.
The role of local media (and the work of the Volunteer
tcoloy Cos) lso l
c of spo s y foo ply
spos. as foo ss, hs bo
were desperately looking for news of loved ones and
trying to nd ways to provide assistance. They werebl o sppo spos cly by pov locl
knowledge, translation support and technical expertise.
acol vc lso sss hs
living in other countries were important information
gatekeepers: English speaking, with access to the
Internet (and thus the web platforms of international
cs), bl o sc pocvly fo foo.
t po ol spo ply o
spcs of h spos (voccy fs
fo cy sssc, pss o ol
political gures, and direct nancial support to
svvos o cs) s o ssl odiaspora responses elsewhere, notably in Burma after
hc ns. ts sss cos
sIgnal m andemergenCy medIa viv q, c i ic i viv i y q. y, y w y wy w w gig . ty w c i, c ciy ig i viv w .
sig m i i w ii i p pic, w w c y q ( i viv). Wii w q, iv g c wy .
t i qicy i i ii cg c, wi
q i wig c q , iig j ii. sig m wy w c. dc, gi,igi cgy w i. ty w wi i, w i w , w y c c ici , wic i w , i c iv. ty yc iv. Ww i cy, y i Ceo,mi Vi.
o w, eci dy, c sig m i y q iig , J ci, w w y i q.li , w c, g i iv.1
sig m y i iiy. ti i c wi y y hii v; igi gv sig m ii wi ciiz i hii cc ; y i i i i us, C c c sig m c.2 hiii q i sig m c q ii ihii ig iv i c .
tg i i, y icsig m civ w gv ivy
g w i . a wiy i, sig m w i i iy hiii y i. li g w ji ciwig.
sic q, sig m c g- i hii ig gci.
1 Wii, t. sig m pvi lii i hii, la ti, y 1 2010.
2 Ii.
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a Ki y P ( pk) 16 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
s cpcs of spos f sposs
could bear considerable fruit for those working on
coco.
alos ll locl opos po
their emergency broadcasting services with little or no
sssc fo yo o coy. ts
was partly because few specialist media NGOs are at
present well prepared to handle emergencies. Measures
sc s sby f, socpl bsc p,
agreements with humanitarian responders to ensure
journalists can access supplies such as food and tents,
cs s fo fl o ssl sppls
in-country, would make a dramatic difference.
t h xpc lso l pocof xing existing communications networks as quickly
s possbl. mc s b , fo xpl, of
fact that survivors in Haiti could SMS and call from
under the rubble. With an overloaded Urban Search and
Rescue (USAR) system, this information was mostly
important to local friends and family who identied
o y svvos. By s o,
most effective communication work in the crucial few
days after the quake was carried out by local media:
journalists embedded with civil society networks,
who knew and were trusted by their audience and
were profoundly committed to serving their listeners.Mapping, engaging with and supporting such efforts
s b poy f sss.
hoW loCal teleComsComPanIes resPonded
In the early days after the earthquake, Voila (who
was operational within two days of the earthquake)
dcl spo posvly o lpl ss
from NGOs to send out information via SMS to their
sbscb bs -ffc .
The information from NGOs, however, quickly andunintentionally became perceived as spamming by
sbscbs.5 There was little consistency in content and
ccl lcs l o ovlo sys, lvy
of the same SMS multiple times and long delays in
ss ssso.
For commercial as well as humanitarian reasons,
both companies ceased working with free-for-all
systems within weeks to protect their customer base.
ioclly, cocl pv s
ffc of foc cooo css. dcls
insistence that they would not work on the cholera
response with organisations and content not fully
5 tc ci i hii iic -ii g i i y.
sanctioned by the Ministry of Public Health, the World
Health Organisation (WHO) or the Red Cross was
bs o o poc po s
that their customers associated Digicel with reliable
information, as well as the need to limit partnerships
for the sake of their own internal capacity. Telecoms
cops h lso pp o v b c o
ssv o s s ngO sco. as
David Sharpe, Head of Products at Digicel, puts it, We
listen to our end stakeholders the customer.
t spos o lso pcp
arrival of a number of new international actors from
coloy coy. us, Csspps,
toso rs Foo (trF) b ofos ll lc ffos o pov sssc, svl
of them explicitly in the context of improving two-way
communication between international responders and
survivors. The efcacy of such systems has been widely
debated elsewhere and this paper does not propose to go
ov s o.6
hoW sPeCIalIstmedIa organIsatIonsresPonded
Media organisations already present in Haiti were
also badly hit by the disaster but when they recovered,
their response was one of the swiftest ever launched.7
Using existing funding, Internews were able to
scale up in days and launch the ENDK radio show.
Organisations like International Media Support (IMS),
amarC (Wol assoco of Coy ro
Broadcasters), Internews and Reporters sans Frontires
(RSF) collaborated to produce emergency assessments
of impact on local media. They launched their own
responses, which included provision of a centre for
ssocos pp c, s
well as trauma counselling and support for staff.Initial assessments of journalists killed, injured
and traumatised were made by the Association of
Haitian Journalists (AJH) supported by IMS, who
also worked with AJH and the Ministry of Culture and
Communication to ensure that journalists received basic
humanitarian assistance such as tents. Some support
was given to replace equipment, but much of it came late
so v ll.
6 s kcic, n, mc, n, mw, n, pic. a. I evi uii hii pjc, p pic, ai 2011, dv Iisy Ii digic C, J Cwy, J.Disaster Relief 2.0:the future of information sharing in emergencies, g .
7 i yi mi, Ii sy Cii:l hii i y kig i, Jy 2011.
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a Ki y P ( pk) 17 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
hoW InternatIonal aIdagenCIes resPonded
Humanitarian agencies overwhelmed by the scale
of the disaster and and for many the impact on
their own staff and ofces mostly did not prioritise
communication with affected communities. Surprisingly
few of those with a long-term presence had localKreyol
sp spospopl, los ll focss o
ol los.The result of this was also a marginalisation of the
locl . as un cs os sbls
operations at the airport, so press conferences were held
at the UN base outside the centre of town, a facility that
local journalists had difculty accessing for months
after the earthquake. Press releases, situation reports
and press conferences were all in English with few
osos pov Fc slos. gv
the lack of dedicated local communication staff, few
organisations were prepared to spend any time going to
local radio studios and giving interviews or explaining
their work.Those that did, however, found that communicating
did not just help ll the information vacuum among
ffc poplo, lv cosbl
operational benets. After the rst food distributions
proved chaotic, WFP decided that one of the best
ways to improve their system was to make sure people
understood how it worked (see case study above).
ao oso p cosbl
rewards for prioritising local communication was the
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). The agency
sourced a Haitian American spokesperson with uent
Kreyolas a matter of urgency. Explicitly tasked withsppo locl coco, o o l
international media, he worked with the gender-based
volc o co bocs ss of pblc
service announcements (PSAs) with advice for victims.
Based on anecdotal feedback, UNFPA say the response
to the PSAs helped convince thePolice Nationale dHaiti
o sp p pols cps.
the storyo mr rICeI i c hii q gcy,giig g-c iii ii viv w gcg iii iiiw cic. rcii ivc iii w i yiy g , w y v g ic.t iv iii, Wpic vc y cii, i c, iq pi,
c Kreyolic iicig.
iq w iw Wp i w c i. tgCdaC hii, Wp ccwi endk, mInustah m c i i. I i , gv 150iviw, qicy c iviw w ic m ric
y c i. W yw i w iq i w vy y.h w ig icwi y g igi iig w
c y w w, y Jc Qii,Iw iici i.
t ic iiw y c iq w civ vyi i. I c cy, g ig i
g c i. dig w , civ 127 sms. p wyig I i d, w c. t c I ciy , I i v bcy i Iiv c y y c cig sms. Ici y z. I wvy i cig. I wgig sms i, c
2 I w wy w.
mc pi, Wp h Cici, i c c i i cii-ig c, ig Wp
qicy y .ti i w Wp w ig vc i w icv yw ig c . t gcy i i gig i vc w ig w ig.
a c gcy jc, m&e w ci i
w. iq pi jg iw cc iviw ci i, c sms g cii. Wi cwgig c i ,mc pi iv cici w w vi iiiig ii ip pic i ic.
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a Ki y P ( pk) 18 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
t b i I I i i c p w picip i c i iii ii c i i i ii i.dImItrY leGer, unpa spokesperson
engagIng WIthhumanItarIans
Aside from projects such as ENDK, local media
reported that they found it difcult and frustrating
to engage with humanitarian organisations. From
pobls o scy un bs o
pss cofcs o l bs, y of
found humanitarian organisations hard to access when
y foo.
L o spclly col cy,
local radio in particular was sometimes unappreciative
of osos xpc o pov
for free. Having said that, two key humanitarian radio
shows ENDK and the IOM project Chimen Lakay(Kreyolfor The Way Home) are currently broadcast
fo f by p sos. a spos v vy
v opos of py fo , b o sos
were very clear that international organisations needed
o s y cocl s fo
whom air and production time are commodities.
Journalists would have welcomed further
engagement with humanitarian agencies. However,
lack of strategic working relationships between
cs locl s v, v ov
y f , spclly fo os poo
dialogue and discussion rather than just disseminating
foo.
t ii p i ciciwi bcii, wi sms cci. t i b cpip wi c i, w i b cicic.JaCQues desrosIer,General seCretarY, aJh
Cross-cuttigad system-leelcommuicatiomodels
eedBaCK and
tWo-WayCommunICatIon
O of os obl coco po
of the Haiti response was the dramatically increased
ability of survivors to interact with aid agencies
cop o ps spos. t lvls of obl
phone ownership and use (8090 percent) among
survivors was a key factor, as was the clear desire of
populations to engage with aid agencies.8 Fo xpl,
when Internews established an SMS contact number
for listeners to their ENDK radio show they received
800 messages in 24 hours. Community mobilisers also
po svvos xpc o s ponumbers, and then expected to be able to call when they
sos.
Of the agencies interviewed for this paper, few
established feedback systems within the earliest phase
of the response (with the exception of Internews).
Oxfam and World Vision International (WVI) were
among the rst, establishing feedback and community-
bs syss s p of spcy
accountability work about a month after the disaster.
Internews developed an SMS-based system with a
8 ti g vi ccig i i cc i iig -q i. Iw c cc i y2011 i g vyig i q-c wi v 85 c i c 90 c i.
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a Ki y P ( pk) 19 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
sl obl po b cll co
messages through a software programme, which then
cp clo . ty locl
sff b o oo lys co. WVisbls fbc sys bs o coy
scssos (fo o o s s Cp 3). Oxf
Care lso sbls lpls fo svvos, bo
sff by sl ol sff b.
isly, y cs o s p
fbc syss xpss sos svos bo
such systems which led them to discount the idea.
Many thought that they were expensive and difcult to
manage, that agencies would be overwhelmed with calls,
that most callers would be angry and frustrated and that
it would be impossible to answer the many questions
s, l o f fso .Those who did set up feedback systems, however,
fo sc po o fs
or were more manageable than expected. While the
volume of inquiries was considerable at the start, it
was not unmanageable. Noula (see p 66 fo cs
sy) po of vy 100 clls, o were angry. As Fedrique Pierre noted in his experience
with WFP, most were happy to have made contact,
appreciative that someone was making the effort to
ls o , os of sos y s
were basic and relatively easy to log and answer. All also
found that the feedback was invaluable in assisting them
o l- foo o svvos s,
cocs pcpos.
acs o sbls fbc syss,
meanwhile, often found that like F their
community mobilisers were compensating for this
by v psol po bs o svvos, l o psol sss
fco sys fo l s
endKand theeedBaCKsystem
Vy y i jc Iw wig endki i y ic c i qiw i, ciy i vi w vig c c w ic. Ji gig c endk w ig viv w qi ic,
qi wic ji w. t ci i c sms (w ci cciy c). t y iiiy i w g y ccicig c, c sImc.
Iigy, v icii cicii w ci iig c y.
my cc i i wc, i w v, c w w w y i
c w wy i.a iiiy i i vw cciy ci i g. W w wy iig yy w ici, i
Jc Qii, Iwii ci i.
I 24 endki civ 800sms g. I w c yic cw cy. W i ok,w w w ig wi iii? i Iw . l c i c
qi w wc i. sms wc icy i wy c icy gg i c .
t cc i iw c ii qi cy cc i, jic w wi v
ii gvi c w. I w gy .I c c g y w -i j, ciy
yi w i v v jg. I i w iiiy -i .
t cc i
y w i endkv c gy iggig ic ii cc iendk gig. a i c -cigg ( w c y sms) i i iv ic c ici w y
. I wv v y i giig ig ii cii,ciy i y y wendk ig . tyi wiy i iiciy.
t i i w i i c.ev w, v y , wciv v 150 g
i y. pvyw, v hii ivig, y wi i sms qi w g ic,y c endk i.
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a Ki y P ( pk) 20 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
col o b poply sppo, o s o
vl fo opos polcy .
t endk cs sy llss clly lpl
uses of a single feedback system, how important such a
system can be to the programmes audience, and how
c c sp ol ll
issues. In particular, it is worth noting that because the
ENDK feedback system was not limited to the provision
of international aid, and the system was open (people
could raise whatever issues they liked) it also provided
cl fo sos o o fos of sssc.In particular, the system was instrumental in letting
survivors know the importance of replacing personal
documents, such as birth certicates, and how to
register deaths. These were not captured as important
o sl s sssss.
A nal gap that needs to be lled is the capacity to
oo ly ys of spos. ts
point was raised by WFP, who had no capacity to track
their own campaigns, and by other CDAC staff members
who said they would have found summaries of local
news broadcasts extremely helpful. The United Nations
Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) carriedo ly oo Fc b v s
capacity was unusual and the monitoring was never
geared towards humanitarian responders. Good media
monitoring would be another very effective way of real
cp of cocs sss o svvos.
aCe-to-aCeCommunICatIon InemergenCy resPonse
The need to work fast and to reach as many
popl s possbl s cloc of s
coco cy spos fls oa question of how to work with media. Investing in
c s, sc s coy oblss, o
handle face-to-face interaction is seen as expensive, slow
ffcv.
Aid agencies who did establish teams of community
mobilisers or community liaison staff, or who were
fo o o v sc s fo bfo
the earthquake (such as Concern), however, found
s vs p off. Fsly, fc-o-fc
exchange is often the only way to share certain kinds of
information, such as practical advice on hand washing
or demonstrating how to secure a tent. Secondly, itis very much valued by survivors who often want the
cc o l v fsos. t iol
Oso fo mo (iOm) coy
unoPs and earlyuse o CommunItymoBIlIserst unops jc miiy pic
W i ig g iig ip pic g y q,wi ciy ii iiiiv. t w cig vi iviy
y i jc (c cici, cigy ycgy) i ci w.
iy ii w ci g gig cii q. ty w
cc wi ii c w j c .
i w i y wgig gv i , w w i gv, i sg mw, pgmg. W w gig qi v cvy. W w, w w c g ii.
bc unops w cig v wi c qi, i y c
ii i wi iic. t v y, jc w i iw c i c ii i.
W g ci c i w j vwig. W w ig2,000 y! I g givig ig CCCm [C Cii C mg] c ig, j yig w w wig, i mw.
Ciy ii v y v yig ycci , y j w . W v y ycci i w i i w i i , i .
l i , ciy iii c v gic unops i, viig ii ci w i c y iig ig iigi, cic ic f vi y wigy. ty c g-c cii cici cig iic w c.
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a Ki y P ( pk) 21 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
mobilisation team, for example, frequently went to
cps o fcl scsso xpl pco
initiatives before they were launched as a way of keeping
sos cl coy losps soo.
For organisations without the capacity to recruit
dedicated community mobilisers, it is worth noting
that the most common need identied by mobilisers
interviewed for this research was for basic training coco. Osos col sol
provide this to any national project staff member who
interacts with communities on a regular basis, especially
to new recruits.
the role o CdaC haItI
The Haiti response saw the rst effort to tackle
coco sys lvl fo of
eld-level coordination and support mechanism
for communication with communities called CDACHaiti. It was initiated by the CDAC global network,
founded in 2009 by a group of agencies to improve
communication with disaster-affected people. CDAC
cosss of vlop osos cl
Internews, the BBC World Service Trust and IMS as well
as humanitarian aid agencies such as Save the Children
and the United Nations Ofce for the Coordination of
h affs (OCha).
Because this was CDACs rst operation, there was
no template for what CDAC Haiti should be. CDAC
ps o o fo b by p o
coordinate communication work between those global
partners who had deployed mostly specialist media
organisations and by reaching out to aid agencies.Following a request by OCHA, Internews took the role of
l cy os v.
Fo s y pc CdaC s coss-cls
service that provided access to newly-established
coco cls sc s endk, ecy
Information Service (EIS), BBC broadcasts and
MINUSTAH FM. By March, however, 1520 agencies
were participating regularly and nding the service
sfl.
CdaC h lso oo o ss sc s coo
coco cos by os s;
c coc lss; poc so pos ococo cvs; sppo pplcos
fo f; coo s sssss of locl
; poo bocs s fcs fo
CdaC hii ig, nv 2011.
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a Ki y P ( pk) 22 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
Recommedatios
emergency radio programming via SMS; and developing
coc lss of locl fo s by cs.
Within a few weeks, CDAC built partnerships
with key clusters, the Ministry of Culture and
Communication and MINUSTAH, and was functioning
as an information-sharing focal point for all working
in this eld, helping to minimise duplication, ensuring
information was consistent and accurate, and
voc coosly o blf of ll cos fo b
communication with earthquake survivors.
a i w CdaC
p b iip wic i b ii p bi w p. B ip i w w wki w t c i w - cii ciw pi iw b pic.undaC CommunICatIon sta, port
au prInCe, marCh 2010
There is also no question, however, that the lack of
s of fc o cly o xc ol of
CdaC h c cofso o so ps
those with whom they sought to interact. Managing the
system also placed a considerable burden on Internews
s l cy.
Despite initial attempts, CDAC was also not
successful at connecting with the local communications
sector, including telecoms companies. However given
the experimental nature of CDAC, the fact that few
participants had any prior knowledge of Haiti and
the extreme environment in which the responsewas launched, this is understandable. The Haiti
experience does however underscore the need to
bo coco s psps
s p of cy spos pl ss
risk reduction work at country level, to ensure the
cocvy c pp s soo s possbl (fo o o
CdaC s Cp 4).
I ii i, igf
cici w ii iiy. ti icig -i icci ig c i vic. ti iiy v vig w c,ciy y gii wi iig c c i-cy / i civii y w w.
t ii y f
ii gci cgi ic cici c i c cc i ivy ii ic. I cic,i:
Reorming humanitarian unding criteria to
include communication work as a legitimate
orm o humanitarian assistance (both in
terms o standalone projects and as an
integrated part o technical operations),
particularly CERF and ERRF.
Prioritising the provision o inormation to
aected communities at cluster level during a
response.
Implementing key recommendations below
or individual agencies, including providing
technical support and resources or
communication rom the very earliest days o
a response.
Developing ways o listening to and analysing
eedback rom survivors
a cii cif cici i i i i i gci vi ici, vi ci cc ii, ii y ivciv cici wi ccii.
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a Ki y P ( pk) 23 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
or medIadeveloPmentorganIsatIons
dv .f mi vgii v i c ic i ci, c iiy iigiiiiv y w y c v.
egcy ig.f t cici
c w gy yig gcy , cc gcy ig cic Cer. a i c i , i civiiiy i i c wi .
s c i.f egcy i ccic c ci :
Replacing basic technical equipment and
providing technical capacity to repair what is
difcult to replace (such as transmitters).
Providing basic humanitarian assistance to
sta (tents, ood, water, psychosocial support).
Supporting agencies should work with
humanitarian agencies to source such supplies
rather than seek to procure or manage them
themselves.
Access to supplies such as uel or generators
(either through cash grants or closer workingrelations with the Logistics Cluster).
Providing support services to acilitate
production, including Internet access, mobile
phone credit, support with transport etc.
G ig ic.f e
cici c i ciw cig yigw vivig i wi cic, j g ic i. cii giv c. pi i, , w qy ii ihii i c w icy i w i icw y ifi, viig i y i w i.
or humanItarIanorganIsatIons
pvi cic fcici wi c cii . ei ci i icii/ i w, ci c cici iiy cicywi ig i-cy cici.
lc gg.f m cici i c ic gg vi i.
ei w-wy cicifci .e i sms/w- g i, ivc g c c c.
p g cici wf ig jc ig.
Iv i ciy ii c--fc cici cciy .
Ic wi- i i iii f- i. l ic c, usb , cg c., ig i i ic cic ci g c w.
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a Ki y P ( pk) 24 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
THIS CHAPTER WILL LOOK
coco spos o col
outbreak in October 2010. Starting with an
analysis of key tools, the chapter will then look
at how the cholera information campaign played out
at eld level and outline the lessons learnt for greater
impact and for future responses. In particular, it will
focus on the importance of listening, of work that
exposed the gulf between Haitian and international
pcpos of col, opol pc of
ffcv coco.
As well as describing the cholera response, this
chapter will lay out some of the key aspects of the
communication work around cholera, identifying
strengths and weaknesses in approach. It will also
note the value of investment not just in communication
capacity but also in research, as a way of capturing
perceptions, allowing campaigns to evolve, and of
pc.
Chapter 2Respodig tothe choleraemergecy
Key IndIngs
t iig cicifcciy i cy, iic jcv q,w i i cig wi ii cig.
C y v fw i i hii, iw i g c ivicig ig,i ic ic iicc.
pic ii fgig w cic icc iic, i y c i ci i.
c--cf
cici, ig iig w ciicyi c iciv ic ciw c.
t civf icw w qicy c yi gii c
ig iv ii.
eciv c yfiv y v:gig c iici ci iig cc, c c iy, c c im&e.
Wi c icfci cig cvi icvi , iiv yw iv cc cii c c .
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a Ki y P ( pk) 25 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
Cholera ad thehumaitariarespose
hs col ob b o of
St Marc, a small town in Artibonite in late October
2010 and was ofcially conrmed four days into the
pc o Ocob 21s. By apl 2010, of
a million people had developed symptoms, an ofcial
gure certain to be lower than the real number due to
difculties of accurate data collection in rural areas.The outbreak was unexpected as Haiti had no history
of col s sssss c o by
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention after the
earthquake had identied the chances of a cholera
outbreak as low.
From an operational point of view, the
communication response to cholera is the story of how
so y of syss socs s p f
bc cclly po. Osos
that had invested in communication work such as IFRC
iOm cpcy ools sposl
could be mobilised within hours and which becamecentral to the response. Several organisations had teams
of experienced community mobilisers who were able to
begin mass face-to-face cholera prevention work within
ys.
Radio projects such as ENDK, Chimen Lakay
the IFRC broadcasts on Radio 1 were well established,
with experienced staff and audiences that trusted them
as information sources. The Hygiene Promotion Sub
Cls b cps fo svl os,
s os fo c popl
in basic hygiene. And while Haiti had not experienced
col ob bfo, fc ss s
well understood, easy to prevent and easy to treat meanty sss col b cly vlop s p-
existing global consensus on how to handle the disease.
i o, spos ly
dedicated communication coordination mechanism
CdaC h.
Advocacy for communication work was also made
f s by fc col s cos by
s s pblc foo cy.
The dramatic difference in the speed with which
communication projects were developed, resources
obls sol co o
communication work compared to the earthquakeresponse was marked.
t s co of msy of
Public Health was also a factor, particularly in ensuring
cosscy of y sss by sbls c
Co fo dvlop L mls,
and leveraging many existing relationships with
ps.
nvlss, col spos l
how, despite considerable efforts and groundbreaking
work within the sector, the public information capacity
available to humanitarian response was still inadequate.
CDAC Haiti, still an experimental initiative, with only
three staff and no formal status yet, was expected to play
ol of fll-scl cls. t hl Cls l cpcy xps cls lvl.
Cholera ad mediatechology
The cholera outbreak also came at a time when many
of colocl foo-s ovos
sbls h f , bco flly-
edged partnerships.iFrC iOm b os foo blss
with the key messages, developed by the Ministry of
Public Health and partners. IFRC also uploaded cholera
foo o o *733 l. a s
, msy of Cl Coco
established a call centre in partnership with Digicel.
dcl lso sbls b of ls s
of ov, cl b o cll fo
collco of bos o fo blc
services. Digicel also developed a system whereby
subscribers who travelled through cholera hotspots
were automatically sent an SMS with a warning andvc.
It is difcult to compare the experiences of the two
call centre systems one automated (IFRC), one with
C cig i. CopYrIGht Who
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a Ki y P ( pk) 26 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
ls sff by ploys (msy of Cl
Communication) as neither carried out any kind of
vlo sys. acol vc sss
msy of Cl Cocos *300 b
was hard to get through on, given that only four people
were taking calls at the beginning. Call centre staff
were oriented on cholera prevention and response
during Ministry of Public Health press conferences
while questions asked on the helpline were fed directly
bc o pss cofcs so y col b pblcly
ss by xps.1
Once again, however, the technology experience
col focs poc of ls
vlop cpcy o l sos. iFrC po130,000 clls ol o icv Voc rspos
system, promoted via SMS, although there is no way
at present to gauge how many of those people felt the
information on the system reected their needs. Digicel
reported that their SMS blasts, in partnership with the
Ministry of Public Health, resulted in large numbers of
people calling the Digicel customer call centre, which
overwhelmed staff not trained on cholera. The Noula
system had a similar experience, with call centre
operations staff put in the position of having to answer
questions on a disease with no technical background or
sppo.
W w c c c. Pp c k, w i c? W I w f?...Pp i i .daVId sharpe, head o produCts atdIGICel
Choleraad local media
As with the earthquake, the local media response
was swift. Radio 1 broadcast a special two-hour
po, s foo fo lobl WhO
website, the day before the ofcial conrmation of
cholera. The Ministry of Public Health was also quick
o p o o spos sb o locl
1 Iviw wi Ji si, usaId cic miiy C Cici, mc 3 2011.
journalists, and from the start held daily press briengs
with experts present to answer questions. Many radio
sos bocs pss cofc lv
every day. Stations like Radio 1 also acted on their
own initiative, commissioning local artists to record
messages and PSAs about cholera prevention and cure.
On other stations, especially local broadcasters who
lss ccss o cc foo, ly
of information was in some cases much lower, with
rumours and misunderstandings nding their way onto
the airwaves.
Local media could, however, be resistant to requests
fo f , fo po o
spots. This was partly because the cholera epidemicstruck just before the election, and many stations had
ly p-sol o cs,
valuable revenue (this was particularly an issue in
Artibonite). Other stations were happy to broadcast
Ministry of Public Health spots, although there were
logistical challenges in delivering PSAs to stations.
Training in cholera and reporting was also made
vlbl o locl vy cly o
initiative by the United Nations Educational, Scientic
and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and AJH. Both
organisations found medical staff in all major Haitian
cities that could brief local media. This was mostlyos o psol cocs losps
bl o CdaC h. aJh lso co
previous disaster risk reduction training for media was
useful for cholera, as journalists were able to leverage
ov cocs vlop .2
Radio was of primary value to the cholera response.
O ps t nv l govs, fo
example, described how he had rst heard about
cholera from listening to his radio the only one in
vll. rcos cy of so,
cl col foo s sos. ul
IOM community mobilisers reached the town in early
December, the priests sermons were the only source offoo fo popl.
The iewrom the feld
In line with classic public health education
ooloy, col cp h focss
o fy y sss bo pvo
2 Jcq di, G scy aJh, iviw mc 23 2011.
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a Ki y P ( pk) 27 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
spos o s y popl s
possbl v s y cls s possbl. t
foo ss oo cl ccl
foo, pclly o psol cos (
washing, water purication, symptom identication)
and packaged it in a way intended to make it easy to
understand and implement. Posters, radio, TV, SMS and
community mobilisers were the primary channels for
sso of foo.
i pcc, s ppoc los. t
fc h v xpc col bfo
led many organisations to think they were starting
from a zero sum of knowledge of cholera. In practice,hs s xs cll, los socl
beliefs to interpret the disease. While cholera was
medically new, Haitis narratives of disease (especially
hiV), fc coy by oss
sppo cy spos ll sp
ly pcpos of col s cos
o . ts fs lly s fsl o blv
cholera was a disease and that it was a deliberate
p by oss o ll hs.
The practical consequences of this were considerable.
Fo xpl, 200-b col c
St Marc, which was built to relieve the overcrowdedlocal hospital, was burnt to the ground by the local
community two days after it was completed. This
pattern was quickly repeated elsewhere, with
communities preventing construction, taking down or
c xs fcls. t sspo col
was not an illness led to the belief that it was a voodoo
curse. By December, 45 male and female voodoo priests
b lyc f b bl fo sp
cholera deliberately, most of them in the South.3
Such incidents, especially the rejection of the
col cs, c
coy by sps. t cy of so
o sbls cs s cly
s possbl, y osos
assumed that communities would understand that these
facilities were intended to help, and had not explainedor discussed them with surrounding communities.
The nature and function of the centres were also not
ss y of ly ss, lo s
changed after the incident in St Marc.
Oc col popl obsv los
all patients who went for treatment recovered, their
s sf. ts llss fo
communication work to evolve and adapt according
o ccscs, o l fo ps of
response. Evidence from the eld suggests that those
osos oo o lo-bs ppoc
o coco, sc s h r Coss
3 hii g c i-v ycig,Reuters, dc 23 2010.
hrC andPerCePtIons oCholera
a w w i c hrC
ycci ci ici cwi i i c i q-c w y w y wig.
ag i civiy w cc c, hrC i vii w cig ici cig i i g.o ic i w c ici ci c w y wi ciic iy c, wy i w ig i icii cig.
t hrC ici v iiv c w cy i. ty g y iv i cii y c v i , i i i cig ci. ty qy hiiKreyolyig mi y yiy(ic i hii).
hii w cicci, i ig
ic i i c. pici ii i iigii wig q c y wi ivig i c y y i.
ycci civ, hrC ii ivig c i ci j c, y ciii ig wy v c i. ti vy cqc: c c w jc, w w ic, cv w w g i ccwi i, w igi, civ w c. t y i ig g i w iig ciiiy ig
gii cyig ii cig.t y cc nGo iiy c civ i c wig ii, i c iy, y cci ci i. a , hrC ycci w cicyi wi i. hrC v iciy c cici, wic ivv ig cci g civ iig c.
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a Ki y P ( pk) 28 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
(HRC), were better placed to understand and respond to
reactions to cholera. It was also clear that treating these
misperceptions as just simple misinformation was also
o spos, s s fl o cos
the validity of the Haitian worldview. To miss this
crucial point was to misunderstand the nature of the
coco cll ly.
Osos oo ls ppoc
were able to improve the impact of their response
pos. to cob sso pv
-fco, C r Coss (CrC)
col c Cfo
introduced a phone follow-up system for discharged
patients, to ensure they continued to follow advice aboutpv -fco. as sl, y v cv
cvs lvl of lss 2 pc.4
How eectiewas the choleracommuicatio
campaig?evl ovll coco ffo ocholera is extremely difcult, and isolating the impact of
any specic intervention almost impossible: too many
organisations were involved and too many techniques
used. This holistic approach, however, was at least part
of the reason the campaign was judged effective by
almost all interviewees. Community mobilisers also said
the fact that the same information was available from so
many sources and was thus repeated to communities in
so many different ways was extremely helpful.
t ii w ik i i pp w.InterVIeWee
In Haiti, two particular models of measuring impact
: u nos Cls F (uniCeF),
who carried out a Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices
(KAP) study in January/February 2011, and CDAC
Haiti, which coordinated a multi-agency study of cholera
knowledge levels in November 2010. Internews also
carried out research that was published in June 2011.
4 evi Ci r C c c i C yi c, i, ai 2011.
an IntegratedaPProaCh toCommunICatIon:Cholera and themInIstry o PuBlIChealtht miiy pic h i hii g icici c i w c. t cc w y c ii i
aii wii w y ,wi ii .
C miiy pic h w i q iy ig.evy y, iiy c iy iii g, i g i gv vi . ty ivi un nGo , i icig c w c wcic qi i. I ic,y ic y qi y hiiig c gv *300 ci y c w i ic y .
t cc w iyc iv c y i w vii ci i nv 14.t miiy pic h gi v- i g c, y pi pv, wic w cc y w.
by nv 10 miiy pic h v w v 12i , wi iii g gComatel c ji.1 t iiy w wi digic sms ci ci , wi gig y IrC i i sms jc wi Vi.
ty ii i ii wi miiy C Cici, ig c ci. ti w i iiiy y w vi c, w w c cii.
ai qi ig c i cc, i vi ic i cici.
1 t , wv, w wi : i ic wc ci v wy ii c w, v ci yi y. ti i c ig i wi i ic, i c c i g cii gci.
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a Ki y P ( pk) 29 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
alos foly, ppoc o
impact was a classic baseline/endline methodology,
which looked for retention and action on the key
sss poo by col foo
cp. t vc pov by hrC pp
and discussions with medical staff and communitymobilisers suggest that this was not adequate as an
approach, with little scope for identifying key barriers to
bvo c fo h pspcv.
The ways in which operational staff commented on
pc of foo cp, fo xpl,
were very different from those benchmarks used by
coco xps. Coy oblss s
they knew the campaign was working when families
b vs col ps ospl (f y
ovc l f of ss). mcl sff,
meanwhile, judged effectiveness in terms of drops in the
number of patients with advanced symptoms arrivingat treatment centres: those who recognised symptoms
and knew what to do came earlier and thus were easier
o o lly o svv, cl
work easier. While anecdotal, such information clearly
s vl s co of cp ffcvss
it would be useful to nd a way to use such systems in
evaluations of communication projects.
This given, the data available does show that thecoco cp scc ly y
basic ideas. The ndings of UNICEFs KAP survey, for
example, show that the vast majority of people now
know the basics of cholera. The CDAC Haiti survey
lso fo 76 pc of spos fl
information available on cholera was satisfactory.5
However, both studies found that more detailed
knowledge of prevention and cure of cholera was patchy.6
5 CdaC i vy ic cici cig c, hii, nv/dc 2010.
6 CdaC hii wi 63 c i y w w yi , y 40 c w cc ci unICey (cc igy ) i g c 18 c.
hii c gi, mc 2011.
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a Ki y P ( pk) 30 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010
t ic ig- c.Even in a public inrmatin emergency such as
chlera, a dialgue-based apprach that priritises
understanding lcal perceptins the disease,
cllects eedback and is able t respnd quickly t
changing levels understanding is mre eective
than a ne-way, ne-t-many public inrmatin
campaign. The apprach needs t be systematic and
clearly articulated, with channels r eedback t fw
back int decisin making and prject design.
u c c. Mre ertneeds t be made early n in such campaigns t
iterate lcal perceptins int the cmmunicatinrespnse. Peple act n what they perceive t be
true, and attempts t infuence behaviur withut
understanding the wider cntext will therere be
limited. Studies such as the HRC paper are essential,
and strng cluster leadership t make sure that such
ndings are shwcased and acted upn culd als
make a dierence.
m y g cy i. Thecase r develping cnsensus at glbal level
arund key messages n issues such as chlera is
clear, and the imprtance cnsistent messaging
at eld level is vital. But it is als imprtant t
remember that all inrmatin needs t be culturally
cntextualised: a prcess nt just designing lcally
apprpriate materials, but als understanding
lcal perceptins and cncerns that d s much
t determine the extent t which peple react t
inrmatin.
rii. Even the mst basic inrmatinneeded t be repeated ver and ver again, and this
need cntinues tday. Even six mnths ater the
utbreak, the IFRC radi shw was still receiving
basic questins n chlera, and many cmmunitymbilisers identied the time bere the 2011 rainy
seasn as a key perid t reinrce messages.
mgig c fi. Whilebasic inrmatin regarding chlera may appear
simple, in practice prductin key messages was
dicult. General inrmatin had t cver several
areas: preventin, identicatin symptms, and
treatment. Subsequent t this, urther messaging
was develped in respnse t emerging prblems,
particularly arund the issue chlera treatment
centres and stigmatisatin survivrs. Inrmatin
als had t be lcally specic. Systems rdevelping messaging need t be fexible t ensure
new messages and guidance can be generated and
shared quickly this is essential in an emergency
envirnment.
t i. Hwever urgent the situatin, it isclear that ailing t test print materials adequately
bere ging int prductin is a mistake as it is s
dicult t rectiy errrs nce materials are prduced.
As demnstrated in the case ther cmmunicatin
materials in Haiti, testing materials, especially in
emergency situatins, des nt necessarily require
ull cus grup methdlgy. Simply asking r
inrmal eedback rm lcal sta, drivers and
cmmunity mbilisers can be sucient t identiy
basic prblems.
miig vi. M&E shuld be clselycnnected t the issue eedback. While thestandard apprach t measuring impact is thrugh
cnventinal evaluatin methdlgies, these have
sme imprtant limitatins in the cntext chlera.
Firstly, baseline data in an emergency is extremely
hard t cllect and is rarely an peratinal pririty.
Secndly, the ndings tend t be static, resulting in
snapsht studies published at the beginning and
end prjects, rather than the cnstantly updated
inrmatin systems needed t guide a ast mving
respnse acrss a wide gegraphical area. There
is als the add