Crossman 1

Crossman, Blair

Intermediate IR Seminar

Haddad

4/28/14

A Bunkered Nation: The Rise (and Fall?) of the Culture of Perpetual War in America

At 1:00 P.M. on the 7th of October, 2001, millions of Americans watched on television as

President George W. Bush addressed the country from the Treaty Room of the White House.

Announcing that the Armed Forces of the United States had already begun strikes against

training camps and military compounds of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, President Bush

laid out the foundation for what would soon be known as the “War on Terror”. In this war, he

stated, “every nation has a choice to make. In this conflict there is no neutral ground”, making it

clear that the U.S. was deadly serious about its new objective to make the world safe for

democracy, peace, and human rights1. Though President Bush was optimistic and emphasized the

defined goals and objectives of the U.S.’s military actions abroad, this speech and this day

marked the beginning of the conflict that has defined American politics, both foreign and

domestic, for more than twelve and a half years with no end in sight.

How is it that the United States became embroiled in such a war? Surely the culture of a

self-avowed “peace-loving nation” must have changed somehow after the events of 9/11 in order

to precipitate the decade of hostilities that followed it—but why? The effects of this change can

be seen in American policy-making, with liberties and freedoms falling to the wayside when the

magic words “national security” are uttered. Our relationship with Arab states and even our allies

Crossman 2

have become strained due to the ever-expanding war against al-Qaeda and their kin. Even the

nature of the war itself seems doomed to fail—how can one declare war on a tactic and hope to

prevail? The War on Terror is a symptom of this paradigm shift in American militarism, this

willingness to employ military power and resources not as a last resort but as the primary mode

of enacting policy, encouraging the notion of “preventative war” as a legitimate option, and

generating further resentment of American neo-imperialism abroad.

But from where did this new culture arise? If it was a product of a grassroots movement,

a common uproar against the terrorist attacks against American citizens, then surely the record

would show how public opinion turned and influenced the leadership of the nation, but if the

shift came from our country’s leaders and those with their hands on the levers of power, then this

heel-turn would be equally as visible. It is my intention to show that the culture of perpetual war

prevalent in the United States is both detrimental to the continued success of American policies,

was foisted upon an unwilling country by those with the keys to the kingdom (by lobbyists,

elected officials, and corporate interests), and to shed light on a way to extricate ourselves from

this thirteen-year-long quagmire in which we will surely founder.

Perpetual War Under the Microscope

In order to show the events that led to its creation, a definition of “perpetual war” is

needed. This state is defined under two categories—the involvement in conflict abroad and the

shift in domestic wartime priorities at home (including changes in production and reductions in

freedoms). The first, involvement in conflict overseas, is a broad subheading that covers the

United States engagement in military operations throughout the world and the resources

(economic, political, and human capital) that are used up in making these operations a reality.

Crossman 3

Though the Iraq War has ended and the American troop presence is lessening in Afghanistan, the

United States is still engaging in combat operations (including unmanned drone strikes) in five

other regions of the world, including Yemen, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, and Senegal. By

2011, almost 300 drone strikes had been completed within the Pakistani border, with the number

increasing to over 350 by the end of 2013.1 These “targeted killings,” as they are referred to, are

intrinsically indiscriminate in their destructive power, tarnishing the reputation of the United

States as a benevolent foreign power to citizens abroad, galvanizing opposition to American

meddling, and radicalizing the younger generations of Muslims in the region. In the Pakistan

campaign alone, more than 286 out of the 2,851 confirmed deaths have been identified as

civilians killed unintentionally by these air strikes, with the actual number of deaths likely to be

much higher.2

Unintended Consequences

What does this mean to the average American? As Franklin Spinney describes in his

article “The Domestic Roots of Perpetual War,” it means that “we have become a fearful nation,

a bunkered nation, bogged down in never-ending wars abroad accompanied by shrinking civil

liberties at home”.3 America spends more on defense and military than the defense budgets of the

next 10 countries combined—more than $680 billion per year—though we feel no safer.4 The

Soviet Union, America’s only true military rival in the past 70 years, has been dead and gone for

over two decades, yet our military budget has increased, even when taking into account sixty-

five years of inflation. This seemingly inordinate discrepancy in budgeting-to-threat ratio arises

from a relic of the Cold War, “a subtle web of dysfunctional bureaucratic modes of conduct that 1 Charting the data for US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004 – 2014, The Long War Journal, December 25, 20132 "Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis". New America Foundation.3 “The Domestic Roots of Perpetual War”. Spinney, Franklin. Challenge, Jan/Feb 20114 Data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2013.

Crossman 4

evolve gradually over [its] forty years.” This web, consisting of elected officials, appointees, and

other civil servants has attached itself to the various parties of the Military-Industrial-

Congressional Complex (MICC), resulting in a never-ending need for more and more money in

the defense industry with less and less oversight. Too lucrative to be stopped by the downfall of

the great Soviet enemy, the MICC needed some kind of new bogeyman with which to terrify and

justify its rampant consumption to the American people—and the events of 9/11 served to

provide just such a threat to the good people of the United States.

America’s “Long War” has been defined by our reticence to engage in diplomatic and

other “soft power” recourses to accomplishing foreign policy and a subsequent rise in our

willingness to employ military “hard power” to bring about the same effect. Although this

marginalization of diplomacy has been taking place slowly over the last several decades, the

process was expedited enormously under the presidency of George W. Bush. Instead of

attempting to negotiate with sovereign nations on terms of mutual understanding, the Bush

administration subscribed to the rather Wilsonian idea of peace through American empire. This

vision of American exceptionalism is one of the driving forces behind the Iraq and Afghanistan

Wars, and one of the reasons for the United States’ continued involvement in the region long

after the war turned sour. Riding on the wave of public opinion (almost 70% of those polled

favored keeping U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2002)5, Bush and his cabinet were able to advance

the hawkish goal of American empire touted by many a neoconservative think-tank as both

desirable and necessary, including the report released by Project for the New American Century

in 1997 that recommended a new world order that “must have a secure foundation on

unquestioned U.S. military preeminence”.6 5 The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press Poll Database, January 9-January 13, 2002. Poll questions retrieved May 1, 2014, from Pew Research Center.6 “The United States and Islam: Toward Perpetual War?”. Hoodbhoy, Pervez. Social Research, Winter 2005.

Crossman 5

The Men Behind the Curtain

This attempted creation of an American proxy-state in the Middle East was fueled in

large part by a desire by those in positions of power and influence to “maintain peace and

security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East”, thereby helping to secure America’s hegemonic

future. The Project for a New American Century, founded by neoconservative Paul Wolfowitz in

the late 1990s, was again one of the most influential think tanks and sources for the Bush

administration’s policy advisors. Known as the “Vulcans”, these neoconservative ideologues

waged battle with traditionalists inside the administration but managed to sway the president

from the more traditional Republic viewpoints toward reactionary, decisively militaristic policies

only after September 11, 2001. This conversion was prompted first and foremost, as M. Kent

Bolton brings up in his book U.S. National Security and Foreign Policymaking After 9/11:

Present at the Re-Creation, because the events of 9/11 “demanded dramatic and demonstrable

changes in order for U.S. national security policy—historically built on threats from nation-states

—to face the transnational global jihadi hydra.”7 Secondly, the president “liked to do big things,”

and the projects proposed by the neoconservatives were certainly grand in scope. Thirdly,

President Bush stated on several occasions that, for him, the world changed immeasurably after

the attacks on September 11. The neoconservatives perceived that as an opportunity, coupled

with the other factors, to bring him over to the far right and away from the more moderate

elements of the Republican Party that favored patience and diplomacy over military might.

Though the president had chosen his side, the ideological battle royale continued to rage

in Washington between the hard line neoconservatives (such as Defense Secretary Donald

7 U.S. National Security and Foreign Policymaking After 9/11: Present at the Re-Creation. Bolton, M. Kent. 2008. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Crossman 6

Rumsfeld, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and Defense Undersecretary Paul

Wolfowitz) and the more moderate traditionalists (such as Secretary of State Colin Powell and

his chief of staff, Lawrence Wilkerson). This battle was both vicious and, for the most part, one

sided. Secretary Powell’s attempts to further peace talks between Israel’s Ariel Sharon and

Palestinian Authority leader Yasser Arafat was “cut off at the knees” by other senior

policymakers, most importantly from the Department of Defense. In a speech to the American

Enterprise Institute, neocon Newt Gingrich contrasted the “failure of State” with the

“transformed Defense Department,” faulting them for creating a “road map for peace” in the

Middle East.8 By 2003, the neocons had begun to systematically muscle the traditionalists out of

the way. This removal of the moderate elements in government by neoconservatives helped

streamline the continued and increasing application of military force in U.S. foreign policy and

was the result of a power play by those closest in the Bush administration to the president—those

with the most to gain from this rise of militarism.

While public opinion still remained strongly in favor of military intervention, the

“Vulcans” decided that it would now be a good time to push another war down America’s throat.

With fabricated claims of weapons of mass destruction and of harboring terrorists, Bush seized

the opportunity to finish the war started by his father in 1990—one that would hopefully allow

him to ride the wave of nationalist fervor to re-election in 2004. In its early stages, when the

memories of those killed in the September 11 attacks were still fresh in the nation’s

consciousness, public opinion was greatly in favor of using military force in Iraq.9 This

nationalist upsurge soon lost its initial appeal to the average American by 2005 and 2006, when

almost half of the country doubted that a military intervention in the faraway country was truly in 8 Glenn Kessler, “State-Defense Policy Rivalry Intensifying,” Washington Post, April 22, 20039 The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press Poll Database, December 19 - January 4, 2003. Poll questions retrieved May 1, 2014, from Pew Research Center.

Crossman 7

the best interests of the United States.10 This downswing was the result of the rapidly spiking

casualty rate and the enormous amount of money being funneled into the Iraq and Afghanistan

Wars, to which the American media began to pay quite close attention—drawing the attention of

the citizenry. War fatigue began creeping into society. It seems that Americans did not want to

be involved in a war that they could not now justify—once the red haze had lifted and the wool

lifted off their eyes, the outcry to “bring the troops back” began.

A New Administration, A New Era?

In essence, the population began to realize that the invasion of Iraq was neither crucial to

the eradication of terrorism or to providing justice for the September 11 attacks. This was one of

the many platforms that Barack Obama ran his campaign for the presidency from 2007-2008. A

self-avowed opponent of “dumb war,” Obama made a kept a promise to remove the American

troop presence in Iraq and de-escalate our involvement in Afghanistan, and he has kept these

promises—but that does not mean he has not fallen prey to the same temptations of military

power as President Bush.11 Inheriting the greatly expanded, emboldened, and empowered Central

Intelligence Agency from the previous administration, Obama has made “targeted killings” of

suspected terrorist operatives a major priority. The traditional method of accomplishing these

activities in the past had been to send a ground team, either killing or capturing the individual(s)

in question and taking them to Guantanamo Bay or another CIA “black site” for interrogation

and likely indefinite detainment. This process and most certainly the well-documented human

rights abuses of prisoners involving allegations of torture tarnished the reputation of the Bush

presidency (an event Obama was not keen on repeating) and was impossible in some regions of

10 The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press Poll Database, December 7 - December 11, 2005. Poll questions retrieved May 1, 2014, from Pew Research Center.11 “Barack Obama and what he said on the Iraq war,” The Telegraph, December 14, 2011.

Crossman 8

the world, such as Pakistan, where the government had disallowed the deployment of U.S.

ground troops—but not the use of UAVs.

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or “drones,” as they are colloquially referred to,

provided something of a loophole for Obama to continue to flex his foreign policy muscles in an

increasingly unresponsive Washington and avoid the allegations of torture and abuse that

plagued Guantanamo Bay, as well as avoiding increasing the size and scope of large, expensive

prison complexes like it.12 Unable to completely extricate the country from “Operation Enduring

Freedom,” the White House and Langley decided to scratch each other’s back—Obama would

continue to provide targets and operations to the Agency (and refrain from prosecuting any of the

officials who could be linked to the waterboarding scandal) and the CIA would act as the

President’s own covert military force. The increased militarization of the intelligence community

is another byproduct of America’s radically altered culture of militarism—the DoD is acting like

a spy agency and the CIA is acting like the military. Both agencies regularly exchange personnel,

intelligence, and technology, even to the point where Navy SEALs are “sheep-dipped” by the

CIA and taken on as operatives in order to complete offensive, covert, “wet work” style

operations or assassinations.13 This has led to the deterioration of the quality and focus of the

intelligence community, creating a kind of “tunnel vision” that focuses entirely too much upon

the Middle East, again to the detriment of U.S. foreign policy overall. The recent annexation of

Crimea by the Russian Federation passed almost completely under the radar of the CIA and other

intelligence agencies in large part because of this tunnel vision. This particular side effect of the

culture of perpetual war vis-à-vis the “War on Terror” is that an allied, sovereign nation was

more or less invaded without any kind of significant warning other than ignored satellite imagery 12 The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth. Mazzetti, Mark. 2013. The Penguin Press13 The Way of the Knife. Mazzetti, Mark.

Crossman 9

of Russian troops massing on the Ukrainian border. This scenario is not too far-fetched to be

repeated elsewhere in the world, or somewhere that critically impacts the interests of the United

States—as long as it isn’t in Central Asia, it seems, our intelligence resources might not be up to

the task of warning us.

One of the most noticeable symptoms of our country’s current shift toward militarism

and perpetual war is the growing distaste in government for diplomacy and the Department of

State. Our nation’s diplomats continue to “punch below their weight,” evidenced by the massive

migration of tasks normally suited to civilian leadership to the Department of Defense.14 In

Afghanistan, small unit military leaders are put in command of operations aimed at creating local

systems of governance rather than diplomats or other Foreign Service Officers through the State

Department. While some propose that this is a problem of the culture endemic to the Department

of State, what seems more likely to me is that it is a problem of conflict of interest. Funding has

to come from somewhere, and when the Department of Defense or the CIA can come to the

bargaining table and point out exactly how many terrorists they have killed and how many

regions of a foreign country are successfully occupied by U.S. troops, they have a decisive

advantage (especially when factoring in MICC lobbyists and hawkish congressional elements).15

The State Department cannot point to any such statistics—it is quite difficult to show how many

terrorist attacks have been stopped by successful diplomacy—and so they are given the

proverbial short end of the stick. Civilian diplomacy is one of the foundations upon which peace

must be built, and the effective sidelining of our nation’s diplomatic corps is extremely

damaging both to our continued reputation and to our ability to achieve lasting results in our

foreign policy. Even after military force is used, there must be some kind of “nation-building” or 14 State of Disrepair: Fixing the Culture and Practices of the State Department. Schake, Kori N. 2012. Hoover Institution Press15 Linvill, Brian Edward COL USARMY. E-mail interview. May 4, 2014.

Crossman 10

assistance in reconstruction and remodeling of government, infrastructure, and the like in order

to build upon the success and push toward peace. War-torn countries that have had their political

and social structures ravaged (usually by the United States Armed Forces) require this kind of

assistance if they are to succeed and become partners on the international level. In this, our new

militarism has damaged our relationships more than anything—it has subsumed the very

institution that provides our country with the global interactions it needs to survive and thrive.

Uprooting the Weed

There is an interesting paradox in American ideology regarding warfare. Though we

profess to be a peace-loving nation, we have nonetheless been involved in over twenty offensive

military engagements within the past twenty years—though we still feel great dissatisfaction

with this continuous warfighting and see a lack of success in our policies abroad. Robert Divine

sheds light on this phenomenon in his book Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, in which he

outlines several observations that he has observed in United States cultural tendencies. Foremost

among these observations is the fact that Americans view certain regimes as “evil,” believing

that the world would be better off without them, thus also justifying the belief that war is

required to attain peace.16 A second observation is that American leaders tend to couch military

interventions in terms other than national interest and are either unwilling or unable to engage in

conflict while stating that the U.S. is going to war solely for its own benefit. Divine argues that

the United States needs “a more realistic view of war” in order to learn from its mistakes, that the

naïve notion that peace will prevail on Earth after just one more “evil” regime falls. This notion

is erroneous. George W. Bush seemed to subscribe to this view that once the Taliban, Osama bin

Laden, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea fell terrorism would be forever ended and perpetual peace

16 Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace. Divine, Robert A. 2000. Texas A&M University Press

Crossman 11

would reign on Earth. This fallacious ideology is the basis of the entire shift in American

political culture toward militarism. It is because of this notion that neoconservative ideologues

campaign so ruthlessly toward ever-expanding defense budgets and military involvement

overseas—perpetual war for perpetual peace.

Recognizing the causes for our cultural affliction is the crucial first step toward rectifying the

malignant influence that this perpetual war has had on the United States. As evidenced, much of

the blame for the cultural and political shift lies on the militant neoconservatives whose power

solidified in the early days of the Bush presidency (but whose roots go back to the late 1980s).

Another crucial portion of the responsibility, of course, is tied in with the Military-Industrial-

Congressional Complex mentioned by Spinney in his article. The MICC (rather than holding

purely ideological reasons for the perpetuation of warfare and militarism) is beholden to the

bottom line—they are motivated in large part by the enormous sums of money and resources that

are funneled into defense projects and their kin, largely without care for how wisely that money

is spent. Illustrating this point, Andrew Bacevich offers the example of the U.S. Marine Corps’

$12 billion-dollar, two decade long project to perfect the V-22 Osprey, a tilt-rotor transport craft.

“In that time, four Osprey prototypes have crashed during test flights, killing twenty-three

marines. The projected price per aircraft has skyrocketed from $24 million to $105 million…

[yet] Congress obligingly continues to funnel hundreds of millions of dollars every year into a

program that as of 2004 had yet to yield even a single fully operational squadron.”17 This

example beautifully demonstrates the fact that, to the MICC, money is no object, even at the

expense of rationality and human lives.

17 The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War. Bacevich, Andrew.

Crossman 12

The United States does not need the newest, most technologically complex and advanced

fighter jet to engage with the rest of the world productively. What it needs are policies that will

counteract the decades-long degradation of our international public image. What it needs is to

“solve the riddle of development and, once having done so, to invest in implementing that

decision.”18 Each of these issues, if solved, would go a long way toward eliminating the need for

U.S. policymakers to even contemplate putting boots on the ground or authorizing a new wave of

airstrikes. Even if neither of those two problems were solved directly by a reduction in our

military development, the sheer amount of money being wasted in that industry is more than

incentive enough to take a critical look at which projects truly merit financial backing and which

should be pruned off of the already enormous tree of the Defense Department and its contractors.

With the State Department starving for funding and training (both in ready supply over at the

Pentagon), surely some of these resources could be earmarked by Congress for diplomacy and

civilian engagement rather than criticizing State for their insufficient efficiency, responsiveness,

and progress (though their annual budget is a fraction of the DoD).19

Some detractors may ask, “What can be accomplished by diplomacy that cannot be

accomplished through feats of arms?” While it is true that military force can be necessary to

dismantle terrorist networks or defend against attacks, the current situation in the world is far

from the gruesome picture painted by some neoconservative zealots. In point of fact, the U.S.

military and its allies has been so complete in its “Long War” that there are no longer any

effective terrorist organizations with global reach like Al-Qaeda once had.20 The new wave of

Islamist militants does not come from these structured, political organizations but instead from

18 The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War. Bacevich, Andrew.19 State Dept. Fact Sheet on Aid Funding in 2015 Budget Proposal. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov; Department of Defense Funding Highlights. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/defense.pdf20 Linvill, Brian Edward, COL USARMY. E-mail interview. May 4, 2014.

Crossman 13

disenfranchised, radicalized groups spread throughout the Islamic world and most especially in

poor, undeveloped countries. Short of wiping out the entire population, there is no military

victory against an enemy like this. The answer, then, lies in diplomacy and peaceful engagement.

If provided with education, the opportunity to raise a family, and a general increase in the quality

of life, the youths that are often swayed by jihadist rhetoric will have no reason to take up arms

against the Great Satan—especially if America extends not the mailed fist of war but the open

hand of partnership to these countries. This, more than anything else, will weaken violent

extremism to the point where it is no longer a significant threat to America or the world.

Another key turning point in pulling our country’s culture back from perpetual war is

increasing the difficulty of using military force. This is a complicated, multifaceted issue, to be

sure, but when the President of the United States holds almost unilateral power (no formal

declaration of war has been signed by Congress since World War 2) over the deployment of

troops, naval vessels, or aircraft both manned and unmanned in any part of the world. Congress

seems willing to stand back and tacitly agree to let the President to do what he wishes in most

situations regarding military power, either by essentially ignoring the War Powers Act’s

requirements or, more likely, by allowing him to go through other channels—most importantly

through the CIA—to engage in covert action or drone strikes abroad. The temptation to use the

new CIA’s teeth to accomplish what the President needs to be done without squabbling and

bickering with Congress and other policymakers is great, but the CIA must be returned to its

initial primary function of providing reliable intelligence for the protection of American citizens

and interests, not engaging in a secret war halfway around the world with little to no oversight

from the American people. Besides the issues inherent in allowing one man (or woman) this kind

of power, it undermines the democratic principles regarding separate institutions sharing power

Crossman 14

on which our country is based. It may be politically advantageous for members of Congress to be

able to point the finger at the President when public opinion ultimately turns against military

involvement, but this sidesteps the real problem. When Congress works together with the

President (and not in an accommodating or acquiescent manner) it makes it much more difficult

to distance one or the other party from the violence, depoliticizing it and returning the decision to

engage in military conflict to its rightful place as a serious, bipartisan, national issue that should

not be undertaken as the first response or to the “easy way out”. Finally, this grants the average

American a greater voice in the kinds of military action that take place, hopefully decreasing the

influence and power of certain warhawks in government or business. War is everyone’s

responsibility—it is time that everyone gets a say.

Where do we go now?

In fairness, those responsible for America’s decline into militarism and a culture of

perpetual war did not set out to do so in order to damage the country’s reputation and strip it of

resources—similar to pollution, the consequences were unintended but foreseeable as products of

choices made in the past, most by a select few taking it upon themselves to line their pockets or

ensure a greater “place in the sun” for American empire. As Bacevich says in his indictment of

this culture and its proponents, “it is not motive that matters but outcome.” The outcome of our

recent wars have been damaging to America’s economy, personal liberties, public image, and

diplomatic relations with much of the world—it will take time for it to recover. Though there are

some who seem to believe that America’s security and welfare relies upon our the extent of our

military reach—that an ever-expanding perimeter will somehow make us safer—this is

empirically not the case. What we must remember is that the United States reach cannot exceed

its grasp or, like other failed empires before, it will stumble and fall. This need not be our fate.

Crossman 15

America can once again take up the mantle of “land of the free and home of the brave” by

promoting peace and democracy not through military might but through public diplomacy and

engagement with the international community. It’s time to beat our swords into plowshares. It’s

time to end our endless war. It’s time for peace.