A Big Bibliography.

A Bibliography1

Aberbach, Joel D. 1990. Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight.

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Adler, E. Scott. 1999. Protecting Turf in a Reform Era: Distributive Politics and Congressional

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Ainsworth, Scott, and Itai Sened. 1993. The Role of Lobbyists: Entrepreneurs with Two

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1 This is simply a list of references taken from various books and articles I have published, and then updated with other references as they become useful in my research. Rather than remake it each time I keep a master bibliography. It can be useful for others, so I make it available. In this spirit, please do not mis-use it or plagiarize it. Note that some articles listed as “forthcoming” may have appeared in the time since I prepared this bibliography. There may also be errors or incomplete citations; if you find such things please email me at [email protected] and I will make corrections. The bibliography is sorted automatically and may not be in perfectly correct alphabetical order.

Frank R. Baumgartner February 21, 2005

2

Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in

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3

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4

Axelrod, Donald. 1988. Budgeting for Modern Government. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

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5

Banaszak, Lee Ann. 1996. Why Movements Succeed and Fail: Opportunity, Culture and the

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Baumgartner, Frank R. 2002. Social Movements and the Rise of New Issues. Paper presented at

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Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 1996a. The Multiple Ambiguities of “Counteractive

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6

Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 1996b. Good Theories Deserve Good Data.


Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 1998. Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in

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Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 2001. Issue Niches and Policy Bandwagons:

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Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones, eds. 2002. Policy Dynamics. Chicago: University

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7

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Baumgartner, Frank R., Bryan D. Jones, and Michael C. MacLeod. 1997. It Doesn’t Get Any

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Baumgartner, Frank R., Bryan D. Jones, Glen S. Krutz, and Michael C. Rosenstiehl. 1997.

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8

Baumgartner, Frank, R., Bryan D. Jones, and Michael C. MacLeod. 1998. Policymaking,

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A Big Bibliography.

Documents

Transcript of A Big Bibliography.