G.R. No. 158228 March 23, 2004DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as represented by its Secretary, ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN,petitioner,vs.DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS),respondent.D E C I S I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:This petition for review oncertiorariseeks to set aside the decision1of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64378, which reversed the August 30, 2000 decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, as well as the Resolution dated May 7, 2003, which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.In controversy are Lot No. 2509 and Lot No. 817-D consisting of an aggregate area of 189.2462 hectares located at Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros Occidental, respectively. On October 21, 1921, these lands were donated by the late Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS (formerly Bureau of Education).2Consequently, titles thereto were transferred in the name of respondent DECS under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 167175.3On July 15, 1985, respondent DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year 1984-1985 to crop year 1993-1994. The contract of lease was subsequently renewed for another 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year 1995-1996 to crop year 2004-2005.4On June 10, 1993, Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming to be permanent and regular farm workers of the subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante.5After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piosa, sent a "Notice of Coverage" to respondent DECS, stating that the subject lands are now covered by CARP and inviting its representatives for a conference with the farmer beneficiaries.6Then, MARO Piosa submitted his report to OIC-PARO Stephen M. Leonidas, who recommended to the DAR Regional Director the approval of the coverage of the landholdings.On August 7, 1998, DAR Regional Director Dominador B. Andres approved the recommendation, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the petition is granted. Order is hereby issued:1. Placing under CARP coverage Lot 2509 with an area of 111.4791 hectares situated at Had. Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental and Lot 817-D with an area of 77.7671 hectares situated at Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros Occidental;2. Affirming the notice of coverage sent by the DAR Provincial Office, Negros Occidental dated November 23, 1994;3. Directing the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office of Negros Occidental and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officers of Sagay and Escalante to facilitate the acquisition of the subject landholdings and the distribution of the same qualified beneficiaries.SO ORDERED.7Respondent DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the Order of the Regional Director.8Aggrieved, respondent DECS filed a petition forcertiorariwith the Court of Appeals, which set aside the decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.9Hence, the instant petition for review.The pivotal issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 (CARL).The general policy under CARL is to cover as much lands suitable for agriculture as possible.10Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 sets out the coverage of CARP. It states that the program shall:" cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, allpublicand private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture."More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account, ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain;(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.Section 3(c) thereof defines "agricultural land," as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." The term "agriculture" or "agricultural activity" is also defined by the same law as follows:Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprises or Agricultural Activity means the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.11The records of the case show that the subject properties were formerly private agricultural lands owned by the late Esteban Jalandoni, and were donated to respondent DECS. From that time until they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, the lands continued to be agricultural primarily planted to sugarcane, albeit part of the public domain being owned by an agency of the government.12Moreover, there is no legislative or presidential act, before and after the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, classifying the said lands as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. Indubitably, the subject lands fall under the classification of lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.Respondent DECS sought exemption from CARP coverage on the ground that all the income derived from its contract of lease with Anglo Agricultural Corporation were actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes, such as for the repairs and renovations of schools in the nearby locality.Petitioner DAR, on the other hand, argued that the lands subject hereof are not exempt from the CARP coverage because the same are not actually, directly and exclusively used as school sites or campuses, as they are in fact leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation. Further, to be exempt from the coverage, it is the landper se,not the income derived therefrom, that must be actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.We agree with the petitioner.Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are exempted from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption, viz:x x x x x x x x xc) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense,school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, , shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.13x x x x x x x x xClearly, a reading of the paragraph shows that, in order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be "actually, directly, and exclusively used andfound to be necessary;"and2) the purpose is "for school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes."The importance of the phrase "actually, directly, and exclusively used andfound to be necessary" cannot be understated, as what respondent DECS would want us to do by not taking the words in their literal and technical definitions. The words of the law are clear and unambiguous. Thus, the "plain meaning rule" orverba legisin statutory construction is applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.14We are not unaware of our ruling in the case ofCentral Mindanao University v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board,15wherein we declared the land subject thereof exempt from CARP coverage. However, respondent DECS reliance thereon is misplaced because the factual circumstances are different in the case at bar.Firstly, in theCMUcase, the land involved was not alienable and disposable land of the public domain because it was reserved by the late President Carlos P. Garcia under Proclamation No. 476 for the use of Mindanao Agricultural College (now CMU).16In this case, however, the lands fall under the category of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.Secondly, in theCMUcase, the land was actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for school sites and campuses. Although a portion of it was being used by the Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.) under a "Management and Development Agreement", the undertaking was that the land shall be used by the Philippine Packing Corporation as part of the CMU research program, with direct participation of faculty and students. Moreover, the land was part of the land utilization program developed by the CMU for its "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Project" (CMU-KSSP), a multi-disciplinary applied research extension and productivity program.17Hence, the retention of the land was found to be necessary for the present and future educational needs of the CMU. On the other hand, the lands in this case were notactuallyandexclusivelyutilized as school sites and campuses, as they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, not for educational purposes but for the furtherance of its business. Also, as conceded by respondent DECS, it was the income from the contract of lease and not the subject lands that was directly used for the repairs and renovations of the schools in the locality.Anent the issue of whether the farmers are qualified beneficiaries of CARP, we disagree with the Court of Appeals finding that they were not.At the outset, it should be pointed out that the identification of actual and potential beneficiaries under CARP is vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform pursuant to Section 15, R.A. No. 6657, which states:SECTION 15.Registration of Beneficiaries. The DAR in coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) as organized in this Act, shall register all agricultural lessees, tenants and farmworkers who are qualified to be beneficiaries of the CARP. These potential beneficiaries with the assistance of the BARC and the DAR shall provide the following data:(a) names and members of their immediate farm household;(b) owners or administrators of the lands they work on and the length of tenurial relationship;(c) location and area of the land they work;(d) crops planted; and(e) their share in the harvest or amount of rental paid or wages received.A copy of the registry or list of all potential CARP beneficiaries in the barangay shall be posted in the barangay hall, school or other public buildings in the barangay where it shall be open to inspection by the public at all reasonable hours.In the case at bar, the BARC certified that herein farmers were potential CARP beneficiaries of the subject properties.18Further, on November 23, 1994, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage placing the subject properties under CARP. Since the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP,19it behooves the courts to exercise great caution in substituting its own determination of the issue, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the administrative agency. In this case, there was none.The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the bastion of social justice of poor landless farmers, the mechanism designed to redistribute to the underprivileged the natural right to toil the earth, and to liberate them from oppressive tenancy. To those who seek its benefit, it is the means towards a viable livelihood and, ultimately, a decent life. The objective of the State is no less certain: "landless farmers and farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to move the nation toward sound rural development and industrialization."20WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 64378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision dated August 30, 2000 of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform placing the subject lands under CARP coverage, is REINSTATED.SO ORDERED.

an reform program.On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.The "WHEREAS" clause o:f the Resolution states:WHEREAS, the province of Camarines Sur has adopted a five-year Comprehensive Development plan, some of the vital components of which includes the establishment of model and pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops, soil testing and tissue culture laboratory centers, 15 small scale technology soap making, small scale products of plaster of paris, marine biological and sea farming research center,and other progressive feasibility concepts objective of which is to provide the necessary scientific and technology know-how to farmers and fishermen in Camarines Sur and to establish a housing project for provincial government employees;WHEREAS, the province would need additional land to be acquired either by purchase or expropriation to implement the above program component;WHEREAS, there are contiguous/adjacent properties to be (sic) present Provincial Capitol Site ideally suitable to establish the same pilot development center;WHEREFORE . . . .Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon. Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, docketed as Special Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and P-19-89 of the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, presided by the Hon. Benjamin V. Panga.Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of writ of possession. The San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion.The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an order dated December 6, 1989, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of possession in an order dated January18, 1990.The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated February 1990.In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order dated December 6, 1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose.Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.Hence this petition.It must be noted that in the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked for: (i) the dismissal of the complaints for expropriation on the ground of the inadequacy of the compensation offered for the property and (ii) the nullification of Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur.The Court of Appeals did not rule on the validity of the questioned resolution; neither did it dismiss the complaints. However, when the Court of Appeals ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the Province of Camarines Sur shall have obtained the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to change the classification of the lands sought to be expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural use, it assumed that the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project (Heirs of Juancho Ardano v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]; Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SC.RA 461 [1987]).The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. As held inSumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum the general welfare."It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657), particularly Section 65 thereof, which requires the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform before a parcel of land can be reclassified from an agricultural to a non-agricultural land.The Court of Appeals, following the recommendation of the Solicitor General, held that the Province of Camarines Sur must comply with the provision of Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.InHeirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, petitioners raised the issue of whether the Philippine Tourism Authority can expropriate lands covered by the "Operation Land Transfer" for use of a tourist resort complex. There was a finding that of the 282 hectares sought to be expropriated, only an area of 8,970 square meters or less than one hectare was affected by the land reform program and covered by emancipation patents issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. While the Court said that there was "no need under the facts of this petition to rule on whether the public purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in a balancing of competing public interest," it upheld the expropriation after noting that petitioners had failed to overcome the showing that the taking of 8,970 square meters formed part of the resort complex. A fair and reasonable reading of the decision is that this Court viewed the power of expropriation as superior to the power to distribute lands under the land reform program.The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the Province of Camarines Sur by stressing the fact that local government units exercise such power only by delegation. (Comment, pp. 14-15;Rollo, pp. 128-129)It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 28l US 439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 SCt. 360). It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct. 684). While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations.Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, which provides:A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of law that the Court of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads:Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for, agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition:Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it applies to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years from its award."The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries.Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication (Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 241).To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use (United States Ex Rel Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 US 546, 90 L. ed. 843, 66 S Ct 715; State ex rel Twin City Bldg. and Invest. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 NW 885, 8 ALR 585).There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace the sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto (Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 [1983]). The Republic of the Philippines, as sovereign, or its political subdivisions, as holders of delegated sovereign powers, cannot be bound by provisions of law couched in general term.The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation declared in the tax declarations of their property, are unfounded. This Court has declared as unconstitutional the Presidential Decrees fixing the just compensation in expropriation cases to be the value given to the condemned property either by the owners or the assessor, whichever was lower ([Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987]). As held inMunicipality of Talisay v. Ramirez, 183 SCRA 528 [1990], the rules for determining just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which allow private respondents to submit evidence on what they consider shall be the just compensation for their property.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.

G.R. No. 127198 May 16, 2005LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, San Fernando, Pampanga, and JOSE R. CAGUIAT represented by Attorneys-in-fact JOSE T. BARTOLOME and VICTORIO MANGALINDAN,respondents.D E C I S I O NTINGA,J.:This is aPetition for Review1dated December 6, 1996 assailing theDecision2of the Regional Trial Court3dated July 5, 1996 which ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) to pay private respondents the amount ofP30.00 per square meter as just compensation for the States acquisition of private respondents properties under the land reform program.The facts follow.On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of just compensation for their agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The petition named as respondents the DAR and Land Bank. With leave of court, the petition was amended to implead as co-respondents the registered tenants of the land.After trial, the court rendered the assailedDecisionthe dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners and against respondents, ordering respondents, particularly, respondents Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the Philippines, to pay these lands owned by petitioners and which are the subject of acquisition by the State under its land reform program, the amount of THIRTY PESOS (P30.00) per square meter, as the just compensation due for payment for same lands of petitioners located at San Vicente (or Camba), Arayat, Pampanga.Respondent Department of Agrarian Reform is also ordered to pay petitioners the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as Attorneys Fee, and to pay the cost of suit.SO ORDERED.4DAR and Land Bank filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by the trial court in itsOrder5dated July 30, 1996 for beingpro formaas the same did not contain a notice of hearing.Thus, the prescriptive period for filing an appeal was not tolled. Land Bank consequently failed to file a timely appeal and the assailedDecisionbecame final and executory.Land Bank then filed aPetition for Relief from Order Dated 30 July 1996,6citing excusable negligence as its ground for relief. Attached to the petition for relief were two affidavits of merit claiming that the failure to include in the motion for reconsideration a notice of hearing was due to accident and/or mistake.7The affidavit of Land Banks counsel of record notably states that "he simply scanned and signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing"8due to his heavy workload.The trial court, in itsOrder9of November 18, 1996, denied the petition for relief because Land Bank lost a remedy in law due to its own negligence.In the instant petition for review, Land Bank argues that the failure of its counsel to include a notice of hearing due to pressure of work constitutes excusable negligence and does not make the motion for reconsiderationpro formaconsidering its allegedly meritorious defenses. Hence, the denial of its petition for relief from judgment was erroneous.According to Land Bank, private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DARs valuation of their properties. Private respondents thus failed to exhaust administrative remedies when they filed a petition for the determination of just compensation directly with the trial court. Land Bank also insists that the trial court erred in declaring that PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228) are mere guidelines in the determination of just compensation, and in relying on private respondents evidence of the valuation of the properties at the time of possession in 1993 and not on Land Banks evidence of the value thereof as of the time of acquisition in 1972.Private respondents filed aComment10dated February 22, 1997, averring that Land Banks failure to include a notice of hearing in its motion for reconsideration due merely to counsels heavy workload, which resulted in the motion being declaredpro forma,does not constitute excusable negligence, especially in light of the admission of Land Banks counsel that he has been a lawyer since 1973 and has "mastered the intricate art and technique of pleading."Land Bank filed aReply11dated March 12, 1997 insisting that equity considerations demand that it be heard on substantive issues raised in its motion for reconsideration.The Courtgave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.12Both parties complied.13The petition is unmeritorious.At issue is whether counsels failure to include a notice of hearing constitutes excusable negligence entitling Land Bank to a relief from judgment.Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:Sec. 1.Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.As can clearly be gleaned from the foregoing provision, the remedy of relief from judgment can only be resorted to on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.14Measured against this standard, the reason profferred by Land Banks counsel,i.e.,that his heavy workload prevented him from ensuring that the motion for reconsideration included a notice of hearing, was by no means excusable.Indeed, counsels admission that "he simply scanned and signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing" speaks volumes of his arrant negligence, and cannot in any manner be deemed to constitute excusable negligence.The failure to attach a notice of hearing would have been less odious if committed by a greenhorn but not by a lawyer who claims to have "mastered the intricate art and technique of pleading."15Indeed, a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is nothing but a mere scrap of paper. The clerk of court does not even have the duty to accept it, much less to bring it to the attention of the presiding judge.16The trial court therefore correctly considered the motion for reconsiderationpro forma.Thus, it cannot be faulted for denying Land Banks motion for reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment.It should be emphasized at this point that procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While in certain instances, we allow a relaxation in the application of the rules, we never intend to forge a weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal interpretation and application of rules apply only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Party litigants and their counsel are well advised to abide by, rather than flaunt, procedural rules for these rules illumine the path of the law and rationalize the pursuit of justice.17Aside from ruling on this procedural issue, the Court shall also resolve the other issues presented by Land Bank, specifically as regards private respondents alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the question of just compensation.Land Bank avers that private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DARs valuation instead of filing a petition to fix just compensation with the trial court.The records reveal that Land Banks contention is not entirely true. In fact, private respondents did write a letter18to the DAR Secretary objecting to the land valuation summary submitted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office and requesting a conference for the purpose of fixing just compensation. The letter, however, was left unanswered prompting private respondents to file a petition directly with the trial court.At any rate, inPhilippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals,19we declared that there is nothing contradictory between the DARs primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings.In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.20Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice.Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27,ergojust compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. InOffice of the President, Malacaang, Manila v. Court of Appeals,21we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensation.Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657)22before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling inParis v. Alfeche.23Section 17 of RA 6657 which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the determination of just compensation, reads as follows:Sec. 17.Determination of Just Compensation.In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DARs failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.24In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their property, taking into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value, assessors value and the volume and value of its produce. This Court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the amount of just compensation due private respondents in accordance with, and guided by, RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 170220 November 20, 2006JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her capacity as Assignee of FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, NENITA SUNTAY TAEDO and EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III,Petitioners,vs.LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent.D E C I S I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the October 27, 2005 Amended Decision1of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530, which vacated its May 26, 2004 Decision affirming (a) the Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as Special Agrarian Court, in Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, dated March 31, 2003 directing respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to deposit the provisional compensation as determined by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD); (b) the May 26, 2003 Resolution denying LBPs motion for reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order requiring Teresita V. Tengco, LBPs Land Compensation Department Manager, to comply with the March 31, 2003 Order.The facts of the case are as follows:Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee2of Federico C. Suntay over certain parcels of agricultural land located at Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 3,682.0285 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31 (T-1326)3of the Registry of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro. In 1972, a portion of the said property with an area of 311.7682 hectares, was placed under the land reform program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (1972)4and Executive Order No. 228 (1987).5The land was thereafter subdivided and distributed to farmer beneficiaries. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP fixed the value of the land at P5,056,833.54 which amount was deposited in cash and bonds in favor of Lubrica.On the other hand, petitioners Nenita Suntay-Taedo and Emilio A.M. Suntay III inherited from Federico Suntay a parcel of agricultural land located at Balansay, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro covered by TCT No. T-1286of the Register of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro, consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 45.0760 hectares and Lot 2 containing an area of 165.1571 hectares or a total of 210.2331 hectares. Lot 2 was placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27 but only 128.7161 hectares was considered by LBP and valued the same at P1,512,575.05.Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties, hence the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary administrative proceedings for determination of just compensation. On January 29, 2003, the PARAD fixed the preliminary just compensation at P51,800,286.43 for the 311.7682 hectares (TCT No. T-31) and P21,608,215.28 for the 128.7161 hectares (TCT No. T-128).7Not satisfied with the valuation, LBP filed on February 17, 2003, two separate petitions8for judicial determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, docketed as Agrarian Case No. R-1339 for TCT No. T-31 and Agrarian Case No. R-1340 for TCT No. T-128, and raffled to Branch 46 thereof.Petitioners filed separate Motions to Deposit the Preliminary Valuation Under Section 16(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 (1988)9and Ad Cautelam Answer praying among others that LBP deposit the preliminary compensation determined by the PARAD.On March 31, 2003, the trial court issued an Order10granting petitioners motion, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, of the Land Compensation Department I (LCD I), Land Bank of the Philippines, is hereby ordered pursuant to Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 in relation to Section 2, Administrative Order No. 8, Series of 1991, to deposit the provisional compensation as determined by the PARAD in cash and bonds, as follows:1. In Agrarian Case No. R-1339, the amount of P 51,800,286.43, minus the amount received by the Landowner;2. In Agrarian Case No. R-1340, the amount of P 21,608,215.28, less the amount of P 1,512,575.16, the amount already deposited.Such deposit must be made with the Land Bank of the Philippines, Manila within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of this order and to notify this court of her compliance within such period.Let this order be served by the Sheriff of this Court at the expense of the movants.SO ORDERED.11LBPs motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution12dated May 26, 2003. The following day, May 27, 2003, the trial court issued an Order13directing Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, LBPs Land Compensation Department Manager, to deposit the amounts.Thus, on June 17, 2003, LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 77530.14On June 27, 2003, the appellate court issued a 60-day temporary restraining order15and on October 6, 2003, a writ of preliminary injunction.16On May 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision17in favor of the petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Order dated March 31, 2003, Resolution dated May 26, 2003, and Order dated May 27, 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED. The preliminary injunction We previously issued is hereby LIFTED and DISSOLVED.SO ORDERED.18The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly ordered LBP to deposit the amounts provisionally determined by the PARAD as there is no law which prohibits LBP to make a deposit pending the fixing of the final amount of just compensation. It also noted that there is no reason for LBP to further delay the deposit considering that the DAR already took possession of the properties and distributed the same to farmer-beneficiaries as early as 1972.LBP moved for reconsideration which was granted. On October 27, 2005, the appellate court rendered the assailed Amended Decision,19the dispositive portion of which reads:Wherefore, in view of the prescription of a different formula in the case of Gabatin which We hold as cogent and compelling justification necessitating Us to effect the reversal of Our judgment herein sought to be reconsidered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED, and Our May 26, 2004 Decision is hereby VACATED and ABANDONED with the end in view of giving way to and acting in harmony and in congruence with the tenor of the ruling in the case of Gabatin. Accordingly, the assailed rulings of the Special Agrarian Court is (sic) commanded to compute and fix the just compensation for the expropriated agricultural lands strictly in accordance with the mode of computation prescribed (sic) Our May 26, 2004 judgment in the case of Gabatin.SO ORDERED.20In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals held that the immediate deposit of the preliminary value of the expropriated properties is improper because it was erroneously computed. CitingGabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines,21it held that the formula to compute the just compensation should be: Land Value = 2.5 x Average Gross Production x Government Support Price. Specifically, it held that the value of the government support price for the corresponding agricultural produce (rice and corn) should be computed at the time of the legal taking of the subject agricultural land, that is, on October 21, 1972 when landowners were effectively deprived of ownership over their properties by virtue of P.D. No. 27. According to the Court of Appeals, the PARAD incorrectly used the amounts of P500 and P300 which are the prevailing government support price for palay and corn, respectively, at the time of payment, instead of P35 and P31, the prevailing government support price at the time of the taking in 1972.Hence, this petition raising the following issues:A. THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED THE CASE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LATEST DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. ELI G.C. NATIVIDAD, ET AL., G.R. NO. 127198, PROM. MAY 16, 2005; and22B. THE COURT A QUO HAS, WITH GRAVE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, DECIDING ISSUES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RAISED, AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION.23Petitioners insist that the determination of just compensation should be based on the value of the expropriated properties at the time of payment. Respondent LBP, on the other hand, claims that the value of the realties should be computed as of October 21, 1972 when P.D. No. 27 took effect.The petition is impressed with merit.In the case ofLand Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,24the Court ruled thus:Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacaang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensation.TheNatividadcase reiterated the Courts ruling inOffice of the President v. Court of Appeals25that the expropriation of the landholding did not take place on the effectivity of P.D. No. 27 on October 21, 1972 but seizure would take effect on the payment of just compensation judicially determined.Likewise, in the recent case of Heirs of Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,26we held that expropriation of landholdings covered by R.A. No. 6657 take place, not on the effectivity of the Act on June 15, 1988, but on the payment of just compensation.In the instant case, petitioners were deprived of their properties in 1972 but have yet to receive the just compensation therefor.1wphi1The parcels of land were already subdivided and distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries thereby immediately depriving petitioners of their use. Under the circumstances, it would be highly inequitable on the part of the petitioners to compute the just compensation using the values at the time of the taking in 1972, and not at the time of the payment, considering that the government and the farmer-beneficiaries have already benefited from the land although ownership thereof have not yet been transferred in their names. Petitioners were deprived of their properties without payment of just compensation which, under the law, is a prerequisite before the property can be taken away from its owners.27The transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner.28Our ruling in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform29is instructive, thus:It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27 (Emphasis supplied.)it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. x x xThe CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.We also note that the expropriation proceedings in the instant case was initiated under P.D. No. 27 but the agrarian reform process is still incomplete considering that the just compensation to be paid to petitioners has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of R.A. No. 6657 before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, R.A. No. 6657 is the applicable law, with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 having only suppletory effect.30In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,31we held that:RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the properties which the DAR shall acquire and distribute to the landless.1wphi1And to facilitate the acquisition and distribution thereof, Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of the Act should be adhered to.Section 18 of R.A. No. 6657 mandates that the LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP or as may be finally determined by the court as the just compensation for the land. In determining just compensation, the cost of the acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.32Corollarily, we held in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada33that the above provision was converted into a formula by the DAR through Administrative Order No. 05, S. 1998, to wit:Land Value (LV) = (Capitalized Net Income x 0.6) + (Comparable Sales x 0.3) + (Market Value per Tax Declaration x 0.1)Petitioners were deprived of their properties way back in 1972, yet to date, they have not yet received just compensation. Thus, it would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228 considering the failure to determine just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No. 227 or E.O. No. 228, is important considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.34WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision dated October 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals affirming (a) the March 31, 2003 Order of the Special Agrarian Court ordering the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines to deposit the just compensation provisionally determined by the PARAD; (b) the May 26, 2003 Resolution denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order directing Teresita V. Tengco, respondents Land Compensation Department Manager to comply with the March 31, 2003 Order, is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as Special Agrarian Court is ORDERED to proceed with dispatch in the trial of Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, and to compute the final valuation of the subject properties based on the aforementioned formula.SO ORDERED.CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBANChief JusticeChairpersonMA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZAssociate JusticeROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate JusticeC E R T I F I C A T I O NPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBANChief Justice

G.R. No. 118712 October 6, 1995LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP.,respondents.G.R. No. 118745 October 6, 1995DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL.,respondents.FRANCISCO, R.,J.:It has been declared that the duty of the court to protect the weak and the underprivileged should not be carried out to such an extent as deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side.1As eloquently stated by Justice Isagani Cruz:. . . social justice or any justice for that matter is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.2In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated principles be applied in its resolution.Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No. 118745) and Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 118712) following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33465. However, upon motion filed by private respondents, the petitions were ordered consolidated.3Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 20, 1994, which granted private respondents' Petition forCertiorariandMandamusand ruled as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition forCertiorariandMandamusis hereby GRANTED:a) DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 is declarednullandvoidinsofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposits in cash or bonds;b) Respondent Landbank is ordered toimmediatelydeposit not merely "earmark", "reserve" or "deposit in trust" with an accessible bank designated by respondent DAR in the names of the following petitioners the following amounts in cash and in government financial instruments within the parameters of Sec. 18 (1) of RA 6657:P 1,455,207.31 Pedro L. YapP 135,482.12 Heirs of Emiliano SantiagoP 15,914,127.77 AMADCOR;c) The DAR-designated bank is ordered toallow the petitioners to withdrawthe above-deposited amounts without prejudice to the final determination of just compensation by the proper authorities; andd) Respondent DAR is ordered to 1)immediatelyconductsummaryadministrative proceedings to determine the just compensation for the lands of the petitioners giving the petitioners15 days from noticewithin which to submit evidence and to 2) decide the caseswithin 30 daysafter they are submitted for decision.4Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the Resolution dated January 18, 1995,5denying their motion for reconsideration.Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL, Republic Act No. 6657).Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657, private respondents filed with this Court a Petition forCertiorariandMandamuswith prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. Private respondents questioned the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 19926and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990,7and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.Through a Resolution of the Second Division dated February 9, 1994, this Court referred the petition to respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and disposition.As found by respondent court , the following are undisputed:PetitionerPedro Yapalleges that "(o)n 4 September 1992 the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of petitioner Yap were totally cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte and were transferred in the names of farmer beneficiaries collectively, based on the request of the DAR together with a certification of the Landbank that the sum of P735,337.77 and P719,869.54 have been earmarked for Landowner Pedro L. Yap for the parcels of lands covered by TCT Nos. 6282 and 6283, respectively, and issued in lieu thereof TC-563 and TC-562, respectively, in the names of listed beneficiaries (ANNEXES "C" & "D") without notice to petitioner Yap and without complying with the requirement of Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 to deposit the compensation in cash and Landbank bonds in an accessible bank. (Rollo, p. 6).The above allegations are not disputed by any of the respondents.PetitionerHeirs of Emiliano Santiagoallege that the heirs of Emiliano F. Santiago are the owners of a parcel of land located at Laur, NUEVA ECIJA with an area of 18.5615 hectares covered by TCT No. NT-60359 of the registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, registered in the name of the late Emiliano F. Santiago; that in November and December 1990, without notice to the petitioners, the Landbank required and the beneficiaries executed Actual tillers Deed of Undertaking (ANNEX "B") to pay rentals to the LandBank for the use of their farmlots equivalent to at least 25% of the net harvest; that on 24 October 1991 the DAR Regional Director issued an order directing the Landbank to pay the landowner directly or through the establishment of a trust fund in the amount of P135,482.12, that on 24 February 1992, the Landbank reserved in trust P135,482.12 in the name of Emiliano F. Santiago. (ANNEX "E";Rollo,p. 7); that the beneficiaries stopped paying rentals to the landowners after they signed the Actual Tiller's Deed of Undertaking committing themselves to pay rentals to the LandBank (Rollo, p. 133).The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent Landbank claims 1) that it was respondent DAR, not Landbank which required the execution of Actual Tillers Deed of Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and 2) that respondent Landbank, although armed with the ATDU, did not collect any amount as rental from the substituting beneficiaries (Rollo, p. 99).Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development Corporation (AMADCOR, for brevity) alleges with respect to its properties located in San Francisco, Quezon that the properties of AMADCOR in San Francisco, Quezon consist of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares and another parcel covered by TCT No. 10832 with an area of 163.6189 hectares; that a summary administrative proceeding to determine compensation of the property covered by TCT No. 34314 was conducted by the DARAB in Quezon City without notice to the landowner; that a decision was rendered on 24 November 1992 (ANNEX "F") fixing the compensation for the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares at P2,768,326.34 and ordering the Landbank to pay or establish a trust account for said amount in the name of AMADCOR; and that the trust account in the amount of P2,768,326.34 fixed in the decision was established by adding P1,986,489.73 to the first trust account established on 19 December 1991 (ANNEX "G"). With respect to petitioner AMADCOR's property in Tabaco, Albay, it is alleged that the property of AMADCOR in Tabaco, Albay is covered by TCT No. T-2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay with an area of 1,629.4578 hectares'; that emancipation patents were issued covering an area of 701.8999 hectares which were registered on 15 February 1988 but no action was taken thereafter by the DAR to fix the compensation for said land; that on 21 April 1993, a trust account in the name of AMADCOR was established in the amount of P12,247,217.83', three notices of acquisition having been previously rejected by AMADCOR. (Rollo, pp. 8-9)The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent Landbank claims that petitioner failed to participate in the DARAB proceedings (land valuation case) despite due notice to it (Rollo, p. 100).8Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657.9Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds.10Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657.11Moreover, the DAR maintained that the issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and the ruling in the case ofAssociation of Small Landowners in the Philippines,Inc.,et al.vs.Hon.Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343).12For its part, petitioner Landbank declared that the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits was in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the words "reserved/deposited" were also used.13On October 20, 1994, the respondent court rendered the assailed decision in favor of private respondents.14Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but respondent court denied the same.15Hence, the instant petitions.On March 20, 1995, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 118745 alleging that the appeal has no merit and is merely intended to delay the finality of the appealed decision.16The Court, however, denied the motion and instead required the respondents to file their comments.17Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring as null and void DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds, and (2) in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed for just compensation.Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the word "deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit any grave abuse of discretion since it merely exercised its power to promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the declared policies of RA 6657.The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands xxx xxx xxx(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, uponthe deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bondsin accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . . (emphasis supplied)It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit".The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.18In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot extendthe law and amend a legislative enactment,19for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.20In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of the cases involving the final valuation of their properties, petitioners assert the negative.The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and payment of final compensation as provided under Section 1821of the same law. According to petitioners, the right of the landowner to withdraw the amount deposited in his behalf pertains only to the final valuation as agreed upon by the landowner, the DAR and the LBP or that adjudged by the court. It has no reference to amount deposited in the trust account pursuant to Section 16(e) in case of rejection by the landowner because the latter amount is only provisional and intended merely to secure possession of the property pending final valuation. To further bolster the contention petitioners cite the following pronouncements in the case of "Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform".22The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well-accepted principle of eminent domain.xxx xxx xxxThe CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.xxx xxx xxxHence the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.Notably, however, the aforecited case was used by respondent court in discarding petitioners' assertion as it found that:. . . despite the "revolutionary" character of the expropriation envisioned under RA 6657 which led the Supreme Court, in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343), to conclude that "payments of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money" even as the Supreme Court admits in the same case "that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other" the Supreme Court in said case did not abandon the "recognized rule . . .that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation."23(Emphasis supplied)We agree with the observations of respondent court. The ruling in the "Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full payment of just compensation before the title to the expropriated property is transferred.The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible expropriation of private respondents' properties was painful enough for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to private respondents in exchange for the taking, under an authority (the "Association" case) that is, however, misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on private respondents, which the Court must rectify.Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly, we reiterate the cardinal rule that:. . . within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain,just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking.Without prompt payment,compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.24(Emphasis supplied)The promulgation of the "Association" decision endeavored to remove all legal obstacles in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer.25But despite this, cases involving its implementation continue to multiply and clog the courts' dockets. Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the goal of totally emancipating the farmers from their bondage will be attained in due time. It must be stressed, however, that in the pursuit of this objective, vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally important because social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection.26WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the appealed decision is AFFIRMEDin toto.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 159674 June 30, 2006SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO, CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR., RONGIE D. AGUILAR, TACIANA D. AGUILAR, ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN, ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR., EDGAR DUENAS, MARIO ERIBAL, REYNALDO C. ESENCIA, EMMA GONZAGA, RUBEN A. IBOJO, SAMUEL JAMANDRE, HILARION V. LANTIZA, ANSELMO LOPEZ, TERESITA NACION, CHARIE E. NASTOR, NELSON L. NULLAS, CARLITO S. OLIA, ANA PATIO, ROBERTO T. PATIO, ANTONIO P. ROCHA, FERNANDO C. RUFINO, PATERNO P. SAIN, CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and JOEMARIE VIBO,Petitioners,vs.DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and HACIENDA MARIA, INC.,Respondents.D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the review and reversal of the Resolutions1of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2003 and 28 August 2003, respectively.The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:The petitioners, with the exception of two, are the recipients of Emancipation Patents (EPs) over parcels of land located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their respective Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and EP numbers presented below:PetitionersTCT/EP Nos.Areas(has.)

1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLOTCT No. T-287/EP No. A-0376751.7833

2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR.TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-0272932.00000.1565

3. RONGIE D. AGUILARTCT No. T-913/EP No. A-0272953.1441

4. TACIANA D. AGUILARTCT No. T-944/EP No. A-0272964.2405

5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUANTCT No. T-302/EP No. A-0378093.3082

6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR.TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-0356763.1437

7. EDGAR DUENASTCT No. T-949/EP No. A-0376584.0128

8. MARIO P. ERIBALTCT No. T-952/EP No. A-0378362.3087

9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIATCT No. T-950/EP No. A-0378442.0950

10. RUBEN A. IBOJOTCT No. T-928/EP No. A-0378731.5737

11. SAMUEL JAMANDRETCT No. T-909/EP No. A-1593482.2670

12. HILARION V. LANTIZATCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-0378254.55260.4579

13. ANSELMO LOPEZTCT No. T-973/EP No. A-0378404.4939

14. TERESITA NACIONTCT No. T-900/EP No. A-0378492.2140

15. CHARIE E. NASTORTCT No. T-825/EP No. A-0378293.9291

16. NELSON L. NULLASTCT No. T-396/EP No. A-0378262.7491

17. CARLITO S. OLIATCT No. T-910/EP No. A-0376731.7954

18. ROBERTO T.PATIOTCT No. T-912/EP No. A-0378606.4266

19. ANTONIO P. ROCHATCT No. T-914/EP No. A-0378302.2143

20. FERNANDO C. RUFINOTCT No. T-923/EP No. A-0378484.5322

21. PATERNO P. SAINTCT No. T-954/EP No. A-0378134.3223

22. CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, andTCT No. T-891/EP No. A-0378803.7151

23. JOEMARIE VIBOTCT No. T-893/EP No. A-0378271.31852

The two other petitioners, Emma Gonzaga and Ana Patio, are the surviving spouses of deceased recipients of EPs over parcels of land also located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their corresponding TCT and EP numbers identified as follows:(Deceased) Registered OwnersTCT/EP Nos.Areas(has.)

1. MANUEL S. GONZAGATCT No. T-920/EP No. A-0378324.1953

2. RAFAEL PATIOTCT No. T-929/EP No. A-0378613.00783

The parcels of land described above, the subject matters in this Petition, were formerly part of a forested area which have been denuded as a result of the logging operations of respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI). Petitioners, together with other persons, occupied and tilled these areas believing that the same were public lands. HMI never disturbed petitioners and the other occupants in their peaceful cultivation thereof.HMI acquired such forested area from the Republic of the Philippines through Sales Patent No. 2683 in 1956 by virtue of which it was issued OCT No. P-3077-1661. The title covered three parcels of land with a total area of 527.8308 hectares, to wit:Lot No.Area(in hectares)

Lot No. 1620, Pls 428.52

Lot No. 1621, Pls 411.64

Lot No. 1622, Pls 4487.47

TOTAL527.834

On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree No. 275was issued mandating that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under Operation Land Transfer and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries.HMI, through a certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be covered under said law.In 1973, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) conducted a parcellary mapping of the entire landholdings of 527.8308 hectares covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. In 1975 and 1976, the DAR approved the Parcellary Map Sketching (PMS) and the Amended PMS covering the entire landholdings.HMI, through its representatives, actively participated in all relevant proceedings, including the determination of the Average Gross Production per hectare at the Barangay Committee on Land Production, and was a signatory of an undated Landowner and Tenant Production Agreement (LTPA), covering the 527.8308 hectares. The LTPA was submitted to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in 1977.Also in 1977, HMI executed a Deed of Assignment of Rights in favor of petitioners, among other persons, which was registered with the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of OCT No. P-3077-1661. The annotation in the OCT showed that the entire 527.8308 hectares was the subject of the Deed of Assignment.In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and approved. From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners, among other persons.In December 1997, HMI filed with the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of CARAGA, Region XIII, 17 petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor. The 17 petitions, which were later consolidated, sought for the cancellation of the EPs covering the disputed 277.5008 hectares which had been awarded to petitioners. HMI did not question the coverage of the other 250.3300 hectares under Presidential Decree No. 27 despite claiming that the entire landholdings were untenanted and not devoted to rice and corn.On 27 November 1998, after petitioners failed to submit a Position Paper, the RARAD rendered a Decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established tenancy relations between HMI and petitioners when Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect on 21 October 1972. The Decision was based on a 26 March 1998 report submitted by the Hacienda Maria Action Team. Petitioners TCTs and EPs were ordered cancelled. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Petitioners appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which affirmed the RARAD Decision.After the DARAB denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the latter proceeded to the Court of Appeals with their Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Court of Appeals issued the following assailed Resolution:A perusal of the petition reveals that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was executed by Samuel A. Estribillo who is one of the petitioners, without the corresponding Special Power of Attorneys executed by the other petitioners authorizing him to sign for their behalf in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and necessarily DISMISSED.6Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With Alternative Prayer with Leave of Court for the Admission of Special Power of Attorney (SPA) Granted to Petitioner Samuel Estribillo by his Co-Petitioners." The Court of Appeals denied the motion by issuing the following assailed Resolution:Petitioners seek the reconsideration of Our Resolution promulgated on January 27, 2003 which dismissed the petition for certiorari.We find no reason to reverse, alter or modify the resolution sought to be reconsidered, since petitioners have failed to show that their belated submission of the special power of attorney can be justified as against the unequivocal requirements set forth by Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.While it is true that the Supreme Court has recognized special circumstances that justify the relaxation of the rules on non-forum shopping, such circumstances, however, are not present in the case at bar.More importantly, said Rules cannot be relaxed in view of the Supreme Courts ruling in Loquias vs. Ombudsman, 338 SCRA 62, which stated that, substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the certification [on] non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same.Since the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum shopping was executed without the proper authorization from all the petitioners, such personal knowledge cannot be presumed to exist thereby rendering the petition fatally defective.Par. 2, Sec. 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended states:"Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice x x x"It is, thus, clear that the Motion for Reconsideration has no legal basis to support it and should be dismissed forthwith. Moreover, granting arguendo that a special power of attorney belatedly filed could cure the petitions defect, the requirement of personal knowledge of all the petitioners still has not been met since some of the other petitioners failed to sign the same.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.7Petitioners now file this present Petition contending that there had been compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. They further reiterate their argument that the EPs are ordinary titles which become indefeasible one year after their registration.The petition is impressed with merit.1awphil.netPetitioners have sufficiently complied with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure concerning the Certification Against Forum shoppingRule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was preceded by Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which required a certification against forum shopping to avoid the filing of multiple petitions and complaints involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and other tribunals and agencies. Stated differently, the rule was designed to avoid a situation where said courts, tribunals and agencies would have to resolve the same issues. Rule 7, Section 5, now provides:Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his afo